COMPARISON OF THE INVASION OF CRETE AND THE PROPOSED INVASION OF MALTA

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial

fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

Military History

by

STEPHEN L. W. KAVANAUGH, MAJ, USA B.A., Virginia Military Institute, Lexington, VA, 1994

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2006

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14. ABSTRACT In 1941, after the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, senior German military leaders were consideringtwo airborne operations, one for the invasion of Crete and the other for the invasion of Malta. The invasionof Crete was executed from 20 May to 1 June 1941 with heavy German losses. The invasion of Malta nevertook place even though the senior military leaders in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)recommended invading Malta over Crete because of its strategic importance, but were overridden byAdolf Hitler. A year later, while the North Africa campaign was being conducted, another invasion wasplanned for Malta, but within a few weeks of executing the plan it too was postponed and eventuallycancelled. The primary focus of this research is to establish why in 1941 Crete was invaded, but Malta wasnot. The secondary focus is to establish why one year later a second planned invasion of Malta was rejectedand abandoned, and what were the strategic repercussions of not invading Malta. The Axis never capturedMalta, and the offensive capability of Malta was never destroyed, thus leading to the defeat of all Axisforces in North Africa.

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ Stephen L. W. Kavanaugh Thesis Title: Comparison of the Invasion of Crete and the Proposed Invasion of Malta Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair Jonathan M. House, Ph.D. , Member Mr. Bob A. King, M.B.A., M.A. , Member Mr. Herbert F. Merrick, M.S. Accepted this 16th day of June 2006 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

iii

ABSTRACT

COMPARISON OF THE INVASION OF CRETE AND THE PROPOSED INVASION OF MALTA by MAJ Stephen L. W. Kavanaugh, 115 pages. In 1941, after the conquest of Yugoslavia and Greece, senior German military leaders were considering two airborne operations, one for the invasion of Crete and the other for the invasion of Malta. The invasion of Crete was executed from 20 May to 1 June 1941 with heavy German losses. The invasion of Malta never took place even though the senior military leaders in the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) recommended invading Malta over Crete because of its strategic importance, but were overridden by Adolf Hitler. A year later, while the North Africa campaign was being conducted, another invasion was planned for Malta, but within a few weeks of executing the plan it too was postponed and eventually cancelled. The primary focus of this research is to establish why in 1941 Crete was invaded, but Malta was not. The secondary focus is to establish why one year later a second planned invasion of Malta was rejected and abandoned, and what were the strategic repercussions of not invading Malta. The Axis never captured Malta, and the offensive capability of Malta was never destroyed, thus leading to the defeat of all Axis forces in North Africa.

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the ever-present support and patience of my family,

especially my wife Michelle, because without her understanding this project would never

have succeeded. COL Rainer Waelde and Dr. Wayne Lutton, whose assistance with

research is greatly appreciated. I want to thank my committee Dr. Jonathan House, Mr.

Bob King, and Mr. Herb Merrick for their support and assistance. Even through their

busy schedules they provided guidance and suggestions that enabled this project to reach

its successful conclusion. Finally, Mrs. Helen Davis who reviews every MMAS thesis

and still managed to treat this thesis as if it was the most important to her.

v

DEDICATION

To my wife, Michelle; and my sons, Conner and Aidan, for their sacrifice on

weekends and evenings while I completed this project and missed part of the best year of

my life.

vi

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ............. ii

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS............................................................................................... iv

DEDICATION.....................................................................................................................v

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS ............................................................................... viii

ILLUSTRATIONS ..............................................................................................................x

PREFACE.......................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER 1 MALTA .........................................................................................................1

Introduction..................................................................................................................... 1 Location .......................................................................................................................... 2 Topography..................................................................................................................... 3 History ............................................................................................................................ 4 Security ........................................................................................................................... 6

CHAPTER 2 STRATEGIC SETTING................................................................................9

Great Britain ................................................................................................................. 10 Germany........................................................................................................................ 13 Italy ............................................................................................................................... 18

CHAPTER 3 OPERATION MERCURY (INVASION OF CRETE) ...............................32

Location and Topography............................................................................................. 32 Operational Situation .................................................................................................... 33 Planning ........................................................................................................................ 37 Intelligence.................................................................................................................... 40 Logistics........................................................................................................................ 41 Operational.................................................................................................................... 42 Results and Lessons Learned........................................................................................ 46

Results....................................................................................................................46 Lessons Learned.....................................................................................................48

Conclusion .................................................................................................................... 50

CHAPTER 4 ATTACKING AND DEFENDING MALTA .............................................54

vii

1940 .............................................................................................................................. 54 1941 .............................................................................................................................. 63 Resupplying Malta........................................................................................................ 70 Strategic Update............................................................................................................ 72 1942 .............................................................................................................................. 75

CHAPTER 5 OPERATION HERCULES.........................................................................85

Planning of Operation................................................................................................... 85 Hercules: The Plan........................................................................................................ 89 Hercules: Training ........................................................................................................ 92 Hercules: Invasion and Logistical Support ................................................................... 95 Rommel Seizes Tobruk................................................................................................. 96 Hercules: Cancelled ...................................................................................................... 98 What Happened to Malta? .......................................................................................... 102

CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION..........................................................................................106

Why Not Malta?.......................................................................................................... 106

BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................111

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ....................................................................................113

CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT ...............................114

viii

ACRONYMS AND DEFINITIONS

Commando Supremo Italian Military High Command

DAK Deutsches Afrika Korps, German Africa Corps

DIME Elements of National Power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic)

Flieger Flying, usually translated as Airborne

Fliegerkorps Air Corps

FJR Fallschirmjäger Regiment, Parachute Infantry Regiment

Gebirgs Mountain

General der Flieger Lieutenant General (Luftwaffe)

GeneralFeldmarschall General of the Army

Generalleuntant Lieutenant General

Generalmajor Major General

Großadmiral Fleet Admiral

Luftflotte Air Fleet, Air Force: ex. 4th Air Force

Luftlande Airlanding

Luftlande Sturmregiment Airlanding assault regiment

OB South Oberbefehlshaber South, Commander-in-Chief South

OKH Ober Kommando der Heeres, German Army High Command

OKL Ober Kommando die Luftwaffe, German Air Force High Command

OKM Ober Kommando der Kriegsmarine, German Navy High Command

OKW Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht, German Armed Forces High Command

ix

RDF Radio Direction Finder

Regia Aeuronautica Royal (Italian) Air Force

Regia Esercito Royal (Italian) Army

Regia Marina Royal (Italian) Navy

x

ILLUSTRATIONS

Page Figure 1. Unit Symbols .....................................................................................................xi

Figure 2. Map of Europe and Mediterranean Theater ........................................................3

Figure 3. Axis convoy routes 1941-1942 ..........................................................................67

Figure 4. Diagram of Hercules Plan..................................................................................90

Figure 5. Axis Order of Battle for Operation Hercules.....................................................94

PREFACE

Note: In order to maintain consistency throughout this thesis “Europe” refers to

the European mainland from France to the Soviet Union, to include the Balkans and the

Mediterranean Sea. North Africa refers to the area of Africa that is along the

Mediterranean Sea from Tunisia to Egypt. This is to be used primarily at the strategic

level. The “Mediterranean Theater” refers to the Mediterranean Sea, the Balkans, and

North Africa at primarily the operational level of warfare.

Figure 1. Unit Symbols Source: Bruce Quarrie, German Airborne Divisions: Mediterranean Theatre, 1942-1945 (Oxford, England: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 2.

xi

1

CHAPTER 1

MALTA

Introduction

In the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II there were many islands

that were considered by both the United States and Japan to be vital and thus warranted

vast expenditures of resources to attack and defend. Some of these islands were

Guadalcanal, Tarawa, Guam, Tinian, and Iwo Jima. All of these islands had an

importance at the strategic and operational level of warfare in World War II. These

islands were in a position that could directly affect the offensive capability of one side,

interdict the sea and air lines of communication within the theater, or serve as an airbase

from which to conduct either or both fighter and bombing operations.

In the European Theater of Operations, due primarily to the terrain, only a few

islands had important roles in the conduct of operations. However, there was one island

in the Mediterranean Sea that was to have strong strategic and operational implications

on the European mainland, in the Mediterranean Sea, and in North Africa. This island

was Malta. Because of its location Malta was to influence the way that Great Britain,

Italy, and Germany conducted operations throughout Europe until 1943.

Throughout the war in the Mediterranean Theatre of Operations Malta was a huge

stumbling block for Italy and Germany. Many attempts were made by Italy and Germany

through their respective air forces to render the base ineffective as a platform to conduct

air and naval operations. The problem was that whenever the air offensives were reduced

or paused the British found a way to make Malta operational and continue to attack

Italian and German convoys supporting operations in North Africa. However, the Axis

2

never executed an operation to seize Malta and therefore take it away from the British

and make it an operational base for the Axis forces to conduct offensive operations. This

information forces the following question: Why did the Axis expend so much manpower

and materiel to neutralize the island, but not to seize it and totally prevent its use? What

was the strategic or operational reasoning why Italy and Germany never invaded the

island? This study attempts to answer this question, and also try to see if their reasoning

was correct.

Location

The island of Malta is located almost directly in the middle of the Mediterranean

Sea. The Malta archipelago consists of three islands (Malta, Gozo, Comino) and is

located just 56 miles south of Sicily and 225 miles from the coast of Tunisia. The highest

elevation on the main island is 846 feet. The width of the main island, Malta, varies

between 6 and 7 1/2 miles. Of Malta’s twenty-eight miles of coastline, nineteen,

according to the British, were suitable for the landing of troops.1 Of the other two key

British bases in the Mediterranean, Gibraltar is about 1,000 miles away and Alexandria

some 820 miles.(see figure 2) Malta has a total area of 121.9 square miles (315.6 square

kilometers), and the main island of Malta is 94.8 square miles in area.2 With a population

of some 300,000, Malta had a population density of over 2,300 per square mile, rising to

49,504 per square mile in the urban districts.3 This population density made it one of the

most densely populated places in the world in World War II.4

Figure 2. Map of Europe and Mediterranean Theater Source: Department of the Army, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-260, The German Campaigns in the Balkans (Spring 1941) (Historical study, Department of the Army, November 1953), 1.

Topography

At first glance the main island seems to comprise just a featureless rock plateau,

but in fact there are a number of topographical regions. In the west is a high limestone

plateau, falling away in steps on all sides and providing only for some sparse grazing for

sheep and goats. To the north, an escarpment edges the plateau, while in the east it is cut

by a number of small valleys. Within these lower-lying areas the soil is good for crops

and by making full use of irrigation they are intensively cultivated. North of the plateau

3

4

there are ridges and depressions, which are continued in the islands of Comino and Gozo.

In the south and southeast of Malta there are gently undulating uplands, which is where

many of the people live. The coastline has high cliffs in the southwest, gentle bays in the

northwest and wide beaches in the north.5

The Grand Harbor of Valetta is a natural deep-water harbor with a depth of 25

meters, which has ensured its economic and strategic importance over the centuries. One

of Malta’s major problems is that it is badly supplied with drinking water. There are no

rivers or lakes, so it depends very much on its winter rainfall. This has over the years

provided underground stores of fresh water. The hot, dry summers and mild, wet winters

are influenced by the trade winds that blow in from the French Mediterranean coast, the

mistral and, less pleasant, the xlokk that brings sultry, warm and humid air from North

Africa, particularly in the late summer/early autumn.6 This influenced the directions that

sailing ships approached the island, and could have determined the direction of approach

for transport aircraft carrying paratroopers.

History

Malta’s history has been one of occupation by other countries in order to gain an

advantage within the Mediterranean for economic and military importance. Ever since

earliest recorded times Malta has been looked upon as “the navel of the inland sea”, long

providing a natural bridge between Europe and Africa. Malta has been inhabited since as

early as 4000 B.C. By 218 B.C. it was ruled by the Roman Empire. During the period of

Roman control it is said that Saint Paul was shipwrecked on the island in A.D. 59 and

converted the population to Christianity. The Romans remained in control of Malta, or

“Melita” as they called it, until it was taken over by Arabs in A.D. 870 The Arabs held

5

the island until 1091 when the Norman ruler of Sicily defeated them. With the Arab

defeat Roman Catholicism was reestablished. During and after the Middle Ages the

island again gained importance within the Mediterranean. The Ottoman Empire

attempted to capture the islands from the Knights of St. John, who held Malta for close to

270 years, in the Great Siege of 1565. During this siege the Knights held off the Turkish

fleet from May to September of that year. The Knights would continue to hold the islands

until surrendering them to Napoleon and the French in 1798. Britain would next blockade

Malta and then occupy the island in 1800.7

Malta’s location in the central Mediterranean Sea made it as important

strategically as Gibraltar was to the British. Gibraltar controlled access to the

Mediterranean Sea. Malta, however, was able to provide the British with the ability to

control access to three seas; the Western Mediterranean, the Adriatic, and the Aegean

through the Eastern Mediterranean. Because of Britain’s naval strength it was able to

influence the strategic actions of the three powers that bordered the Mediterranean;

France, Spain, and Italy. As long as Great Britain possessed Malta and Gibraltar it would

be the dominant sea power in the Mediterranean.8

Malta had been the most important British naval base in the Mediterranean since

its capture from the French. It possessed a dry dock and complete repair facilities capable

of handling the largest ships in the service of the Royal Navy.9 It also had ample

equipment reserves and resources, sufficient to maintain the British Mediterranean Fleet

that was based at Malta and which, between World War I and World War II, was second

in strength only to the Home Fleet. The security of the base, symbolized by the presence

6

of up to four battleships and their attendant cruisers and destroyers anchored in Grand

Harbor, seemed unshakeable until the mid 1930s.10

Security

After the Ethiopian crisis of 1935, it became increasingly clear to Britain that Italy

could not be relied upon to remain a friendly power. With Italian airbases in Sicily, the

Regia Aeronautica was only twenty minutes flying time away from Malta. And it should

be recalled that in the mid-to-late 1930s, Italy had what was considered to be a first-class

air force, given the standards of the time. The British War Cabinet concluded that the

threat of aerial bombardment jeopardized the security of Malta to such an extent that in

July 1937 the cabinet decided to develop Alexandria as the main base of the

Mediterranean Fleet.11 In the middle of 1936 the Italian Consul-General was expelled for

organizing espionage and subversion and thereafter Italy appears to have abandoned any

further attempts at spying or sabotage.12 From this point the British took measures to

increase the security of the island base.

In July 1939, the British Committee of Imperial Defense authorized an increase of

antiaircraft defenses for Malta. The Army and Royal Air Force protested that it was a

waste of money and equipment to try to improve the air defenses of a fleet base that was

so obviously vulnerable. Following a technical evaluation, the Committee decided to base

four fighter squadrons on the island, along with 112 heavy and 60 light antiaircraft guns,

supported by 24 searchlights. In April 1939, Malta was one of the first overseas bases to

receive a new Radio Direction Finder (RDF)--as radar was then referred to.13

Nevertheless, Malta was practically defenseless in June 1940 when the war

commenced in the Mediterranean and could have easily been taken by Italy, who had just

7

declared war on Great Britain. Very few of the authorized increases in the defense had

been delivered. The searchlights had arrived, but only 34 of the heavy guns and 8 of the

light ones. None of the fighter squadrons were on hand. Manning the coastal and

antiaircraft batteries were the men of the Royal Malta Artillery and the King’s Own

Malta Regiment. A few days before Mussolini declared war, Admiral Cunningham sent

the old monitor HMS Terror to La Valetta, Malta’s main harbor, to add its guns to the

defense. Thus Italy’s failure to capture Malta in a coup de main at the outset gave the

British an opportunity to reinforce the base. The consequences of this failure on the part

of Mussolini became more and more evident as the war progressed.14

On Italy’s entry into the war Italian residents and some pro-Italian Maltese were

interned and there was no sign of any fifth column activity or resumed espionage until

May 1942. In that month Carmelo Borg Pisani landed on the southeast coast in an Italian

E-boat with a wireless radio set, maps, money, and instructions to report to Italian naval

intelligence on British operational movements, morale, and food supplies. Pisani was

immediately captured by a patrol from the 1st Dorsets. He was handed over to military

intelligence and later executed in November 1942 as a spy. After this the Axis made no

further attempts to land spies.15

For centuries prior to the Second World War Malta was a strategic island. It is

relevant to see what the strategic situation was for each of the significant powers in the

Mediterranean Theater of Operations. These powers are defined as the countries of Great

Britain, Italy, and Germany. Each had different goals at the strategic level, and therefore

each had a different view of Malta and how it would impact their strategic and

operational conduct of the war.

8

1Wayne Lutton, Malta and the Mediterranean: A Study in The Allied and Axis Strategy, Planning, and Intelligence during The Second World War (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms International. 1983), 27.

2George Forty. Battle for Malta, (Hersham, England: Ian Allen Publishing. 2003), p. 14.

3Lutton, 69.

4Forty, 17.

5Ibid., 15.

6Ibid., 15.

7Ibid., 14.

8John Keegan, The Price of Admiralty: The Evolution of Naval Warfare (London: Penguin Press, 1990), 11-13.

9Lutton, 28.

10Forty, 14.

11Lutton, 28.

12Forty, 17.

13Lutton, 28-29.

14Ibid., 27 & 29.

15Forty, 17.

9

CHAPTER 2

STRATEGIC SETTING

Before looking at the operations that occurred on, from, and against Malta and the

proposed invasion of Malta, there are two important factors that need to be addressed.

The first was the strategic situation of the three main powers in the Mediterranean

Theater--Great Britain, Italy, and Germany--from 1940 through the end of 1941. Malta

affected each of these nations and their armed forces. The second factor, described in

chapter 3 was Operation Mercury, the invasion of Crete. It is necessary to talk about the

planning, outcome, and lessons learned from this invasion at the strategic and operational

level in order to get a better understanding of how the Ober Kommando der Wehrmacht

(OKW) and Commando Supremo, the Italian Military High Command, planned to

execute the invasion of Malta, and why Hitler and Mussolini ultimately decided not to

conduct Operation Hercules, the airborne and seaborne invasion of Malta.

The Mediterranean Sea and surrounding land areas were not considered a theater

of war until June 1940, when Italy declared war on Great Britain and France. Once Italy

declares war a series of events took place that pushed the Mediterranean Theater and

specifically Malta into the forefront of military operations by the three countries already

listed and ultimately by the United States. This chapter ends with 1941 because to go into

further detail would detract from the operations against Malta in 1940 and 1941, and

because as the second proposed invasion of Malta, Operation Hercules, is discussed, I

will give an update on the strategic situation and how it affected the planning and

execution of the invasion at the time.

10

It would be hard to say who had more at stake in the loss or capture of the tiny

island fortress from 1940 through 1943. Great Britain felt it was necessary to hold onto

Malta in order to maintain a link between Gibraltar in the west and Alexandria in the east

in turn ensuring the survival of its troops in North Africa and the Middle East. The loss of

Malta would have forced Britain to move troops and supplies completely around the

continent of Africa, a journey of several thousand miles. Italy felt it was necessary to

attack Malta by air in order to neutralize the island and permit the movement of supply

convoys to Libya and the Italian forces fighting there. Germany at first had no desire to

interfere with the plans of Italy and did not want to be bothered with Italy’s “Mare

Nostrum” while planning for the invasion of Great Britain and later the invasion of

Russia. Circumstances later forced Hitler to come to the aid of his failing ally in order to

keep Italy in the war and Mussolini in power.

Great Britain

Malta was controlled by Great Britain prior to and throughout the war; so let us

look at the British situation first. In 1940 Great Britain was one of two countries actively

at war with Germany, with France being the other. Since Italy was not yet involved in the

war there was very little that the British had to fear about the loss of Malta. With that in

mind the two allies had a cooperative alliance for the defense of the Mediterranean in

case Italy did enter the war, but like everything else that was done prior to war

commencing in Europe it was not given the top priority.

At the beginning of 1940 Great Britain was not involved in active fighting on the

mainland of Europe, but was fighting Germany at sea in the Battle of the Atlantic, a

campaign that would affect decisions of the Royal Navy throughout the war. In April

11

1940 Great Britain had to react to the German invasion of Denmark and more importantly

to the invasion of Norway because it gave Germany a safe staging area for surface ships

into the North Sea and into the Atlantic Ocean, which threatened convoys transiting to

Britain. It was this dismal invasion that finally caused Winston Churchill to replace

Neville Chamberlain as Great Britain’s Prime Minister on 10 May 1940.1 That same day

Great Britain and France found themselves having to deal with the German invasion of

France and the Low Countries, Belgium, Holland, and Luxembourg. Unable to stop the

German advance through northern France, British and other allied forces were ordered to

move to the channel ports to be evacuated. Operation Dynamo, the evacuation of

Dunkirk, began on 27 May and concluded on 4 June with the evacuation of

approximately 220,000 British and 120,000 French troops2. Six days later Italy declared

war on Great Britain and France. This action forced Great Britain to shift some strategic

focus to the Mediterranean Theater, including the island of Malta, and Egypt, which

contained 40,000 British and Dominion troops.

With France defeated and occupied by Germany, Great Britain stood alone in the

war against Germany, and immediately began planning for the Battle of Britain that it

knew would come at some point. The air defense of Great Britain was the primary focus.

The British War Cabinet concluded on 6 June that any fighters sent to the Mediterranean

would be better used to defend Alexandria rather than Malta. However, two weeks later,

Prime Minister Churchill vetoed a proposal to abandon Malta and the eastern

Mediterranean and withdraw Admiral Cunningham’s fleet to Gibraltar.3 Both planes and

pilots were in short supply but because of Churchill’s insistence on defending Malta,

aircraft and crews were made available to be sent to the island. From the outset of the war

12

in the Mediterranean, Malta was regarded as one of Britain’s most vital bases. Aside from

its military utility, the island was a symbol of British sea power and of the will to resist

the Axis dictators. So, if Mussolini gave little thought to Malta and its potential threat to

his North African supply lines, such was not the case with Churchill and the British

Admiralty.4

For the remainder of 1940 Great Britain stood alone in the Mediterranean against

Italy and was able to win some strong victories. By the close of 1940 British General

Percival Wavell in Egypt had fought a campaign against the Italian forces in North Africa

and captured 130,000 Italian prisoners, ultimately taking most of Libya from the Italians

to including the port city of Tobruk.5

As 1941 began the outlook for Great Britain was still uncertain, but was better

then in 1940; however, by the end of the year, the outlook became very bleak again. In

February 1941 Britain was facing not only Italian but also strong German forces in North

Africa that would result in another long campaign across Libya and parts of Egypt for the

entire year. The battle of the Atlantic was still going strong, but the convoy system and

Lend-Lease program, which began in March 1941 from the United States, was helping to

lower losses and increase the supplies getting through. The spring of 1941 saw Great

Britain shifting forces from North Africa to Greece to stop the German invasion of the

Balkans. This was followed by two evacuations similar to Dunkirk. The first was the

evacuation of 43,000 troops from Greece to Crete and Egypt and the second, following

the German airborne invasion of Crete, was the evacuation of 14,800 British, Greek and

Allied soldiers from Crete to Egypt. With the defeat in Greece and Crete, British forces

13

were only visible on one part of mainland Europe, Gibraltar. The Gibraltar- Malta-

Alexandria line was to serve as a strategic hinge in the defense of Great Britain’s assets.

The German bombing campaign against British cities, the Blitz, and the battle of

the Atlantic both continued throughout 1941, as did the fighting in North Africa against

Rommel’s Africa Corps. But so far the war had not involved Great Britain’s Pacific

oriented territories and therefore had not forced the proper allocations of personnel or the

proper supplies to defend its Asian empire. This changed in December 1941 with the

Japanese attack on the United States fleet at Pearl Harbor and the British garrisons in

Malaya, Hong Kong, Shanghai, and elsewhere.6 Along with attacks against British

possessions came attacks that required the evacuation of Australian forces in North

Africa in order to defend Australia against possible Japanese attacks.7

At the close of 1941 Great Britain’s forces were stretched more then either Italy

or Germany since they were involved in combat operations on a true global scale.

However, Britain still managed to find a way to defend one of its smallest territories and

cause it to be a thorn in the side of the Axis powers in Europe.

Germany

Even after Italy’s entry into the war, Germany had little to no interest in the

Mediterranean Theater. According to Hitler the Mediterranean was entirely Mussolini’s

affair. Hitler was satisfied that the Italians had everything under control and would soon

be able to “see off” the tiny British forces in the area of Mussolini’s lake. However, when

he realized the incompetence of the Italians and their inability to cope with Greece and

Great Britain he felt forced to shift badly needed resources.8 This situation between the

14

Italian and German Armed forces and specifically between Hitler and Mussolini will be

discussed at a later point as the planning for operations against Malta began to take shape.

At the beginning of 1940 Germany was in control of most of continental Europe.

Germany had conducted a successful campaign against Poland in September 1939. Just

prior to that campaign Germany and the Soviet Union had surprised the western allies by

signing a non-aggression pact, thereby securing Germany’s eastern flank from possible

attack at least for the time being. At the beginning of 1940 in the west there was a state of

war, but no combat on the continent of Europe. What existed was the “Sitzkrieg” or

“phony war.” Germany’s Navy (Kriegsmarine) and more specifically the U-boat force

under the command of Admiral Karl Dönitz was very active, conducting unrestricted

submarine warfare against Great Britain’s merchant fleet and the Royal Navy in an

attempt to strangle Great Britain’s lifeline to the outside world and force her to surrender.

On 9 April 1940, Germany invaded and captured Denmark and Norway and

occupied these countries with approximately 500,000 troops. Part of the reason for this

campaign was to gain raw materials, especially iron ore, and ports for the Navy to use to

gain better access to the Atlantic Ocean. The campaign in Norway, which ended on 9

May, was considered successful, but had the negative affect of costing Germany a large

portion of her surface fleet, which would have consequences later on that summer and

fall.

On 10 May 1940 Germany unleashed Operation Yellow, the invasion of the Low

Countries and France. This campaign saw the successful use of German airborne forces

to capture specific strong points to include Eban Emael in Belgium. By the end of the

invasion of France, Germany occupied Europe from the Atlantic coast of France up to

15

Norway, and east to the border of the Soviet Union. It was towards the end of the

campaign in France that Italy declared war on Great Britain and France. Hitler attempted

to persuade Italy not to enter the war at this point, saying it was unnecessary. Even

though Italy did enter the war Hitler was still satisfied to allow Mussolini to deal with

events in the Mediterranean situation as he saw fit, but as time went on the senior

German leaders saw that the estimates made before the war about Italian capabilities

were coming true. By the end of 1940 they realized that Italy would not be able to

support its own forces.

Following the Battle for France, as the Allies knew Operation Yellow, Hitler

decided to invade Great Britain and defeat the last remaining enemy in the west before

turning his attention to the Soviet Union in the East. However, prior to invading England

it was necessary to gain air superiority over the skies of Britain. Thus began the Battle of

Britain, the German operation that lasted formally from July through September 1940.

This battle was intended as the prelude for Operation Sealion, the sea-borne invasion of

Britain, but because of the large losses of German aircraft and pilots the invasion of

Britain never took place, however air attacks against Britain continued.

With the invasion of Great Britain cancelled, Germany was able to focus entirely

on the invasion of the Soviet Union, which was scheduled for spring 1941. However,

Italy threw a wrench into those plans. With the Italian debacle in Greece and the

subsequent British occupation of Crete and Limnos in the Mediterranean, Germany was

forced to plan an invasion of Greece in order to support her ally and throw the British out

of the Balkans. At a conference on 4 November 1940, when Hitler announced his

decision to occupy Gibraltar, the Balkans was brought sharply to the attention of Hitler

16

and of the Army High Command because of the need to secure bases to launch the

invasion of the Soviet Union and the need to secure necessary raw materials such as oil

from Romania. Along with planning for the capture of Gibraltar to help close the

Mediterranean to the British, the Führer also ordered that the Romanian oilfields be

protected. He requested that plans should be drawn up for an invasion of Greece to be

undertaken from the German bases in Romania and Bulgaria (code-named Marita) so as

to enable the Luftwaffe to attack targets in the eastern Mediterranean, especially, Crete

and Limnos.9 Through the winter of 1940-1941 Germany used the four areas of national

power of the DIME model--Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economy--to get the

Balkan countries of Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia to sign the Tripartite

Pact and become allies of Germany, thus allowing German forces to move freely through

them in order to invade Greece. Germany was able to secure the signing of the pact and

the support of all the countries, except Yugoslavia, where a coup occurred just prior to

the signing of the pact and the new government decided not to sign. This action infuriated

Hitler and caused him to require the invasion of Yugoslavia to punish the Yugoslavs for

their actions. On 6 April 1941 air attacks against Belgrade signaled the beginning of

Operation 25, the German invasion of Yugoslavia. By 13 April the capital of Belgrade

was captured, and by 15 April Sarajevo was in German hands. On 6 April German forces

in Bulgaria invaded Greece. Although the Metaxas Line, fortresses on the Greek-

Bulgarian border, stopped the Germans until Yugoslavia fell on 17 April, by 27 April the

whole Peloponnesian peninsula was overrun and Athens was in German control.10

In addition, while the Balkan campaign was in progress, Section L, the Operations

Section of OKW, had to produce an appreciation to show whether it was more important

17

for future strategy in the Mediterranean to occupy Crete or Malta. All officers of the

section, whether from the Army, Navy, or Air Force, together with General Walter

Warlimont, voted unanimously for the capture of Malta since it seemed to be the only

way to secure permanently the sea-route to North Africa. Their views were, however,

overtaken by events even before they reached General Alfred Jodl. Hitler was determined

that Crete should not remain in the hands of the British because of the danger of air

attacks on the Rumanian oilfields and he had further agreed with the Luftwaffe that from

a base in Crete there were far reaching possibilities for offensive action in the eastern

Mediterranean. A curious incident occurred in the connection of comparing Malta to

Crete in 1941; shortly after the decision to invade Crete was made Hitler’s senior aide,

Colonel Schmundt, appeared in the OKW Section L offices and demanded that no

mention should be made in Section L’s war diary of these differences of opinion within

supreme Headquarters or of any similar cases which might occur in the future.11 The

details of the invasion will be discussed in the next chapter, but briefly the invasion was

conducted from 20 May through 1 June. It was a successful operation, but like Norway

incurred losses in specific areas that would affect operations in the future.

While the planning for the Balkans campaign was ongoing, Germany was also

beginning operations in North Africa to support the collapsing Italian Army. In January

1941 X Fliegerkorps was sent to Sicily to assist in reopening the strangled Italian supply

lines to North Africa by neutralizing the airpower and sea power exerted by the British

from Malta, this was but a minor diversion to German planning.12 In February 1941

Hitler sent General Erwin Rommel and the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK). Rommel

managed to push back the British forces and get as far as the Egyptian frontier, but they

18

were unable to capture the city of Tobruk. A siege to capture the port city would continue

on and off until the next summer. The campaign through North Africa would be the

reason why Malta became a focal point for all forces. In the end North Africa would be

an area of good news through 1941 when the upcoming Russian campaign began to have

setbacks.

As the culmination of German planning, Operation Barbarossa began on 22 June

1941. The German campaign in the Soviet Union would become the main effort of

German strategic and operational planning for the rest of the war. From the time it started

through the opening of the second front in France in 1944, all other areas would play a

supporting role to the fighting that took place all through the Eastern Front. By the end of

1941 German forces had come within sight of Moscow, only to be pushed back by strong

Soviet forces on 6 December 1941. As the year ended German forces had gone onto the

defensive through the bitter Russian winter.

Because the senior command elements of the German armed forces were far more

preoccupied with global events--and in particular the titanic struggle with the Soviet

Union--than to be continually concerned with Middle East affairs. This was the task

delegated to GeneralFeldmarschall Albert Kesselring who was appointed OB South on 28

November 1941. From his office in Rome he commanded all German land and air forces

in the Mediterranean theater, but was subordinate to the Italian Chief of Staff.13

Italy

Italy was by far the least prepared of the three countries when it entered the war in

1940. It had difficulty defeating far less capable nations much less acting as an aggressor

nation against France and Great Britain. This section will discuss not only Italian

19

strategic operations through 1941, but also what led the Italians to war and the state of

their armed forces when the war began in order to give a more complete picture of Italy’s

readiness for war.

Benito Mussolini had been the fascist leader of Italy since 1922 and by 1940

occupied no less then five high offices within the Italian government to include Supreme

Commander and head of the Government, Minister of War, Minister for the Navy, and

Minister for the Air Force. He was also the Minister of the Interior and President of the

Fascist Grand Council and was the sole advocate for entering the war in 1940.15

Italy entered into the “Pact of Steel” with Germany on 22 May 1939. The pact

was the Italian-German alliance and was signed by the two foreign ministers, Galeazzo

Ciano of Italy and Joachim von Ribbentrop of Germany. The treaty consisted of seven

Articles which maybe summarized as follows: Article I: the two nations would remain in

continuous contact with each other in order to be in agreement on matters in Europe.

Article II: The two nations would consult with each other on matters of mutual interest

and if one nation’s security were threatened then the other would offer its diplomatic and

military support. Article III: If one of the countries were attacked then the other nation

would come to its aid with all its military might on land, sea, and air. Article IV: The two

countries were to “further intensify their collaboration in the military field, and in the

field of war economy.” Article V: If in a war together, neither nation would seek peace

without the agreement of the other. Article VI: The nations understood the need for an

alliance and would continue to work in the future to “promote the adequate development

of the common interests” between the two nations. Article VII: The agreement would be

valid for ten years and would be renewed prior to the end of the ten-year period.14 Italy

20

had more to gain from the Pact then Germany did, even though leading up to the signing

of the pact both Hitler and Mussolini were on approximately equal footing on the

strategic stage. However, Italy was far behind Germany in the economic and military

arenas.

As a member of the “Pact of Steel” with Germany, Italy was under some

obligations to assist Germany if Germany was attacked; however, since Germany was not

attacked when she invaded Poland in 1939, Mussolini saw no need to enter the war to

assist Germany. By 1940 Italy had expanded her empire to include the areas of Ethiopia,

Libya, and Albania. Through the first few months of 1940 Italy had no intention of

entering the war, but that did not prevent Mussolini from preparing for eventually

entering the war as Hitler’s ally. In a letter to Hitler in early 1940 Mussolini claimed that

Italy was not prepared to enter the war soon and that he wanted to wait until Italy would

“not be a burden but a relief to you,” however, he stated that he was “accelerating the

tempo of military preparations.”16 This changed by the end of March when Mussolini

decided to shift from “non-belligerent” to combatant, although he had not selected the

date to officially enter the war.17 Up to this point Italy’s stance of non-belligerence

relieved Germany of the need to support her Latin neighbor with scarce war supplies.

This stance also proved to be helpful to the Western Allies who were able to focus their

supplies and personnel to other theaters of war, specifically to defending France and

attempting to defeat the German invasion of Norway.18

When Mussolini informed his senior leadership about entering the war, they were

all against such action. Marshal Badoglio spoke for the majority of Mussolini’s advisors

when he told the Duce that Italy was unprepared for war. No raw materials had been

21

stockpiled and what reserves were on hand would soon be exhausted. Italy’s industrial

base was only one-tenth of Germany’s and even with supplies was not organized to

provide the equipment needed to fight a modern war of long duration.19 The Italian

Supreme Defense Committee met under Mussolini’s chairmanship in February 1940.

Each of the three service Chiefs of Staff presented a report on the rearmament programs

drawn up and what actual work was going forward. The minister of Foreign Exchange

and Currencies, Raffaello Riccardi, threw cold water on the entire rearmament program

by pointing out that Italy’s limited reserves in gold and foreign currencies made it

impossible to implement such ambitious plans. Raw materials essential to conducting a

war economy were lacking. He concluded his grim assessment by demanding a revision

of the rearmament program that reflected Italy’s actual economic condition.20 Despite all

the recommendations from his advisors Mussolini still decided to push forward to enter

the war.

While the senior leadership of Italy was trying to give Mussolini an accurate

picture and attempting to dissuade him from plunging Italy into war with the western

powers, Germany was also trying to the same thing. The Germans had long been aware

of Italy’s military and economic weakness. In April 1938, the German Naval High

Command (OKM) reported to the Armed Forces Command (OKW):

In our opinion, in a war with England, Italy, as an ally, would be a burden of the first order, especially in regards to the war’s economic prosecution; while Italy would not be able to provide effective military support in districts of strategic importance to Germany (except in the Mediterranean). On this basis, OKM recommends that Italy for the time being (if war breaks out) act as a benevolent neutral.21

On 10 March 1940, German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop visited Rome and

informed his hosts that Germany was going to attack the West and had over 200 highly

22

equipped divisions assigned for this assault. Eight days later, Mussolini met Hitler at the

Brenner Pass. Hitler said that the war would be over that summer and Italy’s military

involvement was not required. It was up to Mussolini to decide if and when Italy entered

the war.22 Because the Italians were not prepared for war, the Germans actually tried to

do everything possible to prevent their ally from entering the war.

When Germany was preparing for the invasion of Poland in August of 1939,

Italian participation in the war had been expected by the Germans under provisions of the

“Pact of Steel”. However, by June 1940 it was clear to many in Hitler’s circle that Italy

would prove to be a needless complication, if not an actual hindrance to their war effort.

The French were close to defeat and Italian involvement at this point might well interfere

with military operations and the post-war peace negotiations. On 2 June 1940, Mussolini

sent a brief message to Hitler, in which he revealed his timetable. On Monday, 10 June,

he would declare was against Britain and France. The next morning military operations

would commence. Right up to the last minute, the Germans tried to persuade Mussolini to

at least delay his entry into the war.23 Further confirmation was given to the Germans, if

they needed any, through the Italian leadership of Italy’s fundamental unpreparedness for

war; they received it from Marshal Badoglio, the Chief of Commando Supremo. On 5

June 1940, the German Embassy in Rome telegraphed a message marked “MOST

URGENT” to Berlin, in which the German Military Attaché, General Enno von Rintelen,

reported that Badoglio had confided, “We could not expect a great deal from the Italian

armed forces since the Army and Air Force were not ready and there was a long frontier

to be protected. He hoped that the war would be brought to an end with the same speed

with which we had conducted the first phase.24

23

Now that we have seen what the leadership tried to do to prevent Mussolini from

dragging Italy into the war let us take a specific look at the Italian armed forces and

actually how prepared each was for a major war. Up to this point all the military

operations that Italy had conducted were against what would be considered third world

countries, specifically, Ethiopia and Albania, but fighting against Great Britain and

France would be far different.

The Italian armed forces were organized into three service commands, the Army,

Air Force, and Navy. They were theoretically co-equal but subordinated to the Supreme

Command, which tended to be dominated by the Army. Of the three services, the Army,

the Regio Esercito, was in the worst shape at the outbreak of the war.25 Numerically, the

Italians had a vast advantage against the British. The Italian Army then numbered about

86 divisions.26 In Ethiopia and Eritrea, some 200,000 Italian and colonial troops under

the Duke of Aosta faced 18,000 British and assorted Empire forces, equally divided in

Kenya and the Sudan. In North Africa, Marshal Graziani, who took command in late June

after Marshal Balbo was killed by “friendly” antiaircraft fire, had nearly 250,000 troops

at his disposal. General Archibald Wavell, the Commander in Chief, Middle East, since

July 1939, had only 36,000 British, Indian, and New Zealand troops with which to hold

Egypt.27 This numerical superiority was misleading when compared to the shortcomings

in the areas of supply and the fact that most of the armaments used by the Italian Army

were outdated, and it was estimated that the ability to upgrade and refurbish the Army

would not be completed within the next five years. The Italian Army also had a drastic

shortage of motorized vehicles and modern tanks.28

24

Like the Army, the Italian Air Force, Regia Aeronautica, was a quality force in

numbers alone. By 1935, the Regia Aeronautica held many of the world’s records for

aircraft performance. However, it came to suffer from bloc obsolescence and by 1940

was rather closer to the level of a Balkan air force, such as Yugoslavia or Bulgaria.29 A

Luftwaffe intelligence report had said of the Regia Aeronautica, “On the basis of their

backward tactics, Italian air units will suffer setbacks at the beginning of a war against an

opponent with strong fighter and air defense. It is questionable, considering the Italian

mentality, whether the Italian Air force possesses the inner strength to overcome such

weaknesses.”30 In broad terms the Italian Air Force was numerically superior to those

elements of the RAF that opposed it in the Middle East area generally and over the

Mediterranean in particular. The Italians had some 2,600 first line aircraft.31 Mussolini

had taken great pains to create a large, modern air force when he came into power. He

once boasted that he would black out the sun with his planes. To be fair, the Regia

Aeronautica probably reached its peak in 1936. After this time its war potential was

reduced through lack of reserves and equipment.32

Of the three services, the Navy, the Regia Marina, was in the best condition to

fight. In 1922, when Mussolini assumed power, the Italian Navy was in very poor

condition, with four battleships, seven antiquated cruisers taken over from the Austro-

Hungarian and German navies at the end of World War I, and a relative handful of old

destroyers, torpedo boats, and service ships. As a signatory to the Washington Naval

Treaty of 1922 and later the London Naval Treaty of 1930 the Italians were limited on the

ability to expand the Navy.33 However, by 1940 the Italians had six battleships, including

two new ones of 35,000 tons; seven 10,000-ton heavy cruisers; 21 light cruisers; 67

25

destroyers; 69 torpedo boats; 117 submarines; and mine-sweepers, repair ships, and

special assault craft (MAS-mezzi d’ assaulto). However, the Italian Navy was less than it

appeared on paper. Apart from a few minor engagements in the Adriatic, the Italian Navy

saw little action in World War I, nor did it carry out much training during the inter-war

years, so it lacked the experience in naval strategy and tactics necessary to fight a

prominent sea power like Great Britain. In 1939, for example, it had four old World War

I battleships, built in 1911 in service, only two of which (Cavour and Cesare) had been

refitted and modernized. In 1940 the fleet was considerably improved by its

commissioning of two new “fast” battleships, the 35,000-ton Littorio (name changed to

Italia in August 1943) and Vittorio Veneto. Italy had no aircraft carriers, arguing that its

land-based aircraft were always in range. However, this would prove to be a decided

disadvantage. It was the large Italian submarine fleet that seemed to pose the greatest

danger when war was declared, as four-fifths of them were ready for action. The British

opinion of the Italian Navy is explained in a war time HMSO booklet entitled East of

Suez, West of Malta and published in 1943. In it the Admiralty says:

Although Italian seamen have never lacked courage, her Navy has not the professional and psychological outlook of the blue-water sailor; and under Mussolini’s regime, political uncertainty must inevitably have penetrated the wardrooms and mess-decks of the fleet. When that happened, it was perhaps no longer completely reliable as a weapon of war. A suspicion of this may have decided Italy to put her faith in air power and take no undue risks with the fleet.37

As an aspect of the Navy, little consideration was taken for the Italian merchant

shipping when the war began, specifically where all the ships were located in the world.

In 1940 Italy had 786 ships over 500 gross tons. When Mussolini had declared war, one-

third of them, totaling nearly 1,200,000 gross tons, had been sailing outside the

Mediterranean and had not been withdrawn to safe waters before the declaration. As a

26

consequence, many of them were lost at the very outset of hostilities. Many of the ships

caught overseas in June 1940 were among Italy’s best. Of the 500 ships remaining under

Italian control after the war began, many were unsuited for war service, either because of

their large size, as with the ocean liners pressed into service, their age, slow speed, or

limited size. This situation was to have an immediate impact on resupplying North Africa

while fighting the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force to get the convoys to their

objective.38

Now that we have a better picture of the Italian armed forces let us take a look at

what their instructions were when Mussolini declared war. With the outbreak of

hostilities, Commando Supremo issued plans that directed the armed forces to conduct

the following operations:

Land fronts: offensive in the Western Alps against France (which was at the point of seeking an armistice with Germany);

Precautionary observation of Yugoslavia; Initial defensive attitude on the Albania front: same to be modified in

accordance with developments in the situation in the Balkans; Defensive in Libya, on the Tunisian as well as on the Egyptian front;

Defensive in the Aegean; Air-sea offensive throughout the Mediterranean.39

Mussolini had told Hitler that military operations would commence the day

following his declaration of war. That next morning, 11 June 1940, elements of the

Italian Air Force began bombing Malta. At the same time Italy began offensive

operations against the French along their mutual border. The purpose for these operations

and the basic reason for Italy entering the war in the first place was so Mussolini could

have a legitimate seat at the peace negotiations when the German campaign ended in

France. However, despite France’s poor showing against the Wehrmacht in the north, the

French were not only able to hold against the Italians, but were actually able to take

27

counter-offensive action of their own and beat back the Italians prior to surrendering to

the Germans. This was the first setback for Italy and for Mussolini’s prestige as a

political leader.

The next setback for Italy came in North Africa where Italy held Libya and

Ethiopia. Between these two areas were approximately 250,000 troops facing 40,000

British and Dominion forces in Egypt. The Italians under Marshal d’Armata Rodolfo

Graziani invaded and occupied British Somaliland on 17 August 1940, possibly cutting

off the merchant transit route through the Red Sea and cutting of the British route from

India. On 13 September Graziani reluctantly invaded Egypt under pressure from

Mussolini. The assault into Egypt was initially successful. The Italians were able to

capture Sidi Barrani, 65 miles inside Egypt’s border with Libya; however British General

Wavell sent an attack force of 30,000 troops to recapture Sidi Barrani, which they did,

along with 20,000 Italian prisoners. By the end of the British campaign, which started on

9 December 1940, the British had beaten the Italians back across Libya to Tripoli, and

had captured the port of Tobruk and more than 130,000 Italian prisoners.40

While fighting was going on in North Africa Mussolini felt it necessary, at the

end of September, to order the demobilization of 600,000 troops, over half of the Army,

because he could not afford to maintain them over the winter. At the same time as

fighting in North Africa and ordering a demobilization Mussolini planned for the

invasion of Greece, which began prior to the beginning of November 1940. Greece and

the Balkans was an area that Germany had long attempted to prevent Italy from invading.

Since mid-summer, the Germans had been warning Mussolini not to extend the war into

the Balkans because Germany needed this region to be secured prior to invading the

28

Soviet Union in 1941. On the morning of 28 October 1940, ten weak Italian divisions

invaded Greece through the mountains of Albania. Prior to the invasion Mussolini told

Ciano, “Hitler keeps confronting me with accomplished facts. This time I am going to

pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the papers that I have occupied

Greece.”41 The Italian attack was one of the most ill prepared operations of the Second

World War. By November 1, the doughty Greeks counter-attacked and forced the hapless

Italians back toward Albania. So serious was the Greek threat to Albania that Mussolini

was forced to pour men and equipment into that front. The Navy had to divert traffic

from the North African supply route to Albania. The Italian Air Force ended up sending

over 650 aircraft to support operations in the Balkans.42 With the Italians on the

defensive in North Africa and now Greece, it became more publicly evident to Italy’s

ally, Germany that the Italians would require more and more assistance from Germany in

order to survive in the war.

Throughout 1941 Italy was unable to conduct any offensive campaigns on its

own. German troops backed up the Italian troops in North Africa, while in the Balkans

the Italians were kept on the defensive by the Greeks even though in April 1941 Greece

was invaded by Germany. Only when Germany defeated Greece did the offensive action

against Italian forces in Albania end. With the German invasion of Russia in June 1941,

Mussolini did commit several divisions to Operation Barbarossa. The horrific Italian

losses on the Eastern Front further eroded Mussolini’s support with the King and the

Italian people.43

Through all these campaigns Malta still remained in British possession. There

were leaders on both sides that wondered why the Italians never captured the island at the

29

outset of the war. In fact Hitler was vexed that Mussolini had failed to capture Malta at

the very outset of war.44

While discussing the strategic picture of the Mediterranean in 1941 particular

attention needs to be given the operation that concluded the German invasion of the

Balkans. This was an operation that would have a direct impact on future operations

against Malta and mark the final major use of one of Germany’s elite Fallschirmjäger.

1Jason McDonald, The World War II Multimedia Database [database on-line];

available from http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/france.htm; Internet; accessed on December 2005 (hereafter cited McDonald, http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/_____.htm).

2Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia [database on-line]; available from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Dunkirk; Internet; accessed on February 2006 (hereafter cited Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/_____).

3Lutton, 33.

4Ibid., 27.

5McDonald, http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/africa.htm.

6McDonald, http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/uk.htm.

7Ibid.

8Forty, 22.

9Matthew Cooper The German Army 1933-1945: Its Political and Military Failure. (Chelsea, Michigan: Scarborough House, 1990), 251.

10McDonald, http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/greece.htm.

11Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939-1945, (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1964), 131.

12Kenneth Macksey, Kesselring, German Master Strategist of The Second World War. (London, England: Greenhill Books, 1996), 105.

13Forty, 48.

30

15Forty, 43.

14Adolf Hitler.ws: An Apolitical Historical Website, [database on-line]; available from http://www.adolfhitler.ws/lib/proc/pactofsteel.html, Internet; accessed on February 2006.

16Lutton, 6.

17Ibid., 8.

18Ibid., 4.

19Gerhard Schreiber; Bernd Stegmann; and Detlaf Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, vol 3 The Mediterranean, South-east Europe, and North Africa1939-1941. (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1995), 25.

20Lutton, 7.

21Ibid., 12.

22Ibid., 8.

23Ibid., 12-13.

24Ibid., 14.

25Ibid., 16.

26Forty, 21-22.

27Lutton, 25.

28Schreiber, Stegmann, and Vogel, 66-67.

29Lutton, 17-18.

30Ibid., 13.

31Forty, 46.

32Ibid., 21.

33Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/London_Naval_Treaty.

37Forty, 43-46.

38Lutton, 135.

31

39Ibid., 22.

40McDonald, http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/africa.htm.

41Lutton, 45.

42Ibid., 41-45.

43McDonald, http://www.worldwar2database.com/html/italy.htm.

44Lutton, 23.

32

CHAPTER 3

OPERATION MERCURY (INVASION OF CRETE)

Now that the strategic stage has been set it is important to examine the one

operation that would be looked upon during the planning for the invasion of Malta,

Operation Mercury, the codename for the airborne invasion of Crete in May 1941. The

ten-day battle at the end of May 1941 was the largest use of airborne forces up to that

time. It was the first time that almost an entire division was dropped onto an objective

and used to secure a major strategic target.1

Location and Topography

As the fourth largest island in the Mediterranean, the island of Crete dominates

the entrance into the Aegean Sea and the southern approaches to the Turkish Straits. It is

located just sixty miles south of the Greek mainland in the eastern Mediterranean, 460

miles from Egypt, 240 miles from Libya, and 600 miles from the Suez Canal. This

location had strategic implications for both Germany and Great Britain in 1941.2 Crete is

approximately 160 miles long from west to east and varies in width from 8 to 35 miles.

The interior of the island is covered by mountains that rise in the western part of the

island to an elevation of 8,100 feet. The southern coast is covered with cliffs, so that the

only usable port along this part of the coast is the small harbor of Sphakia. There are only

a few north-south roads, and the only motor road to Sphakia, ends 1,300 feet above the

town. The sole major traffic artery runs close to the northern coast and connects the

towns of Maleme and Canea in the west, and Retimo and Heraklion as you move east.

Suda Bay is located on the northern coast and lies between Canea and Retimo, on the

33

western half of the island. The topography of the island therefore favored the invader,

since the mountainous terrain left no other alternative to the British but to construct their

airfields close to the exposed northern coast.3

Operational Situation

At the beginning of 1940 Crete was not occupied by any of the warring powers.

Even after Italy declared war no one occupied the island. It was only after the Italian

surprise attack on Greece in October 1940 that the British occupied Crete with one

brigade in addition to some Greek units. The British improved the three local airfields at

Maleme, Retimo, and Heriklion and the harbor installations at Suda Bay, where they

established a naval refueling base.4 In November 1940 when the British landed their first

element of troops, General Sir Archibald Wavell, British Commander of Middle East

Command, considered Crete as a secondary priority. Wavell’s command was

overstretched in accomplishing its priorities with the Italians in North Africa and Greece,

unrest in Syria and Iraq. Even though his forces were busy this did not mean that Crete as

a military garrison should be entirely neglected.5 During the German invasion of Greece,

Crete was first used as the main supply base for British operations in the Balkans and

later as the collection point for most of the troops evacuated from Greece. Once the

evacuation of Greece was complete there were 32,000 British and Imperial troops and

14,000 Greek troops on Crete. The original garrison, numbering approximately 5,000

men, was fully equipped, but the majority of the troops evacuated from Greece arrived

tired, disorganized, and equipped only with the small arms they saved during the

withdrawal.6

34

The British had always regarded the Mediterranean as a bridge and not as a

dividing line and therefore they expected that the Luftwaffe would bypass Crete to pose a

real threat against the British fleet in Alexandria and British bases in the central and

eastern Mediterranean, such as Malta and Gibraltar. The views of the US Navy were even

more extreme, but saw the possibility of Germany capturing Crete. The US Navy

visualized that with the German occupation of Crete; the British fleet would be driven

from the Mediterranean and even considered an end to the war to be possible.7 In view of

the massive strength of the Luftwaffe in the Balkans, General Sir Archibald Wavell

argued that Crete could not be held against a determined attack. Despite this assertion

Prime Minister Churchill did not order its evacuation, but instead put General Sir Bernard

Freyberg, Commanding General of the New Zealand Division, in charge of Crete’s

defense.8

For the Germans, possession of Crete would secure the Aegean Sea for Axis

shipping and provide air bases to launch offensives against British forces in Egypt, and in

Hitler’s opinion lessen Britain’s influence in the Eastern Mediterranean. The Balkan

region, as well as Crete, was also important to Germany as Hitler set his sights on the

Soviet Union. Control of the Balkans would provide a secure right flank for his invading

forces and protect the oilfields in Romania, which provided necessary fuel for his war

machine. Allied control of Crete with their air and sea superiority would deny the

Germans a strategic military foothold in the region.9 As long as the British held the

island, they would be able to maintain naval and air superiority in the eastern

Mediterranean; Crete could serve as a springboard for British landings along the Balkan

coast; and it was a potential air base from which the Romanian oil fields could be

35

attacked.10 It is important to note that General Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps was

beginning its initial offensive against the British forces in North Africa concurrently with

the German offensive on the Balkan Peninsula. Its initial operations held and then drove

General Wavell’s army back towards the Egyptian frontier. This defeat was brought

about as a result of Churchill’s order to Wavell to use part of the 8th Army as an

expeditionary force to Greece.11 Keeping the sea-lanes of communication open to

German forces in North Africa became paramount to prevent failure there.

As the conclusion to the campaign in Greece was in sight by mid April 1941 the

focus moved to invading a strategic island in the Mediterranean that could influence

future operations in the Mediterranean and North Africa and protect Germany’s strategic

interests. The German senior leadership was split as to whether to invade Malta or Crete.

On 15 April General der Flieger Kurt Student, one of General der Flieger Alexander

Löhr’s subordinates and commander of XI Flieger Corps, submitted to Göring a plan for

capturing Crete. On the same day the Army High Command, Ober Kommando der

Heeres (OKH), transmitted a plan for the invasion of Malta. The latter plan had been

under consideration for some time.12 Speaking for the OKW Operations Staff, General

Alfred Jodl recommended that they seize Malta. It had been less than a week since an

entire convoy bound for North Africa had been sunk and it was the opinion of Jodl’s staff

that the over-all situation would be helped the most by capturing the British island base.

The capture of Malta would eliminate the threat to the Africa-bound convoys, which the

capture of Crete did not offer this advantage. The OKW operations staff foresaw that the

onset of the Russian campaign would lead to a relative reduction in German air strength

36

in the Mediterranean and that support of Rommel’s forces would be the top priority.

Neutralizing Malta dropped to the third priority for the Luftwaffe.13

During the debate over invading Malta or Crete, Hitler decided that Crete was

more important and selected an invasion there over an attack on the island of Malta, even

though Malta was a British stronghold and was influencing Axis operations in North

Africa. In Hitler’s opinion, Crete with its potential for larger airfields and good anchorage

was more important then Malta.14 Capturing Crete would also push British bombers back

to Egypt and out of range of the Romanian oil fields at Ploesti.

On 20 April, after a conference with General Student, Hitler decided in favor of

invading Crete rather than Malta, and five days later Directive No.28 was issued under

the code designation Operation Mercury.15 The majority of senior leaders believed that

Malta was a more important target and needed to be eliminated. However, giving Malta

priority over Crete would have done more to eliminate a threat to German offensive

operations in North Africa. It also would have required commitment of substantial

German resources to a potentially costly undertaking, which would have had to be

planned and implemented, from the outset, with an already unreliable ally instead of

using only German troops as in Crete.16

So Hitler decided to give priority to the assault on Crete. In his opinion, the

possession of Crete, allowed the Luftwaffe to cover the Eastern Mediterranean and bring

Alexandria and the Suez Canal within operational range, thus jeopardizing Malta’s

resupply from the east, and sharply diminishing its value as a stepping-stone for staging

area for eastbound resupply operations. Operation Mercury could be initially mounted on

an independent basis, bringing the Italians in later, if at all. Most importantly, it might

37

make the invasion of Malta unnecessary.17 According to this directive the necessary

preparations were to be made to invade and occupy Crete. It was to serve as a base for

future air operations against the British in the eastern Mediterranean. At the time ample

ground forces were available in the southern Balkans, but a major obstacle stood in the

path of the seizure of Crete. British naval superiority in the eastern Mediterranean

remained uncontested and a sea-borne landing in Crete could not be affected until the

British fleet had been destroyed or at least driven out of the Aegean.18

Planning

With the issuing of War directive No. 28, preparations for the invasion of Crete

began; however, it took time to assemble the necessary men and equipment since they

were scattered all across Europe. As a result, D-Day for Operation Mercury was put back

until 20 May. This delay allowed the confused defense of Crete to be put into some sort

of order.19 General der Flieger Alexander Löhr, the commander of IV Luftflotte, was put

in charge of executing Operation Mercury. His task force consisted of the following

units:

1. VIII Fliegerkorps under the command of General der Flieger Freiherr (Baron) Wolfram von Richthofen.

2. XI Fliegerkorps, commanded by Generalmajor Kurt Student: 10 air transport groups with approximately 600 troop carriers and 100 gliders; one reconnaissance squadron; the reinforced 7th Flieger (Airborne) Division; 5th Gebirgs (Mountain) Division; one regiment of the 6th Gebirgs Division; several airborne antiaircraft, engineer, and medical battalions forming the corps troops. The total strength of the invasion force was approximately 25,000.

3. One Bombardment group, which was to lay mines in the Suez Canal area. 4. One naval patrol group and one air-sea rescue squadron.20

38

During the early planning process General Löhr favored a single concentrated

drop to seize the airfield at Maleme, followed by a build up of additional infantry and

heavy weapons, and then a conventional advance up the island from west to east. Such an

approach would allow for a consolidated German effort and ease of command and

control; however, it might allow the British time to reinforce the garrison either by sea, or

by landing troops at either Heraklion or Retimo. Generalmajor Student suggested no less

then seven separate drops, the most important being around the airfields at Maleme,

Retimo and Heraklion, with the focus on Heraklion. Student’s plan would enable the

Germans to seize all the main strategic points at the outset. It was predicated on the

ground resistance being minimal. In the end Göring imposed a compromise plan. The

drops on D-Day by 15,000 combat troops of the 7th Flieger Division would be made in

two waves: the first in the morning around the town of Hania and the airfield at Maleme,

the second in the late afternoon against the airfields at Heraklion and Retimo. This would

be followed on D+1 by the arrival of the 7,000 mountain troops of 5th Gebirgs Division

under Generalmajor Julius Ringel and the sea-borne elements.21

Gruppe West, commanded by Generalmajor Eugen Meindl, consisted of the entire

Luftlande Sturmregiment, minus two companies of glider troops that were attached to

Gruppe Mitte, which would land in the first wave and had the objective of securing

Maleme airfield. The divisional commander, Generalleutnant Wilhelm Süssman,

commanded Gruppe Mitte. The first wave would consist of the divisional headquarters

along with the two glider companies from the Luftlande Sturmregiment as well as Oberst

Richard Heidrich’s 3rd Fallschirmjäger Regiment (FJR), reinforced by engineer and AA

units. Their objective would be to land in Prison Valley and attack towards Hania and

39

Suda. The second wave would be commanded by Oberst Alfred Sturm and consist of the

1st and 3rd Battalions, 2nd FJR, with the town of Retimo as its objective. Gruppe Ost,

commanded by Oberst Bruno Bräuer and landing in the second wave, consisted of the 1st

Fallschirmjäger Regiment, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 2nd (FJR) with Heraklion as

its objective.22

Even though there was an initial disagreement about the plans, Göring’s

compromise plan was supported by all the planners. All the senior leaders including the

Kriegsmarine’s Konteradmiral Karl-Georg Schuster agreed that Maleme should be one of

the main targets. It was the closest objective to the island’s administrative center, Hania,

and Suda Bay. It was also the shortest flight time from the Greek mainland. This latter

aspect was important, as the 502 operational Ju-52s could not carry all the assault

elements in a single drop; the maximum was around 6,000 in one lift. This meant that,

even had the German intelligence estimates proved correct, the attacking forces would

have been at a 1:2 disadvantage. This issue’s impact will be further discussed below.23

There was no agreement between the three services on how to conduct the

invasion or if it should be conducted. While the Luftwaffe approached the invasion of

Crete with full confidence, the other two services maintained a reserved attitude. Unable

to participate in the operation with its own ships, the German Navy was all the more

skeptical because of the manifest weakness of the Italian Fleet. On the other hand, the

German Navy welcomed this opportunity for the possible defeat of the British

Mediterranean Fleet. The Navy was responsible for securing the sea-lanes and was to

contact the Italian Navy to coordinate for this purpose as well as for the procurement of

the necessary shipping space. The Army’s lack of enthusiasm was based on the

40

assumption that the British would defend Crete to the bitter end since it protected their

flank in North Africa and at the Suez Canal. The Army was to provide suitable units to

reinforce the airborne corps, including an armored combat team that was to be sea borne.

Moreover, the Army was to make available the occupation forces, which would be

needed to relieve the airborne troops once the seizure of the island had been

accomplished. The Army also had reservations because there was a real danger that too

many first-class troops might be diverted to a secondary theater of war w