COMPETING APPROACHES TO PERMANENT HOUSING

IN SRI LANKA

and some implications for transitional shelter

Michal Lyons Professor of Urban Development

London South Bank Universitylyonsm@lsbu.ac.uk

Theo Schilderman International Team Leader

Access to InfrastructurePractical Action

theo.schilderman@practicalaction.org.uk

Sri Lanka’s experience

• Some 120,000 homes to (re)build• Poverty in affected areas:

– Southern and Southeastern Province GDP: $640– National GDP : $930– Within this, most vulnerable groups hit

• Reconstruction approach:– Followed Gujarat 2001– ‘Donor-assisted’ Programme (DAP)– ‘Owner-driven’ Programme (ODP)

‘Donor-Assisted’ Programme (DAP)• Partnership between central government and NGO• Relocated housing on government land• Beneficiaries identified formally after completion

‘Owner-Driven’ Programme (ODP)• Partnership between households/communities and

NGOs• Cash compensation from government• Beneficiaries involved from the start

Crucial element: ‘BUFFER ZONE’

Diametrically opposite approaches:• Expected outputs (no. of houses to nearest ‘00):

– DAP 89,200

– ODP 30,500 (increased by 17,500 mid-2006)

• Size of developments:

– DAP 100 – 2000+ households

– ODP 5 -50, generally less than a dozen

• Siting (land availability):– DAP grouped/isolated

– ODP dispersed/integrated

• Procurement techniques– DAP through contractors

– ODP owner managed

• Handling of funds

Implications– Organisations involved

– Resource issues

– Infrastructure and amenities

– Plot sizes

– Involvement of beneficiaries

– Displacement and vulnerability

– Community building

– Livelihood redevelopment

– Issues of corruption

Outputs at 01/12/06

housing program

houses DAP ODP other total

completions 12,207 48,981 2,281 63,649

19% 77% 4% 100%

starts 12,897 32,517 2,445 47,859

27% 58% 5% 100%

total 25,104 81,498 4,726 111,328

23% 73% 4% 100%

Percent of required completions by programme and province

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

DAP ODP total

South

W &NWEast

NE

total

Opportunities for petty corruption

• DAP: households require certification for place on beneficiary list

• ODP: households require certification for level of damage (plus existence of house!)

• GS plus DS need to sign, but• Weak link in both programmes: local

government power• Prevention: CDC or equivalent• External accountability: DRMU

Complaints to DRMUDisaster Relief Monitoring Unit of Sri Lanka Human Rights

Commission:Complaints as at 31.10.06: 10,761

Livelihoods: 3354 (31.4%)Welfare: 506 ( 5.0%)Housing: 6723 (62.5%)

Of which DAP: 35.3% (25% of reconstructed houses) ODP: 64.7% (75% of reconstructed houses)

Complaints investigated by DRMU as % of dwellings completed by province

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

DAP ODP

Southern

Eastern

total

‘Lots of organizations are working …[with]…no tangible benefit. There are houses being done, all by contractors, and beneficiaries finally are allocated a house/number. There is no transparency, no recourse for beneficiaries,

even if construction is flawed. …What [Practical Action and the ODP] are doing is better than all this. Here the people are responsible and have ownership of the programme and they are put in front.

There is no secrecy about any transaction or anything like that ...’

Mr. Sivaji of RDS- Thirukkovil

DAP and ODP through the eyes of a community organiser:

Lack of infrastructureNo transport … no postal service in the village and there is

no system in place for such activities… with the absence of lighting it is very dangerous to travel on the roads in the night… The village has a huge garbage problem.

Culture of PassivityPeople were instructed to dig garbage pits in their own

premises but as yet only a very few people have done so. The remainder has got used to tying up their garbage in bags and dumping them in an uninhabited backyard or into the bushes or just leaving the garbage on the sides of the roads.

Summary: Immense gaps in achievement, especially in difficult areas• Dwelling numbers

– Far higher in the ODP (as seen in Table 1)• Development time

– Only 235 of 430 sites started in the DAP• Construction quality

– Serious problems identified on DAP sites (GTZ 2006)• Planning quality

– Access, services, public space, townscape • Culture of passivity

– High levels of complaints among DAP participants• Delay in activation and re-engagement

– Occupancy rates < 50% (infrastructure and distance)

Implications of, and for transitional shelter strategy

For TS, dispersed settlement –even if it must be relocated - is often preferable to grouped settlement, because it is :• responsive, allows the displaced population more choice and

better relations with the local community.

• appropriate to their needs, offering better use of existing coping strategies and social networks.

• effective in offering developmental opportunities to the local population.

• cost-effective for the aid community, requiring smaller initial investments than large-scale responses, such as planned camps.

• Low-impact environmentally, economically, politically

(Corsellis, 2006)

Characteristics of TS in Sri Lanka

• 120,000 households displaced by Tsunami alone (in addition to those displaced by conflict)

• 55,000 shelters constructed by over 100 partners coordinated by UNHCR

• These were almost exclusively for beneficiaries of the DAP (although not exclusively).

• Number of camps:• Size of camps:• Greatest density of partners in South(west) and

Eastern Province

How did the permanent shelter programmes (PSP) affect the TS?

• Demand: Influence of initial Coastal Exclusion Zone policy – large numbers relocated to TS (reduced 06/06)

• Resources: PSP prioritised in land allocation – exacerbated relocation problems

• Political structures: Complete separation of powers (TAFOR, working through TAP, versus TAFREN) – very little coordination and no potential to formalise TS sites into PS

• Supply: Long production delays in DAP, uncertainty over allocation, impending relocation – discouraged citizen involvement and developing livelihoods

Hence• Long stays in poorly (re)located camps and in conditions of

uncertainty• Loss of productive time and resources• Culture of dependency and Individualisation

Did TS influence PS?• TS seen as symptom of failure by GoSL, and thus marginalised• TS Strategy, informed by SPHERE standards, was only partially

adopted by TAP (though reintroduced by UNHCR) (Corsellis, 2004; UNHCR, 2005)

• Suspicion of foreign donors meant little communication between TAP and donor community (gap partially bridged by UNHCR)

• Inexperienced NGOs with inexperienced staff did not take on board long-term implications of TS for residents.

• Underinvestment in shelter quality, site quality, livelihoods, services and amenities

Thus a legacy of problems for PS from TS • Limited economic impact (Sheppard and Hill)• Passive attitudes developed during TS period, difficult to change

following resettlement• Culture of dependency and resentment (Lyons, 2007)

Conclusions

• The TSP was heavily circumscribed by the institutional and political framework for the PSP

• The weaknesses of the TSP weakened the potential for a successful PSP

• The main ‘negative feedback loop’ was with the DAP rather than the ODP.

THANK YOU!