competing for consultation: civil society and conflict between the european commission and the...

This article was downloaded by: [University of North Texas]On: 12 November 2014, At: 10:29Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH,UK

West European PoliticsPublication details, including instructions for authorsand subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

Competing for consultation: Civilsociety and conflict between theEuropean Commission and theEuropean ParliamentPieter BouwenPublished online: 15 Mar 2007.

To cite this article: Pieter Bouwen (2007) Competing for consultation: Civil societyand conflict between the European Commission and the European Parliament, WestEuropean Politics, 30:2, 265-284, DOI: 10.1080/01402380701239715

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380701239715

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all theinformation (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform.However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, orsuitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressedin this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not theviews of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content shouldnot be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions,claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilitieswhatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connectionwith, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes.Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly

http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fwep20

http://www.tandfonline.com/action/showCitFormats?doi=10.1080/01402380701239715

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01402380701239715

forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Competing for Consultation: CivilSociety and Conflict betweenthe European Commissionand the European Parliament

PIETER BOUWEN

This article investigates how informal rules in the European Union change in the periodsbetween formal treaty revisions. On the basis of a case study on the White Paper onGovernance presented by the European Commission in July 2001, it shows howinstitutional change is driven by conflict between the Commission and the EuropeanParliament. The conflict concerns the development of informal rules to structure theinteraction of the Commission and the Parliament with Europe’s civil society. Theinteraction with civil society organisations is very important for the EU bodies becauseit allows them to acquire resources that are indispensable in order to fulfil and expandtheir organisational role. An additional aim of this article is to examine how theseinstitutional developments might influence the long-term development of formal treatyrules.

The aim of this article is to contribute to the new literature on the dynamicsof EU institutional change by focusing on the process of change in informalrules during the period between formal treaty revisions (Hix 2002; Farrelland Heritier 2003; Lindner and Rittberger 2003; Stacey and Rittberger2003). However, it seeks not only to understand how informal rules changeduring the interstices between treaty revisions, but also how these interstitialinstitutional changes influence the long-term development of formal treatyrules. In particular, the article addresses an important bias in the existingliterature. So far this literature has almost exclusively dealt with informalinstitutional change regarding the structuring of direct inter-organisationalrelations between the EU bodies: the European Parliament, the Council andthe European Commission. The study of the numerous bi- and trilateralaccords between the European Commission and the European Parliamentare a good example (Stacey 2003). However, no attention has been paid so

Correspondence Address: [email protected]

West European Politics,Vol. 30, No. 2, 265 – 284, March 2007

ISSN 0140-2382 Print/1743-9655 Online ª 2007 Taylor & Francis

DOI: 10.1080/01402380701239715

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

far to the creation of informal rules that regulate the interaction of the EUbodies with civil society and the inter-organisational relations with respectto these interactions.

In order to address this gap, this article investigates a number of concreteproposals in the Commission’s White Paper on Governance of July 2001designed to improve the involvement of European civil society in the policy-making process. The case study on the White Paper shows that theseproposals can be viewed as proposals for informal institutional change. Thestudy is based on a detailed analysis of the White Paper and a number ofdirectly related documents and describes the inter-organisational conflictbetween the European Commission and the European Parliament as a resultof the Commission’s proposals in the White Paper.

By seeking to understand this inter-organisational conflict, the article alsocontributes to the literature dealing with the inter-organisational powerstruggle at the EU level. This literature studies the ways in which theEuropean Commission, the European Parliament and the Council arecompeting for power at the EU level. Important examples of the former arethe perpetual conflict between the EU bodies over comitology (Bucker et al.1996: 63; Hix 2000: 62) and the inter-organisational disputes settled throughlitigation in the European Court of Justice (McCown and Jun 2003).Finally, it is important to point out that in order to develop a fullunderstanding of the inter-organisational conflict analysed here, ideas andinsights will be borrowed from scholarship on European interest representa-tion (Bouwen 2002; 2004).

The next two sections seek to present some theoretical insights withregard to informal institutional change, the first of which focuses on inter-organisational conflict and the second on European interest representation.This is followed by an overview of the different rules (formal/informal orgeneral/specific) that govern the consultation with civil society organisationsat the European level. The subsequent section presents an empirical analysisof the rules that were proposed in the White Paper to structure theconsultation by the EU bodies of European civil society organisations,based on the theoretical considerations developed earlier. The followingsection seeks to understand the outcome of the inter-organisational conflictthat arose between the Commission and the Parliament over thedevelopment of informal rules. The article concludes with an investigationof the impact these interstitial informal rules might have on subsequenttreaty revisions.

Informal Institutional Change and Inter-Organisational Conflict

The European Union’s constitutional structure and policy-making processescannot be understood by only studying the formal member state decisions inthe context of inter-governmental conferences. In the past, many studiesfocused almost entirely on the analysis of the formal treaty-based

266 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

institutions or rules, without paying attention to the specific dynamics ofinformal institutions or rules. This article, in contrast, argues that informalrules play an important role because they specify the formal treaty texts thatare frequently vague and incomplete. Treaty texts can be considered asincomplete contracts which do not cover all contingencies and thereforeneed to be specified through the creation of new informal rules (Ayres andGertner 1992; Tirole 1999).

Informal rules are not the result of a legislative process at the EU level ora ratification process by the member states. They can take different formssuch as customs, routines or various procedural rules that are often theresult of informal bargaining between the different EU bodies outside of thenormal legislative procedures. Another crucial distinction between formaland informal rules is that informal rules are not subject to third-partydispute resolution. In contrast, formal rules are legally enforceable by athird-party judicial body. In the European Union, third-party legaloversight takes place via the European Court of Justice, which possessesthe authority to issue binding legal sanctions. Examples of such informalinstitutions are the inter-organisational agreements analysed by Lindner(2003) or the various informal procedures established around the co-decision process studied by Shackleton and Raunio (2003).

Formal and informal rules are a potential source of inter-organisationalconflict. Since rules can affect the distribution of policy-making powers, theEU bodies compete to bring about their preferred versions of them.Winning or losing the inter-organisational contest over institutions mightreallocate power among the different EU bodies and thereby change theinstitutional status quo. This occurs in the EU’s formal as well as informalspheres. Several variables may affect the relative power of the EU bodies toinfluence the outcome of the inter-organisational bargaining process overformal or informal rules. Farrell and Heritier (2003) distinguish variablessuch as time horizon and sensitivity to failure.1 First, EU bodies havedifferent priorities for policy-making. A shorter time horizon makes an EUbody vulnerable to pressure from a body that takes a longer view. Second,some EU bodies are less affected by the failure of specific policy-makinginitiatives than others. It allows them to make credible threats with regard tothese policy-making initiatives.

Civil Society Consultation and Inter-Organisational Conflict

This article addresses a bias in the new literature on the dynamics of formaland informal institutional change in the EU. This new literature oninstitutional change has almost exclusively dealt with formal and informalinstitutional change regarding the structuring of direct inter-organisationalrelations between the European Parliament, the Council and the EuropeanCommission. No attention has been paid so far to the creation of formaland informal rules that regulate the interaction of the EU institutions with

Competing for Consultation 267

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

civil society.2 The great majority of studies has investigated the creation andchange of informal institutions that govern the direct relations between theParliament and the Council (Farrell and Heritier 2003; Lindner 2003). Forexample, Lindner wishes to explain why informal institutions that structurethe direct relations between the Council and the Parliament do not alwaysbecome formalised. Inter-institutional relations with the European Commis-sion have been much less studied. An exception is Stacey (2003), who studieshow the Commission is involved in numerous bi- and trilateral accords withthe European Parliament. The role of Europe’s civil society in the EU’sinter-institutional relations has been absent from the new research agenda.

However, the battle for competencies does not only take place with regardto the development of rules that dictate direct inter-organisational relations.The rules that structure the interaction of the EU bodies with civil societyorganisations are also crucial in the inter-organisational power struggle. EUbodies are eager to interact intensively with civil society organisationsbecause they need these close contacts. The continuous interaction with civilsociety organisations allows the EU bodies to acquire resources that areindispensable in order to fulfil and expand their organisational role (Bouwen2002: 269). It follows that European interest group activity cannot beregarded as a unidirectional activity of the civil society organisations vis-a-vis the EU bodies. EU bodies are also eager to interact with civil society inorder to obtain important resources. It is therefore appropriate to conceiveof the relationship between the civil society organisations and the EU bodiesas an exchange relationship between two groups of interdependentorganisations (Bouwen 2002: 368).

The exchange models developed by sociologists in the 1960s for the studyof inter-organisational relationships constitute an interesting starting pointfor the analysis of the interaction between civil society and the EU bodies(Levine and White 1961: 587; Blau 1964). Some authors have already –either implicitly (Greenwood et al. 1992) or explicitly (Buholzer 1998; Pappiand Henning 1999) – used exchange theories to study European interestintermediation. According to these theories, the interaction of Europeaninterest groups and the EU bodies can be conceptualised as a series of inter-organisational exchanges. These models are closely related to the resourcedependence perspective of Pfeffer and Salancik (1978). Whereas boththeoretical approaches emphasise the importance for organisations toexchange resources, resource dependency focuses more closely on theensuing interdependence between the interacting organisations (Pfeffer 1997:63). In the context of the EU policy-making process, civil societyorganisations and the EU bodies become interdependent because theyprovide each other with resources.

In return for providing the civil society organisations with access to theEU agenda-setting and policy-making process, the EU bodies wantresources that are useful to fulfil their role in the EU policy-making process:expertise and legitimacy (Bouwen 2002: 369–71). These two resources play a

268 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

crucial role in the inter-organisational power struggle between the EUbodies. When a specific EU body obtains a substantial amount of high-quality expertise through its intense interaction with civil society organisa-tions, this might lead to a situation of asymmetric information vis-a-vis theother EU bodies. The EU body concerned can exploit this informationaladvantage to realise its preferred outcome in day-to-day EU decision-making and to improve its position in the inter-organisational battle forcompetencies. However, not only more expertise, but also an increase in theoverall legitimacy of that body can strengthen its inter-organisationalposition in the policy-making process. Indeed, broad consultation of civilsociety organisations can contribute to the improvement of the legitimacy ofthe concerned EU body (Bouwen 2006).

A Commission discussion paper from January 2000 explicitly points at theimportance of expertise and legitimacy as the rationale behind the existingco-operation between the European Commission and non-governmentalorganisations.3 Its author, Jerome Vignon, also chairman of the GovernanceTeam that prepared the White Paper in July 2001, confirmed the crucial rolefor the Commission of expert knowledge and legitimacy in the EU policy-making process.4 In particular, he emphasised that these resources areindispensable for the Commission to successfully fulfil and expand itsleadership role at the European level. According to Vignon, the proposals inthe White Paper were aimed at strengthening the position of the EuropeanCommission vis-a-vis the other EU bodies. Improving the interaction withcivil society organisations is indispensable for the Commission’s efforts toimprove its legitimacy and capitalise on its knowledge position. The inter-organisational battle in Europe is not only fought through direct informalinstitution-building among the EU bodies, but also through the developmentof formal or informal rules that structure the interaction of the different EUbodies with civil society organisations.

Formal and Informal Rules on Consultation

The traditional discussion with regard to the development of formal andinformal rules that govern the consultation of European civil society can beillustrated by the arguments proposed by the European Commission in itscommunication on consultation from December 2002.5 The Commissionexplained that a legally binding approach to consultation, i.e. the creation offormal rules, is to be avoided for two reasons. First, the Commission arguedthat a clear dividing line must be drawn between consultations launched onthe Commission’s own initiative prior to the adoption of a proposal, and thesubsequent formalised and compulsory decision-making process accordingto the Treaties. Second, it suggested the need to avoid challenges tolegislative proposals in the European Courts, on the grounds that there wasan alleged lack of consultation of interested parties. The Commission fearedthat such an overly legalistic approach would be incompatible with the need


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

for the timely delivery of policy, and with the expectations of citizens thatthe EU bodies should deliver on substance rather than concentrate onprocedures.

These arguments aid an understanding of the emphasis on thedevelopment of informal rules on consultation and the limited extent towhich these rules have become formalised over time. In addition, theyexplain why existing formal rules mostly have a sector-specific rather than ageneral scope; this limits applicability. The general and specific rules onconsultation are analysed in the next two sections.

The General Rules on Consultation: More Informal than Formal

With the White Paper on Governance of July 2001, the EuropeanCommission attempted to devise a set of general rules to govern theconsultation of European civil society.6 It is the most recent attempt tostructure the interaction with Europe’s civil society (Lehmann and Bosche2003). Previously, in 1993, the European Commission produced acommunication on ‘An open and structured dialogue between theCommission and special interest groups’.7 This document discussed thesituation of interest representation at the EU level and proposed someguiding principles to define the relations between the Commission andinterest groups. Because these principles were part of a Commissioncommunication, they were informal rules that had no legal basis. In July1996, after years of discussion, the European Parliament had adopted itsrules on lobbying in the European Parliament (McLaughlin and Greenwood1995; Schaber 1998: 215). These rules are the cornerstone of the Parliament’spolicy to regulate the interaction between Members of the EuropeanParliament and private interests. However, these rules are part of theParliament’s internal Rules of Procedure.8 Because they are not the objectsof normal EU legislation, they remain informal and are not legallyenforceable by a third-party judicial body.

There is one important exception to the informal nature of the generalrules on consultation. The protocol on the application of the principle ofsubsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam statesin point 9: ‘Without prejudice to its right of initiative, the Commissionshould – except in case of particular urgency or confidentiality – consultwidely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate, publishconsultation documents.’ All protocols are considered to enjoy the legalstatus of primary legislation and to be an integral part of the EC Treaty.9

Because of the limited scope and the vagueness of the protocol, the impactof this formal rule on consultation has remained rather low. It can beconcluded that with the important exception of the provision in point 9 ofthe Amsterdam protocol, the bulk of general rules aimed at regulating thebehaviour of civil society organisations in their relations with the EU bodiesare of an informal and non-binding nature.

270 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

The Formal Nature of Specific Rules on Consultation

The development of general rules should be distinguished from efforts overrecent decades to govern relationships between specific EU organisationsand private interests in particular policy sectors. Probably one of the bestknown examples is the establishment of the social dialogue that creates alegal framework for the relations between the social partners and theEuropean Commission in the area of EU social policy. These proceduresorganise the participation of management and labour in European socialpolicy-making and were created by the Social Agreement added to theMaastricht Treaty. Subsequently, the Amsterdam Treaty enshrined theseformal rules as primary EU legislation in the EC Treaty (Articles 138 and139 of the EC Treaty). Another example of primary legislation governingrelations between the Commission and the social partners is Article 130 inthe employment title of the EC Treaty. This article established theEmployment Committee, which consults management and labour. A similarcommittee was provided for by Article 147 of the EC Treaty. Thecommittee, composed of representatives of governments, trade unions andemployers’ organisations, assists the European Commission with themanagement of the European Social Fund.

Formal provisions that establish rules for the consultation of Europeancivil society organisations are found in secondary EU legislation as well as inthe EU Treaties. Examples include the ‘tripartite advisory committees’ in thesocial policy sector composed of government representatives, trade unionrepresentatives and employer representatives (Smismans 2004a; 2004b). TheAdvisory Committee for Safety, Hygiene and Health Protection at Work,for example, was created in 1974 by a Council Decision.10 In addition, othertripartite committees advise on policy in the field of free movement ofworkers11 and social security for migrant workers.12 In other policy areas,formal committees have been established on the basis of Commissiondecisions in order to shape the interaction of the Commission with privateinterests (Falke 1996: 156). Early in 1990, for example, the Consumers’Consultative Council was set up to enable the Commission to hear the viewsof organisations representing consumer interests.13 In December 1993, TheCommission established a General Consultative Forum on the Environmentin which, among others, environmental and consumer interests canparticipate.14 An overview of numerous other formal and structuredconsultative bodies in which private interests can participate can be foundin the CONECCS database managed by the Secretariat-General of theEuropean Commission.15

The White Paper on Governance

A detailed analysis of the White Paper on Governance allows us tounderstand better how informal general rules have developed covering


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

consultation with civil society. In early 2000, the European Commissionidentified the reform of European governance as one of its strategicobjectives. To that effect, the Commission issued a communication in July2001 that became known as the White Paper on European Governance.16 Inthe communication, the Commission defines ‘governance’ as the rules,processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised atthe European level, particularly as regards openness, participation,accountability, effectiveness and coherence.

The White Paper contains proposals for change in four specific areas:improving the involvement in shaping and implementing EU policy,improving the quality and enforcement of EU policies, redefining theEU’s contribution to global governance, and re-examining the role of theEU bodies. In this article, I focus on the Commission proposals designed toimprove the involvement of European civil society in the EU policy-makingand implementation process. These proposals are non-sector-specific andconcern general rules to structure the interaction between the EU bodies andEuropean civil society organisations. More particularly, I investigate theproposals that were presented with the aim of improving the interaction ofcivil society organisations with the European Commission and, to a lesserextent, with the European Parliament.

Informal Institutional Change

The Commission’s White Paper proposals can be considered as an attemptto exert informal influence (Stacey 2003).17 They seek to foster informalinstitutional change with the aim of increasing the Commission’s relativepower vis-a-vis the other EU bodies. Because the proposals take the form ofa Commission communication, they lack a formal foundation and are notbinding, as no enforcement is possible through third-party disputeresolution. In view of the lack of legal enforcement, the White Paperproposals are supposed to be implemented by the EU bodies, i.e. theCommission, the Parliament and, to a lesser extent, the Council of Ministersand European civil society organisations.

The Commission’s proposal builds on the rather limited formal treatybase governing relations between the EU bodies and European civilsociety. As noted above, the formal treaty base is restricted to the protocolon the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionalityannexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam (Point 9). The limited scope andvagueness of the protocol leave ample room for the EU bodies to developinformal rules specifying a framework for interaction with civil society.Even though attempts were made before the Treaty of Amsterdam todevelop informal rules governing the relationship with civil society (e.g.Commission communication 93/C63/02 discussed above), the scope anddetail of these rules remained limited and further elaboration was thereforeexpected.

272 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Conflict between the European Commission and the Parliament

The proposed changes in the institutional status quo provoked conflictbetween the European Commission and the Parliament as the resources and,consequently, the distribution of policy-making powers between both EUbodies could be affected. The Commission’s White Paper on Governancegenerated intense discussions. Not only the European Commission, theParliament and the Council participated in the debate, but EU advisorycommittees, such as the Economic and Social Committee and theCommittee of the Regions, were also involved. Since the most importantdisagreements on the White Paper arose between the European Commissionand the European Parliament, the following discussion concentrates on thisinter-organisational conflict.18

The original reform proposals of the European Commission. The WhitePaper contains concrete proposals to reorganise the interactions between theCommission and civil society organisations, which constitute commitmentsand obligations mainly for the Commission, but also for the civil societyorganisations.19 Table 1 gives an overview of the commitments andobligations on the part of the European Commission; Table 2 provides asummary of the obligations for civil society organisations.

The Commission’s proposals sought to improve the involvement ofEuropean civil society in two ways (Vignon 2003). First, the Commissionwished to broaden the existing consultation process. Widening the range ofconsulted civil society organisations would increase the overall legitimacy ofthe Commission’s policy actions. In particular, the Commission wanted toremedy the dominance of business interests in European interest politics by

TABLE 1

OBLIGATIONS ON THE PART OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

. The Commission aims at establishing a code of conduct that sets minimum standards,focusing on what to consult about, and when, whom and how to consult.

. In policy sectors, where consultative practices are already well established, the Commissionaims at developing more extensive partnership arrangements.

. The Commission is developing on-line consultation through the Interactive Policy-MakingInitiative.1

. The Commission intends to establish a comprehensive on-line database with details of thecivil society organisations active at the European level.

. The Commission will publish a review of the existing formal and structured consultativebodies.

Note: 1On 3 April 2001 the European Commission adopted a Communication on InteractivePolicy Making (IPM), which aims to improve governance by using the Internet for collectingand analysing reactions in the marketplace for use in the European Union’s policy-makingprocess. The initiative on IPM is one of the tools that should help the Commission to respondmore quickly and accurately to the demands of citizens, consumers and business.

Source: COM(2001) 428 final.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

increasingly including non-business or diffuse interests such as consumergroups, human rights groups and environmentalists.20 The White Paperproposed the establishment of minimum standards that would indicate whoshould be consulted and how; the development of on-line consultationthrough the Interactive Policy-Making Initiative; and the further elabora-tion of a comprehensive on-line database listing the different civil societyorganisations active at the European level.

Second, the Commission’s White Paper aimed to rationalise the existingconsultation process through a substantial reduction of the number ofparticipants and a strengthening of the existing contacts. The Commissionwanted to realise this objective through the establishment of partnershiparrangements that would intensify its interaction with a limited number ofpreferred consultation partners capable of providing high-quality expertise.Civil society organisations would have to fulfil a number of criteria relatingto their capacity to provide information, their internal structures andrepresentativeness in order to participate in the partnership arrangements.These criteria would impose strict obligations on the relevant civil societyorganisations. In comparison with these obligations, the new principles ofgood governance were rather weak.

Thus, three new obligations were crucial to reforming existing consulta-tion practices: 1) the introduction of minimum standards, 2) the establish-ment of partnership arrangements, and 3) the use of criteria ofacknowledgement. Whereas these three proposals constituted a genuineinnovation, the other proposals either elaborated or only marginallyimproved on existing practices.

The European Parliament disagrees with the reform proposals. The reactionof the European Parliament to the original Commission proposals wasprepared by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, with Sylvia-YvonneKaufmann, a German Member of the European Parliament, as rappor-teur.21 In the following paragraphs, a number of excerpts from theEuropean Parliament resolution on the Commission White Paper onEuropean Governance are used to illustrate disagreement with theCommission proposals.22

TABLE 2

OBLIGATIONS ON THE PART OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS

. The civil society organisations must themselves follow the principles of good governance, i.e.participation, accountability, openness, effectiveness and coherence.

. In return for participation in partnership arrangements, the civil society organisations haveto tighten up their internal structures, furnish guarantees of openness and representativity,and prove their capacity to provide information or lead debates in the member states.

Source: COM(2001) 428 final.

274 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

The European Parliament clearly felt threatened by the proposal for theextension of the Commission’s consultation activities with interested partiesand emphasised its unique role in the EU decision-making process:

consultation of interested parties . . . can only ever supplement and cannever replace the procedures and decisions of legislative bodies whichpossess democratic legitimacy; only the Council and the Parliament, asco-legislators, can take responsible decisions in the context oflegislative procedures. (EP resolution point 11 (b))

The Commission’s one-sided proposals to extend its consultation practiceswere implicitly criticised by the European Parliament, which pointed at thecentral role that should be played by the Economic and Social Committee forthe consultation of civil society, possibly in conjunction with the Commission:

an important mouthpiece for civil society is, by definition and inaccordance with its newly formulated role under Article 257 as amendedby the Treaty of Nice, the Economic and Social Committee, which hasadvisory status and which, as the law stands, may also be consulted bythe Council and Commission ‘in all cases in which they consider itappropriate’; early consultation of the Economic and Social Committeeby the Commission can be seen as a way of increasing participatorydemocracy at the Union level. (EP resolution point 11 (c))

. . . it would not be consistent with good governance for theCommission to set up groups of experts and delegate to them taskswhich could better be carried out by the ESC in that it is independentof the Commission. (EP resolution point 11 (d))

. . . in conjunction with the ESC, the Commission must findorganizational structures so that a procedure for consulting interestedparties can be conducted in a meaningful and efficient manner . . . (EPresolution point 11 (f))

Furthermore, the Parliament made clear its opposition to closer linksbetween the Commission and interested parties, in particular when theselinks take the form of ‘accredited organisations’ or organisations that havepartnership arrangements with the European Commission. The Parliamentexpected an additional level of bureaucracy:

however indispensable it may be to consult relevant groups andexperts when drafting legislative proposals in particular, it should notbe allowed to add a further level of bureaucracy, for instance in theform of ‘accredited organizations’ or ‘organizations with partnershipagreements’. (EP resolution point 11 (e))


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Nevertheless, the Parliament agreed with the establishment of minimumstandards for the consultation of interested parties. However, the creation ofthese standards should not be tied to specific commitments for the interestedparties, i.e. criteria of acknowledgement, since such criteria could threatenthe independence of civil society organisations. At all times, all interestedparties should be able to participate:

. . . following on from the suggestions made by the Commission andthe ESC, that an inter-institutional agreement on democraticconsultation be concluded committing all three institutions tocommonly agreed consultations standards and practices at the EUlevel; [the European Parliament] points out, however, with regard tothe independent role of many non-governmental organizations, thatthe creation of consultation standards must not be tied to any quid proquo on the part of organizations of civil society because independentand critical public opinion is essential for a vibrant democracy;confirms, however, that the democratic requirements placed on theCommunity regulatory process as regards accountability and trans-parency must also be apply to these organizations. (EP resolutionpoint 12)

In sum, whereas the Parliament agreed with the introduction of minimumstandards, the assembly clearly disagreed with the Commission regardingthe establishment of partnership arrangements with civil society organisa-tions and the use of criteria of acknowledgement.

The Commission’s amended version of the original proposals. As a result ofthe criticisms of the European Parliament and the remarks from the EUadvisory committees, the European Commission amended its originalproposals and issued a new communication: ‘Consultation document:Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dialogue – Proposal forgeneral principles and minimum standards for consultation of interestedparties’.23 In the introduction to the amended document, the EuropeanCommission took a defensive tone. In the first lines, the Commissionattempted to appease the European Parliament and the EU advisorycommittees. It immediately pointed to the crucial role of these organisationsin the consultative process:

Interaction between the European institutions and society takes placein various forms:– primarily through the European Parliament as the elected repre-

sentation of the European citizens;– through the institutionalized advisory bodies of the EU (Economic

and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions), based ontheir role according to the Treaties);

276 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

– and through less formalized direct contacts with interested parties.(COM (2002) 277 final)

Even though the importance of the dialogue between the EuropeanParliament and the civil society advisory bodies was recognised in the WhitePaper on Governance, it did not figure prominently in the originaldocument, as the Commission was primarily focusing on ways to improveits own consultation practices. This is clear in the amended paper, where theCommission strongly argued in favour of its own consultative role. In thisregard, the Commission explicitly referred to the legal base of itsconsultation practices as outlined in the protocol on the application of theprinciples of subsidiarity and proportionality annexed to the AmsterdamTreaty:

However, the essential role of these advisory bodies does not excludedirect contacts between the Commission and interest groups. In fact,wide consultation corresponds to the Commission’s duties accordingto the Treaties and contributes to putting forward sound proposals tothe legislature. This is fully in line with the European Union’s legalframework, which states that the Commission should . . . consultwidely before proposing legislation and, wherever appropriate, publishconsultation documents.24 (COM (2002) 277 final)

A number of innovative proposals were eliminated in the amended version.The Commission dropped its original proposals for the development ofpartnership arrangements and the establishment of specific obligations onthe part of the civil society organisations, i.e. the establishment of criteria ofacknowledgement. The only remaining obligation for civil society organisa-tions was respect for the general principles of good governance, which onlyconstitutes a weak commitment on their part. As a consequence, theobligations on the part of the civil society organisations were substantiallyreduced; the new communication almost exclusively consisted of obligationsfor the European Commission. A crucial obligation for the Commissionthat had not been eliminated was the development of minimum standards ofconsultation. Less innovative proposals such as the development of on-lineconsultation through the Interactive Policy-Making initiative or theestablishment of an on-line database with details of civil society organisa-tions active at the European level also survived in the new communication.

As a consequence of the substantial changes in the original Commissionproposal, only one of the two main goals of the White Paper were likely tobe attained. Whereas additional guarantees were established in order toensure a wide consultation process at the European level through minimumstandards, the Interactive Policy-Making initiative and the on-line database,it was unlikely that the rationalisation of the consultation process was goingto be successful. The main reason is that the partnership arrangements as


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

well as the criteria for acknowledgement were dropped in the newcommunication. Finally, it is important to point out that civil societyorganisations were invited to submit their reactions and comments to thenew communication. This round of consultations resulted in another versionof the communication,25 which is not analysed in the context of this articleon the inter-organisational struggle between the Commission and theParliament, as this communication is the result of the interaction betweenthe Commission and the civil society organisations.

The Outcome of the Inter-Organisational Conflict

With the White Paper on Governance, the European Commission made aproposal for informal institutional change in order to improve its position inthe EU inter-organisational competition for consultation. By widening andrationalising the consultation process, the Commission wanted to strengthenand improve its interaction with Europe’s civil society. The Commissionwould thereby increasingly be able to benefit from the resource exchangewith different civil society organisations. The ensuing informational advant-ages and increased legitimacy would improve the Commission’s position inthe inter-organisational battle for competencies. The European Parliament,however, felt threatened by the proposals to extend the Commission’sconsultation activities with interested parties, since they could lead to areallocation of power between the Parliament and the Commission, therebymodifying the institutional status quo. This explains the fierce reaction of thesupranational assembly to the original proposals of the White Paper.

The empirical study of the inter-organisational discussion between theCommission and the Parliament shows that the latter was able tosuccessfully amend the original version of the White Paper. A number ofthreatening features of the Commission proposals, such as the establishmentof partnership arrangements and criteria for acknowledgement, wereeliminated in the subsequent new communication. How can it be explainedthat the Parliament was able to successfully thwart the Commission’sinformal influence attempt? Two of the factors proposed by Farrell andHeritier (2003) seem to have played an important role. First, the sensitivityto failure was greater for the European Commission than for the EuropeanParliament. The White Paper on Governance was part of an orchestratedeffort to reform the European Commission (Bauer 2002). After the collectiveresignation of the Santer Commission in the spring of 1999, the new collegeof commissioners under the chairmanship of Romano Prodi engaged inextensive reforms in order to restore the confidence of the European publicand the other EU bodies in the European Commission. As a cornerstone ofthe Commission’s reform agenda, failure to secure the support of theParliament and the EU advisory committees for the White Paper wouldhave damaged the credibility of the entire reform process. The Parliamentwould have been much less affected by a failure of the White Paper. On the

278 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

contrary, it would have been a basis to criticise the European Commissionfurther, thereby extending its control over the already weakened suprana-tional organisation. If its proposals for amending the White Paper were nottaken into account, the Parliament could make credible threats to boycottthe Commission’s reform process.

Second, the different time horizons of the European Commission and theParliament are likely to have played an important role. In general,‘impatient’ actors who account the future highly will be in a weakerposition than actors that are relatively time-insensitive, because the formerwill be more vulnerable to others’ threats to delay policy issues. From theprevious discussion it has become clear that the White Paper was muchmore a priority for the Commission than for the Parliament. Inability topush through its reform agenda within an acceptable period of time wouldhave seriously harmed the Commission’s reform efforts. It follows that theCommission clearly had a shorter time horizon than the Parliament withregard to the White Paper on Governance. As has been pointed out byFarrell and Heritier (2003), shorter time horizons make actors vulnerable topressure from those that take a longer view. This helps explain thewillingness of the Commission to take the Parliament’s critical comments onthe White Paper fully into account.

Interstitial Informal Rules and Subsequent Treaty Revisions

Having investigated the causes of the inter-organisational conflict and itsmedium-term outcome for the development of informal general rules on EUinterest representation, a crucial question remains regarding the long-termdevelopment of formal general rules. To what extent will the informal rulesdeveloped during the interstices between treaty revisions influence theformal rules of subsequent treaty revision?

In this article, arguments have been presented that contribute to ourgeneral understanding of the limited formalisation over time of the informalrules on EU interest representation. Most importantly, a legally bindingapproach to consultation is avoided by the European Commission, becauselegislative proposals could then be challenged in the European Courts on theground of alleged lack of consultation. This would threaten the Commis-sion’s right of initiative and hamper the timely delivery of EU policies. Theimportant role played by the European Commission’s legal service inavoiding the formalisation of the proposed rules on consultation is oftenemphasised in this regard.

Since no treaty revisions have taken place since the discussion of the WhitePaper, its long-term impact in terms of formal rules cannot yet be assessed.The proposal for a ‘Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe’, as agreedby the heads of state and government in Brussels on 18 June 2004, could,however, be regarded as a proxy for future treaty change. An analysis of theConstitutional Treaty suggests that it has not been directly influenced by the


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

intensive debate between the Commission and the Parliament on the WhitePaper on Governance. The concrete rules proposed in the White Paperconcerning consultation are not formalised in the constitutional text. This isentirely in line with the traditional reticence at the EU level to formaliseexisting informal rules governing EU interest representation.

It could, however, be argued that the prior discussions on the White Paperhave put the issue of consultation more firmly on the agenda of futureconstitutional change.26 Whereas in the past, references to consultation inthe EC Treaty were limited to the protocol on the application of theprinciple of subsidiarity and proportionality, in the Constitutional Treatythe entire Article 47 is dedicated to the principle of participatory democracy(Smismans 2004a; 2004b). Moreover, the fact that this article is situatedunder Title VI, ‘The democratic life of the Union’, further reinforces itssignificance. It states that the Union bodies shall give representativeassociations the opportunity to make known and publicly exchange theirviews in all areas of Union action. Furthermore, it points out that the Unionbodies shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue withrepresentative associations and civil society and that the Commission shallcarry out broad consultation with parties concerned in order to ensure thatthe Union’s actions are coherent and transparent.

In addition, the new protocol in the Constitutional Treaty on theapplication of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality goes a stepfurther than the present one. In Article 2 it states:

Before proposing legislative acts, the Commission shall consult widely.Such consultations shall, where appropriate, take into account theregional and local dimension of the action envisaged. In case ofexceptional urgency, the Commission shall not conduct such consulta-tions. It shall give reasons for the decision in its proposal.

In contrast to the present protocol, there can be only exemptions in cases ofexceptional urgency, and also the regional and local dimension is mentioned.

Finally, while there has been no direct long-term impact of the inter-organisational struggle over the informal rules on EU interest representa-tion, the intense discussions between the Commission and the Parliamentare likely to have influenced the constitutional debate on the future ofEurope. The success of the White Paper discussions in affecting the formalrules of the subsequent treaty revision will, however, depend on the successof the ongoing ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty in the EUmember states.

Acknowledgements

The views expressed in this article are purely those of the author and maynot be regarded as stating the official position of the institution for which

280 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

the author is working. I am grateful to Ben Crum, Dirk Debievre, MargaretMcCown, Berthold Rittberger, Matilda Rotkirch, Stijn Smismans andFrederic Varone for comments on earlier versions of this article. In addition,I would like to thank Adrienne Heritier, Henry Farrell, Carl-FredrikBergstrom, Joseph Jupille and Leonor Moral Soriano for their interestingremarks during the Workshops on Contested Competences at the SwedishInstitute for European Policy Studies, Stockholm, October 2003 and at theRobert Schuman Centre of the European University Institute, Florence,May 2004.

Notes

1. For other factors explaining informal institutional change, see the overview provided by

Stacy and Rittberger (2003).

2. Even though there is no common or legal definition of the term ‘civil society organisation’,

the European Commission uses the term to refer to a broad range of organisations which

include: labour-market players; organisations representing social and economic players,

which are not social partners in the strict sense of the term; NGOs which bring people

together in a common cause, such as environmental organisations, human rights

organisations, charitable organisations, educational and training organisations, etc.; CBOs

(community-based organisations), e.g. youth organisations, family associations and all

organisations through which citizens participate in local and municipal life; religious

communities (see COM(2002) 277 final). This description corresponds to the analysis

developed by the Economic and Social Committee in its opinion ‘The Role and

Contribution of Civil Society in the Building of Europe’ (OJ C329, 17 November 1999,

p. 30).

3. Commission discussion paper: ‘The Commission and Non-governmental Organizations:

Building a Stronger Partnership’, COM(2000) 0011 final.

4. Interview with Jerome Vignon, Director, DG Employment and Social Affairs, Brussels, 5

May 2004.

5. Commission Communication: ‘Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and

Dialogue – General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested

Parties’, Brussels 11 December 2002, COM (2002) 704 final, p. 10.

6. The proposals in the White Paper on Governance were influenced by an interesting

discussion paper issued by the Commission in January 2000: ‘The Commission and Non-

governmental Organizations: Building a Stronger Partnership’. The Commission developed

some guidelines for best practice for consultation in this paper.

7. Commission communication (93/C63/02).

8. Rule of Procedure 9(2) and Annex IX Article 3.

9. Article 311 of the EC Treaty states that ‘The protocols annexed to this Treaty by common

accord of the Member States shall form an integral part thereof’.

10. Council Decision of 27 June 1974 on the setting up of an Advisory Committee on Safety,

Hygiene and Health Protection at Work, 74/325/EEC.

11. Council Regulation of 15 October 1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the

Community, 1612/68/EEC.

12. Council Regulation of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to

employed persons, to self-employed persons and to members of their families moving

within the Community, 1408/71EEC.

13. Commission Decision of 17 December 1989 setting up a Consumers’ Consultative Council,

90/55/EEC.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

14. Commission Decision of 7 December 1993 on the setting up of a General Consultative

Forum on the Environment, 93/701/EEC.

15. CONECCS database: http://europa.eu.int/comm/civil_society/coneccs/index_en.htm

16. European Governance, A White Paper. Brussels, 25 July 2001, COM(2001) 428 final.

17. Stacey (2003) has interpreted the White Paper proposals along the same lines.

18. For the reactions to the White Paper of the Council and the two EU advisory committees,

see: Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on European Governance – a White

Paper (CES 357/2002); Opinion of the Committee of the Regions of 13 March 2002 on the

White Paper on European Governance (CdR 102/2001 fin); Council resolution of 6

February 2003 on Social Inclusion – through social dialogue and partnership (OJ 2003/C

039/01).

19. European Governance, A White Paper. Brussels, 25 July 2001, COM(2001) 428

final.

20. It has indeed been shown in the literature on European interest politics that business

interest are much better represented in Brussels than other societal interests (Mazey and

Richardson 1999: 121).

21. Report of the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (FINAL A5-0399/2001) on the

Commission White Paper on European Governance (COM(2001)428 – C5-0454/2001 –

2001/2181(COS)).

22. European Parliament resolution on the Commission White Paper on European Governance

(COM(2001)428 – C5-0454/2001 – 2001/2181(COS)).

23. Commission Communication, Brussels 5 June 2002, COM (2002) 277 final.

24. Protocol (No. 7) on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality,

annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty.

25. Commission Communication: ‘Towards a Reinforced Culture of Consultation and

Dialogue – General Principles and Minimum Standards for Consultation of Interested

Parties’, Brussels 11 December 2002, COM (2002) 704 final.

26. Jerome Vignon, chairman of the Governance Team that prepared the White Paper in July

2001, is convinced that the discussions surrounding the White Paper have led to the

formalisation of the relation between the European Commission and civil society in the

proposed Constitutional Treaty (Interview with Jerome Vignon, Director, DG Employment

and Social Affairs, Brussels, 5 May, 2004).

References

Ayres, Ian, and Robert Gertner (1992). ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal

Choice of Legal Rules’, The Yale Law Journal, 101, 729–73.

Bauer, Michael (2002). ‘Reforming the European Commission – A (Missed) Academic

Opportunity’, European Integration Online Papers, 6:8.

Blau, Peter (1964). Exchange and Power in Social Life. New York, Sydney, London: John Wiley

& Sons, Inc.

Bouwen, Pieter (2002). ‘Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access’,

Journal of European Public Policy, 9:3, 365–90.

Bouwen, Pieter (2004). ‘Exchanging Access Goods for Access. A Comparative Study of

Business Lobbying in the EU Institutions’, European Journal of Political Research, 43:3, 337–

68.

Bouwen, Pieter (2006). ‘Business Interest Representation and Legitimate European Govern-

ance’, in Stijn Smismans (ed.), Civil Society and Legitimate European Governance.

Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 277–96.

Bucker, Andreas, Elisabeth Eberharter, Gunther Schafer and Alexander Turk (1996). ‘The

History of Comitology’, in Robin Pedler and Gunther Schafer (eds.), Shaping European Law

and Policy: The Role of Committees and Comitology in the Political Process. Maastricht:

European Institute of Public Administration, 61–81.

282 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Buholzer, Rene (1998). Legislatives Lobbying in der Europaischen Union, Ein Konzept fur

Interessengruppen. Bern-Stuttgart-Wien: Verlag Paul Haupt.

Falke, Josef (1996). ‘Comitology and other Committees: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment’,

in Robin Pedler and Gunther Schafer (eds.), Shaping European Law and Policy: The Role of

Committees and Comitology in the Political Process. Maastricht: European Institute of Public

Administration, 117–65.

Farrell, Henry, and Adrienne Heritier (2003). ‘Formal and Informal Institutions under Co-

decision: Continuous Constitution Building in Europe’, Governance, 16:4, 577–600.

Greenwood, Justin, Jurgen Grote and Karsten Ronit, eds. (1992). Organised Interest and the

European Community. London: Sage Publications.

Hix, Simon (2000). ‘Parliamentary Oversight of Executive Power. What Role for the European

Parliament in Comitology?’ in Thomas Christiansen and Emil Kirchner (eds.), Committee

Governance in the European Union. Manchester, New York: Manchester University Press,

62–78.

Hix, Simon (2002). ‘Constitutional Agenda-Setting through Discretion in Rule Interpretation:

Why the European Parliament Won at Amsterdam’, British Journal of Political Science, 32:2,

259–80.

Lehmann, Wilhelm, and Lars Bosche (2003). ‘Lobbying in the European Union: Current Rules

and Practices’, Working Paper – Constitutional Affairs Series (AFCO 104 EN). Luxembourg:

European Parliament.

Levine, Sol, and Paul E. White (1961). ‘Exchange as a Conceptual Framework for the Study of

Interorganizational Relationships’, Administrative Science Quarterly, 5, 583–601.

Lindner, Johannes (2003). ‘Institutional Stability and Change: Two Sides of the Same Coin’,

Journal of European Public Policy, 10:6, 912–35.

Lindner, Johannes, and Berthold Rittberger (2003). ‘The Creation, Interpretation and

Contestation of Institutions’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 41:3, 445–74.

Mazey, Sonia, and Jeremy Richardson (1999). ‘Interests’, in Laura Cram, Desmond Dinan

and Neill Nugent (eds.), Developments in the European Union. New York: St. Martin’s Press,

105–29.

McCown, Margaret, and Hae-Won Jun (2003). ‘Inter-Institutional Disputes in the EU: The

Constitutional Dimension of European Judicial Integration’, Paper presented at European

Union Studies Association Annual Conference, Nashville, TN, March 2003.

McLaughlin, Andrew and Justin Greenwood (1995). ‘The Management of Interest Representa-

tion in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33:1, 143–212.

Pappi, Franz, and Christian Henning (1999). ‘The Organization of Influence on the EC’s

Common Agricultural Policy: A Network Approach’, European Journal of Political Research,

36, 257–81.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey (1997). New Directions for Organization Theory, Problems and Prospects. New

York; Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pfeffer, Jeffrey, and Gerald Salancik (1978). The External Control of Organizations, A Resource

Dependence Perspective. New York, London: Harper and Row Publishers.

Schaber, Thomas (1998). ‘The Regulation of Lobbying at the European Parliament: The Quest

for Transparency’, in Paul-H. Claeys, Gobin Corinne, Isabelle Smets and Pascaline Winand

(eds.), Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration. Brussels: European Interuniversity

Press, 208–21.

Shackleton, Michael, and Tapio Raunio (2003). ‘Co-decision since Amsterdam: A Laboratory

for Institutional Innovation and Change’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10:2, 171–88.

Smismans, Stijn (2004a). Law, Legitimacy and European Governance. Functional Participation in

Social Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Smismans, Stijn (2004b). ‘The Constitutional Labelling of ‘‘The Democratic Life of the EU’’:

Representative and ‘‘Participatory’’ Democracy’, in Andreas Follesdal and Lynn Dobson

(eds.), Political Theory and the European Constitution. London: Routledge.

Stacey, John (2003). ‘Displacement of the Council via Informal Dynamics? Comparing the

Commission and the Parliament’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10:6, 936–55.


Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

Stacey, John, and Berthold Rittberger (2003). ‘Dynamics of Formal and Informal Institutional

Change in the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10:6, 858–83.

Tirole, Jean (1999). ‘Incomplete Contracts: Where Do we Stand?’, Econometrica, 67, 741–81.

Vignon, Jerome (2003). ‘The White Paper on Governance: Challenges and Opportunities for

EU Business Associations’, in Justin Greenwood (ed.), Challenge of Change in EU Business

Associations. Houndmills, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 60–3.

284 P. Bouwen

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f N

orth

Tex

as]

at 1

0:29

12

Nov

embe

r 20

14

competing for consultation: civil society and conflict between the european commission and the...

Documents