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Competition Policy
-The Japanese experience-
24 March 2015
Hiroyuki ODAGIRI Commissioner
Japan Fair Trade Commission
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
• 1946-47 Dissolution of Zaibatsu – Liquidation of holding companies, e.g., Mitsui, Mitsubishi, and Sumitomo
• 1947 De-concentration Law – Splitting 11 companies, e.g., Nippon Steel, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
(both later re-merged), and Dainippon Beer (today’s Asahi & Sapporo)
• 1947 Act on Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair Trade (so-called Anti-Monopoly Act or AMA) – Most recent revision to come in force in April 2015
– July 1947: Start of Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) with the Chairman and 4 Commissioners
– JFTC General Secretariat with about 800 staff
History
Japan Fair Trade Commission
The Number of Staff and Budget of the JFTC
607
643 672
706
737 765
795 779 791 799 799
823
7,686 7,853 7,819
8,131 8,338 8,416
8,682
8,446
8,962 8,915 8,742 8,802
6,000
6,500
7,000
7,500
8,000
8,500
9,000
9,500
500
550
600
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
1000
FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008 FY2009 FY2010 FY2011 FY2012 FY2013
Number of staff
Budget
The Number of staff Budget [million yen]
The Number of Staff and Budget of JFTC
Transferred the Act against Unjustifiable Premiums and Misleading Representations to Consumer Affairs Agency
Including 12 lawyers and 3 economists as fixed-term members
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Surcharge Amount 5years-average (million yen)
Japan Fair Trade Commission
Enforcement
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
35000
40000
45000
1978 ~1983 ~1988 ~1993 ~1998 ~2003 ~2008 ~2013
Surcharge Amount 5years-average (million yen)
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Encouragement of Business activities
Private monopolization
Unreasonable restraint of trade
Unfair trade practices
Prohibition of behavior that falls under
violations
Assuring interests for general consumers
Development of a democratic and wholesome national
economy
Promotion of fair and free competition
Merger regulation
Prevention of excessive concentration of corporate
power
Stimulation of initiatives of enterprises
Heightening the level of employment and
people’s actual income
Objectives of the Antimonopoly Act (as stated in Article 1)
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Private monopolization
Unreasonable restraint of trade
Unfair trade practices
Merger regulationPreventive regulation
(prior notification is required)
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Any behavior that substantially restraints competition in any particular field of trade is prohibited.
Any behavior that tends to impede fair competition is prohibited.
Any merger that substantially restraints competition in any particular field of trade is prohibited.
Three Pillars
• Private monopolization (e.g. exclusion of competitors), • Unreasonable restraint of trade = Hard-core cartel (e.g. price fixing, output
restriction, market division, bid rigging)
• Group boycotts, resale price restriction, unjust low price sales, trading on exclusive terms, interference with competitors’ transactions, abuse of superior bargaining position, etc.
Structure of the Antimonopoly Act
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Legal measures against violations of AMA
Conducts Legal Measures
Private Monopolization Cease and Desist Order Surcharge Payment Order Criminal Accusation
Unreasonable Restraint of Trade (Price fixing cartel /Bid-rigging, etc.)
Cease and Desist Order Surcharge Payment Order Criminal Accusation
Unfair Trade Practices Cease and Desist Order Surcharge Payment Order*
Anticompetitive Merger Cease and Desist Order
*Only certain types of Unfair Trade Practices
Japan Fair Trade Commission
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
The JFTC’s Priorities
○ Promotion of international cooperation to cope with globalized business activities
○ Enhancement of advocacy activities to improve competitive environment
○ Strict and expeditious enforcement against price-fixing cartels and bid riggings that have significant impacts on peoples' lives
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Recent cases ○ Bid rigging (public projects) - Engineering works and paving works ordered by the Chiba Prefecture (February 2014) - Snow-Melting equipment engineering works for Hokuriku Shinkansen ordered by the Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency (Filing criminal accusation: March 2014) ○ Bid rigging (private business projects) - Electricity transmission line works ordered by TEPCO (Tokyo Electric Power Co., Inc.) and KEPCO (Kansai Electric Power Co., Inc.) (TEPCO: December 2013, KEPCO: January 2014) - Low temperature air conditioning system work (January 2015) ○ Price cartels - Manufacturers of high-fructose corn syrup and manufactures of starch syrup and glucose (June 2013) - Steel ball manufacturers (September 2014) ○ International cartels - Automotive parts (November 2012) - EU, US, Canada - Industrial machinery bearings and automotive bearings (March 2013) - EU, US - International ocean shipping services for automobiles (March 2014) - EU ,US
Bid rigging, price-fixing cartels
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
○ Recent cases of the abuse of superior bargaining position, causing undue losses to smaller companies (e.g., suppliers) - A supermarket in Hokkaido (July 2013) Forced purchase Request for dispatch of employees Request for payment of monetary contribution
- A discount store in Kyusyu (June 2014) Request for dispatch of employees Request for payment of monetary contribution
- Investigation is also made by the ‘Task Force on Abuse of Superior Bargaining
Position’ to effect fast remedies (warnings issued in 58 cases in FY2013 )
Unfair trade practices : Abuse of superior bargaining position
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
• International cartels – Cartel among firms based in different countries – Collaboration of agencies is needed across countries
• International division of labor – Procurement, manufacturing, and sales across borders – Which jurisdiction should take action? – How to prevent duplication of sanctions?
• International (cross-border) mergers – How to coordinate reviews across different jurisdictions? – How to coordinate remedies?
Globalization and competition policy
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Case1. Marin Hose Japan Fair Trade Commission
On-the-spot inspection
May 7,2007 (Coordination with: DOJ, EC, etc.)
Date of order February 22, 2008
Violators (location/ cease and desist order/surcharge payment order)
Bridgestone Corporation (Japan/✓/2,380,000yen), Dunlop Oil & Marine Limited (UK/✓/-), Trelleborg Industries SAS (France/✓/-), Parker ITR S.r.l. (Italy/✓/-), Manuli Rubber Industries S.p.A (Italy/✓/-), Yokohama Rubber Co. (Japan/-/-), Comital Brands S.p.A(Italy/-/-), Manuli Oil & Marine (USA) INC.(U.S./-/-)
Case Summary The violators substantially restrained competition in the field of trade of specified marine hose ordered by customers located in Japan, by jointly determining the Champion and ensuring that the Champion would receive the orders.
Feature First case that JFTC took the cease and desist order against overseas company
International market allocation case
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Case2. Wire Harness Japan Fair Trade Commission
On-the-spot inspection
February 24, 2010 (Coordination with DOJ, EC, etc.)
Date of order January 19,2012 Violators (location/ cease and desist order/surcharge payment order)
Yazaki Corporation(Japan/✓/9,607,130,000yen) Sumitomo Electric Industries Ltd.(Japan/-/2,102,220,000yen) Fujikura Ltd.(Japan/✓/1,182,320,000yen) Furukawa Electric Co., Ltd.(Japan/-/-)
Illegal conducts
The violators substantially restrained competition in the field of automotive wire harness and related products ordered by automobile manufacturers (Toyota, Daihatsu, Honda, Nissan and Subaru) by jointly designating winning bidders and collaborating to have them win the biddings.
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Case3. Automotive Parts Japan Fair Trade Commission
On-the-spot inspection July 2011(Coordination with DOJ etc.)
Date of order November 22,2012
Illegal conducts The violators substantially restrained competition in the field of each of the following products ordered by the automobile company, by jointly designating successful bidders and collaborating to have them win the biddings.
Products Automobile companies Violators
Generators Honda Mitsubishi, Denso Suzuki Mitsubishi, Hitachi Automotive , Hitachi, Denso
Starters Honda Mitsuba, Mitsubishi, Denso Suzuki Mitsubishi, Hitachi Automotive, Hitachi, Denso
Windshield wiper systems
Suzuki Mitsuba, Denso Nissan Mitsuba, Denso Fuji (Subaru) Mitsuba, Denso
Radiators and electrical fans
Honda T.RAD, Denso Fuji (Subaru) Calsonic Kansei, Denso
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Wire Harness case, Automotive Parts case + Headlamps and Rear Combination Lamps case + Bearing case
Japan Fair Trade Commission
Wire Harness
Bearing
Headlamp
Generator
Starter
Windshield Wiper system
Radiator Electrical Fan
Rear Combination
Lamp
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
On-the-spot inspection
September 6, 2012 (Coordination with DOJ etc.)
Date of order March 18, 2014
Violators (location/ cease and desist order/surcharge payment order)
Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (Japan/✓/13,101,070,000yen) Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha, Ltd.(Japan/✓/5,698,390,000yen) Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics, AS(Norway/✓/3,495,710,000yen) Nissan Motor Car Carrier Co. Ltd. (Japan/✓/423,310,000yen) Mitsui O.S.K Lines, Ltd. (Japan/-/-)
Illegal conducts
(1) The violators fixed freight rate and/or colluded freight rate quotations to submit to consignors among those who have trade with the same consignors; and (2) refrained from bidding against one another for the purpose of securing incumbent trades.
Case4. International Ocean Shipping
Ocean Route Violators North American Route NYK LINE, “K”LINE,WWL and MOL European Route NYK, “K”LINE,WWL,NMCC and MOL Middle and Near Eastern Route NYK, “K”LINE and MOL Oceanian Route NYK, “K”LINE and MOL
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
おs D
A C
Consignors (Automobile companies and trading companies
located in Japan)
(1) The Violators fixed freight rates and/or colluded freight rate quotations to submit to consignors among the violators who have trade with the same consignors at negotiating with the consignors.
Violators
(2) The Violators refrained from bidding against one another for the purpose of securing the incumbent trades.
Don`t submit lower freight rates than mine to Automobile Company Y.
Sure.
A
B C O.K.
①Requests for freight rate quotations
②Negotiation between violators and consignors
③Decision on freight rates
Why don’t we submit the same freight rates as last year to Automobile Companies X?
The Violators agreed to mutually refrain from contending for customers by not offering lower freight rates and to raise or maintain freight rates.
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Case5. Cathode Ray Tubes (case of international division of labor)
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On-the-spot inspection
November 8, 2007 (Coordination with :DOJ, EC, etc)
Date of order October 7, 2009 Violators (location/ cease and desist order/surcharge payment order)
MT Picture Display Co.,Ltd.(Japan/✓/-) ,MT Picture Display (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd. (Malaysia/-/650,830,000 yen) , PT. MT Picture Display Indonesia(Indonesia/-/580,270,000 yen), MT Picture Display (Thailand) Co., Ltd. (Thailand/-/566,140,000 yen), Samsung SDI Co., Ltd.(Korea/✓/-), Samsung SDI (Malaysia) BERHAD(Malaysia/-/1,373,620,000 yen), LG Philips Displays Korea Co., Ltd.(Korea/-/151,380,000 yen) , P.T. LP Displays Indonesia(Indonesia/-/932,680,000yen), Chunghwa Picture Tubes Co. Ltd.(Taipei/-/-), Chunghwa Picture Tubes (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd.(Malaysia/-/-) , Thai CRT Co. Ltd(Thailand/-/-)
Case Summary The violators substantially restrained competition in the field of sales of the specified CRTs , by jointly setting minimum target prices to sell to overseas manufacturing subsidiaries of the Japanese TV manufacturing and sales companies.
Feature
First case that JFTC took surcharge payment order against overseas company
Difficulties in enforcement process for foreign enterprises
Japan Fair Trade Commission Suppliers of the CRTs for Television Customers for the CRTs for Television
Japanese manufacturing and sales companies of CRT televisions
Violators (5 Parent Companies) : companies manufacturing and selling
the CRTs for television located in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan etc.
Overseas manufacturing subsidiaries of Japanese manufacturing and sales companies
of CRT televisions (manufacturing base of the CRT televisions
located in Southeast Asia )
Violators (6 Subsidiaries) (manufacturing base of the CRTs
for Television located in Southeast Asia )
Instruct the purchase price decided by ②
①Jointly set minimum target prices
for CRTs for Television among the violators
③Instruct the sale price decided by ②
④Sale of the CRTs for Television at the price
instructed by ③
②Negotiations for the prices for the CRTs for Television, based on the
price decided by ①
【 Indonesia, Singapore, Thai, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia 】 In the Southeast Asia 19
⑤Sell the CRT televisions
Japan Fair Trade Commission
International M&A cases
○ Semiconductor-manufacturing equipment (May 2013; approved with remedies)
ASML US Inc. - Cymer Inc.
- US, Korea
○ Hard disk drive (December 2011; approved with remedies)
Western Digital Ireland, Ltd. - Viviti Technologies Ltd.
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. - Seagate Technology International
- US, Korea, EU
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Policy Recommendation and Advocacy -As “a pair of wheels” with law enforcement-
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Advocacy activities 1 – Electricity market Japan Fair Trade Commission
The Cabinet decision instructed the JFTC to show its view from the standpoint of competition policy in light of the current situation that
i) “GEUs (general electricity utilities, like TEPCO) have the market power, while PPSs (power producers and suppliers) face difficulties in increasing their market share” and
ii) “there has been no competition among the GEUs beyond their respective service areas, and large-scale users cannot purchase electricity in a single contract covering the entire country.
“Policy on Regulatory and Institutional Reform in the Energy Sector” The Cabinet decision (April 3, 2012)
JFTC’s points of view - Are the purposes of regulations reasonable? - Are the contents and methods of regulations well-designed? - Inquiry into the characteristics of the electricity market and the enterprises’ behavior
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Japan Fair Trade Commission Proposals for the electricity market from competition policy
(September 2012) The JFTC suggests; ○ Promotion of incentives for enterprises - Independence of GEU’s retail units from the generation/wholesale units - Securing accessibility to and neutrality of GEU’s transmission and
distribution units ○ Securing appropriate terms and conditions for the use of facilities and
services provided by the monopolistic suppliers ○ Infrastructure improvements, bargaining power disparity in retail sectors,
etc.
Step 1: Expanding use of the nationwide grid (by 2015)
Step 2: Liberalization of the
retail electricity sector (by 2016)
Step 3: Legal separation between electricity generators and
distributors, and abolishing retail price regulations
(by 2020) (under discussion)
Government reform plan is in progress
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
○ Difficulty in balancing child-raising and working is one of the factors for the declining birth rate
○ A large number of children are on a waiting list for childcare facilities ○ Childcare is one of “sectors which could become the driving force of
growth as vast new markets” (Japan Revitalization Strategy, June 2013)
Study Report on Childcare Sector (June 2014)
Advocacy activities 2 – Childcare Sector
In the Report, JFTC proposes; ○ Promotion of new entry of diverse businesses into the market ○ Impartiality in subsidy systems and taxation systems ○ Enhanced information disclosure and third-party evaluation ○ Enhancement of additional services
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Intellectual Property Rights and Competition Policy
- Another challenge -
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
• Antimonopoly Act “shall not apply to such acts recognizable as the exercise of rights under … the Patent Act” and other IPR Acts (Article 21).
• However, “any act that may seem to be an exercise of a right cannot
be ‘recognizable as the exercise of the rights’ provided for in the aforesaid Article 21, provided that it is found to deviate from or run counter to the intent and objectives of the intellectual property systems, which are, namely, to motivate entrepreneurs to actualize their creative efforts and make use of technology” (JFTC, Guidelines for the Use of
Intellectual Property under the Antimonopoly Act, 2007).
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Japan Fair Trade Commission
• Pachinko Machine Patent Pool Case (1997) – 10 dominant incumbent firms formed a patent pool,
which refused to license the patents to new entrants.
– Violation of AMA’s prohibition of private monopolization
Patent Pool
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
• Effective in preventing royalty stacking and reducing transaction costs
• However, it should not be used for anti-competitive purposes, e.g., to collude on product prices or to deter entry
Japan Fair Trade Commission
• Standards are now indispensable for compatibility – E.g., 250 standards are involved in laptop computer
• Firms form ‘consortium’ or ‘forum’ to agree on standards. – They should not promote collusion in product markets
• Participating firms are supposed to offer license of their standard essential patents (SEPs) on a FRAND basis – What to do with non-participating firms? – How to decide an FRAND rate? – Recent private litigation case in Japan: Samsung vs. Apple
Standard Setting
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Surcharge
Criminal Investigative
power
Base rate: 6% Raising base rate : 10%
Repeat offense : add 50%
Offense leader : add 50%
Leniency program Revising leniency program
Expanding target conduct
Expanding target conduct
Criminal investigative power
Raising maximum jail term
Exclusive right for criminal accusation
Hearing procedure
Recommendation system
Abolition of recommendation
system
Prior procedure
Ex ante hearing procedure
Ex post hearing procedure
Procedures for hearing
prior to Final Administrative
Orders Abolition of
ex post hearing procedure
Consideration of Reform of
hearing procedure
Making Prior Procedure more sufficient and transparent
Before 2005 amendment
2005 amendment 2009 amendment 2013 amendment (unenforced)
Japan Fair Trade Commission
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Japan Fair Trade Commission
Current procedure New procedure Investigation
by JFTC
Notification by JFTC (expected content of order,
etc.)
Explanation by Investigators (expected content of order, fact finding, evidence, etc.)
Procedures for hearing opinion
(presided over by an officer designated by JFTC)
Supreme Court
Tokyo District Court
Tokyo High Court
Cease and desist order/ surcharge payment order
questions from recipient
Presentation of opinions (oral/written) and offer of
evidence by recipient
Commission meeting
Investigation by JFTC
Opportunity for recipients to express opinions and
offer evidence
Notification by JFTC (expected content of
order, etc.)
JFTC Explanation (expected content of order,
fact-finding, evidence, etc.)
Commission meeting
Supreme Court
Tokyo High Court
Hearing procedure for administrative appeal
Cease and desist order/ Surcharge payment order
Outline of Revision
Appeal procedures Introduction of trial at the District
Court
Only Tokyo District Court has jurisdiction over the appeal suit pertaining to the cease and desist order/surcharge payment order as the court of first instance (ensuring expertise in the court).
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Setting a panel of five judges will be allowed in Tokyo High Court when the court hears the case.
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Abolition of the substantial evidence rule and restriction on offering new evidence
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Procedures prior to issuing final orders Improving sufficiency and
transparency of the procedure
Inspection and copy of evidence that proves facts found by JFTC will be sanctioned
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Introduction of the procedures for hearing presided over by an officer designated by JFTC
○
Asking of questions and oral presentation of opinions will be allowed in the procedures for hearing ○
Note: The recipient will be allowed to copy only its own property and the written statements of its employees.
Abolition of hearing procedure for administrative appeal
Addressing the criticism that JFTC plays the role of both prosecutor and judge in the current JFTC hearing procedures
Panel of three judges hears the case in Tokyo District Court (a five-judge panel may be set).
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Procedures prior to final
administrative order
Appeal procedures
JFTC
The court
procedures prior to final
administrative order
Appeal procedures
Court
Inspection of evidence and copying recipient’s
own property and
written statements
of its employees
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