commentaries on the gallic war.pdf

8/11/2019 Commentaries on the Gallic War.pdf

1/196

TheGallicWars

ByJuliusCaesar

TranslatedbyW.A.McDevitteandW.S.Bohn

BOOK1

Chapter1

AllGaulisdividedintothreeparts,oneofwhichtheBelgaeinhabit,

theAquitanianother,thosewhointheirownlanguagearecalledCelts,

inourGauls,thethird.Allthesedifferfromeachotherinlanguage,

customsandlaws.TheriverGaronneseparatestheGaulsfromtheAquitani;

theMarne

and

the

Seine

separate

them

from

the

Belgae.

Of

all

these,

theBelgaearethebravest,becausetheyarefurthestfromthecivilization

andrefinementof[our]Province,andmerchantsleastfrequentlyresort

tothem,andimportthosethingswhichtendtoeffeminatethemind;

andtheyarethenearesttotheGermans,whodwellbeyondtheRhine,

withwhomtheyarecontinuallywagingwar;forwhichreasontheHelvetii

alsosurpasstherestoftheGaulsinvalor,astheycontendwith

theGermansinalmostdailybattles,whentheyeitherrepelthemfrom

theirownterritories,orthemselveswagewarontheirfrontiers.

Onepartofthese,whichithasbeensaidthattheGaulsoccupy,takes

itsbeginningattheriverRhone;itisboundedbytheriverGaronne,

theocean,andtheterritoriesoftheBelgae;itborders,too,on

thesideoftheSequaniandtheHelvetii,upontheriverRhine,and

stretchestowardthenorth.TheBelgaerisesfromtheextremefrontier

ofGaul,extendtothelowerpartoftheriverRhine;andlooktoward

thenorthandtherisingsun.AquitaniaextendsfromtheriverGaronne

tothePyrenaeanmountainsandtothatpartoftheoceanwhichis

nearSpain:itlooksbetweenthesettingofthesun,andthenorth

star.

Chapter2

AmongtheHelvetii,Orgetorixwasbyfarthemostdistinguishedand

wealthy.He,whenMarcusMessalaandMarcusPisowereconsuls,incited

bylustofsovereignty,formedaconspiracyamongthenobility,and

persuadedthepeopletogoforthfromtheirterritorieswithalltheir

possessions,[saying]thatitwouldbeveryeasy,sincetheyexcelled

allinvalor,toacquirethesupremacyofthewholeofGaul.Tothis


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hethemoreeasilypersuadedthem,becausetheHelvetii,areconfined

oneverysidebythenatureoftheirsituation;ononesidebythe

Rhine,averybroadanddeepriver,whichseparatestheHelvetian

territoryfromtheGermans;onasecondsidebytheJura,averyhigh

mountain,whichis[situated]betweentheSequaniandtheHelvetii;

onathirdbytheLakeofGeneva,andbytheriverRhone,whichseparates

ourProvincefromtheHelvetii.Fromthesecircumstancesitresulted,

thattheycouldrangelesswidely,andcouldlesseasilymakewar

upontheirneighbors;forwhichreasonmenfondofwar[astheywere]

wereaffectedwithgreatregret.Theythought,thatconsideringthe

extentoftheirpopulation,andtheirrenownforwarfareandbravery,

theyhadbutnarrowlimits,althoughtheyextendedinlength240,

andinbreadth180[Roman]miles.

Chapter3

Inducedby

these

considerations,

and

influenced

by

the

authority

of

Orgetorix,theydeterminedtoprovidesuchthingsaswerenecessary

fortheirexpedition tobuyupasgreatanumberaspossibleof

beastsofburdenandwagons tomaketheirsowingsaslargeaspossible,

sothatontheirmarchplentyofcornmightbeinstore andtoestablish

peaceandfriendshipwiththeneighboringstates.Theyreckonedthat

atermoftwoyearswouldbesufficientforthemtoexecutetheir

designs;theyfixbydecreetheirdepartureforthethirdyear.Orgetorix

ischosentocompletethesearrangements.Hetookuponhimselfthe

officeofembassadortothestates:onthisjourneyhepersuadesCasticus,

thesonofCatamantaledes(oneoftheSequani,whosefatherhadpossessed

thesovereigntyamongthepeopleformanyyears,andhadbeenstyled

friendbythesenateoftheRomanpeople),toseizeuponthesovereignty

inhisownstate,whichhisfatherhadheldbeforehim,andhelikewise

persuadesDumnorix,anAeduan,thebrotherofDivitiacus,whoatthat

timepossessedthechiefauthorityinthestate,andwasexceedingly

belovedbythepeople,toattemptthesame,andgiveshimhisdaughter

inmarriage.Heprovestothemthattoaccomplishtheirattemptswas

athingveryeasytobedone,becausehehimselfwouldobtainthe

governmentofhisownstate;thattherewasnodoubtthattheHelvetiiwerethemostpowerfulofthewholeofGaul;heassuresthemthat

hewill,withhisownforcesandhisownarmy,acquirethesovereignty

forthem.Incitedbythisspeech,theygiveapledgeandoathtoone

another,andhopethat,whentheyhaveseizedthesovereignty,they

will,bymeansofthethreemostpowerfulandvaliantnations,be

enabledtoobtainpossessionofthewholeofGaul.

Chapter4


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WhenthisschemewasdisclosedtotheHelvetiibyinformers,they,

accordingtotheircustom,compelledOrgetorixtopleadhiscause

inchains;itwasthelawthatthepenaltyofbeingburnedbyfire

shouldawaithimifcondemned.Onthedayappointedforthepleading

ofhiscause,Orgetorixdrewtogetherfromallquarterstothecourt,

allhisvassalstothenumberoftenthousandpersons;andledtogether

tothesameplaceallhisdependentsanddebtorbondsmen,ofwhom

hehadagreatnumber;bymeansofthoseherescuedhimselffrom[the

necessityof]pleadinghiscause.Whilethestate,incensedatthis

act,wasendeavoringtoassertitsrightbyarms,andthemagistrates

weremusteringalargebodyofmenfromthecountry,Orgetorixdied;

andthereisnotwantingasuspicion,astheHelvetiithink,ofhis

havingcommittedsuicide.

Chapter5

Afterhisdeath,theHelvetiineverthelessattempttodothatwhich

theyhadresolvedon,namely,togoforthfromtheirterritories.

Whentheythoughtthattheywereatlengthpreparedforthisundertaking,

theysetfiretoalltheirtowns,innumberabouttwelve totheir

villagesaboutfourhundred andtotheprivatedwellingsthatremained;

theyburnupallthecorn,exceptwhattheyintendtocarrywiththem;

thatafterdestroyingthehopeofareturnhome,theymightbethe

morereadyforundergoingalldangers.Theyordereveryonetocarry

forthfromhomeforhimselfprovisionsforthreemonths,readyground.

TheypersuadetheRauraci,andtheTulingi,andtheLatobrigi,their

neighbors,toadoptthesameplan,andafterburningdowntheirtowns

andvillages,tosetoutwiththem:andtheyadmittotheirparty

andunitetothemselvesasconfederatestheBoii,whohaddwelton

theothersideoftheRhine,andhadcrossedoverintotheNorican

territory,andassaultedNoreia.

Chapter6

Therewereinalltworoutes,bywhichtheycouldgoforthfromtheircountryonethroughtheSequaninarrowanddifficult,betweenMount

JuraandtheriverRhone(bywhichscarcelyonewagonatatimecould

beled;therewas,moreover,averyhighmountainoverhanging,so

thataveryfewmighteasilyinterceptthem;theother,throughour

Province,mucheasierandfreerfromobstacles,becausetheRhone

flowsbetweentheboundariesoftheHelvetiiandthoseoftheAllobroges,

whohadlatelybeensubdued,andisinsomeplacescrossedbyaford.

ThefurthesttownoftheAllobroges,andthenearesttotheterritories


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oftheHelvetii,isGeneva.Fromthistownabridgeextendstothe

Helvetii.TheythoughtthattheyshouldeitherpersuadetheAllobroges,

becausetheydidnotseemasyetwellaffectedtowardtheRomanpeople,

orcompelthembyforcetoallowthemtopassthroughtheirterritories.

Havingprovidedeverythingfortheexpedition,theyappointaday,

onwhichtheyshouldallmeetonthebankoftheRhone.Thisdaywas

thefifthbeforethekalendsofApril[i.e.the28thofMarch],in

theconsulshipofLuciusPisoandAulusGabinius[B.C.58.]

Chapter7

WhenitwasreportedtoCaesarthattheywereattemptingtomaketheir

routethroughourProvincehehastenstosetoutfromthecity,and,

byasgreatmarchesashecan,proceedstoFurtherGaul,andarrives

atGeneva.HeordersthewholeProvince[tofurnish]asgreatanumber

ofsoldiersaspossible,astherewasinallonlyonelegioninFurther

Gaul:he

orders

the

bridge

at

Geneva

to

be

broken

down.

When

the

Helvetii

areapprizedofhisarrivaltheysendtohim,asembassadors,the

mostillustriousmenoftheirstate(inwhichembassyNumeiusand

Verudoctiusheldthechiefplace),tosay thatitwastheirintention

tomarchthroughtheProvincewithoutdoinganyharm,becausethey

had [accordingtotheirownrepresentations,] nootherroute:that

theyrequested,theymightbeallowedtodosowithhisconsent.

Caesar,inasmuchashekeptinremembrancethatLuciusCassius,the

consul,hadbeenslain,andhisarmyroutedandmadetopassunder

theyokebytheHelvetii,didnotthinkthat[theirrequest]ought

tobegranted:norwasheofopinionthatmenofhostiledisposition,

ifanopportunityofmarchingthroughtheProvinceweregiventhem,

wouldabstainfromoutrageandmischief.Yet,inorderthataperiod

mightintervene,untilthesoldierswhomhehadordered[tobefurnished]

shouldassemble,herepliedtotheambassadors,thathewouldtake

timetodeliberate;iftheywantedanything,theymightreturnon

thedaybeforetheidesofApril[onApril12th].

Chapter8

Meanwhile,withthelegionwhichhehadwithhimandthesoldiers

whichhadassembledfromtheProvince,hecarriesalongfornineteen

[Roman,notquiteeighteenEnglish]milesawall,totheheightof

sixteenfeet,andatrench,fromtheLakeofGeneva,whichflowsinto

theriverRhone,toMountJura,whichseparatestheterritoriesof

theSequanifromthoseoftheHelvetii.Whenthatworkwasfinished,

hedistributesgarrisons,andcloselyfortifiesredoubts,inorder

thathemaythemoreeasilyinterceptthem,iftheyshouldattempt


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tocrossoveragainsthiswill.Whenthedaywhichhehadappointed

withtheembassadorscame,andtheyreturnedtohim;hesays,that

hecannot,consistentlywiththecustomandprecedentoftheRoman

people,grantanyoneapassagethroughtheProvince;andhegives

themtounderstand,that,iftheyshouldattempttouseviolencehe

wouldopposethem.TheHelvetii,disappointedinthishope,tried

iftheycouldforceapassage(somebymeansofabridgeofboats

andnumerousraftsconstructedforthepurpose;others,bythefords

oftheRhone,wherethedepthoftheriverwasleast,sometimesby

day,butmorefrequentlybynight),butbeingkeptatbaybythestrength

ofourworks,andbytheconcourseofthesoldiers,andbythemissiles,

theydesistedfromthisattempt.

Chapter9

Therewasleftoneway,[namely]throughtheSequani,bywhich,on

accountof

its

narrowness,

they

could

not

pass

without

the

consent

oftheSequani.Astheycouldnotofthemselvesprevailonthem,they

sendembassadorstoDumnorixtheAeduan,thatthroughhisintercession,

theymightobtaintheirrequestfromtheSequani.Dumnorix,byhis

popularityandliberality,hadgreatinfluenceamongtheSequani,

andwasfriendlytotheHelvetii,becauseoutofthatstatehehad

marriedthedaughterofOrgetorix;and,incitedbylustofsovereignty,

wasanxiousforarevolution,andwishedtohaveasmanystatesas

possibleattachedtohimbyhiskindnesstowardthem.He,therefore,

undertakestheaffair,andprevailsupontheSequanitoallowthe

Helvetiitomarchthroughtheirterritories,andarrangesthatthey

shouldgivehostagestoeachother theSequaninottoobstructthe

Helvetiiintheirmarch theHelvetii,topasswithoutmischiefand

outrage.

Chapter10

ItisagaintoldCaesar,thattheHelvetiiintendedtomarchthrough

thecountryoftheSequaniandtheAeduiintotheterritoriesofthe

Santones,whicharenotfardistantfromthoseboundariesoftheTolosates,which[viz.Tolosa,Toulouse]isastateintheProvince.Ifthis

tookplace,hesawthatitwouldbeattendedwithgreatdangerto

theProvincetohavewarlikemen,enemiesoftheRomanpeople,bordering

uponanopenandveryfertiletractofcountry.Forthesereasons

heappointedTitusLabienus,hislieutenant,tothecommandofthe

fortificationwhichhehadmade.HehimselfproceedstoItalybyforced

marches,andthereleviestwolegions,andleadsoutfromwinterquarters

threewhichwerewinteringaroundAquileia,andwiththesefivelegions


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marchesrapidlybythenearestrouteacrosstheAlpsintoFurther

Gaul.HeretheCentronesandtheGraioceliandtheCaturiges,having

takenpossessionofthehigherparts,attempttoobstructthearmy

intheirmarch.Afterhavingroutedtheseinseveralbattles,hearrives

intheterritoriesoftheVocontiiintheFurtherProvinceonthe

seventhdayfromOcelum,whichisthemostremotetownoftheHither

Province;thenceheleadshisarmyintothecountryoftheAllobroges,

andfromtheAllobrogestotheSegusiani.Thesepeoplearethefirst

beyondtheProvinceontheoppositesideoftheRhone.

Chapter11

TheHelvetiihadbythistimeledtheirforcesoverthroughthenarrow

defileandtheterritoriesoftheSequani,andhadarrivedatthe

territoriesoftheAedui,andwereravagingtheirlands.TheAedui,

astheycouldnotdefendthemselvesandtheirpossessionsagainst

them,send

embassadors

to

Caesar

to

ask

assistance,

[pleading]

that

theyhadatalltimessowelldeservedoftheRomanpeople,thattheir

fieldsoughtnottohavebeenlaidwaste theirchildrencarried

offintoslavery theirtownsstormed,almostwithinsightofour

army.AtthesametimetheAmbarri,thefriendsandkinsmenofthe

Aedui,apprizeCaesar,thatitwasnoteasyforthem,nowthattheir

fieldshadbeendevastated,towardofftheviolenceoftheenemy

fromtheirtowns:theAllobrogeslikewise,whohadvillagesandpossessions

ontheothersideoftheRhone,betakethemselvesinflighttoCaesar,

andassurehimthattheyhadnothingremaining,exceptthesoilof

theirland.Caesar,inducedbythesecircumstances,decides,that

heoughtnottowaituntiltheHelvetii,afterdestroyingallthe

propertyofhisallies,shouldarriveamongtheSantones.

Chapter12

Thereisariver[called]theSaone,whichflowsthroughtheterritories

oftheAeduiandSequaniintotheRhonewithsuchincredibleslowness,

thatitcannotbedeterminedbytheeyeinwhichdirectionitflows.

ThistheHelvetiiwerecrossingbyraftsandboatsjoinedtogether.WhenCaesarwasinformedbyspiesthattheHelvetiihadalreadyconveyed

threepartsoftheirforcesacrossthatriver,butthatthefourth

partwasleftbehindonthissideoftheSaone,hesetoutfromthe

campwiththreelegionsduringthethirdwatch,andcameupwiththat

divisionwhichhadnotyetcrossedtheriver.Attackingthemencumbered

withbaggage,andnotexpectinghim,hecuttopiecesagreatpart

ofthem;therestbetookthemselvestoflight,andconcealedthemselves

inthenearestwoods.Thatcanton[whichwascutdown]wascalled


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theTigurine;forthewholeHelvetianstateisdividedintofourcantons.

Thissinglecantonhavinglefttheircountry,withintherecollection

ofourfathers,hadslainLuciusCassiustheconsul,andhadmade

hisarmypassundertheyoke.Thus,whetherbychance,orbythedesign

oftheimmortalgods,thatpartoftheHelvetianstatewhichhadbrought

asignalcalamityupontheRomanpeople,wasthefirsttopaythe

penalty.InthisCaesaravengednotonlythepublicbutalsohisown

personalwrongs,becausetheTigurinihadslainLuciusPisothelieutenant

[ofCassius],thegrandfatherofLuciusCalpurniusPiso,his[Caesars]

fatherinlaw,inthesamebattleasCassiushimself.

Chapter13

Thisbattleended,thathemightbeabletocomeupwiththeremaining

forcesoftheHelvetii,heprocuresabridgetobemadeacrossthe

Saone,andthusleadshisarmyover.TheHelvetii,confusedbyhis

suddenarrival,

when

they

found

that

he

had

effected

in

one

day,

what

they,themselveshadwiththeutmostdifficultyaccomplishedintwenty

namely,thecrossingoftheriver,sendembassadorstohim;atthe

headofwhichembassywasDivico,whohadbeencommanderoftheHelvetii,

inthewaragainstCassius.HethustreatswithCaesar: that, if

theRomanpeoplewouldmakepeacewiththeHelvetiitheywouldgo

tothatpartandthereremain,whereCaesarmightappointanddesire

themtobe;butifheshouldpersistinpersecutingthemwithwar

thatheoughttorememberboththeancientdisgraceoftheRomanpeople

andthecharacteristicvaloroftheHelvetii.Astohishavingattacked

onecantonbysurprise,[atatime]whenthosewhohadcrossedthe

rivercouldnotbringassistancetotheirfriends,thatheoughtnot

onthataccounttoascribeverymuchtohisownvalor,ordespise

them;thattheyhadsolearnedfromtheirsiresandancestors,as

torelymoreonvalorthanonartificeandstratagem.Whereforelet

himnotbringittopassthattheplace,wheretheywerestanding,

shouldacquireaname,fromthedisasteroftheRomanpeopleandthe

destructionoftheirarmyortransmittheremembrance[ofsuchan

eventtoposterity].

Chapter14

TothesewordsCaesarthusreplied: that onthatveryaccounthe

feltlesshesitation,becausehekeptinremembrancethosecircumstances

whichtheHelvetianembassadorshadmentioned,andthathefeltthe

moreindignantatthem,inproportionastheyhadhappenedundeservedly

totheRomanpeople:foriftheyhadbeenconsciousofhavingdone

anywrong,itwouldnothavebeendifficulttobeontheirguard,


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butforthatveryreasonhadtheybeendeceived,becauseneitherwere

theyawarethatanyoffensehadbeengivenbythem,onaccountof

whichtheyshouldbeafraid,nordidtheythinkthattheyoughtto

beafraidwithoutcause.Butevenifhewerewillingtoforgettheir

formeroutrage,couldhealsolayasidetheremembranceofthelate

wrongs,inthattheyhadagainsthiswillattemptedaroutethrough

theProvincebyforce,inthattheyhadmolestedtheAedui,theAmbarri,

andtheAllobroges?Thatastotheirsoinsolentlyboastingoftheir

victory,andastotheirbeingastonishedthattheyhadsolongcommitted

theiroutrageswithimpunity,[boththesethings]tendedtothesame

point;fortheimmortalgodsarewonttoallowthosepersonswhom

theywishtopunishfortheirguiltsometimesagreaterprosperity

andlongerimpunity,inorderthattheymaysufferthemoreseverely

fromareverseofcircumstances.Althoughthesethingsareso,yet,

ifhostagesweretobegivenhimbytheminorderthathemaybeassured

thesewilldowhattheypromise,andprovidedtheywillgivesatisfaction

tothe

Aedui

for

the

outrages

which

they

had

committed

against

them

andtheirallies,andlikewisetotheAllobroges,he[Caesar]will

makepeacewiththem. Divicoreplied,that theHelvetiihadbeen

sotrainedbytheirancestors,thattheywereaccustomedtoreceive,

nottogivehostages;ofthatfacttheRomanpeoplewerewitness.

Havinggiventhisreply,hewithdrew.

Chapter15

Onthefollowingdaytheymovetheircampfromthatplace;Caesar

doesthesame,andsendsforwardallhiscavalry,tothenumberof

fourthousand(whichhehaddrawntogetherfromallpartsoftheProvince

andfromtheAeduiandtheirallies),toobservetowardwhatparts

theenemyaredirectingtheirmarch.These,havingtooeagerlypursued

theenemysrear,cometoabattlewiththecavalryoftheHelvetii

inadisadvantageousplace,andafewofourmenfall.TheHelvetii,

elatedwiththisbattle,becausetheyhadwithfivehundredhorse

repulsedsolargeabodyofhorse,begantofaceusmoreboldly,sometimes

toofromtheirreartoprovokeourmenbyanattack.Caesar[however]

restrainedhismenfrombattle,deemingitsufficientforthepresenttopreventtheenemyfromrapine,forage,anddepredation.Theymarched

foraboutfifteendaysinsuchamannerthattherewasnotmorethan

fiveorsixmilesbetweentheenemysrearandourvan.

Chapter16

Meanwhile,CaesarkeptdailyimportuningtheAeduiforthecornwhich

theyhadpromisedinthenameoftheirstate;for,inconsequence


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ofthecoldness(Gaul,beingasbeforesaid,situatedtowardthenorth),

notonlywasthecorninthefieldsnotripe,buttherewasnotin

storeasufficientlylargequantityevenoffodder:besideshewas

unabletousethecornwhichhehadconveyedinshipsuptheriver

Saone,becausetheHelvetii,fromwhomhewasunwillingtoretire

haddivertedtheirmarchfromtheSaone.TheAeduikeptdeferring

fromdaytoday,andsayingthatitwasbeingcollected brought

in ontheroad.Whenhesawthathewasputofftoolong,andthat

thedaywascloseathandonwhichheoughttoserveoutthecorn

tohissoldiers; havingcalledtogethertheirchiefs,ofwhomhe

hadagreatnumberinhiscamp,amongthemDivitiacusandLiscuswho

wasinvestedwiththechiefmagistracy(whomtheAeduistyletheVergobretus,

andwhoiselectedannuallyandhaspoweroflifeordeathoverhis

countrymen),heseverelyreprimandsthem,becauseheisnotassisted

bythemonsourgentanoccasion,whentheenemyweresocloseat

hand,andwhen[corn]couldneitherbeboughtnortakenfromthefields,

particularlyas,

in

a

great

measure

urged

by

their

prayers,

he

had

undertakenthewar;muchmorebitterly,thereforedoeshecomplain

ofhisbeingforsaken.

Chapter17

ThenatlengthLiscus,movedbyCaesarsspeech,discloseswhathe

hadhithertokeptsecret: thattherearesomewhoseinfluenceswith

thepeopleisverygreat,who,thoughprivatemen,havemorepower

thanthemagistratesthemselves:thatthesebyseditionsandviolent

languagearedeterringthepopulacefromcontributingthecornwhich

theyoughttosupply;[bytellingthem]that,iftheycannotany

longerretainthesupremacyofGaul,itwerebettertosubmittothe

governmentofGaulsthanofRomans,noroughttheytodoubtthat,

iftheRomansshouldoverpowertheHelvetii,theywouldwresttheir

freedomfromtheAeduitogetherwiththeremainderofGaul.Bythese

verymen,[saidhe],areourplansandwhateverisdoneinthecamp,

disclosedtotheenemy;thattheycouldnotberestrainedbyhim:

naymore,hewaswellaware,thatthoughcompelledbynecessity,he

haddisclosedthemattertoCaesar,athowgreatariskhehaddoneit;andforthatreason,hehadbeensilentaslongashecould.

Chapter18

CaesarperceivedthatbythisspeechofLiscus,Dumnorix,thebrother

ofDivitiacus,wasindicated;but,ashewasunwillingthatthese

mattersshouldbediscussedwhilesomanywerepresent,hespeedily

dismisses:thecouncil,butdetainsLiscus:heinquiresfromhimwhen


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alone,aboutthosethingswhichhehadsaidinthemeeting.He[Liscus]

speaksmoreunreservedlyandboldly.He[Caesar]makesinquirieson

thesamepointsprivatelyofothers,anddiscoveredthatitisall

true;that Dumnorixistheperson,amanofthehighestdaring,in

greatfavorwiththepeopleonaccountofhisliberality,amaneager

forarevolution:thatforagreatmanyyearshehasbeeninthehabit

ofcontractingforthecustomsandalltheothertaxesoftheAedui

atasmallcost,becausewhenhebids,noonedarestobidagainst

him.Bythesemeanshehasbothincreasedhisownprivateproperty,

andamassedgreatmeansforgivinglargesses;thathemaintainsconstantly

athisownexpenseandkeepsabouthisownpersonagreatnumberof

cavalry,andthatnotonlyathome,butevenamongtheneighboring

states,hehasgreatinfluence,andforthesakeofstrengthening

thisinfluencehasgivenhismotherinmarriageamongtheBituriges

toamanthemostnobleandmostinfluentialthere;thathehashimself

takenawifefromamongtheHelvetii,andhasgivenhissisterby

themother

s

side

and

his

female

relations

in

marriage

into

other

states;thathefavorsandwisheswelltotheHelvetiionaccount

ofthisconnection;andthathehatesCaesarandtheRomans,onhis

ownaccount,becausebytheirarrivalhispowerwasweakened,and

hisbrother,Divitiacus,restoredtohisformerpositionofinfluence

anddignity:that,ifanythingshouldhappentotheRomans,heentertains

thehighesthopeofgainingthesovereigntybymeansoftheHelvetii,

butthatunderthegovernmentoftheRomanpeoplehedespairsnot

onlyofroyalty,butevenofthatinfluencewhichhealreadyhas.

Caesardiscoveredtoo,oninquiringintotheunsuccessfulcavalry

engagementwhichhadtakenplaceafewdaysbefore,thatthecommencement

ofthatflighthadbeenmadebyDumnorixandhiscavalry(forDumnorix

wasincommandofthecavalrywhichtheAeduihadsentforaidto

Caesar);thatbytheirflighttherestofthecavalryweredismayed.

Chapter19

Afterlearningthesecircumstances,sincetothesesuspicionsthe

mostunequivocalfactswereadded,viz.,thathehadledtheHelvetii

throughtheterritoriesoftheSequani;thathehadprovidedthathostagesshouldbemutuallygiven;thathehaddoneallthesethings,

notonlywithoutanyordersofhis[Caesars]andofhisownstates,

butevenwithouttheir[theAedui]knowinganythingofitthemselves;

thathe[Dumnorix]wasreprimanded:bythe[chief]magistrateofthe

Aedui;he[Caesar]consideredthattherewassufficientreason,why

heshouldeitherpunishhimhimself,ororderthestatetodoso.

Onething[however]stoodinthewayofallthis thathehadlearned

byexperiencehisbrotherDivitiacussveryhighregardfortheRoman


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people,hisgreataffectiontowardhim,hisdistinguishedfaithfulness,

justice,andmoderation;forhewasafraidlestbythepunishment

ofthisman,heshouldhurtthefeelingsofDivitiacus.Therefore,

beforeheattemptedanything,heordersDivitiacustobesummoned

tohim,and,whentheordinaryinterpretershadbeenwithdrawn,converses

withhimthroughCaiusValeriusProcillus,chiefoftheprovinceof

Gaul,anintimatefriendofhis,inwhomhereposedthehighestconfidence

ineverything;atthesametimeheremindshimofwhatwassaidabout

DumnorixinthecounciloftheGauls,whenhehimselfwaspresent,

andshowswhateachhadsaidofhimprivatelyinhis[Caesars]own

presence;hebegsandexhortshim,that,withoutoffensetohisfeelings,

hemayeitherhimselfpassjudgmentonhim[Dumnorix]aftertrying

thecase,orelseorderthe[Aeduan]statetodoso.

Chapter20

Divitiacus,embracing

Caesar,

begins

to

implore

him,

with

many

tears,

that hewouldnotpassanyveryseveresentenceuponhisbrother;

saying,thatheknowsthatthosechargesaretrue,andthatnobody

sufferedmorepainonthataccountthanhehimselfdid;forwhenhe

himselfcouldeffectaverygreatdealbyhisinfluenceathomeand

intherestofGaul,andhe[Dumnorix]verylittleonaccountofhis

youth,thelatterhadbecomepowerfulthroughhismeans,whichpower

andstrengthheusednotonlytothelesseningofhis[Divitiacus]

popularity,butalmosttohisruin;thathe,however,wasinfluenced

bothbyfraternalaffectionandbypublicopinion.Butifanything

veryseverefromCaesarshouldbefallhim[Dumnorix],noonewould

thinkthatithadbeendonewithouthisconsent,sincehehimself

heldsuchaplaceinCaesarsfriendship:fromwhichcircumstance

itwouldarise,thattheaffectionsofthewholeofGaulwouldbe

estrangedfromhim. Ashewaswithtearsbeggingthesethingsof

Caesarinmanywords,Caesartakeshisrighthand,and,comforting

him,begshimtomakeanendofentreating,andassureshimthathis

regardforhimissogreat,thatheforgivesboththeinjuriesof

therepublicandhisprivatewrongs,athisdesireandprayers.He

summonsDumnorixtohim;hebringsinhisbrother;hepointsoutwhathecensuresinhim;helaysbeforehimwhatheofhimselfperceives,

andwhatthestatecomplainsof;hewarnshimforthefuturetoavoid

allgroundsofsuspicion;hesaysthathepardonsthepast,forthe

sakeofhisbrother,Divitiacus.HesetsspiesoverDumnorixthat

hemaybeabletoknowwhathedoes,andwithwhomhecommunicates.

Chapter21


12/196

Beingonthesamedayinformedbyhisscouts,thattheenemyhadencamped

atthefootofamountaineightmilesfromhisowncamp;hesentpersons

toascertainwhatthenatureofthemountainwas,andofwhatkind

theascentoneveryside.Wordwasbroughtback,thatitwaseasy.

DuringthethirdwatchheordersTitusLabienus,hislieutenantwith

praetorianpowers,toascendtothehighestridgeofthemountain

withtwolegions,andwiththoseasguideswhohadexaminedtheroad;

heexplainswhathisplanis.Hehimselfduringthefourthwatch,

hastenstothembythesameroutebywhichtheenemyhadgone,and

sendsonallthecavalrybeforehim.PubliusConsidius,whowasreputed

tobeveryexperiencedinmilitaryaffairs,andhadbeeninthearmy

ofLuciusSulla,andafterwardinthatofMarcusCrassus,issent

forwardwiththescouts.

Chapter22

Atday

break,

when

the

summit

of

the

mountain

was

in

the

possession

ofTitusLabienus,andhehimselfwasnotfurtheroffthanamile

andhalffromtheenemyscamp,nor,asheafterwardascertainedfrom

thecaptives,hadeitherhisarrivalorthatofLabienusbeendiscovered;

Considius,withhishorseatfullgallop,comesuptohimsaysthat

themountainwhichhe[Caesar]wishedshouldbeseizedbyLabienus,

isinpossessionoftheenemy;thathehasdiscoveredthisbythe

Gallicarmsandensigns.Caesarleadsoffhisforcestothenexthill:

[and]drawsthemupinbattleorder.Labienus,ashehadbeenordered

byCaesarnottocometoanengagementunless[Caesars]ownforces

wereseenneartheenemyscamp,thattheattackupontheenemymight

bemadeoneverysideatthesametime,was,afterhavingtakenpossession

ofthemountain,waitingforourmen,andrefrainingfrombattle.

When,atlength,thedaywasfaradvanced,Caesarlearnedthrough

spies,thatthemountainwasinpossessionofhisownmen,andthat

theHelvetiihadmovedtheircamp,andthatConsidius,struckwith

fear,hadreportedtohim,asseen,thatwhichhehadnotseen.On

thatdayhefollowstheenemyathisusualdistance,andpitcheshis

campthreemilesfromtheirs.

Chapter23

Thenextday(asthereremainedinallonlytwodaysspace[tothe

time]whenhemustserveoutthecorntohisarmy,andashewasnot

morethaneighteenmilesfromBibracte,byfarthelargestandbeststored

townoftheAedui),hethoughtthatheoughttoprovideforasupply

ofcorn;anddivertedhismarchfromtheHelvetii,andadvancedrapidly

toBibracte.Thiscircumstanceisreportedtotheenemybysomedeserters


13/196

fromLuciusAemilius,acaptain,oftheGallichorse.TheHelvetii,

eitherbecausetheythoughtthattheRomans,struckwithterror,were

retreatingfromthem,themoreso,asthedaybefore,thoughthey

hadseizedonthehighergrounds,theyhadnotjoinedbattleorbecause

theyflatteredthemselvesthattheymightbecutoffromtheprovisions,

alteringtheirplanandchangingtheirroute,begantopursue,and

toannoyourmenintherear.

Chapter24

Caesar,whenheobservesthis,drawsoffhisforcestothenexthill,

andsentthecavalrytosustaintheattackoftheenemy.Hehimself,

meanwhile,drewuponthemiddleofthehillatriplelineofhis

fourveteranlegionsinsuchamanner,thatheplacedabovehimon

theverysummitthetwolegions,whichhehadlatelyleviedinHither

Gaul,andalltheauxiliaries;andheorderedthatthewholemountain

shouldbe

covered

with

men,

and

that

meanwhile

the

baggage

should

bebroughttogetherintooneplace,andthepositionbeprotected

bythosewhowerepostedintheupperline.TheHelvetiihavingfollowed

withalltheirwagons,collectedtheirbaggageintooneplace:they

themselves,afterhavingrepulsedourcavalryandformedaphalanx,

advanceduptoourfrontlineinverycloseorder.

Chapter25

Caesar,havingremovedoutofsightfirsthisownhorse,thenthose

ofall,thathemightmakethedangerofa11equal,anddoawaywith

thehopeofflight,afterencouraginghismen,joinedbattle.His

soldiershurlingtheirjavelinsfromthehigherground,easilybroke

theenemysphalanx.Thatbeingdispersed,theymadeachargeonthem

withdrawnswords.ItwasagreathinderancetotheGaulsinfighting,

that,whenseveraloftheirbucklershadbeenbyonestrokeofthe

(Roman)javelinspiercedthroughandpinnedfasttogether,asthe

pointoftheironhadbentitself,theycouldneitherpluckitout,

nor,withtheirlefthandentangled,fightwithsufficientease;so

thatmany,afterhavinglongtossedtheirarmabout,choserathertocastawaythebucklerfromtheirhand,andtofightwiththeir

personunprotected.Atlength,wornoutwithwounds,theybeganto

giveway,and,astherewasintheneighborhoodamountainabouta

mileoff,tobetakethemselvesthither.Whenthemountainhadbeen

gained,andourmenwereadvancingup,theBoiiandTulingi,whowith

about15,000menclosedtheenemyslineofmarchandservedasa

guardtotheirrear,havingassailedourmenontheexposedflank

astheyadvanced[prepared]tosurroundthem;uponseeingwhich,the


14/196

Helvetiiwhohadbetakenthemselvestothemountain,begantopress

onagainandrenewthebattle.TheRomanshavingfacedabout,advanced

totheattackintwodivisions;thefirstandsecondline,towithstand

thosewhohadbeendefeatedanddrivenoffthefield;thethirdto

receivethosewhowerejustarriving.

Chapter26

Thus,wasthecontestlongandvigorouslycarriedonwithdoubtful

success.Whentheycouldnolongerwithstandtheattacksofourmen,

theonedivision,astheyhadbeguntodo,betookthemselvestothe

mountain;theotherrepairedtotheirbaggageandwagons.Forduring

thewholeofthisbattle,althoughthefightlastedfromtheseventh

hour[i.e.12(noon)1P.M.]toeventide,noonecouldseeanenemy

withhisbackturned.Thefightwascarriedonalsoatthebaggage

tilllateinthenight,fortheyhadsetwagonsinthewayasarampart,

andfrom

the

higher

ground

kept

throwing

weapons

upon

our

men,

as

theycameon,andsomefrombetweenthewagonsandthewheelskept

dartingtheirlancesandjavelinsfrombeneath,andwoundingourmen.

Afterthefighthadlastedsometime,ourmengainedpossessionof

theirbaggageandcamp.Therethedaughterandoneofthesonsof

Orgetorixwastaken.Afterthebattleabout130,000men[oftheenemy]

remainedalive,whomarchedincessantlyduringthewholeofthatnight;

andafteramarchdiscontinuedfornopartofthenight,arrivedin

theterritoriesoftheLingonesonthefourthday,whileourmen,

havingstoppedforthreedays,bothonaccountofthewoundsofthe

soldiersandtheburialoftheslain,hadnotbeenabletofollow

them.CaesarsentlettersandmessengerstotheLingones[withorders]

thattheyshouldnotassistthemwithcornorwithanythingelse;

forthatiftheyshouldassistthem,hewouldregardtheminthesame

lightastheHelvetii.Afterthethreedays intervalhebeganto

followthemhimselfwithallhisforces.

Chapter27

TheHelvetii,compelledbythewantofeverything,sentembassadorstohimaboutasurrender.Whenthesehadmethimonthewayandhad

thrownthemselvesathisfeet,andspeakinginsupplianttonehad

withtearssuedforpeace,and[when]hehadorderedthemtoawait

hisarrival,intheplace,wheretheythenwere,theyobeyedhiscommands.

WhenCaesararrivedatthatplace,hedemandedhostages,theirarms,

andtheslaveswhohaddesertedtothem.Whilethosethingsarebeing

soughtforandgottogether,afteranightsinterval,about6000

menofthatcantonwhichiscalledtheVerbigene,whetherterrified


15/196

byfear,lestafterdeliveringuptheirarms,theyshouldsufferpunishment,

orelseinducedbythehopeofsafety,becausetheysupposedthat,

amidsovastamultitudeofthosewhohadsurrenderedthemselves,

theirflightmighteitherbeconcealedorentirelyoverlooked,having

atnightfalldepartedoutofthecampoftheHelvetii,hastenedto

theRhineandtheterritoriesoftheGermans.

Chapter28

ButwhenCaesardiscoveredthis,hecommandedthosethroughwhose

territorytheyhadgone,toseekthemoutandtobringthembackagain,

iftheymeanttobeacquittedbeforehim;andconsideredthem,when

broughtback,inthelightofenemies;headmittedalltherestto

asurrender,upontheirdeliveringupthehostages,arms,anddeserters.

HeorderedtheHelvetii,theTulingi,andtheLatobrigi,toreturn

totheirterritoriesfromwhichtheyhadcome,andastherewasat

homenothing

whereby

they

might

support

their

hunger,

all

the

productions

oftheearthhavingbeendestroyed,hecommandedtheAllobrogesto

letthemhaveaplentifulsupplyofcorn;andorderedthemtorebuild

thetownsandvillageswhichtheyhadburned.Thishedid,chiefly,

onthisaccount,becausehewasunwillingthatthecountry,fromwhich

theHelvetiihaddeparted,shouldbeuntenanted,lesttheGermans,

whodwellontheothersideoftheRhine,should,onaccountofthe

excellenceofthelands,crossoverfromtheirownterritoriesinto

thoseoftheHelvetii,andbecomeborderersupontheprovinceofGaul

andtheAllobroges.HegrantedthepetitionoftheAedui,thatthey

mightsettletheBoii,intheirown(i.e.intheAeduan)territories,

asthesewereknowntobeofdistinguishedvalor,towhomtheygave

lands,andwhomtheyafterwardadmittedtothesamestateofrights

andfreedomasthemselves.

Chapter29

InthecampoftheHelvetii,listswerefound,drawnupinGreekcharacters,

andwerebroughttoCaesar,inwhichanestimatehadbeendrawnup,

namebyname,ofthenumberwhichhadgoneforthfromtheircountryofthosewhowereabletobeararms;andlikewisetheboys,theold

men,andthewomen,separately.Ofallwhichitemsthetotalwas:

OftheHelvetii[lit.oftheheadsoftheHelvetii]263,000Ofthe

Tulingi...........36,000OftheLatobrigi. .....

.....14,000OftheRauraci...........23,000Ofthe

Boii.............32,000Thesumofallamountedto.

..368,000.Outofthese,suchascouldbeararms,[amounted]to

about92,000.Whenthecensusofthosewhoreturnedhomewastaken,


16/196

asCaesarhadcommanded,thenumberwasfoundtobe110,000.

Chapter30

WhenthewarwiththeHelvetiiwasconcluded,embassadorsfromalmost

allpartsofGaul,thechiefsofstates,assembledtocongratulate

Caesar,[saying]thattheywerewellaware,that,althoughhehad

takenvengeanceontheHelvetiiinwar,fortheoldwrongdoneby

themtotheRomanpeople,yetthatcircumstancehadhappenednoless

tothebenefitofthelandofGaulthanoftheRomanpeople,because

theHelvetii,whiletheiraffairsweremostflourishing,hadquitted

theircountrywiththedesignofmakingwaruponthewholeofGaul,

andseizingthegovernmentofit,andselecting,outofagreatabundance,

thatspotforanabode,whichtheyshouldjudgetobethemostconvenient

andmostproductiveofallGaul,andholdtherestofthestatesas

tributaries.Theyrequestedthattheymightbeallowedtoproclaim

anassembly

of

the

whole

of

Gaul

for

a

particular

day,

and

to

do

that

withCaesarspermission,[stating]thattheyhadsomethingswhich,

withthegeneralconsent,theywishedtoaskofhim.Thisrequest

havingbeengranted,theyappointedadayfortheassembly,andordained

byanoathwitheachother,thatnooneshoulddisclose[theirdeliberations]

exceptthosetowhomthis[office]shouldbeassignedbythegeneral

assembly.

Chapter31

Whenthatassemblywasdismissed,thesamechiefsofstates,whohad

beforebeentoCaesar,returned,andaskedthattheymightbeallowed

totreatwithhimprivately(insecret)concerningthesafetyofthemselves

andofall.Thatrequesthavingbeenobtained,theyallthrewthemselves

intearsatCaesarsfeet,[saying]thattheynolessbeggedandearnestly

desiredthatwhattheymightsayshouldnotbedisclosed,thanthat

theymightobtainthosethingswhichtheywishedfor;inasmuchas

theysaw,that,ifadisclosurewasmade,theyshouldbeputtothe

greatesttortures.FortheseDivitiacustheAeduanspokeandtold

him: ThatthereweretwopartiesinthewholeofGaul:thattheAeduistoodattheheadofoneofthese,theArvernioftheother.After

thesehadbeenviolentlystrugglingwithoneanotherforthesuperiority

formanyyears,itcametopassthattheGermanswerecalledinfor

hirebytheArverniandtheSequani.Thatabout15,000ofthem[i.e.

oftheGermans]hadatfirstcrossedtheRhine:butafterthatthese

wildandsavagemenhadbecomeenamoredofthelandsandtherefinement

andtheabundanceoftheGauls,morewerebroughtover,thatthere

werenowasmanyas120,000oftheminGaul:thatwiththesetheAedui


17/196

andtheirdependentshadrepeatedlystruggledinarms thatthey

hadbeenrouted,andhadsustainedagreatcalamity hadlostall

theirnobility,alltheirsenate,alltheircavalry.Andthatbroken

bysuchengagementsandcalamities,althoughtheyhadformerlybeen

verypowerfulinGaul,bothfromtheirownvalorandfromtheRoman

peopleshospitalityandfriendship,theywerenowcompelledtogive

thechiefnoblesoftheirstate,ashostagestotheSequani,andto

bindtheirstatebyanoath,thattheywouldneitherdemandhostages

inreturn,norsupplicateaidfromtheRomanpeople,norrefuseto

beforeverundertheirswayandempire.Thathewastheonlyoneout

ofallthestateoftheAedui,whocouldnotbeprevaileduponto

taketheoathortogivehischildrenashostages.Onthataccount

hehadfledfromhisstateandhadgonetothesenateatRometobeseech

aid,ashealonewasboundneitherbyoathnorhostages.Butaworse

thinghadbefallenthevictoriousSequanithanthevanquishedAedui,

forAriovistusthekingoftheGermans,hadsettledintheirterritories,

andhad

seized

upon

a

third

of

their

land,

which

was

the

best

in

the

wholeofGaul,andwasnoworderingthemtodepartfromanotherthird

part,becauseafewmonthspreviously24,000menoftheHarudeshad

cometohim,forwhomroomandsettlementsmustbeprovided.Theconsequence

wouldbe,thatinafewyearstheywouldallbedrivenfromtheterritories

ofGaul,andalltheGermanswouldcrosstheRhine;forneithermust

thelandofGaulbecomparedwiththelandoftheGermans,normust

thehabitoflivingofthelatterbeputonalevelwiththatofthe

former.Moreover,[asfor]Ariovistus,nosoonerdidhedefeatthe

forcesoftheGaulsinabattlewhichtookplaceatMagetobria,than

[hebegan]tolordithaughtilyandcruelly,todemandashostages

thechildrenofalltheprincipalnobles,andwreakonthemevery

kindofcruelty,ifeverythingwasnotdoneathisnodorpleasure;

thathewasasavage,passionate,andrecklessman,andthathiscommands

couldnolongerbeborne.UnlesstherewassomeaidinCaesarand

theRomanpeople,theGaulsmustalldothesamethingthattheHelvetii

havedone,[viz.]emigratefromtheircountry,andseekanotherdwelling

place,othersettlementsremotefromtheGermans,andtrywhatever

fortunemayfalltotheirlot.Ifthesethingsweretobedisclosed

toAriovistus,[Divitiacusadds]thathedoubtsnotthathewouldinflictthemostseverepunishmentonallthehostageswhoarein

hispossession,[andsays]thatCaesarcould,eitherbyhisowninfluence

andbythatofhisarmy,orbyhislatevictory,orbynameofthe

Romanpeople,intimidatehim,soastopreventagreaternumberof

GermansbeingbroughtovertheRhine,andcouldprotectallGaulfrom

theoutragesofAriovistus.

Chapter32


18/196

WhenthisspeechhadbeendeliveredbyDivitiacus,allwhowerepresent

beganwithloudlamentationtoentreatassistanceofCaesar.Caesar

noticedthattheSequaniweretheonlypeopleofallwhodidnone

ofthosethingswhichtheothersdid,but,withtheirheadsbowed

down,gazedontheearthinsadness.Wonderingwhatwasthereason

ofthisconduct,heinquiredofthemselves.NoreplydidtheSequani

make,butsilentlycontinuedinthesamesadness.Whenhehadrepeatedly

inquiredofthemandcouldnotelicitanyansweratall,thesame

DivitiacustheAeduananswered,that thelotoftheSequaniwas

morewretchedandgrievousthanthatoftherest,onthisaccount,

becausetheyalonedurstnoteveninsecretcomplainorsupplicate

aid;andshudderedatthecrueltyofAriovistus[evenwhen]absent,

justasifhewerepresent;for,totherest,despiteofeverything

therewasanopportunityofflightgiven;butalltorturesmustbe

enduredbytheSequani,whohadadmittedAriovistuswithintheirterritories,

andwhose

towns

were

all

in

his

power.

Chapter33

Caesar,onbeinginformedofthesethings,cheeredthemindsofthe

Gaulswithhiswords,andpromisedthatthisaffairshouldbeanobject

ofhisconcern,[saying]thathehadgreathopesthatAriovistus,

inducedbothbyhiskindnessandhispower,wouldputanendtohis

oppression.Afterdeliveringthisspeech,hedismissedtheassembly;

and,besidesthosestatements,manycircumstancesinducedhimtothink

thatthisaffairoughttobeconsideredandtakenupbyhim;especially

ashesawthattheAedui,styled[astheyhadbeen]repeatedlyby

thesenate brethren and kinsmen,wereheldinthethraldomand

dominionoftheGermans,andunderstoodthattheirhostageswerewith

AriovistusandtheSequani,whichinsomightyanempire[asthat]

oftheRomanpeopleheconsideredverydisgracefultohimselfand

therepublic.That,moreover,theGermansshouldbydegreesbecome

accustomedtocrosstheRhine,andthatagreatbodyofthemshould

comeintoGaul,hesaw[wouldbe]dangeroustotheRomanpeople,and

judged,thatwildandsavagemenwouldnotbelikelytorestrainthemselves,aftertheyhadpossessedthemselvesofallGaul,fromgoingforth

intotheprovinceandthencemarchingintoItaly(astheCimbriand

Teutoneshaddonebeforethem),particularlyastheRhone[wasthe

solebarrierthat]separatedtheSequanifromourprovince.Against

whicheventshethoughtheoughttoprovideasspeedilyaspossible.

Moreover,Ariovistus,forhispart,hadassumedtohimselfsuchpride

andarrogance,thathewasfelttobequiteinsufferable.


19/196

Chapter34

HethereforedeterminedtosendembassadorstoAriovistustodemand

ofhimtonamesomeintermediatespotforaconferencebetweenthe

two,[saying]thathewishedtotreathimonstatebusinessandmatters

ofthehighestimportancetobothofthem.TothisembassyAriovistus

replied,thatifhehimselfhadhadneedofanythingfromCaesar,

hewouldhavegonetohim;andthatifCaesarwantedanythingfrom

himheoughttocometohim.That,besides,neitherdarehegowithout

anarmyintothosepartsofGaulwhichCaesarhadpossessionof,nor

couldhe,withoutgreatexpenseandtrouble,drawhisarmytogether

tooneplace;thattohim,moreover,itappearedstrange,whatbusiness

eitherCaesarortheRomanpeopleatallhadinhisownGaul,which

hehadconqueredinwar.

Chapter35

WhentheseanswerswerereportedtoCaesar,hesendsembassadorsto

himasecondtimewiththismessage. Since,afterhavingbeentreated

withsomuchkindnessbyhimselfandtheRomanpeople(ashehadin

hisconsulshipbeenstyled kingandfriendbythesenate),hemakes

thisrecompenseto[Caesar]himselfandtheRomanpeople,[viz.]that

wheninvitedtoaconferencehedemurs,anddoesnotthinkthatit

concernshimtoadviseandinformhimselfaboutanobjectofmutual

interest,thesearethethingswhichherequiresofhim;first,that

hedonotanymorebringoveranybodyofmenacrosstheRhineinto

Gaul;inthenextplace,thatherestorethehostages,whichhehas

fromtheAedui,andgranttheSequanipermissiontorestoretothem

withhisconsentthosehostageswhichtheyhave,andthatheneither

provoketheAeduibyoutragenormakewaruponthemortheirallies;

ifhewouldaccordinglydothis, [Caesarsays]that hehimselfand

theRomanpeoplewillentertainaperpetualfeelingoffavorandfriendship

towardhim;butthatifhe[Caesar]doesnotobtain[hisdesires]

thathe(forasmuchasintheconsulshipofMarcusMessalaandMarcus

Pisothesenatehaddecreedthat,whoevershouldhavetheadministration

oftheprovinceofGaulshould,asfarashecoulddosoconsistentlywiththeinterestsoftherepublic,protecttheAeduiandtheother

friendsoftheRomanpeople),willnotoverlookthewrongsofthe

Aedui.

Chapter36

TothisAriovistusreplied,that therightofwarwas,thatthey

whohadconqueredshouldgovernthosewhomtheyhadconquered,in


20/196

whatmannertheypleased;thatinthatwaytheRomanpeoplewerewont

togovernthenationswhichtheyhadconquered,notaccordingtothe

dictationofanyother,butaccordingtotheirowndiscretion.If

heforhispartdidnotdictatetotheRomanpeopleastothemanner

inwhichtheyweretoexercisetheirright,heoughtnottobeobstructed

bytheRomanpeopleinhisright;thattheAedui,inasmuchasthey

hadtriedthefortuneofwarandhadengagedinarmsandbeenconquered,

hadbecometributariestohim;thatCaesarwasdoingagreatinjustice,

inthatbyhisarrivalhewasmakinghisrevenueslessvaluableto

him;thatheshouldnotrestoretheirhostagestotheAedui,butshould

notmakewarwrongfullyeitheruponthemortheirallies,ifthey

abidedbythatwhichhadbeenagreedon,andpaidtheirtributeannually:

iftheydidnotcontinuetodothat,theRomanpeoplesnameofbrothers

wouldavailthemnaught.AstoCaesarsthreateninghim,thathewould

notoverlookthewrongsoftheAedui,[hesaid]thatnoonehadever

enteredintoacontestwithhim[Ariovistus]withoututterruinto

himself.That

Caesar

might

enter

the

lists

when

he

chose;

he

would

feelwhattheinvincibleGermans,welltrained[astheywere]beyond

allotherstoarms,whoforfourteenyearshadnotbeenbeneatha

roof,couldachievebytheirvalor.

Chapter37

AtthesametimethatthismessagewasdeliveredtoCaesar,embassadors

camefromtheAeduiandtheTreviri;fromtheAeduitocomplainthat

theHarudes,whohadlatelybeenbroughtoverintoGaul,wereravaging

theirterritories;thattheyhadnotbeenabletopurchasepeacefrom

Ariovistus,evenbygivinghostages:andfromtheTreviri,[tostate]

thatahundredcantonsoftheSuevihadencampedonthebanksofthe

Rhine,andwereattemptingtocrossit;thatthebrothers,Nasuas

andCimberius,headedthem.Beinggreatlyalarmedatthesethings,

Caesarthoughtthatheoughttousealldispatch,lest,ifthisnew

bandofSuevishouldunitewiththeoldtroopsofAriovistus,he[Ariovistus]

mightbelesseasilywithstood.Havingtherefore,asquicklyashe

could,providedasupplyofcorn,hehastenedtoAriovistusbyforced

marches.

Chapter38

Whenhehadproceededthreedaysjourney,wordwasbroughttohim

thatAriovistuswashasteningwithallhisforcestoseizeonVesontio,

whichisthelargesttownoftheSequani,andhadadvancedthreedays

journeyfromitsterritories.Caesarthoughtthatheoughttotake

thegreatestprecautionslestthisshouldhappen,fortherewasin


21/196

thattownamostamplesupplyofeverythingwhichwasserviceable

forwar;andsofortifiedwasitbythenatureoftheground,asto

affordagreatfacilityforprotractingthewar,inasmuchastheriver

Doubsalmostsurroundsthewholetown,asthoughitweretracedround

itwithapairofcompasses.Amountainofgreatheightshutsinthe

remainingspace,whichisnotmorethan600feet,wheretheriver

leavesagap,insuchamannerthattherootsofthatmountainextend

totheriversbankoneitherside.Awallthrownarounditmakes

acitadelofthis[mountain],andconnectsitwiththetown.Hither

Caesarhastensbyforcedmarchesbynightandday,and,afterhaving

seizedthetown,stationsagarrisonthere.

Chapter39

WhileheistarryingafewdaysatVesontio,onaccountofcornand

provisions;fromtheinquiriesofourmenandthereportsoftheGauls

andtraders

(who

asserted

that

the

Germans

were

men

of

huge

stature,

ofincrediblevalorandpracticeinarms thatoftentimesthey,on

encounteringthem,couldnotbeareventheircountenance,andthe

fiercenessoftheireyes) sogreatapaniconasuddenseizedthe

wholearmy,astodiscomposethemindsandspiritsofallinnoslight

degree.Thisfirstarosefromthetribunesofthesoldiers,theprefects

andtherest,who,havingfollowedCaesarfromthecity[Rome]from

motivesoffriendship,hadnogreatexperienceinmilitaryaffairs.

Andalleging,someofthemonereason,someanother,whichtheysaid

madeitnecessaryforthemtodepart,theyrequestedthatbyhisconsent

theymightbeallowedtowithdraw;some,influencedbyshame,stayed

behindinorderthattheymightavoidthesuspicionofcowardice.

Thesecouldneithercomposetheircountenance,norevensometimes

checktheirtears:buthiddenintheirtents,eitherbewailedtheir

fate,ordeploredwiththeircomradesthegeneraldanger.Willswere

sealeduniversallythroughoutthewholecamp.Bytheexpressionsand

cowardiceofthesemen,eventhosewhopossessedgreatexperience

inthecamp,bothsoldiersandcenturions,andthose[thedecurions]

whowereincommandofthecavalry,weregraduallydisconcerted.Such

ofthemaswishedtobeconsideredlessalarmed,saidthattheydidnotdreadtheenemy,butfearedthenarrownessoftheroadsandthe

vastnessoftheforestswhichlaybetweenthemandAriovistus,or

elsethatthesuppliescouldnotbebroughtupreadilyenough.Some

evendeclaredtoCaesar,thatwhenhegaveordersforthecampto

bemovedandthetroopstoadvance,thesoldierswouldnotbeobedient

tothecommand,noradvanceinconsequenceoftheirfear.

Chapter40


22/196

WhenCaesarobservedthesethings,havingcalledacouncil,andsummoned

toitthecenturionsofallthecompanies,heseverelyreprimanded

them, particularly,forsupposingthatitbelongedtothemtoinquire

orconjecture,eitherinwhatdirectiontheyweremarching,orwith

whatobject.ThatAriovistus,duringhis[Caesars]consulship,had

mostanxiouslysoughtafterthefriendshipoftheRomanpeople;why

shouldanyonejudgethathewouldsorashlydepartfromhisduty?

Heforhispartwaspersuaded,that,whenhisdemandswereknownand

thefairnessofthetermsconsidered,hewouldrejectneitherhis

northeRomanpeoplesfavor.Butevenif,drivenonbyrageandmadness,

heshouldmakewaruponthem,whatafterallweretheyafraidof?

orwhyshouldtheydespaireitheroftheirownvalororofhiszeal?

Ofthatenemyatrialhadbeenmadewithinourfathers recollection,

when,onthedefeatoftheCimbriandTeutonesbyCaiusMarius,the

armywasregardedashavingdeservednolesspraisethantheircommander

himself.It

had

been

made

lately,

too,

in

Italy,

during

the

rebellion

oftheslaves,whom,however,theexperienceandtrainingwhichthey

hadreceivedfromus,assistedinsomerespect.Fromwhichajudgment

mightbeformedoftheadvantageswhichresolutioncarrieswithit

inasmuchasthosewhomforsometimetheyhadgroundlesslydreaded

whenunarmed,theyhadafterwardvanquished,whenwellarmedandflushed

withsuccess.Inshort,thatthesewerethesamemenwhomtheHelvetii,

infrequentencounters,notonlyintheirownterritories,butalso

intheirs[theGerman],havegenerallyvanquished,andyetcannot

havebeenamatchforourarmy.Iftheunsuccessfulbattleandflight

oftheGaulsdisquietedany,these,iftheymadeinquiries,might

discoverthat,whentheGaulshadbeentiredoutbythelongduration

ofthewar,Ariovistus,afterhehadmanymonthskepthimselfinhis

campandinthemarshes,andhadgivennoopportunityforanengagement,

fellsuddenlyuponthem,bythistimedespairingofabattleandscattered

inalldirections,andwasvictoriousmorethroughstratagemandcunning

thanvalor.Butthoughtherehadbeenroomforsuchstratagemagainst

savageandunskilledmen,noteven[Ariovistus]himselfexpectedthat

therebyourarmiescouldbeentrapped.Thatthosewhoascribedtheir

feartoapretenseaboutthe[deficiencyof]suppliesandthenarrownessoftheroads,actedpresumptuously,astheyseemedeithertodistrust

theirgeneral sdischargeofhisduty,ortodictatetohim.That

thesethingswerehisconcern;thattheSequani,theLeuci,andthe

Lingonesweretofurnishthecorn;andthatitwasalreadyripein

thefields;thatastotheroadtheywouldsoonbeabletojudgefor

themselves.Astoitsbeingreportedthatthesoldierswouldnotbe

obedienttocommand,oradvance,hewasnotatalldisturbedatthat;

forheknew,thatinthecaseofallthosewhosearmyhadnotbeen


23/196

obedienttocommand,eitheruponsomemismanagementofanaffair,

fortunehaddesertedthem,or,thatuponsomecrimebeingdiscovered,

covetousnesshadbeenclearlyproved[againstthem].Hisintegrity

hadbeenseenthroughouthiswholelife,hisgoodfortuneinthewar

withtheHelvetii.Thathewouldthereforeinstantlysetaboutwhat

hehadintendedtoputofftillamoredistantday,andwouldbreak

uphiscampthenextnight,inthefourthwatch,thathemightascertain,

assoonaspossible,whetherasenseofhonorandduty,orwhether

fearhadmoreinfluencewiththem.Butthat,ifnooneelseshould

follow,yethewouldgowithonlythetenthlegion,ofwhichhehad

nomisgivings,anditshouldbehispraetoriancohort. Thislegion

Caesarhadbothgreatlyfavored,andinit,onaccountofitsvalor,

placedthegreatestconfidence.

Chapter41

Uponthe

delivery

of

this

speech,

the

minds

of

all

were

changed

in

asurprisingmanner,andthehighestardorandeagernessforprosecuting

thewarwereengendered;andthetenthlegionwasthefirsttoreturn

thankstohim,throughtheirmilitarytribunes,forhishavingexpressed

thismostfavorableopinionofthem;andassuredhimthattheywere

quitereadytoprosecutethewar.Then,theotherlegionsendeavored,

throughtheirmilitarytribunesandthecenturionsoftheprincipal

companies,toexcusethemselvestoCaesar,[saying]thattheyhad

nevereitherdoubtedorfeared,orsupposedthatthedetermination

oftheconductofthewarwastheirsandnottheirgeneral s.Having

acceptedtheirexcuse,andhavinghadtheroadcarefullyreconnoitered

byDivitiacus,becauseinhimofallothershehadthegreatestfaith

[hefound]thatbyacircuitousrouteofmorethanfiftymileshe

mightleadhisarmythroughopenparts;hethensetoutinthefourth

watch,ashehadsaid[hewould].Ontheseventhday,ashedidnot

discontinuehismarch,hewasinformedbyscoutsthattheforcesof

Ariovistuswereonlyfourandtwentymilesdistantfromours.

Chapter42

UponbeingapprizedofCaesarsarrival,Ariovistussendsembassadors

tohim,[saying]thatwhathehadbeforerequestedastoaconference,

mightnow,asfarashispermissionwent,takeplace,sincehe[Caesar]

hadapproachednearer,andheconsideredthathemightnowdoitwithout

danger.Caesardidnotrejecttheproposalandbegantothinkthat

hewasnowreturningtoarationalstateofmindashespontaneously

profferedthatwhichhehadpreviouslyrefusedtohimwhenrequesting

it;andwasingreathopesthat,inconsiderationofhisownandthe


24/196

Romanpeoplesgreatfavorstowardhim,theissuewouldbethathe

woulddesistfromhisobstinacyuponhisdemandsbeingmadeknown.

Thefifthdayafterthatwasappointedasthedayofconference.Meanwhile,

asambassadorswerebeingoftensenttoandfrobetweenthem,Ariovistus

demandedthatCaesarshouldnotbringanyfootsoldierwithhimto

theconference,[saying]that hewasafraidofbeingensnaredby

himthroughtreachery;thatbothshouldcomeaccompaniedbycavalry;

thathewouldnotcomeonanyothercondition. Caesar,asheneither

wishedthattheconferenceshould,byanexcusethrownintheway,

besetaside,nordursttrusthislifetothecavalryoftheGauls,

decidedthatitwouldbemostexpedienttotakeawayfromtheGallic

cavalryalltheirhorses,andthereontomountthelegionarysoldiers

ofthetenthlegion,inwhichheplacedthegreatestconfidence,in

orderthathemighthaveabodyguardastrustworthyaspossible,

shouldtherebeanyneedforaction.Andwhenthiswasdone,oneof

thesoldiersofthetenthlegionsaid,notwithoutatouchofhumor,

that

Caesar

did

more

for

them

than

he

had

promised;

he

had

promised

tohavethetenthlegioninplaceofhispraetoriancohort;buthe

nowconvertedthemintohorse.

Chapter43

Therewasalargeplain,andinitamoundofearthofconsiderable

size.Thisspotwasatnearlyanequaldistancefrombothcamps.Thither,

ashadbeenappointed,theycamefortheconference.Caesarstationed

thelegion,whichhehadbrought[withhim]onhorseback,200paces

fromthismound.ThecavalryofAriovistusalsotooktheirstandat

anequaldistance.Ariovistusthendemandedthattheyshouldconfer

onhorseback,andthat,besidesthemselves,theyshouldbringwith

themtenmeneachtotheconference.Whentheywerecometotheplace,

Caesar,intheopeningofhisspeech,detailedhisownandthesenates

favorstowardhim[Ariovistus],inthathehadbeenstyledking,in

that[hehadbeenstyled]friend,bythesenate inthatveryconsiderable

presentshadbeensenthim;whichcircumstanceheinformedhimhad

bothfallentothelotoffew,andhadusuallybeenbestowedinconsideration

ofimportantpersonalservices;thathe,althoughhehadneitheranintroduction,norajustgroundfortherequest,hadobtainedthese

honorsthroughthekindnessandmunificenceofhimself[Caesar]and

thesenate.Heinformedhimtoo,howoldandhowjustwerethegrounds

ofconnectionthatexistedbetweenthemselves[theRomans]andthe

Aedui,whatdecreesofthesenatehadbeenpassedintheirfavor,

andhowfrequentandhowhonorable;howfromtimeimmemorialtheAedui

hadheldthesupremacyofthewholeofGaul;even[saidCaesar]before

theyhadsoughtourfriendship;thatitwasthecustomoftheRoman


25/196

peopletodesirenotonlythatitsalliesandfriendsshouldlose

noneoftheirproperty,butbeadvancedininfluence,dignity,and

honor:whothencouldendurethatwhattheyhadbroughtwiththem

tothefriendshipoftheRomanpeopleshouldbetornfromthem?He

thenmadethesamedemandswhichhehadcommissionedtheembassadors

tomake,that[Ariovistus]shouldnotmakewareitherupontheAedui

ortheirallies,thatheshouldrestorethehostages;thatifhecould

notsendbacktotheircountryanypartoftheGermans,heshould

atalleventssuffernoneofthemanymoretocrosstheRhine.

Chapter44

AriovistusbrieflyrepliedtothedemandsofCaesar;butexpatiated

largelyonhisownvirtues, thathehadcrossedtheRhinenotof

hisownaccord,butonbeinginvitedandsentforbytheGauls;that

hehadnotlefthomeandkindredwithoutgreatexpectationsandgreat

rewards;that

he

had

settlements

in

Gaul,

granted

by

the

Gauls

themselves;

thatthehostageshadbeengivenbytheirgoodwill;thathetook

byrightofwarthetributewhichconquerorsareaccustomedtoimpose

ontheconquered;thathehadnotmadewarupontheGauls,butthe

Gaulsuponhim;thatallthestatesofGaulcametoattackhim,and

hadencampedagainsthim;thatalltheirforceshadbeenroutedand

beatenbyhiminasinglebattle;thatiftheychosetomakeasecond

trial,hewasreadytoencounterthemagain;butiftheychoseto

enjoypeace,itwasunfairtorefusethetribute,whichoftheirown

freewilltheyhadpaiduptothattime.Thatthefriendshipofthe

Romanpeopleoughttoprovetohimanornamentandasafeguard,not

adetriment;andthathesoughtitwiththatexpectation.Butifthrough

theRomanpeoplethetributewastobediscontinued,andthosewho

surrenderedtobeseducedfromhim,hewouldrenouncethefriendship

oftheRomanpeoplenolessheartilythanhehadsoughtit.Asto

hisleadingoverahostofGermansintoGaul,thathewasdoingthis

withaviewofsecuringhimself,notofassaultingGaul:thatthere

wasevidenceofthis,inthathedidnotcomewithoutbeinginvited,

andinthathedidnotmakewar,butmerelywardeditoff.Thathe

hadcomeintoGaulbeforetheRomanpeople.ThatneverbeforethistimedidaRomanarmygobeyondthefrontiersoftheprovinceofGaul.

What[saidhe]does[Caesar]desire? whycomeintohis[Ariovistus]

domains? thatthiswashisprovinceofGaul,justasthatisours.

Asitoughtnottobepardonedinhim,ifheweretomakeanattack

uponourterritories;so,likewise,thatwewereunjust,toobstruct

himinhisprerogative.AsforCaesarssayingthattheAeduihad

beenstyledbrethrenbythesenate,hewasnotsouncivilizednor

soignorantofaffairs,asnottoknowthattheAeduiinthevery


26/196

lastwarwiththeAllobrogeshadneitherrenderedassistancetothe

Romans,norreceivedanyfromtheRomanpeopleinthestruggleswhich

theAeduihadbeenmaintainingwithhimandwiththeSequani.Hemust

feelsuspicious,thatCaesar,thoughfeigningfriendshipasthereason

forhiskeepinganarmyinGaul,waskeepingitwiththeviewofcrushing

him.Andthatunlesshedepartandwithdrawhisarmyfromtheseparts,

heshallregardhimnotasafriend,butasafoe;andthat,even

ifheshouldputhimtodeath,heshoulddowhatwouldpleasemany

ofthenoblesandleadingmenoftheRomanpeople;hehadassurance

ofthatfromthemselvesthroughtheirmessengers,andcouldpurchase

thefavorandthefriendshipofthemallbyhis[Caesars]death.

ButifhewoulddepartandresigntohimthefreepossessionofGaul,

hewouldrecompensehimwithagreatreward,andwouldbringtoa

closewhateverwarshewishedtobecarriedon,withoutanytrouble

orrisktohim.

Chapter45

ManythingswerestatedbyCaesartotheeffect[toshow]; whyhe

couldnotwaivethebusiness,andthatneitherhisnortheRomanpeoples

practicewouldsufferhimtoabandonmostmeritoriousallies,nor

didhedeemthatGaulbelongedtoAriovistusratherthantotheRoman

people;thattheArverniandtheRutenihadbeensubduedinwarby

QuintusFabiusMaximus,andthattheRomanpeoplehadpardonedthem

andhadnotreducedthemintoaprovinceorimposedatributeupon

them.Andifthemostancientperiodwastoberegarded thenwas

thesovereigntyoftheRomanpeopleinGaulmostjust:ifthedecree

oftheSenatewastobeobserved,thenoughtGaultobefree,which

they[theRomans]hadconqueredinwar,andhadpermittedtoenjoy

itsownlaws.

Chapter46

Whilethesethingsarebeingtransactedintheconferenceitwasannounced

toCaesarthatthecavalryofAriovistuswereapproachingnearerthe

mound,andwereridinguptoourmen,andcastingstonesandweaponsatthem.Caesarmadeanendofhisspeechandbetookhimselftohis

men;andcommandedthemthattheyshouldbynomeansreturnaweapon

upontheenemy.Forthoughhesawthatanengagementwiththecavalry

wouldbewithoutanydangertohischosenlegion,yethedidnotthink

propertoengage,lest,aftertheenemywererouted,itmightbesaid

thattheyhadbeeninsnaredbyhimunderthesanctionofaconference.

Whenitwasspreadabroadamongthecommonsoldierywithwhathaughtiness

Ariovistushadbehavedattheconference,andhowhehadorderedthe


27/196

RomanstoquitGaul,andhowhiscavalryhadmadeanattackuponour

men,andhowthishadbrokenofftheconference,amuchgreateralacrity

andeagernessforbattlewasinfusedintoourarmy.

Chapter47

Twodaysafter,AriovistussendsembassadorstoCaesar,tostate that

hewishedtotreatwithhimaboutthosethingswhichhadbeenbegun

tobetreatedofbetweenthem,buthadnotbeenconcluded; [andto

beg]that hewouldeitheragainappointadayforaconference;or,

ifhewerenotwillingtodothat,thathewouldsendoneofhis[officers]

asanembassadortohim. TheredidnotappeartoCaesaranygood

reasonforholdingaconference;andthemoresoasthedaybefore

theGermanscouldnotberestrainedfromcastingweaponsatourmen.

Hethoughtheshouldnotwithoutgreatdangersendtohimasembassador

oneofhis[Roman]officers,andshouldexposehimtosavagemen.

Itseemed

[therefore]

most

proper

to

send

to

him

C.

Valerius

Procillus,

thesonofC.ValeriusCaburus,ayoungmanofthehighestcourage

andaccomplishments(whosefatherhadbeenpresentedwiththefreedom

ofthecitybyC.ValeriusFlaccus),bothonaccountofhisfidelity

andonaccountofhisknowledgeoftheGalliclanguage,whichAriovistus,

bylongpractice,nowspokefluently;andbecauseinhiscasethe

Germanswouldhavenomotiveforcommittingviolence;and[ashis

colleague]M.Mettius,whohadsharedthehospitalityofAriovistus.

HecommissionedthemtolearnwhatAriovistushadtosay,andtoreport

tohim.ButwhenAriovistussawthembeforehiminhiscamp,hecried

outinthepresenceofhisarmy, Whyweretheycometohim?Wasit

forthepurposeofactingasspies?Hestoppedthemwhenattempting

tospeak,andcastthemintochains.

Chapter48

Thesamedayhemovedhiscampforwardandpitchedunderahillsix

milesfromCaesarscamp.Thedayfollowingheledhisforcespast

Caesarscamp,andencampedtwomilesbeyondhim;withthisdesign

thathemightcutoffCaesarfromthecornandprovisions,whichmightbeconveyedtohimfromtheSequaniandtheAedui.Forfivesuccessive

daysfromthatday,Caesardrewouthisforcesbeforethecamp,and

puttheminbattleorder,that,ifAriovistusshouldbewillingto

engageinbattle,anopportunitymightnotbewantingtohim.Ariovistus

allthistimekepthisarmyincamp:butengageddailyincavalry

skirmishes.ThemethodofbattleinwhichtheGermanshadpracticed

themselveswasthis.Therewere6,000horse,andasmanyveryactive

andcourageousfoot,oneofwhomeachofthehorseselectedoutof


28/196

thewholearmyforhisownprotection.Bythese[foot]theywereconstantly

accompaniedintheirengagements;tothesethehorseretired;these

onanyemergencyrushedforward;ifanyone,uponreceivingavery

severewound,hadfallenfromhishorse,theystoodaroundhim:if

itwasnecessarytoadvancefurtherthanusual,ortoretreatmore

rapidly,sogreat,frompractice,wastheirswiftness,that,supported

bythemanesofthehorses,theycouldkeeppacewiththeirspeed.

Chapter49

PerceivingthatAriovistuskepthimselfincamp,Caesar,thathemight

notanylongerbecutofffromprovisions,choseaconvenientposition

foracampbeyondthatplaceinwhichtheGermanshadencamped,at

about600pacesfromthem,andhavingdrawnuphisarmyinthreelines,

marchedtothatplace.Heorderedthefirstandsecondlinestobe

underarms;thethirdtofortifythecamp.Thisplacewasdistant

fromthe

enemy

about

600

paces,

as

has

been

stated.

Thither

Ariovistus

sentlighttroops,about16,000meninnumber,withallhiscavalry;

whichforcesweretointimidateourmen,andhinderthemintheir

fortification.Caesarnevertheless,ashehadbeforearranged,ordered

twolinestodriveofftheenemy:thethirdtoexecutethework.The

campbeingfortified,helefttheretwolegionsandaportionofthe

auxiliaries;andledbacktheotherfourlegionsintothelargercamp.

Chapter50

Thenextday,accordingtohiscustom,Caesarledouthisforcesfrom

bothcamps,andhavingadvancedalittlefromthelargerone,drew

uphislineofbattle,andgavetheenemyanopportunityoffighting.

Whenhefoundthattheydidnoteventhencomeout[fromtheirintrenchments,]

heledbackhisarmyintocampaboutnoon.ThenatlastAriovistus

sentpartofhisforcestoattackthelessercamp.Thebattlewas

vigorouslymaintainedonbothsidestilltheevening.Atsunset,after

manywoundshadbeeninflictedandreceived,Ariovistusledbackhis

forcesintocamp.WhenCaesarinquiredofhisprisoners,wherefore

Ariovistusdidnotcometoanengagement,hediscoveredthistobethereason thatamongtheGermansitwasthecustomfortheirmatrons

topronouncefromlotsanddivination,whetheritwereexpedientthat

thebattleshouldbeengagedinornot;thattheyhadsaid, that

itwasnotthewillofheaventhattheGermansshouldconquer,if

theyengagedinbattlebeforethenewmoon.

Chapter51


29/196

Thedayfollowing,Caesarleftwhatseemedsufficientasaguardfor

bothcamps;[andthen]drewupalltheauxiliariesinsightofthe

enemy,beforethelessercamp,becausehewasnotverypowerfulin

thenumberoflegionarysoldiers,consideringthenumberoftheenemy;

that[thereby]hemightmakeuseofhisauxiliariesforappearance.

Hehimself,havingdrawnuphisarmyinthreelines,advancedtothe

campoftheenemy.ThenatlastofnecessitytheGermansdrewtheir

forcesoutofcamp,anddisposedthemcantonbycanton,atequaldistances,

theHarudes,Marcomanni,Tribocci,Vangiones,Nemetes,Sedusii,Suevi;

andsurroundedtheirwholearmywiththeirchariotsandwagons,that

nohopemightbeleftinflight.Onthesetheyplacedtheirwomen,

who,withdisheveledhairandintears,entreatedthesoldiers,as

theywentforwardtobattle,nottodeliverthemintoslaverytothe

Romans.

Chapter52

Caesarappointedovereachlegionalieutenantandaquestor,that

everyonemighthavethemaswitnessesofhisvalor.Hehimselfbegan

thebattleattheheadoftherightwing,becausehehadobserved

thatpartoftheenemytobetheleaststrong.Accordinglyourmen,

uponthesignalbeinggiven,vigorouslymadeanattackupontheenemy,

andtheenemysosuddenlyandrapidlyrushedforward,thattherewas

notimeforcastingthejavelinsatthem.Throwingaside[therefore]

theirjavelins,theyfoughtwithswordshandtohand.ButtheGermans,

accordingtotheircustom,rapidlyformingaphalanx,sustainedthe

attackofourswords.Therewerefoundverymanyofoursoldierswho

leapeduponthephalanx,andwiththeirhandstoreawaytheshields,

andwoundedtheenemyfromabove.Althoughthearmyoftheenemywas

routedontheleftwingandputtoflight,they[still]pressedheavily

onourmenfromtherightwing,bythegreatnumberoftheirtroops.

Onobservingwhich,P.Crassus,ayoungman,whocommandedthecavalry

ashewasmoredisengagedthanthosewhowereemployedinthefight

sentthethirdlineasarelieftoourmenwhowereindistress.

Chapter53

Thereupontheengagementwasrenewed,andalltheenemyturnedtheir

backs,nordidtheyceasetofleeuntiltheyarrivedattheriver

Rhine,aboutfiftymilesfromthatplace.Theresomefew,eitherrelying

ontheirstrength,endeavoredtoswimover,or,findingboats,procured

theirsafety.AmongthelatterwasAriovistus,whomeetingwitha

smallvesseltiedtothebank,escapedinit;ourhorsepursuedand

slewalltherestofthem.Ariovistushadtwowives,oneaSuevan


30/196

bynation,whomhebroughtwithhimfromhome;theotheraNorican,

thesisterofkingVocion,whomhehadmarriedinGaul,shehaving

beensent[thitherforthatpurpose]byherbrother.Bothperished

inthatflight.Oftheirtwodaughters,onewasslain,theothercaptured.

C.ValeriusProcillus,ashewasbeingdraggedbyhisguardsinthe

fight,boundwithatriplechain,fellintothehandsofCaesarhimself,

ashewaspursuingtheenemywithhiscavalry.Thiscircumstanceindeed

affordedCaesarnolesspleasurethanthevictoryitself;because

hesawamanofthefirstrankintheprovinceofGaul,hisintimate

acquaintanceandfriend,rescuedfromthehandoftheenemy,andrestored

tohim,andthatfortunehadnotdiminishedaughtofthejoyandexultation

[ofthatday]byhisdestruction.He[Procillus]saidthat,inhis

ownpresence,thelotshadbeenthriceconsultedrespectinghim,whether

heshouldimmediatelybeputtodeathbyfire,orbereservedfor

anothertime:thatbythefavorofthelotshewasuninjured.M.Mettius,

also,wasfoundandbroughtbacktohim[Caesar.]

Chapter54

ThisbattlehavingbeenreportedbeyondtheRhine,theSuevi,who

hadcometothebanksofthatriver,begantoreturnhome,whenthe

Ubii,whodweltnearesttotheRhine,pursuingthem,whilemuchalarmed,

slewagreatnumberofthem.Caesarhavingconcludedtwoveryimportant

warsinonecampaign,conductedhisarmyintowinterquartersamong

theSequani,alittleearlierthantheseasonoftheyearrequired.

HeappointedLabienusoverthewinterquarters,andsetoutinperson

forHitherGaultoholdtheassizes.

BOOK2

Chapter1

WhileCaesarwasinwinterquartersinHitherGaul,aswehaveshown

above,frequentreportswerebroughttohim,andhewasalsoinformedbylettersfromLabienus,thatalltheBelgae,whowehavesaidare

athirdpartofGaul,wereenteringintoaconfederacyagainstthe

Romanpeople,andgivinghostagestooneanother;thatthereasons

oftheconfederacywerethese first,becausetheyfearedthat,after

all[Celtic]Gaulwassubdued,ourarmywouldbeledagainstthem;

secondly,becausetheywereinstigatedbyseveraloftheGauls;some

ofwhomas[ontheonehand]theyhadbeenunwillingthattheGermans

shouldremainanylongerinGaul,so[ontheother]theyweredissatisfied


31/196

thatthearmyoftheRomanpeopleshouldpassthewinterinit,and

settlethere;andothersofthem,fromanaturalinstabilityandfickleness

ofdisposition,wereanxiousforarevolution;[theBelgaewereinstigated]

byseveral,also,becausethegovernmentinGaulwasgenerallyseized

uponbythemorepowerfulpersonsandbythosewhohadthemeansof

hiringtroops,andtheycouldlesseasilyeffectthisobjectunder

ourdominion.

Chapter2

Alarmedbythesetidingsandletters,Caesarleviedtwonewlegions

inHitherGaul,and,atthebeginningofsummer,sentQ.Pedius,his

lieutenant,toconductthemfurtherintoGaul.He,himself,assoon

astherebegantobeplentyofforage,cametothearmy.Hegives

acommissiontotheSenonesandtheotherGaulswhowereneighbors

oftheBelgae,tolearnwhatisgoingonamongthem[i.e.theBelgae],

andinform

him

of

these

matters.

These

all

uniformly

reported

that

troopswerebeingraised,andthatanarmywasbeingcollectedin

oneplace.Then,indeed,hethoughtthatheoughtnottohesitate

aboutproceedingtowardthem,andhavingprovidedsupplies,moves

hiscamp,andinaboutfifteendaysarrivesattheterritoriesof

theBelgae.

Chapter3

Ashearrivedthereunexpectedlyandsoonerthananyoneanticipated,

theRemi,whoarethenearestoftheBelgaeto[Celtic]Gaul,sent

tohimIcciusandAntebrogius,[twoof]theprincipalpersonsofthe

state,astheirembassadors:totellhimthattheysurrenderedthemselves

andalltheirpossessionstotheprotectionanddisposaloftheRoman

people:andthattheyhadneithercombinedwiththerestoftheBelgae,

norenteredintoanyconfederacyagainsttheRomanpeople:andwere

preparedtogivehostages,toobeyhiscommands,toreceivehiminto

theirtowns,andtoaidhimwithcornandotherthings;thatallthe

restoftheBelgaewereinarms;andthattheGermans,whodwellon

thissideoftheRhine,hadjoinedthemselvestothem;andthatsogreatwastheinfatuationofthemall,thattheycouldnotrestrain

eventheSuessiones,theirownbrethrenandkinsmen,whoenjoythe

samerights,andthe,samelaws,andwhohaveonegovernmentandone

magistracy[incommon]withthemselves,fromunitingwiththem.

Chapter4

WhenCaesarinquiredofthemwhatstateswereinarms,howpowerful


32/196

theywere,andwhattheycoulddo,inwar,hereceivedthefollowing

information:thatthegreaterpartoftheBelgaeweresprung,from

theGermans,andthathavingcrossedtheRhineatanearlyperiod,

theyhadsettledthere,onaccountofthefertilityofthecountry,

andhaddrivenouttheGaulswhoinhabitedthoseregions;andthat

theyweretheonlypeoplewho,inthememoryofourfathers,when

allGaulwasoverrun,hadpreventedtheTeutonesandtheCimbrifrom

enteringtheirterritories;theeffectofwhichwas,that,fromthe

recollectionofthoseevents,theyassumedtothemselvesgreatauthority

andhaughtinessinmilitarymatters.TheRemisaid,thattheyhad

knownaccuratelyeverythingrespectingtheirnumber,becausebeing

unitedtothembyneighborhoodandbyalliances,theyhadlearned

whatnumbereachstatehadinthegeneralcounciloftheBelgaepromised

forthatwar.ThattheBellovaciwerethemostpowerfulamongthem

invalor,influence,andthenumberofmen;thatthesecouldmuster

100,000armedmen,[andhad]promised60,000pickedmenoutofthat

number,and

demanded

for

themselves

the

command

of

the

whole

war.

ThattheSuessionesweretheirnearestneighborsandpossessedavery

extensiveandfertilecountry;thatamongthem,eveninourownmemory,

Divitiacus,themostpowerfulmanofallGaul,hadbeenking;who

hadheldthegovernmentofagreatpartoftheseregions,aswell

asofBritain;thattheirkingatpresentwasGalba;thatthedirection

ofthewholewarwasconferredbytheconsentofall,uponhim,on

accountofhisintegrityandprudence;thattheyhadtwelvetowns;

thattheyhadpromised50,000armedmen;andthattheNervii,who

arereckonedthemostwarlikeamongthem,andaresituatedatavery

greatdistance,[hadpromised]asmany;theAtrebates15,000;the

Ambiani,10,000;theMorini,25,000;theMenapii,9,000;theCaleti,

10,000;theVelocassesandtheVeromanduiasmany;theAduatuci19,000;

thattheCondrusi,theEburones,theCaeraesi,thePaemani,whoare

calledbythecommonnameofGermans[hadpromised],theythought,

tothenumberof40,000.

Chapter5

Caesar,havingencouragedtheRemi,andaddressedthemcourteously,orderedthewholesenatetoassemblebeforehim,andthechildren

oftheirchiefmentobebroughttohimashostages;allwhichcommands

theypunctuallyperformedbytheday[appointed].He,addressinghimself

toDivitiacus,theAeduan,withgreatearnestness,pointsouthow

muchitconcernstherepublicandtheircommonsecurity,thatthe

forcesoftheenemyshouldbedivided,sothatitmightnotbenecessary

toengagewithsolargeanumberatonetime.[Heasserts]thatthis

mightbeaffectediftheAeduiwouldleadtheirforcesintotheterritories


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oftheBellovaci,andbegintolaywastetheircountry.Withthese

instructionshedismissedhimfromhispresence.Afterheperceived

thatalltheforcesoftheBelgae,whichhadbeencollectedinone

place,wereapproachingtowardhim,andlearnedfromthescoutswhom

hehadsentout,and[also]fromtheRemi,thattheywerethennot

fardistant,hehastenedtoleadhisarmyovertheAisne,whichis

onthebordersoftheRemi,andtherepitchedhiscamp.Thisposition

fortifiedonesideofhiscampbythebanksoftheriver,rendered

thecountrywhichlayinhisrearsecurefromtheenemy,andfurthermore

insuredthatprovisionsmightwithoutdangerbebroughttohimby

theRemiandtherestofthestates.Overthatriverwasabridge:

thereheplacesaguard;andontheothersideoftheriverheleaves

Q.TituriusSabinus,hislieutenant,withsixcohorts.Heordershim

tofortifyacampwitharamparttwelvefeetinheight,andatrench

eighteenfeetinbreadth.

Chapter6

TherewasatownoftheRemi,bynameBibrax,eightmilesdistant

fromthiscamp.ThistheBelgaeontheirmarchbegantoattackwith

greatvigor.[Theassault]waswithdifficultysustainedforthat

day.TheGaulsmodeofbesiegingisthesameasthatoftheBelgae:

whenafterhavingdrawnalargenumberofmenaroundthewholeof

thefortifications,stoneshavebeguntobecastagainstthewall

onallsides,andthewallhasbeenstrippedofitsdefenders,[then],

formingatestudo,theyadvancetothegatesandunderminethewall:

whichwaseasilyeffectedonthisoccasion;forwhilesolargeanumber

werecastingstonesanddarts,noonewasabletomaintainhisposition

uponthewall.Whennighthadputanendtotheassault,Iccius,who

wasthenincommandofthetown,oneoftheRemi,amanofthehighest

rankandinfluenceamonghispeople,andoneofthosewhohadcome

toCaesarasembassador[tosue]forpeace,sendsmessengerstohim,

[toreport] That,unlessassistanceweresenttohimhecouldnot

holdoutanylonger.

Chapter7

Thither,immediatelyaftermidnight,Caesar,usingasguidesthesame

personswhohadcometohimasmessengersfromIccius,sendssome

NumidianandCretanarchers,andsomeBalearianslingersasarelief

tothetownspeople,bywhosearrivalbothadesiretoresisttogether

withthehopeof[makinggoodtheir]defense,wasinfusedintothe

Remi,and,forthesamereason,thehopeofgainingthetown,abandoned

theenemy.Therefore,afterstayingashorttimebeforethetown,


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andlayingwastethecountryoftheRemi,whenallthevillagesand

buildingswhichtheycouldapproachhadbeenburned,theyhastened

withalltheirforcestothecampofCaesar,andencampedwithinless

thantwomiles[ofit];andtheircamp,aswasindicatedbythesmoke

andfires,extendedmorethaneightmilesinbreadth.

Chapter8

Caesaratfirstdeterminedtodeclineabattle,aswellonaccount

ofthegreatnumberoftheenemyastheirdistinguishedreputation

forvalor:daily,however,incavalryactions,hestrovetoascertain

byfrequenttrials,whattheenemycouldeffectbytheirprowessand

whatourmenwoulddare.Whenheperceivedthatourmenwerenotinferior,

astheplacebeforethecampwasnaturallyconvenientandsuitable

formarshalinganarmy(sincethehillwherethecampwaspitched,

risinggraduallyfromtheplain,extendedforwardinbreadthasfar

asthe

space

which

the

marshaled

army

could

occupy,

and

had

steep

declinesofitssideineitherdirection,andgentlyslopinginfront

graduallysanktotheplain);oneithersideofthathillhedrew

acrosstrenchofaboutfourhundredpaces,andattheextremities

ofthattrenchbuiltforts,andplacedtherehismilitaryengines,

lest,afterhehadmarshaledhisarmy,theenemy,sincetheywere

sopowerfulinpointofnumber,shouldbeabletosurroundhismen

intheflank,whilefighting.Afterdoingthis,andleavinginthe

campthetwolegionswhichhehadlastraised,that,ifthereshould

beanyoccasion,theymightbebroughtasareserve,heformedthe

othersixlegionsinorderofbattlebeforethecamp.Theenemy,likewise,

haddrawnuptheirforceswhichtheyhadbroughtoutofthecamp.

Chapter9

Therewasamarshofnogreatextentbetweenourarmyandthatof

theenemy.Thelatterwerewaitingtoseeifourmenwouldpassthis;

ourmen,also,werereadyinarmstoattackthemwhiledisordered,

ifthefirstattempttopassshouldbemadebythem.Inthemeantime

battlewascommencedbetweenthetwoarmiesbyacavalryaction.Whenneitherarmybegantopassthemarsh,Caesar,upontheskirmishes

ofthehorse[proving]favorabletoourmen,ledbackhisforcesinto

thecamp.Theenemyimmediatelyhastenedfromthatplacetotheriver

Aisne,whichithasbeen;statedwasbehindourcamp.Findingaford

there,theyendeavoredtoleadapartoftheirforcesoverit;with

thedesign,that,iftheycould,theymightcarrybystormthefort

whichQ.Titurius,Caesarslieutenant,commanded,andmightcutoff

thebridge;but,iftheycouldnotdothat,theyshouldlaywaste


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thelandsoftheRemi,whichwereofgreatusetousincarryingon

thewar,andmighthinderourmenfromforaging.

Chapter10

Caesar,beingapprizedofthisbyTiturius,leadsallhiscavalry

andlightarmedNumidians,slingersandarchers,overthebridge,

andhastenstowardthem.Therewasaseverestruggleinthatplace.

Ourmen,attackingintheriverthedisorderedenemy,slewagreat

partofthem.Bytheimmensenumberoftheirmissilestheydroveback

therest,who,inamostcourageousmannerwereattemptingtopass

overtheirbodies,andsurroundedwiththeircavalry,andcuttopieces

thosewhohadfirstcrossedtheriver.Theenemy,whentheyperceived

thattheirhopeshaddeceivedthembothwithregardtotheirtaking

thetownbystormandalsotheirpassingtheriver,anddidnotsee

ourmenadvancetoamoredisadvantageousplaceforthepurposeof

fighting,and

when

provisions

began

to

fail

them,

having

called

a

council,determinedthatitwasbestforeachtoreturntohiscountry,

andresolvedtoassemblefromallquarterstodefendthoseintowhose

territoriestheRomansshouldfirstmarchanarmy;thattheymight

contendintheirownratherthaninaforeigncountry,andmightenjoy

thestoresofprovisionwhichtheypossessedathome.Togetherwith

othercauses,thisconsiderationalsoledthemtothatresolution,

viz:thattheyhadlearnedthatDivitiacusandtheAeduiwereapproaching

theterritoriesoftheBellovaci.Anditwasimpossibletopersuade

thelattertostayanylonger,ortodeterthemfromconveyingsuccor

totheirownpeople.

Chapter11

Thatmatterbeingdeterminedon,marchingoutoftheircampatthe

secondwatch,withgreatnoiseandconfusion,innofixedorder,nor

underanycommand,sinceeachsoughtforhimselftheforemostplace

inthejourney,andhastenedtoreachhome,theymadetheirdeparture

appearverylikeaflight.Caesar,immediatelylearningthisthrough

hisscouts,[but]fearinganambuscade,becausehehadnotyetdiscoveredforwhatreasontheyweredeparting,kepthisarmyandcavalrywithin

thecamp.Atdaybreak,theintelligencehavingbeenconfirmedbythe

scouts,hesentforwardhiscavalrytoharasstheirrear;andgave

thecommandofittotwoofhislieutenants,Q.Pedius,andL.Aurunculeius

Cotta.HeorderedT.Labienus,anotherofhislieutenants,tofollow

themcloselywiththreelegions.These,attackingtheirrear,and

pursuingthemformanymiles,slewagreatnumberofthemasthey

werefleeing;whilethoseintherearwithwhomtheyhadcomeup,


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halted,andbravelysustainedtheattackofoursoldiers;thevan,

becausetheyappearedtoberemovedfromdanger,andwerenotrestrained

byanynecessityorcommand,assoonasthenoisewasheard,broke

theirranks,and,toaman,restedtheirsafetyinflight.Thuswithout

anyrisk[tothemselves]ourmenkilledasgreatanumberofthem

asthelengthofthedayallowed;andatsunsetdesistedfromthe

pursuit,andbetookthemselvesintothecamp,astheyhadbeencommanded.

Chapter12

Onthedayfollowing,beforetheenemycouldrecoverfromtheirterror

andflight,CaesarledhisarmyintotheterritoriesoftheSuessiones,

whicharenexttotheRemi,andhavingaccomplishedalongmarch,

hastenstothetownnamedNoviodunum.Havingattemptedtotakeit

bystormonhismarch,becauseheheardthatitwasdestituteof[sufficient]

defenders,hewasnotabletocarryitbyassault,onaccountofthe

breadthof

the

ditch

and

the

height

of

the

wall,

though

few

were

defending

it.Therefore,havingfortifiedthecamp,hebegantobringupthe

vineae,andtoprovidewhateverthingswerenecessaryforthestorm.

InthemeantimethewholebodyoftheSuess

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