communal riots of muzaffarnagar- shamli, 2013: institutionalised

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Communal Riots of Muzaffarnagar- Shamli, 2013: Institutionalised Riots System, Majoritarian Politics and Human Insecurity of the ‘Minority’ Community in the region. Submitted by: Surbhi Khyati ISA Asia Pacific Conference 2016, City University, Hong Kong Table of Contents INTRODUCTION 2 THE POLITICS OF CATEGORISATION AND HUMAN (IN)SECURITY OF THE ‘MINOTITY’ COMMUNITY 3 REDUCING CITIZENS TO CATEGORIES –A CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN SECURITY ERROR!BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. MUZAFFARNAGAR AND SHAMLI – A NEW CASE OF IRS? 4 POLITICAL SKETCH 5 SOCIAL MAKEUP 5 (1) JATS 6 (2) KHAP PANCHAYAT 6 (3) FARMERS’POLITICS OF THE REGION - 7 THE 2013 RIOTS 10 MANUFACTURED VIOLENCE – FRACTURED COMMUNITY 14 EFFECTS OF THE RIOTS ON HINDUS AND MUSLIMS 15 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HINDUS AND MUSLIMS BEFORE RIOTS 15 CHANGE IN RELATIONSHIP AFTER THE RIOTS 16 POLITICAL OUTCOMES 17 CONCLUSION 18

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Page 1: Communal Riots of Muzaffarnagar- Shamli, 2013: Institutionalised

CommunalRiotsofMuzaffarnagar-Shamli,2013:InstitutionalisedRiotsSystem,MajoritarianPoliticsandHumanInsecurityofthe‘Minority’Communityintheregion.Submittedby:SurbhiKhyatiISAAsiaPacificConference2016,CityUniversity,HongKong

TableofContents

INTRODUCTION 2

THEPOLITICSOFCATEGORISATIONANDHUMAN(IN)SECURITYOFTHE‘MINOTITY’COMMUNITY 3REDUCINGCITIZENSTOCATEGORIES–ACHALLENGEFORHUMANSECURITY ERROR!BOOKMARKNOTDEFINED.

MUZAFFARNAGARANDSHAMLI–ANEWCASEOFIRS? 4POLITICALSKETCH– 5SOCIALMAKEUP– 5(1)JATS 6(2)KHAPPANCHAYAT 6(3)FARMERS’POLITICSOFTHEREGION- 7THE2013RIOTS 10

MANUFACTUREDVIOLENCE–FRACTUREDCOMMUNITY 14EFFECTSOFTHERIOTSONHINDUSANDMUSLIMS 15RELATIONSHIPBETWEENHINDUSANDMUSLIMSBEFORERIOTS 15CHANGEINRELATIONSHIPAFTERTHERIOTS 16POLITICALOUTCOMES 17

CONCLUSION 18

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IntroductionCommunalidentitiesandtheirviolentmanifestationsareanon-goingsocio-politicalprobleminSouthAsiaforoversevendecadesnow.InSouthAsianlexicon,theword‘communal’delineatesaverydifferentanalogythanthegeneralmeaningofthetermasusedinotherpartsoftheworld.Communalism,inthiscontext,pertainstoaconditionofsuspicion,fearandhostilitybetweenmembersofdifferentreligiouscommunities(Pandey,1990,p.6).Communalviolenceorcommunalriot,similarly,meansviolentconflictsbetweenthesereligiousgroups,“analogoustoviolentracialorethnicconflicts,[which]involvecollectiveand/orindividualactsofviolence–murder,looting,arsonandthedestructionofproperty.”(Patel,1995,p.370).Communalidentityisreligion-basedidentity,likeHinduorMuslimidentity,invokedparticularlyagainstotherreligiousidentities.Communalismisthusinvokedinbinary,oneagainsttheother,inmostofthecircumstances,almostalwaysasgroupidentitybasedonhomogenizedreligiousmarkers.AsPandeysuggests,“Inacademicinvestigations,moreoftenthannot,thetermisappliedtoorganizedpoliticalmovementsbasedontheproclaimedinterestofthereligiouscommunity,usuallyinresponsetoarealorimaginedthreatfromanotherreligiouscommunity(orcommunities)”(Pandey,1990,p.6).Communalpoliticsisthemanipulationoruseofthesegroupidentitiesindirectpoliticalinstigationsandworkings.ThepoliticsofcommunalismanditsresultantviolencehasbeenpresentintheannalsofIndianhistoryevenbeforeindependence.CommunalpoliticsremainedpivotalinthepartitionofBritishIndiaintoIndiaandPakistanandisblamedfortheviolenceandbloodshedfollowingthepartitionandmigrationofHindus,SikhsandMuslimsacrosstheborderonbothsidesin1947.CommunalviolencehasgraduatedfrombeingsporadicincidencesofviolenceintobeinganunceasingrecurringfeatureofIndianpolitics.OneofthewatershedmomentsinIndiancommunalhistoryafterpartition,whichchangedthepoliticalandsocialconversationaboutandaroundreligiouscommunities,wasthedemolitionofBabriMosqueinAyodhya(UttarPradesh)in1992.Themostrecentlarge-scalecommunalviolenceinIndiaweretheriotsofMuzaffarnagarandShamliinthenorthernstateofUttarPradesh,whichleftaround50,000peopleinternallydisplaced,thelargestsuchdisplacementafterpartition.InstitutionalisedRiotSystemInthispaper,Iwillpresentthefindingsofresearchandinterviewsconductedintheviolence-hitregionofMuzaffarnagarandShamliin2015,tobringforththeinterestsofcertainpoliticalgroupsandtheroleof‘InstitutionalisedRiotsSystem’(IRS)(Brass,2004)incommunalviolencewitnessedbythisregionin2013.Inhispaper‘DevelopmentofanInstitutionalisedRiotSysteminMeerutCity,1961to1982’(2004),Brasschallengedtheideathatriotsaresponteneousoccurrences,wheretheangerofacommunityagainstanotherleadstoviolence.Brasssaid-Farfrombeingspontaneousoccurrences,theproductionofsuchriotsinvolvescalculatedanddeliberateactionsbykeyindividuals,theconveyingofmessages,recruitmentofparticipants,andotherspecifictypesofactivities,especiallyprovocativeones,thatarepartofaper-formativerepertoire.Moreover,alltheseactionsmayrequirefrequentrehearsalsuntilthetimeisripe,thecontextisfelicitous,andtherearenoseriousobstructionsincarryingouttheperformance.(2004,p.4839).

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Healsostressedevenwherethereisexistenceofinterreligiousassociationorinterpersonalrelationamongstmembersofdifferentcommunities,“elementsofcivicengagementcannotwithstandthepowerofpoliticalmovementsandforcesthatseektocreateintercommunalviolence”(ibid.).InmyresearchofMuzaffarnagarandShamliriotsof2013,Ifoundelementsofcalculatedanddeliberateactionsbeforetheriots,variousprovocativeactivitiesandrehearsalsofriotsbeforetheactualriotofSeptember2013.

ThePoliticsofCategorisationandHuman(In)Securityofthe‘Minotity’CommunityHistorically,securitydebateshavelargelyrevolvedaroundtheunderstandingofStatebeingthereferentobjectofsecuritizationfromthreat,wherethreatwasperceivedtobeexternal.(CommissionofHumanSecurity[CHS],2003,p.2).However,withtheendofColdWarandtheriseofapresumably‘unipolar’world,mostofthe‘threats’nowarewithinstate’sownterritorialboundary.Sourceofconflictandaggressionaremostlyinternalratherthanexternal.Hence,aneedwasfelttobroadenthehorizonofsecurityparadigmandredefinetheunderstandingofsecurity.Inthiscontext,theHumanDevelopmentReportof1994publishedbyUNDPbroughttheideaofHumanSecurityontheglobalstageasanalternativeapproachestoSecurity,claimingthatitistimeforhumanitytorestoreitsperspectiveandredesignitsagenda(UNDP,1994,p.1).WhiletheadvocatesofHumanSecurityareunanimousontheideaofHumanBeing,andnotthestate,being“theonlyirreduciblefocusfordiscourseonsecurity”(MacfarlaneandKhong,ascitedinShani,2007,p.4),thereisalackofconsensusaboutwhattheindividualsshouldbesecuritizedagainst.Proponentsofwhatistermedthe‘narrowview’conceivehumansecuritynegatively,intermsofabsenceofthreatstophysicalsecurityofindividuals,whilethoseof‘broadview’advocateforfreedomfromfearandfreedomfromwant(CHS,2003,p.4).TheNarrowApproachtoHumanSecurityconceivesthethreatas‘physicalharm’toindividuals.Proponentsofthe‘narrow’conceptofhumansecurityfocusonviolentthreatstoindividualsor,asUNSecretary-GeneralKofiAnnanputsit,‘theprotectionofcommunitiesandindividualsfrominternalviolence’(HumanSecurityCentre,2005).Thebroaddefinitionofhumansecurity,ontheotherhand,isnotnecessarilyexclusiveofthenarrowdefinitionof‘negativesecurity’,butaddsmuchmoretoit.TheFinalReportoftheCommissiononHumanSecurity(CHS),headedbyAmartyaSenandSadakoOgata,publishedin2003,takesthebroadapproach,definingHumanSecurityintermsofprotectionofthe'VitalCore'ofallhumanlivestoenhancehumanfreedomandfulfilment.Asperthisreport,humansecuritymeans

“protectingpeoplefromcritical(severe)andpervasive(widespread)threatsandsituations.Itmeansusingprocessesthatbuildonpeople’sstrengthsandaspirations.Itmeanscreatingpolitical,social,environmental,economic,militaryandculturalsystemsthattogethergivepeoplethebuildingblocksofsurvival,livelihoodanddignity”(CHS,2003,p.4).

Post-SecularHumanSecurityAthirdperspectivethathasemergedintheHumanSecurityparadigmisthatofpost-secularapproach,whicharguesagainstthewestern-liberalstandofviewinghumanbeingsasanindividualunencumberedbycommunityandculture.Theproblemwith

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thisdominantwestern-liberalunderstanding,asGiorgioShaniargues,isthatitfailstograntdifferentfaith-basedgroupstherighttoliveinaccordancewiththeirbeliefs–enjoyingalifeendowedwithmeaninganddignityfromtheirworldviewandunderstanding–andforcesthemtoassimilatetothehegemonicvaluesofwesternsecularmodernityasenshrinedinthemodernnation-statesystem(2007,2014a,2014b).Unlessthisculturaldifferenceofvariousfaith-basedgroupsisrecognisedandincludedinthediscourseofhumansecurity,theidealsofhumansecurity,freedomfromfear,freedomfromwantandespeciallyfreedomtoliveindignity,willremainadistantdream.Thisessaywillarguethatthecontinuumofreligious-basedviolenceinIndiainciteshumaninsecuritiesatallthreelevelsofhumansecurityparadigm,thatis,narrowapproach,broadapproachaswellaspostsecularapproach.

MuzaffarnagarandShamli–AnewcaseofIRS?TherearethreeimportantcharacteristicsofMuzaffarnagar,whichmakesitinterestingasacasestudy.ThefirstisthepresenceofJatswhoareHindusaswellasJatswhoareMuslims–commonlyknownasMula-Jatsintheregion.MulaJatsoccupyasignificantpositioninsocialrelationshipshere,mainlybecauseoflandownership.ThesecondinterestingfeatureofMuzaffarnagaristhestrongpresenceoffarmers’politicshere,tillrightbeforetheriots.Muzaffarnagarisoneofthehighestproducersofsugarcaneinthecountry,becauseofwhichithashighestGDPinthestate.ThefarmersofMuzaffarnagar,bothHindusandMuslims,werepartofaverystrongfarmers’movementin1990sand2000sandevenafterthemovementbecamelesseffective,thefarmersoftheregionhadastrongsayinthepoliciesofagriculturesetbythestateandtheagro-industrysector.ThethirdpointthatmakesMuzaffarnagarunique,eveninthewesternUttarPradeshregion,isthefactthatthisdistricthadneverwitnessedariot,inspiteoflargeMuslimpresence.WhilethefirsttwocharacteristicsmentionedabovecanbefoundinsomeotherdistrictsofwesternUttarPradesh,mostofthedistrictslikeMeerutandBulandshahrhavefacedviolentcommunaltensionsinthepast,significantlyduringthe1992Babrimosquedemolitionandtheriotsthatfollowedit.Hence,IRSisarguablyestablishedinthesedistricts.However,suchasystemwasnon-existent,aswascommunalviolence,inMuzaffarnagar-Shamli.Allthesethreepointswillbediscussedingreaterdetailsbelow,withanattempttoshedsomemorelightonthesocio-politicalaswellaseconomicatmosphereofMuzaffarnagar.DemographyofMuzaffarnagar-ShamliMuzaffarnagarisanorthwesterndistrictofUttarPradesh,whichsharesborderswiththeneighbouringstatesofHaryanaandNationalCapitalRegionofDelhi.ShamliwascarvedoutofMuzaffarnagarin2011.SinceShamliisstillanewlyformeddistrict,andthelastCensusconductedinIndiawasintheyear2011,mostofthedataoftheregionisstillavailableunderMuzaffarnagardistrict.SaddledbetweentworiversGangaandYamuna,Muzaffarnagar-Shamliareprimarilyagriculturebasedregion,withover71percentofthepopulationlivinginruralagrarian

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area.Thesearealsotwoofthelargestsugarcane-producingdistrictsofthecountry,withhighestGDPinthestateofUttarPradesh.Thedistricthasanareaof4008squarekilometersandhas27townsand1019villages.AccordingtoCensusofIndia,2011,thetwindistrictsofMuzaffarnagar-Shamlihaveapopulationofabout4millionpeople.Outofthis,only1.2millionliveinurbanareas,whereasaround3millionliveinruralareas.Religionwise,1.7millionpeoplefollowIslaminthedistrict,while2.8millionareHindus.The57.51%HindupopulationofthedistrictisdominatedbylowercasteHindus(JatavsandChamars)andJats(anagrariancommunity).Muslimsconstitutemorethan40%ofthepopulation,whichismuchhigherthantheirpopulationpercentageatanall-Indialevel(13%).StatisticsofMuzaffarnagar-ShamliasperCensus2011. InNumbers InPercentageTotalPopulation 4,143,512 PopulationinUrbanAreas 1,191,312 28.75%PopulationinRuralAreas 2,952,200 71.25%Hindus 2,832,914 57.51%Muslims 1,711,453 41.30%

PoliticalSketch–TherearefourmajorpoliticalpartiesinUttarPradesh-theIndianNationalCongress(calledCongressorINChereafter);theBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP),whichistheHindunationalistpartyofIndia;theSamajwadiParty(SP)whichemergedasthechampionofbackwardclasseslikeYadavs(acastegroupwithsignificantpopulationinUttarPradesh)andMuslims;andBahujanSamajParty(BSP),whichemergedasthedefenderoftheScheduledCastegroups.Whilethefirsttwoarenationalparties,SPandBSPareregionalpartieswithpoliticalsignificanceinUttarPradesh(thoughBSPgotthestatusofanationalpartytechnicallyasithascandidatesinotherstatesaswell).SamajwadiPartyrulesthestatenowandtheChiefMinisterisAkhileshYadav.TheSPgovernmentcameinpowerin2012andwasinpowerduringtheMuzaffarnagarriots.Thenextstatelegislativeelectionsareduein2017.Politically,theentireregionofWesternUttarPradeshhasalargepresenceofMuslimsandJats,twoimportantcommunitieswithsufficientstrengthtochangethepoliticalfortunesofparties.Muslimshavesignificancepresenceinaround13parliamentaryconstituencieswhereasJats,with6percentpopulationinWesternUP,canswingpoliticalfortunesinatleast10constituencies(Pai,2013a,2013b,2014).TheregionisdominatedbyOBC-Muslimpopulation,ononehand,wooedbySamajwadiPartyandtheDalitcastes,ontheother,targetedbyBahujanSamajParty.TheBJPwontheconstituencybetween1991and1999,theperiod,whichsawtheriseofHindutvaacrossthecountry.Since1999,however,BJPwasunabletowinthisseatuntilthelastelectionsof2014.Inthepast,however,westernUttarPradeshwasthestrongholdofanotherregionalpartycalledLokDal,whoseleaderChaudharyCharanSinghwasaverypopularfarmers’leaderamongstbothJatsandMuslims.Thepartydividedlateronandnow,RashtriyaLokDal(RLD),runbyCharanSingh’ssonAjitSinghandgrandsonJayantChaudhary,stillhassomebaseinthearea.RLDstillpresentsitselfasafarmers’partyandtriestowoobothMuslimsandJats,whohavetraditionallybeenitsvoters.

SocialMakeup–

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Asisclearfromthepointmentionedabove,inordertounderstandthesocialmakeupoftheregion,itisveryimportanttounderstandthreefactors–(1)Jats;(2)KhapPanchayatand(3)Farmers’politicsoftheregion.

(1)JatsJatsarepresentinlargenumbersinwesternUttarPradeshandinMuzaffarnagar.Theycomprisenearly40%ofthepopulationinMeerut,Muzaffarnagar,SaharanpurandBijnordistrictsofwesternUP.Becauseoftheirnumericalpreponderanceaswellastheircontroloversizeableproportionofland,Jatsdominateboththepoliticsandeconomyoftheregion.Theviolencethatensuedin2013wasaresultofdirectclashbetweenJatsandMuslimsinsomevillagesofMuzaffarnagar-Shamli.JatsareaHinducommunitymainlysettledinthenorthernandnorth-westernregionsofIndia.TheJatspopulateHaryana,somepartsofPunjabandRajasthanaswellasWesternUttarPradeshTheyaremostlyagrariancommunity,withlargelandholdingsinbothUttarPradeshandHaryana.Jatsofsomeregion(mainlyRajasthan)areincludedinthelistofOtherBackwardClasses(OBCs)inIndia,whichmeansthattheyaregivenreservationingovernmentemployment.JatsofUttarPradesharenotgiventhebenefitofreservation,whichhasprovedtobethecauseofmajoragitationsandprotestsfromthiscommunity.AccordingtoSurajBhanBharadwaj(2012),thesocialpositionofJatsstrengthenedafter16thcentury.TheJatsofWesternUttarPradesharedividedinto92Gotrasorclans(2012,p.62).

(2)KhapPanchayatInordertounderstandthesocialrelationshipsbetweenJatsandothercommunitiesinMuzaffarnagar,itisimportanttounderstandasocialsetupuniquetoJat-dominatedareasinIndiacalledKhapPanchayat.KhapPanchayatcanbebestunderstoodalocal,informalsystemofdisputeresolutionandsocialcontrol,primarilydominantinregionsofIndiawithhigherpopulationofJats.ThemainregionswhereKhapisprevalenttodayinthecountryincludesthestatesofHaryana,someregionofPunjabandRajasthanandWesterndistrictsofUttarPradesh.WhileKhapPanchayatismostlyassociatedwithJats,othercommunitiesinUttarPradesh,likeGujjarsandRajputsarealsoapartofthissocialinstitution.Whiletheinstitutionitselfisconsideredveryold,itisstillpopularandhasalotoflegitimacyamongstthecommunitiesparticipatinginitinmodernIndia.ScholarstracetheoriginsofKhaptothetribaltimes,evenasinformationavailableaboutKhapsisfewandfarbetween(Kumar,2012).KhapsareknowntohaveplayedasignificantroleduringtheMughalperiod(16thcentury)inIndia(Bharadwaj,2012;Sangwan,2008;Kumar,2012).AsperSangwan(2008),KhapswereanimportantsourceofdisputeresolutioninNorthernIndiaduringthisperiod.AstheBritishEastIndiaCompanytookovertherightstocollectlandrevenuefromtheMughalemperorin1803inHaryana,PunjabandUttarPradesh,thecolonialrulealsomaintainedtherecognitionoftheKhapsystem(Kumar,2012).EvenaftertheindependenceofIndiain1947,theholdofbiglandlordsdidnotchangemuchdespiteattemptsoflandreformsinnorthernstatesofHaryana,Punjab,andUttarPradesh.SincetheinstitutionofKhapisintrinsicallylinkedtolandholdingsinruralareas,eventhoughKhapsbecameinformalasformalStatetookovertheadministration,thelegitimacyandpopularityofKhapremainedunalteredintheregion(Kumar,2012),totheextentthatlocaladministrationnormallydoesnotinterferewiththefunctioningsoftheKhapPanchayatandavoidconfrontationwiththem(Sagwan,2008).Initsbasicstructure,Khapcomprisesofacertainnumberofvillagesorganisedintoacouncil.However,overtheperiodoftime,anddependingonthesocio-economicmakeupoftheregion,Khapstodayareofdifferenttypes.Whilesomearedominatedandunitedtogetherbyaparticularclan(Gotra),thereareothersorganisedonthebasisofdominantcastesandsomeothersonthebasisofbothgotraandcaste.Therearealso

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someKhaps,whicharemulti-gotraandmulti-caste.Thebasicparameterfortheorganisation,however,remainsgotra,casteandlandholdingsinthevillage.EachKhaphasothergotrasandcastegroupslivinginthevillage,butsincetheyarefewerinnumberorholdfarlessland,theydonotdominatetheKhap.KhapsystembelievesintheconceptofBhaicharaorbrotherhoodamongstthevillagemembers.Theideaofbhaicharameansthatmembersofthesamegenerationareclassificatorysiblings(brother–sister)andcannotintermarry.ThisideaofbhaicharastartsfromvillagelevelandcontinuesuptotheKhaplevel(Sangwan,2008,p.341).AsBharadwajrightlypointsout,whiletheJatsareHindus,theirsocio-culturalpracticesdidnotconformtothetraditionalrigidculturesoftheHinducastesystem.Jatsdidnothaverestrictionsandtaboosaboutcustomsandtraditionsregardingmarriagesduringtheirearlyphases.ThatiswhythereispopularsayingthatJatkakyaHinduaurMeokakyaMusalman[What’sHinduabouttheJatsorMuslimabouttheMeos].ThisconveysthatitisdifficulttoclearlyequatethereligionofJatsasHinduorthereligionoftheMeoasMuslims.JatsdidnotrigidlyobserveHindutraditions,nordidMeoscoselyobserveMuslimtraditions.ThissayingthuscapturesthefluidiltyofthesemoderndaycategorieslikeJatsbeingHindusandMeosbeingMuslims.OnecansafelysaythattheJatcommunitystoodapartfromtherigidboundariesofBrahmanicalHinduorder...fromtheMughalperiodtothepresent,Jatcommunitieshavedevelopedinstrikinglydifferentwaysfromothergroups.(2012,p.64)SimilartotheMeosofRajasthanarethecommunityofMuslimJatsorMulaJatsinMuzaffarnagarandShamli.Mula-JatsarelandowningMuslimswhobelongtothecommunityofJatsandhencearecalledMula-Jats.TheyareconsideredtobeconvertsfromtheJatcommunityintoIslamatsomepointinhistory.ThereissignificantculturalsimilaritybetweenJatsandMula-Jats.Becauseofthecastecorrespondenceandlandownership,MulaJatsandJatssharedaverycloserelationshipwithoneanotherintheregion.Mula-JatshavebeenknowntobeapartoftheKhapPanchayatforaverylongtime.AsMangeKhanofKharadvillageinMuzaffarnagar(PersonalInterview,September10,2015)pointsout:“BothHindusandMuslimsareapartoftheKhapsystem…WhenKhapPanchayatwerecalledinthepast,Muslimswerealsocalledtoparticipateinit.”FarmerleaderRakeshSinghTikaitofBharatiyaKisanUnion(BKU)alsoexplainedthisfeatureofKhap.“KhapisnotofJatsalone;it'sofeveryjatiintheregion…Peoplefromallcommunitycome(inKhappanchayats).Khapwasasocialsystembeforethegovernment.PanchayatisystemwastakenfromKhapPanchayat.Its1200-1400yearsold”(PersonalInterview,October11,2015).TheexampleofKhapPanchayatandparticipationofMula-JatsinthispanchayatuntilrecentlyshowsthatcategoriesofHinduandMuslim,pittedagainsteachotherincommunalpolitics,aretoooversimplifiedandhomogeneous,anddoesnotrecognisepluralitiesofidentitieslikethoseofJatsandMula-Jats.

(3)Farmers’PoliticsoftheRegion-MuzaffarnagarandShamli,andbyextension,theentirewesternUttarPradeshhasaverystrongagrariancommunity.ApartfromJatsandMula-Jats,Gujjars,TyagisandRajputshavesignificantlandholdinginthearea.Thus,theregionhasbeenahotbedforfarmers’politicsforoverfourdecadesnow.Jatsbeingsthelargestlandholdingcommunity,dominatefarmers’politics.AsZoyaHasan(1994)pointsout,thedecadeofthe1980switnessedtheemergenceoftwointerrelatedchangesinUttarPradesh,thefirstbeingagriculturaltransformationsthatincreasedproductivitybymanyfolds,andthesecongbeingthetransformationoffarmersthemselves,asaresultofthefirsttransformation,intoamajorpoliticalforce.Boththesedevelopmentcrystallizedintoapowerfulfarmersmovementinthestateduringthe1980s,whenthefarmerssucceeded

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indemandingandnegotiatingforbetterpricesforagriculturalproduceandinfluenceotherissuesoftradebetweenagriculturalandindustrialsector,thusimpactingtheeconomicpoliciesconcerningagricultureinUttarPradeshandatanationallevel(1994,p.165).Amongstthefirstfarmers’politicalleaderfromtheregionwasChaudharyCharanSingh,whohadbeeninstrumentalinlendingapoliticalvoicetofarmersofUttarPradesh,specificallyofthewesternUttarPradeshfromwherehebelonged.SinghwasaninfluencialleaderoftheJanataDalgovernmentthatchallengedthehegemonyofCongressPartyunderformerPrimeMinisterIndiraGandhi.HeusedhispoliticalinfluencetobringaboutashiftintheeconomicpowerfromcitiestoruralareasandchallengedthesupremacyofCongressbyconstructinganallianceofmiddleandbackwardcastes,andsucceededinmarginalisingtheCongressinwesternUttarPradeshduringthe1970s(Hasan,1994,p.168).AstheChiefMinisterofUttarPradesh,theMinisterofFinanceundertheJanataDalgovernmentfrom1977to1979andasthePrimeMinisterofIndiafrom1979to1980,SinghbecametheleadingprotagonistsoffarmersinUttarPradeshandinIndia.However,afterhisdeathin1987,andinLokDal’sfailuretoextanctanymajorconcessionforfarmersfromtheconsecutiveCongressgovernments,therewasapoliticalvacuumcreatedregardingfarmers’voiceinpolitics.BharatiyaKisanUnion(BKU),whichwasformedin1978,rosetoprominencein1987tofillthisgapandbecomethechampionoffarmersinstateaswellasnationalpoliticsforthenextdecade.Itsleader,ChaudharyMahendraSinghTikait,wasacharismaticfarmerleaderfromMuzaffarnagar’sSisaulivillage,chosetoremainoutoftheelectoralpoliticsandworkasapressuregroupforfarmersbycreatingfarmers’movementinthestatethatsuccessfullyinfluencedtheeconomicandtradepoliciesforfarmersofUttarPradeshonanumberofoccasionsinthenexttenyears.BKUcapturednationalattentioninthewinterof1988,whenitssupporterslaidsiegetoMeerut,demandinghighersugarcaneprices,loanwaiversandhigherruralinvestmentwithloweringofelectricityandwaterratesinruralareas.InOctober1988,massivefarmers’rallycapturedDelhi.Theagitationwasmilitantinnatureandgainedwidespreadsupport,withfarmersblockingroads,closingvillagesforadministrationandcontinuingprotestforseveraldays(Hasan,1994,p.166).Farmers’movementunderBKUhadstructachordinruralUttarPradeshandsoonbecameamovementwithwhichallpoliticalpartieswantedtoassociatethemselveswith.Whilethesuccessofthecampaignwasintermsofconcessionforthefarmers,itslong-termimpactwastheemergenceofTikaitasapowerfulleader“withformidableabilitytomobilisethepeasantryofwesternUttarPradesh”(Hasan,1994,p.168).Eventhoughthemovementdidnotachieveitsmajordemandofhigherpricesofsugarcane,Tikaitsucceededinmaintainingthemomentumofthefarmers’movementandintransformingBKUasapressuregroupforfamrers’interest.Thesuccessoffarmers’politicsintheregionisverysignificantinthehistoryofcommunalrelationshipsofMuzaffarnagar,tounderstandthishomogenisationofcategoriesthatdidnotexistinpast.BKUwasdefinitelydominatedbyJats,andfollowedthestructuresofKhapPanchayatforitsownmeetings.ButBKUalsohadaverystrongsupportbaseamongstMuslimsoftheregion.AsHasanpointsout,“Thepoliticalsignificanceanddurabilityofthefarmers’movementwasdependentonitsabilitytoforgeanetworkofsupportbytranscendingtheshort-terminterests…sothataspectrumofruralproducersbelievedtheysharedeconomicinterestsandpoliticaloutlooks”(1994,p.181).Thiscross-communalnetworkwassuccessfullyforgedbyBKUbyuseofpluralreligioussymbols,andtakingcareoftheinterestsofMuslimfarmers.BKUinvestedspecialeffortsinpromotingcommunal

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harmonyinWesternUttarPradesh,andasaresult,gainedplentyofsupportfromMuslims.TheMuslimfarmersthatIinterviewed,includingMangeKhanofvillageKharadandShaifAliSiddiquifromvillageBawadi(PersonalInterview,September9,2015),claimedthattheyalwaysparticipatedintheBKUrallies.“Duringfarmers’protests,BKUcalledKhapsandgavecallsforprotests,weusedtoparticipateinsuchKhaps.In2011-12,weparticipatedinBKUKhapthatledtorailblockandahugefarmers’protest,”saidMangeKhan(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).AsignificantexampleofthisnetworkwastheBKU’scampaignagainsttheabductionandmurderofaMuslimgirl,Naiyma,inMuzaffarnagardistrictin1989.RakeshTikait,inhisinterview,pointedtotheincidentasanexampleofHindu-Muslimunityintheregion.AbouttheNaiymacase,Hasanwrites:ThisincidentsnowballedintoamajoragitationasTikaitmarchedwiththousandsoffarmerstothebanksoftheGangaCanal,anddemandedthatthegovernmentrecoverNaiyma.FollowingtherecoveryofNaiyma’sbody,hundredsofthousandsoffarmersgatherednearthecanaltoprotestagainsthermurder.AstheTimesofIndiaobserved:ThemereactofthousandsofHindussquattingonthebanksofacanalatBhopatoseekredressalofaMuslimgrievanceisremarkableinitself.Whilethisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatcommunalprejudicesarebeingconsciouslycombated,itdoespowerfullydemonstratethatthereisacommoncodeofsocialmoralitythatguidesruralsociety–arealitythaturbanpoliticiansareunabletograsp(TimesofIndia,9August1988).(Hasan,1994,p.182).TimesofIndiamadeaveryimportantpointaboutthecommoncodeofsocialmoralityinruralsociety,wherethecommunityawarenessofbeingJatandMuslimwasovershadowedbytheawarenessofbelongingtoafarmers’community.Thisawarenessofbelongingtoafarmers’communitywithcommoneconomicandsocialinterests,however,hasdiminishedovertheyearsandnow,theidentityisnolongerofthefarmer,butofthecategoriesengrainedintheConstitution,thoseof‘Hindu’and‘Muslim’.Forinstance,whenthefarmersofMuzaffarnagarweretogetherunderBKUpolitics,negotiatingforbettersugarcaneprices,theidentity‘we’constitutedofallthefarmers,HindusandMuslims,andthesugarmillownersconstitutedthe‘they’.Thisaffectedthepolicy-makingforagricultureforseveralyearstocome,asfarmersbecamemembersofthecommitteeinUttarPradeshthatdecidedthesugarcaneprice.Now,however,thisidentityoffarmerislostastheidentityofhomogenised‘Muslim’and‘Hindu’communityhastakenover.MangeKhan,thefarmerwhoparticipatedinrailblocksin2011-12underBKU,saidaboutthesituationduringtheriots–AllMulaJatshavelandinthesevillages.SomeHinduJatshavemorefarmlandthanusbutmostdon’t.Butournumericalstrengthislessinthevillage.Thetotalvoteinourvillageis7400,outofwhichMuslimshaveavoteof250andthey(Hindus)aretherest.Sowhatcouldwehavedoneduringtheviolence?Ifwehadstayed,oursituationwouldhavebeenlikeLisad.Thatiswhyweleftthevillage.(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).LisadisavillageinShamli,wheremaximumnumberofdeathsamongstMuslimcommunitywasreportedduringtheriots.Aswillbeelaboratedlater,nonebutoneMuslimfamilyhasreturnedtothatvillagetwoyearsaftertheriots.Thiscategoryof‘we’and‘they’issignificantlydifferentfromthe‘we’and‘they’offarmers’movementorofprotestagainstNaiyma’sabduction.ThisisnottosaythatthecommunityofHinduandMuslimdidnotexistearly,butapoliticalcategoryof‘Hindu’

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and‘Muslim’mightnothaveexisted,whichnowexists.Thesehomogenisedcategoriesincludeanyandall‘Muslims’-fromlandownerMula-Jatstolowercasteslikewashermenandlandlabourers.Andadirectresultofthesecategorisationandrealisationofcommunityidentityisthat,whereasinademocracy,theeconomicinterestsoffarmersshouldhavebeenthecohesiveforceforcommondeliberation–anditwasforasignificantlylongperiod–thecommunityidentitiesmakesuchcohesion,whichisstillinfavourofboththeHinduandtheMuslimfarmers–moredifficult(andevenimpossibleinariot-tornarealikeMuzaffarnagar).

The2013RiotsInspiteofsuchsocio-culturalandpoliticalbondsbetweenthetwocommunitiesofHindusandMuslims,theregionofMuzaffarnagarandShamli,forthefirsttimeinitshistory,witnessedlarge-scalecommunalviolencein2013,whichdisplacedaround50,000peoplejustaftertheriots.WhilemanyoftheintervieweesconfirmedthattensionbetweenHindusandMuslimsandincidentsofharassmentofMuslimshadbeengoingonforayearbeforetheriots,theactualincidentthatledtotheriotswasthatofallegedeve-teasingofaJatgirlbyaMuslimmannamedShahnawaz.ShahnawazwasallegedlykilledonAugust27,2013,inhisvillageKawaal–aMuslimmajorityvillageinMuzaffarnagar–bytwoJatmen,SachinMallikandGauravMallik(ofthenearbyMallikpurvillage),whowerethebrotherandcousinofthegirlallegedlyteased.Thetwomen,inturn,wereattackedbythemobinKawaalvillageasareactiontoShahnawaz’sdeath,andwerekilledinKawaalaswell.AsperthereportoftheNationalCommissionforMinorities(NCMreport,September19th,2013),Shahnawaz’sfatherdeniedtheallegationsofteasingandreportedthattherewasascufflebetweentheMallikbrothersandShahnawazregardingaminormotorcycleaccidentthatescalatedintoafightleadingtothethreemurders.Thenextday,saysthereport,peoplereturningafterthecremationoftheJatmen,setfiretoahutmentandahutinabrickkiln,anddamaged27housesinvillageKawaal.Astensiongrew,aMuslimgatheringtookplaceinMuzaffarnagartownarea,which,asperthereport,wastoappealforcalmonAugust28.Butthetensiondidnothalt.AfterthecondolencemeetingoftheMallikbrothersinanearbyvillagecalledNanglaMandauronAugust31,acarwithMuslimswasattackedandthepeopleincarwerebeatenasthecarwasburnt.SomemoreincidentsofattackonMuslimswerereportedfromMuzaffarnagaraswell.Asthetensioncontinued,apanchayatwascalledinthevillageLisadonSeptember5,wheretheMahapanchayatofSeptember5wasannounced(NCMreport,September19,2013).RakeshTikait,thefarmers’leaderofBKU,saidintheinterview(PersonalInterview,October11,2015)–Whenthepanchayatwascalled,tensionwashigh.IgaveacallforassemblyandsaidonAugust28ththatonAugust31st,wewillallassembleandwillpayhomagetoSachinandGaurav(shradhanjalisabha).Ididnotexpectthattherewouldbesomuchangeramongstthepublic.Whenweassessedthatahugecrowdmayturnupforthecondolencemeeting,andtherewasalotofangerandreactionamongstthepeople,Icancelledit..PeoplesaidIwaswrongincancellingthemeeting.Inspiteofcancelingthemeeting,somepeoplestillassembledandsaidthattherewillbeameetingonSeptember7.TherewasneitheranyleadernoranyplanforthemeetingonSeptember7.OnSeptember7,amahapanchayat(grandassembly)wascalledinNanglaMandaur,wheremorethan40,000men(mostlyJats)gathered.AspertheNCMreport,participantsenroutetothemahapanchayatwereassaultedintheMuslimmajority

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villageofBassiKalan,andtensionrosefurther.Atthemahapanchayat,inflammatoryspeechesweregivenandaMuslimbusdriverwasbeatentodeath(NCMreportSept.9,2013).JatsreturningfromthemahapanchayatwerewaylaidbyaMuslimcrowdatalocalcanalbridgeandfourotherplaces.Sixdeathswerereportedintheseincidents,thatincluded2Muslims.ThetensionledtoacurfewbeingimposedinMuzaffarnagar.It’simportanttonoteherethattheversionofwhathappenedduringthemahapanchayatdiffersamongstMuslimsandJatsIinterviewed,witheachclaimingtheotherstartedtheviolenceandwashostilefortheother.Onthesameday,ajournalistwaskilledinMuzaffarnagarduringtheviolenceandthestategovernmentcalledintheIndianArmyforcontrollingthesituation.However,violencespreadinvillageswithseveralcasesofarsonandmurderreportedfromvillagesofKutba,Kutbi,Lank,Lisad,Baawadi,Phugana,MohammadpurRaiSingh,Kakra,Kharad,MohammadpurModernandAtali.Meanwhile,thedistrictmagistrate(DM)andsuperintendentofpolice(SP)werechangedbythestategovernmentthriceinthewakeoftheriots.SoonaftertheincidentsofAugust27,theDistrictMagistrateandSuperintendentofPoliceofMuzaffarnagarweretransferred.Thenextteamwasalsotransferredwithindays,saystheNCMreport.Tikaitaccusesthegovernmentanddistrictadministrationforthedisruptionandviolencethatstartedfromthemahapanchayatandcontinuedforthenextthreedays,spreadinginvillagesofMuzaffarnagarandShamli.Heclaims-Itwasamahapanchayat.Itwasareactionfromthepublic.Itwentwhereveranyonecalled.Itwasacrowd.Therewasnoleaderornoaimofthiscrowd.Peoplewerereadytofollowanyonewhowouldlead.Thereweresome500-600,000peoplewhereastherewereonly7-8menfromtheadministrationtocontrolthecrowd.Administrationandgovernmenthadaroleinorchestratingtheriots.(PersonalInterview,October11,2015).AspertheNCMreports(19September2013,3October2013,26December2013,28January2014,28June,2014),65peopleweremurderedduringtheriotsandaround51,000peoplefledtheirhomesduringtheriots.Aftertheriots,thestategovernmentsetupreliefcampsforriotvictims.Lateron,astheriotvictimsrefusedtoreturntotheirrespectivevillages,thestategovernmentgrantedarelocationpackageofRs500,000perfamily.Somefactsoftheviolenceisasfollows:Totalreliefcamps–58(41inMuzaffarnagarand17inShamli)Totalnumberofpeoplelivinginthesecamps–51,000Sixmonthslater,numberofpeopleleftincamps–2500TotalnumberofpeoplekilledinMuzaffarnagar–29(9Hindusand20Muslims)Totalmurdersduringtheriots–65Totalcasesregistered–566LisadinShamliwastheworstaffectedvillage.Ithasapopulationof19000,including15,500JatHindus,2200Muslimsand1500ScheduledCaste.AsperthereportofNCMdatedOctober3,112oftotal250buildingsbelongingtoMuslimsinLisadwereburntdownduringtheriots.Kutuba-KutubivillageofMuzaffarnagarwerethesecondworstriot-hitvillage.TherewerenoJatdeathsreportedfromthistwinvillage,but8MuslimswerekilledinKutbaand48housesofMuslimswereburntdowninKutuba-Kutubi(NCMreport,September19).ThefirstpointIwillmakehereisthattillthepeopleofMuzaffarnagaridentifiedasfarmers,boththecommunitiesvotedinsimilarpatternstomakesurethatleaderswhocareaboutfarmersweresentasrepresentativetolegislativeassemblyandparliament.However,intheeventsprecedingtheriots,theidentitiesofthepeopleunderwent

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certainchanges.Whiletherecanbeseveralreasonscontributingtotheseidentitychanges,onereasonthatwashighlightedbyseveralintervieweeswastheso-calledbenefitthatMuslimcommunityisgettingfromthegovernmentbecausetheyare‘minority,'whichbecameaboneofcontentionbetweenJats/HindusandMuslimsintheregion.Again,itispertinentheretonotethatsuchargumentsthatthegovernmentisonlyworkingfor‘minorities’areverymisplacedbecauseoftworeasons–one,thereisampleevidencetosuggestthat‘minorities,'especiallyMuslims,aresocio-economicallybackwardanddeservesocialwelfarebythegovernment.However,suchschemesbeingtermedasbeingfor‘minorities’createsdivisivesentiments.Andtwo,tobefairtoanygovernmentscheme,whenpeoplefocusonschemesonlybroughtforminorities,theystoptakingintoaccountalltheotherbenefitsandschemesgrantedtoalltheothersectionsofthesociety.ButamoreimportantpointtobemadehereisthatsuchsentimentsareopentoorevencreatedbypoliticiansforelectoralbenefitsbyinstigatingcommunalragethroughwhatPaulBrass(2004)callsInstitutionalisedRiotSystem(discussedlater).TheSamajwadiPartygovernmentinUttarPradeshcameupwithaseriesofsocialwelfareschemesforminoritiesinthestatebetween2012-13.Onesuchschemewasprovidingfundingfordaughtersoftheminoritycommunityfor‘educationormarriage’;anothergovernmentpolicywasforconstructingboundarywallsingraveyardsforMuslims.Atthesametime,thegovernmentalsocameupwithseveralotherflagshipschemeslikedistributingfreelaptopstomeritoriousclassXandclassXIIstudents,whichwasforallcommunity,including20%forminoritiesand21%forScheduledCasteandTribe.Similarly,thegovernmentalsocameupwithunemploymentallowanceforallunemployedyouthbetweentheageof25and40,whichwasalsoforeveryoneirrespectiveofcommunitymembership.Thereactionoftheseschemes,however,wasthatSamajwadiPartygovernmentwasseenfavouringonlyMuslimsinthestate.Forexample,OmPrakashMallik,aformerforestofficerandfarmerfromvillagePhuganainShamlisaidintheinterviewthatMuslimsintheregionhadbecome“arrogant”sincetheSamajwadiPartygovernmentcametopower.“Theyweremorearrogantandstubborninthelastsix-sevenmonths,especiallysinceSamajwadiPartygovernment,”saidMallik.“Likenow,everythingisfortheirbenefit.Policiesaremadeinthenameofminorities.Evenschemesforthepoorhavearound20-30%benefitallottedforminorities.MinoritymeansMuslimsoverhere.ReportsbyMuslimsarelodgedveryeasilyinthepolicestationwhilewehavetofacealotofdelay”(PersonalInterview,October12,2015).MallikpointedoutthatJatsintheregionwerealreadyarrogantandstubborn.ButsincetheSPgovernmentcameintopower,Muslims“startedfeelingthattheyaresuperiortotheHindusasthisistheirgovernment”andthisbecameareasonfortensionbetweenthetwocommunities,thatledtoclashesbetweentheminhisvillageaswell.Malliksaid–OnereasonforthetensionbetweenthecommunityistherolethatBJPplayed.BJPhasalwayssidedwithHindus.BJPsaidthisveryopenlythatinthisperiod(ofSPgovernment),onlyonecommunityisbenefittingfromthegovernment.ThiswasalsosupportedbynonBJPpeople,thatthisgovernmentisbenefittingonlyforMuslims,anddoingnothingforHindus.(IfHindusarethevictims,thentheywilltakesomeone’ssupportright.ItcamefromBJP).Forinstanceinschools,100%ofthescholarshipforminoritieswasdistributed,somescholarshipforYadavswasalsodistributed,buttherestofthescholarshipnevercame.Inallrecruitmentproceduresforgovernment,MulayamSingh(PresidentofSamajwadiparty)filledhismen(YadavsandMuslims)andnooneelsegotrecruited.(ibid.)

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SimilarsentimentswereechoedbyseveralotherJatmembersIinterviewed.KapilDeoAgarwal,whowasamemberofBJPandlaterwentontobevotedasmemberofthestatelegislativeassemblyfromMuzaffarnagar,said-[A]ftercomingtopower,MulayamSinghYadavhasplayedtheroleofdividingthesocietyonreligiouslines.Theyspent1000crorerupeesforboundrywallof(Muslim)cemetry.First,thereisnonecessityforaboundarywallinacemetry.Secondly,iftheywantit,theyshoulddoitthroughvillagehead,blockheadsbecausethereismoneyatblockandvillaheheadlevel.Butthegovernment,justtoprovideprotectionandtoappeaseIslamicpeople,doesthiskindofthinginasystematicmanner,andinreligiousplaces,onlyboundarieswillbeerectedformuslimcementryandnotforHinducrematorium,thentherewillbeoutrageinpublic.Thematterisnottheboundary,butfavouringonecommunity.Third,whenmoneycamefordaughters,itwasonlyforminoritydaughters.IrrespectiveofhoweverpooraHindugirlmaybe,themoneyonlycameforminoritygirls,whetheritbefordaughtersorscholarshipforstudents.EventhelaptopsthatweredistributedweredistributedtoMuslimgirlsandwhentherewasoutrageaboutit,someweredistributedamongstothersaswell.Sojusttoappeasesomesections,Akhileshgovernmenthasdonethejobofdividingthesociety.(PersonalInterview,October11,2015).ItisimportanttopointoutherethatthesesentimentsabouttheprejudicedbehaviourofthegovernmentwerewitnessedverystronglyamongsttheJatsalone.Infact,thenarrativesprovidedintheinterviewswereverysimilartooneanotherandraiseddoubtaboutwhethertheywereindependentthoughtsoftheintervieweesorwerepartofpropagandabyaparticularpoliticalparty.Hasan(1994)calleditdemonisationofthestate,amethodusedbyBJPandotherHindunationalistgroupsin1992communalriotsaswell.Thisdivisivenessdrasticallychangedthevotingtrendsintheregion.MangeKhanexplainsthatearlier,HindusandMuslimsvotedtogetherintheregion.“ThisareahasvotedforBJP,SP,BSP,etc.andevenRashtriyaLokDal…[weevenvotedforBJP,inspiteofbeingaMuslim]WeknewthatBJPwasananti-Muslimparty.Butwehadtheconfidencethatourfriendiswinningsohewillhelpus.Nowthatconfidenceisnotthere,”hesaid(PersonalInterview,September10,2015),claimingthatnow,allMula-JatswillvoteforaMuslimcandidate.GhulamMohammadJaula,fromvillageJaula,whowasaseniormemberofBKUbutseparatedfromtheorganisationaftertheriots,saidthattheyallvotedforSPin2014elections.Atleastonetrendhaschangedinthearea.Inthisarea,jatsvotefortheircastemember(candidate)whicheverpartytheymightbefrom.ThisishowMuslimsarealsothinkingnow.Muslims,afterthisriot,willnotvoteforJats,nomatterwhichpoliticalpartytheyarefrom,evenifitisSP.Rightnow,therearetalksofmysongettingaticketfornextelectionsfromRLD,buttheMuslimsarenotreadyforthis.TheyaresuggestingitisbettermysontakesaticketfromBSPratherthanLokDal.Thepainandbetrayalisquitefreshrightnow,MuslimswillnotvoteforanyJatthistime.(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).Hence,theseinterviewsprovethatvotebankpoliticshasincreasedandisdividedonreligiouslinesintheregion.MuslimsarenotreadytotrustanyrepresentativefromJatcommunityandwanttosendtheirownrepresentativestotheparliament.NotgrantedanysafeguardintheConstitutiontocounterHindumajoritarianism,Muslimswillthushavetovoteenbloctoclaimashareofpoliticalpower.

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ManufacturedViolence–FracturedCommunityAtseveralinstances,theintervieweesreferredtothe“recruitmentofparticipants”,“provocativeactivities”andofotheractivitiesinvillagesbycertainHindunationalistelementsdirectlyorindirectlyrelatedtotheBJP,inthedaysprecedingtheriots.Forinstance,SajeevKumar,villageheadofvillageDulehrainMuzaffarnagar,nexttothetwin-villageofKutba-Kutbithatwitnessedextensiveviolence,saysthatthegeneraltrendinvillagesisthattheofficeofapoliticalpartyisopenedafewmonthsbeforetheelectionsfortheelectoralcampaignintheregion.However,whilethenationalelectionswereduein2014,theBJPpartyofficeinMuzaffarnagarruralareaswasalreadyopenandrunninginearly2013(PersonalInterview,October12,2015).AsimilarnarrativewasprovidedbyGhulamMohammadJaula(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).Further,MohammadIslamofLisadvillage,whowastheonlyMuslimtoreturntothevillageaftertheriots,saysthatforthefirsttimeinhismemory,theShivSena,anultranationalistHindugroupwithitsbaseinthestateofMaharashtra,wasseencampaigninganddistributingswordsinhisvillageafewmonthsbeforetheriots.Islamsaid-Some6-7monthsbeforetheriots,ShivSenahadaceremonyhere.TheywereusinginflammatoryspeechagainstMuslimsontheloudspeaker.Thiswasthefirsttimethatweheardsuchagatheringorsuchhatredonloudspeakeragainstus.WecomplainedtoourVillagePradhan[villagehead],andheagreedthatwhathappenedwasnotcorrect.Theydistributedswordsaswell.(PersonalInterview,October13,2015).MohammadKhalid,whowasafruitvendorinLisadbuthadtomovetothenearbytownofKandhlaafterhishouseandshopwereburntdownduringtheriots,alsoconfirmedtheaccountofShivSenadistributingswordsinthevillage(PersonalInterview,September8,2015).MangeKhanofKharadaccusedtheHindunationalistgroupsofdistributingalcoholandmoneyintheareatowinoverandrecruittheJatyouthsfortheriots.“Alcoholwasdistributedjustbeforetheriots.Alcoholsweredistributedinourvillageaswell.BJPalsodistributedmoney,”saidKhan(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).Hemaintainedthatonlytherogueelementsofthevillage,thusrecruited,wereinvolvedintheviolenceandmostoftheelderlyJatmenwerenot.NarratingsimilarincidencesofactivitiesbyShivSena,GhulamMohammadJaulasaid–“TheyouthsofJathavegoneinfavourofBJP.AmitShah(aBJPleader)hasdistributedmoneyamongstthem.Jateldersareveryworriedbytheirownsonsandtheviolencebecauseitcausedalotofwastage”(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).Althoughthesearehearsaynarrativesandcannotbefullyconfirmedordenied,thepresenceofsuchnarrativesmakesitclearthateveniftherewasnoinstitutionalisedriotsysteminMuzaffarnagarbefore,becausetherewerenoriotsbefore2013,thereisastrongprobabilitythatHindunationalistforcesattemptedtoestablishsuchasystemintheregionjustbeforetheriots.Brasssaysthatprovocativeactivitiesareplannedbeforetheriots,andsuchactivitiesrequirefrequentrehearsalsuntilthetimeisripeforthemainevent(2004,p.4839).Severalsuchprovocativeincidentswerereportedintheregion,whichconsequentlyincreasedthetensionbetweenthetwocommunities,foroversixmonthsbeforetheactualriot.OnesuchmajorincidentwastheprotestledbyBJPMemberofParliamentHukumSinghinShamli.TheincidenthappenedinJune2013whenSinghwasamemberofUttarPradeshlegislativeassembly.Themedia,byandlarge,reportedtheincidentasthatofaprotestbyBJPleadersagainstthegangrapeofa.AsperthereportbyTheIndian

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ExpressdatedJune18,2013,agirlwasgangrapedwhiletravellingfromUttarakhandtoHaryana.TheBJPleaderswereprotestingagainsttheincidentwhenSPAbdulHameedorderedlathi-charge(useofbaton)onthem.Theprotesttookplacewhencurfew,“prohibitingtheassemblyofpeople,hadbeenimposedinShamlicitysinceafternoonafter"minorclashes"witha"communaltinge"werereported.”Differentintervieweesgavedifferentaccountsofthisprotest.Forinstance,VikrantBurman,alocalBSPactivistinShamlidistrictsaidthattheBJPtriedtoblowtheissueofDalitcommunityintoaHindu-Muslimincident(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).MangeKhan,ontheotherhand,calleditanincidentwhereBJPtriedtostokecommunaltension.“BJPleadersSangeetSomandHukumSinghtriedtostokeviolenceinShamlijustbefore2013riots.SPAbdulHameedstoppedit.Therewaslathi-charge,andBJPleadersgothurt.Afterthat,on5thSeptember,therewasthemahapanchayat...BJPcandidatesandpeoplewerevisibleinMuzaffarnagarforayearorso,”saidKhan(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).AcompletelydifferentaccountispresentedbyRajeshMallik,sonofBabaHarkishanofLisadvillage.BabaHarkishanistheheadofGathwalaKhapintheregionandwasaccusedofviolenceinLisadandotherareasduringtheriot.Averyoldman,heisrespectedamongsttheJatsofGathwalaKhapandwasanactivevoiceduringtheriots,alongwithhisson.TheyarealsoaccusedincasesofviolenceregisteredinLisadvillage.Mallik,andanothermemberofJatcommunityfromLisad,Surpalwerepresentduringtheinterview.Surpalsaid–SPAbdulHameedwaspostedinourdistrict.OuryoungerbrothersareValmikis(it’salowercaste)asdefinedbyHinduhierarchy.Hameedmadeapublicstatementabouthisreligionandsaidthatfirst,heisaMuslimandthenheisaSuperintendentofPolice.Hemadecommentsabouthiscommunity.Whencalamityhitouryoungerbrothers(Valmikis),theywereputinjail,andtheirFIRswerealsonotlodged,allHindus,includingRajputsandothercastes,neitherthroughBJPnorShivSena,butbytheirfreewill,cametogethertofightfortheirbrothers,theValmikis.MuslimshadattackedValmikisandhadbeatenthemupandsettheirhomesonfire.(PersonalInterview,October13,2015).RajendraMalliksupportedthisaccountbyclaimingthattheMuslimssetthehousesonfireinfrontofHameed.Asisclearfromtheaboveelaboration,whiletheaccountsoftheincidentsdiffer,itisclearhowincidentsofcommunaltensionweretakingplacemuchbeforetheactualriotofSeptember2013,confirmingwithBrass’stheoryofIRS.

EffectsoftheRiotsonHindusandMuslims

RelationshipBetweenHindusandMuslimsbeforeRiotsSeveraloftheinterviewees,whenaskedaboutrelationshipsbetweenHindusandMuslimsbeforetheriots,claimedthattherelationswereverygood.MangeKhan,forinstance,saidthattheyusedtodojointfarmingofsugarcane,whereonepartofthefieldwascultivatedbyaMuslimfarmerandanotherbyaHindufarmer(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).ZahidHussain,wholivesinShamli,alsoconfirmedthatthetwocommunitiessharedverycloserelationship.“Werememberthataschildren,weusedtogoseeRamLeela(aplayofRamayanacommonlystagedduringthefestivalofDashehra).Festivalswerecelebratedtogether,”saidHussain.Hefurthersaid-Ihavemovedtotownbutmyparentsstillliveinthevillage.Jatsinmyvillagekeptmyparentsintheirhouseforprotection(duringviolence),tookgoodcareofthem,gavethemfood,washedtheirclothes.Thesituationwassuchthatwewantedtobringour

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parentstothetowntolivewithus,buttheJatwomenofourvillagewouldn’tletmyparentsleavethevillage,becausetheycalledthemthecharmofthevillage.Theywouldsaythatwewilltakecareofyourparents,cookandwashforthem,butwontletsthemleave.(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).ShaifAliSiddiquiofBawadi,Shamli,saysthathesharedcloserelationshipwithseveralHindusofhisvillage.“TherewereHindufriendsinvillage,whocouldnoteatmeatathomeasmeatwasnotcookedintheirhomes.So,theywouldcometomyhousetoeatmeat,”saidSiddiqui.HerememberedthatduringtheBabrimosquedemolitionin1992,therewasfearofattackonMuslimsandhewantedtoguardthemosqueinhisvillage,lestsomeoneattacksanddemolishesit.“TwoelderJatmenofmyvillagecameandsentushome,sayingthattheywillguardthemosqueforusallnight.Andtheydid.Suchwasourrelationship,”saidSiddiqui.(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).HindusandMuslimsusedtoparticipateincommonpanchayatsaswell.AbdulSattar,whoisnowaresidentofMLACampinKairana,Shamli,acolonyestablishedforpeoplewhowerelivinginreliefcampsafterfleeingfromtheirvillage,said-Weusedtoparticipateinpanchayats.Whoeverneededtocallapanchayat,theycouldcall,beitMuslimorHindu.Ineversawsuchalevelofviolenceandtensionbetweenthetwocommunities.EvenforfightsbetweenJats,Muslimswereinvited.If,say,amatterwasnotresolvedbythepanchayat,thenalargerpanchayatof36biradari(community)wascalledtoresolvethematter,forMuslimsandforothercommunities.(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).HidnusandMuslimssharedafinancialrelationshipinvillagesaswell.InvillageswhereHinduJatswerelandowners,theyusedtogiveloantoMuslimsforallsocialpurposes.Surpal,fromLisadvillage,said-Therearetwotypesofemploymentintheseareas.Thefirstissugarcaneagriculture.Thesecondisofbrickkiln.Labourersworkinbothkilnsandourfarms.Ouragriculturedependsonlabourers(whoaremostlyMuslims).Whenthey(Muslims)neededmoney,wegavethemloan.Thenweusedtokeepdeductingsomeamountfromtheirpaymentforfarmlabour.Thisishowthesystemworked....Wearedependentoneachother.Theydependedonusformoney.Wewerethepeopleresponsibleforrunningthesocialsysteminthevillages,sowewereresponsiblefortheirwelfareaswell.Thatiswhywelendedthemmoneywheneverneeded.(PersonalInterview,October13,2015).Hussainsaid–Ihaveseeninmychildhoodthatiftherewasdroughtinaparticularyear,theHindususedtodosomeBhandarasandYagyas(worshippingforrain),andmyfatherandotherMuslimswoulddonatemoneyandcontributeintheYagyaforrain.EvenJatswouldsendmoneyforMuslimsinMosque.(PersonalInterview,September9,2015).

ChangeinRelationshipaftertheRiotsEvenafteralmosttwoyearsoftheriots,severalMuslimfamilieswholeftthevillagesarenotreadytoreturntotheirvillage.Withtherelocationgrantsfromthegovernment(Rs500,000perfamily),theyhavebuilthousesinnearesttownarea,orneartheircamps.Asaresult,severalvillageslikeLisadandBaawadiinShamliandKutba-KutbiinMuzaffarnagar,havebecomeall-Hinduvillages,withnoMuslimfamilieslivinginthemanymore.EventheMuslimswhoreturnedtotheirvillage,arereadytoselloftheirlandandpropertyinthesevillagesandsettlesomewhereelse.Forinstance,MohammadIslamfromLisad,whoistheonlyMuslimtoreturntohisvillageaftertheriots,said–Ireturnedbecausemyfatherwaskeenonreturning.Hedidnotlikeliveanywhereelse.Hetalkstopeoplehere.Hewouldnotgoanywhereevenbeforetheriots,evenforfamilyvisits.Hejustlikesbeinghere.[But]Ifriotshappenagain,wehavemadearrangements,likeIhaveconstructedahouseinKairana.Icannotlivehereallaloneforever.There

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werearound300housesofMuslimshereandnowIamtheonlyonelefthere.Wewilllivehereaslongaspossible,andthenImightsellmypropertyandleave.Ihave12-13bighasoflandhere,andsomeotherproperties,whichIcouldnotsellimmediatelyaftertheriots.MyelderbrothersettlednearDelhinow.MulaJatsinKharad,whohavesignificantpropertyintheirvillage,arealsonotfeelingsafetoliveintheirvillagesforlong.Dr.SharifofKharadsaidthatMuslimsintheirregionareafraidaftertheviolenceof2013andwanttolivetogether,inghetoes,separatedfromtheHindus.Hesaid-WethinkthattherewillbeanautomaticpartitionbetweenHindusandMuslimsbecauseofthefearandtheseevents.Bawadi,Lisad,Lankh,PhuganahavenoMuslimsleftinthevillages.AndBJPwillgainfromthispartition.Becauseoftheseriots,Muslimshavegonebackatleast20yearsindevelopmentinthisregion.NoonewillbenefitfromthepartitionapartfromBJPbutwhatcanwedo?Shouldwedie?SomesayweshouldhaveleftforPakistanwhentherewaspartition.(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).TensionamongstHindusandMuslimsisperceivableintheseareas.GhetoisationofMuslimhomesisfurtheraggravatingtheprocessofalienationamongstMuslims.Forinstance,thepeopleinterviewedinKharadclaimthattheynolongertalktoHindusintheirvillage,orparticipateinthevillagepanchayats.GhulamMohammadJaulagaveseveralaccountsofhostilityamongstthetwocommunitiesevenaftertheriotsended-WearehearingalotofcaseslikeeveteasingofMuslimwomen,teasingofaMullahbypullinghisbeardonabus.Sowhilethesituationiscalm,relationshavenotimproved(betweenHindusandMuslims).Recently,inaRLDrallyaddressedbyChaudharyAjitSingh,therewasverylowturnoutofMuslimsintherally....Theelderswereneverinterestedinthiskindoftensionandviolence.It’stheyouthwhoaremoreinvolvedintheriots.Thecasesthatwerefiledwereduetothepressureofthecourt,inwhichinnocentpeopleweresenttojailfromboththeir(Hindu)sideaswellasourside.Manywhowereatfaultescapedfrombothsides....Bothcommunitieshavetoliveinthesamecountry,itsbettertheyliveinpeace.Becausethisviolenceisharmingeveryone.Farmershavefacedworseloss....Muslimshaveafeartodaythatthey(therioters)arenotevenconsideringMuslimsasIndians.Muslimsneedsupportrightnow…”(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).HindusalsodonottrusttheMuslimsanymore.SurpalandRajendraSinghofLisadnowfearthattheMuslimsarenotgoingtoreturntheirloans.“Inourvillage,thetotalloanonMuslimswhichisnotpaidyetisaround3.5crorerupees.SimilarsituationisthereineveryothervillagewhereMuslimshaveleft.Thatmoneywillnotreturnnow.Iftheylivedinvillage,theycouldhavereturned.Butnowitdoesnotseemso,”saidSingh,addingthatatotalof102FIRandsome400peoplearenamedinLisadaloneandthatmostoftheseFIRswerefalseandtheMuslimswereusingtheseFIRstoblackmailtheHindusandarereadytosettlethesecasesiftheHindusgivemoneyassettlement(PersonalInterview,October13,2015).

PoliticalOutcomesAsisclearlyevidentfromthecasestudyofMuzaffarnagarandShamli,relationshipsbetweenHindusandMuslimschangedovertheperiodoftime.IdentitieschangedfromactivefarmerstoreligiouscommunitymemberlikeHindusandMuslimsandthepoliticalexploitationofsuchdivisionledtotheriots,withoneparticularpoliticalparty,theBJP,benefittingextensivelyfromsuchpolarisation.AsGhulamMohammadJaulapointedourquitecorrectlyinhisinterview,TobreakthewesternUttarPradesh,BJPreallyneededtotakeJatsunderitswingbecauseJatsinfluencethevotesofJhimars,Chamars,Rajputsetcofthevillage.They

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createdtheatmosphereoftensionforthelastoneyear,whereMuslimsweretargeted.ThiswasallinreactiontoMulayamSinghYadav’sgovernmentpoliciesforMuslims.TheBJPstartedsayingthatthisgovernmentisonlyforMuslimstoinstigatedivision.(PersonalInterview,September10,2015).Aftertheriots,intheparliamentaryelectionsof2014,BJPwonaclearmajorityof281seatsintheparliament.InUttarPradesh,thepartywon71ofthe80parliamentaryseats,givingitsbestperformanceinthestateever.Hence,toanswerthefinalsubsidiaryresearchquestion-‘Doestheinteractionbetweenthe‘secular’and‘post-secular’featureoftheConstitutionresultinpoliticisedidentityformationleadingtocommunalclash?’–thecasestudyofMuzaffarnagarandShamlipresentaclearexampleofhowpoliciesforminoritycommunitiesbythegovernmentbecomesafactorintransforming‘secular’identitylikethatoffarmersintoreligiouspoliticalidentityofHinduandMuslim.ItneedstobeclarifiedherethattherearevariousfactorsthatleadtocommunalisminIndia,andsuchpost-secularfeaturesoftheIndianConstitutionbecomeoneofthosemanyfactorsthatleadtocommunalclash.

ConclusionThepoliticsofreducingpeopletopre-assignedcategoriesormarkers,liketheirreligiousaffiliationortheirgender,aggrevatesthethreatstohumansecurity.Suchcategoriesareeasilytranscendedintobecomingmodernidentities.Fromthecasestudypresentedhere,itcanbededucedthat,inspiteofsharingahealthysocialandculturalspaceandbeinginterdependentoneachotherforeconomicwellbeing,theresidentsofMuzaffarnagar-ShamlidistrictwerereducedtothepoliticalcategoryofHindusandMuslimsin2013riots.ThevictimsoftheseriotswerepredominantyMuslims,targetedfortheirreligiousaffiliationinspiteofthefactthattheyhadnothingtodowiththeclashbetweentheyouthsinKawalvillageofMuzaffarnagar.Muslimsisthecategorythatisconsidered‘minority’inpoliticallanguageofIndia,owingtotheirnumericalstrengthbeinglessascomparedtothe‘Hindus’inIndia.Thecategoryof‘Muslim’thusceasestodenoteonlyreligiousaffiliationsandendsupbecomingamarkerforidentitybasedonlowestcommondenominationofareligion.Italsoendsupbecomingapoliticalmarkerandasourceofhumaninsecurityforthepeoplefollowingaparticularreligion.TherightwingBJP–whichbasesitspoliticsonHindumajoritarianism–wonthe2014parliamentaryelectionswithflyingcoloursimmediatelyaftertheriotsof2013,whichprovesthatpolarisationofsuchpoliticisedidentitieshasleverageintheraceforpoliticalpower.Inanidealmodelofmajoritariandemocracy,‘majority’,inprinciple,isexpectedtoberandomandprotem,readytochangeatthenextvote.However,themajorityassociatedwiththeenumerationoftheethnoreligiouscategories,haveapermanencyandinthemodernpoliticaldemocracy,such‘majority’formationscanprovehazardousnotonlyforthesocietybutalsofortheverysurvivalofidealpoliticaldemocracy.Suchcategorisationof‘majority’and‘minority’becomesaseverethreattohumansecurityofthegrouporcategorythatismarginalised,asincaseofMuslimsinIndia,wholosetheirlives,sourceoflivelihoodaswellasfaceconstantchallengetotheirrighttodignity.ThecaseofMuslimsinMuzaffarnagarandShamliisnotverydifferentfromtheconditionofMuslimsacrossIndia,whohavebeensubjectedtoviolenceacrossthecountryonvariouscountsofcommunalviolence.Plethoraofevidenceisavailableonsocio-economicbackwardnessofMuslimsinIndia,andtheirexposuretoperiodic

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violencenotonlythreatenstheirrighttolivein“freedomfromfear”butalsoaggravatesthechallengestotheir“freedomfromwant”.HarassmentinsocialspacesbecauseofprevalentprejudicesensuingfromincidentswherethecrimeofoneMuslimisextendedtobecometheonusofallwhobelongtothereligionalsochallengestheirrighttolivewithdignity.Thus,thepoliticsofcategories,theidentityformationitensuesandthepoliticisationofsuchidentitiescanbeacauseofgravehumaninsecurities,challengingtheparadigmofHumanSecurityatallthreelevels–thefreedomfromfear,freedomfromwant,andfreedomtoliveindignity.

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