coastal effects of offshore energy systems: an assessment
TRANSCRIPT
Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Systems:An Assessment of Oil and Gas Systems,
Deepwater Ports, and Nuclear PowerplantsOff the Coasts of New Jersey and Delaware
November 1976
NTIS order #PB-274033
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing OfficeWashington, D.C. 20402- Price $4.45
Stock NO. 052-003 -00245-1
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
DIRECTOR’S OFFICE
Emilio Q. Daddario, DirectorDaniel V. De Simone, Deputy Director
OCEANS ASSESSMENT ADVISORY PANEL
Richard Sullivan, Panel Chairman, Stevens Institute of Technology
David J. BardinCommissioner, New Jersey Department ofEnvironmental Protection
E.C. Broun, Jr.Dresser Industries, Inc.
Francis T. Christy, Jr.Resources for the Future
John DanielloSecrtary for Delaware Community Affairsand Economic Development
John Mark DeanUniversity of South Carolina
Richard M. EckertNew Jersey Public Service Electric andGas Company
Don E. KashUniversity of Oklahoma
H.W. MenardScripps Institution of Oceanography
Charles C. MollardSeafarers International Union,AFL–CIO
James SullivanCenter for Science in the Public interest
OTA OCEANS PROGRAM STAFF
Robert W. Niblock, Program Manager
Prudence S. Adler Thomas A. CottonKathleen A. Beil Emilia L. GovanJudy B. Cefkin Peter A. Johnson
Judith M. Roales
TECHNOLOGY A SSESSMENT B o A R D Congress of the United States EM ILIO Q. DADDARIODIRECTOR
OLIN E. TEAGUE, TEXAS, CHAIRMANCLIFFORD P. CASE, N. J., VICE CHAIRMAN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT DANIEL V. DE SIMONE
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS. MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ. W A S H I N G T O N, D.C. 2 0 5 1 0DEPUTY DIRECTOR
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS. S.C. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN. CHARLES A. MOSHER, OHioRICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA. MARVIN L. ESCH, MICH. Nov 11 1976TED STEVENS, ALASKA MARJORIE S. HOLT, MD.
EMILIO Q. DADDARIO
The Honorable Ernest F. Holl ingsChairmanNational Ocean Policy StudyUni ted S ta tes SenateWashington, D. C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On behalf of the Board of the Office of Technology Assess-ment, we are forwarding to you the repor t Coas ta l E f fec t sof Offshore Energy Systems: Oil and Gas, Deepwater Ports,and F loa t ing Nuclear Powerplants.
The report consists of two volumes: t h e f i r s t c o v e r s t h efindings and analysis and the second provides back-upm a t e r i a l . This report concludes OTA’S assessment of theonshore effects which may be associated with the implementationof one or a combinat ion o f the three technolog ies s tudiedoff the coast of New Jersey and Delaware.
This study was requested by you in your capacity as Chair-man of the National Ocean Policy Study, in a letter datedJ a n u a r y 1 4 , 1 9 7 4 . The request was accepted and the studyauthorized by the Technology Assessment Board on July 23,1974. A dra f t vers ion o f the o f f shore o i l and gas sec t ionof this report was transmitted to NOPS in April 1976.
Sincere ly ,
Clifford P. CaseChairman
Enclosure
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TECHNOL o gY A SSESSMENT B O A R D Congress of the United States EM ILIO Q. DADDARIO
OLIN E. TEAGUE, TEXAS, CHAIRMAN DIRECTOR
CLIFFORD P. CASE, N. J., VICE CHAIRMAN OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT DANIEL V. DE SIMONEEDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASS. MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ. WASHINGTON , D.C. 20510 DEPUTY DIREcTOR
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S.C. GEORGE E. BROWN, JR., CALIF.HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, MINN. CHARLES A, MOSHER, OHIORICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA. MARVIN L. ESCH, MICH.RED STEVENS, ALASKA MARJORIE S. HOLT, MD. Nov 11 1976
EMILIO Q. DADDARIO
The Honorable Olin E. TeagueChairman of the BoardOff ice of Technology AssessmentCongress o f the Uni ted S ta tesWashington, D. C. 20515
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The enc losed repor t , Coas ta l E f fec t s o f Of f shore Energy Systems:Oil and Gas, Deepwater Ports, and Floating Nuclear P o w e r p l a n t s ,presents OTA'S analysis of the probable onshore impacts of imple–menting one or a combination of the three technologies studiedoff the coast of New Jersey and Delaware.
The assessment was requested on January 14, 1974, by SenatorErnest F. Holl ings, Chairman of the National Ocean Policy Study.It was prepared by the Oceans Program Assessment staff , and hasbeen reviewed extensively within OTA, by the Ocean AssessmentAdvisory Panel , and by personne l f rom the Federa l agenc ies , S ta tes ,and indust r ies which wi l l be a f fec ted by the s tudy .
T h e r e p o r t s p e c i f i c a l l y ( 1 ) d e l i n e a t e s t h e p o s s i b l e a c t i o n sCongress may want to consider in future legislation and over-s ight dea l ing wi th o f f shore o i l and gas , deepwater por t s , andf loa t ing nuc lear powerplants ; ( 2 ) a n a l y s i s p a s t a n d f u t u r egovernment ac t ions in prepar ing for the three technolog ies o f fNew Jersey and Delaware; (3 ) presents the poss ib le economic ,p o l i t i c a l , s o c i a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l , and legal impacts of implementingthe technolog ies ; and (4 ) rev iews the a l te rnat ives to the tech–nolog ies or the impl ica t ions o f not implement ing the technolog iesin the s tudy area .
Some o f the ana lys i s requi red for the overa l l assessment hasalready been made available to Congress and used by committeesresponsible for developing amendments to the Coastal Zone Manage-ment Act and amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf LandsA c t o f 1 9 5 3 . The assessment a l so resu l ted in the prepara t ionand publ i ca t ion o f three o ther s tudies des i red by Congress fors p e c i f i c u s e s . Those were: “An Analysis of the Department ofthe Interior’s Proposed Acceleration of Development of Oil andGas on the Outer Continental Shelf , “ “An Analysis of the
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The Honorable Olin E. TeaguePage 2
Feas ib i l i ty o f Separa t ing Explora t ion f rom Product ion o f Oi land Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf ,” and “Oil Transportationby Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and Safety Measures.”
This assessment was the first major undertaking by OTA toinclude a large-scale public participation program. The publicparticipation element was an effort to bring about an exchangeof information between OTA and citizens in the study region.The two-way flow of information was intended to contribute tothe public’s understanding of the technologies being assessedand to obtain information directly from the affected citizensabout impacts of greatest public concern. The data obtainedcontributed to OTA’S effort to insure that these factors wereadequately addressed in the study so as to assist the Congressin anticipating, understanding, and considering to the fullestextent possible, the consequences of technological applicationas mandated by the Technology Assessment Act of 1972. Thecontributions of the public participation program are detailedin the report.
This transmittal includes two volumes: the assessment reportitself and working papers which are back-up material for thefindings and discussions in the assessment report.
EMILIO Q . DADDARIOD i r e c t o r
Enclosures
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report was prepared by the Office of Technology Assessment OceansProgram staff. The staff wishes to acknowledge the assistance and cooperation ofthe following contractors and consultants in the gathering and formulation of thebackground data:
The BDM Corporation Intermountain Technologies, Inc.
Pamela L. Baldwin Hittman Associates, Inc.
Dr. Robert L. Bish Lawrence-Allison and Associates, Inc.
Dr. Irving C. Bupp, Jr. Thomas B. Neville
Dr. Michael J. Canoy Nuclear Engineering Services, Inc.
Dresser Industries Potomac Policy Group
Ecological Analysts, Inc. Princeton University
Energy and Environmental Analysis, Rutgers UniversityInc. Dr. Stephen N. Salomon
Engineering Computer Optecnomics,Robert TaggartInc.
John Gardenier Dr. Irvin L. White
The staff further wishes to acknowledge those organizations, both public andprivate, which reviewed and commented on various draft documents circulated byOTA or provided other types of assistance:
American Institute of Merchant ShippingAmerican Littoral SocietyAmerican Petroleum InstituteAmerican Trust of Merchant ShippingAmoco Oil Co.Atlantic City Electric Co.Atlantic City, N.J., Division of Civil PlanningAtlantic County Citizens Council on the Environ-
mentThe Honorable Dolph Briscoe, Jr., Governor of
TexasBrookhaven National LaboratoryBureau of Land Management, U.S. Department of
the InteriorThe Honorable Brendan T. Byrne, Governor of
New Jersey, and his staffCape May, N. J., Planning BoardChesapeake UtilitiesCitizens Energy CouncilClean Atlantic Associates
Coast Guard, U.S. Department of TransportationConservation Foundation, TheCouncil on Environmental QualityDeepwater Ports Office, U.S. Department of Com-
merceDelaware Bay Transportation Co.Delaware River and Bay AuthorityDelaware State Planning OfficeDelmarva Power and Light Co.E.]. du Pent de Nemours & Co.The Honorable Edwin W. Edwards, Governor of
LouisianaElizabethtown Gas Co.Environmental Policy CenterEnvironmental Policy InstituteEXXON Corp.Florida Audubon SocietyGeological Survey, U.S. Department of the InteriorGetty Oil Co.Jersey Central Power and Light Co.
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Keys to Education for Environmental ProtectionLeague of Women VotersMonmouth County, N.J., Environmental CouncilNational Council on the Public Assessment of
TechnologyNational IntervenersNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Administra-
tion, U.S. Department of CommerceNational Wildlife FederationNatural Resources Defense CouncilNew Jersey Department of Environmental
ProtectionNew Jersey Department of Public AdvocateNew Jersey Energy OfficeNew Jersey Friends CouncilNew Jersey Library AssociationNew Jersey Sierra ClubNew York State Department of Environmental
ConservationOcean County, N. J., Planning BoardOffice of Business Advocacy, New Jersey Depart-
ment of Labor and IndustryOffice of Domestic Shipping, U.S. Maritime
Administration
Offshore Power Systems, Inc.Passaic River CoalitionPenJerDel Corp.Program Development Office, U.S. Department of
the InteriorPublic Service Electric and Gas Co.Sea-Land Service, Inc.Secretary of the InteriorStop Nuclear PowerTexas A & M University, Ocean Engineering
ProgramThe Honorable Sherman W. Tribbitt, Governor of
Delaware, and his staffUnited Auto WorkersU.S. Army Corps of EngineersU.S. Environmental Protection AgencyU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionUniversity of South Carolina Institute for Marine
Biology and Coastal ResearchVirginia Seafood CouncilWatch Our WaterwaysThe Wilderness SocietyZero Population Growth
LIST OF WORKING PAPERS
The following working papers have been prepared by OTA and include back-ground data, detailed analyses, and further documentation of specific subjectsreferenced throughout this assessment. The working papers 1 through 10 arepublished as volume II of this report (OTA-O-38) and maybe ordered through theSuperintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.20402 (Stock No. 052–003–00246–9.) price $11.75.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
Federal and State Regulation of the Three Offshore Energy Technologies
Biological Impacts of Three Offshore Energy Technologies
Oil Spill Risk Assessment for OCS Oil and Gas and Deepwater PortDevelopment
Air and Water Quality Impacts of Oil and Gas Processing Facilities
Regional Energy Supply and Demand Considerations
Fiscal Effects of OCS Oil and Gas and Deepwater Port Development
Environmental Studies for OCS Oil and Gas Development
Safety Analysis for Floating Nuclear Powerplants
Analysis of Fuel and Waste Handling and Decommissioning for FloatingNuclear Powerplants
Economic Considerations for Floating Nuclear Powerplants
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LIST
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III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OF WORKING PAPERS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
BACKGROUND. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
STUDY AREA APPROACH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
SELECTION OF ISSUES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DATA SOURCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MAJOR FINDINGS AND SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SYSTEMS:Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
DEEPWATER PORTS:Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
FLOATING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS:Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ALTERNATIVES TO OFF SHORE TECHNOLOGIES:Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ISSUES AND OPTIONS ● . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
COMMON ISSUE:1. Offshore Priorities and Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ISSUES:2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.
Federal Management System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Regulation and Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Oil Spill Liability and Compensation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .State Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Pollution Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Conflicting Ocean Uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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DEEPWATER PORTS ISSUES:10. Tanker Design and Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7611. Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup at Deepwater Ports. . . . . . 8012. Standards in State Waters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8313. Adjacent Coastal State Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
FLOATING NUCLEAR PLANT ISSUES:14. Risks From Major Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9015. Deployment involute.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9916. Technical Uncertainties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10217. Siting offloading Powerplants Outside U.S. Territorial Limits 106
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
DEVELOPMENT OF OFF SHORE PETROLEUMTECHNOLOGIES IN THE MID-ATLANTIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123Activities to Date..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Seismic Surveys . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. .. .. ... ... ...... 124Resource Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125Interior Department Preparations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125Selection of the Lease Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131Environmental Impact Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131Environmental and Other Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134Coastal Zone Management. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136State Views . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
Future Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140Lease Sale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140Exploration and Its Impacts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144Development Plans.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146Production and Its Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150Transportation and Storage and Their Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160Oil Spills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 165Processing and Refining and Their Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169Effects on Regional Energy Prices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171Decommissioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
THE POSSIBILITY OF DEEPWATER PORTS IN THEMID-ATLANTIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
The Need for Deepwater Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173Deepwater Port Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179Status of New Jersey and Delaware Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186Description of Deepwater Port Technology in the Mid-Atlantic. . . 188
THE PROPOSAL FOR A FLOATINGIN THE MID-ATLANTIC. ... , . .
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Nuclear Reactor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Platform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Breakwater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Power Transmission . . . . . . . . . . .
Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Site. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Licenses . . . . . . . . . . ..., . . . . . . . .Public Role in Licensing. . . . . . . .costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Assembly . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Breakwater Construction . . . . . . .Transmission System . . . . . . . . . . .Plant Installation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Fuel Supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Waste Handling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Decommissioning. . . . . . . . . . . . . .Decommissioning Alternatives. .River and Bay Sites . . . . . . . . . . . .Conventional Nuclear Plants. . . .
Coastal Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Direct Benefits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Environmental and Social Effects
Risks and Safety . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Accident Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NUCLEAR POWERPLANT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Probability of Core-Melt Accidents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Consequences of a Core-Melt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Accident Risks in the Study Area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Constraints on Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Energy Patterns in the Mid-Atlantic States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Offshore Oil and Gas Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Insulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Solar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Automobile Efficiency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Floating Nuclear Plant Alternatives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Interconnection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Conservation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Cogeneration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
197197204204204206207207207207210211212213213213214214215218219222222224224225226230230230232236
238239240240241241241242242242243
PACE
coal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER IV . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
v PUBLIC PARTICIPATION ● ...,.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ● *...... . . . . . . . . 255
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION: A PILOT PROJECT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
MAJOR FINDINGS FOR ALL TECHNOLOGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257Overall Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259Findings by Region.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260Offshore Drillings for Oil and Gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
Anticipated Effects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260Process of Implementing the Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261Preferences and Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
Deepwater Ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265Anticipated Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265Process of Implementing the Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267Preferences and Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
Floating Nuclear Powerplants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268Anticipated Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 268Process of Implementing and Managing the Technologies. . . . . . 270Preferences and Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 270
HOW PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AFFECTED THE OTAASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
SOURCES AND USES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION DATA . . . . . . . 274Workshops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276Followup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 277Review of Draft Documents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
FOOTNOTES: CHAPTER V . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279
IV GLOSSARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
LIST OF FIGURESFIGURE NO. PAGE
II–l—BaltimoreCanyon Trough lease sale area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14II–2—Hypothetical deepwater port site offshoreNew Jersey coast . . . . . . . . . . . 20II–3—Proposed site of the floating nuclear powerplant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24III–l-Cablesand ship traffic lanes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72III–2—1mportant fisheries near lease area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
IV– l—The coastal zones of Delaware and New Jersey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118IV–2-Cape Helopen, Del., Seashore.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122IV– 3—Baltimore Canyon development activities by phase of development and
by year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124IV–4—Potential energy supply provided by Baitimore Canyon oil and gas
development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126IV–5—Estimates of undiscovered recoverable oil and gas resources in U.S.
offshore areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127IV–6—Simplified flow diagram showing operations necessary for discovery,
production, and abandonment of an oil field . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128IV–7—Baltimore Canyon Trough lease sale area. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132IV–8-OCS leasing procedures: Information flow into decision points . . . . . . . 140IV–9—Proposed OCS planning schedule (June 1975). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141IV–10—Ongoing activities in U.S. offshore areas... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142IV–ll—OTA assumptions for oil and gas development in Baltimore Canyon
Trough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145IV–12—Drilling crews at work offshore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147IV–13—Three exploratory rigs for possible use in the Mid-Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . 148IV–14—Assumed rates of exploratory drilling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149IV–15—Artist’s drawing of production platform similar to those which might
b e us ed in th e Mid-Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....:... 152IV–16—Platform construction yard outside Morgan City, La. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154IV–17—Potential sites and land requirements for OCS supported bases . . . . . . . 154IV–18—Total new land requirements related to OCS development during years
of peak activity in New Jersey and Delaware. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156IV–19—Direct employment from all OCS activities under the high and median
recovery assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157IV–20—Annual earnings of direct regional OCS workers under median and
high recovery assumptions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158IV–21—State-local tax revenue per OCS employee and their families compared
to revenue from non-OCS workers and their families. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160IV–22—Typical pipelaying barges similar to those which could be used in the
Mid-Atlantic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162IV–23—Responsibility of Federal agencies for pipelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164IV–24-Clean Atlantic Associates initial equipment stockpiles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168IV–25—Partial listing of presently available equipment in the Mid-Atlantic
area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . 168IV–26—0il cleanup equipment at work skimming spill from Gulf of Mexico . . 169IV–27-Oil spills in the U.S. waters ranked by operation, calendar year 1974.. 170IV–28—U.S. oil supplies 1950/74 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173IV–29—Tanker capacities of major U.S. oil ports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174IV–30—Major U.S. Refining Centers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175IV–31—Mid-Atlantic refinery capacity as of January l, 1973 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176IV–32—Oceanborne crude petroleum to the United States—1969 . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
PAGE
IV–33—Worldwide single-point mooring installation—1973. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180IV–34—Proposed deepwater port site in Delaware Bay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181IV–35—Deepwater port site offshore northern New Jersey. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182IV–36—LOOP and Seadock deepwater port sites in the Gulf of Mexico . . . . . . . 183IV–37—LOOP deepwater port layout . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184IV–38—1976 projections of petroleum supply and demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186IV–39—Hypothetical deepwater port site offshore New Jersey coast . . . . . . . . . 189IV–40-Catenary anchor leg mooring (CALM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190IV–41—Single anchor leg mooring (SALM) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191IV–42—Hypothetical deepwater port layout including onshore facilities. . . . . . 192IV–43—Fifteen-year totals of oil spills from one, 1.6-million-barrel-per-day
deepwater port compared to small tanker alternative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194IV–44—Size comparison of proposed Atlantic Generating Station . . . . . . . . . . . 198IV–45—Visualization of a floating nuclear powerplant in comparison to the
USS Franklin D. Roosevelt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199IV–46—Annual observed and forecast values for energy consumption and
peak-hour demand, 1963– 1987, for Public Service Electric & Gas Co. servicearea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
IV–47-Cutaway diagram of a floating nuclear plant containment building . . . 205IV–48—Offshore siting rubble-mound breakwater. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206IV–49—Proposed site of floating nuclear plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208IV–50—Cost estimates of nuclear units at time of order vs. actual finished cost
or estimate as of December 1975 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211IV–51—Floating nuclear powerplants manufacturing facility, Jacksonville,
Florida ... , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212IV – 52—Annual shipments of radioactive materials to and from the two-unit
Atlantic Generating Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215IV –53—Probable actions to be taken in decommissioning a floating nuclear
powerplant by various methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219IV–54—Three siting alternatives for floating nuclear plants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223IV–55—Benefits from the proposed Atlantic Generating Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225IV–56—Monetary costs of construction and operation of the Atlantic Generat-
ing Station . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . 225IV–57—Environmental costs of the proposed Atlantic Generating Station. . . . . 338V–l—Public participation questionnaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258V– 2—Results of public participation questionnaire: offshore drilling for oil
and gas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262V–3—Results of public participation questionnaire: deepwater ports. . . . . . . . . 266V–4—Results of public participation questionnaire: floating nuclear
powerplants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269V–5—Sites of OTA contacts during public participation program . . . . . . . . . . . . 275
Chapter I
INTRODUCTION
BACKGROUND
About half of all Americans live and workalong the Atlantic or Pacific Oceans, the Gulf ofcording to a Senate Commerce Committee study,
within 50 miles of a coastline—Mexico, or the Great Lakes. Ac-that figure may grow to 80 per-
cent of the total population by the turn of the century. With any such concentrationof people in less than 10 percent of the Nation’s land area will come intensedevelopment and competition for land for housing, industry, commerce, energyfacilities, resort communities, and transportation networks.
The consequences of 25 years of accelerated dredging, filling, and constructionin coastal areas are not understood at this time, So far, the growth of population inthe coastal areas has proceeded with little research into the long-range implicationsof increased activities in those areas. It is known that marshes, estuaries, and tidalflats along the coasts of the United States are crucial to sustaining marine life,directly or indirectly. It is not known how much more development and whatkinds of development can take place in coastal areas before the complex relation-ships between land and sea and between human life and marine life may be ir-reversibly disrupted. In fact, it is only since the enactment of the Coastal ZoneManagement Act of 1972, the principal legislation dealing with problems of thecoastal zone, that these questions have been addressed in an organized fashion.(The relationship of coastal zone management and offshore energy systems is dis-cussed in chapter IV.)
This assessment is an attempt to add to the understanding of the effects ofcoastal development by focusing on three energy systems which have been pro-posed for the waters off New Jersey and Delaware.
The objective of the study has been to trace the likely consequences of threeenergy systems for the ocean environment, the coastal environment, and theeconomics and patterns of life in both States during the next two decades.
The three systems are:
1. Oil and natural gas development on the Mid-Atlantic Outer ContinentalShelf;
2. Installation of a deepwater port to accommodate supertankers in theMid-Atlantic area; and
3. Construction of at least two floating nuclear powerplants.
The study was requested by Senator Ernest F. Hollings, chairman of the Na-tional Ocean Policy Study and sponsor of the Coastal Zone Management Act. Therequest was approved by the Technology Assessment Board on July 23, 1974
This report has been prepared by the Oceans Program of OTA with the assist-ance of an advisory panel of 11 members from industry, Government, andacademia, who have reviewed draft material for each section of the report and metperiodically to comment on the course of the study and to provide guidance to thestaff. The Advisory Panel provided advice and critique throughout the assessment,but does not necessarily approve, disapprove, or endorse the report, for whichOTA assumes full responsibility.
The Technology Assessment Board approves the release of this report, whichidentifies a range of viewpoints on a significant issue facing the U.S. Congress. Theviews expressed in this report are not necessarily those of the Board nor of in-dividual members thereof.
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENTThe Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was created in 1972 as an adviso-
ry arm of Congress. OTA’S basic function is to help legislative policy makers antici-pate and plan for the consequences of technological changes and to examine themany ways, expected and unexpected, in which technology affects people’s lives.The assessment of technology calls for exploration of the physical, biological,economic, social, and political impacts which can result from applications of scien-tific knowledge. OTA provides Congress with independent and timely informationabout the potential effects—both beneficial and harmful-of technological applica-tions.
Requests for studies are made by chairmen of standing committees of theHouse of Representatives or Senate; by the Technology Assessment Board, thegoverning body of OTA; or by the Director of OTA in consultation with the Board.
The Technology Assessment Board is composed of six members of the House,six members of the Senate, and the OTA Director, who is a non-voting member.
OTA currently has underway studies in eight general areas-energy, food,health, materials, oceans, transportation, international trade, and policies andpriorities for research and development programs.
STUDY AREA AND APPROACHThis study concentrated on proposed developments off the coast of New
Jersey and Delaware for several reasons, one being that plans to deploy energyfacilities off the coasts of those States are actual rather than hypothetical proposals.
The Department of the Interior accepted bids in August 1976 for leases on 154tracts on the Outer Continental Shelf off the New Jersey and Delaware coasts and it
was expected that oil companies could begin exploratory drilling within 6 monthsafter the sale of leases.
In the summer of 1976, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) was wellalong in its technical evaluation of, and hearings on, proposals to moor two float-
ing nuclear powerplants inside a breakwater off the New Jersey coast.
Plans to build a deepwater port in the area have been in suspension since theearly 1970’s, when changes in the world oil situation reduced the economic incen-tives for such a port. But the Delaware Bay area would be a logical candidate for sit-ing a deepwater port if future changes in the oil distribution system revived in-terest in a port.
In addition, New Jersey and Delaware share some characteristics with othercoastal States. Both depend on expanded industrial activity to create new jobs andsustain economic growth. Expanded industry means expanded energy resourcesand both States depend on other regions of the United States or on foreign sup-pliers for all of their oil and natural gas. Both States also depend heavily on touristincome which, in turn, depends on the attractiveness of beach areas which wouldbe vulnerable to damage from accidents during the operation of any of the threeenergy systems.
Finally, planning for the offshore energy systems has been proceeding fasterthan planning for effective management of coastal areas under the Coastal ZoneManagement Act.
Because many States share these characteristics to some degree, the findings ofthis study can be applied to other States if adjustments for differing conditions andlevels of resources are made that might be anticipated in other areas.
The study area is described in more detail in chapter IV.
The study approach was basically the same for each energy system. A founda-tion of data was developed to provide a framework for analyzing issues for con-gressional consideration.
The first step in assessing each system involved a detailed examination of eachtechnology and how it most likely would be deployed. This phase of the study con-sidered only those technologies and systems in their most likely configurations inwaters off New Jersey and Delaware and drew largely on published reports. Thereports were supplemented by analysis in areas where published data did not pro-vide enough detailed information for full development of issues and options.
The next step in the study was to identify and evaluate the probable impacts ofthe energy systems on the ocean and coastal environments either as a result ofroutine operations or as a result of malfunctions which experience with similartechnology in other areas has shown are likely to occur. In the case of floatingnuclear powerplants, which have not been installed anywhere, the projections ofimpact were based on land-based nuclear-plant experience adjusted to reflectoperation in an ocean environment.
Finally, the study produced estimates of the effect that each energy system
would have on New Jersey and Delaware. These included changes in employmentin the region, in the cost and reliability of energy supply, the impact on air andwater quality, on road and rail networks, on land that would be diverted fromother possible uses to support the proposed systems, and on general patterns of lifewithin each State.
SELECTION OF ISSUESIn the course of the study, areas of possible conflict emerged between tech-
nology and the environment or among institutions that would share responsibilityfor the systems. Potential or actual conflicts which appeared to be amenable topolicy consideration by Congress or by State governments or private groups wereidentified. These conflicts are discussed in chapter 111 as issues with options forcongressional consideration. In most cases, the issues evolved from analysis of thelikely consequences of deployment of a technology under existing legal and institu-tional frameworks and comparison of those consequences with changes in law orcustom.
The nature of the issues differs from system to system.
In the case of oil and natural gas development, the major issues are concernedless with individual technology than with the system as a whole and particularlywith the institutional framework in which the system operates. In the case of deep-water ports and floating nuclear powerplants, the issues stem largely from thetechnology, from questions about its reliability, and from avenues that offer prom-ise of reducing risk by changing design or by more careful analysis of risks in-herent in the technology.
The changing events that are natural with technologies in active planning re-quired flexibility in the execution of this assessment. Pertinent new or revised in-formation became available to the study team at every stage. Some of the analysisrequired for the overall assessment had timely congressional utility and waspublished in special documents or released in draft form by the Technology Assess-ment Board.
These publications include the following reports:● Oil Transportation by Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollution and
Safety Measures.
● An Analysis of the Feasibility of Separating Exploration From Productionof Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf.
● An Analysis of the Department of the Interior’s Proposed Acceleration ofDevelopment of Oil and Gas on the Outer Continental Shelf.
● Coastal Effects of Offshore Energy Development: Oil and Gas Systems.
These documents and drafts were of particular help to congressional commit-tees responsible for developing amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Actand amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.
DATA SOURCESBasic data used in the study have been subjected to critical analysis by the
OTA staff to develop projections of development patterns and impacts.
The estimates of resources in the Baltimore Canyon Trough which were usedto project impacts were drawn from U.S. Geological Survey estimates. During thecourse of the study, U.S. Geological Survey changed its estimate of resources from 8billion barrels of oil to 1.8 billion barrels and the study was modified to reflect thereduction.
Resource projections are discussed along with the history, current status, andpossible future development of each technology in chapter IV. Alternatives to thesetechnologies, based on projections of energy supply and demand, also are dis-cussed in chapter IV.
PUBLIC PARTICIPATIONTo broaden the information base for this study and to make certain that public
attitudes toward the three energy systems were taken fully into account, OTA con-ducted a public participation program as part of the assessment.
Workshops were held in New Jersey and informal meetings with groups ofprivate citizens as well as representatives of interest groups were held in Delawareto explore citizen attitudes. About 15,000 brochures explaining the technologyassessment process and asking for views on all three technologies were distributedin both States. About 1,000 persons responded to a questionnaire that was includedin the brochure and an analysis of the responses is included as an integral part ofthis report in chapter V.
Chapter II
MAJOR FINDINGS AND SUMMARY
The following are the major findings of this assessment of the three energysystems which have been proposed for deployment off the coast of New Jersey andDelaware. A summary of the assessment of each of the technologies is includedafter the findings.
● No significant damage to the environment or changes in patterns of life
in either New Jersey or Delaware is anticipated during operation of the
three systems at presently projected levels. However, careful planning,engineering, and strict operational monitoring are required for each ofthese complex systems. To a large extent, such planning and monitor-ing will depend on the quality of oversight by the responsible Federalagency.
● Future deployment of ocean technologies on a scale larger than thatanticipated at the present time could create serious conflicts amongusers and impose excessive burdens on ocean and coastal environ-ments. No formal mechanism exists or is planned for resolving conflictsor directing research to discover the cumulative social and environ-mental consequences of vastly expanded uses of the oceans.
● Changes in Federal practices are necessary to reduce delays in deter-mining offshore oil and gas resources, to provide full attention to Stateand local needs and potential impacts, and to assure strict enforcementof operating standards to minimize ocean and coastal pollution. Con-solidation of authority within the Department of the Interior is essentialto supervision of offshore development and the coordination of opera-tions with State and local governments.
● While floating nuclear powerplants may offer economic and environ-mental advantages over land-based nuclear plants, the siting of nuclearplants on water may present unique accident risks which have not yetbeen comprehensively assessed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion.
● Tankers that would use deepwater ports off New Jersey and Delawarepose a greater pollution and safety threat than the ports themselves.Confining tanker operations to a port several miles from the coast mayoffer environmental and safety advantages, provided that the tankersusing the facility are strictIy regulated.
11
● There are specific alternatives which, if substituted for each of the pro-posed offshore projects, could supply equivalent amounts of energy tothe Mid-Atlantic region. None, however, offers clear social, environ-mental, or economic advantages. Increased imports are an alternativeto offshore oil and gas development. Onshore nuclear plants and coal-fired plants are alternatives to floating nuclear powerplants. Greaterreliance on small tankers is an alternative to deepwater ports. Reduc-tion of energy consumption could offer long-term advantages, but thereare no specific plans at the State or national level for an energy con-servation program that might eliminate the need for the energy supplieswhich would come from one or more of the proposed offshore systems.
A principal product of this assessment is the development of public policyissues associated with the deployment of each offshore technology and the iden-tification of congressional options for addressing those issues.
Chapter III contains a complete presentation of the issues and options.
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SYSTEMS—SUMMARY
The submerged Outer Continental Shelf(OCS) l ands o f the Mid-At lant i c wereclassified by geologists as a potential source ofoil and natural gas in the late 1950’s, but theydid not become a priority target for develop-ment until the 1970’s.
Following the oil embargo imposed by theOrganization of Petroleum Exporting Coun-tries in October 1973, accelerated leasing anddevelopment of the Mid-Atlantic OCS wasmade a high priority item in the Administra-tion’s plan for lessening U.S. dependence onforeign sources of oil.
In 1974, studies by the U.S. GeologicalSurvey estimated that as much as one-third ofthe U.S. oil reserves for the future were mostlikely to be discovered in the OCS regions. I nthe Mid-Atlantic, estimates were that oil pro-duction could be as much as 7 percent of the1973 national production level and gas pro-duction could be as much as 8 percent of the1975 national production level.
As first announced, accelerated OCSdevelopment called for leasing a total of 10million acres in a single year, an amount equalto what had been leased during the previous21 years.
Although the Bureau of Land Management(BLM), Interior’s lead agency in leasing, hadbeen examining the possibility of an acceler-ated program for 2 years before the 1973 deci-sion was made, it was not prepared for a sud-den change of this magnitude. In the periodsince the acceleration program was an-nounced, BLM has been chronically short ofstaff, particularly the specialists required foranalyzing coastal and onshore impacts infrontier States. BLM was also unprepared forthe adverse reaction of Atlantic Coastal Statesto the 1973 accelerated leasing decision.
The Governors of both New Jersey and
Delaware publicly favor early exploration ofthe Mid-Atlantic OCS for oil and natural gas,but their support is qualified. Both haveargued for changes in Federal OCS policy as acondition of their full support.
The desire for change stems from severalfactors. One involves basic uncertainties aboutenvironmental and economic impacts of atechnology which is alien to the Mid-Atlanticeven though it is familiar to the Gulf of Mex-ico. Another involves a series of lapses incommunication and coordination between theStates and the Interior Department whichhave raised doubts among State officials aboutthe capability of the Federal Government inplanning for operation of offshore oil and gassystems.
The Mid-Atlantic OCS program intensifiedpressure on the State governments, par-ticularly from residents along the coast, toprotect their beaches. Because existing lawrestricts major decisions about OCS develop-ment to the Federal Government, Stateofficials have argued for a role as active par-ticipants, rather than observers, in threegeneral areas. They are:
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Drafting of oil and gas regulations and en-forcement plans which could affect thequantities of oil that may be spilled duringoffshore development;
Selection of areas to be leased which willaffect locations of such facilities as onshorestaging areas, pipeline landfalls, tank farms,and gas processing plants; and
Approval of development plans which set apattern of deployment of technology thatwould prevail in the area during the life of aMid-Atlantic oil and gas field.
State officials also desire more centraliza-tion of responsibilities and authority within
Figure 11-1. Baltimore Canyon Trough lease sale area
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Source Office of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
the Interior Department to facilitate the flowof information to the States.
This report contains detailed descriptions ofeach of the component elements in a typicaloffshore oil and gas system, starting withgeophysical survey ships which are used togather preliminary data on resources and con-tinuing through technology used for explora-tion drilling, production drilling, transporta-tion, storage, and processing. Deployment oftechnology is traced over time for twoassumptions-one in which 1.8 billion barrelsof oil and 5.3 trillion cubic feet of gas are dis-covered and recovered and another for 4.6billion barrels of oil and 14.2 trillion cubic feetof natural gas.
It is estimated that 25 platforms could be in-stalled offshore, each with 24 producing wells,within 14 years after the initial lease sale toproduce the 1.8 billion barrels of oil at anaverage peak rate of 313,000 barrels per day.Under the 4.6 billion barrel assumption, therecould be 52 platforms, each with 24 producingwells within 15 years after a lease sale. Peakdaily rate for this assumption would be650,000 barrels.
Onshore, the oil and gas distribution net-work, averaging both assumptions, wouldcover about 3-square miles with pipelinerights-of-way, staging areas (of up to 170acres), tank farms (covering 50 to 75 acreseach), and gas processing plants (on sites ofabout 100 acres each). If drilling platformswere fabricated in either State, land needswould increase by about 1,000 acres.
Five areas in the New Jersey–Delawareregion could serve as staging areas foroffshore development, three coastal sites andthe port complexes of New York City andPhiladelphia–Camden. All three coastalsites—Atlantic City and Cape May, N.J., andLewes, Del.—would meet such staging arearequirements as availability of harbors forsupply boats, accessibility by rail, proximityto lease sites, and availability of land for
storage and service facilities. Service firmsunder contract to oil companies would choosestaging areas on the basis of lowest overalloperating costs.
Earlier studies by the Council on Environ-mental Quality, the American Petroleum In-stitute, and the Department of the Interiorhave produced varying projections of thephysical, biological, and social changes thatwould result from offshore development inthe Mid-Atlantic OCS. The earlier studies useddifferent assumptions about the amounts ofoil and gas that may be recovered anddifferent State and/or regional boundaries forconsideration. When these projections are ad-justed to a common base, however, they fallwithin the same general range of effects thatare estimated in the OTA study.
It is concluded that, if a major spill occurredat a drilling or production platform 50 milesat sea, the odds are one in ten that an oil slickwould reach the beaches of New Jersey andDelaware.
The danger of oil striking a beach would in-crease if a spill occurred as a result of apipeline rupture nearer to shore. The dangerwould decrease if a spill occurred at structuresfarther than 50 miles from shore. The plat-forms expected as a result of the first Mid-Atlantic lease sale will be located approx-imately 54 to 100 miles from shore. The dis-tance lowers the risk of oil striking the beachand also makes the structures invisible fromshore.
One element of the offshore oil system thatwould require particularly careful planning isthe placement of pipelines in coastal areas.There is general agreement that pipelinesshould be routed to avoid marshlands, adesign that would be difficult to achieve alongthe New Jersey or Delaware coast, virtually allof which is backed by marshlands,
Direct employment in New Jersey andDelaware would peak at about 9,000 workers
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if the high estimate of 4.6 billion barrels ofrecoverable oil is correct and at about 4,500workers if the median estimate of 1,8 billionbarrels is correct. Capital expenditures wouldtotal between $2 billion and $4 billion. Peakland requirements for the high estimate wouldbe about 1,645 acres in the New Jersey–Delaware region. Of that, 320 acres could becoastal land around coastal harbors and theremainder would be inland. Seven hundredacres would be required for pipeline rights-of-way that probably would parallel existingrailroad lines or highways.
Analysis of the tax systems of a variety ofcoastal States, including New Jersey andDelaware, indicates that per capita taxrevenue from OCS-related installationsonshore would be significantly higher thanthe statewide average per capita revenuesfrom other sources, except during the first 2 or3 years of development. The principal reasonis that the major onshore installations, such astank farms and pipelines, are capital intensive,and therefore produce substantial sales andproperty tax revenues. However, this estimateis for statewide revenues only. It is quitepossible that particular localities within aState will experience net adverse budgetaryimpacts during the course of OCS develop-ment, since there is little reason to expect thatthe tax revenue-producing onshore facilitieswould be located in the tax jurisdiction of thecommunities that must provide public serv-ices and facilities for the population support-ing offshore exploration and development.This problem may also occur between States ifthe oil and gas are not landed in the same Statein which the main support bases are located. Itis also possible that a locality could experiencea net negative fiscal impact if extraordinaryexpenditures for public facilities such as roadsare required to support OCS development.
The major source of potential impacts onair and water quality onshore would be anynew refinery capacity that might result fromOCS development. Ambient air quality stand-
ards, particularly those related to oxidantlevels, could be a significant constraint on newor expanded refinery capacity. Concentrationsof waterborne pollutants in refinery effluentare relatively small and probably would notsignificantly affect the quality of a receivingstream. Refinery cooling, however, could pro-duce thermal pollution problems in DelawareBay or Newark Bay, both of which are alreadyvery close to the maximum permissible load.
Dramatic changes in regional energy pricesshould not be expected to follow OCSdevelopment. Lower transportation costsmight give New Jersey and Delaware a priceadvantage compared with some other regionsof the country. But future prices would de-pend, in part, on oil and gas price controlpolicies.
As a result of its study, OTA has identifiedthe Federal-State conflicts as the major issues.Eight specific OCS issues are treated in thisreport. They are:
Federal Management System .—Federalmanagement of the offshore oil and gasprogram is fragmented within the Depart-ment of the Interior and coordination withother Federal agencies which share jurisdic-tion is ineffective. (See pages 43–46.)
Regulation and Enforcement.—Inadequateregulation and enforcement of offshore oiland gas technology could result in more ac-cidents and more oil spills than would oc-cur if a more effective system were imple-mented. (See pages 47–50.)
Oil Spill Liability and Compensation.—Exist -ing laws are not adequate either to assignliability or compensate individuals or in-stitutions for damages from oil spills result-ing from exploration, development, or pro-duction in the Baltimore Canyon Trougharea. (See pages 51 –56.)
Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup.—There
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is no assurance that the technology utilizedin the Baltimore Canyon Trough or in anyother OCS frontier region would be ade-quate for oil spill surveillance, containment,and cleanup. (See pages 57–59.)
Environmental Studies.—Environmentalresearch and baseline studies are not for-mally coordinated with the Interior Depart-ment’s leasing schedule and there is no re-quirement that information gathered beused in the decisionmaking process for saleof offshore lands and subsequent operation.(See pages 60-62.)
State Role.—The limited role of State govern-ments in the decisionmaking process forOCS development under existing laws andpractices may lead to unnecessary delays
and improper planning for such develop-ment. (See pages 63–66.)
Pollution Research.—The effects of pollutantswhich may be discharged during OCSoperations cannot presently be determinedwith any accuracy and recent researchefforts have not clarified conflicting claimsby oil companies and environmentalgroups regarding the amount and conse-quences of marine pollution. (See pages67–69,)
Conflicting Ocean Uses.—There are potentialconflicts between OCS oil and gas activitiesand vessel traffic engaged in commercialshipping and fishing activities. However,there has been no comprehensive study andanalysis to identify all conflicts and to findways of resolving them. (See pages 70–75.)
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OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS SYSTEMS—FINDINGS
Effects of OCS Development
Oil and natural gas can be produced inthe amounts presently projected off theMid-Atlantic coast without significantdamage to the environment or disruptionof patterns of life in New Jersey orDelaware if operations are carefullydesigned, planned, and monitored.However, careful planning, engineering,and strict operational monitoring are re-quired for each of these complex systems.To a large extent, such planning andmonitoring will depend on the quality ofoversight by the responsible Federalagencies. (See pages 150– 160.)
Changes in lines of authority within theDepartment of the Interior would im-prove the Department’s ability to super-vise offshore development and to coordi-nate operations with State and localgovernments. ( S e e p a g e s 4 3 – 4 6 ,1 30–131 .)
Federal-State Relations
States cannot participate in a meaningfulway in the process that leads to majorleasing and OCS decisions under presentpolicies. The State role at present is littlemore than that of commentator. (Seepages 131–140, 155- 156.)
Existing laws and regulations do notclearly specify the information aboutOCS activities to which States are en-titled, a lapse that encourages disputesover rights to data between State andFederal officials. (See pages 63–66, 125,138–140, 147–150.)
Federal efforts to deal with State concernsare fragmented among many depart-ments and agencies and seldom reflect asense of need for coordination, clear linesof communication, and close workingties. (See pages 43–46, 130, 152–155,161 –165.)
The Interior Department’s relations with
State governments are improving butrelations still depend more on individualjudgments by Interior Departmentofficials than on formal administrativeprocedures on which the States can rely.(See pages 139-140.)
● Changes in Federal OCS policies andpractices have lagged behind changes inthe social and political climate in theMid-Atlantic in which offshore develop-ment will occur. The lag is particularlyimportant with respect to environmentalconcerns and a desire among States forgreater access to Federal information anddecision making. (See pages 63-66,127–1 31.)
. As of mid-1976, the Office of CoastalZone Management had not asserted itselfas coordinator of State and Federal ac-tivities involving the effects of offshoredevelopment on the coastal zone. (Seepages 43–46, 136-138.)
. Concerns of New Jersey and Delawareofficials over environmental and socialimpacts of offshore development arecompounded by their doubts about thequality of Federal management of theleasing program and doubts about theeffectiveness of the enforcement of OCSregulations. (See pages 63–66. )
. Neither Delaware or New Jersey wants todelay of fshore development un-necessarily, but both are prepared to seeklegal remedies if development in the Mid-Atlantic proceeds without what they con-sider adequate State participation in deci-sions. (See pages 159–160.)
Planning
. Federal requirements under the CoastalZone Management Act that Federal ac-tivities be consistent with a State’s coastalzone management plan have played norole as yet in Mid-Atlantic OCS activities
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because neither New Jersey or Delawarehas completed coastal zone managementplans. (See pages 136–138.)
The exact location of OCS facilities andthe magnitude of development impactswill not be known until Outer Continen-tal Shelf “frontier areas” have been ex-plored and the size and location ofpetroleum resources have been deter-mined. (See pages 133 , 143-144 ,146– 172.)
Regulation, Safety, and Pollution
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The regulation of offshore technology bythe U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) isbased on general guidelines to the indus-try with minimal inspection and enforce-ment, USGS regulations are more con-cerned with specific pieces of equipmentthan with the total oil and gas productionsystem. (See pages 47-50, 130, 146,152–155, 161–163.)
Techniques exist, but are not alwaysused, for setting design standards and in-stallation practices and for testing all ma-jor items of equipment involved in OCSoperations. (See pages 47–50, 152–155,161 –163.)
Federal regulations are not sufficientlyprecise with regard to standards for con-struction of offshore platforms orpipelines. (See pages 47–50, 152- 155.)
The purpose of the Interior Department’sOCS environmental studies program andits role in the management of OCS ac-tivities is not clearly defined. In theirpresent form, environmental surveysconducted under the auspices of thisprogram are not useful either in writingenvironmental impact statements or inmaking OCS leasing decisions. (See pages60–62, 134–135.)
. Federal pollution research efforts are notas well coordinated as are those spon-sored by private industry. (See pages67–69, 167–169.)
Oil Spills
● Under some weather conditions, oil spillsfrom a platform as far as 50 miles at seacould reach the New Jersey and Delawarecoasts but it is not possible to predict thepoint of impact. (See pages 165–166.)
● Weather, wind, and ocean currents willaffect the dispersion, trajectory, chemicalcomposition, and ultimate disposition ofoil spills. These conditions vary fromseason to season, and even from day today, but research on ocean conditions inOCS areas has a low budget priority. (Seepages 165–166.)
● The Federal Government does not setdefinitive standards for the industry tofollow in carrying out its responsibilityto provide cleanup equipment in theevent of a major oil spill. USGS does notinspect cleanup equipment but relies onindustry to make its own inspections.(See pages 57-59, 166- 167.)
. USGS procedures for monitoring dis-charges of oil and other pollutants duringOCS operations are inadequate and theagency does not use monitoring equip-ment that is available and in use by otherGovernment agencies. (See pages 57–59,166–169.)
● Under existing Federal practices there areno standards that cleanup and contain-ment equipment, which would be avail-able in the Mid-Atlantic, must meet, andno assurance that a major oil spill ac-tually could be confined and removed
from the water even if the best equipmentis available. (See pages 57–59, 166– 169. )
At the present time, the laws of an adja-cent State would be used to determine alessee’s liability for oil spill damages butneither New Jersey or Delaware lawsprovide for compensation to injured par-ties. (See pages 51–56.)
Impacts
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Drastic changes in regional energy priceswill not result from offshore develop-ment in the Mid-Atlantic. (See pages171–172.)
A net fiscal benefit to Mid-Atlantic Stategovernments probably will result fromonshore facilities related to offshoredevelopment but there may be localizedfiscal problems and the advantage wouldnot occur until after the first 3 years ofoffshore activity. (See pages 157– 159.)
Discovery of offshore oil would notnecessarily lead to construction of newrefineries in the Mid-Atlantic. In fact, ex-isting air quality regulations might pre-vent construction of new refineries inNew Jersey and Delaware. (See pages169–170.)
The major impacts on air and waterquality in the region would result fromexpanded refineries and from gas proc-essing plants. (See pages 170– 1 71. )
There is no formal mechansim for resolv-ing conflicts among the many users of theocean or for directing research to dis-cover the cumulative environmental con-sequences of expanding the use of theocean for energy development and otherpurposes. (See pages 37-42, 70-75,155–156.)
Figure II-2. Hypothetical deepwater port site offshore New Jersey coast
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DEEPWATER PORTS — SUMMARY
In the late 1960’s, energy supply patternsand environmental concerns seemed to justifyconstruction of at least one deepwater port forsupertankers off the coast of New Jersey andDelaware.
By 1976, that was no longer the case. Aseries of changes in State laws and Federalpolicies, capped by the inflation and uncer-tainty of supplies that followed sharp in-creases in world oil prices, had changed theregion’s petroleum distribution system dra-matically.
Plans for expanding old refineries andbuilding new ones were on the shelf. Increasesin demand for petroleum products were beingmet by Gulf Coast and Caribbean refineries.Inflation had doubled original estimates of thecost of a deepwater port.
Extensive interviews with industry officialsand analysis of feasibility studies disclosethat—barring future changes as drastic asthose of the early 1970’s—the oil industry willnot revive Mid-Atlantic deepwater port plansfor at least 10 years.
New tax policies, changes in environmentallaws, changes in oil prices or sharp increasesin Mid-Atlantic demand for imports couldchange the picture again. It also is possiblethat environmental or political goals couldprompt States to build a deepwater port evenif it were not attractive on purely economicgrounds.
In the meantime, the oil industry is movingahead with plans to build two deepwaterports off the shores of Texas and Louisianathat eventually can handle 10 million barrelsof oil a day. A program of refinery construc-tion and expansion is underway in both Texasand Louisiana to handle imports of crude oil.
water ports, several sites and types of ter-minals were studied, including a sea pier lo-cated inside Delaware Bay. Of these, the tech-nology most likely to be placed in watersunder Federal jurisdiction is a largemonobuoy complex located far enough fromthe coast to serve the largest supertankers inthe world fleet. These are 480,000 deadweightton (dwt) ships, a quarter-of-a-mile long, thatcarry up to 3.7 million barrels of oil and re-quire 110 feet of water depth for maneuvering.One site that could accommodate the largesttankers is 32 miles off southern New Jerseywhere waters are 110 to 115 feet deep.
Oil could be pumped from the site throughunderwater and overland pipelines to theDelaware River refinery complex which in-cludes seven refineries with a total capacity of890,000 barrels of petroleum product per day.The capacity of the refineries could be nearlydoubled without acquiring additional land.
During the course of this study, severalbulk-oil terminal designs were analyzed. Themonobuoy was selected for detailed studybecause it is a proven technology, already inoperation in more than 100 deepwater portsaround the world, and because it is less expen-sive, safer, and more accessible in roughweather than other designs.
A monobuoy is a floating steel drum, 30 feetto 50 feet in diameter, which is anchored overa buried pipeline leading to shore. Tankers tieup to the buoy, connect the buoy’s floatingrubber hoses to their cargo compartments andpump oil through the hoses and into thepipeline.
Under 1976 conditions, the cost of buildingand operating a monobuoy complex offDelaware Bay would make the price oftransferring oil through the deepwater port
During the period of strong Government higher than the existing system, which usesand industry interest in Mid-Atlantic deep- lightering barges. Another barrier is
Delaware’s Coastal Zone Act which prohibitspipeline landfalls in that State. New Jersey’sCoastal Area Facilities Review Act does notprohibit pipeline landfalls outright but boththe present and immediate past Governors ofNew Jersey are on record in opposition todeepwater port development in their State.
Thus, the descriptions of technology andthe likely consequences of its deploymentwhich are discussed in this study are purelyhypothetical. Basic changes in policy and theeconomics of oil distribution will be necessarybefore a deepwater port can bethe region.
Given the lack of interest in adeepwater port on the part ofofficials and the oil industry, the
deployed in
Mid-AtlanticGovernmentmatter is not
a major public issue at this time. The passageof the Federal Deepwater Port Act of 1974 alsohas reduced the number of issues of Federalconcern.
However, this study has identified severalpotential issues. They include:
Tanker Design and Operations.—Tankerspills are the source of five to fifteen timesas much oil as all offshore drilling and port
DEEPWATER PORTS—FINDINGSConstruction
. A deepwater port is not likely to be builtto serve the Mid-Atlantic during the next10 years. (See pages 186–188.)
. Industry is not likely to abandon its exist-ing marine transportation system forsupplying the Mid-Atlantic with oilproducts as long as there is no clear costadvantage . ( S e e p a g e s 1 7 3 - 1 7 8 ,186–188.)
. Expanded or new refinery capacitywould be necessary to make a deepwaterport economically feasible, But existing
operations combined; yet pollution controlregulations are far less stringent for tankersthan for either deepwater ports or offshoreoil and gas operations. (See pages 76–79. )
Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup at Deep-water Ports.—The use of offshore deep-water ports may reduce the risk of certainoil spills and environmental damage belowthat of transporting crude oil by smallertankers into the congested New York Har-bor and Delaware Bay. Even the very smallrisk of a catastrophic spill from a super-tanker, however, dictates that stringentpollution control and cleanup systems beused. (See pages 80–82.)
Standards in State Waters.—Under existingFederal law, operators of deepwater portsin State waters could ignore the safety andenvironmental pollution standards that ap-ply to ports outside the 3-mile limit. (Seepages 83-85.)
Adjacent Coastal State Status.—Differing in-terpretations of statutory criteria for deter-mining adjacent coastal State status make itdifficult to predict which States couldqualify for that status in the future andwhether some States may be deprived of thebenefits of such status. (See pages 86–89.)
Federal and State air quality regulationsmake construction of new refineriesalong the Delaware River and Bayunlikely in the foreseeable future,although existing refineries may be ex-panded without exceeding pollutionstandards. (See pages 186– 188.)
Environment
. Because a decision to build a deepwaterport would logically follow—not force—
a decision to build new refineries, a portis likely to be postponed at least until,and if, refinery capacity in the Mid-Atlantic expands significantly. (See pages186–188.)
● A deepwater port system would offer en-vironmental advantages over smalltankers operating in existing ports. Pres-ently, small tankers spill twice as muchoil that can damage the coastal zone aswould be spilled in a deepwater portsystem. (See pages 193–194.)
● The most serious threat of oil spills as aresult of a deepwater port system comesfrom the tankers using the port. Yet,tanker regulations are less strict than portregulations. (See pages 76–79, 195– 196. )
● Because of the serious design limitationsof containment and cleanup equipment,even the most advanced equipment willbe effective only about 55 percent of thetime in winter seas off the Mid-Atlanticcoast. These facts emphasize the impor-tance of preventing spills rather thanregulating cleanup equipment. (See pages80–83, 193–194.)
Planning and Procedures
● Coast Guard Vessel Traffic SurveillanceSystems are not required for deepwaterports in State waters and budgetpriorities in the Coast Guard could delayinstallation of these systems for the ports.(See pages 83-85, 185- 186.)
● There is disagreement among Federalofficials, State governments, and otherinterested parties as to statutory criteriafor determining which States near adeepwater port are eligible for economicassistance and regulatory powers of theDeepwater Port Act. (See pages 86–89,195.)
. Applications for the construction andoperation of deepwater ports in State orterritorial waters are not under thejurisdiction of the Deepwater Port Actand there is minimal coordination be-tween the two agencies which do havejurisdiction —the A r m y Corps o fEngineers and the Depart men t ofTransportation. (See pages 83-85,185–1 86.)
Figure II-3. Proposed site of the floating nuclear powerplant
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FLOATING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS—SUMMARY
Late in 1972, New Jersey’s largest publicutility company concluded that floatingnuclear powerplants moored off the coastwould solve a major problem faced with alllarge-scale generators—access to coolingwater. The company, Public Service Electric &Gas Co., which generates more than 60 per-cent of the State’s power, also concluded theycould be built for less money and be less en-vironmentally damaging than land-basedplants. Access to cooling water was crucial tothe company’s future plans. At the time itscustomers were using electricity at rates thatmeant doubling Public Service’s generatingcapacity every 8 years—a rate of growth wellabove the national average—and the numberof sites for new plants that could be builtwithout cooling towers was severely limited.
During the period of steep growth in de-mand in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, theoffshore plant was a critical element in PublicService’s long-range plans for providing newgeneration facilities. Its construction schedulecalled for having large amounts of newgenerating capacity in place by the early1980’s. Two land-based nuclear plants nearSalem, N. J., were running 5 years behindschedule. Construction of two more nuclearunits was delayed when objections to the useof Newbold Island in the Delaware Riverforced Public Service to relocate the project toHope Creek, just north of the Salem plants.Lead times for land-based plants elsewhere inthe State were running between 8 and 12years.
In September 1972, after conducting its ownsite surveys off the New Jersey coast, PublicService contracted to buy the first two floatingplants to be produced by Offshore PowerSystems, Inc. In 1973, Public Service signed acontract for two more floating plants.
Today, after 3 years of analyzing the
offshore power concept, staff members of theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), andsome other Federal agencies have come to thesame general conclusion about the cost andenvironmental impact of floating nuclearpowerplants. These staff judgments are tenta-tive and are not in any sense formal endorse-ments of the concept or the constructionplans. The Public Service proposal still mustwork its way through a series of reviews,public hearings, and decisions by Federal andState agencies and meet challenges from en-vironmental groups, New Jersey beach com-munities, and some nuclear scientists andengineers who say that the systems are un-necessary, and may be unworkable or unsafe.Before an offshore nuclear plant can startgenerating power it must clear three separatestages of licensing. The first of these probablywill not be completed before 1977.
The preliminary NRC staff reviewsnevertheless have provided enough en-couragement to the companies involved in thefloating nuclear powerplants—the AtlanticGenerating Station Units 1 and 2—that theyhave spent more than $120 million thus far forplans, environmental studies, and in toolingup for production.
Public Service plans to have the first plantoperational in 1985 and the second in 1987.
Each plant is designed to generate 1,150megawatts (MWe) of power, a supply thatPublic Service estimates will provide aboutone-third of the additional power it plans tobe generating by 1987. The plants aredesigned to generate power for 40 years, afterwhich they will be shut down and decommis-sioned.
Several advantages of supplying electricityfrom offshore stations have been advanced inrecent years by supporters and some analysts
of the concept. Promoters of offshore plantstake the position that:
● Unlimited supplies of cooling water areavailable at ocean sites and the environ-mental consequences of dischargingheated water into the ocean will beminimal compared with the conse-quences of discharging heated water intorivers, lakes and bays.
. Offshore construction eliminates the dis-ruption of coastal marshlands and estu-aries to a great extent.
. The floating power concept moves in thedirection of standardized nuclear plantdesigns, a goal the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission (then the Atomic EnergyCommission) set in 1972.
. Shipyard construction of plants willshorten the time required to put a nuclearplant in operation after a decision ismade to build it.
. Volume production can cut costs and im-prove quality control.
Federal and State agencies have beenreviewing the offshore powerplant proposalinformally since late 1971 and formally sinceJuly 1973, when the Atomic Energy Commis-sion docketed an Offshore Power Systems ap-plication for a permit to build eight floatingnuclear powerplants.
During that time, the Atlantic GeneratingStation has received encouragement from thestaff of the Council on Environmental Quality,which views the proposal with “guarded op-timism. ” The Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion’s Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulationhas declared the project “generally accepta-ble” as to environmental impact and risk. Thesame office concluded in a Safety EvaluationReport published in September 1975 that withsome modifications in design “there isreasonable assurance that . . . [the reactorscould be installed] without undue risk to thehealth and safety of the public.”
During preheating conferences on theOffshore Power Systems application for amanufacturing permit, interveners havechallenged many of these claims, questioneddesign features, raised doubts about the needfor any new generating capacity in the area,and argued that the technology is unprovenand should not be tested near New Jerseycommunities.
The State of New Jersey, which has notsought official intervener status, has com-plained to the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion that neither of two environmental impactstatements NRC has published “faces up fullyto all the risks [of floating plants] about whichyou owe the public your professional advice. ”
In a May 4, 1976, letter to NRC, David J.Bardin, New Jersey Commissioner of Environ-mental Protection, wrote that the most impor-tant lapse was in not addressing the possibleconsequences of a major accident “on theground that such failures were unlikely to oc-cur. ”
Some of the major points that intervenershave argued in preheating conferences since1974 are:
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The plant will be vulnerable to externalhazards such as ship collisions, airplanecrashes, and severe storms. Damage tothe plant could result in dispersal ofradioactive materials injurious to humanhealth and aquatic life.
Transportation and handling of radioac-tive fuel and wastes involve risks tohuman safety and health and to themarine and coastal environment.
Evacuation in case of an accident will bedifficult, especially in summer months,and there are no adequate plans or pro-cedures for such emergencies.
Fear of nuclear accidents will reduce theappeal of the area for recreational uses
and have a detrimental effect on theregion’s tourist -based economy,
● Other impacts that could be adverse in-clude industrialization of the oceanaround the site, onshore supportfacilities, dredging, and defects in under-water electrical transmission lines.
. NRC should prepare a comprehensive,programmatic EIS on the construction offloating nuclear powerplants locatedoffshore.
More than 15,000 New Jersey and Delawareresidents were contacted by OTA as part of thepublic participation program of this study.From these participants, more than 1,000responses dealing specifically with the float-ing nuclear plant were selected for analysis.The analysis showed that the public wasgenerally well aware that advantages and dis-advantages must be weighed in decidingwhether to build a floating nuclear plant. Theanalysis, along with press reports and state-ments at public hearings, also showed that thepublic sees the disadvantages as involvingquestions of safety, environmental degrada-tion and high construction costs. The advan-tages include increased energy supplies withresulting economic expansion and cheaperpower than would be possible with continueduse of oil-fired generating plants.
Specific concerns about safety involvepossibilities of accidents, leakage of radioac-tive waste and unresolved questions about thepermanent disposal of nuclear waste. Therewas a perception among those who answeredthe OTA questionnaire that floating nuclearpowerplants are experimental and that thereis no experience on which to base estimates ofrisk and reliability.
One of the advantages cited in question-naires and workshops is that nuclearpowerplants are less polluting generally thanfossil-fueled plants. In turn, participants sawadvantages in floating plants over land-based
plants in their distance from shore and theelimination of pressures on New Jersey watersupplies for cooling water.
In this study, OTA has analyzed availableinformation on costs, benefits, environmentalimpact, safety, waste disposal systems,transportation, transmission cables, anddecommissioning activities associated withthe floating plants. The study does not attemptto evaluate controversies about the safety andperformance of nuclear plants in general;these are beyond the scope of the coastaleffects analysis, It concentrates, instead, on ex-ploring differences between the designs offloating and land-based plants and comparingthe advantages and disadvantages of each,
The major issues identified by OTA in itsstudy of the floating nuclear plant are:
Risks From Major Accidents.—The NuclearRegulatory Commission (NRC) is notevaluating the risks from accidents in float-ing nuclear plants comprehensively enoughto permit either a generic comparison of therelative risks from land based and floatingnuclear plants, or an assessment of thespecific risks from deploying floating plantsoff New Jersey. (See pages 90–98.)
Deployment in Volume.—As many as 59floating nuclear powerplants could be builtby a single manufacturer by the year 2000but no policy analysis of the impacts ofdeploying that many plants in U.S. coastalwaters has been done or is contemplated.(See pages 90-101.)
Technical Uncertainties.—Several technicalaspects of the deployment, operation, anddecommissioning of floating nuclearpowerpIants have not been analyzedthoroughly enough to permit judgmentsabout the relative risks of the overallsystem. (See pages 102–105. )
Siting of Floating Powerplants Outside U.S.Territorial Limits.—Because there is nophysical barrier to location floating nuclear
powerplants more than 3 miles offshore, authority to regulate floating nuclearproposals for siting plants outside ter- powerplants outside U.S. territory is notritorial limits are possible. However, U.S. clear under existing international law. (See
FLOATING
pages 106–111.). . — — — —. .-—
NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS—FINDINGS
Energy Supply
● The two 1150 megawatt floating nuclearplants proposed to be located offshoreNew Jersey could produce about 10 per-cent of the State’s electrical needs pro-jected for 1990. (See pages 197–200.)
Planning and Procedures.
●
●
●
●
●
No detailed procedure or design stan-dards have been developed for transport-ing fuel to a floating plant or for carryingirradiated fuel and other radioactivewastes to shore. (See pages 102–105,214–218.)
Offshore sites for nuclear powerplantsoffer advantages over shore-based sitesin terms of impacts on the marine en-v i r o n m e n t . ( S e e p a g e s 1 0 6 - 1 1 1 ,200–201, 222, 229.)
The floating nuclear powerplant conceptof standardizing design may provide amethod for controlling escalating costs ofnuclear power plants. (See pages200–201, 225–228.)
There are several decommissioning optionsfor the floating nuclear plant, but onlythe one of dismantling the radioactive in-ternals at the plant site and disposing ofthem appears to be technically andeconomically feasible. (See pages102–105, 219–222.)
Existing international law does notspecifically settle the question of jurisdic-tion over a floating nuclear powerplantlocated beyond national territorial limits,
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commissionappears not to have authority under pre-sent law to approve siting of a U.S.nuclear powerplant in waters outside ofU.S. jurisdiction. (See pages 106–111.)
Federal licensing of floating nuclearplants is confined to rather narrow tech-nical and administrative questions re-lated to building eight plants and deploy-ing two of those plants off the coast ofNew Jersey. It does not consider the im-plications of approving the larger scaled e p l o y m e n t o f f l o a t i n g n u c l e a rpowerplants. (See pages 99–101.)
The one U.S. company now developing acapacity to build floating nuclearpowerplants intends to build and marketfour such plants a year after 1985.Operating at peak capacity beginning in1977, this company could produce 59floating nuclear plants by the year 2000.(See pages 99-101.)
Safety
●
●
●
The nuclear reactor and floating bargeare proven technologies but the combina-tion of the two as a system is not, (Seepage 203.)
A critical review of completed studiesdiscloses little foundation for concludingthat either construction or routine opera-tions of the two plants at the AtlanticGenerating Station would endangerpublic health or environment. (See pages224–229.)
In the unlikely event of a core-melt acci-
dent in a floating plant, the molten coreeventually would melt through the bot-tom of any barge and release radioactivematerials directly into the ocean wherethey could contaminate beaches and beabsorbed in the food chain. (See pages90–98, 232–236.)
● The probability of a core-meltdown acci-dent in a floating nuclear powerplant iscomparable to the probability calculatedin WASH–1400, commonly known asthe Rasmussen Report, for land-basedplants. However, the expected conse-quences of releases of radioactivematerials as a result of a core-melt at afloating plant could be significantlydifferent. (See pages 90–98, 230–237.)
● The probability of an atmospheric releaseof radioactive materials may be as much
as seven times greater for a core-melt at afloating plant than for a core-melt at theland-based plant, as calculated inWASH–1400. However, the amount andconsequences of the release may bereduced by design features and offshoresiting of the plant. (See pages 90–98,230–237.)
. The Liquid Pathways Generic Studybeing prepared by the Nuclear Regulato-ry Commission and Offshore PowerSystems comparing the radiological con-sequences of accidental release ofradioactive materials into water at float-ing plants and land-based plants is not ascomprehensive as WASH – 1400’sanalysis of the consequences of accidents,partly because it does not considereconomic impacts. (See pages 90-98,233–236.)
ALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES—SUMMARY
New Jersey and Delaware would have a servation and energy supply programs, thelimited number of alternatives over at least most likely course for the Mid-Atlantic regionthe next two decades if any or all of the pro- during the next 20 years is to extend theposed offshore energy systems were not energy system that already is planned or indeployed. place.
Without strong national leadership in con-
ALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE TECHNOLOGIES—FINDINGS● There are specific alternatives which, if
substituted for each of the proposedoffshore energy projects, could supplyequivalent amounts of energy. Increasedimports are an alternative to offshore oiland gas development. Onshore nuclearplants and coal-fired plants are alterna-tives to floating nuclear plants. Greaterreliance on small tankers is an alternativeto deepwater ports. None of the specificnear-term alternatives offer clear social,economic, or environmental advantages.(See pages 238-246.)
● Reduction of energy consumption couldoffer longer term advantages but thereare no specific plans at the State or na-tional level for an energy conservationprogram that might eliminate the needfor energy supplies that would comefrom one or more of the proposedoffshore systems. (See pages 240–244. )
● Utility managers will choose existing andtested technologies that are most apt tomatch the consumption levels in theirforecasts and will assign reliability ofpower supply a higher priority than cost.(See pages 239-240.)
● The most promising alternatives forstretching out supplies of fossil fuels areprograms to improve insula t ion o fhomes and offices, changes in automobile
●
●
●
●
design to increase mileage, and use of ex-isting technologies to increase theamount of power generated per unit offuel. (See pages 240–242.)
Coal is a potential substitute for everybasic fuel in the United States and sup-plies could last for more than a centuryeven if consumption were to quadruple.However, massive conversion to use ofcoal would entail major changes intransportation networks, in air qualitystandards, new mining techniques, andnew miner-training and safety programs.(See pages 243-244.)
Utility companies and other energy sup-pliers in Mid-Atlantic States will not fac-tor supplies of oil and natural gas fromthe Baltimore Canyon Trough into theirfuture plans until exploration establisheslikely production levels. (See pages238–239.)No single new technology or change inthe way existing technologies are used islikely to provide more than a small per-centage of total energy requirementsbefore the end of the century. Solutionsto energy problems will be found inting together many relatively smallservation and supply programs.pages 240–246.)
Given existing laws, regulations,
put-con-(See
fuel
supplies, and technologies, New Jersey . Solar energy will not contribute much toutilities report that they would replace energy supplies before the end of the cen -f loa t ing nuc lear powerplants wi th tury unless Federal programs to cut solarshoreline f loating plants, land-based installation costs and private plans tonuclear plants, and coal-fired plants, i n market solar products are given higherthat order of preference. (See pages priorities than they now enjoy. (See238–240.) page 241.)
I
“.
-. .
F
Chapter III
ISSUES AND OPTIONS
INTRODUCTIONThis study has assessed the
economic effects of offshore oilsocial, political, institutional, environmental, andand gas, deepwater ports, and floating nuclear
powerplant technology on the coastal zone of New Jersey and Delaware. The potentialeffects in this one region have been used to illustrate those public policy issues whichare of significant concern to Congress and the Nation.
OTA found that each of the three technologies studied posed different problemsand benefits for the area and that little cumulative effect could be expected even if allthree were to be deployed simultaneously.
There was, however, one issue which was raised by all three of the technologies:the possibility of increasing and diversified use of the oceans in the future without anyformal mechanism for planning development, identifying priority ocean uses, andresolving conflicts among an increasing number of users.
This chapter discusses this common issue, eight issues pertaining to the develop-ment of oil and gas resources, four pertaining to deepwater ports, and four pertaining tofloating nuclear powerplants. Analyses of these issues have been used to develop policyoptions which Congress may wish to consider for resolving some of the problems iden-tified. These policy options have been reviewed by industry and pertinent governmentagencies and their comments have been considered prior to preparation of this finalreport.
The comments quoted in the margins of the Issues discussions reflect the view ofcitizens who joined in the public participation segment of this study and the views ofState and Federal officials who reviewed the work for OTA.
35
ISSUE 1Offshore Priorities and Planning
Future deployment of ocean technologies on a largescale could create serious conflicts among users andimpose excessive burdens on ocean and coastal en-vironments unless a system for setting priorities of useand for zoning ocean areas, much as land areas noware zoned, is established.
FINDINGS
1. Decisions aboutthe oceans now are left
the most appropriate usesto the individual judgments
ofof
private c i t izens and companies and the several Federal
a g e n c i e s t h a t h a v e j u r i s d i c t i o n o v e r s o m e p h a s e o f
o c e a n a c t i v i t i e s .
2. There is no formal mechanism for resolving con-flicts among the many users of the ocean or for direct-ing research to discover the cumulative environmentalconsequences of expanding use of the oceans.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE
In normal operation, none of the three offshoreenergy systems addressed in this study is likely to imposeintolerable burdens on either the ocean or coastal en-vironment, singly or in combination. Conflicts betweenthese new systems and traditional users of waters offNew Jersey and Delaware probably can be resolved withappropriate vessel traffic control systems and methods ofcoordinating oil development and fishing operations.
If such offshore programs as floating nuclearpowerplants prove workable, they could lead to deploy-ment of more floating powerplants and other offshoretechnologies on a major scale.
No priorities now exist for uses of the oceans. Nostructure, legal or administrative, exists for resolvingconflicts among users or for performing research on thelong-range and cumulative impacts of expanded oceanuse.
Environmental impact statements and public hear-ings which are required for most ocean licensing providea forum for identifying some conflicts among ocean uses,
.-
Overall Concern
Public ParticipationComments
but they seldom identify hard choices among limitedocean resources and ocean uses.
The region’s ocean waters have been used for fish-ing, military operations, and commercial shipping sincecolonial days. More recently, the ocean has been used forrecreation, dump sites, communication lines, andweather stations.
Several other ocean uses have been proposed, eitherfor the near or distant future. One proposal would installwind- or wave-powered generators at sea to generateelectrical power. Research and development is underwayon methods of using the ocean for controlled develop-ment of biological resources as a method to generate in-creased food and energy supplies. Mining of the OuterContinental Shelf for sand, gravel, and minerals is an ex-isting activity that could be expanded. Several proposalsexist for creating artificial islands for heavy industriesthat, on land, are regarded as “bad neighbors. ”
Meanwhile, use of the ocean and its beaches forrecreation continues to grow, as do marine research,archeological exploration, and salvage operations.
Many conflicts in ocean use are not confined to U.S.territorial waters. Commercial fishing, shipping, andmining, for example, are international activities thatoften involve U.S. waters. The Third International Law ofthe Sea Conference is addressing many marine problems,although its primary mission is to resolve conflictsamong nations rather than conflicts among individualusers. Some industry organizations and a few interna-tional organizations, such as the IntergovernmentalMaritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), were cre-ated to solve problems between specific ocean activitiesand other uses that conflict with those activities. IMCOdeals primarily with commercial shipping activities.However, no single international group is responsible foran overall view of the potential for future problems.
The following summary of the major historic andfuture uses of the ocean off Delaware and New Jerseysuggests in more specific terms the potential conflictsamong ocean users, both domestic and foreign.
COMMERCIAL FISHING
The Delaware and New Jersey fishing grounds are atthe southernmost tip of the North Atlantic fisheries. In
—
the North Atlantic’s broad expanse of offshore waters—which includes the Continental Shelf from Cape Cod toCape Hatteras—U.S. fishermen caught 1.5 billion poundsof commercial fish and shellfish in 1975, which is almostone third of the total U.S. catch.
Preliminary figures collected by the National Fish-eries Service show that commercial fishermen inDelaware and New Jersey grossed $20 million in 1975,with a catch of more than 150 million pounds.
According to the National Fisheries Service, morethan 2,000 New Jersey and Delaware fishing boats pro-vided full- or part-time employment to more than 3,500persons.
In the Mid-Atlantic, foreign vessels, operating pri-marily outside the 12-mile national limit, have tradi-tionally caught large quantities of fish. The vessels camefrom the Soviet Union, Poland, Japan, Spain, Italy, andEast and West Germany. Even though the United Stateshas recently enacted a 200-mile fisheries zone, provisionsfor licensing foreign fishing within this zone are still inthe future.
Commercial fishing in this region by both U.S. andforeign fishermen, is likely to continue at the presentlevel without major increases in the future because manyof the resources are already utilized to their maximumlimit. There will probably be additional activity to restoredepleted stocks, to regulate and enforce new manage-ment systems for fisheries, and to find new ways to in-crease productivity of certain species. All of these ac-tivities will require the use of more ocean surface andbottom space in areas that might be sought for other usessuch as oil drilling or siting of platforms. In addition, sur-face traffic of fishing vessels, enforcement vessels, andresearch vessels which tend to stay at sea for longerperiods of time could conflict with other surface traffic.1
SPORT FISHING
In 1970, an estimated 1.7 million salt-water sportfishermen in the Mid-Atlantic region generated about$300 million of business activity, according to a 1970 Na-tional Survey of Fishing and Hunting. Sport boats takeanglers to search for barracuda, shark, mackerel,bluefish, butterfish, bass, trout, flounder, and croakers inthe Continental Shelf waters and beyond for tuna,dolphin, mackerel, and albacore.
Between Atlantic City, N.J., and Ocean City, Md., theocean yields white marlin and tuna for sport fishermen.
Based on past trends, interest in sport fishing proba-bly will increase in coming years at a rate higher than ac-tual population growth. Boat traffic will increasinglycause conflicts, especially at the coastal harbors that mayalso be used for supply boats to support offshore tech-nologies. In addition, land-use pressures may increase inspawning and nursery grounds in the coastal zones,which are utilized by 75 percent of the sport fish at sometime in their life cycle. z
MERCHANT SHIPPING
The shipping lanes off Delaware and New Jersey areocean versions of interstate highways that link Mid-Atlantic metropolitan areas. There are two major two-way traffic lanes into the Delaware Bay, second in theregion only to New York Harbor in total cargo handled.
One route is designated by the InternationalMaritime Consultative Organization of the United Na-tions as the recommended lane for traffic in and out ofDelaware Bay, However, only U.S. flag ships are forcedby the U.S. Coast Guard to comply with the recommen-dation and less than half of the ships that call at DelawareBay are U.S. flag ships. The other route is not recognizedby IMCO, but is a well-established traffic land usedheavily by foreign and domestic ships. Many other lanesintersect the recognized lanes.
The ports on the Delaware River and New YorkHarbor together are probably the most heavily utilized inthe United States. They handle over one-third of all im-ported and domestic oil carried by tankers. Nearly 3,000major tankers enter and leave each port per year. Totalmajor ship traffic into Delaware Bay is more than 5,000ships per year and into New York Harbor more than8,000 per year. Almost 150 steamship liners operate outof the Port of New York alone. Many of these ships areforeign flag (almost all of the tankers carrying importedoil) and traffic problems will undoubtedly increase asother offshore users enter the region. The conflicts areclear between offshore platforms in the Baltimore Can-yon, which could be located near some traditional ship-ping lanes if oil is discovered.3
I
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS
The scheduled sale of oil and gas leases in the Mid-Atlantic could cause a sharp increase in the number ofstructures and amount of ship traffic in the ocean offDelaware and New Jersey.
As many as 10 exploratory rigs and 50 productionplatforms may be working off the Mid-Atlantic coast atone time, along with vessels engaged in exploration, crewtransport, supply, platform and pipeline construction. Asmany as 30 vessels-supply boats, tugs, and crew boats—could be operating in the Baltimore Canyon region by1980 in direct support of exploration rigs. When and ifBaltimore Canyon oil and gas is discovered and activitieshit their peak, the number of operating support vesselscould increase to over 200 and include constructionbarges, pipelaying barges, and other varieties ofworkboats. These uses and resulting traffic will conflictwith shipping, fishing, research, recreation, and othersurface uses not only offshore, but in the already limitedcoastal harbors. Oil could be tankered to shore fromOuter Continental Shelf production rigs.4
MILITARY
A large portion of the Mid-Atlantic ContinentalShelf is used by the military for acknowledged and forclassified activities. Unclassified military operations inthe area include submarine missions, air exercises, gun-nery practice, missile and rocket testing, search andrescue drills, oceanographic research, and ocean sur-veillance. There are also several deepwater dumpinggrounds for explosives and nuclear waste,
Naval ships and planes, which are most likely toconflict with surface ship traffic, use the area 18 hours aday on weekends. Potential air traffic conflicts are alsopossible with helicopters that are used to transport crewsto offshore platforms.
INSTALLATION AND FACILITIES
The cities of Philadelphia, Pa,, and Camden, N.J.,and E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Co. of Edge Moor, Del.,dump municipal and industrial waste in two deepwatersites 50 miles southeast of Delaware Bay. The dump sitesare designated and monitored by the Environmental Pro-tection Agency.
In 1974, barges made 222 trips from Delaware Bay tothe dump sites. Since then, the Environmental ProtectionAgency has reduced the number of dump permits for thearea. Philadelphia, which dumps the largest volume ofwaste, has been ordered to phase out its dumping by1980. Because of public opposition to ocean dumping offthe resort areas of Atlantic City, N.J., Rehoboth Beach,Del., and Ocean City, Md., it is unlikely that any new ma-jor dumping permits will be issued.
Three major transoceanic telephone cables areburied directly east of the New Jersey shore, The cablesare buried about 10 feet deep along most of the Continen-tal Shelf. Many conflicts between scallop fishermen, whorun dredges over the bottom near the cables, and thetelephone company have arisen in the past. New conflictsare possible if and when oil pipelines are added to theseafloor network.
_——— .-— ——.————
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Congress may wish to deal with problems arisingfrom conflicting ocean uses on any of a number ofpolicy levels. It could:
1. Mandate a detailed study of conflicting oceanuses to assemble a data base on present andfuture uses and suggest priorities for develop-ment and control. Such a study could alsoassess present Federa l organizat iona lcapabilities to deal with such conflicts and, ifappropriate, propose changes, if any, required inthe Federal structure.
2. Provide one ocean-related agency withauthority to resolve ocean-use conflicts thatresult from increased offshore activities, Anysuch delegation of authority probably wouldhave to specify arbitration, public or private, asan avenue for resolving some conflicts.
3. Require joint planning for offshore uses by con-flicting parties, public and private, domestic andforeign.
ISSUE 2Federal Management System
Federal management of the offshore oil and gasprogram is fragmented within the Department of the in-terior and coordination with other Federal agencieswhich share jurisdiction is ineffective.
FINDINGS
1. The Department of the Interior, in its OCSmanagement role, must coordinate elements ofdevelopment which involve 4 cabinet-level depart-ments, 15 subcabinet and independent agencies, 22State governments, and public and private interestgroups.
2. There is no top-level coordination of OCSmanagement, practices, and studies initiated by theDepartment of the Interior. Line responsibilities for OCSactivities are divided within the Department of the in-terior between two of its bureaus, both of which have awide range of other activities that overshadow theirOCS responsibility.
3. Clear lines of responsibility have not beenestablished between the Department of the Interior andthe Office of Coastal Zone Management despite the factthat offshore development in the Mid-Atlantic could pro-duce the most important impacts on coastal zonessince the Coastal Zone Management Act became law.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Despite the urgency which the Administration at-taches to expanding offshore lease sales and petroleumproduction, no consolidation of responsibility and ac-countability for the OCS program in one agency has oc-curred.
Public ParticipationComments
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapterIV, particularly pages 124– 140.
I
The Department of the Interior, in its OCS manage-ment role, must coordinate elements of offshore develop-ment that involve cabinet-level departments, some 15subcabinet and independent agencies, 22 State govern-ments, and public and private interest groups. Over thepast 2 years, this coordination has been seriously ques-tioned. Examples of this difficulty have been disputesover pipeline jurisdiction among agencies within the In-terior Department itself. One Interior Department agencyhad been negotiating, without success, with a Transpor-tation Department agency over pipeline jurisdiction fornearly 5 years before a memorandum of understandingwas signed by the two Departments. No policy-levelpressure has been brought to bear on Interior’s Bureau ofLand Management and the U.S. Geological Survey tosolve their own jurisdictional problems about pipelineswithin the Interior Departmental
Many studies of offshore development have been in-itiated at middle and lower levels of the Department. It isnot clear whether they will produce information thatpolicy makers either at the Federal or State level actuallyrequire. There is no top-level coordination of suchstudies.
Line responsibility for OCS activities is dividedwithin the Interior Department between two bureaus,both of which have a wide range of other activities thatovershadow their OCS responsibilities in terms of man-power and budget. The Bureau of Land Management(BLM) is the lead agency in developing leasing programsand granting rights to offshore exploration and develop-ment. Once leases are signed, responsibility for supervis-ing offshore activities passes to the U.S. GeologicalSurvey (USGS), which is primarily a scientific agencywith limited regulatory responsibility. The USGS draftstechnical regulations for offshore equipment and opera-tions and enforces those regulations. The regulationshave been, and continue to be, more concerned withspecific items of equipment than with relationships be-tween the equipment and the total oil and gas develop-ment system.
Clear lines of responsibility have not beenestablished between Interior officials and officials of theOffice of Coastal Zone Management for OCS operations,despite the fact that offshore development in the Mid-Atlantic could produce the most important impacts on
I
coastal zones there of any single development since theCoastal Zone Management Act became law.2
The Office of Coastal Zone Management (OCZM)could have a significant impact on offshore energydevelopment when States begin to complete coastal zoneplans. The Office has had a relatively minor role inoffshore energy development to date. This role couldchange when New Jersey and Delaware submit finalplans and the Office must make judgments aboutwhether the plans make sufficient allowance for coastalzone activities that are in the “national interest” andwhether, in turn, Federal activities in coastal zones are“consistent” with State plans. Neither “national interest”nor “consistent” has been formally defined by the OCZMor any Federal agency so far.
State officials have expressed a hope that oncecoastal plans are completed, the Office of Coastal ZoneManagement would function as a clearinghouse forFederal activities and plans to help States sort out variousFederal programs with coastal implications. They alsosaid they would hope the Office would assert authority,once coastal plans are completed, to force coordinationamong Federal programs that involve coastlines. a
In addition, long-range national policy questionswhich arise from accelerated leasing schedules should beconsidered.
For example, can the United States proceed in-definitely without (a) a formal process for determiningtotal energy needs and (b) calculating the share of thoseneeds that should be provided by OCS resources? Thatallocation, rather than the existing program for leasingmaximum acreage in the minimum number of years,could become the guide for future leasing programs. It isalso important to consider whether the United States canproceed indefinitely with offshore developments for oiland natural gas and other seabed resources, fisheries, andcommercial activities, without a formal process for rec-onciling conflicts not only among the uses but betweenthose uses and their impact on the ocean environment.
—
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
. ..—-—.
1. Assign a single policy-level office within the
Department of the Interior the authority and respon-sibility for OCS policy coordination.
2. Assign to a single policy-level office within theDepartment of the Interior general responsibility forprogram coordination with all Federal agencies withOCS responsibilities and specific line authority andresponsibility for operations of:
● those sections within the USGS which now draftand enforce technical regulations for offshore oiland natural gas activities;
● those sections within the Bureau of LandManagement which now supervise offshore leas-ing and environmental studies programs; and
● all land uses, ocean use, economic, geological,and other planning that is now carried onindependently in various sections within the in-terior Department that relate to OCS operations.
ISSUE 3Regulation and Enforcement
Inadequate regulation and enforcement of offshore oiland gas technology could result in more accidents andmore oil spills than would occur if a more effectivesystem were implemented.
Oil and Gas
FINDINGS1. The present Federal system for the regulation of
offshore oil and gas development and for the enforce-ment of these regulations does not assure the use ofadequate technology for safety and pollution preven-tion.
2. Many of the operating orders for the Mid-Atlanticare not issued by the Department of the Interior untilafter leases have already been sold.
3. Technology exists for setting design standards,installation practices, specifications, and schedulingtests and inspections for all major equipment items re-lated to OCS operations but it has not been utilized.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Three principal aspects of regulating offshore oiland gas technology are in question:
1. The standards and specifications for design, con-struction, and installation of individual compo-nents.
2. Regulations which are issued to guide the opera-tions and illustrate best technical practice for useof each component.
3. The enforcement system and procedures forchecking, monitoring, and reporting adherence toestablished regulations.
A significant problem with identifying potential im-pacts from lapses in technology supervision is the fact
Public ParticipationComments
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*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapterIV, particularly pages 140– 171.
that very little data or analysis is available for evaluatingaccidents and safety questions.
During offshore U.S. oil operations spanning the 10years from 1967 to 1976, major spills (of more than 1,000barrels each) were few in number but caused more than80 percent of the pollution by volume. The two principalsources of these spills were underwater pipelines anddrilling-production platforms, each contributing roughlyequivalent numbers and volumes of spills.
“Safety Alert” notices, which are issued in the Gulfof Mexico to warn industry of malfunctions in equip-ment, provide other data on causes. Of 27 such noticesreviewed, the causes of significant accidents includedplatform machinery malfunctions, platform constructionoperations failures, ship collisions, blowout-preventormalfunctions, shallow gas pockets, and severe storms.1
There appears to be no systematic analysis of this acci-dent data or any other for the purpose of determiningwhere specific improvements are needed.
The U.S. Geological Survey, principally throughOCS orders and other lease stipulations, regulates OCStechnology and related activities. Recent studies havemade recommendations for several changes, includingmore stringent regulation of oil spill prevention equip-ment and techniques, better equipment standards, andincreased inspection and training. z
Few of the substantive recommendations of thesestudies—which included development of comprehensivestandards and specifications, improved training, and im-proved inspection and enforcement practices—have beenreflected by changes in proposed OCS orders for the Mid-Atlantic or other regions such as Alaska. The USGS, infact, debates the need to complete orders and inspectionplans prior to a lease sale. The USGS has, on the otherhand, instituted a number of the procedural recommen-dations of these studies.3
The USGS decided, in the case of the ‘Mid-Atlantic,orders on platforms and pipelines would not be issueduntil some unspecified time after the lease sale and thatinspection procedures would be established only after ex-ploration and development activities take place. TheUSGS has said that there is no need to issue these ordersuntil the industry clearly intends to develop an offshorearea.
The offshore oil industry has developed a goodsafety record with regard to oil spill accidents from plat-forms, especially since the Santa Barbara spill in 1969. Atthe same time, however, Federal regulatory agencies,principally USGS, do not appear to employ the bestavailable system for establishing standards and enforcingregulations. There is, therefore, no assurance that the bestpractices and standards will be consistently followed.
Pipeline networks have not been subject to stringentregulatory standards in the United States in the past andpipeline failures, with resulting oil discharges, have oc-curred in the Gulf of Mexico as well as in other offshoredevelopment regions.4
Specific design standards, installation practicespecifications, and scheduled tests and inspections couldreadily be adopted for pipelines in the Mid-Atlanticregion, and in other OCS regions, based on existingknowledge and available technology.
New technology is available to assure pipeline safetyand could be immediately incorporated in regulationsprior to any lease sale. This includes standards for coat-ing pipelines with corrosion protective materials, stand-ards for welding and inspecting welds, specifications forpipe materials, and procedures for installing and buryingpipe.
Oil production platforms are highly complexsystems, subject to great uncertainties, which aredesigned, built, and installed by oil companies understringent self-imposed technical guidelines. There is verylittle regulation of this technology. Most recognized in-dustry standards are not required by Government regula-tions; the OCS order for platforms merely states thatplatforms shall be adequately designed and certified,Government inspections of construction, installation,and operations are not systematically planned.
The American Bureau of Shipping, a private groupwhich sets design standards and inspects offshore equip-ment for insurance companies, has developed specifica-tions and inspection procedures for offshore mobile plat-forms. The Bureau regularly works with the U.S. CoastGuard to certify ships and other floating equipment.Adoption of this regulation and enforcement practice tofixed production platforms by OCS regulatory agenciescould increase the effectiveness of the present system im-mediate y.
The U.S. Coast Guard recently developed regula-tions for deepwater ports which, in many cases, covertechnology and hardware similar or identical to that usedin OCS operations. The Coast Guard philosophy ofregulation appears to be one of setting detailed, firm andcomprehensive rules for designing, building, and operat-ing, and then carefully checking adherence to those rules.On the other hand, the USGS philosophy appears to beone of asking for industry’s best efforts and then makingbroad judgments about its adequacy.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONSThe following options are available for making
changes to the present system:
1. Require that OCS orders be completed prior to,and made part of, all lease sales. Such ordersshould include design standards for the com-plete system, along with test and inspectionschedules. Require development plans to becomplete and comprehensive, to utilize environ-mental data developed for the region, and tofollow specified standards and practices for thesystem.
2. Transfer regulatory and enforcement authorityfrom USGS to the U.S. Coast Guard for majorOCS systems, and apply existing Coast Guardregulations on drill ships and floating platformsto other offshore technology.
3. Separate regulation and enforcement for dailyOCS operations within the Federal Governmentby assigning these responsibilities to an agen-cy, or department, other than Interior, whilepreserving Interior’s OCS development respon-sibilities.
ISSUE 4Oil Spill Liability and Compensation
Existing laws are not adequate either to assign liabilityor to compensate individuals or institutions fordamages from oil spills resulting from exploration,development, or production in the Baltimore CanyonTrough area.
Oil and Gas
FINDINGS——- .
1. Because existing law does not deal com-prehensively with liability for oil spills from offshorestructures in OCS activity, the law of the adjacent Stateis used for determining a lessee’s liability for damages.The laws of Delaware and New Jersey, which are adja-cent to Baltimore Canyon lease areas, do not containexplicit provisions to provide for compensation to par-ties injured by oil spills.
2. Under existing statutory and case law, damagedparties lack effective protection against economiclosses that may result when an oil spill reaches shore.
3. There are benefits to having the States handlesome aspects of liability and compensation and thesebenefits can be preserved by a Federal law which doesnot completely preempt State laws.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Public ParticipationComments
The possibility of a major oil spill during develop-ment in the Baltimore Canyon Trough is a potential im-pact that concerns the public and government officials ofNew Jersey and Delaware. ] The concern is intensified by I
the fact that, under existing law, damaged parties lack l e a k s Comp, iII II. ~ ~ r ; , ,, \ .$,
protection against economic losses that may result from must be required ~‘ I ; : ; i ‘ 1.
oil reaching shore.
The OTA oil spill risk assessment indicates thatthere probably would be at least one major oil spill dur-ing development of the Baltimore Canyon Trough. Undercertain weather conditions and at certain times of the
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapterIv’, particularly pages 165– 1(57.
51
year, oil could come ashore anywhere in the New Jerseyarea, affecting tourist and commercial fishing incomes. zNatural resources such as estuarine areas and wildlifepreserves whose values are difficult to quantifyeconomically also could be damaged.
Most Federal liability statutes apply to spills fromvessels rather than spills that may occur as a result ofoffshore oil and gas development. Under existing law,offshore structures such as production platforms proba-bly would be treated as artificial islands and would not begoverned by the principles of law governing the liabilityof vessels.3
Offshore structures within the territorial seas arecovered in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act(FWPCA), as amended (33 USC 1321), which makes adischarger liable to the Federal Government for cleanupand removal costs up to a limit of $8 million. The dis-charger is liable for full costs if negligence can be shown.However, no evidence of financial responsibility such asa surety bond is required for offshore operators. A $35million fund is established to support cleanup effortswhen a discharger fails to act on his own but there is noprovision for compensating parties for damages that thecleanup effort cannot prevent. Such parties must rely onthe courts and the application of the common law of tortsto recover losses under theories of negligence, trespassand, occasionally, nuisance. Primary responsibility foradministering the liability provisions of the FWPCA restswith the U.S. Coast Guard which monitors all cleanupefforts and, when necessary, initiates Governmentcleanup.
Other relevant Federal statutes which deal withliability for oil pollution are the Deepwater Port Act of1974, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of1973, and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.Each of these has specific and limited application.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act does notspecifically establish a system for oil spill liability,although it does authorize the Secretary of the Interior topromulgate regulations to prevent waste and conservenatural resources. When read in conjunction with otherrelated laws, such as the National Environmental PolicyAct, that provision authorizes the Secretary to issue rulespertaining to pollution which are binding on the lessees.4
I I
After the Santa Barbara oil spill, regulations wereissued (34 FR 13547, August 22, 1969) making lesseesstrictly liable for all cleanup and removal costs. However,the regulations stipulated that a lessee’s obligations tothird parties, other than those of cleanup costs, aregoverned by applicable law (30 CFR 250.43).
In the absence of Federal law dealing with liabilityfor oil spills resulting from offshore development, the ap-plicable law for determining a lessee’s liability fordamages presumably is the law of the adjacent State.5
Both New Jersey and Delaware are working on newliability laws,6 but present laws do not seem to providefor compensation to injured parties, other than throughcivil action.
The objectives of a model oil spill liability law in-clude an incentive to prevent spills and to move quicklyto contain and clean up those spills that cannot be pre-vented; compensation for damage victims, T andassurance that a lessee would be able to assume any fi-nancial burdens resulting from damage claims.
Current laws do not meet those objectives. Whilerapid cleanup may be somewhat encouraged by the pres-ent system, the incentive to prevent oil spills is not asstrong as it could be. Although an OCS discharger isstrictly liable, and there are few defenses against damageclaims, liability is limited to removal and cleanup costsexcept where courts apply common law to require com-pensation.
Other questions have to do with whether loss of op-portunity for recreation or loss of navigation rights areproperly recoverable injuries.
Under current laws, if a lessee escapes liabilityunder one of the permissible defenses, and cleanup costsexceed the current $35 million fund limit under theFWPCA, there is no source of funds from which to com-pensate loss. This problem could be addressed in newlegislation,
Because offshore operators are not required todemonstrate financial responsibility and because in-surance against oil spills sometimes is difficult to obtain,it is possible that companies which could not assume cur-rent required liability expenses would be permitted tooperate off New Jersey and Delaware. B
Full liability insurance for ocean-related pollutionhas been generally unavailable on the commercial marketto owners and operators of onshore and offshorefacilities. 9 This is partly because insurers cannot ac-curately estimate potential damage or loss, The oil indus-try has established an entity to compensate victims ofpollution by onshore and offshore oil structures. Oil In-surance Limited (OIL) is an insurance company set up bymembers of the industry to cover catastrophes, propertydamage, pollution, and wild-well control, both onshoreand offshore. Coverage up to $100 million per membercompany, with a deductible of $1 million, will be pro-vided in any one year. A company must repay OIL over aperiod of 10 years for all settlements through retroactivepremiums.
While compensation for direct physical damagescould be awarded by the courts, such an award woulddepend on the ability of a damaged party to underwriteprotracted legal action. Indirect damages are even lesslikely to be recoverable.10 Therefore, there are many po-tential circumstances where an injured party would notbe able to obtain adequate compensation.
Property owners who are directly damaged by oilwould have the best chance to recover property and busi-ness losses under existing law. However, courts generallyhave held that lost business profits and lowered propertyvalues of persons whose property has not been directlydamaged by oil could not be foreseen by a negligent partyand therefore are not grounds for damage claims. Thus,there is no recourse for such people as hotel ownerswhose property is not on beach frontage and thereforecannot be damaged directly, but who lose incomebecause an oil spill keeps tourists away from a resortarea. Other principles such as trespass and nuisance areeven more limited in application and also provide norecourse for those who are indirectly damaged.11
Existing laws are not clear on the unresolved ques-tion of whether State or local governments may seek andobtain relief for loss of wildlife or natural beauty or otherdamage to the environment. Nor are the laws clear onwhet her governments may claim damages for lost taxand licensing revenue for diminished tourism andreduced harvesting of fish. 12
Perhaps the most controversial subject of any
liability and compensation discussion is unlimitedliability for all cleanup costs and damages.
There is disagreement on whether an unlimitedliability provision would encourage industry to under-take the least pollution-prone operation or would dis-courage industry from undertaking operations with anyrisk at all. There is also disagreement over whetherunlimited liability would encourage those responsible forspills to rapidly and completely clean up a spill orwhether it would encourage laxity.
Some suggest that unlimited liability is either unin-surable, or that the rates for such insurance will beprohibitive to independent companies. However,unlimited liability already exists in such areas as crewclaims and cargo damage in shipping, although potentiallosses in these areas are easier to calculate than are oilspill losses. Some instances of unlimited liability havebeen in effect for several years without any adverse effect.At the Federal level, the OCS regulation imposingunlimited liability for cleanup which followed the SantaBarbara accident has been in effect since 1969 and theparticipation of independents has not been endangered.At the State level, four States have unlimited liabilitylaws, and have not noticed adverse impacts on the oil in-dustry. 13
Both Delaware and New Jersey are considering theirown liability and compensation legislation, but becausepreemption of State laws is a key provision of some pro-posed Federal legislation, the States may be reluctant toinvest considerable effort in adopting such legislationwhich could be nullified by Federal law.
However, in two important areas of liability plans—rapid, reasonable cleanup and equitable damage compen-sation—States appear to be better qualified to deal withthe situation than the Federal Government. For example,experience has shown that State agencies respond fasterto spills than Federal agencies.14 A In addition, Stateofficials may be better able to evaluate local damages anda fund administered on the State level may be more ac-cessible to claimants.
The benefits of both State- and Federal-level regula-tion of oil spill liability and compensation could bepreserved in a framework that would: (1) require Statesto accept Federal certificates of financial responsibility,
—
thus minimizing compliance costs to industry; (2) pre-vent States from levying fees on oil for the purpose ofcreating State funds, thus minimizing product costs toconsumers; and (3) permit States to impose their ownliability limits and to create funds by appropriations inorder to undertake cleanup operations and compensatedamage victims.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
1. Congress could adopt legislation dealing withliability and compensation for damages associated withoffshore oil and gas production that would be com-prehensive enough to cover such problems as indirectdamages, class actions, and unlimited liability.
2. Congress could adopt liability and compensa-tion legislation that addresses only direct damages andlet other issues evolve through case law.
—
ISSUE 5Oil Spill Containment and Cleanup
There is no assurance that the technology utilized inthe Baltimore Canyon Trough or in any other OCS fron-tier region would be adequate for oil spill surveillance,containment, and cleanup.
FINDINGS
1. There is confusionbecause most local officialsshould be expected or who isthe event of a spill.
2. There are no definitivefollow regarding standards
Oil and Gas——-
over who is in charge Public Participationdo not know what action Commentsavailable to take action in
regulations for industry tofor equipment, minimum
l e v e l s of m a n p o w e r r e a d i n e s s , a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o rcoverage on OCS oil spills.
3. Industry is making an effort to be well equippedto deal with spills in the Mid-Atlantic.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
An estimate of the range of probable oil spills as aresult of Baltimore Canyon development activities hasbeen made, based on statistics from offshore oil opera-tions over the past 10 years, principally in the Gulf ofMexico. A few major accidents have caused most of theoil spilled into the marine environment. None of theseoffshore spills to date has been contained and cleaned upon site.
OTA estimates the range of oil spilled over the pro-jected 30-year life of the field will be from 5,000 to860,000 barrels resulting from 1 to 40 spill incidents. Themost likely amount is 40,000 barrels and 18 spill inci-dents. 1
Depending on the season, the size of spill, and pre-vailing conditions, the shoreline could be severely im-pacted as a result of inadequate containment andcleanup.
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapter]\/, particu]~rly ~~~t?s 165– 167”
57
The Coast Guard is responsible for the implementa-tion of Federal pollution response functions in the coastalarea as required by the National Contingency Plan. Amemorandum of understanding between the CoastGuard and the Department of the Interior gives the CoastGuard the responsibility to respond to discharges in theOCS consistent with this plan, but reserves for theDepartment of the Interior the responsibility of control-ling the discharge at the source.
The Coast Guard, in implementing the intent of theFWPCA, has structured its enforcement and responseposture to foster the cleanup of polluting discharges bythe responsible party. The Coast Guard on-scene coor-dinator, in each pollution incident, makes a determina-tion as to the propriety of the responsible party’s removalactions and initiates Federal removal actions when theyare necessary.
The confusion over who is in charge should a spilloccur has been evidenced by OTA’S inquiries of publicand private groups in the New Jersey and Delawareregion. Most local officials are unaware of the provisionsof the National Contingency Plan or the Coast Guard-Department of the Interior memorandum of understand-ing and do not know what action would occur or who isavailable to take actions in the event of an oil discharge.
The key to oil spill cleanup operations is quickresponse. The present capability to deploy effective highseas removal equipment is limited by the availability ofsuch equipment and the ability to deliver the equipmenton scene. The Coast Guard has developed high seas con-tainment booms and removal devices and has begunstockpiling this equipment. Towable high-speed deliverysleds have been developed by the Coast Guard and are tobe available prior to development of the Mid-AtlanticOCS.
Industry, through Clean Atlantic Associates, Inc., isdeveloping a stockpile of equipment and operational pro-cedures for dealing with potential oil spills, but there areno firm Government requirements for most of their ac-tivities.
The Department of the Interior, under the authorityof its OCS operating orders, which require lessees tomaintain cleanup equipment, could monitor CleanAtlantic Associates activities, but cannot order the group
to acquire equipment meeting certain standards or totrain personnel for certain levels of operation.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
1. Provide authority and funding for the CoastGuard to patrol for oil spills and take charge im-mediately should a spill occur.
2. Prepare definitive regulations for industry tofollow, including standards for equipment, minimumlevels of manpower readiness, and responsibility forcoverage on all OCS oil spills.
OTHER OPTIONS
Federal and State officials could develop a stronginformation program to advise local officials and thepublic of procedures that would be followed and partieswho are responsible for actions in the event of a spill.
Environmental StudiesISSUE 6
Environmental research and baseline studies are notformally coordinated with the Interior Department’sleasing schedule and there is no requirement that in-formation gathered be used in the decisionmakingprocess for sale of offshore lands and subsequentoperation.
Oil and Gas
FINDINGS
1. The purpose of Interior’s environmental studiesprogram and its role in the management of OCSdevelopment has not been clearly defined.
Public ParticipationComments
2. The value of the investment in environmentalstudies is questionable if there is little or no relation-ship between the studies and management decisions.
3. Environmental studies to date are not usefuleither for Environmental Impact Statements or in leasingdecisions because they are not completed in time to beused.
4. Some important elements are missing from theMid-Atlantic and other regional studies now underway,including nearshore investigations, climatology, physi-cal oceanography, and shallow geologic studies.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
The OCS environmental studies programs now un-derway in frontier areas are a major Federal undertakingin oceanographic investigation. The fiscal year 1976budget for these studies is over $40 million with substan-tial field data collection underway in the Mid-Atlantic,Gulf of Mexico, offshore Southern California, and Alaska.Most of the programs include collection of marinebiological data, measurements of hydrocarbons and traceelements in the marine environment, and analyses ofphysical and chemical characteristics of the marine en-vironment. Some of the programs also include otherspecific biological, oceanographic, geologic, andmeteorologic studies. 1
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapterIV, particularly pages 131 – 1 4(1.
60
—
The purpose of these studies has not been fullydefined, and many questions remain about how the in-formation developed can or will be used in the decision-making process of leasing OCS lands and managing orregulating subsequent OCS activities. Presumably, theenvironmental studies will begin to establish a definitionof the “baseline” or existing environmental conditionsfrom which one can measure environmental impacts thatmight be caused by any oil and gas activities throughoutthe life of an offshore field. The studies would also con-tinue in conjunction with oil development and becomeclosely related to monitoring of any environmentalchanges. In addition, many biologists believe that thestudies should identify environmentally sensitive areasor special hazards that would indicate which areas, ifany, should be withdrawn from lease offerings.2
The vague relationship between these studies andany decisionmaking process, however, is a principalissue. If there is little or no relationship between thestudies and management decisions, then the value of theinvestment in the studies is questionable. If the studies donot include environmentally sensitive regions such asnearshore waters or do not provide adequate scientificevidence, then the usefulness of the results is questiona-ble.
Many scientists claim that the studies are not wellplanned since they attempt to solve too many complexproblems within unrealistic time frames, and that studyefforts are hopelessly fragmented. s A priority of impor-tant subjects should be established if meaningful resultsare to be obtained. Some important elements are missingfrom the Mid-Atlantic and other regional studies nowunderway, including nearshore investigations,climatology, physical oceanography, and shallowgeologic studies.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
The following options could be employed for mak-ing such changes in the present system as may beneeded:
‘1 ‘ , 1
I -, . ,
1. Require that environmental studies be made aformal part of the lease-management process by
defining the content and timing necessary forproviding data for milestone decisions.
2. Require that environmental studies that woulddefine baselines and identify sensitive orhazardous areas and conditions be completedprior to preparation of a development plan, andthat the data be used in evaluating and approv-ing development activities.
3. Separate the responsibility for environmentalstudies from the agency in charge of develop-ment (Interior) and put a scientific agency incharge (such as the National Oceanic and At-mospheric Administration).
ISSUE 7State Role
The limited role of State governments in the decision-making process for OCS development under existinglaws and practices may lead to unnecessaryand improper planning for such development.
FINDINGS
delays
Oil and Gas
1. New Jersey and Delaware officials are not Public Participationreceiving informat ion which they consider necessary to Commentsplan for dealing with the onshore impacts of offshoredevelopment and there is no description in present lawsor regulations which specifies what information must beprovided to the State in development plans or impactstatements.
2. Top-level State officials in New Jersey andDelaware do not believe that current laws and prac-tices for planning and administering offshore petroleumdevelopment allow for full State participation in impor-tant decisions.
3. Without meaningful State participation in deci-sionmaking, State and local officials may try to usecourt action to block or delay decisions with which theydisagree.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
The flow of information from the Federal Govern-ment to the States in the 2 years since the decision wasmade to accelerate offshore leasing has been slow anduncoordinated. The States are concerned about this situa-tion because they need comprehensive and timely infor-mation in order to plan for the onshore effects of offshoredevelopment.
Offshore energy development eventually will meanthe location of staging areas, pipelines, tank farms, gasprocessing plants, and perhaps even new refineries on
. ,, 1 ~ ., 1
‘ ,, , I r ! t ; : n] E, ;> I I, “ , ! .- ~
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapter
+ .’ , , “
IV, particularly pages 136– 140, 146– 150.
63
shore to support OCS oil and gas production. The Statesare concerned that these onshore activities may requiremajor investments of public funds that cannot bescheduled without considerable advance warning andsome assurance that the investments actually are re-quired, and that revenues ultimately generated byoffshore activity will support the expenditures.
State officials say, by and large, that they understandthe present limitations on the Interior Department inproviding some types of data. They also recognize thatsome progress has been made in meeting State needs, butmost of the steps taken by the Bureau of Land Manage-ment (BLM) to provide information are strictly ad-ministrative actions, are not guaranteed by law, and canbe changed without consultation with the States.
State officials also say that there are still specific in-formation gaps, principally in the following areas:
● Hard information on potential onshore im-pacts, including a quantification of potentialeconomic losses to tourist and fishing indus-tries.
● Detailed estimates of oil and gas reserves.
. Historic and predictive data on the inci-dence and effects of oil spills.
● Information on geologic and climatic condi-tions and shoreline characteristics thatmight pose dangers to offshore structuresand pipelines.
. Environmental and baseline data in general,particularly data on wetlands and nearshoreareas.
Once management plans have been approved byFederal officials under the Coastal Zone ManagementAct, both States presumably would have a legal rightunder the Act to “necessary information and data” aboutany Federal activity in their coastal zone, including ac-tivity related to offshore oil and natural gas development.However, since the Act does not specify whether theStates or the Federal Government would interpret theword “necessary, “ it is not certain that it will solve theStates’ information problems. Final approval of NewJersey and Delaware coastal zone management programsis expected early in 1977.
States have also pressed for access to point-of-no-return decisions that would affect the location and mag-nitude of onshore activities. By law, the States’ role ispresently limited to not much more than that of an ob-server. They are allowed to comment on information andproposed actions, but there is no requirement that theircomments and suggestions be acted upon.
The goal of legislation should be to create a frame-work for relationships between State and FederalGovernments that would ensure States full participationin major OCS decisions. One way to assure State involve-ment in those major decisions could be to make par-ticipation a legal right of a State rather than an option ofFederal decisionmakers. Thus, the right of States to avoice in policy decisions that may have significant social,economic, or environmental consequences for theircitizens, would be unobstructed up to, but not including,the right to veto Federal offshore development plans.
States have the right through their riparian laws, en-vironmental protection regulations, and zoning powersto block or delay development once it involves Statelands. State officials with whom OTA researchers talkedin the course of the study seemed universally to prefercontinuing participation in development decisions ratherthan blocking actions, but officials indicate they will takelegal action to block development if their concerns arenot satisfied.
Under pending legislation, a revision of the OCSLands Act of 1953, States would be entitled to commenton development plans before they were approved by theSecretary of the Interior, to have written explanations forthe Secretary’s rejection of those comments, and to ap-peal that decision to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.1
That same principle of arbitration could be appliedto other important decision points in the developmentprocess, including the sale of leases, The Interior Depart-ment, for example, could solicit State comments on pro-posed lease sales and solicit State proposals for leasestipulations which States felt necessary to protect theirenvironmental and economic interests. Interior could ex-plain in writing why any State proposal had been re-jected. States could have the same rights of appeal onlease stipulations as they would have on developmentplans under the pending legislation.
‘‘Exploration should I I - beState and Federal ~: ~,partnership
“ It WoUId sep” I I ‘that a draft affected State draft woukd, -final reporti
. , ! [ } - n - I
Such free exchange of information and State accessto decisions would not necessarily resolve all future con-flicts about offshore energy development. It would,however, help clear up uncertainties about the groundrules for development which affect not only Federal andState officials but the oil industry as well. i,.
Codifying the rights of States to participate in deci- / ‘ I ( j q I ( i ., ‘sions, object to proposals, and appeal to third parties , I :’ [“l ‘“‘ t ‘ t, ‘ I ($ i f } : f I ,1, \c, , ,,;,~ ,,,>could extend the time required to set offshore energy ‘ ‘I
development in motion in frontier OCS areas. However,the existing process has its own built-in potential delaysthrough court actions and challenges to locations ofonshore facilities.
Codifying the rights of States would, at least, make itpossible to anticipate delays and to know with somedegee of certainty how much more time the processwould take than it does under existing law.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
1. Congress could require the Department of theInterior to solicit State comments on proposed leasesales, State proposals for stipulations to be written intoleases, and State comments on development plans toprotect economic and environmental interests. TheDepartment of the Interior could be required to explainin writing why any State proposal was rejected andStates could have a right of appeal.
2. Congress could require enforcing agencies tosubmit to the States long-range and detailed plans forenforcing lessee compliance with operating orders,evaluate State comments on the plans, and modify theplans, or explain a failure to modify them, to accommo-date State objections.
3. Congress could require that an impact state-ment be prepared to accompany each developmentplan and that major development plans include detaileddescriptive, design, and procedural information onoffshore and onshore facilities that industry wants tobuild.
ISSUE 8Pollution Research
The effects of pollutants which maybe discharged dur-ing OCS operations cannot presently be determinedwith any accuracy and recent research efforts have notclarified conflicting claims by oil companies and en-vironmental groups regarding the amount and conse-quences of marine pollution.
Oil and Gas
-. . . . —.
1. Many specific environmental conditions of eachOCS region which may affect the dispersion, trajectory,chemical composition, and ultimate fate of a spill areunknown.
2. It appears that very little public research moneyis allocated to projects that address the unknowns ofthe effects of oil spills and other OCS pollutants.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Some unavoidable oil spills from accidents, chronicoil discharges from platforms, and discharges of otherpollutants will occur should the Baltimore CanyonTrough be developed. It appears that future estimates ofpollutant discharges from OCS operations can be basedon statistical evidence from past Gulf of Mexico ex-perience because no major changes in levels of pollutioncontrol technology are projected. Since it probably wouldrequire substantial investments to effect major reductionsin pollution levels, the questions of benefit received areconstantly raised. There are no reliable estimates of totalenvironmental damages that may be caused by OCS re-lated pollution, and it is very doubtful whether marinebiological, esthetic or chemical changes caused by pollu-tion can now be quantified.
What is not known and cannot be measured at thistime is the severity of damage related to amounts andconcentrations, the effects on the food chain and ultimateconsumer, and the long-term effects of chronic dis-charges. Also unknown are many specific environmental
Public ParticipationComments
-.
*This brief discussion of the issue is drawn from the full text of“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic,” chapterIV, particularly pages 134-135, 165-167.
67
conditions of each OCS region which may affect the dis-persion, trajectory, chemical composition, and ultimatefate of any spill. Environmentalists argue that with somany unknowns, coupled with potential dangers, allefforts should be directed toward preventing oil spillswhenever technically possible.1
The U.S. Coast Guard has recently evaluated itsMarine Environmental Protection (MEP) program,which principally addresses oil pollution other than thatrelated to OCS operations, but which can serve as an ex-ample of analyses of relative causes and effects of spills.
The Coast Guard oil spill data, however, includesonly those OCS spills that are voluntarily reported. Inthis evaluation it is stated that oil exploration/productionoperations contributed almost a million gallons out of the15 million gallon total discharged during 1974.
It is also stated that “the documented direct cost tosociety of oil pollution incidents (from all sources) in theUnited States is about $50 million a year or in excess of$4,500 per incident. The estimate is undoubtedly lowsince it includes only the costs of cleanup and the value ofthe product discharged. ” A far greater concern thandirect cost is the indirect cost to society.
The U.S. Geological Survey maintains an oil spilldata base in the OCS Events Files. In this file, informationis maintained on all oil spills of one barrel or more,blowouts, fires and explosions, fatalities, and mis-cellaneous accidents. Input for each incident includesprobable cause, type of operation, date, location, andbrief description of the event. The file is updated monthlyand the data are analyzed by USGS for amounts andtrends. It is unclear, however, what use USGS makes ofthe anlayses since many types of incidents occurrepeatedly with no change in operating orders. Underpresent laws and regulations, oil spills from explorationor production facilities within 3 miles of shore must bereported to the Coast Guard. Oil spills from facilitiesbeyond 3 miles must be reported to the USGS. There is nocoordination of the information gathered by the twoagencies.
The oil industry has sponsored a significant amountof research into the effects of oil pollution, including astudy of the effects of oil operations on the marine en-vironment off the Louisiana coast by the Gulf Univer-
sities Research Consortium. z In addition, the AmericanPetroleum Institute, the Coast Guard, and the Environ-mental Protection Agency sponsor regular conferenceson prevention and control of oil pollution at which manyreports on research efforts are presented.3 There appearsto be no equivalent coordination of pollution researchefforts among Federal agencies which share respon-sibility for OCS management.
The report to Congress of the Secretary of Com-merce on Ocean Pollution is one of the few examples of acoordinating effort. 4 The report describes oil pollutionresearch efforts by the National Science Foundation, theEnvironmental Protection Agency, the Bureau of LandManagement, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the U.S.Geological Survey, the National Oceanic and At-mospheric Administration, and others.
It appears that very little research money is allocatedto projects that address the unknowns of the effects of oilspills and other OCS pollutants.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
1. Sponsor additional research on the effects ofpollutants at existing centers of excellence andspecifically coordinate research pertinent to OCSoperations through a central agency such as EPA.
2. Coordinate the collection of data about oilspills from exploration and production facilities by giv-ing the USGS authority to require reports for all suchspills, regardless of whether they are in State orFederal waters.
Conflicting Ocean Uses
There are potential conflicts between OCS oil and gasactivities and vessel traffic engaged in commercialshipping and fishing activities. However, there hasbeen no comprehensive study and analysis to identifyall conflicts and to find ways of resolving them.
Oil and Gas
1. It appears that proposed drilling rigs in theBaltimore Canyon Trough would be more vulnerable toramming by ships than has been the case in the Gulf ofMexico.
2. Major traffic lanes for the ports of New York andPhiladelphia lead through or near the lease area.
3. The Maritime Administration has stated that newtraffic control systems have adverse economic impactson shipping.
4. The Department of the Interior has alreadyremoved some tracts from leasing because of conflictswith fishing activities, but the presence of offshorestructures could attract marine life, thus enhancing fish-ing and increasing watercraft traffic.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Rammings of oil and gas platforms by merchantships have occurred in the Gulf of Mexico. In a recent in-cident, the Globtik Sun, a 50,000-ton Bahamian-registered tanker, struck a Chevron platform in the Gulfon August 15, 1975, resulting in the death of six persons,a major fire aboard the ship and a 5-mile long oil slick.The platform was not operational, so no oil was lost fromit. 1
While the number of Gulf of Mexico rigs which havebeen hit by ships over the past 10 years has led to only 1percent of all oil spills, the great majority of these rigs are
Public ParticipationComments
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of“Development of Offshore Oil and Gas in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapterIV, particularly pages 136– 140, 144– 159,
70
in quite shallow water, close to shore, and shipping laneshad been established to avoid them. Drilling rigs in theGulf of Mexico are concentrated in areas where largeships do not normally travel, except at well-markedentrances to harbors. Only 10 major accidents involvingships striking drill rigs have occurred over the past 12years. All but one (the most recent one) of the ships wereunder 20,000 tons. All were traveling closer to thecoastline than was usual. By contrast, the Mid-Atlantictracts proposed for sale are in deepwater commonlyutilized by very large ships, but there is no proposal fortraffic control. The EIS states that the Army Corps ofEngineers issues navigation permits for locating rigs andplatforms and “generally does not allow structures to beplaced within traffic lanes as identified by the CoastGuard.” 2
Off the coast of New Jersey and Delaware, bothcoastal and trans-Atlantic traffic lanes from the majorports of New York and Philadelphia lead through or nearthe lease areas. Major vessel arrivals at the Delaware Bayhave been estimated at about 5,000 per year by thePhiladelphia Maritime Exchange. Major vessel arrivals atNew York Harbor have been estimated at 8,400 per year.These two ports handle more than one-third of all U.S.imported and domestic oil transported by tanker. Inter-national agreements have provided voluntary vesseltraffic separation schemes, which are established lanesfor arriving and departing ships at the major harbors ofNew York and Delaware Bay. These lanes, however, donot extend as far out to sea as the proposed lease areas,except for one New York lane extending to the HudsonCanyon near the northern region of interest.3
One way to reduce the potential hazard is by reduc-ing the number of structures on the surface of the water.This can be done, and is done to some extent in the Gulfof Mexico, by the use of subsea completions which locatethe valves and wellhead controls far underwater on thesea floor rather than on production platforms.
It appears that in general, any proposed structure onthe surface of the Mid-Atlantic Ocean would be morevulnerable to ramming by ships than has been the case inthe Gulf for the following reasons:
1. The large ship traffic density in the vicinity of po-tential rigs in the Mid-Atlantic is probably two tothree times that of the OCS region of Louisiana.
—
I
Figure Ill-1.
Source Office of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
k
I
Source Office of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
2. Traffic patterns off the Mid-Atlantic coast tend topass directly through potential rig locations whilethose in the Gulf have, to date, circumvented ma-jor concentrations of rigs.
3. The weather conditions, including wind, sea-stateand fog, are more severe for longer periods oftime in the Atlantic than in the Gulf.
The Maritime Administration of the Department ofCommerce has agreed these factors increase the risk ofcontact between ships and structures, but Commercebelieves that if all offshore structures are preciselymarked and made known to mariners and equipped withwarning lights, sound signals, and radar beacons or trans-ponders, vessels should be generally able to avoid themwithout traffic control systems. Traffic control systemsaffect the speed, route, and fuel consumption of water-borne commerce, according to a Department spokesman.Because of this adverse economic impact on the shippingcommunity, Commerce is reluctant to have new trafficcontrol systems instituted.
. , (
In addition to commercial shipping vessels, morethan 275 commercial fishing vessels operate out of NewJersey and Delaware and large numbers of fishermenfrom New England and the South Atlantic States operatein the offshore region nearby. Foreign fishing outside the12-mile limit also is substantial. The number of foreignfishing ships sighted was more than 100 in one month inthe Mid-Atlantic during the past year.
The fin fishing and scalloping areas which are ofprime importance to U.S. fisheries cover a large portionof the Baltimore Canyon lease areas under consideration.Several areas proposed for leasing have been excludedfrom the proposed lease sale by the Interior Departmentat the request of the Atlantic Offshore Fish and LobsterAssociation. a
Sport fishing is very extensive in the New Jersey-Delaware offshore region, but statistics are not availableto document numbers of vessels or fishermen currentlyutilizing this area. Many charter fishing boats and largerprivate sport-fishing boats regularly voyage offshore,and various angler’s guides show locations of tuna,marlin, dolphin, bluefish, and other species in the regionof proposed leasing. Offshore structures may attractmarine life and encourage an increase in fish population
density, which is considered an advantage by manysport fishermen. 5
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Some of the options available to Congress forminimizing offshore conflicts are:
1. Congress could expand the authority of the U.S.Coast Guard to give it jurisdiction to establishan effective offshore traffic control system. Suchauthority already exists for Coast Guardjurisdiction over navigable waters and areasaround deepwater ports.
2. Congress could authorize specific studies ofconflicts in ocean uses and means to resolvethem.
OTHER OPTIONS
1. Departments of Transportation and the Interiorcould draw up a memorandum of understanding in whichthey agree to a system for resolving conflicts betweenvessel traffic and OCS oil and gas activities.
2. Industry, with or without Department of the in-terior regulations, could deploy as many subsea com-pletions on oil and gas wells as is practical andeconomically possible to reduce the number of surfacestructures required for OCS production.
3. Informal planning groups, with the industries andpublic involved, could be established to resolve con-flicts.
—
ISSUE 10Tanker Design and Operations
Tanker spills are the source of 5 to 15 times as much oilas all offshore drilling and port operations combinedyet pollution control regulations are far less stringentfor tankers than for either deepwater ports or offshoreoil and gas operations.
FINDINGS
1. Tankers accidentally spill 200,000 tons of oileach year, worldwide, and 12,000 tons in waters within50 miles of the U.S. coast due to accidents of all kinds.
2. The major causes of these accidents are struc-tural failure, collisions, rammings, and grounding, manyof which are in turn caused by human error.
Deepwater Ports
3. Tankers deliberately discharge 1 million tonseach year, worldwide, and some unknown portion of
tank cleaning operations. Such discharges are illegalwithin 50 miles of the U.S. coast.
Public ParticipationComments
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Equipment used in deepwater ports appears to haveperformed well in many worldwide applications. But thesupertankers which utilize the ports are far less dependa-ble and greater efforts are needed to reduce tanker-caused pollution to acceptable levels.
Several changes in tanker design and constructionhave been proposed to reduce pollution. Such design im-provements include: double bottoms and double hulls,inert gas systems, added maneuvering devices, improvednavigation systems, and improved tank cleaning andballasting systems.1 Regulations regarding some of thesehave been challenged however, largely by industrygroups on the grounds that the resulting reduction in theamount of oil spilled would be small in relation to totaloil pollution.
1 ’I
J
*This brief discussion of this issue is drawn from the full text of“The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter IV,particularly pages 195—196.
76
Oil spill statistics do not support assigning priorityto any single improvement, but a case can be made thatseveral design and operational changes together wouldsubstantially reduce oil pollution. A total system ap-proach is needed to balance construction improvementswith operating improvements such as traffic control andtraining.
The Ports and Waterways Safety Act of 1972 author-izes the U.S. Coast Guard to regulate design, construc-tion, and operations of U.S. tankers and foreign flagtankers operating in U.S. waters. Regulations for U.S.tankers in domestic trade have been issued. Proposedrules for U.S. flag tankers engaged in foreign trade andforeign flag tankers in U.S. waters were published onApril 15, 1976. The closing date for comments on theserules was June 12, 1976, and a final environmental im-pact statement was under review in August.
Hearings were held by the Senate Commerce Com-mittee on March 2 and 3, 1976, at which witnesses ex-pressed concern about the adequacy of Coast Guardtanker regulations. They questioned whether best availa-ble technology was, in fact, being required and Alaskasaid it would join other Western States in imposingregulations of its own on supertankers entering its ports.The Coast Guard testified that its regulations were basedon thorough consideration of best technology andpriorities of concern not only within the United Statesbut worldwide. Industry representatives supported theCoast Guard position and pointed out that the FederalGovernment, not the States, has jurisdiction over inter-state and foreign commerce matters, as defined by theConstitution. z
The problem of reducing pollution from tankers iscompounded by economics and international politics. s
First, the most economical oil tanker transportationsystems use methods that many authorities believe mustbe changed to reduce pollution. Needed are design im-provements, which add costs for the operator; trainingand licensing programs, which may be financed by bothgovernment and operators; and improved traffic controland cleanup techniques, which also may be financed byboth. It is not possible to project cost/benefit figures forpollution because few pollution damage costs have beenquantified, because the effectiveness of many prevention
measures cannot be quantified, and because theeconomics of tanker transportation are subject to extremevariations.
Second, there is controversy over the question ofmultilateral versus unilateral regulation of tankers inU.S. waters.
One school of thought is that international agree-ments are the best way of dealing with internationaltrade problems and pollution control measures. Onedrawback to this approach is that international conven-tions have a history of extremely slow adoption and poorenforcement. The 1973 International Pollution Conven-tion has developed tanker standards which would makesubstantial improvements, but they are not yet in effectbecause they have not been ratified by a majority of sig-natory nations—including the United States. As ofmid-1976, only three countries had ratified it and it ap-pears that the earliest implementation would be 1980 to1983. Existing U.S. Coast Guard regulations on tankerconstruction and operation closely parallel the 1973agreement but many States and environmental groupsclaim that U.S. regulations should be substantiallystricter than international standards.
Another school of thought is that the United Statesshould take unilateral action to improve tanker stand-ards. Opponents of that approach claim that action bythe United States to make more stringent rules withoutsimilar adoption internationally may make the U.S.tanker fleet less competitive. Ninety-four percent of U.S.imports are carried by foreign flag tankers and if theUnited States tries to enforce stricter standards on theforeign fleet, it could interrupt supplies.
Many environmental groups argue that the UnitedStates, through major oil companies, does control mostforeign flag ships and that the United States is a majortanker customer for an industry that now needscustomers.
By the end of 1976, about half of the world tankerfleet will be surplus to need, partly because of overexpan-sion and partly because the world recession sharply cutoil demand. Tanker owners are looking to the UnitedStates to take up much of the slack because U.S. importsare more likely to increase sharply than imports by othercountries. The situation may provide substantial leverage
for the United States to set standards for operation offoreign flag ships in U.S. waters.
Many States and environmental groups support thefact that the major reduction in operational discharges bytankers can be made by requiring segregated ballastsystems aboard vessels so that ballast water is nevermixed with oil. The Coast Guard has just published ad-vance notice of proposed rules which would require suchsegregated ballast systems for all tankers over 70,000 dwtutilizing U.S. ports.4 The proposed rules would apply toboth foreign and domestic tankers. If adopted, this re-quirement would be a major improvement in regulationof tankers using deepwater ports. Comments on theseproposed rules are now being evaluated by the CoastGuard.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Among the options available to Congress for deal-ing with tanker technology issues are the following:
1. Congress could require the U.S. Coast Guard toanalyze the causes of oil spills so that prioritiesmay be set for implementing design and opera-tions standards for supertankers calling at U.S.deepwater ports.
2. Congress could require the U.S. Coast Guard todevelop specific regulations for supertankersusing deepwater ports in the United States.
3. Congress could provide economic incentivesfor U.S. importers to encourage them to charteronly those tankers that meet high standards ofdesign and operations.
OTHER OPTIONS
States could impose their own rules and regulationsfor operation of tankers and deepwater ports in theirwaters.
ISSUE 11Oil Spill Containment and Cleanupat Deepwater Ports
The use of offshore deepwater ports may reduce therisk of certain oil spills and environmental damagebelow that of transporting crude oil by smaller tankersinto the congested New York Harbor and DelawareBay. Even the very small risk of a catastrophic spillfrom a supertanker, however, dictates that stringentpollution control and cleanup systems be used.
FINDINGS
1. Even the most advanced Coast Guard equip-ment for high-seas containment of oil spills would beeffective in winter seas off Delaware and New Jerseyonly 55 percent of the time.
2. Because of the serious limitations of contain-ment and cleanup equipment, emphasis should be onpreventing spills rather than on regulations for cleanupequipment,
3. Regulations for preventing spills from a deep-water port appear to be adequate. However, regulationof tankers using the ports can be improved greatly.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Department of Transportation regulations requirethat deepwater port operators have onsite equipment forcontaining and cleaning up spills of less than 1,000 bar-rels, but equipment for dealing with larger spills is notrequired onsite. Such equipment need only be “readilyaccessible” to the operator.1
Most of the equipment needed for dealing withlarge-scale spills from deepwater ports or tankers ismaintained by the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has re-cently developed oil pumpout and salvage equipment foruse in major tanker accidents and containment andcleanup equipment for rough waters; it is not likely thatprivately built equipment would handle large volumes ofoil in rough seas as effectively. However, even the Coast
1. ‘
Public ParticipationComments
*This brief discussion of the issue is drawn from the full text of“The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid- Atlantic,” chapter IV,particularly pages 1 93– 195
80
Guard gear, which would be used under the provisionsof the national contingency plan for an oil spill emergen-cy, has strict operational limits.
Even the most advanced Coast Guard system forhigh seas oil containment is only effective in waves under5 feet, currents of 1 knot or less, and winds of up to 20knots. Winter seas off New Jersey and Delaware, where adeepwater port might be located, exceed these limits 45percent of the time.2
Development of containment and cleanup systemswhich would more adequately handle large volumes ofoil and would be dependable in rough seas would requirea large commitment of money and technical expertise.
In addition to the limitations of existing equipment,projections of the movement of oil at sea are limited andlittle data is available for use in predicting the path an oil
slick will take or when it will come ashore.
If a spill does-reach shore, there is little equipmentavailable for use in cleaning up beaches and wetlands.What is used is costly and inefficient.
Therefore, OTA has concluded that the emphasismust be on preventing oil spills rather than on require-ments for cleanup and containment equipment. Regula-tions for preventing spills from a deepwater port itselfappear to be adequate; however, regulations for tankersusing the ports can be improved greatly. (See Issue 10:Tanker Design and Operations.)
A lack of reliable statistics and analysis of causes andeffects of oil spills hampers every effort to assess the riskand damage of oil spills.
The Coast Guard operates a Pollution IncidentReporting System which gathers and stores data on allspills in U.S. waters. The Coast Guard also collects worlddata on ship accidents and prepares some analysis ofcauses. These world statistics are much more relevant tothe deepwater port question than U.S. figures becausethere are no deepwater ports operating in the UnitedStates as yet. But the world data are not well enoughverified to be usable in forecasting nor does it documentcauses or trends in accidents and resultant spills. s
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Among the options available to Congress inresolving problems relating to oil spills in the deep-water port system are these:
1. Require the Department of Transportation’sDeepwater Port Project Office to report annuallyon oil spill cleanup technology and contingencyplans for each proposed or operating deepwaterport. These reports should contain the status ofresearch and data efforts concerning oil spillstatistics, causes, and effects so that it could bedetermined if operators are using the bestavailable systems.
2. Expand research efforts within the Coast Guard,NOAA, and the Environmental Protection Agencyon trends, causes, and effects of oil spills. Thetrend data base could be improved by expand-ing the scope of the National TransportationSafety Board to permit it to conduct an in-vestigation of the causes of any major accidentinvolving supertankers and deepwater portsabroad.
3. Require a case study of response time, contain-ment, and cleanup efforts used in every majorspill in order to determine whether existingequipment and systems are used to the best ad-vantage and to identify areas where changes areneeded.
ISSUE 12Standards in State Waters
Under existing Federal law, operators of deepwaterports in State waters could ignore the safety and en-vironmental pollution standards that apply to ports out-side the3-mile limit. —
Deepwater Ports
FINDINGS
1. Deepwater ports in State waters will be Public Participationl icensed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is Commentsnot obliged to require the same standards for construc-tion and operation that are set by the Department of . . . —..
Transportation under the Deepwater Port Act of 1974.
2. The law does not require a Coast Guard VesselTraffic Surveillance System for deepwater ports inState waters, and budget priorities conceivably coulddelay installation of such a system for a port in Statewaters.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Deepwater ports in a State’s territorial waters or ininland waters such as the Delaware Bay would not besubject to the Federal Deepwater Port Act. All ports with-in 3 miles of shore would come under the jurisdiction ofthe U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, of the States, and ofany regional commissions or authorities to which Stateshad delegated authority. For example, the Delaware BayTransportation Co. plan for a deepwater port would notbe covered by the Deepwater Port Act.
,
Since the permit authority the Corps of Engineerscould exercise over a near-shore port facility does not atthis time include a requirement that ports comply withthe same Federal standards as deepwater ports outsidethe 3-mile limit, there is no guarantee that they wouldmeet minimum safety and environmental standards setat the Federal level to protect the national interest and in-terests of States other than the host State.1
*This brief discussion of the issue is drawn from the full text of“The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid-Atlantic, ” chapter IV,particularly pages 185-186.
83
The Corps of Engineers may issue permits on thebasis of its own judgment of an applicant’s design, with-out regard to DOT regulations for deepwater portsbeyond the 3-mile limit. By the same token, the Corpscould require ports under its jurisdiction to comply withconstruction and operation regulations promulgatedunder the Deepwater Port Act.
The States retain influence over the Corps in permitdecisions because an applicant must certify to the DistrictEngineer that the activity conforms to the coastal zonemanagement program of the State involved, If a State haslaws that regulate deepwater ports, the Corps will issue apermit only if the State approves.
Under existing Federal law, the Coast Guard is re-quired to install a traffic surveillance system for deep-water ports in Federal waters, but there is no such re-quirement for ports in State waters. Therefore, the CoastGuard would not be obliged to improve traffic controls inthe Delaware Bay for a port proposed by the DelawareBay Transportation Co.
Briefly, the Vessel Traffic Surveillance (VTS) systemis an additional source of information with backup radarcapability intended to contribute to the safe operation ofvessels. It functions much the same as an air traffic con-trol system.
The Coast Guard does have jurisdiction over VTSwithin the 3-mile limit under the Ports and WaterwaysAct of 1972, and is installing surveillance systems in ma-jor U.S. ports on a schedule dictated largely by budgetconsiderations. Those budget considerations and priorcommitments could mean that VTS would not be imple-mented in deepwater port areas in State waters as quicklyas it is in offshore ports.
In addition to the possible lack of safety and en-vironmental standards, deepwater ports in State waterswould lack coverage under the insurance and liabilitysections of the Deepwater Port Act. z That Act makes com-pensation available only to persons damaged as a resultof spills related to ports licensed by the Federal Govern-ment. That means that each State with a deepwater portwithin its waters must develop its own comprehensiveliability and compensation plan to protect its citizens andproperty holders and those of neighboring States whichmight be affected by a spill.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Possible courses of action available to Congressfor resolving discrepancies in the laws governing con-struction and operation of deepwater ports in U.S. ter-ritorial waters and ports inside the 3-mile limit include:
1. Congress could amend the Deepwater Port Actto cover all ports, including those inside the 3-mile limit.
2. Congress could amend the law to require avessel traffic surveillance system as a condi-tion of operating a deepwater port under thejurisdiction of the Corps of Engineers.
3. Committees of Congress with jurisdictionalauthority could advise the Corps of Engineers todelay approval of deepwater ports until fundingfor a surveillance system was assured.
4. Congress could accelerate funding for sur-veillance systems generally, or it could providespecial funding authority to the Coast Guard tomeet requirements in specific port areas.
5. Congress could require, either formally or infor-mally, that the Corps of Engineers comply withDOT standards for deepwater port constructionand operation.
OTHER OPTIONS
1. States could enact laws for deepwater ports intheir waters that were modeled on the Deepwater PortAct of 1974.
2. The Department of Transportation and theCorps of Engineers could develop, by memorandum ofunderstanding, identical standards for deepwater portconstruction and operations in State waters.
—
ISSUE 13Adjacent Coastal State Status
Differing interpretations of statutory criteria for deter-mining adjacent coastal State status make it difficult topredict which States could qualify for that status in thefuture and whether some States may be deprived of thebenefits of such status.
1. A recent denial by the Secretary of Transporta-tion of a Florida petition for adjacent coastal Statestatus focused attention on disagreement amongFederal officials and among State governments andother interested parties as to how statutory criteria fordetermining adjacency should be interpreted and ap-plied.
2. The Secretary’s decision left unresolved thequestion of whether tankers in transit to and from adeepwater port can ever be considered a factor indetermining adjacent coastal State status.
3. If tankers in transit are to be considered, it is notclear whether the determining factor is only the in-creased risk to the petitioning State from tanker spillsrelated to a deepwater port, or whether relative risksamong the States should be compared, regardless ofwhether overall risks are increased or decreased by adeepwater port.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
The Deepwater Port Act gives adjacent coastal Statesa role in approving or disapproving a license and an op-portunity to benefit from the protections offered by law.Unless a State is located within 15 miles of a deepwaterport or connected by pipeline to such a port, the Secretaryof Transportation makes the final determination of whichStates are to be considered “adjacent.”
An adjacent coastal State is entitled; to veto a pro-
Deepwater Ports
Public ParticipationComments
particularly page 139.
86
posed port, to collect fees for environmental or ad-ministrative costs related to such facilities, and to receivepriority over private applicants for a license to constructand operate a port. Because of the benefits of adjacentcoastal State status and the fact that there are a largenumber of coastal States close together in the Mid-Atlan-tic region, several States may ask to be designated “adja-cent” if a deepwater port should be proposed for licens-ing off the coast of New Jersey and Delaware.
The Act specifies that after having received recom-mendations from NOAA and the Coast Guard, the Secre-tary shall designate a petitioning State as “adjacent” if hedetermines that there is a risk of damage to the coastalenvironment of said State equal to or greater than the riskto a State directly connected by pipeline to the proposedport. Recently, Florida asked to be declared an adjacentcoastal State in connection with the licensing of LOOPand Seadock deepwater ports off Louisiana and Texas.The Florida case brought attention to the fact thatdifferent interpretations of the statute could lead todifferent determinations as to whether a State’s petitionis granted or denied. ] This lack of criteria for applyingthe statutory language to a specific situation may alsofigure in any applications for adjacent status made byMid-Atlantic States.
Florida petitioned for adjacent coastal State statuson grounds that the risk of an oil spill along its coastlinefrom tankers moving through the Florida Straits to andfrom the deepwater ports posed a danger equal to, orgreater than, the risk to either Texas or Louisiana, whichare automatically “adjacent” by statutory definition.
Based on his interpretation of the statute, the Secre-tary of Transportation denied Florida’s petition. In arriv-ing at his decision, the Secretary considered the opinionsof the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administrationand the Coast Guard, the two congressionally mandated“expert” agencies which advise the Secretary in an “adja-cency” case. NOAA concluded that risk of damage to thecoastal environment of Florida from proposed LOOP orSeadock is equal to, or greater than, the risk posed to thecoastal environment of Texas or Louisiana, and wouldthus warrant granting adjacent coastal State status toFlorida. 2 The Secretary acknowledged that the risks toFlorida from tankers in transit were greater than, orequal to, those of Louisiana or Texas. However, instead of
basing his decision on a comparison of relative risks towhich the States were subjected, the Secretary, on thebasis of Coast Guard data, concluded that the risks toFlorida from tankers in transit would exist whether ornot the ports were built, and Florida’s petition was notgranted.3
The Secretary justified his decision by stating thatthe intent of the Act was to concern itself “with those en-vironmental hazards that were to be generated by the(deepwater port) program it was authorizing—that is,with those risks that would be created by the construc-tion of the ports in question. ” He concluded that becausethe deepwater port program itself did not create addi-tional risks to Florida from tankers in transit, that wasnot a class of risks that Congress intended the Secretaryto consider in his determination.4 NOAA’s interpretationis that the legislative history of the Act shows that reduc-tion of small tanker traffic is one of the main justifica-tions cited by Congress in support of passage of the Act.Because Congress already assumed this to be a benefit ofdeepwater ports, the provisions for declaration of adja-cency could be viewed as an additional environmentalsafeguard or mechanism for assuring that States sub-jected to risks equal to, or greater than, adjacent Stateswould participate in the decisionmaking process, andshare in the benefits of adjacency.
More important, in arriving at its recommendation,NOAA determined that the Act mandates a comparisonof the risks between the States, and that if tankers in tran-sit are considered, the risk of damage to each respectiveState must be compared, regardless of whether the over-all risk to all States was reduced.
Transportation Department officials said in laterdiscussions with OTA that although tankers in transitwere not a determining factor in the Florida case, theycould be so considered in the Mid-Atlantic if a State couldshow that a port would cause a change or “distortion” inexisting tanker traffic patterns that would result in an in-crease in the risk of oil spills. s However, it is not clearwhether the Secretary’s decision has set a precedent thatwould be inconsistent with this type of consideration.
Industry officials have complained that applicationsfor adjacent status may add to the costs of deepwaterports by delaying construction. However, the law re-quires all interested States to apply for adjacent status
within 14 days after a deepwater port application hasbeen published in the Federal Register. The maximumdelay that can result from the process of naming adjacentcoastal States, regardless of the number of States in-volved, is 114 days. But industry might be subject tohigher costs and more restrictions on the constructionand operation of the port as a result of State stipulationsand charges if several States are granted adjacent status.
— — .—.— . — — . — .———— - —
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
1. Congress could specify whether the risk ofpollution from tankers passing a State’s coastline to orfrom a deepwater port should provide grounds fordeclaring a State adjacent regardless of whether suchports increase or decrease risks from tankers ingeneral.
2. Congress could specify whether the com-parison of risks mandated in the Act (i.e., equal to orgreater than the risks to a State connected to theport by pipeline) should be the only determinant of adja-cency or whether this should be the key factor only inthe context of overall increase or decrease of risksfrom a deepwater port to all relevant States.
ISSUE 14Risks From Major Accidents
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is notevaluating the risks from accidents in floating nuclearplants comprehensively enough to permit either ageneric comparison of the relative risks from land-based and floating nuclear plants, or an assessment ofthe specific risks from deploying floating plants offNew Jersey.
1. A preliminary analysis by OTA1 indicates thatthe probability of a core-meltdown accident in a float-ing nuclear plant is no greater than the land-basedplants considered in the NRC’s Rasmussen Report(WASH- 1400). 2
2. The OTA analysis indicates that the conclu-sions of WASH– 1400 concerning the expected conse-quences of releases of radioactive material into the at-mosphere as a result of a core-melt cannot be directlyapplied to floating plants because:
—the probability of an atmospheric release ofradioactive materials in case of a core-melt maybe about seven times greater for a plant of thedesign used in the proposed floating systemthan for the plant analyzed in WASH–140Q3
—the plant design used in the floating systemmay reduce the amount of radioactive materialreleased to the atmosphere if a core-melt acci-dent led to a failure of the containment;
-offshore siting of floating nuclear plants mayreduce the consequence of airborne releasesbecause there would be no resident populationfor several miles in all directions around theplant; and
—the interaction of the molten core withseawater that would occur in case of a core-melt accident in a floating plant could be a po-tential source of addit ional atmosphericreleases of radioactive materials not consideredin WASH– 7400.
Floating NuclearPowerplants
Public ParticipationComments
3. A study being prepared by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission that compares the radiologicalconsequences of accidental releases of radioactivematerials into water at floating nuclear plants and land-based nuclear plants is not as comprehensive asWASH– 7400’s analysis of the consequences of acci-dents because it does not translate radiological dosesinto health effects and does not consider economic im-pacts.
4. Certain aspects of the proposed site for theAtlantic Generating Station, such as the fact that theprevailing summer winds tend to blow from the AtlanticGenerating Station site towards an island having a peaksummer recreational population of more than 100,000,make it impossible to apply WASH-1400’s conclusionsabout the expected consequences of airborne releasesto the Atlantic Generating Station.
5. A substantial amount of information is availablethat could be used to assess the consequences of acore-melt in a floating nuclear plant, and researchprograms are underway to provide additional applica-ble information. There do not appear to be any signifi-cant information needs that will not be satisfied byr e s e a r c h p r o g r a m s a l r e a d y u n d e r w a y .
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
The environmental and health effects of normaloperations of a floating nuclear powerplant have beenstudied extensively by Government and industryanalysts. A critical review of these studies discloses littlefoundation for concluding that either construction orroutine operations of two plants at the Atlantic Generat-ing Station would pose a substantial threat to publichealth or the environment.
However, while routine operations appear to posefew problems, the most serious accident that could occurin a nuclear powerplant—a meltdown of the fuel core—could pose a severe threat to public health and safety andto the environment. While operation of any nuclearpowerplant involves some accident risks, a core-melt in afloating nuclear powerplant may involve unique riskssince the molten core probably would melt through the
n uclear powerpIants ti ‘,must regardless O f (:~that they are safe ;in (~
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text t)t “TheProposal for a Floating Nuclear Powcrplant in tht’ Mid- Atlantic,”chapter IV, particularly pages 230–237.
bottom of the floating platform and release large quan-tities of radioactive fission products directly into thebody of water on which the plant is floating. Public con-cern about the risks from floating nuclear plants isreflected in the responses to OTA’s public participationquestionnaire, the contentions of interveners in thelicensing process, and the State of New Jersey’s request tothe Nuclear Regulatory Commission for an assessment ofsuch risks.
Recognizing that floating nuclear powerplants pre-sent unique safety issues, the Advisory Committee onReactor Safeguards directed Offshore Power Systems toperform a number of studies related to these uniqueissues. As a followup, the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion decided to conduct a general study of the radiologi-cal consequences of a release of radioactive materials intowater from both land-based and floating plants. This Li-quid Pathways Generic Study, scheduled to be publishedin draft form in late-1976, will analyze the consequencesof releases from a wide range of accidents; from relativelyminor ones to the most serious case, the core-melt. Whencompleted, it will be published as a Nuclear RegulatoryCommission study and will be considered in the licens-ing process for both environmental and safety reviews ofthe Offshore Power Systems application for a license tobuild eight floating nuclear powerplants.
By injecting into the licensing process a study whichincludes analysis of some of the consequences of a core-melt accident, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ap-pears to have taken a step away from its policy of not re-quiring any consideration of core-melt accidents inreviewing and approving applications for licenses tobuild and operate nuclear powerplants. However, itshould be noted that there has been no change in the for-mal requirements for licensing, because the final en-vironmental statement on the Offshore Power Systemsapplication will contain only an analysis of the conse-quences of accidents less severe than a core-melt.
OTA concludes that the accident risks posed by thenew technology of floating nuclear powerplants deservethorough study. The analysis that supports the conclu-sion must begin with an examination of the way in whichpowerplant safety is treated under current NuclearRegulatory Commission procedures.
“The quality of Iife on this planet isbeing degraded and its very existencethreatened by large-scale nuclear fis-sion such as used in power product-ion. “
“What’s wrong with enIarging a float-ing nuclear power plant to incIude aresort hotel and offshore gambling ?Heated waters couId be used forcentral heating systems, heated swim-ming pools, etc General public wouIdeventualIy overcome science fiction -stimuIated fears of nuclear power
“True, there are remote dangers but Iam familiar with Oyster Creek NuclearPlant and wouId not hesitate to Iivenext door
“1 do not believe that offshorepowerplants can survive the storm po-tential of the Jersey Coast
The Commission’s objective is “to assure that therisk from normal operation and postulated accidents ismaintained at an acceptably low level and to assure thatthe likelihood of more severe accidents is extremelysmall. ”4
The Commission attempts to meet the objective withthree levels of regulations in which it:
● Establishes standards for the design, construction,and operation of nuclear powerplants that are in-tended to keep the probability of failure or mal-functions at a low level.
. Requires equipment and emergency procedures tocope with malfunctions that do occur, such as anemergency control mechanism that will terminatea fuel core’s chain reaction under abnormal plantconditions.
. Requires safety systems to control a worst-case setof “design-basis accidents”, such as a loss of areactor’s primary coolant that might lead to acore-melt unless auxiliary cooling systems wereavailable.
The Commission divides the spectrum of postulatednuclear powerplant accidents into nine categories, rang-ing from minor incidents (Class 1) to the potentially.catastrophic but highly improbable core-melt (Class 9).Commission policy requires only Class 1 through Class 8accidents to be considered in licensing designs and sitesfor powerplants.
Class 8 accidents include ejection of a fuel rod, acrack in a steam line and, most importantly, a loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) involving a major break in oneof the lines carrying the water that transfers heat fromthe core to the steam system. The LOCA is one of twopossible initiating events for a core-meltdown. The otheris a temporary disruption of the system—known as atransient—which raises core temperature above thecapacity of the cooling system. If a LOCA were followedby proper operation of the engineered safety features,such as the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS), itwould be considered a Class 8 accident; if these systemsfailed and the core overheated and melted, it would be aClass 9 accident. The consequences of Class 9 accidentscould be far more severe than the Class 8 accidents,
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because they could release substantial quantities ofradioactive materials into the environment.
The NRC’s rationale for not requiring considerationof Class 9 accidents in the design basis of protectionsystems and engineered safety features or in evaluatingproposed sites is that the probability of their occurrenceis judged to be so small that the total risk from such acci-dents (the probability of an accident multiplied by the ex-pected consequences of the accident) is extremely low; solow that they can be safely ignored, even though theirconsequences could be far worse than those of other mal-functions.
Until 1975, this judgment was not supported bydetailed analysis of the probabilities or consequences ofvarious classes of accidents. In that year, the NRCreceived the final results of the Reactor Safety Study(WASH– 1400). This was intended to develop realisticestimates of the probabilities of major accidents, and oftheir public health consequences (such as death and ill-nesses) and economic costs (such as evacuation, decon-tamination, crop losses, and loss of productive use ofquarantined land).
The report was issued in final form on October 30,1975. It estimated that the probability of a core-melt acci-dent in a land-based pressurized water reactor plant isabout one in twenty thousand per year of reactor opera-tion, and that only about one in seven core-melt accidentswould lead to the release of significant amounts ofradioactive materials into the atmosphere. It also con-cluded that the risks from operating 100 nuclear powerreactors were small compared to other man-made andnatural risks. While the Nuclear Regulatory Commissionhas not yet announced whether, or how, the results of thestudy will affect nuclear safety regulations, it did stateafter completion of the draft report that “the very lowresultant risk described in the draft study amply justifiesthe conclusion that no immediate action is required orappropriate as a result of the draft study’s present assess-ment of the probabilities and consequences of core-meltdown. ” 5 NRC’s view does not appear to havechanged after publication of the final report.
The validity of the conclusions of WASH– 1400 con-cerning the absolute level of risks from nuclearpowerplants is a matter of controversy, as is reactor
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safety in general. Any resolution of this controversy is farbeyond the scope of this study. Consequently, OTA’sconsideration of WASH– 1400 was confined primarily todetermining whether there are grounds for concludingthat there are significant differences in the risks associ-ated with floating nuclear powerplants and land-basedplants, recognizing that there is disagreement overwhether the risks associated with land-based plants arefully understood. It should be noted, however, thatresults presented in (Draft) WASH– 1400 imply thatwhatever the absolute level of risks from all classes ofreactor accidents may be, the total risks from Class 9 acci-dents are greater than the risks from Class 8 accidents,because the lower likelihood of Class 9 accidents could beoffset by their greater potential consequences.6 This find-ing supports OTA’s conclusion that it would be advisableto conduct a realistic, comprehensive analysis of theoverall risks from core-melt accidents in floating nuclearpowerplants, even though current NRC regulations re-quire analysis of accidents only through Class 8.
As noted earlier, the Liquid Pathways Generic Studydoes appear to represent a move away from the policy ofnot considering Class 9 accidents at all in the licensingprocess, although there has been no change in the formallicensing requirements. However, this study is not, anddoes not purport to be, a comprehensive comparison ofthe risks of floating plants with those of land-basedplants similar in scope to WASH– 1400. Specifically, itconsiders only liquid pathways for dispersion of radioac-tive releases; it does not translate calculations of radia-tion doses into health effects; it does not considereconomic impacts; and it considers only the conse-quences of an accident at a single plant, rather than at-tempting to calculate the risks of operation of a con-siderable number of floating plants.
OTA’s comparison of the reactor used in the floatingnuclear powerplant with the pressurized water reactorexamined in WASH– 1400 indicated that even though theprobabilities of a core-melt appeared similar for bothplants, the WASH– 1400 conclusions concerning the risksfrom airborne releases could not be directly applied tofloating plants because of design differences affecting theprobabilities and magnitudes of atmospheric releasesfrom a core-melt. Furthermore, the wide range of sites onwhich WASH– 2400 risk calculations were based did not
reflect the more limited range of sites available to floatingplants.
Thus, OTA concludes from its examination of the Li-quid Pathways Generic Study and WASH– 1400 that sub-stantial additional analysis will be needed to produce acomprehensive generic comparison of the risks fromfloating nuclear powerplants with those from land-basedplants. However, its examination of related research indi-cates that most of the information needed for such ananalysis should be currently available or forthcomingfrom active research programs.
OTA also concludes that both the Liquid PathwaysGeneric Study and WASH– 1400 have limited ap-plicability in assessing the potential impacts of deployingfloating nuclear powerplants in the study area. Thecalculations of expected consequences of accidents inWASH– 1400 are based on site characteristics averagedover 68 sites expected to be in use by 1981. The averagingtechnique used makes it impossible to determine how thecharacteristics of specific types of sites affect consequencecalculations. Specifically, there are characteristics of theproposed Atlantic Generating Station site that suggestthat consequence calculations based on average sitecharacteristics would be misleading, For example, theeconomy of the region around Atlantic City dependsheavily on summer recreational use of the beaches andthe ocean; hence an accident that released large quantitiesof radioactive materials into the ocean could have asevere economic impact, both in the short run, throughthe effects of a limitation on use of the beaches and oceanin the area, and in the long run, through adverse effectson the attractiveness of the area for recreation relative toother areas. The potential severity of the impact of a ma-jor accident on the regional economy also highlights thelimitations of the Liquid Pathways Generic Study, whichdoes not analyze economic effects.
Another site-specific factor which could increase theconsequences of a major accident is the fact that the pre-vailing winds during the peak summer tourist monthswould tend to carry radioactive releases produced by anaccident towards Long Beach Island, whose southern tipis 2.8 miles north of the Atlantic Generating Station site,and whose year-round population of about 10,000 canreach a summer daytime peak of more than 100,000. Thispotential problem is compounded by the fact that only
one bridge is available for evacuation of the island in caseof an accident.
Neither WASH– 1400 nor NRC procedures foranalyzing the consequences of design basis accidents takeinto account correlations between wind direction andseasonal population peaks.
These peculiarities of the proposed AtlanticGenerating Station suggest that a site-specific analysiswould be required to assess the expected consequences ofa major accident. A recent review of WASH– 1400 indi-cates that differences in population distribution aroundvarious sites considered in WASH– 1400 can affect the ex-pected consequences (and hence the risks) of serious acci-dents by factors of one thousand or more.7 NRC regula-tions already require site-specific analysis of theradiological (but not economic) consequences of acci-dents through Class 8. Since WASH– 1400 implies that thetotal risks from Class 9 accidents are greater than thosefrom Class 8 accidents, the sensitivity of risk to sitecharacteristics suggests that site-specific analyses of con-sequences of core-melts could be useful in decisions con-cerning siting alternatives. It should be noted that M.Bender and S. H. Bush of the Advisory Committee onReactor Safeguards have expressed opinions supportingthis view in the June 7, 1976, “Interim Report of theFloating Nuclear Power Plant,” sent to Marcus Rowden,Chairman of the NRC.
. — . — — — . -— ———. ...- .——-——-——— ..-. — —
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Congress has delegated authority to the NuclearRegulatory Commission to exercise most of the optionsthat OTA’s analysis shows are available for dealing withquestions about safety of floating nuclear powerplants.
Where powers have been delegated to NRC, theoptions open to Congress include:
. An informal notice to the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission that it would support programs toexercise the options;
● A more formal inquiry through the hearing processinto the validity of exercising the options; and,finally
79-188 0- 76 - 8
1 ’ 1
. A formal instruction to the NRC to exercise anyof the options that seemed appropriate to Con-gress or committees with jurisdiction.
The specific options that OTA’s analysis shows areavailable are:
1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission could carryforward OTA’s preliminary analysis of the prob-abilities of core-melts and associated at-mospheric releases of radioactive material infloating nuclear powerplants as compared toland-based plants.
2. The NRC could expand the scope of the LiquidPathways Generic Study to include theeconomic consequences of airborne and water-borne releases of radioactive materials follow-ing postulated accidents.
3. The NRC could perform an analysis of the con-sequences of a core-melt at the proposed Atlan-tic Generating Station for explicit considerationin the licensing process for that site.
4. The NRC could revise its regulations to requiresite-specific analysis of the consequences ofClass 9 accidents as part of the site-licensingprocess.
5. The NRC could conduct a comprehensive riskanalysis on floating nuclear powerplants com-parable to WASH– 1400, as has been suggestedboth in WASH– 1400 itself 8 and in the Environ-mental Protection Agency’s critique of thatstudy.9
6. In order to place the risks of floating nuclearplants in broader perspective, Congress couldfund comparable studies of the risks of alterna-tive sources of electric power, such as coal.
ISSUE 15Deployment in Volume
As many as 59 floating nuclear powerplants could bebuilt by a single manufacturer bypolicy analysis of the impacts ofplants in U.S. coastal waters hastemplated.
the year 2000 but nodeploying that manybeen done or is con-
FINDINGS
1. Federal licensing of floating nuclear plants isconfined to rather narrow technical and administrativequestions related to building eight plants and deployingtwo of those plants off the New Jersey coast.
2. The one U.S. company now developing acapacity to build floating nuclear plants intends to buildand market four such plants a year after 1985. If othermanufacturers were to enter the field, production couldexceed four plants a year after licenses were granted.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Offshore Power Systems, which is building aJacksonville, Fla., facility to manufacture floating nuclearpowerplants, estimates that it will have the capacity tocomplete 19 plants by 1990. Operating at peak capacity offour plants per year, it could complete 59 plants by theyear 2000.
The only proposals which the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission has been asked to license so far are pro-posals to manufacture eight plants and to deploy two ofthose plants behind protective breakwaters off the NewJersey coast.
While the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has pre-pared impact statements for these proposed actions it un-derstandably has not taken it upon itself to examine thebroader policy question of setting in motion a system thatcould produce large numbers of plants by the end of thecentury.
Floating NuclearPowerplants
Public ParticipationComments
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of“The Proposal for a Floating Nuclear Powerplant in the Mid-Atlan-tic, ” chapter IV, particularly pages 207– 210.
99
If the floating plant concept were successful, othermanufacturers might enter the field, not only in theUnited States but also abroad.
The long-range implications of setting in motion atotal system for building, installing, and operatingnuclear powerplants in ocean waters have not been ad-dressed by the NRC or by any other public or privateorganization.
Among the policy questions that are raised by thepossibility of volume production of floating nuclearpowerplants are:
● To what extent should the Federal Government beinvolved in major private industry decisions todeploy new technologies such as floating nuclearplants which could be supplying almost 10 per-cent of the Nation’s total electrical energy by1990?
● To what extent should Federal action consider sit-ing decisions for large offshore powerplants?
. To what extent should Federal or State planningaddress the need for floating nuclear plants in-cluding evaluation of local and regional risks andbenefits?
. What would be the effect on coastal areas of ac-celerated industrialization that might result frommore plentiful supplies of electrical energy gener-ated by offshore powerplants?
. Conceivably, the Offshore Power Systems plantalone could build 59 floating powerplants by theyear 2000. To what degree would coastal Statesbecome dependent on that form of offshoreenergy production, if that many plants weredeployed?
. If design flaws manifested themselves only aftercoastal States had become dependent on offshoresystems for power, how would prolonged shut-downs of offshore plants affect coastal economiesand the organizations involved in producing andoperating such systems?
. What would the economic and social costs of largenumbers of floating powerplants be, comparedwith alternative sources of energy?
. What are the environmental and public healthconsequences of operation of large numbers offloating nuclear plants?
Raising these questions does not mean that thisstudy has prejudged the answers. It is probable, however,that these long-range policy questions are at least as im-portant as the shorter term technical and administrativequestions which are being analyzed now and that theyshould be addressed formally.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
Committees of Congress with jurisdictionalauthority could commission a study on the effects oflarge-scale deployment of floating nuclear powerplantsin U.S. and foreign waters.
ISSUE 16Technical Uncertainties
Several technical aspects of the deployment, operation,and decommissioning of floating nuclear powerplantshave not been analyzed thoroughly enough to permitjudgments about the relative risks of the overallsystem.
FINDINGS
1. Techniques for hand i n g f u e l a n d r a d i o a c t i v e
w a s t e s f r o m f l o a t i n g n u c l e a r p l a n t s h a v e n o t b e e n
planned in detail. A system for supplying floating plants
that includes barges or other vessels and shore bases
is technically feasible, but without a specific design the
r i s k s c a n n o t b e e v a l u a t e d .
2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has notdeveloped regulations for decommissioning largepower reactors, and levels of radioactivity to be permit-ted in decommissioning plans are now determined on acase-by-case basis.
3. Twoseparate studies of decommissioning stand-ards and practices for major power reactors are now un -derway-one sponsored by industry and the other by theNuclear Regulatory Commission; however, neither studycovers floating plants.
4. If past practices were followed, only one of four
m e t h o d s t h e N u c l e a r R e g u l a t o r y C o m m i s s i o n p r o p o s e d
for decommissioning f loat ing nuclear plants appears to
be workable. The one workable method of decommis-sioning seems to be dismantling highly radioactivematerials with remotely controlled equipment before aretired plant is withdrawn from the breakwater. The NRCanalysis did not take into account new information thatindicates that radioactive materials in the reactorvessel will not decay to levels that permit disposal byconventional methods for 110 years after a plantceases operation.
102
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,
Floating Nuclear
.
Public ParticipationComments
I
,. ,1 ,
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
Fuel and waste handling technology has not beenfully developed for floating nuclear plants although ex-isting techniques at land-based plants would apply tomuch of the system for floating plants. This includesstandards for shipping containers, fuel storage and han-dling within the plants, and waste disposal. There are noobvious problems associated with fuel and waste han-dling which could not be adequately dealt with by prop-erly engineered systems and there are no significantdifferences between floating and land-based plants as tothe expected annual releases of liquid, solid, and gaseousradioactive waste. The draft environmental impact state-ment for the Atlantic Generating Station describes, ingeneral terms, the most likely pattern for the fuel andwaste handling system to be employed. As with land-based plants, major emphasis is placed on packaging ofradioactive materials. Logical statements are made as toexpected safety of handling and shipping operations butthere is insufficient information to substantiate assigninga low risk to the operation. Analysis is needed on thedetailed design of handling gear aboard the plant, designof eqLIipment for ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore transfer,the design of a ship or tug-barge system to transport fueland wastes, and the extent of the shore-side faci1ity toreceive and transfer fuel and waste. 1
Decommissioning plans for floating nuclear plantshave not been detailed and some of the options fordecommissioning the Atlantic Generating Station, asstated in the environmental impact statement, have beenproposed without thorough analysis of the expected in-ventory of radioactive materials after 40 years of plantoperation. Decommissioning practices and the ultimatedisposal of radioactive materials that are left after a largepowerplant is shut down are questions which apply to allnuclear power reactors, and the problem is now beingaddressed, principally for land-based plants.
The NRC has issued a regulatory guide for decom-missioning in general, but to date standards for futurelicensing of shut-down facilities are determined on acase-by-case basis. The Atomic Industrial Forum hassponsored a study of decommissioning land-based I
, “
* T h i+ brit’t d iwu~~ion of tht’ i~+u(~ i+ t,lht~n trom tht’ tull tt’xt of“ J hc I’ropow” I tor ,1 l;lo,ltirl~ N LICICI,I r l’()~~t’rpl,l n t i n tht’ Al id - ~ltl,l n -tic, ” chapter IV, particularly pages 21 3–222, 224–230.
nuclear plants which is due to be released in the fall of1976. A similar study was initiated by the NuclearRegulatory Commission for land-based plants duringmid-1976. It is anticipated that results of both studies willbe used by NRC to reevaluate standards for, and practicesof, decommissioning large power reactors and disposingof radioactive materials.
OTA sponsored a short study of the differences be-tween land-based and floating nuclear plants whenevaluating decommissioning alternatives and deter-mined that, based on past practice, only the option of dis-mantling the plant on site is clearly workable. Other op-tions of sinking the activated plant, mothballing atanother site, or mothballing followed by dismantling,which were described in the EIS, do not appear workablewithout clearer standards and further analysis of thetechniques and the consequences. The OTA study alsodisclosed errors due to inadequate analysis in past in-vestigations of decommissioning the FNP. It appears thatthe questions raised by OTA’s decommissioning in-vestigation could be addressed by analysis of publichealth standards for decommissioned plants, optionsavailable to meet those standards, and other effects ofcertain options such as sinking the plant in the ocean. Thequestion of what shore facilities and support would berequired for various approaches could also be addressed.
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
1. Committees of Congress with jurisdictionalauthority could examine these uncertainties in over-sight hearings. Some specific options which could beexplored in hearings include:
a. A requirement that design criteria and pro-cedures for transferring materials to and from float-ing plants be completed in detaiI before an operatinglicense can be issued.
b. A requirement that disposal areas for spentfuel be assured in the event that a completesystem for waste disposal and fuel reprocessingstill has not been designed by the time the AtlanticGenerating Station begins operating.
c. A requirement that the Nuclear Regulatory
C o m m i s s i o n r e e v a l u a t e i t s c o n c l u s i o n s a n d
r e g u l a t i o n s o n d e c o m m i s s i o n i n g f o r b o t h f l o a t i n g
a n d l a n d - b a s e d n u c l e a r p l a n t s .
2. C o m m i t t e e s o f C o n g r e s s w i t h j u r i s d i c t i o n a l
authority could ask the NRC to estimate the time andresources required to resolve technical and administra-tive uncertainties, and to solicit independent judgmentsabout whether the problems are serious enough to war-rant such time and resources.
OTHER OPTIONS
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission, acting on itsown authority, could initiate studies designed toresolve the technical and administrat ive uncertaint ies.
ISSUE 17Siting of Floating PowerplantsOutside U.S. Territorial Limits
r 7 f—————l
Because there is no physical barrier to locating floatingnuclear powerplants more than 3 miles offshore, pro-posals for siting plants outside territorial limits arepossible. However, U.S. authority to regulate floatingnuclear powerplants outside U.S. territory is not clearunder existing international law.
1. State laws which would otherwise apply tonuclear powerplants would not cover any portion of afacility sited outside a State’s territorial waters.
2. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission appears tobe unable to approve the installation of a U.S. nuclearpowerplant in waters outside U.S. borders, but on theContinental Shelf.
3. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act appliesonly to the exploration and exploitation of naturalresources and not to the construction of a breakwater,positioning of cables, and other activities associatedwith a nuclear power station.
4. Exist ing internat ional law does not speci f ical ly
settle the question of jurisdiction over a floating nuclear
p o w e r p l a n t l o c a t e d b e y o n d n a t i o n a l t e r r i t o r i a l l i m i t s ,
and if the Third U.N. Law of the Sea Conference shouldfail to settle the matter, the question of jurisdiction willbe left to the unilateral action of nations.
DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE*
An offshore nuclear power station has been pro-posed for location within 3 miles of the New Jerseycoastline. The Atlantic Generating Station consists of apair of floating nuclear plants moored within a largebreakwater. Since waters shallow enough to accommo-date this type of facility (maximum 70 feet) can be found
*This brief discussion of the issue is taken from the full text of “TheProposal for a Floating Nuclear Powerplant in the Mid-Atlantic, ”chapter IV, particularly pages 207–210.
106
more than 3 miles from shore, proposals for more distantlocations could be made. Furthermore, there may betechnical, social, economic, environmental, or other ad-vantages to siting a floating nuclear powerplant outsidethe 3-mile limit.
United States domestic law presently appears toprohibit the licensing of a nuclear powerplant in anylocat ion “not under or within the jurisdiction of theUnited States. ” (There are certain exceptions, but they arenot relevant here. ) Because legal authority extending U.S.jurisdiction for such purposes is lacking, it is questiona-ble whether NRC would have the authority to issue alicense for a nuclear power station moored in watersbeyond the territorial sea. Legislation to clarify this situa-tion would be necessary.
Moreover, the legal authority of the United States toextend its jurisdiction to water areas over its ContinentalShelf, but beyond 3 miles, is uncertain under existing in-ternational law. Comprehensive U.S. sovereignty ends at3 miles. Certain special purpose authority, e.g., on theContinental Shelf for exploration and exploitation ofnatural resources, is sanctioned by international law’, butjurisdiction to authorize the construction or operation offloating nuclear powerplants is not presently recognized.
Thus, clarification of U.S. authority under interna-tional law to regulate this activity beyond its territoriallimits is an important precedent to an extension ofjurisdiction, i f conflict with other nations is to beavoided. Treat y articles are now being debated i n theThird U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, which may settlethe international law question.
DOMESTIC LAW
1. State Jurisdiction
The regulatory jurisdiction of most States is limitedto waters within the 3-mile limit. State laws which wouldotherwise apply to nuclear powerplants would not covera facility sited beyond 3 miles. The State would havejurisdiction over transmission lines within State watersbut it would have no control over such matters as en-vironmental protection. In short, a State would have verylittle control over the nuclear facility located at 3.1 milesas opposed to the same facility located at 2.9 miles. Such a
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situation certainly would dampen a State’s desire for in-volvement in an extra-territorial nuclear project.
2. Federal Law
Section 101 of the Atomic Energy Act (42 USC 2131)reads as follows:
And
It shall be unlawful except as providedin section 91 of this Act for any person with-in the United States to transfer or receive ininterstate commerce, manufacture, produce,transfer, acquire, possess, use, import, or ex-port any utilization or production facility,except in accordance with a license issued bythe Commission pursuant to section 103 or104 of this Act.
section 103 provides in part:
(d) No [commercial] license under thissection may be given to any person for ac-tivities which are not under or within thejurisdiction of the United States. . . .
These provisions can be read to prohibit the award-ing of a license by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC) for a floating nuclear powerplant to be sited out-side U.S. territorial limits. The waters on the U.S. Conti-nental Shelf beyond 3 miles are not clearly “under orwithin U.S. jurisdiction. ” This being so, the NRC wouldbe unable to approve the installation of a U.S. nuclearpowerplant in waters outside U.S. borders but on theContinental Shelf.
NRC officials believe they have jurisdiction beyond3 miles under existing law, but no written opinion hasbeen rendered by the Commission.
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act creates aregulatory regime and a system for leasing land applica-ble only to the exploration and exploitation of naturalresources (e.g., oil, gas, and sulphur). That law is not ap-plicable to the construction of a breakwater, positioningof cables, etc., associated with a nuclear power station.Lack of this kind of authority is a further hindrance tooffshore nuclear power development beyond 3 miles.
Other Federal regulatory mechanisms, e.g., environ-mental controls, likewise are geographically limited.Without a clear extension of all such authorities inlegislation, the construction of a floating nuclear
powerplant would either not be attempted or be refusedby Federal officials.
INTERNATIONAL LAW
If clarification of U.S. law is desired, a geographicalextension of U.S. laws and regulations must have inter-national support. Without a legal basis for its action, theUnited States could face protests from neighboring na-tions or from nations which use the high seas off U.S.coasts.
Existing international law of the sea does notspecifically settle the question of jurisdiction over a float-ing nuclear powerplant located beyond national ter-ritorial limits. Existing law clearly affords a coastal na-tion the authority to prescribe regulatory measures fornuclear powerplants sited within its territorial waters.The limit of territorial waters is presently set at 3 miles bycustom but quite likely will be expanded to 12 miles inthe near future, either through custom or by treaty.Beyond territorial waters, ocean areas are essentially freefrom national control except for very limited purposesrecognized in convention or custom (Convention on theHigh Seas, 1958). Authority exists by treaty, for example,to regulate for sanitary, customs, or fiscal purposes in acontiguous zone of 12 miles from shore (Convention onthe Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, 1958).
Presently under negotiation, in the fifth session ofthe Third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference, aretreaty provisions which will clarify jurisdiction overeconomic activities in coastal waters beyond territoriallimits. The Conference’s revised single negotiating text(RSNT), part 2, contains several provisions relevant tothe consideration of jurisdiction over floating nuclearpowerplants. Directly relevant is chapter 3 of the RSNTwhich would create an exclusive economic zone extend-ing 200 nautical miles from the coastline. (See especiallyArticles 44, 45, and 48.) Article 44 specifies the rights,jurisdiction, and duties of the coastal States in the ex-clusive economic zone and reads in part as follows:
1. In an area beyond and adjacent to itsterritorial sea, described as the exclusiveeconomic zone, the coastal State has:
x- * * * *
--
(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction withregard to establishment and use of all artificialislands, installations, and structures;
(c) Exclusive jurisdiction with regard to(i) other activities for the economic exploitationand exploration of the zone, such as the pro-duction of energy from the water, currents, andwinds;
* * * * *
These provisions, in essence, would provide thecoastal State with the legal authority to regulate (and toauthorize the location of) floating nuclear powerplants inthis 200-mile economic zone. Consequently, the questionof U.S. jurisdiction over floating nuclear powerplantsconstructed beyond 3 miles, but within 200 milesoffshore may very well be settled by agreement in a newlaw of the sea treaty. However, there are many whobelieve that this Conference will fail and no agreementwill be reached, In that event, settlement of the questionof jurisdiction will be handled in the traditional custom-ary law fashion, whereby nations will unilaterally claimjurisdiction, or the right to regulate and locate suchfacilities off their shores. Such claim will then be eitheraccepted or rejected by other countries.
In summary, international law in this area is in adeveloping phase, but it may be clarified in the nearfuture.
—.—— —— — — — — —
CONGRESSIONAL OPTIONS
In light of the ambiguity of the legal regime applica-ble to floating nuclear plants outside U.S. territorialwaters, the Congress may wish to consider actionwhich would:
1. Clearly establish a U.S. claim of extendedjurisdiction in coastal waters for purposes ofregulating power-production facilities such asoffshore nuclear plants.
2. Extend seaward existing Federal laws governingsuch matters as the placement of structuresoffshore, the disposal of dredged materials andpollutants, and enforcement and monitoring
thereof . Al ternat ively , the Congress may wish to
enact new legislation setting up a separate ad-ministrative structure for licensing of offshorepower-production facilities.
3. Establish a process by which lands under thewaters of the contiguous zone could be leasedfor purposes other than resource explorationand exploitation.
4. Extend adjacent State laws to such facilities.
Footnotes: Chapter IIIISSUE 1 OFFSHORE PRIORITIES AND
PLANNING1.
2.3. .
4.
ISSUE1.
2,
3. .
ISSUE1.2.3.4.
ISSUE
Data based on conversation with NationalFisheries Service, May 3, 1976, and WilliamF. Gusey, “The Fish and Wildlife Resourcesof the Middle Atlantic Bight, ” January 1976.Ibid.Port Authority of New York and NewJersey, PorI of IV(J7(I York Sfnfistics, 1974, andPII iladcl~l}l iu M ariti~~zc E.I’C-/IUIIcyc Sfntistics,1958-74.Working Paper #2.
2 FEDERAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMInterv icws with Interior staff members,February 1976.During a February 17, 1976, interview withOffice of Coastal Zone Management staffmembers, OTA researchers were told by oneofficial: “It is not clear who is doing what,and the States are bewildered. No one evenknows for sure who is going to do what. It isa very confused process. ”“The Federal Government doesn’t seem tounderstand why we are being so dogmaticabout some things, ” a Delaware official toldan OTA researcher on February 4, 1976.“We have to be because they are so sloppy. ”
3 REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENTWorking Paper #1.Ibid.Ibid.According to U.S. Coast Guard Pollution In-cident Reporting System (PIRS) data on oilspills in 1974, a major source of dischargewas pipelines.
4 OIL SPILL LIABILITY ANDCOMPENSATION
1. Written responses to an OTA questionnairedistributed August 1975-January 1976, andoral statements in OTA workshops in May,June, and August, 1975.
2. Martin C. Miller, Jerry C. Bacon, Ivan M.Lissauer, Office of Research and Develop-ment, U. S. Coast Guard, Department ofTransportation, A Comp~/kr Siml/lation Tech -niqlle for O i l S p i l l s off t h e Ncu~ \mey -
?>.
4.5.
6.7.
8.
9.10.
11.
12.
13.14.
Dt>l(7i(1(7)’(’ Coasflr)~c, Report No. CG-D- 1 /1975,Springfield: National Technical InformationService, September 1975.Interagency Comprehensive Oil SpillLiability Group, Department of Justice DraftMemorandum, March 14, 1975, p.5.Ibid.Section 4(a) (2) of the Outer ContinentalShelf Lands Act, as amended by the Deep-water Port Act.Interviews with State officials, June 1976.Environmental Policy Institute, Oil: SIIIdy ofPol//(tioil lirsllrfl)lcc lJif7hi/ify Lf77iIS, October 10,1975.Ibid, pp. S-5 and 6, and op. cit., Interagency,pp. 26-27.Ibid.Bergman, Samuel, “No Fault Liability for OilPollution Damage, ” ~oz[r]~al of Mari~i))lc l.~i(’fl)rd Conl)llcrc(’, vol. 5, October 1973, pp.20-21.Lundquist, Thomas R., “Compensation forOil Pollution Damages, ” TIIC /~/stilr//c o~~ MmIai~d %ici~crs, S1/))//wsi/(///, Februa ry 1974, andop. cit., lntera~ency, pp. 15-18.For discussion of the current status of courtdecisions on these matters, see InteragencyStudy Group, March 15, 1975, pp. 14-1~,Maine, Massachusetts, Washington, Oregon.Environmental Policy Center testimony onNew Jersey, S. 1409, ‘June 2, 1976. -
ISSUE 5 OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT ANDCLEANUP
1. Working Paper #3.
ISSUE 6 ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES1.2.
3.
Working Paper #10.U.S. Department of the Interior, Draft En-zlironmental lmpct Statement for Mid-A tlmficSale #40, VO1. 2, p. 359.
Straughan, Dale M,, Ei~z’ir(~}~}~[~’~~ta/ Sfr((fi(’s nsTl!c!{ l< f’lflfc to of fs!lorc Pctrolrrllfl O/wr(7til)/ls,Report to the Marine Board, NationalResearch Council, 1975.
ISSUE 7 STATE ROLE1. Working Paper #1.
112
1.?A.
3. .
4.
ISSUI1.
2.
?. .
4.
5
ISSUE 1(1 TANKER DESIGN AND OPERATIONS1.
2.
3. .4.
U.S. Congress, Office of Technology}’ Assess-m e n t , Oil TI’oIrs/JOI-1(7/;OII” hr~ T1711A(JI-s: AIIA )r (I / [/s i s of M (7 )-; )~ (> po~l~lfj[)~r (711[1 S(7f(’1.V
Mct?s;(rcs, Washington: Go\’ernnlcnt Print-ing Office, 1975.U.S. Senate Commerce Comnlitte~~ hcarin~son Ports and Waterw’avs !%fetv Act of 1972,March 2 and 3, 1976. “ “Op. cit., Office of Tcchnolog}r Assessment.Frlf(>rfil Rl;~istc1’, IT()] . 4 1 , No, 94, Mav 13,1976.
ISSUE 11 OIL SPILL CONTAINMENT ANDCLEANUP AT DEE PWATER PORTS
1. 33. CFR 149.319.2. Inter\’iew With officials of U.S. Department
of Transportation, U.S. Coast C,uard.3. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology
ISSUE 12 STANDARDS IN STATE W’ATERS1. Working Paper #1 .2. lbici.
ISSUE 13 ADJACENT COASTAL S 1 ~1’1’[{STATUS
1. Inter\riew with Hal Scott, Florida AuciutxlnSociety, April 6, 1976.
2. Corrt~s\l(J1lclc~llccJ from U.S. D(~pclrtn~c~nt t}t
3
4.
C(~m m~~rce, Nationa I OCLJ,l n {c ,1 ncj A t -rnospht’r i c Administration, t[~ \$’illian~ 1’.Colcma n, Sec r-eta ry of Tra n ~pt~rt,1 t i t~n,March 11, 1976.C(Jrres~Otl[lcicllcc~ from U.S. DcJp,lrtnl~~nt (JtT r a ns p LJ r t a t i (~ n, u .s. C()’1 St (;LI ‘1 rd , t ()William T. Coleman, St~crc~tar}r ~~f ‘1 r,~n\p~~r-tati{~n, March 17, 1976.Interview’ with DOT officials, April 5, 1976.
5, Ibici.
ISSUE 14 RISKS Fl{(>hf MAJOR ACC’II)EN”l S
‘i .- I Y , ( ) - 7( - ,
Table Ill-1. Consequences of individual release categories
ACCIDENT AVERAGE* PEAK* ●
TYPE PROBABILITY Man-rem Acute Damage Man-rem Acute DamagePER YEAR (X106) Fatalities ($X109) (X106) Fatalities ($X109)
PWR 1 7X1 O-7 2,8 34 1.4 32 1,100 4.3PWR 2 5X1 O-6 3.1 62 1.8 31 2,300 5.6PWR 3 5X1 O-6 1.4 39 .70 13 1,100 2.6PWR 4 5X1 O-7 .29 2.7 .24 2.9 106 1.6PWR 5 1 X1 O-6 .07 .22 .06 .70 17 .46PWR 6 1 X1 O-5 7.5X1 O-3 o 1.0X10-3 91 X10-3 o 4.9X10-3
PWR7 6X 1 0-5 1.3X1O-4 o 1.1X10- 5 16x10 -4 o 3.6x10-5
PWR8 4X1O-5 .92x10-3 o .43X10- 3 15X10- 3 o 2.2X10-3
PWR9 4X1O-4 1.1X1O-6 o * O 19X10- 6
9X10- 7
o = 0BWR1 2.2 1.7 1.2 21 115 4.4BWR2 2X1O-6 1.8 48 1.2 16 1,200 4.0BWR3 1X1O-5 .89 3.0 .61 9.4 110 3.4BWR4 3X1O-5 .42 3.9 .28 4,2 90 1.5BWR5 1X1O-5 .19 1.1 .10 1.8 52 .86BWR6 1X1O-4 .22X1O-6 o = 0 3.5X10-6 o - 0
“Averageoverpopulafionandmeterological conditions, assuming accidentoccurs with unit probability, i.e,, given theaccident.● “It should be understood that the probabilities of these peak values are approximately three orders of magnitude smaller than the accident probability valuesgiven in column 2.
NOTE: The conclusion that the risks from Class 9 greater for PWR 2 than for PWR 9 (3.1 millionaccidents are greater than the risks from Class 8 ac- man -reins compared to 1.1 man-reins). In terms ofcidents is implied in the table 111-1, which was early deaths, P WR 2 would produce on the averageincluded in the draft of the Reactor Safety Study 62 deaths and could cause up to a peak of 2,300(page 71, Appendix VI), but not in the final report. deaths, while PWR 9 is not expected to cause early
The rows labeled PWR 1 through PWR 9 repre-sent sets of accident sequences in pressurized waterreactors that procduce each of nine distinct catego-ries of releases of radioactive materials from thecontament. The probability given for each release.category is the sum of the probabilities of thevarious accidents that could produce that type ofrelease. Category PWR 9 approximates a Class 8design-basis, loss-of-coolant accident, in which thesafety systems function properly and no core-meltoccurs. Categories PWR 1 through PWR 7 all resultfrom Class 9 core-melt accidents involving somefailure of the emergency systems and ultimatelyfailure of the containment and escape of radioac-tive materials.
The relatively greater risks of Class 9 accidentscan be seen by comparing the most severe categoryof core-melt accidents, PW R 2, with the Class 8category, PWR 9. The table shows that PWR 2 ison Iv about 80 times less likely than PWR 9, yet thecon sequences are man y orders of magnitudegreater. For example, the expected total radiationdose to humans-the primary determinant of long-term cancer deaths—is nearly 2 million times.
deaths even under the worst weather and site con-ditions. In economic terms, PWR 2 would produceon the average $1.8 billion in damages, while PWR9 would produce essentially negligible economicimpacts even i n the worst circumstanccs.
7
8.
9.
Yellin, Joel, “The Nuclear Regulatory Com-m i ss i o n ‘s R ea c t o r Safety St u d y,WASH- 1400,” The Bell )ournal of Economics,vol. 7, No. 1, Spring 1972, Table 2, p. 325.Op. cit., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion.U.S Environmental Protection Agency, Reac-tor Safety Study, WASH-1400: A Review of theFinal Report, June, 1976, pp. 1-8.
ISSUE 16 TECHNICAL UNCERTAINTIES1. Working Paper #9.2. Ibici.
Chapter IV
DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES
i
, INTRODUCTIONi
~ tI
I This OTA assessment deals specifically with three technologies and the potentialI impacts on New Jersey and Delaware of the deployment of any or all of the three inI
the ocean waters off the two States. Those two States, with their divergent energyand environmental needs, are described in this chapter.
The assessment involved detailed study of the equipment to be used as well as1,the State and Federal management systems which license, regulate, and generally1
oversee the deployment and operation of the three technologies. The equipmentII and the management systems are described and analyzed in this chapter in the con-
text of the history, current status, and possible future development in the Mid-Atlantic of oil and gas resources, deepwater ports, and floating nuclearpowerplants.
During the assessment, OTA made its own projections of deployment andresulting impacts of the technologies. Other projections have been made by indus-try, various executive agencies, and private study groups. In nearly every case, thedifferences between the many projections of impacts are the result of differences inthe basic assumptions made by the various groups. Those impacts and assumptionsmade by OTA are specified here.
OTA also investigated what would happen if any or all of the three technologieswere not implemented. The possible alternatives to oil and gas, deepwater ports,and floating nuclear powerplants and how these alternatives are being pursued arediscussed in the final section of this chapter.I
.— . . . . . . . . —.— —-. . . . . . .— . . . -- ———. .
117
Figure IV-1. The coastal zones of Delaware and New Jersey
m I
“x.2
.-.
.+.T .-
. ,–“.
,’
. .
I
I
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment, “Energy, 011 and the State of Delaware and “Inventory of New Jersey Coastal Area, 1975’
Description of the Study AreaDelaware and New Jersey—among the
smallest and most densely populated of the 50States—are a microcosm of the Nation’senergy conflicts: burgeoning demand forpetroleum and electric power accompanied byboth a dependence on outside sources forenergy and a continuing concern for thequality of life.
Wide Atlantic beaches that attract an esti-mated 100 million users annually1 merge withcoastal wetlands, marshes, and forests, thengive way to intense industrialization fartherinland.
Both States border the Atlantic Ocean; NewJersey with 126 miles of ocean coastline andDelaware with 28. Water along the ocean coastis relatively clean and most of the resort areasare located there. The States are separated fromeach other by the Delaware Bay, which isdevoted mostly to boating, fishing, and ship-ping. Industrialization and pollution areheavy along the upper Bay and the DelawareRiver, which is at the southern end of an in-dustrial corridor that stretches north to theHudson River of New York.
Development in both States is clusteredalong the Delaware River Basin, a 300-milelong waterway which has attracted commerceand industry for three centuries.
In recent assessments of the Delaware RiverBasin, the Council on Environmental Qualityhas said the region is “at the cutting edge” ofmany of the environmental concerns facingAmerica. Its water and air were among thefirst to be heavily polluted; its oldest citieswere among the first to be changed by in-dustrialization; its towns grew as a result ofmigration from Europe and from the SouthernUnited States; its rural areas were among thefirst in the Nation to be urbanized by residen-tial and industrial expansion; its mountainsand beaches were among the most severely
impacted by the recreation boom, With theenergy shortage, it is a prime target foroffshore energy systems and associated in-dustrial development.2
The economic life of the two States is inex-tricably tied to divergent ventures: theenergy-intensive manufacturing -refining -petrochemical complexes of the inland areaand the tourist-recreation-fishing meccas ofthe coastal waters and beaches.
Both Delaware and New Jersey enactedlaws to help deal with conflicts between in-dustry and tourism. Delaware has a CoastalZone Act which prohibits new heavy indus-tries in the coastal zone. New Jersey has aCoastal Area Facility Review Act which setsup a permit procedure for new or expandingindustry. In a further effort to plan for in-dustrial growth, the urban sections of bothStates belong to regional planning commis-sions.
The demand for oil and electricity for in-creasing populations and the desire to avoidthe adverse impacts associated with energyfacilities in Delaware and New Jersey haveproduced pressures for clean sources ofenergy, new controls on existing energysystems and careful coordination of growth.The conflicts have posed severe planning andzoning problems and brought traditional Stateand local regulatory systems and land-usepatterns into question. Both States aredeveloping coastal zone managementprograms which may resolve some of the con-flicts. They also are developing new State lawsto deal with changing demands,
Neither State produces any oil or naturalgas. Their energy needs are met with crude oilor petroleum product imports from foreignsources or from domestic wells along the Gulfof Mexico and natural gas from transconti-nental pipelines.
Petroleum demand is expected to increaseby nearly one-third by 1985. Electricity de-mand is projected to increase by at least one-half by 1985 assuming no change in the pres-ent growth pattern.
New Jersey, which has developed 29 per-cent of its total land area for housing, com-merce, or industry, is the most heavily in-dustrialized State in the Nations Increasingurbanization and industrialization are takingover New Jersey farmland at the rate of 40,000acres a year. At the same time, New Jersey hasmore land in recreational uses than any otherof the five Mid-Atlantic States.4 Fourteen per-cent of New Jersey’s land is recreational.
Delaware is predominantly a rural Statewith the highest percentage of wetlands andfarmlands of any Mid-Atlantic State. Only 8percent of its land is used for commerce, in-dustry, or homes.5
New Jersey’s recreational land serves thelarge populations of New York and Penn-sylvania. Thirty percent of the demand forNew Jersey recreational land is made by out-of-State tourists. Recreational demands areprimarily for beaches and boating and are ex-pected to almost double by the year 2000.6
Tourism, or travel-related business, centersalong the coast primarily in Atlantic andMonmouth Counties.
The tourist industry, which accounts for$3.5 billion of New Jersey’s estimated $50billion annual gross product, is second ineconomic importance only to the petrochemi-cal industry. p
P e t r o c e m i c a l s , w h i c h d e p e n d o npetroleum and natural gas byproducts for rawmaterials, account for $4 billion of the State’sgross product. Eleven major plants are con-centrated in Northern Jersey and along theborders with Pennsylvania and Delaware neara refinery complex that processes two-thirdsof the crude oil refined on the east coast. 8
When all manufacturing businesses areconsidered, more than 40 percent of NewJersey’s 3 million workers owe their jobs tomanufacturing. g Manufactured goods andpetrochemical products are the primary ex-ports from the two States.
About 31 percent of Delaware’s 200,000jobs are in the manufacturing sector.10 TheStates largest industry is petrochemicals, witha c o m p l e x o f p l a n t s l o c a t e d i n t h eWilmington-Delaware City area at the north-ern tip of the State.
Tourism is ranked third among incomesources in Delaware and annually generates$202 million worth of business, 11 locatedmostly in Sussex County. Most of the touristbusiness in Delaware involves fishing, swim-ming, and picnicking. With more than 16million people living within a day’s drive ofDelaware, 87 percent of the increasing de-mand for sport fishing is from out of State.12
Most of the visitors to Delaware are from theBaltimore-Washington area.
Despite the transportation demands madeby both industry and tourism, neither State isamply supplied with major transportationfacilities except where they coincide with theNew York City to Washington, D. C., corridor.One major divided highway runs north-souththrough the coastal region of each State. Majorrail service is limited to the metropolitan cor-r idor and a f re ight service betweenWilmington, Del., and Norfolk, Va., via arailroad ferry across the Chesapeake at CapeCharles. Mass transit systems are limited tothe metropolitan areas.
Existing transportation probably could notsupport industrial and commercial activitythat may result from any new large-scaledevelopment.
Two large ports serve Delaware and NewJersey. The Port of New York and New Jerseyis the Nation’s largest handler of importedgeneral cargos. In 1973, the port handled
nearly 218 billion short tons of cargo—pri-marily passengers, containers, grain, andpetroleum. The petroleum terminals aremainly on the New Jersey side of the Port. TheDelaware River Ports, centering aroundPhiladelphia, have handled an increasingamount of cargo in recent years, more than 40percent of it crude oil. Total tonnage throughthe ports in 1973 was 139 billion short tons.13
The wetlands of the two States—250,000acres in New Jersey and 139,000 acres inDelaware—are crucial to coastal life. The areasare nursery and breeding grounds for much ofthe marine life in the ocean and bay. Theyprovide nutrients which are carried by thetides into open waters to feed fish and otherorganisms. The wetlands provide shelter andfood for waterfowl and migrating birds travel-ing one of the Nation’s busiest flyways.14
In the coastal region of Maryland, Virginia,New Jersey, and Delaware, nearly 1 billionpounds of estuarine-dependent fish productsare harvested annually with a wholesale valueof almost $70 million. The important commer-cial species are menhaden, crabs, lobsters,clams, and oysters. More than a millionsportmen fish in the same coastal areas an-nually and more than a half-million geese andducks are harvested by sports hunters.15
In its final environmental impact statementon the proposed 1976 oil and gas lease sale inthe Mid-Atlantic, the Department of the In-terior indicated that the costs and risks associ-ated with developing wetlands and sandy bar-rier islands can be very high and that destruc-tion of the wetlands already has curtailed theproductivity of some marine species.
The decline in the quality of commercialand sport fisheries in the region led to thepassage of wetlands protection legislation inboth New Jersey and Delaware.16
Behind the wetlands in New Jersey, a largeand unique forest occupies most of the southcentral portion of the State. Known as the Pine
Barrens, the area includes 1,500 square milesof sandy soil with stands of rare pine speciesand other plant and wildlife. Sparsely in-habited and virtually untouched by industrialdevelopment, the Pine Barrens covers a largeuntapped fresh water aquifer.
In this diversified area and off its shores,three new energy systems are now possible:production of oil and gas resources on theOuter Continental Shelf, construction of adeepwater port to handle petroleum importsby supertankers, and siting of the Nation’sfirst floating nuclear powerplant. .
The offshore oil and gas leases run parallelto the southern half of New Jersey and themouth of the Delaware Bay. The most promis-ing site for oil and gas finds—as indicated byindustry tract nominations—is located about80 miles off Cape Henlopen, Del.
At present there is no serious proposal for adeepwater port outside the 3-mile limit ofState waters in the Mid-Atlantic, but thisstudy has determined that a likely site for anoffshore deepwater port, should one be pro-posed, would be about 30 miles off Cape MayCounty, N.J., across the mouth of the bay fromthe Delaware seashore.
The proposed site of the planned floatingnuclear powerplant is off Atlantic County,N.J.
The citizens of the States reflect a widerange of views about the proposals. Industryrepresentatives, labor, and the big city resi-dents generally have favored the developmentof new energy systems off the coast ofDelaware and New Jersey. Environmentalists,beach landowners, and tourist-oriented townsand businesses generally have opposedoffshore development. The Governors of bothStates are on record in favor of exploration foroffshore oil and gas if significant changes aremade in the development process and Federalsupervision. The Governor of New Jersey ison record in opposition to a deepwater port
which would cause large-scale industrializa- although New Jersey is currently investigatingtion of rural areas, and Delaware has the risks of such a system.17
prohibited the port and pipeline landings by The position of each State in regard to thelaw. The Governors have taken no stand as yet new energy systems is discussed in moreon the proposed floating nuclear powerplant detail in later sections of this chapter.
Figure IV-2. The beach at Cape Henlopen, Delaware State Park juts out into the water where the Delaware Baymeets the Atlantic Ocean. A few miles up the Bay, Lewes, Delaware, is a potential staging area for work crewsand supplies that will be needed on offshore oil and gas rigs and platforms.
Source Delaware State Planning Off Ice
Development of Offshore Petroleum Technologies inthe Mid-Atlantic
BACKGROUNDThis study assesses the introduction of
offshore petroleum development in the Mid-Atlantic region. Although the submergedOuter Continental Shelf (OCS) lands withinthis region were classified by geologists as apotential source of oil and natural gas in thelate 1950’s, they were not a priority target fordevelopment until 1974.
Initial notice of plans to develop petroleumresources on Federal lands off the Mid-Atlan-tic coast was given in a 5-year leasing schedulewhich the Department of the Interior firstpublished in June 1971. However, in hisenergy message of April 18, 1973, the Presi-dent announced that drilling on the AtlanticOCS and in the Gulf of Alaska would be de-ferred until a study of the environmental im-pact of oil and gas production in these areascould be carried out, The Council on Environ-mental Quality (CEQ) was instructed to con-duct this study in consultation with the En-vironmental Protection Agency, the NationalAcademy of Sciences, other Federal agencies,and the Governors, legislators, and citizens ofthe coastal States involved. The Council heldpublic hearings, including hearings in citieson the Atlantic coast; established and metwith an advisory committee comprised ofrepresentatives of the Governors of the coastalStates; and consulted with representatives ofenvironmental groups and industry. ]
Development of the offshore petroleumresources of the Mid-Atlantic area was givenhigh priority by the executive branch in 1974.This change in status followed the oil embargoimposed in October 1973 by the Organizationof Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).Accelerated development of the OCS, includ-ing the Mid-Atlantic, was one of the policiesannounced by the Administration for lessen-
ing U.S. dependence upon foreign sources. 2
As initially announced, accelerated OCSdevelopment called for leasing 10 millionacres in a single year, an amount roughlyequal to all of the OCS land that had beenleased during the 21 previous years. On thebasis of its review of this decision, the GeneralAccounting Office (GAO) reported that thedecision to accelerate leasing was made “with-out carefully analyzing and consideringseveral factors and problems affecting thedecision’s soundness. “3 The GAO concludedthat the decision was hastily conceived by In-terior and based on overly optimistic assump-tions and inadequate data and that it wasreached without considering environmentalimpacts, national-regional supply-and-de-mand needs, or alternatives to large-scale ex-pansion of OCS leasing.
Despite the year-long CEQ study and theinvolvement of the State governments andcitizens, OTA found that most affected partiesin New Jersey and Delaware, including Stateand local officials, believe that the Ad-ministration’s 1974 move to acceleratedevelopment off the Mid-Atlantic coast wasmade without giving them an opportunity toparticipate. They were, in part, reacting to therealization that the decision to develop theBaltimore Canyon Trough already has hadsignificant social and political consequencesfor the States of New Jersey and Delaware andtheir coastal communities. They also werereacting to their dealings with the Departmentof the Interior in its role as manager of OCSresource development, Q experiences whichled them to believe that few Interior Depart-ment officials recognize the magnitude andsignificance of the impacts that petroleum ex-ploration and production may have on Mid-.Atlantic States and coastal communities.
ACTIVITIES TO DATESeismic Surveys
Since about 1960 there has been active in-terest on the part of many U.S. oil companiesin development of potential oil and gasresources on the Mid-Atlantic Outer Conti-nental Shelf. The first technology which wasdeployed by industry to explore for potentialdeposits was that of seismic surveys.
Seismic survey ships have beengridlines over the Baltimore Canyon
tracingTrough
periodically since the early 1960’s, usingpneumatic or propane gas guns to generatesound waves which penetrate the rock of thesea floor and register their return to the sur-face on hydrophores which are trailed behindthe survey ships. If petroleum exists in theBaltimore Canyon Trough, it is trapped inlayers of porous rock which have been createdover some 200 million years from soil, clay,and gravel which has washed to sea from the
Figure IV-3. Baltimore Canyon development activities by phase of development and by year
YEARS AFTER LEASING 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
ZERO RECOVERY ASSUMPTION
Geophysical (Seismic) Activity
Exploratory Drilling
MEDIAN RECOVERY ASSUMPTION
Geophysical (Seismic) Activity
Exploratory Drilling
Development Drilling
Product ion
Pipelines
Tank Farms
Gas Processing Plant Construction
Gas Processing Plant Operation
HIGH RECOVERY ASSUMPTION
Geophysical (Seismic) Activity
Exploratory Drilling
Development Drilling
Product ion
Pipelines
Tank Farms
Gas Processing Plant Construction
Gas Processing Plant Operation
I I 1 1 1 I l l 1 1 I I 8 1 1 I t 1 I 1 I I IFROM1960 V
o0
FROM1960 V
FROM1960 V
A
A
o❑
o●
o0
0●
a
o
0
0
0
0
0
1975 ‘ 1977 ‘ 1979 ‘ 1981 ‘ 1983 ‘ 1985 ‘ 1987 ‘ 1989 ‘ 1991 ‘ 1993 ‘ 1995 ‘ ‘NOTE MARKS FOR YEARS DESIGNATE THE BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR
KEY: A First Major Discovery; ● Peak of Production; v Lease Sale; Construction; Operation;
❑ Termination of Activity; Gas Processing Plant on LineSource Office of Technology Assessment
Appalachian highlands. 5 Because sound isreflected by different layers of rock throughwhich it travels, the records of the sound-waves returning to the survey ships can beprocessed by computers to give an interpretera detailed picture of the rock formations thesoundwaves have penetrated.
A seismic survey is a rough and indirectmeasure of petroleum resource potential in aregion and is most uncertain when it is usedin a frontier area that has never been drilledsuch as the Baltimore Canyon Trough,
If oil is discovered in the amounts projectedby geologists using seismic survey resultsthese ships will continue to operate until 1990,overlapping the start of exploration and pro-duction drilling in an effort to outline possibleareas where oil and natural gas might exist.Figure IV-3 summarizes the oil explorationand development activities that OTA has pro-jected between now and 1995.
Although crude, seismic data is used to in-dicate the size and extent of potential oilfields. For this reason, the unsuccessful at-tempts of New Jersey and Delaware to obtainseismic data from the Government have beena source of irritation for many officials. TheU.S. Geological Survey (USGS) itself has con-ducted some seismic surveys and the data,theoretically, could be transmitted to theStates. The USGS also has various kinds ofseismic data purchased or obtained from in-dustry as a requirement for permits forseismic surveying. These data, however, areproprietary information and are not availableto the States.
Delaware State Geologist Robert Jordantold OTA that, the States have been pushingUSGS, without success, to make so-called“public” information available more quickly.If the USGS surveys were made available tothe States 2 or 3 years in advance of a leasesale, he said, the States probably would haveadequate information about the OCS for plan-ning purposes.
Resource Estimates
It is common practice to use seismic surveydata, measurements of magnetic fields, gravityand subsea geology as well as various indica-tors of past trapping of hydrocarbon depositsto make judgments of potential resources in aregion. The oil industry invests substantiallyin surveys, data analysis, and expert judg-ments to make these estimates but does notpublish specific results.
Based on seismic and other proprietarygeophysical data, the U.S. Geological Surveyhas made several estimates of the resources inthe Baltimore Canyon Trough. These esti-mates have changed several times over thepast 2 years and even the methods of makingestimates have been debated among geologistsin industry and government.
The USGS resource estimates for theBaltimore Canyon Trough were reviseddownward by about 50 percent in the last 2years. The estimates are now given in terms ofprobabilities and ranges of possible discoveryand recovery. The present estimate for the me-dian of probable resource was announced formany OCS regions, including the BaltimoreCanyon Trough in May 1975. The estimatewas 1.8 billion barrels of oil and 5.3 trillioncubic feet of natural gas. 6 For the area which isbeing leased first, the USGS estimated in Sep-tember 1975 that recoverable resources couldrange from 0.4 to 1.4 billion barrels of oil andfrom 2.6 to 9.4 trillion cubic feet of naturalgas.
The continually changing nature of thesefigures indicates that they cannot be taken asany more than well-educated guesses aboutthe amount of undiscovered resources.
Interior Department Preparations
Since the announcement that the FederalGovernment would accelerate the process ofleasing Federal land on the Outer ContinentalShelf for petroleum development, the Depart-ment of the Interior (DOI) and the Bureau of
Figure IV-4. Potential energy supply provided by Baltimore Canyon oil and gas development
OIL PRODUCTIONMillion Barrels Per Day
4
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
1980 1985 1990 1995
GAS PRODUCTIONMillion Cubic Feet Per Day
1650
560
1980 1985 1990 1995
MEDIAN RECOVERY
HIGH ‘RECOVERY
Source U S Geological Survey resource estimates and Office of Technology Assessment development assumptions
Land Management (BLM)—Interior’s leasingagency—have been preparing and proceedingwith the many steps in the process. Leasing iscarried out by BLM under the present systempursuant to the OCS Lands Act of 1953. Acomplete description of the present system isgiven in a March 1976 report prepared by theCongressional Research Service titled Effects OfOffshore Oil and Natural Gas Development on theCoastal Zones. Proposed changes as given bySenate and House bills to amend the OCSLands Act are contained in Working Paper #lof this study. At present the Baltimore CanyonTrough region is one of more than a dozenOCS frontier areas now in the program for ac-celerated leasing which includes regions off
the shores of all coastal States. As of this writ-ing some of these areas have already beenleased (deep portions of the Gulf of Mexico,Southern California, eastern Gulf of Alaska,and the Baltimore Canyon).
The steps up to leasing include:●
●
●
●
Planning and estimating the potential ofa specific region;
Selecting a lease area from industry andgovernment-proposed targets;
Preparing of Environmental ImpactStatements and conducting environmen-tal studies;
Coordination of Coastal Zone Manage-
ment Programs and States’ concerns fordevelopment impacts; and
● Final decision to lease, announcement ofsale, and acceptance of bids from indus-try.
Although the Bureau of Land Management(BLM) had spent 2 years examining thepossibility of accelerating lease programsbefore the 1973 proposal for a 10-million acre
sale, they were not prepared for a suddenchange of that magnitude.
In 1972, the BLM’s OCS budget was$650,000 and 2 years before the Bureau hadonly nine staff members, some of them parttime, in Washington to deal with offshoreleases. 7 In the period since the accelerationprogram was announced, BLM has beenchronically short of staff, particularly ofspecialists in urban land use, industrial
Figure IV-5. Estimates of undiscovered recoverable oil and gas resources(a) U.S. offshore areas
AREA CRUDE OIL(b)
(Billions of barrels)
Water Depths of 0-200 metres I 95% 50/0 Statistical(includes state and Federal lands) Probability Probability Mean
1.
I 2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.
10.11.12.13.14.15.16.17.
North AtlanticMid-Atlantic ISouth AtlanticMAFLA (Eastern Gulf of Mexico)Central Gulf of Mexico} (g)
South TexasSouthern CaliforniaSanta Barbara ChannelNorthern CaliforniaWashington - OregonLower Cook InletGulf of Alaska (h)
Southern Aleutian ArcBristol Bay BasinBering SeaChukchi SeaBeaufort Sea
Water depths of 200-2500 metres ”)
(c) (e)
o000
2.0
0.40.6000.5000000
0
0
0.20.3
(d) (e)
2,54.61.32.7
6.4
2.13.00.80.72.44.70.22.47,0
14.57.6
(f)
0.91.80.31.0
3.8
1.11.50.40.21.21.50.10.72.26.43.3
4. MAFLA (Eastern Gulf of Mexico)5. Central Gulf of Mexico }(g)
6. South Texas }
7. Southern California8. Santa Barbara Channel
. . . . . - .— ---- . . ,. ., —--—— . . . ., .
1.3
1.9
2.92.1
0.5
0.9
1.20.9
—.——- .I NATURAL GAS
(Trillions of cubic feet)II 95% 5°70 StatisticalProbability Probability Mean
(c) (e) (d) (e) (f)
o
I o00
17.5
0.40.7001.0000000
13.114.22.52.8
93.0
2.13.30.81.74.5
14.00.55.3
15.038.819.3
4.45.30.71.0
49.0
1.11.70.40.32.45.80.11.65.7
19.88.8
0 1.2 0.3
0 19.3 8.7
0.2 2.9 1.2I 0.4 2.3 1.1L -. ..--. -—-----
a) For assessment of maxlmurn anticipated enwronmental Impact, use of the 50/. probability resource estimate IS suggested.‘b) Natural gas Ilqutds not included. Total U S NGL resources to 200 metres water depth are calculated to be 28 billion barrels, based upon statistical mean
estimates of undiscovered recoverable natural gas resources and an appropriate gas /oil ratio Information IS inadequate to warrant estimates for indlvidual areas(c) 19 in 20 chances that a? least the amount estimated IS present. An estimate of O indicates that there IS less than 95%. probability of Commercial quantities being
present Such estimates are made for frontier areas because the presence of 011 and/or gas has not yet been established by drilling(d) 1 in 20 chance that more than the amount estimated IS present(e) It IS statistically incorrect to sum either the 5°/0 or the 950/o probabtllty estimates for Indwldual areas to obtain totals for a region[f) Mean estimates for lndwldual areas maybe summed for regional or U S totals
[g) Estimates for these two areas combined[h) Includes Kodiak Tertiary Province[II Estimates Ilmlted to areas where development IS underway or Ieaslng IS planned {n the Immediate future
Source U S Geological Survey (estimates)
Figure IV-6. Simplified flow diagram showing operations necessary for discovery, production, and abandon-ment of an oil field
1. GEOPHYSiCAL EXPLORATION
r
I
I , I
2. EXPLORATORY DRILlNG DrillExploratory Well I
Quit Claim
I a
Hydrocarbons - - - - - - - - Lease Ho e Discovery andI Completion!
Updated- - - - - P - -Geophysical Work I
I
:t
IDrill Confirmation
~ EK3
-
DevelopmentDrilling
Development
‘ Program
Dry CompletionInject I Sale
I-A 4
3. DEVELOPMENT 1 .Provide Order and Install
Access to Oil Production Permits ContractFacilities
●I I I
4. PRODUCTION
Maintain and Install and Drill and
Expand Production Maintain Complete Well Produced WaterDevelopment Servicing Disposal Facilities
Facilities Artificial Liftb
1v i● 4 P 1
Remove Additional RemoveFacilities Recovery Projects Facilities
I
RemoveFacilities
I Abandon Field,
5. TERMINATION Remove Facilities,and Complete
Cleanup Operations
Comply with Section 102(2)(C) of National Environmental Policy Act if Federal lease requires preparation and approval of Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)NOTES: (1) Manpower requirements, while not detailed above, are substantial in all phases of the petroleum industry. All types are required, including technical,
skilled and common labor.(2) Not shown are requirements for permits and approvals by numerous Federal, State and local agencies throughout the Iife of the field.
Source National Petroleum Council
economics, and other skills and expertise re-quired for ana lyz ing coas ta l and o theronshore impacts in States like New Jersey andDelaware. 8 Efforts have been made to remedythis and, as of early 1976, BLM had fourregional offices and an OCS budget of $55million; however, it was still short of staff inthe specialty areas cited above.9
BLM officials were also unprepared for thereaction of Atlantic coastal States to the 1973accelerated leasing proposal despite the reac-tions they had observed following events likethe 1969 Santa Barbara blowout. Most of theleasing experience of BLM officials was basedon development in the Gulf of Mexico, whichhad taken place during a time when attitudesand the social context were quite differentthan they were in 1974.
Frank A. Edwards, Assistant Deputy Direc-tor of Minerals and Management, BLM, said inan interview with OTA on January 30, 1976,that the Bureau “had total agreement and un-derstanding with Texas and Louisiana. Theywere pro- oil and -gas and we just didn’t real-ize at first that the other States would be sodifferent. We didn’t realize it would be so cru-cial to educate them and coordinate withthem. ”
William R. Moffat, former Director ofPolicy Analysis for the Interior Department,said in an interview on January 29, 1976, thatthe Department “had been operating in abenign environment in the Gulf. Louisianaand Texas didn’t really care what we did outthere. The whole ethos was different. Theyconsidered it a waste of time when we tried tocoordinate with them. So, at the time, it wasnot obvious to anybody that we were in awhole new ball game. ”
But, State and local officials in the Mid-Atlantic States responded to the leasing pro-posal more like Californians responding toSanta Barbara than like the people of Loui-siana responding to similar accidents in theGulf. The Mid-Atlantic States were less recep-
7 ( 1 j,{ ( ) - 71, . )()
~D•Œ j ( ‘ ‘ \ I ) \ t I 1
tive to proposals to produce oil and naturalgas off their coasts and were skeptical ofassurances that the development would notdisrupt existing patterns of life and land use.
Except for its Gulf of Mexico experience,BLM’s background as a manager of publicresources came from managing Federalmineral, timber, and grazing rights on some450 million acres of land, mostly in theWestern States and in Alaska, This back-ground had not prepared it to meet the newchallenges posed by the accelerated leasingprogram.
To obtain more people with the requiredskills, BLM has generally had to look outsidethe agency. This, in turn, has lengthened leadtimes both in terms of staffing and in terms ofacquainting new staff members with Bureauactivities. One result was that the New YorkCity office, which was set up November 26,1973, and drafted the Environmental ImpactStatement for the Mid-Atlantic lease sale, stillwas short of its full requirement for profes-sional staff members by 10 positions in Marchof 1976.10
The rush of events set in motion by the pro-posal to accelerate lease sales meant that BLMwas playing “catch-up” during most of 1974and 1975.
The net effect of BLM’s experience and per-sonnel limitations was to leave it ill-equippedto coordinate offshore development withStates such as New Jersey and Delaware. In aneffort to overcome these limitations and todeal with State concerns, the Assistant Secre-tary of Interior for Program Development andBudget was designated the OCS policy coor-dinator. Although State officials told OTA thatthe effort improved the flow of informationfrom Interior, BLM officials said the arrange-ment did not always work well, partly becauselines of communication between BLM and theOCS coordinator sometimes broke down.11
One such case involved an assurance by theOCS coordinator that State officials could
review sections of the Environmental Impact offshore equipment and operations and en-Statement in advance of its publication. forces those regulations. The regulations haveBecause of standing orders within BLM, which been, and continue to be, more concernedwere not rescinded after the assurance from with specific items of equipment than withthe OCS policy office, State officials were also relationships between the equipment and theadvised that they could review sections of the total oil and gas development system.statement, but only in the New York office of During the 14 months ending January 1976,BLM and only during certain hours of the day. the former Assistant Secretary for Program
It was only after considerable complaining Development and Budget, Royston S. Hughes,that changes were made in the BLM order and was responsible for coordination of OCS ac-State officials were given easier access to infor- tivities at the Interior Department. It was anmation as it was being assembled. The misun - assignment he combined with managing thederstanding eventually led to the adoption of Department’s budget, supervising policyinternal guidelines for contact with the States planning and analysis, doing economicthrough the EIS process at Interior. analysis of Department programs, and dealing
The resulting guidelines, Instructional with environmental and natural resourceMemorandum No. 76, dealing with “Contacts policy issues.with State governments through the OCS leas-ing process, ” requires that States be contactedto attend meetings during which activities liketentative tract selection are discussed, to par-ticipate in preparation of the EIS, and toreview preliminary drafts of the EIS. Otherprocedures require that the States be informedof the EIS contents where appropriate, and ad-vised of such activities as announcement oftentative tract selection, release of draft andfinal EIS, and notice of sale.
Line responsibility for OCS activities at In-terior is divided between two bureaus, both ofwhich have a wide range of other activitiesthat overshadow their OCS responsibilities interms of manpower and budget. The Bureau ofLand Management is the lead agency indeveloping leasing programs and grantingrights to offshore exploration and develop-ment. Once leases are signed, responsibilityfor supervising offshore activities passes tothe U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), which isprimarily a scientific agency with a limitedregulatory role. The USGS is also responsiblefor topographic mapping, monitoring ofdomestic water resources, and locating andestimating the extent of deposits of allminerals under both public and private lands.The USGS drafts technical regulations for
Officials in New Jersey and Delaware and atthe Interior Department said that Hughes’departure to join the White House staff dis-rupted progress toward opening a line of com-munications through which substantive issuescould be argued to conclusion. State officialsalso insisted that the lines of communicationdepended on Hughes being in the position heheld, not on the way in which Interior wasorganized to deal with the States. 12
Despite the fact that the program to leasetracts off the Mid-Atlantic coast had movedthrough several crucial phases, the position ofthe OCS staff director was vacant from Sep-tember, 1975 to March 1, 1976, when AlanPowers was hired to replace Darius Gaskins,who had returned to academic life. The posi-tion of OCS Coordinator/Assistant Secretarywas vacant from the time of Hughes’ resigna-tion until May 21, 1976, when Ronald Cole-man was confirmed to replace him. In the in-terim, the Deputy Assistant Secretary forProgram Development and Budget, Stanley D.Doremus, acted as coordinator.
A plan for reorganizing the OCS offices wascompleted early in 1976 for consideration bythe Secretary of the Interior. 13
In general, it called for the Assistant Secre-
tary for Program Development and Budget tocontinue combining OCS coordination withhis other responsibilities. In addition, the plancalled for a fulltime OCS director who wouldreport to the assistant secretary. The officewould be responsible for analyzing OCSpolicies, assuring the participation of States indecisions, resolving differences among In-terior officials who have line responsibility foroffshore oil development, and coordinatingstudies involving OCS activities.
The plan would not change line respon-sibility for any aspect of offshore oil develop-ment. It contained no recommendations as tothe size of staff required to coordinate offshoredevelopment. The plan, in effect, continuedthe structure that existed before AssistantSecretary Hughes left Interior.
Based on experience of the 2 years since theAdministration adopted a policy of acceler-ated offshore oil development and because offragmented responsibility and lack of a singleleader, the present structure probably will notbe adequate to solve the problems of coor-dination with other Federal agencies and withthe coastal States. These problems will inten-sify when offshore development begins in theMid-Atlantic.
Selection of the Lease Area
For administrative purposes, the OuterContinental Shelf is divided into a chessboardpattern of tracts each containing a maximumof 5,760 acres or 9 square miles. Oil companiesbid for leases by tract rather than by oil-bear-ing structures.
On March 25, 1975, the Bureau of LandManagement, which acts as agent for the In-terior Department in lease sales, called fornominations by the oil industry of tracts itwould like to have offered for leases. Oil com-panies designated 557 tracts covering 3.1million acres of the Outer Continental Shelf—about ha 1 f of the Trough area which runsroughly parallel to the Atlantic coast for 150
miles between New York and the north coastof Virginia, 14
In August 1975, BLM selected 154 tractscovering 876,750 acres from among thosenominated and tentatively scheduled a sale ofleases for the tracts for May 1976. (See figureIV-7.) Some of the 557 tracts nominated by oilcompanies were eliminated because of con-cerns among commercial fishermen that oiloperations would interfere with their ac-tivities. In other cases, BLM gave no reason forwithdrawing nominated tracts from the leasesale. 15
The final decision to hold the Mid-AtlanticLease Sale #40 was made by Secretary of theInterior Thomas Kleppe late in June and thesale was finally held on August 17 in NewYork City.
Environmental Impact Statements
The most comprehensive packages of infor-mation which were provided to the Statesprior to the sale were the environmental im-pact statements (EIS) on the Baltimore Can-yon Trough Lease Sale #40. The environ-mental impact statement is required by theNational Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)for any Federal action that may have a “sig-nificant” effect on the environment.
Preparation of the document was largelythe responsibility of the regional BLM office inNew York. But staffing problems at the NewYork City office forced BLM to choose in early1975 between meeting a deadline for the draftEIS and taking time to do research on coastalimpacts at the county and local rather than theState level. BLM officials chose to rely on sec-ondary data for such important data as touristincome to Cape May County and other NewJersey coastal areas. Although Interior claimed
that contractor-prepared data was used foroverall consistency among the tourist areas, inthe case of Cape May County, the decisionresulted in a basic conflict between the draftimpact statement’s assessment that annual
Figure IV-7. Baltimore Canyon Trough lease sale area
.
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment and U S Department of the Interior
tourist receipts for the County were $33million and County records that showed thereceipts as $120 million.16 After protests byCape May County and the State of New Jersey,tourist income figures were revised in thefinal EIS to reflect the county’s tabulation.
The draft EIS was issued December 10,1975, and circulated for comments by Federal,State, and local agencies. Public hearings wereheld January 27–30, 1976, in Atlantic City,N.J., and the final impact statement wasreleased May 26, 1976.
Both impact statements were preparedwithout benefit of recent updated guidelinesor regulations as to content. The only applica-ble guidelines for preparation of EIS in In-terior are contained in two manuals and an in-structional memorandum. Neither manual ismore recent than 1972.17 No recent manualsimplementing CEQ guidelines of 1973 havebeen issued, although BLM did say that arevised manual is currently in preparation.18
The environmental impact statement is sup-posed to guide the Secretary on the question ofwhether a lease sale should be held and whichtracts should be leased after consideration ofthe proposed action, the consequences of thataction, and the alternatives.
But State officials and some participants inthe OTA public participation program ex-pressed doubt that the impact statement forthe Mid-Atlantic was adequate for that pur-pose.
The declared intent by BLM to “lease in allfrontier areas by 1978,” including the Mid-Atlantic, has led to an impression among NewJersey and Delaware officials that the EISprocess was a procedural requirement unre-lated to the actual leasing decision. 19
Predicting the environmental consequencesof any proposed action must, of necessity, in-volve some uncertainties and some guess-work. In the case of OCS development, someof the most specific and significant impacts
cannot be predicted before exploratory drill-ing produces information on the quantity andlocation of OCS oil and gas. Despite theselimitations, pre-lease environmental impactstatements can be made more responsive toState needs by requiring that the EIS containdetails of alternative “exploration plans, ” in-cluding possible locations of onshore supportfacilities for exploration, complete sets of OCSorders and lease stipulations covering specificgeographic regions. To insure that the EIScontains as much useful information as possi-ble, BLM could be required to solicit—in ad-vance of preparation of the EIS—written com-ments by affected States on information theywish to have developed and included. JointFederal-State preparation of the EIS also couldavoid some of the difficulties encountered inthe Mid-Atlantic statement where States andlocalities found that information about theirareas was either inaccurate or missing. An ad-ditional requirement could be imposed thatwould call for the draft EIS to be submitted tothe affected States well before it is released,with release conditional upon State agreementthat the draft contains accurate and relevantinformation about the States.
The basic decision as to whether an impactstatement will be written is left to the Federalagency initiating the “major Federal action. ”There are only departmental guidelines onwhat constitutes a “major Federal action” forpurposes of NEPA, and Interior officials con-cede that ultimately the decision on whether astatement is required is “a judgmental one”made by “responsible Federal officials. ''20 I nthe case of OCS activities, Interior has deter-mined that the major action is the decision tolease and prepares impact statements at thatstage. Subsequent stages, such as explorationor development of the leases, are not con-sidered major actions and separate impactstudies are not made.
Presently, the State role with regard toNEPA procedures-consisting primarily ofwritten comments and oral testimony on the
draft EIS—is, at best, that of commentator. The Bureau of Land Management presentlyState comments on an EIS are not binding on a conducts an environmental studies programSecretary of the Interior when he is deciding in OCS regions under a general mandate towhether to hold an OCS lease sale that would collect environmental baseline data and moni -affect coastal States. State recourse to the tor environmental changes in offshore areascourts is purely procedural. A State can pre- under development. Prior to initiating thesevail temporarily, and thus delay a lease sale, if studies, BLM determines the kinds andit can argue successfully that the Interior amounts of data needed in each OCS leaseDepartment has not fulfilled the obligations of area, usually after consulting State and localthe Act, but it cannot reverse a decision on the groups and the OCS Environmental Advisorymerits of its case.
States question whether the timing or thecontents of recent EISs qualify as decision-making tools for the Secretary rather than asjustifications for his decisions.
The National Environmental Policy Actgives the States 30 days to comment on thefinal EIS but Secretary Kleppe announced hisdecision to hold Lease Sale #40 Only 21 daysafter the final statement for the Mid-Atlanticwas released and without waiting for all thecomments to come in.
Environmental and Other Studies
The EIS is supposed to guide the Secretaryon the question of whether a lease sale shouldbe held and which tracts should be leased. Butit can do that only if it contains someminimum information gathered throughbaseline studies which are completed beforethe EIS is written. Without such data a Secre-tary cannot decide which offshore andonshore areas are environmentally sensitiveor are otherwise not suitable for drilling or forsiting of exploratory support facilities.However, the environmental baseline studyfor the Mid-Atlantic area will not even becompleted until February 1977—nearly 6months after the lease sale.
Committee and holding planning conferencesand workshops to design the studies. BLMusually contracts with private or universitygroups for the studies or, in some cases, dele-gates the work to the Commerce Department’sNational Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration .22
NOAA is presently conducting a broadrange of environmental studies for BLM. Inthe Mid-Atlantic, the Virginia Institute ofMarine Science is under contract to BLM toconduct an offshore baseline study only. In allcases, lease sales are planned before any datafrom these studies are available and, therefore,the timing of the studies has been severely crit-icized.23 It is evident that the environmentalstudies to date are useful neither for the EISprocess or to affect a leasing decision becausethey are not completed in time to be used. Italso is not clear whether later OCS manage-ment decisions could or would be affected bydata from environmental studies. Certainlythere is no firm requirement to utilize thedata. Interior has even opposed legislationwhich would give it the power to cancel leasesif serious environmental problems were iden-tified by the studies.
Presumably, a monitoring program in anOCS region where oil is being produced may
Baseline studies are intended to provide in- detect adverse environmental impacts.formation about the existing chemical and However, no formal procedures exist forphysical state of waters before oil operations using monitoring data to regulate productionbegin so that monitoring in later years can activities. Some State representatives claimprovide scientists with data to use to deter- that a formal method to tie environmentalmine whether changes in marine-life patterns studies to management decisions is needed.are associated with oil production.21 Others claim that too much effort is being
spent on these studies, that a minimum of crit- ments and agencies could be involved inical baseline and monitoring data is needed at answering the questions. This action couldleasing time, and that only after a discovery is further undermine State confidence in themade should environmental studies receive seriousness of the Federal Government’s at-serious attention .24 tempt to assist them in planning for OCS
BLM also handles or regulates the collection development.
and dissemination of other types of informa - According to Interior staff members, the listtion in addition to that gathered in baseline of data needs identified by the BLM/OCZMstudies and environmental monitoring. survey will be distributed to all agencies with
One example is a contract for a comparisonof costs and benefits of oil development as itrelates to coastal areas. This contract was sentout for bids in February 1976, nearly a yearafter the call for nomination of tracts for leas-ing, despite the fact that the States had beenexpressing concern for more than 2 years thatthey might have to underwrite part of thecosts of offshore development by providingnew roads, new schools, and other publicservice to support an increase in population. 25
Deadline for completion of the contract—assuming the deadline will be met—is June1977, by which time exploratory drillingprobably will be underway off New Jerseyand Delaware.
Interior has explained the discrepancy intiming by saying that the study is not intendedto turn out information that will be useful tothe Mid-Atlantic. Rather, according to staffmembers in the office of the OCS Coordinator,it is intended to use the Mid-Atlantic as amodel for developing a system of predictingcosts and benefits for other frontier areas.26
In another effort to collect and distributedata, the Bureau of Land Management and theOffice of Coastal Zone Management planned aseries of field trips to coastal States in early1976 to ask State officials what informationthey required to begin planning to cope withthe onshore impacts of offshore oil andnatural gas development.
However, no plans were made to guaranteethat studies and analysis would be initiated toanswer the questions which the States might
potential interest or responsibility in the OCSand coastal zone so that each agency can dealwith the problems in its own way. In a finalreport, BLM will identify needs that are com -mon to all States, needs that are common toeach leasing region, and needs that are specificto certain States. This report, which will bedistributed to the States and Congress as wellas the agencies, is expected in late 1975.27
In interviews, Federal officials haveemphasized the long lead-time involved inoffshore development and said that they feltthat the States were operating under a misap -prehension that offshore development wouldoccur suddenly. In fact, they said, platformsprobably could not be installed off the NewJersey and Delaware coast before 1980 anddevelopment of the Baltimore Canyon Troughwould be drawn out over a period of 20 years.or more.
There is one aspect of the pattern ofdevelopment, however, that could compressthe lead times for offshore development. Oilcompanies contract with independent servicecompanies for most of the goods and servicesinvolved in exploratory and production drill-ing. Some service companies would establishoperations on the East Coast at the onset of ex-ploration drilling, which could begin early in1977. Service companies tend to cluster in thesame area so that the first of these companiesto establish an east coast base might very we]]make a long-lasting decision about the loca-tion of staging areas and other supportfacilities before either New Jersey or Delawarehad completed a coastal zone management
pose to the joint teams since many depart- plan.
Coastal Zone Management
With the passage of the Coastal ZoneManagement Act of 1972, the 30 States eligiblefor funds under the CZM program gained apotential lever in their efforts to influence In-terior Department policies. At present,however, the emphasis must be on the word“potential,” because the key section of theCoastal Zone Management Act—the so-called“Federal consistency provision’ ’—has yet tobecome effective.
The Act made funds available to coastalStates and territories to develop coastal zonemanagement programs. The Act containsbroad guidelines for developing suchprograms, but leaves a large degree of flex-ibility to the States to meet their particularneeds. While participation is voluntary, all 30coastal States and three of four eligible territo-ries have chosen to participate.
On completion of a coastal managementprogram, a State submits its program to theSecretary of Commerce who approves or dis-approves the program, depending on hisjudgment as to whether it meets legislative re-quirements. If the Secretary approves a State’sprogram, the State becomes eligible to receivefunds for the implementation and administra-tion of its program, The approval of a Stateprogram also triggers the “Federal consisten-cy” provision.
That provision, found in Section 307 of theAct, reads, in part, as follows:
After final approval by the Secretary ofa State’s management program, any ap-plication for a required Federal licenseor permit to conduct an activity affect-ing land or water uses in the coastalzone of that State shall provide in theapplication to the licensing or permit-ting agency a certification that the pro-posed activity complies with the State’sapproved program and that such ac-tivity will be conducted in a mannerconsistent with the program. At the
same time, the applicant shall furnish tothe State or its designated agency a copyof the certification, with all necessary in-formation and data. . . . At the earliestpracticable time, the State or its desig-nated agency shall notify the Federalagency concerned that the State concurswith or objects to the applicant’s cer-tification. . . . No license or permit shallbe granted by the Federal agency untilthe State or its designated agency hasconcurred with the applicant’s certifica-tion or until, by the State’s failure toact, the concurrence is conclusivelyp r e s u m e d , unless the Secre-tary . . . finds . . . that the activity is con-sistent with the objectives of this title oris otherwise necessary in the interest ofnational security. (Emphasis added. )
During the summer of 1976, the Office ofCoastal Zone Management (OCZM) drew upa draft of regulations for implementing theFederal consistency policy.
The philosophy behind the regulations cen-ters on the mutual “cooperation” and “in-volvement” of Federal and State agencies andis summed up in the draft:
. . . the consistency provisions are depen-dent upon the continuing cooperative,participatory and reasoned interaction ofthe coastal States and relevant Federalagencies set forth throughout the Act andhighlighted in its legislative history. Thisone aspect of the many implementary ac-tivities States will undertake, will requirethe closest possible one-to-one involve-ment of the State and Federal com-munity. The Secretary, and through him,NOAA and OCZM, will maintainresponsibility for prudent administrationof the Act and assuring that the views ofthe Federal agencies and the States arebalanced within the framework of na-tional CZM policies. In addition to its‘good offices,’ NOAA will also utilize its
responsibility to evaluate the continuingperformance of the States and its report-ing responsibilities to the President andthe Congress to assist in achieving the in-tergovernmental goals embodied in theAct and its consistency provisions.
The draft regulations also set up proceduresfor maintaining consistency of Federal proj-ects, licenses, and permits with State coastalzone management programs. In the case ofconflicts which cannot be resolved by the Stateand Federal agencies involved and the OCZM,the Secretary of Commerce makes final deci-sions “guided ‘by a presumption of validity ofthe State agency’s position except to the extentthat the (Federal) applicant makes out a casefor the proposed activity being either consistentwith the purposes of the Act or necessary in theinterest of national security or both. ”
The Office of Coastal Zone Management hasnot finally defined “national interest” but hassuggested that States meet the requirement forconsidering national interest by developing apolicy statement concerning the national in-terest in their coastal zone.
The Secretary’s decision on whether theFederal action shall be allowed is final, exceptthat he is bound to report to the President andCongress on all activities and projects whichare not consistent with an approved Statemanagement program.
There is some uncertainty about just howmuch leverage the Federal consistency provi-sion would give a State over OCS-related ac-tivity. It is clear that having an approvedcoastal zone management program wouldgive the State an additional vehicle for in-fluencing the location of those onshore andnearshore facilities, such as pipelines, whichrequire a Federal permit. However, becausethe State’s objection to a proposed Federal ac-tion can be overturned by the Secretary ofCommerce, Federal consistency does not pro-vide an absolute veto over actions the Statedeems undesirable. Despite that limitation,
the existence of the provision and the poten-tial for delay that it gives a State should give acompany seeking a permit, the permittingagency, and the Secretary of Commerce an in-centive to work together to insure that Stateconcerns are taken into account before anydecisions about the location of facilities aremade.
While the general relevance of the CoastalZone Management Act to onshore andnearshore OCS-related facilities is clear, onlyunder 1976 amendments to the Act was itspecified that each Federal lease had to be sub-mitted to each State with an approved coastalzone management program to determinewhether the lease is consistent with the Stateprogram. The amendment specifically appliesthe consistency requirement to the basic stepsin the OCS leasing process-exploration,development, and production—in an attemptto satisfy State needs for complete informa-tion, on a timely basis, about the details of theoil industry’s offshore plans.
While the amendments give the States animportant new point of access to the OCSdecision process, they also will expedite OCSoil and gas development by specifying thatonce a lease is certified as consistent all in-dividual activities described in detail in theleasing information submitted to the Statesalso will be presumed consistent.
The leverage created by the “Federal consist-ency” provision is only potential at this timebecause no State has received approval for acoastal zone management program. In fact,the applicability of Federal consistency to OCSleasing was moot as far as New Jersey andDelaware was concerned because neither Statehad an approved management program at thetime of the lease sale. Approved programs inboth States are not expected until early 1977.
Grants to Delaware for coastal zone plan-ning as of July 31, 1976, totaled $511,666, ofwhich $102,000 was a supplemental grant tobe used for work related to OCS development.
New Jersey grants total $1,082,750, including$377,000 in supplemental funds to be used bycounty planning offices to finance studies andplanning for offshore development on aregional and more detailed scale than will bedone by the State coastal zone planning office.
The 1976 amendments also intensify Stateneeds for data about OCS activities and ex-pected impacts because the amendments re-quire that States plan for possible location ofenergy facilities in the coastal zone. Theamendments also require that States show thatthey will be affected by energy facilities inorder to qualify for planning grants and loansunder the Act.
The Office of Coastal Zone Management(OCZM) could have a significant impact onoffshore energy development when Statesbegin to complete coastal zone plans. TheOffice has had a relatively minor role inoffshore energy development to date. Thiscould change when New Jersey and Delawaresubmit final plans and the Office- must makejudgments about whether the plans makesufficient allowance for coastal zone activitiesthat are in the “national interest” andwhether, in turn, Federal activities in coastalzones are “consistent” with State plans.
State officials have expressed a hope thatonce coastal plans are completed the Office ofCoastal Zone Management would- function asa clearinghouse for Federal activities andplans to help States sort out various Federalprograms with coastal implications. They alsohave said they hope that once coastal plans arecompleted OCZM will assert authority toforce coordination among Federal programsthat involve coastlines.
With the passage of the 1976 amendmentsto the Coastal Zone Management Act, givingOCZM an additional $1.2 billion for grantsand loans to coastal States, Congress has addi-tional criteria for determining whether OCZMis adequately asserting its role as coordinator.
State Views.
The list of specific grievances which Stateofficials say arise from existing laws and prac-tices is long. For example:
●
●
●
A decision was made within the Bureauof Land Management in January topostpone the sale of Mid-Atlantic OCSleases from May 1976 to August or later.State officials had not been advised of thedecision as late as March, although thedecision was common knowledge amongState officials as a result of informal dis-cussions with BLM personnel.
The Interior Department has refused toshare seismic data with State officials onthe ground that it is proprietary informa-tion. State officials could purchase thedata from individual seismic survey com-panies and pay geologists to interpret thedata to give the States early warningabout the possible location of major ex-ploration activities and, in turn, aboutspecific areas of coastal impact. 2 8
Delaware officials were told by the Officeof Coastal Zone Management that theycould use Federal grants to pay for thedata and interpretation which the In-terior Department declines to share withthem.29 As of August 1, the State hadspent nearly $27,000 acquiring seismicdata.
The State of New Jersey proposed that thetask of preparing an environmental im-pact statement be handled by the affectedcoastal States under contract to the In-terior Department. The Interior Depart-ment said such an arrangement was notpossible, but the Council on Environ-mental Quality advised OTA that itwould be acceptable for the InteriorDepartment to contract with a coastalState for data and informational supportfor Interior preparation of an EIS, includ-ing a State-oriented analysis of environ-mental impacts.
. State officials complain that there hasbeen no single person or office within theInterior Department to which they couldturn for answers to important questionsabout OCS development.
. They also say they have been forced toargue their right to information thatshould have been offered freely.
Ž State and county planners said that theyhad invested both money and manpowerin gathering data to aid in assessing po-tential impacts of offshore energydevelopment but that the draft EIS didnot reflect the data that was forwarded tothe Bureau of Land Management.
. Information which was supplied to theBureau of Land Management about theimportance of the tourist industry wasnot used in the environmental impactstatement on the proposed Lease Sale#40 and was, in fact, replaced by inaccu-rate data which was obtained from othersources. 30
. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of1953 does not provide for State involve-ment in offshore energy developmentdecisions and the States claim that the In-terior Department has stuck to the letterof the law.
. Some State officials feel Congress hasmissed the mark in efforts to provideState access to the offshore energy proc-ess. One State geologist said “The pro-posed legislation seems to want to shakeup the system almost in a punitivefashion . . . but the States still wouldstand somewhat on the outside. Havingmore power pulled into Congresswouldn’t help the States. ”
Under the present system, there are severalstages in the process where a form of Stateparticipation is possible but not required. In a“fact sheet” dated December 1975, the Bureauof Land Management listed eight steps in the
process (environmental study program,development of OCS orders, call for nomina-tions, tract selection, draft of EnvironmentalImpact Statement, public hearings and com-ments, decision by the Secretary, review ofdevelopment plan) at which they note thatthere is “public participation. ”31 The Statesparticipate at each of these stages by threebasic methods: (1) serving on advisory bodies(e.g., the OCS Research Management Adviso-ry Board); (2) reviewing and commenting onvarious documents (draft impact statement,development plan); (3) being “consulted”before various actions are taken (e.g., tractselection and offer of tracts for sale).
The BLM has instituted some changes in thepast year “in an attempt to meet concerns ex-pressed by the public and the States to im-prove the leasing program. ”32 Included in thechanges are provisions for State participationin the preparation of the final environmentalimpact statement and operating orders forleases off their shores. Interior has also issueda ban on joint bidding among major oil com-panies, cooperated with the States in securingaccess to proprietary geologic data from astratigraphic test program for the Mid-Atlan-tic (although Interior officials told OTA theywill not push industry to make similar infor-mation available in all cases), modified thebidding system, and proposed legislation for aloan program to deal with State needs forfront-end money and a comprehensive oilspill liability and compensation plan.
- Congress also is dealing with several piecesof legislation which will alter the processes in-volved in offshore leasing and development ofoil and gas resources; establish ground rulesfor liability for oil spill damage; and placesome aspects of energy development withinthe realm of the Coastal Zone ManagementAct of 1972.
No legislation, however, addresses theproblems which the States view as mostserious—problems that arise, by and large,
from the way in which Federal-State relation-ships in OCS matters are now structured. Stateofficials feel that they have no power tonegotiate in a serious way decisions that affecttheir responsibility to State residents both to
FUTURE ACTIVITIESLease Sale
The lease sale for the Mid-Atlantic frontierwas held on August 17, 1976, in New YorkCity while legislation dealing with the systemfor leasing and developing the potential oiland gas fields was pending in Congress.
Several U.S. Senators and Representativesasked Secretary of the Interior Thomas Kleppeto delay the lease sale until after pending
minimize harmful impacts that might resultfrom OCS development and to assure suppliesof energy that meetdents generally andticular.
amendments to thelaw.
Kleppe responded
the needs of State resi -State industries in par-
(3CS Lands Act became
that he felt “it would n o tbe in the national interest” to delay because legislation h a d n o t y e t b e e n e n a c t e d a n dsignd into law by the President and i t wasnot clear that it W Ould be.
Figure IV-8. OCS leasing procedures: information flow into decision points— . . . .
Regional Resource4
Potential Evaluation 1; (G. S.) Area Selection ●
*Including tI Preparation
Summary Call for
i ~ Nominations● of a 5-Year
Geologic
I Regional Environmental Federal Area ScheduleReport (BLM)
1 Assessment and Hazard ~ Selection ~ (G. S.) \I EvaluationI 4 t . .1 (G. S.)
,i Federal Tract
Selection(G.S, & BLM)
●
I Tract EnvironmentalEnvironmental Base Line
~I Assessment Studies
/(G. S.) (Interagency)
* Ic
I
* +
I Final EIS
I
Program DecisionOption Document
1 i#
Noticeof Sale(BLM)
ITract
Evaluation(G. S.)
1!
1 Sale Post Sale :Activities
(G. S.)
Source” Draft Environmental Impact Statement Proposed Geological Geophysical Expiration, Department of the Interior, May 1975
Figure IV-9. Proposed OCS planning schedule (June 1975)
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n
z
0U.2
a
a
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z
0m
u
u
o
.+ -I
I
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. . . -—
Source U S Department of the Interior
Figure IV-10. Ongoing activities in U.S. offshore areas
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u
1 5 L - -
12 \
‘\ ,
/ I I
4
Blake Plateau Trouah
G u l f o f \ :~;t:ja;
‘ex’co 1 WesternCal i forn ia Border landsSanta Barbara Channel
Santa Maria Basin
Georges Bank Trough 1Bal t imore Canyon Trough 2
Cape Fear Arch 3S.E. Georgia Embayment 4
56
8901
Santa Cruz Basin 12Arena Bodega Basin 13
Eel River Basin 14Astoria Basin 15
Olympic Basin 16Gulf of Alaska 17
Kodiak Shelf 17Aleutian Shelf 19
Lower Cook Inlet 20Bristol Basin 21
St. George Basin 22Bering Shelf 23
St. Matthew Basin 24Norton Basin 25
Hope Basin 26Arctic Offshore Basin 27
Beaufort Basin 28
Source Shell 011 Company
1.
‘7A .
on the quantity and location of oil and gas thatmay be discovered:.
● Exploratory drilling of the most likelyprospects for discoveries;
● Planning of production facilities for anyfields located;
● Further development and delineation ofoil or gas fields to determine actual pro-duct ion potential;
● Construction and installation of produc-tion platforms, pipelines to shore, andother offshore production facilities;
● Construction of shore facilities for proc-essing, transporting, or utilizing any oilor gas produced;
● During all steps above—provision ofoffshore and onshore support: ships’personnel and equipment;
. Actual production of oil and gas for-periods up to 20–30 years thereafter.
Many government and industry projectionshave been made of the number of drilling rigs,support equipment, personnel, and facilitiesthat might be developed after a lease sale in theBaltimore Canyon Trough. DUring this assess-ment OTA projected certain deployment pat-terns for the New Jersey and Delaware studyregion. While some of the projections differed.from previous ones by industry or govern-men t agencies, the differences given weresmall compared with the great uncertaintiesassociated with the oil exploration and pro -duction business.
The following sections dealing with futuretechnology deployment and possible impactsare based on some major assumptions stem -ming from these OTA projections, as follows:
● Exploratory drilling W ill start bym id -1977.
● Total potential oil reserves in theBaltimore Canyon Trough range from a
●
●
●
median of 1.8 billion barrels to a high of4.6 billion barrels.
Total potential gas reserves in theBaltimore Canyon Trough range from amedian of 5.3 trillion cubic feet to a highof 14.2 trillion cubic feet.
There is a one in twenty chance that nooil or gas in commercial quantities will bediscovered.
Given the above, OTA has, in turn, madeassumptions about production levels, rigdeployment, employment, and land use.
These assumptions are shown in figure1 V -11.
Exploration and Its Impacts
A final period of intensive seismic survey-ing probably would follow the signing Of the.first leases in the Baltimore Canyon Trough,after which exploratory drilling rigs wouldmove onto station and begin drilling, proba -bly within 6 months of the lease sale.
Based on current practice, industry proba -bly would first move three rigs to the bestlease prospects. If early exploration providedevidence that oil resources i n the area werelarge, the number of exploratory rigs on sta-t ion could grow to 10 during the first phase.
EXPLORATORY RIGS
Three classes of exploratory rigs, which areself-contained drilling platforms designed tobe moved from area to area in an offshoredevelopmen t field, could be used in theBaltimore Canyon Trough area. They are drillships, jack-up rigs, and semi-submersible rigs.
Jack-up rigs are large, complex platforms-up to 300 feet on a side-containing drillingequipment, crew quarters, and storage. Theyare support by massive steel legs that arelowered to the ocean floor and then used tojack the rig decks up 50 to 60 feet above the seasurface.
Semi-submersible rigs are similiar large
platforms }~h ich arc supported bV steel legs
that arc mounted on submerged pontoons.When operational, the pontoons float beIow~the sea surface and the legs extend throu~h thesurface to hold the platform 50 to 60 ttwt.II.X)IC the water. They arc usua]ly moored tothe sea floor \\’ith large anchors.
Drill ships contain the same equipment,quarters, and supplies as semi-submersiblesarranged instead aboard a I a r~e ship, t h LISproviding selt-propulsion Capclbilit]r.
The ,lrri\’al of exploratory rigs tvould start
in operation a svstem of support that wouldexpand as the field was developed.
The rigs normally carry a crew of more than100 persons who work 12-hour shifts for 7 to14 days. Such a syrstem requires about 217people, including some shore supert~isors. Ifexist ing practice were followed, mot-e thanhalf of the crews of exploratory rigs \voLIldreturn to the G u 1 f o f Mexico area Lt’ hen the~~were on leave. In addition, a large shore andworkboat support force L\’ould be requ i red,reach ing a total of about 26[1 ~~orkers for 10exploratory rigs.
Figure IV-11. OTA assumptions for oil and gas development in Baltimore Canyon Trough at peak production ofmedian- and high-recovery projections (reached about 1992)
OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION
Oil Production (in millionbarrels per day)
Gas Production (in millioncubic feet per day)
DRILLING RIG DEPLOYMENT
ZeroDiscovery
Exploration Rigs(from star t to
peak) 3Production Rigs(peak level) o
Production Wells(peak level) o
MedianRecovery
313,000
844
MedianRecovery
3-5
25
600
HighRecovery
650,000
1,933
HighRecovery
3-1o
52
1,248
EMPLOYMENT FROM ALL OCS ACTIVITIESIN NEW JERSEY AND DELAWARE
Median HighRecovery Recovery
Direct Employment(peak–reached about 1985) 4,500 9,000
LAND USE FOR ALL OCS ACTIVITIES PROJECTED
Activity
Geophysical Surveys andSupportExploratory DrillingsupportPlatform Construction
Piatform Installationsupport
Development DrillingsupportPipeline Constructionsupport
Oil and Gas ProductionsupportPipeline Corridors
Tank Farms
Gas Processing Piants
Land Required
Docking space for one ortwo ships in coastal ports5 acres per rig in coastaiports500-1,000 acres for onemajor fabrication facilityDocking space for tugboatsand crane barges in a iargeport5 acres per rig in coastalportsDocking facilities andstorage of 10-20 acres inlarge portyz acre per platfOrm ‘n
coastal port2 corridors: approximately90 miles total onshore,20 miles each in coastalzone, 7.5 acres/mile rightof way2 sites near the coast;total 50-75 acres100 acres per plant nearthe coast
NOTES:● Gas processing plants will be built in the region to handle all gas produced but no new refineries are expected. Onshore pipelines and tank farms will be the major permanent coastal facillt ies required to hand Ie the t ransporta-
tion of OCS oil produced● Support bases for exploration and development drilling will be located at coastai ports in the region such as At-
lantic City, Cape May or Lewes, Delaware. Construction of platforms and support for major operations such as pipelaying may take place partially in the
major port areas in the region and partiaily at traditional construction sites outside of the region
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessmen!
~,. !’] ‘; ( ) - 7{, - I I
REGULATIONS
Development Plans
On November 4, 1974, the Interior Depart-ment published a revision of 30 CFR 250.34which requires offshore oil and gas operatorsto submit it to States both a technical devolop-ment plan and a description of activities thatwould be associated with development.
Figure IV-12. Drilling crews work with the drill string at an offshore well similar to those which will be put downin the Mid-Atlantic.
Source Shell 011 Company
Figure IV-13. Three exploratory rigs for possible use in the Mid-Atlantic
Semi-submersible rigSource Marine Engineerlng/Log
information that could be required for in-clusion in inidustry plans and in supplementsto standard development plans include:
● description, quantity , and location of theresources discovered;
● complete description of the o i I and gasproduction system, i ncluding platforms,gathering lines, pumping facilities,separation equipment, and pipelines;
Figure IV-14. Assumed rates of exploratory drilling
ZeroYear Recovery Assumption
197719781979198019811982198319841985198619871988198919901991
TotalExploratoryWells
Rigs Wells
3 123 12
24
● a det a i led ana1ysis of the site-specific en -.vironmental cond it ions for the offshore,nearshore, and onshore areas where oiland gas has been found and at whichplatforms and pipelines would enter; and
MedianRecovery Assumption
Rigs
335555555
Wells
121220202020202020
164
HighRecovery Assumption
Rigs
33681010101010101010101010
Wells
121224324040404040404040404040
520
Summary of Assumpt ions. Drilling Begins in 1977• Each rig drills 4 holes/year. Basis for drilling program
-Zero Case: Stop in two years-Median: Explore 7 major traps plus additional exploration in intermediate traps-High: Explore 7 major 23 intermediate traps plus additional exploration
Source Office of Technology Assessment
● ShLll]OV%” ~LX@ic a n d occanograph icd es c r i p t i c) ns, i n c 1 LI d i n g s e d i m e n t
toehcli’ii)r and idcntific,ltion of hclza rdouscl rcas;
. 13iolc)gic descriptions, i ncl LId ing iden -t i fication of scns it it’c .1 rt~.ls;
● meteorological inform ,It ion; and
Production and Its Impacts
The series of actions in~olvml in productionwoLI ]d hat~e L?nkr i ron men ta ], economic, a nd in -st i tu t iona 1 con seq L] L?nces for NCLV jerse}~ andDelaware. OTA has assL]mcd, t(~r the pL~rposcot this section, no change i n existing law’s,reg LI I at ions, t)r practices a m on~ o i 1 companiesor Federal, State, and lc)ca 1 regu Iators.
None of the information that has been
gathered d u r i ng the study [L?~dS O T Aresearchers tc) conclude that o i 1 and gasdmrc]opmcn t off the Mid-Atlantic coast WOLI ]d
prod LICC i rrekrt!rs ib ie d,l magt! or changes i npatterns of life in either State, provided thatthe technologies u’cre prc}perly planned andeng i necrcd a n d thci r [)pc’rcl t io ns w’erc strict 1 vmonitored. State officials, i ncl LId i ng G()\: .Brendan T. Byrne t)f New Jersey and Co\T.Sherman W. Tribbitt of Delaware, ha~c saidpub] icly and privately that they ha~e reachedsirn i la r concl LIS ions. 3’1 They a ISO have saidrepeated 1}’ that i n i’ iew of the potent ia 1 (orLia m age t o t h e i r coastal ,~rc,ls, t~’h ich areLra I LId both for their en l’ i i-on men t and for thc~
to Llrist income that the}’ produce, the go\cr-no rs have an ob] iga t it) n to satisfy thin-n SC’] I’csthat of fshore dcirclc)pment Jvc)~Ild be cc)n -d LICtL?Ci at least .1s prudcn tl~’ .ls the states
\\’() L1 Id proced i t t hc’i’ h .Id CL) n t ro 1 oi’er t hc’
p r o c e s s .
PRODUCTION PLATFORh4S
Figure IV-15. Artist’s drawing of production platformsimilar to those which might be used in Mid-Atlantic
Source Mobil 011 Corporation
FIXED PLATFORM
\
/
\
/
against blowouts during the drilling process.In the Baltimore Canyon Trough, wells maybe drilled to about 15,000 feet. “Storm chokes”or downhole safety halves are installed in pro-ducing wells after drilling is completed to sealoff an oil flow if pressure rises suddenly andthreatens a blowout. “Blowout preventers, ”stacks of heavy valves, are inserted between adrilling rig and a well to control blowoutsduring the drilling process,
CREW REQUIREMENTS
Development and production drillingwould require about the same number of plat-form crewmembers as exploration rigs, work-ing 7 to 14 days and taking 7 to 14 days o fleave. The flow of food, fuel, drilling pipe, cas-ing, mud, and other materials to offshore plat-forms would be about the same as that re-quired for exploratory drilling.
Once drilling was completed and wellswere connected with a distribution network,maintenance crews would live on central plat-forms from which they would travel to pro-ducing platforms to pm-form routine repairsand inspection. On average, 50 personnel-mechanics, electricians, painters, and othermaintenance workers-could service fourproducing platforms. Thus, offshore person-nel requirements would drop, once drillingwas completed, from more than 800 workersfor four platforms to about 50 workers.
PLATFORM REGULATIONS
Oil production platforms are highly com-plex systems, subject to great uncertainties.The platforms are designed, built, and in-stalled by oil companies under stringent, self-imposed guidelines. There is very little regula -tion of this technology. Most recognized in-dustry standards at-c not required to befollowed; the OCS order for platforms merelystates that they shall be adequately designedand certified. Government inspections of con-struction, installation, and operations are notsystematically planned.
The OCS order covering platforms for the
Mid-Atlantic was not issued before the least>sale. The EIS for the Mid-Atlantic states that“Ma jc)r c~ffshore structu rcs are designed tclW’ ithsta nd en ~’ i rc~n men ta 1 st rcsscs spcci ficd b~~the owner (Jr o p e r a t o r . Typically, forccia .SSO c i a t ed }V i t h t h c 10(1-v M r storm h a v c’ beenthe spc~cified strc~ss. ” This is a major area ofu ncerta i ntl’: first, i t is not known for sure thatopcrato rs \\’c)u ld design to a 1 (1(1 -vcar stormand rcg LI I a t i () ns d o not rqu i rc it; SUN n Ci, t h L’natu t-c of a 1 (N-\’LM r storm i n the Mid-Atlanticis not kno\\’ n \\r ith ,In}r acc LI racy; third, thernagn itu~jc of m an~’ other i ntcract i ng environ -,men tal factors SLI ch as tern pcrat u rc, ~1’a \’t’s,CLI r run ts, and botto” m stab i I i tv is not kn o\\rn~t’ ith an}’ accu rac?’; a n Li to L] rt h, t hmc arc norect) m men d a t i t)ns as tc) sa tcty fclctc)rs adesignt>r must LI SL’ to account for LI ncerta i n t it’s.
The Americ,ln BL] rt.’au of Shipping, a pri\’ate
~ t,
classi ficat ion society which sets cic’sign sta n~i -
a rds and inspects o ffsh o w eq L] i pm cn t to r i n-
su rancc com pan ies, h a s Liorclopcci spL~ci tica -
tions and inspection proceci LI rcs tor oitsh[)rc
platforms. The Bureau has ccrtiiic~~i th~~ ciesi~nand operation of o\’er 200 flea t i ng Li r i 11 i n; rigs(exploration rigs) and regularl~’ \tI)rks \\iththe U.S. Coast Guarci to cert if?’ ships anci t)th~~rfloating eqLI iprnent. The pr~)cwi urt) inc] LILjL>S
publishing a book O( design XL] idt)l inm, C(JIII -
pletely rcnliew’ing and appro[ing or rc’lc~ctingall ciesign plans, inspect i ng .111 mater i a Is .Incicom poncnts as the}’ are bLI i It, and fi na 1 ] \r, tc>st -.ing all major parts. The pr~)ccd LI r~} h .I+ bc>c)n i n
use in the Un itcd States tc)r a I I t)c(’a n -SI) i ngmerchant ships for manl’ vea rs. Adopt i C) n c) fthe principle by OCS - r[’gul.ltclr>’ agL’n c i L’Scou Id increase the effect i\’~mt’ss of t hL’ pr~’s~’n ts}~stenl immcd iatclv.
Figure IV-16. Platform construction yard outside Morgan City, Louisiana
< ~ ““ “ ““’”
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Figure IV-17. Potential sites and land requirements for OCS support bases.
I
I
I
L
Source Office of Technology Assessment
Figure IV-1 7. continued. . .
The total acreage given below is for onshore support ~bases which most likely would be located in coastal ports such as Atlantic City or Cape May, New Jersey, ~and Lewes, Delaware. The totals are for peak activity ;years, most likely between 1980 and 1985. k
Acreage Acreage 3 for Median for Highii Recovery Recovery
1 Exploratory Drilling Support 25 50 ~
Development Drilling Support 55 120Total Support 80 170
. . . ,
Source Office of Technology Assessment
detailed, firm, and comprehensive rules fordesigning, building, and operating, and thencareful IV checking adherence to those rules.On the other- hand, the USGS philosophy ap-pears to be one of asking for industry’s bestefforts and then making broad judgementsabout its adequacy. 42
CONFLICTING OCEAN USES
Delaware is now used intensively for such tra -ditional activities as commercial fishing,marine transportation, disposal of sewagesludge, and military operations. The mostserious near-term offshore conflicts will prob-ably be between proposed oil and gas opera-tions and both commercial fishing and com -mercial shipping. Both coastal and trans-Atlantic traffic lanes from the major ports ofNew York and Philadelphia lead through or
We are concerned that the conflict be-tween heavy vessel traffic in the Mid -Atlantic and the prescence of offshoreplat forms could, in the event of the lease
sale, become seriouS. Five tracts are in the
direct path of an existing shipping lane,six other tracts are considered mosthazardous to navigation, and thirty-oneadditional tracts are in conflict with- or inclose proximity to commonly used ship-ping routes. Any accidents or collisions~
involving platforms and vessels, par- ticularly during anticipated storms orfog, could pose a substantial threat of ad -verse environmental, social, a n deconomic impacts on the shoreline com -m unities where recreationl values of wetlands and beaches at-c high. Consider-ing that adequate technology does not ex -ist for containment of oil on the highseas, there is a probability that oil spills would impact the sensitive shorelines.43
SUPPORT BASES
the Baltimore Canyon Trough area were toyield 1.8 billion barrels of oil, and about 120acres if the yield were 4.6 billion barrels. Thisland is in addition to that required for explor-atory drilling, Figure IV-17 summarizes totalland requirements for support bases likely inthe region.
Five possible areas i n the New Jersey -.Delaware region could serve as staging areasfor offshore development, three coastal sitesand the port complexes of New York City andPhiladelphia-Camden. All three coastal sites—Atlantic City and Cape May, N. J., and Lewes,Del .—WoUld meet such staging area require-ments as availability of good supply boat har-bors with about 15 feet of water depth, ac-cessibi lity by rail, proximity to lease sites, and. .availability of land for storage and servicefacilities. ‘
Service firms under contract to oil com-panies would choose staging areas on thebasis of lowest overall operating cost, whichcannot be evaluated in enough detail at thistime to pet-m it determination of the mostlikely sites. Operating from coastal sites, sup-ply boats would travel between 80 and 250fewer miles on each round trip to the oil fieldthan they would if they were based at eitherinland port. The resulting savings, however,might be offset by lower land prices at inlandareas or by the cost of warehouse facilities
which WO uld have to be built if coastal siteswere chosen.
Atlantic City, N. J., could provide enoughacreage to meet all requirements for Support
development if median estimates of recovera -ble oil and natural gas are correct. If explora -tion activities expanded, additional stagingareas might be required, Such as Cape Mayand Lewes.
zoning and permit powers, including Statepowers relating to air and water pollution, isan effective tool for controlling development.Nonetheless, in the case of OCS development,States and localities find themselves limited toreacting to Federal decisions which set in mo-tion chains of events that can affect populationlevels, employment patterns, requirements forState and local expenditures for publicfacilities and services, and social patterns. Withkey OCS decisions being made at the Federallevel, States can only approve or disapprovelocation of refineries, platform constructionsites, and service bases; or react favorably orunfavorably to genera] oil company efforts tobuild OCS-support facilities. They cannot par-ticipate in the process which leads to suchdecisions. Their only option is to try to exer-cise their legal rights to choose whether or notto approve OCS-related facilities after the factof Federal decisions, oil company investments,and actual oil disco series.
CAPITAL INVESTMENT
Development of oil and natural gas off theNew Jersey and Delaware coast could involve$2 billion to $4 billion in initial capital invest-ments and could influence the U.S. balance oftrade by as much as $50 billion over the life ofthe project, based on very rough figures forcapital investment and discount over the lifeof the field.
Figure IV-18. Total new land requirements related toOCS development during years of peak activity (1 980 to1990) in New Jersey and Delaware under high recoveryassumptions
Activity AcreageRequired
Support Bases in Coastal Ports 170Pipeline Corridors in Coastal Zone 150Pipeline Corridors outside Coastal Zone 550Tank Farms 75Gas Processing Plants 700Total Peak Land Requirement 1,645
State variations, the control of land through Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
Direct e m p l o y m e n t i n New Jersev andDelaware would peak at about 9,000 w;orkersi f the high estimate of resources wet-e correctand at about 4,500 workers if the median mti -mate o f resources were correct. Capitalexpend itures would peak ciur ing the seventhyear of de\ felopment at approximately $1billion. Peak lanci requirements are estimatedto be 1,645 act-es in New Jersey and Delaware.Of that, 32(] acres would be coastal land andthe remainder w o u l d be inland. Sei~enhundred acres would be required for pipelinecorridors \vh ich probablv would parallel cx -isting h ighwa~’s “or ra i] road 1 i nes. FigureIV–18 summarizes the total new land re-q u i red.
FISCAL EFFECTS
Analysis of the effects of offshore de\’elop-ment on tax rm’en Lies in a w’ ide variety ofcoastal States, inclucl i ng New Jersey a n dDelaware, shows that in States where majoronshore facilities are located the per capita taxre\~en LieS from OCS act i\~ities probably w~ouldbe significantly higher than from businessesand indi\idu~ls i n t h e rest o f the Stateeconorn}r except during one time period. Dur -i ng the first 2 c)r 3 ~~ears o f OCS-relateddevelopment, very 1 ittle revenue woLlld he
received from OCS-related businesses so thatper capita revenues woLIIci be lower than thestatewide average. Beg i n n i ng i n the fourthyear, however, the net statewide fiscal impactswou Id become favorable as i n vestmen ts w’cremade i n capita 1- i ntens i\’e onshore facilitiesneeded d LI ri ng the production phase.~~
OTA has prepared a fiscal analysis of costsand rm’cm UC’S from OCS act i \’ i t ies i n t hc’ Statwof New Jersey and Delaware assurn i ng pro-jected development associated with disco\’ervt)f 1.8 b i 11 ion barrels of o i 1 i n the Ba It i moreCanvon Trough.
The fiscal a n a l }rsis conc[ LIdcs t h a t , i n
general, per cap ita tax rc\’enum from OCS-re -]ated acti\ritit% I%rOLIld be cc)nsidcrablv h ighcrironl the foLI r th Prca r on L%rard t h a n statc)~%r ide
Figure IV-19. Direct employment from all OCS activitiesunder the hiah and median recoverv assumptions
5000 I I IMEDIANm I
4000
3000
2000
1000
10,000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000I
1000 I
al:“gu
.RY
1980 1985 1990 1995
HIGH RECOVERY
.
-gL
ii
z-co“Ej
-a
.
1980 1985 1990 1995
PRODUCTION
INSTALLATION AND D e v e l o p m e n t
EXPLORATION
OTHER
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
per capita revenues from other sectors underthe assumptions of the study.
There is an important caveat to the conclu-sion. It assumes that public costs of support-ing OCS bases and providing services to OCS-related workers and their families in one Statewould be offset by revenues from onshore in-vestments in that same State. If, however,most of the support areas and OCS employeeswere located in one State and the landings ofoil and natural gas were made in another, theresults would be very different.
In 1972, per capita State and local revenuesin New Jersey were $847. Before any major
Figure IV-20. Annual earnings of direct regional OCSworkers under median and high recovery assumptionsAnnual Payroll($ Millions)200
160
120
80
40
●
1980 1985 1990 1995
HIGH
Source Office of Technology Assessment
onshore investments occurred, revenues pro-duced by OCS activities would be primarilythose from taxes on individuals which average$512 per capita in New Jersey. Assuming thatper capita expenditures for public services areabout equal to total per capita revenues of$847, per capita expenditures to support OCS-related population would exceed the percapita revenues from OCS activities by about$335 during the first 2 years of development.The gap would decrease to $225 in the thirdyear as some business taxes accrued.
The picture would change in the fourth yearwhen major onshore investments would bemade for pipelines, tank farms, and . naturalgas processing plants. In the year when theseinvestments were made, the State wouldreceive revenues from a real estate transfer taxand from its sales tax (or equivalent use tax).Since these are assumed to be concentrated inthe fourth year, the per capita tax revenue iscalculated to jump nearly $11,000 in that yearin New Jersey. The jump would not be so pro-nounced in Delaware where there is presentlyno sales tax.
In subsequent years, the property tax wouldbecome the main source of revenues. Propertytax revenues would decline on a per capitabasis for a period because they would bedivided among an increasing direct popula-tion engaged in offshore construction anddevelopment drilling, Finally, per capita prop-erty tax revenues would begin to rise in theninth year when completion of constructionwould lead to a decrease in OCS-relatedpopulation. For all years after the fourth year,per capita revenues from OCS activities wouldsubstantially exceed the statewide average.
If either business gross receipts or corporateincome taxes are added, the per capitarevenues accruing from OCS-related activitieswould be even higher after the sixth year or soas production was under-taken. The other un -certainty—that some components of onshore
construction may be exempt from sales taxa -tion—cou]d reduce actual sales tax revenuesbelow the calculated Im’els. However, thiswou Id not a]ter the conclusion that, for mostStates, the per capita tax revenues producedby OCS development should exceed thestatew idc a\’erage after the first 3 years o fdc\elopment.
There are important qualifications to thesecon cl us ions. First, higher than average percapita tax rc~\’cnucs from OCS developmentact i\’ i tics i m plf’ net fiscal benefits only i f theseact i\’ i tics cio n“ot rcqu i re proportionately highor h i~her expend itu res for public facilities andser\iccs. In st~me States, OCS developmentmav requ i rc faci I itics such as roads in areas of.unusuall}r high construction costs. This couldlead to a net negative fiscal impact in spite ofrclat i\’cl}~ high per capita tax revenues.
SeconLi, the analysis deals only with normalg(~ternmcnt,ll expenditures and does not takeinto account sLIch less easilv quantified costsas en~’ i ron mental degradation and loss ofrecrcat i(lnal lands.
Thus, the conclusion that there may be netfiscal benefits dot’s not imply that there are not]l~c(~n?~?cl~satc)~i costs of development.
Third, while there may be a net fiscalbenefit on a statewide basis, there could stillbe serious localized fiscal problems if develop-ment were concentrated in a small corn-munity. One of these problems is that duringthe first 3 years when revenues are low, a localgovernment may not have the fiscal capacityto provide public services to the relatedpopulation, and even in year four the majorrevenues are sales taxes which accrue pri -mari Iy to the State rather than local govern-ment. It may also be the case that onshore in-~~cstmcmts subject to sales and property taxa -tion are in one local government jurisci ictionw’h i Ie a majority of the associated populationresides i n another. This same problem mavocc L] r kwtw’ecn States if OCS expl(~rat ion anci
de\~elopmcnt activities are supportcci frombases in a State different from the onc inwhich the oi 1 and/or gas is ultin~att’1~~ Iancic{i.
STATE ROLE IN DEVELOPMENT ANDPRODUCTION
Because of the uncertainty, State officialshave been increasingly insistent that they bebrought into the development process as par-ticipants rather than observers. State officialshave been, and continue to be, concerned thatsuch critical decisions as choosing pipelinecorridors, siting tank farms, and locating stag-ing areas may be made without adequate con-sultation and that, in the end, States wouldhave to accept the decisions or try to blockdevelopment. The lack of State participation atearly stages of the decision process thereforecreates an adversary relationship in which theState’s only option for controlling adverseonshore impacts is to obstruct, possiblythrough lengthy litigation, thus bringingabout the very delay in OCS development thatthe Federal Government is trying to avoid.
The States and Ioca 1 i ties ha \zc sever-a 1avenues for blocking OCS development. Themost dramatic is simply to file suit to block aproposed lease sale. Neither New Jersey norDelaware has threatened such action publicly.However, staff members of the AttorneysGeneral of both States have explored coursesof legal action open to them if the Governor ofeither New Jersey or Delaware were to decideat some future date that the State should try toblock or delay offshore development.
States and localities also have some legalbasis for intervening later in the developmentprocess to block decisions that they oppose.For example, they could refuse to permit theconstruction of pipelines in their coastal zonesby invoking their rights under either the 1 (lthAmendment or their own riparian laws.However, State and local officials are con-cerned about reliance upon such measures forseveral reasons:
. There is some doubt about the effective-ness of these powers because they havenot been tested under circumstancesidentical to those the States would face inconfrontation with Federal powers.
. Neither State wants to block develop-ment of energy sources that may exist inthe Baltimore Canyon Trough, par-ticularly if it means fighting rearguardactions on technical points.45
. Some State and local officials fear thattheir concerns would be overwhelmed bythe combined forces of the FederalGovernment and the energy industryjoining in the search for new sources ofenergy. In August 1975, Thomas O’Neill,former assistant commissioner of En-vironmental Protection for New Jersey,said: “There is a fear among coastal resi-dents and officials that they’re not going
to have any control. They see a combina-tion of big Government and big oil com-ing down on them and you’ve got somepoor commissioner in Wildwood, N. J.,who feels like he’s standing up there allalone against this juggernaut. ”
What State officials seemed to be seeking, asreflected in interviews with OTA researchers,is a new process that would require formal,effective channels for State participation thatwould satisfy State obligations to protect theircoastlines and still assure adequate supplies ofenergy for State residents and the Nation as awhole.
Transportation and Storage and Their Impacts
The next phase in development of oil andgas off the coast of New Jersey and Delawarewould be construction of a network to moveoil and gas from platforms to storage tanks
Figure IV-21. State-local tax revenue per OCS employee and their families compared to revenue from non-OCSworkers and their families
DELAWAREDollars
10,000
8000
6000
40003000
PER CAPITA REVENUE
2000
1000- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
STATE-LOCAL PER CAPITA REVENUES
I I I I I I 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 I I 1
NEW JERSEYDollars– 10,000
- 8 0 0 0PER CAPITA REVENUE
– 6000
4000
3000
2000
STATE-LOCAL PER CAPITA REVENUES
I I 1 I I I 1 1 I I I I I 1 I I 1 1Years 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Source Office of Technology Assessment
! 4
and processing plants and from there to refin- ing lease stipulation will be applied:cries and into the distribution system.
It is technically possible to lay pipelines toshore and build storage tanks on a schedulethat would have them in place when commer-cial quantities of oil and natural gas beginflowing from the Baltimore Canyon Trougharea. OTA has assumed for this descriptionthat pipelines and tank farms would be built.It is possible, however, that pipelines wouldnot be built if:
● oil or natural gas were found in quan-tities too small to justify the approx-imately $1 million-per-mile cost ofpipelines;
● oil companies decided that for marketreasons they would refine Mid-Atlanticcrude in some other location;
● oil companies decided that regulation ofpipelines or refineries in either Statewould be too stringent to warrant pump-ing crude ashore in New Jersey orDelaware.
In any of these cases, crude oil could bepumped from platforms into offshore storagetanks and carried to refinery sites by tanker.
PIPELINES
“Whenever technically and economicallyfeasible, all pipelines . . . shall be buried to adepth suitable for adequate protection. . . .“ Itshould be possible to specify burial depthswhere current and sand-shifting are high,where shipping lanes and anchoring groundsare located, where pipelines are traversingbeaches, or where fish trawling or dredgingtakes place. The terms “suitable” and “ade-quate protection” could be defined more pre-cisely.
Two kinds of pipelines would be laid on theocean floor to transport oil to shore fromoffshore platforms. Gathering lines, usually 12to 24 inches in diameter, connect individualwells to central platforms. Flow lines connectcentral platforms to shore. In the BaltimoreCanyon Trough area flow lines probablywould be more than 2 feet in diameter and ex-tend 80 to 100 miles to shore.
Pipelines from offshore oil and gas produc-tion facilities might carry an initial installationcost in range of $100 million46 for a 24- to 36-inch pipeline between New Jersey orDelaware and an offshore oil field.
Given the size of the investment, it is in thebest interests of industry that pipelines becoated with corrosion protection coatings and
If pipelines were laid, the work would be properly weighted with concrete where
done by 175-man crews working on 300-foot necessary, be installed with care from pipeline
“lay barges” barges, be adequately welded and inspected,which can assemble and drop tothe ocean floor 1 mile of pipeline per day. The be buried throughout most of the distance
process involves welding 40-foot sections of offshore as well as onshore, and be adequately
steel pipe, coating them with asphalt paste or tested prior to use.
epoxy resin, bathing them in concrete to make PIPELINE REGULATIONSthem heavy enough to stay in place on theocean floor, and trailing the assembled pipeover the side or stern. Smaller barges, drag-ging a “jet-sled” over the ocean floor, followthe lay-barges and pump water throughnozzles on the sled to dig a trench into whichthe pipeline settles.
The environmental impact statement for theMid-Atlantic lease sale states that the follow-
Pipeline networks, however, have not beensubject to stringent regulatory standards inthe United States in the past and pipelinefailures, with resulting oil discharges, have oc-curred in the Gulf of Mexico as well as otheroffshore development regions. According tothe Coast Guard Pollution Incident ReportingSystem data on oil spills in 1974, a majorsource of discharge was from pipelines.
7 1-1$$ , ( ) - 7,, . ,?
Figure IV-22. Typical pipelaying barges similar to those which could be used in the Mid-Atlantic
Source Marine Engineering/Log
Regulatory authority for setting pipelinedesign standards is now divided between theOffice of Pipeline Safety (OPS) in the Depart-ment of Transportation (DOT) and the USGSin the Department of the Interior. The OPSstandards apply to both offshore and onshorep i pe 1 i n es w i t h o u t differentiation o rallowances for special seafloor conditions orstresses due to ocean installation.
OPS has proposed modifications to stand-ards for offshore pipelines which are quitedetailed and firm but the proposed rules werenot in effect when the Mid-Atlantic lease salewas held. The USGS has developed an OCSorder covering pipelines in existing areas suchas the Gulf of Mexico but has not developed asimilar order for the Baltimore CanyonTrough. A memorandum of understandinghas been developed between OPS and USGSconcerning pipeline regulations, but the for-mal process of translating an agreement intoFederal regulations could take some months.
The memorandum sets out the respon-sibilities of each Department, basically givingDOT responsibility for pipelines from a pro-duction platform to shore and giving Interiorresponsibility for pipelines from the wells tothe production platform. The two Depart-ments will coordinate inspection and enforce-ment activities and will jointly be responsiblefor research, according to the agreement, andat least once a year will jointly review all ex-isting standards, regulations, and operatingpractices concerning pipelines. (See figureIV-23.)
Specific design standards, installation prac-tice specifications, and scheduled tests and in-spections could readily be adopted forpipelines in the Mid-Atlantic region and inother OCS regions based on existingknowledge and technology. Such regulationsdo not require detailed knowledge of theregions or environmental conditions becausespecifications normally establish standardsbased on a formula which would accept a
range of inputs and include safety factors for a.specific design.
Much new technology is available to assurepipeline safety and could be incorporated in
regulations, in some cases without additionalresearch. Such technology includes:
●
●
●
●
Standards for coating pipelines with cor-rosion protection materials that havebeen tested and proved to be effectiveover long periods of time.
Standards for welding and inspectingwelds a n d specifications for pipematerials and sizes including temperaturecharacteristics which could assure an ini-tially sound line.
Procedures for installing and buryingpipe which would protect the line fromoverstressing as water depths increase. 47
Pipeline inspection devices which couldbe used regularly over the life of apipeline to detect any deterioration priorto a possible leak.48 Some private firmsare now using these devices to inspectoffshore pipelines although few w i 11make the inspection results public. As aregulatory tool the Government C Ould
readily perform its own inspections with.these devices.
Another element of the system that wouldrequire particular attention is the placement ofpipelines at coastal landfalls. Most biologists
and other scientists agree that pipelinesshould be routed to avoid marshlands, adesign that would be difficult to achieve alongthe Delaware or New Jersey coast. If marsh-lands cannot be avoided, biologists argue for‘‘minimum disruption o f such areasalthough there is no accepted definition ofeither “mini mum” or “disruption. “49
STORAGE TANKS
Oil coming ashore through pipelines proba-bly would be stored temporarily in tank farmsto provide a means of regulating the flow of
— —
oil to refineries. Natural gas would be pipedashore in separate pipelines to gas processingplants that probably would be located neartank farms.
The oil industry rule of thumb for such tankfarms is that they would be able to hold 10days production of oil or gas. At the medianestimate of Baltimore Canyon Troughresources, this would translate to five storagetanks on about 50 acres of land which could belocated close to shore or well inland. For thehigh recovery estimate, 75 acres would be re-quired.
TANKERING
It is feasible and sometimes economical totransport oil produced at offshore fieldsdirectly to refineries by tankers rather than bypipelines. The practicality of such a system de-pends on many variables such as distancefrom the offshore field to the refinery, amountof oil produced, cost of pipelines, status offield development, number of wells and plat-forms producing, cost of offshore storage andloading terminals, gas mixture, and pollutionpotential. In the Gulf of Mexico all productionfrom offshore wells is transported by pipeline
Figure IV-23. Responsibility of Federal agencies for pipelines
MANIFOLD PLATFORM
NPRODUCTION PLATFORMDehydrators, Scrubbers, Heater Treaters,Separators & Other Production Equipment
II
Shoreline+
i:1
! MANIFOLD PLATFORMI!1:I PRODUCTION PLATFORM1
Compressor for 1
Regulated Scrubber or Separator\ \by DOI \
‘ \ .\ \
- - - -I/ I Separators, Dehydrators,.## Heater Treaters, Scrubbers &
/i Other Production Equipment
Compressor or Pump Stationto be Regulated by DOT
— Pipelines Regulated by the Department of the Interior (DO I);
--- Pipelines Regulated by the Department of Transportation (DOT)
Source DOI/DOT Memorandum of Understanding
to refineries along the coast and inland. A ma-jor reason for this is that offshore productionhas been a gradual extension of producingareas on the coast and many wells are spreadoverwide areas in relatively shallow water. Insome other major offshore producing areasvery large fields were discovered whichjustified major pipelines. In other specialcases, such as some North Sea fields, it wasdetermined that offshore storage and tanker-ing would be the best method of transportingoil ashore at least for some initial period offield development.
In the case of offshore New Jersey andDelaware, the potential fields are a substantialdistance seaward (more than 80 miles) andpipelines may not always be economicallyjustified, especially during initial develop-ment stages. It would be feasible to start pro-ducing into a storage tank and using tankersto ship the oil ashore. Of course, if major gasdiscoveries are made a pipeline would be re-quired.
There are some advantages to tankeringnominal quantities of oil when compared tothe disruption that pipeline construction maycause. It should be noted, however, that oilpollution from tankers may not be as easilycontrolled as that from pipelines.
Oil Spills
In all stages of OCS development, oil spillsare a major concern and pose the possibility ofmajor impacts.
RISK ASSESSMENT
The possibility of oil spills is usuallydescribed in terms of risk probability. AnOTA oil spill risk assessment indicates thatthere probably would be at least one major oilspill during development of the Baltimore Can-yon Trough.
OTA projects that it is unlikely that therewould be more than two spills of more than24,000 barrels of crude oil each during the 30-
year life of the Baltimore Canyon Troughfield. The projection of oil spill risk assumesthe high recovery estimate of the USGS of 4.6billion barrels.50 For a median recovery esti-mate of 1.8 billion barrels, oil spill risk figuresare roughly cut in half. (Only high anddian recovery estimates were used in theassess merit.)
This risk assessment concludes thatodds of an oil slick, even from a major spia Platform 50 miles offshore, reaching
me-risk
the11 atthe
New Jersey or Delaware shore would be one-in-ten after the spill had occurred. If oil slicksdid reach Mid-Atlantic beaches, howeverr
they could hit any point along the coastline.Vague and general as these conclusions are,they represent the outer limits of judgmentsthat can be made in view of such variables aswind force and direction, wave action, oceancurrents, and size and location of a spill. 51
This estimate of the range of probableoilspills as a result of Baltimore CanyonTrough development activities has been madebased on statistics from offshore oil opera-tions over the past 10 years, principally in theGulf of Mexico. The greatest volume of oil hascome from a small number of major spills.None of these offshore spills to date has beencontained and cleaned up on site. OTA’s esti-mate of a probable range of large oil spills,
given OCS development follows the highrecovery scenario, is from 5,000 to 860,000barrels resulting from 1 to 40 spill incidents,with the most likely amount being 140,000barrels and 18 spill incidents. 52
Should a major oil spill occur during Mid-Atlantic OCS operations it is doubtful that thespill would be cleaned up. Depending on theseason, the size of spill, and prevailing cond i -
tions, the shoreline could be severely im-pacted. An independent study conducted forOTA by the Coast Guard, indicated that dur-ing a stagnant summer high pressure system,the probability of an oil spill from OCS sitesreaching the shore is very high. 53 On the
other hand, a Chevron representative at theJanuary 1976 Atlantic City EIS hearings statedthat “we believe that there is no chance of oilreaching shore from the proposed (BaltimoreCanyon Trough) OCS lease area. ”54
it has been pointed out by local officials inthe States that if an oil spill were to reach thecoast during a tourist season, the affected areacould lose an entire season receipts.55
Economic losses would be sustained not onlyby those whose property was directlydamaged by oil but also by those who dependfor income on the seasonal tourist industry.These could include owners and employees ofhotels, restaurants, charter boat operations,and other tourist -oriented activities.
Commercial fishermen also could be ad-versly affected—in the short run as a result offish kills or contain i nation and in the long runif damage to spawning and feeding groundswere to reduce the yield. The surf clam indus-try, which is economically important to NewJersey, would be vulnerable to oil spill damage.
Severe oil spills can cause major damage tomarshlands if the spill reaches inshore, towaterfowl if large quantities of oil reach theirhabitat, to bottom-dwelling marine life ifquantities sink and smother them, and to mostfish, plants, and other biota if the concentra-tion is high enough. What is not known andcannot be measured at this time is the severityof damage related to amounts and concentra-tions, the effects on the food web and ultimateconsumer and the long-term effects of chronicdischarges. Also unknown are many specificenvironmental conditions of each OCS regionwhich may affect the dispersion, trajectory,chemical corn posit ion, and ultimate fate ofany spill, Environmentalists argue that withso many unknowns, coupled with potential
all efforts should be directed towarddangers, preventing o i1 spills whenever technicallypossible. 57
OIL SPILL REGULATIONAt the same t i me, however, Federal
regulatory agencies, principally USGS, do notappear to employ the best available system forestablishing standards and enforcing regula-tions dealing with oil spill prevention andcleanup. Recommendations contained in aGAO report of June 1973 covered the need fortrained inspectors, improved inspectionsystems and standards for enforcement.Although USGS has advised Congress that itis proceeding with programs to meet the crit-icisms, no detailed descriptions of changes inprocedure has been published.
The Federal Government, principallythrough agencies such as the Coast Guard andthe EPA, has invested substantial resources inthe research and development of oil spill sur-veillance, containment, and cleanup systems.Many of the more advanced systems havebeen produced and are available in the CoastGuard inventory. These include airborne oilspill detection systems which can locate and“fingerprint” discharges as well as high-seasspill containment and recovery equipment. 58
But the Coast Guard has no statutoryauthority over oil and gas development ac-tivities on the OCS. The Department of the In-terior, through USGS, regulates OCS develop-ment and has a memorandum of understand-ing with the Coast Guard which provides thata Coast Guard coordinator will be available inthe area for emergencies.
Mid-Atlantic OCS Order No. 7, the pollu-tion and waste control order which waspublished in the Federal Register on July 12,1976, places most of the responsibility for oilspill control and removal with the USGS. Ac-cording to the order, “The primary jurisdic-tion to require corrective action to abate thesource of pollution and to enforce the subse-quent cleanup by the lessee or operator shallremain with the (USGS) Area Supervisor pur-suant to the provisions of this Order and thememorandum of understanding between theDepartment of Transportation (U.S. CoastGuard) and the Department of the Interior
(U.S. Geological Survey) dated August 16,.1971. ”
According to Coast Guard instructions forimplementing that memorandum of under-standing, USGS has primary responsibility inany areas leased under the provisions of theOuter Continental Shelf Lands Act in recogni-tion of USGS expertise with respect to abate-ment of the source of pollution at an offshorefacility,
The instructions add, however, that theprovisions of the memorandum of under-standing will prevail only as long as removal ofthe pollutant is accomplished to the satisfac-tion of the Coast Guard on-scene coordinator.If cleanup is not satisfactory to the CoastGuard, the on-scene coordinator may takeover under provisions of the National OilSpill Contingency Plan.
In implementing its responsibilities, theUSGS holds private offshore operatorsresponsible for oil spill cleanup but has nocheck system to review the adequacy of thecleanup equipment available to operators. 59
OCS Order No. 7 requires only that operatorsinspect their own equipment regularly.Offshore cleanup is particularly troublesomebecause even the most advanced systems willperform only about 50 percent of the time inrough waters of the OCS.
The Coast Guard is responsible for a Na-tional Contingency Plan and has available astrike force for spill cleanup from any source.It appears that the Coast Guard would step into clean up a spill in the Mid-Atlantic onlyafter all other efforts failed.
On its own, the offshore oil industry ap-parently has developed a good safety recordwith regard to oil spill accidents, especiallysince the Santa Barbara spill in 1969. -
Some oil companies have formed associa -tions in active OCS regions for the purpose ofproviding oil spill cleanup systems and man-
power. These are voluntary groups which arenot required to use advanced technologywhich has been developed by the CoastGuard.
Sixteen oil companies interested in leasingtracts in the Mid-Atlantic have formed CleanAtlantic Associates and committed $1 millionto purchase cleanup and containment equip-ment and to inventory existing equipment and
expertise which could be used to supplementthe group’s resources.
By July, Clean Atlantic had named Halibur-ton as contractor for its cleanup operationsand had contracted with Raytheon Corp. forstudies to map coastal areas of unusual sen -
sitivity, identify the bird population, and
draw up a plan of action to be followed in theevent of Mid-Atlantic spills.
Although a base of operations had not yetbeen formally chosen, O.J. Shirley, chairmanof the group, said equipment and manpowerwould probably be located at Davisville , R.I.,and at one o f the oil company support bases
which are expected to be located in either NewJersey or Delaware..
According to Shirley, Clean Atlantic wouldbe procuring equipment throughout the sum-mer and expected to be operational before ex -ploratory drilling begins in the Mid- Atlantic.If commercial discoveries of oil are found, h esaid, additional gear may be purchasd.
Shirley has testified at hearings on the finalEIS for the Mid-Atlantic sale that under nor-mal conditions Clean Atlantic equipmentcould be operational at a spill site as far as 125miles from its shore base within 12 hours.
POLLUTION RESEARCH
The OTA oil spill risk assessment also con -
eludes that no less than 85,000 barrels of oiland no more than 1 million barrels of o i 1would be spilled as a total of major- platformor pipeline accidents, chronic discharge of oilfrom platforms, and inevitable leakage from
1 ’
Figure IV-24. Clean Atlantic Associates initial equip-ment stockpiles
—.—.—.—- . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . .- .—. . --- - . . . . . .$
Item Number
OPEN SEAS
Fast Response Open Seas &Bay Skimmer Systems 2
Mini-Fast Response Units 2Open Seas Containment Boom 2000 Ft.Vikoma Sea Pack
(1600 Ft. Open Seas Boom) 1
NEARSHORE/lNLAND
Helicopter Spray Units 2Boat Spray Units 3Dispersant 50 DrumsCollection Agent 10 Drums
BEACH PROTECTION & AUXILIARY EQUIPMENT
Communication System 1Automatic Propane Guns
(Bird Scarers) Set of 12 2..- . . .
Figure IV-25. Partial listing of presently available equip-ment in mid-Atlantic area
Source Clean Atlantic Associates
Source Clean Atlantic Associates
pipelines over the 30-year life of a field. Allestimates were the result of a statistical ex-trapolation of experience in the Gulf of Mexicoand may not apply in the Mid-Atlantic if im-provements in pollution control equipmentand procedures should occur before thedevelopment of this potential offshore oilfield.
Oil companies state that the low-level dis-charge of hydrocarbons which result fromchronic or routine discharges do not have adetrimental effect on the marine environmentor the marine biota.60
The oil industry has sponsored a significantamount of research into the effects of oilpollution, including a study of the effects of oiloperations on the marine environment off theLouisiana coast by the Gulf UniversitiesResearch Consortium. 61 In addition, the
.Item
CONTAINMENT BOOMS
Small (18” & Under)Large (19’’-36”)Extra Large (Over 36”)
SKIMMING APPARATUS
Self-PropelledSelf-Powered & Other
OTHER EQUIPMENT
Vacuum BargesVacuum TrucksPumpsBoats (Over 15 Ft.)Sorbents (Pillows &
(Boom)Storage
Available t1
62,600 Ft. 128,000 Ft. I4,200 Ft. ~
fi
1 $
141
~
4 ~*
28+
161 +/I
93 i4
Bags) 35,000 i
10,000 Ft.
32+ Millioni;
Gallons i\
Ocean Going Barges 50 ●
Automat ic Propane Guns f(Bird Scarers) 12 ~
Bird Rehabilitation Units 2 >
Earth Moving Equipment Readily Available ~- . . . .- — . . . . , . .— .
American Petroleum Institute, EPA, and USGSsponsor regular conferences on preventionand control of oil pollution at which manyreports on research efforts are presented.62
There appears to be no equivalent coordina-tion of pollution research efforts amongFederal agencies which share responsibilityfor OCS management.
The Report to Congress of the Secretary ofCommerce on Ocean Pollution is one of thefew examples of a coordinating effort.63 Thereport describes oil pollution research effortsby the National Science Foundation, the En-vironmental Protection Agency, the Bureau ofLand Management, the Fish and Wildlife Serv-ice, the U.S. Geological Survey, the NationalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration,and others.
The Coast Guard has recently evaluated its
Source Clean Gulf Associates
Marine Environmental Protection (MEP)program which principally addresses oilpollution other than that related to OCSoperations but which can serve as an exampleof analysis of causes and effects of spills. Inthis evaluation it is stated that oil explora -tion/production operations contributed only amillion gallons out of the 15-million-gallontotal discharges into U.S. waters during 1974.(See figure IV-27.) It is also stated that “thedocumented direct cost to society of all oilpollution incidents (from all sources) in theUnited States is about $50 million a year or inexcess of $4,500 per incident. The estimate isundoubtedly low since it includes only thecosts of cleanup and the value of the productdischarged. ”
Processing and Refining and Their Impacts
Discovery of oil offshore would notnecessarily y lead to the construction of newrefinery capacity to process that oil. Becauserefinery construction and expansion decisionsprobably would depend more on regional de-mand than on local availability of crude oilsupplies, it is likely that OCS oil would beprocessed in existing or expanded refineriesand would replace higher priced crude fromforeign sources by an equivalent amount.Throughput for refineries located in easternPennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware isprojected to total 1.87 million barrels per dayin 1985 compared with the currentthroughput of more than 1 million barrels per
Figure IV-27. Oil Spills in U.S. waters ranked by opera-tion, calendar year 1974
ij
IVehicle, PipelineTransportVessel UnderwayVessel FacilityOil Transfer OperationUnknown OperationNatural ResourcesExploration/ProductionVessel Mooring,AnchoringIndustrial OperationsOther FacilityOperationVessel, FacilityFuelingOther VesselOperationVessel MaintenanceOther Non TransportationRelated Operations
5,959,4032,554,443
2,308,1012,265,801
989,369
385,487290,643
275,583
113,037
47,10436,658
34,130
38.916.7
15.114.8
6.5
2.31.9
1.8
0.8
0.30.3
0.2*Source U S Coast Guard, “Marine Environmental ProtectIon Program Evalua-tion of MissIon Per formance, ” August 1975
day. Since this projected throughput exceedsthe most optimistic estimate of peak BaltimoreCanyon Trough oil production of 650,000 bar-rels per day by more than 1.2 million barrelsper day, OCS crude could be processed inthese refineries without further expansion.
If the rate of growth of existing markets forproducts of existing refineries in the NewJersey and Delaware areas were the control-ling factor in decisions about building new
refineries, then the demand could be handledby expansion of refineries already in place inthe region. Refineries in the area now have acapacity of 1.3 million barrels of crude oil perday which could be nearly doubled withoutneed for additional land. It is not clear,however, that growth in existing marketswould be the controlling factor. For example,an oil company that had no regional refinerycapacity might discover a significant deposit
of OCS oil and choose to build a new refineryin the area to process it. Or, oil discovered inthe Georges Bank area to the north could betankered to the Mid-Atlantic refineries andlead to pressure for new construction.
If significant amounts of natural gas arefound, the gas would be piped to processingplants where methane (the key ingredient ofcommercial natural gas) would be separatedfrom ethane (which is used as a petrochemicalfeedstock) and other compounds. After treat-ment, natural gas would flow into gas dis-tribution systems.
Gas processing plants would require about100 acres of land each. For the high recoveryestimate, seven plants and 700 acres would berequired.
AIR QUALITY
The primary source of onshore air andwater impacts (other than oil spills) associatedwith offshore oil and gas development wouldbe new refinery capacity, if any refinerieswere built as a direct result of offshore discov-eries. Analysis shows that the most importantair quality impacts would result from hy-drocarbon emissions while the most impor-tant water impacts would result from thermalpollution and from demands on regionalwater supplies.
Analysis of existing air quality in the studyregion indicates that environmental standardsmay be a significant constraint on either newor expanded refinery capacity. Under currentregulations, these facilities are required toconform to the most stringent limits for eachpollutant set by two basic types of standardsimposed by Federal and State governments.Effluents emitted by each facility must meetcertain quantitative standards with regard topollutant content and, in addition, the am-bient air quality must not be degraded belowspecific standards for the area by additionalpollutant discharges.
Analysis indicates that in the study region
the refinery pollutants of primary concern arenonmethane hydrocarbons, which react withnitrogen oxides in the presence of sun] ight toform photochemical oxidant, an irritating sec-ondary pollutant. It is estimated that a250,000-barrel-per-day refinery emits about40 tons of hydrocarbons per day (or 14,600tons per year), of w’h ich 80 percent or morecan contribute to the production of oxidants.
The area of study is, for the most part, at oro\’er the oxidant and nonmethane hydrocar-bon air quality standards. With any additionalhydrocarbons from a new petroleum refineryor additional expansion of existing refineries,the air quality situation most likely would getworse. E\~en w~ithout the added pollutants, theNew Jersc}~, NWV York, Connecticut, andMetropolitan Philadelphia Air Quality Con-trol Regions total hydrocarbon emissions ex-ceed air qual it)’ standards. In the first area, areduction from 1971 le\’els of 67 percent, or287,000 tons pm year, is required. Therefore, ifthere is an air quality constraint on possiblenew or expanded refineries in the area, itwould in~’ol L’e hydrocarbon emissions fromrefineries and tank farms.
WATER QUALITY
Analysis suggests that the concentration ofwaterborne pollutants from a new 250,000 -barrel-per-day refinery effluent are relativelysmall and probably would not detrimentallyaffect the water quality of a receiving stream.The primary potential problem involves ther-mal impacts. The Delaware Bay and NewarkBay areas are both \’ery close to the maximumpermissible thermal load. Refinery coolingwater would have some impact on these areasbut technological alternatives such as the useof cooling towers could alleviate some of theseproblems.
As to water a\~ailability within the studyarea, potential problems could exist. If thevarious water supply regions with in NewJerse}~ are looked at in isolation and if the.water demand increases up to 2,500 m i 11 ion
gallons a day in northeastern New’ Jersey, asupp] y deficit cou Id result. H o~’m’er, i f thetotal region including the H LIdson and
Delaware Rivers is considered, the o\erallsupply of water is more than adequate to meetprojected demands. Ample potential suppliesof w’ater exist but control over the distributionsystem is fragmented and funds are nota va i 1 a b 1 e t o expand the s yst w-n t o t a kc> a d \’ a n -tage of a\~ailable suppl ies . Wat~~r frt~nl ne}~~sources wou]d require the construction oftransrn ission systems and water controlfacilities such as dams, may encounter con-siderable opposition.
Effects on Regional Energy Prices
Dramatic changes in regional encrg?~ pricesare not expected as a result of OCS dmzelop -ment. However, W h i l e nO absol LltL? pricedecreases are expected, the area recei~ing OCSoil and gas may have lower energv prices rclf7-tivc to some other regions which may pay pre -m iums for higher transportation costs.Another factor would invol\~e futur-e policieson oil and gas price control s.(’~
The expected effects of natural gas disco\-eries in the Baltimore Can}’(~n Trough onregional natural gas prices are highly depend-ent on assumptions concerning deregulation.In the case of complete deregulation, sales ofintrastate gas in the CL]] f Coast area su~gcstthat prices of OCS gas wou]d tt>nd to fo] lo~~rthe price of oil on a dollar-per-million Btu’sbasis, regardless of production costs. In thecase of continued regu Iat ion, ani’ price effectswould depend on possible pass-through ofrelati\~e cost savings resulting frt~m red LIcecl
transportation costs compared to gas from theGulf Coast, However, since transportationcosts are a relatively small share of thedelivered price of gas in the northeast, thepossibility]’ of offsetting increases in prociuc-tion costs makes large cost savings (relative toGulf Coast gas) and price decreases unlikely.
Increasing curtailments of natural gas meanthat increased a\’ailabil ity of this clean-burn-
ing premium fuel from the OCS would be of Fourth, the cost of producing Mid-Atlanticgreater importance than price savings to con- oil may be quite high, andsumers. To the extent that deregulation is lessthan complete by the time that gas productionbegins from the Baltimore Canyon Trough,greater use of natural gas in lieu of higherpriced oil would represent a cost savings tousers due to a change in mix of fuel types.
Predictions of the effects of OCS oil discov-eries on regional energy prices are more un-certain than for natural gas,
First, as is the case with natural gas,deregulation could have a major impact onthe price of domestic oil.
Second, even under the high recoveryassumptions, large quantities of imports willstill be used in the region,
Third, OCS oil probably will tend toward amarket price which is set by OPEC-controlledimports.
Finally, even if there were savings in costs,there would be little incentive to cut prices inorder to achieve a larger share of a marketbecause demand for secure sources of oil isgreater than supply.
With this degree of uncertainty, any predic-tion of prices is necessarily contingent onassumptions concerning the future strength ofthe OPEC cartel and U.S. price controls.
Decommissioning
When production from a platform droppedafter 15 to 30 years to levels that no longerjustified its operation, the platform would bedecommissioned. As the Baltimore CanyonTrough field became depleted, all platformswould be removed, pipelines would be aban-doned, and tank farms and gas processingplants would be dismantled.65
The Possibility of Deepwater Ports in the Mid-Atlantic
THE NEED FOR DEEPWATER PORTSU.S. imports of crude oil nearly trebled be-
tween 1950 and 1970, reaching 1.3 millionbarrels a day just as domestic productionbegan a steady decline from a peak of 11.2million barrels per day of oil and natural gasliquids. (See figure IV-28.) To fill the increas-ing gap between demand and domestic sup-ply, imports soared to 6 million barrels ofcrude and refined product between 1970 and1973. Similar increases in oil imports tookplace in all industrial nations.
With the world oil industry seeking to cutthe costs of moving increasing amounts of oilfrom producers to consumers, tankers grew in
Figure IV-28. U.S. oil supplies 1950/74
MILLION TONSPER YEAR
750
500
250
350 1955 1980 1965 1970 1974
REFINED PRODUCTS IMPORTS
OVERSEAS CRUDE OIL IMPORTS
CANADIAN CRUDE OIL IMPORTS
.,
. c. * DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION
Source Brltk3h Petroleum Statlst!cal Rewew of the World 011 Industry
size through the 1950’s and 1960’s. Super-tankers now in service range from 100,000 to
500,000 deadweight tons (dwt), which is ameasure of their cargo capacity. Supertankersare among the largest ships afloat. Their costadvantage is demonstrated by comparison be-tween a 250,000-dwt tanker and a 50,000-dwttanker, which in the early 1950’s was itselfconsidered huge. Tankers of 50,000 dwt, a sizethat normally serves New York Harbor andDelaware Bay, average 750 feet in length, 100feet in width, and 40 feet in draft. An averagesupertanker of 250,000 dwt is 1,100 feet longand draws 70 feet of water but it can carry fivetimes as much oil as a 50,000-dwt tanker atabout half the cost-per-barrel over long traderoutes. 1 By 1976, supertankers of all sizesrepresented 55 percent of the world tankercapacity. 2
The growing dependence on super-tankersin the world distribution system in the 1960’sprompted Federal officials and oil industryexecutives to press for deepwater ports in U.S.waters to handle this country’s fast-growingimports.
Today only three U.S. ports can accommo-date tankers of more than 100,000 dwt-LosAngeles, Long Beach, and Puget Sound. ? Thereare no deepwater ports in the Mid-Atlanticarea where nearly all crude oil is imported bytanker, a degree of dependence on importedoil which is unique in the United States. (Seefigure IV-29.) Tankers presently deliver morethan 1.2 million barrels of crude daily fromthe Middle East, Africa, and South America tonine Mid-Atlantic refineries.
The nine Mid -Atlantic refineries areclustered in two locations. (See figures IV-30and 31. ) More than two-thirds of the capacityis in Delaware and New Jersey where tankers
Under 50,000 Tons 50,000-75,000 Tons
San Francisco BostonNew YorkDelaware BayBaltimoreNorfolkHoustonGalveston
Source Office of Technology Assessment
must sail up the Delaware Bay and into theDelaware River to discharge their cargo. Theother one-third of the capacity is in northernNew Jersey near New York Harbor. Loadedtankers of more than 55,000 dwt—far smallerthan supertanker class-draw too much waterto reach the oil terminals at either locationwithout being lightered. The controlling depthof the Delaware River channel is 40 feet. Afully loaded 100,000-dwt tanker requires 50feet; the largest supertankers (480,000 dwt)require at least 100 feet of channel depth.Supertankers up to 150,000 dwt now anchorinside Delaware Bay, off Big Stone Beach, Del.,and just outside of New York Harbor, topump their oil into barges for final delivery to
75,000-100,000 Tons 100,000-150,000 Tons
Los Angeles Long BeachPortland, Maine Puget Sound
the refineries. Tankers can lighter their entirecargo, or when enough oil has been“lightered” to allow a tanker to ride higher inthe water, the ship can proceed to a refineryterminal to discharge the remaining cargo.
In 1975, oil from 429 tankers was lighteredto 1,055 barges in the Delaware Bayanchorage. Spillage reports on this lighteringoperation, run by Interstate Oil Transport Co.of Philadelphia, indicate it is exceptionallyclean and free of accidents that lead to pollu-tion. Officials of the lightening firm claim theoperation was responsible for only 5 gallonsof oil spilled into the bay during 1975. J This isnot, however, an adequate measure of the
Figure IV-30. Major U.S. refining centers
1.3 MM BID
1.8 MM B/D
(
Refining Centers
Source Office of Technology Assessment
risks of the present system because lighteningoperations force a substantial increase inbarge and small tanker traffic, and thesevessels themselves often are responsible forserious polluting accidents in world harbors. s
One comparison of the lightening systemwith a deepwater port system was providedby the president of the Philadelphia MaritimeExchange several years ago during testimonybefore the Delaware General Assembly:
“On April 28, 1974,” he said, “the largesttanker ever to enter the Delaware Bay,the 191 ,000-dwt Japanese tankerYasutama Maru, arrived at the Big StoneBeach tanker anchorage and lightered herentire cargo of crude oil—1,283,865 bar-
LOOP
rels—using a small ship and barges totransport the oil upriver. The vesselsailed out of the bay in ballast on May 10,During the oil transfer operation, whilein the bay, 15 separate lightening opera-tions were needed. This involved a25,000-dwt tanker which made 4 tripsfrom the anchorage to the upriver refin-ery plus 11 barge voyages to and fromBig Stone Beach anchorage. How muchbetter and safer this could have beenhandled under the controlled conditionsof a deepwater port which would permita tanker to tie up to a platform, transfer-ring its cargo into a pipeline, in a singleoperation, moving the oil via the pipelinedirect to the refinery. ”
i ’
Figure IV-31. Mid-Atlantic refinery capacity as of January 1, 1973
. .
aa
I
r.,
I
Source Office of Technology Assessment and EXXON Corporation
In 1973, tankers brought 870,000 barrels ofcrude oil a day to Delaware River ports and410,000 barrels per day into New York Har-bor.6 The combination of increasing demandand dwindling domestic production in theearly 1970’s led the oil industry to plan newMid-Atlantic refineries to be supplied byforeign crude. At that time, it appeared thatcrude oil demands could be met withrelatively cheap and virtually unlimited sup-plies from the Middle East. (See figure IV-32.)
Several studies commissioned by theFederal Government and by private industrybetween 1968 and 1973 reached the generalconclusions that:7
● Increasing volumes of oil shipped to theUnited States over the next 10 to 25 yearswould be carried by supertankers.
●
●
●
●
●
! , ,. ,
Most of the crude imported by the UnitedStates would be shipped from the MiddleEast and Africa.The United States had a choice of install-ing deepwater ports to handle importsdirectly or relying on transshipment insmaller tankers from deepwater ports inCanada and the Caribbean.
Transshipment would be more expensivethan direct delivery of crude oil in super-tankers to Mid-Atlantic deepwater ports.
The economic and environmental costs ofdredging existing channels in the Mid-Atlantic harbors to enable supertankersto reach existing dock facilities probablywould rule out such an approach.
Deepwater ports could be built in NewEngland, the Mid-Atlantic, the South
Figure IV-32. Oceanborne crude petroleum to the United States— 1969 (millions of barrels per year)
I~
o Imports
Source Executive Summary, “Offshore Terminal System Concepts, ” Maritime Administration
7fl -188 0 - 76 - 13
Atlantic or the Gulf of Mexico withoutmodifying the technology already in usein deepwater ports off the shores of otherindustrial nations.
. The need was greatest in the Mid-Atlan-tic region.
In the early 1970’s, industry and Govern-ment sources talked of moving 2 million bar-rels of crude a day into Delaware River ports,which would mean an average of five arrivalseach day of 55,000-dwt tankers, the largestships that could navigate the Delaware Riverchannels. If the crude came in one 200,000 dwtto 250,000 dwt, it would require lighteninginto 15 smaller vessels or into a deepwaterport.
Many studies between 1970 and 1973stressed the economic advantages of deep-water ports for the Mid-Atlantic. In general,they concluded that it would cost less to shipoil from Africa or the Persian Gulf to eastcoast refineries with supertankers and deep-water ports than with the existing system. Arange of sites and systems were proposed.Savings, when compared to such alternativesas transshipping thru Caribbean ports, wereestimated to be 5–15 cents per barrel (lessthan one-third-of-a-cent per gallon).8 Whilethis is a small unit cost, it translates to majorsavings for a transport system carrying nearlyhalf-a-billion barrels per year to the eastcoast—between $75 million and $225 milliona year.
DEEPWATER PORT PROPOSALS
Studies sponsored by Government and in-dustry in the 1960’s and 1970’s produced avariety of approaches to construction of deep-water ports at specific locations on the eastcoast and in the Gulf of Mexico. All of thestudies drew on experiences abroad, wheredeepwater ports were developed in the 1960’s,principally to handle supertankers in the Per-sian Gulf-to-Europe and the Persian Gulf-to-Japan trade. More than 100 such ports are inuse today, as shown in figure IV-33.
The kind of deepwater ports contemplatedfor various locations around the United Stateswill have their principal use as terminals forvery large tankers carrying crude oil to majorrefining centers from distant major producingfields such as the Persian Gulf.
Other products also can be or are proposedto be transported through offshore terminals,including ore slurries, but most of those arevery special situations.
Deepwater ports are not usually justifiedfor transferring refined products becausesmaller tankers are used to carry refined prod-ucts, the products are widely distributedthrough small, scattered terminals, and thepresent transport system is geared to the useof the smaller tankers within existing harborsand waterways.
A study for the U.S. Maritime Administra-tion by Soros Associates Inc. in 1972, con-cluded that a 500-acre artificial island could bebuilt inside Delaware Bay off the southern tipof New Jersey, creating a port that would han-dle 6 million barrels of crude per day. The portwould have berths for six supertankers.Storage tanks would be located on the islandwith the port.
A study for the Council on EnvironmentalQuality, prepared by Arthur D. Little Inc. in
1973, pictured a port in the Delaware Bay areatransferring about 6.6 million barrels per dayto new refineries in Cumberland and CapeMay Counties of New Jersey. The report saidthat 14 square miles of the counties—whichnow are devoted to farming and resort ac-tivities—would be required for at least 9 newrefineries and 13 new petrochemical plants.As a result of the port and associated indus-tries, the two counties would become “a newindustrial center” with employment doublingto 300,000 workers by the year 2000, thereport said.
Industry’s own private studies resulted inproposals for deepwater ports in the Atlanticoff Long Branch, N.J., and in the DelawareBay.
The Delaware Bay site was proposed by aconsortium of oil companies which own refin-eries along the Delaware River.
The consortium, the Delaware BayTransportation Co., purchased 1,800 acres ofcoastal land in Kent County, Del., for storagetanks, landside headquarters, and a supplybase for the deepwater port. The companiesplanned to build their port 5 miles offshorebut inside the bay. (See figure IV-34.) Theyplanned a sea pier which could berth threesuper tankers of up to 250 ,000 dwtsimultaneously and transfer crude oil intopipelines running first underwater to the tankfarm and then overland to upriver refineries.The port capacity was to be 2 million barrelsper day, an amount the consortium concludedwould satisfy the needs of existing refineries(with expansion that was then planned) andone new refinery (which was then planned byShell Oil Co.). The proposed port was to use anatural deepwater channel into the bay andrequire only “minimal” dredging to maintaina draft of 70 feet along the approaches to the
Figure IV-33. Worldwide single-point mooring installations—1 973
11,
/ ‘i
r
South Atlantic Ocean
port and at the port itself. In the late 1960’s,planners projected that construction wouldcost $193 million.9
Local opposition to the Delaware Bay portwas strong. In 1971, Delaware’s GeneralAssembly approved one of the Nation’sstrongest pieces of land use and environmen-tal legislation, the Delaware Coastal Zone Act,which prohibited the construction of any newheavy industry—including refineries, tank
Ii
- - - - -
Number of Ports
1960 1965 1970 1975
GROWTH OF DEEPWATER PORTSWORLDWIDE.-. .
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
farms, pipelines, and bulk offshore unloadingterminals—in the coastal area. Almost im-mediately after passage of the law, a campaignwas organized to have the law repealed oramended. To date, those efforts have been un-successful.
Before the 1973 Arab oil embargo, EXXONCorp. gave serious consideration to a deep-water port in 110 feet of water some 13 milesoff the coast of Long Branch, N.J. (See figure
Figure IV-34. Proposed deepwater port site in Delaware Bay.
I
I I
I
Source Of f(ce of Technology Assessment and Energy 011 and the State of Delaware
Figure IV-35. Deepwater port site offshore northern New Jersey, proposed by EXXON in 1973
I I
I
I
I
I
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment and EXXON Corp.
IV-35.) The proposal no longer is an activeplan. EXXON has chosen to expand its Bay-town, Tex., refinery rather than its Bayway,N.J., refinery. Total refining capacity in north-ern New Jersey now is about 500,000 barrels,less than half of the capacity that one EXXONofficial said would be required to support anorthern New Jersey deepwater port.
New Jersey residents, particularly in thesouth, opposed construction of deepwaterports off the southern shore and the massiveindustrialization which the Little study indi-cated might result. In 1973, the New JerseyLegislature declined to pass a formal ban on
deepwater ports and related development,and instead made each energy facility pro-posed for the coastal area subject to individualreview. The former Governor, Thomas Cahill,declared himself strongly opposed to plans fora deepwater port that would industrializerural counties. The present Governor, Bren -dan Byrne, has taken a similar public posi-tion. 10
Consortia of oil and petrochemical com-panies also proposed two deepwater port proj -ects in the Gulf of Mexico off the coast ofTexas and Louisiana. Both projects are still ac-tive. (See figure IV-36.)
Figure IV-36. LOOP and Seadock deepwater port sites in the Gulf of Mexico
● ● DallasFort Worth ● Shreveport ,1 *
‘\
. \
\)-/.
‘r .%
●
●
\ \
VeniceMorgan City
Head of ;
oPasses
LOOP
Gulf of Mexico
C o a s t a l Z o n e
oT e r m i n a l S i t e s u n d e r S t u d y
Source Arthur D Little, Inc
Seadock, the Texas terminal, was plannedby a company made up of nine oil and chemi-cal firms with plants in the area. They proposea port of three monobuoys anchored in 100feet of water 26 miles off Freeport. Capacitywill be 2,5 million barrels of oil per day by1980 with an ultimate expansion capacity to 4million barrels per day. The port plan also in-cludes offshore pumping stations which willmove crude oil at the rate of 125,000 barrelsan hour from the monobuoys to inland refin-eries. In 1976, the cost of the system is esti-mated at $659 million.11
LOOP (Louisiana Offshore Oil Port, Inc.)plans a monobuoy port located in 100 feet ofwater 19 miles off the Louisiana coast. Theport will start operation with a capacity of 1.4million barrels a day and expand to a capacityof 3.4 million barrels a day by the year 2000.Cost of the LOOP system is put at $348million for the early phase and $800 million
It has been suggested that offshore deep-water ports could be utilized for mooringsupertankers while offloading cargo intosmaller tankers or barges for transport torefineries rather than through pipelines, as isa more common plan. It would be feasible tooperate such a monobuoy lightening port andsome advantages could be expected, such asemployment of more small tankers and bargesand a more flexible distribution to a variety ofrefinery locations.
The chief disadvantage is that the use ofmore small tankers and barges increases therisk of pollution.
It appears that industry plans for deepwaterports do not presently contemplate using thelightening system; however, offshore lighten-ing has been used in the past and is part of amajor project to supply the new 200,000-bar-rel-per-day “EcOS” refinery in Louisiana for
for the expanded version. 12 the next 3 years. The plan is to offload super-
Figure IV-37. LOOP deepwater port layout
TERMINAL
.
IAN I FOLD TO REFINERIES
LARGE DIAMETER SUBMARINE PIPELINE
PIPELINE PIPELINE
Source “Louisiana Offshore 011 Port, ” LOOP, Inc , New Orleans, Louisiana
tankers into smaller tankers of about 90,000dwt while underway offshore. This systemwill be utilized until the LOOP deepwaterport is ready to handle the oil.13
Faced with a growing number of specificproposals for deepwater ports, Congressenacted the Deepwater Port Act of 1974. TheAct requires that the Secretary of Transporta-tion license all ports located in Federal watersand that the Coast Guard write and enforceregulations for the construction and operationof the ports. Comprehensive Coast Guardregulations were published in the FederalRegister on Nov. 10, 1975,11 along with pro-posed guidelines for developing design cri-teria for specific sites, guidelines for site-specific environmental impact statements, andguidelines for detailed operating procedures.
The Coast Guard is pursuing severalresearch programs to develop design criteriaon which to evaluate future port constructionand operations. The principal concerns, whichwill receive priority research and develop-ment attention, are in the areas of oil spill
prohibits obstructions to navigation anddredging in navigable waters without a permitfrom the Corps, and section 404 of the FederalWater Pollution Control Act of 1972, whichrequires a permit before dredged material canbe deposited in navigable waters.
The Corps of Engineers is not bound by theDeepwater Port Act. It may issue permits onthe basis of its own judgment of an applicant’sdesign without regard to Coast Guard regula-tions for deepwater ports beyond the 3-milelimit. By the same token, the Corps could re-quire ports under its jurisdiction to complywith construction and operation regulationspromulgated under the Deepwater Port Act.
One port in local waters recently has beenapproved by the Corps. Permits for that port,a monobuoy facility to be located about 2miles off the south coast of St. Croix inCanegarden Bay in water depths of 200 to 230feet, were issued to the Virgin Islands Refin-ery Corp. on June 18. Construction of the portwill begin immediately and completion is ex-pected within 3 years.
response systems, oil spill consequences, in- The absence of any required coordinationspection methods, and procedures. It appears between the Corps and Transportation’sthat the Coast Guard approach to regulations Deepwater Ports Office could lead toand further research to improve regulations is problems in the future because there is noreasonable and should provide for future con- guarantee that ports in local waters wouldtangencies. meet minimum safety and environmental.
Seadock and LOOP have both applied for standards set at the Federal level to protect thelicenses under the Deepwater Port Act. The national interest and the interests of States
Delaware Bay Transportation Co. would not other than the host State.
need a license under the act because its pro-posed port is located in the State waters con-trolled by Delaware.
Deepwater ports in local waters require nolicense from the Transportation Departmentunder the Deepwater Port Act, but they do re-quire permits from the U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers.
The Corps’ jurisdiction over nearshoredeepwater ports originates in two laws—theRivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which
The Corps’ Jacksonville division, whichissued the permits for the Virgin Islands port,coordinated its activities with Transportationonly by sending a public notice of the applica-tion to the Coast Guard and by contacting theCoast Guard on the environmental impactstatement. The Jacksonville office also askedthe Coast Guard to develop a vessel move-ment control system for the port, but made noeffort to apply Federal safety or equipmentstandards to the port before approval of thepermit.15
Presently another nearshore application is tion of the ports will be useful in determiningpending in the Virgin Islands, and at least two whether closer coordination of Corps andother ports in State waters are in early plan- Transportation procedures and regulations isning stages elsewhere off the east coast. These needed.applications and the construction and opera-
STATUS OF NEW JERSEY AND DELAWARE PLANS
A deepwater port probably will not be builtto serve the Mid-Atlantic States during thenext 10 years.
The Arab oil embargo and the cloud itplaced over the reliability of imports was amajor factor in the oil industry’s decision topostpone deepwater port development. But itis only one of several factors, including Statepolicies to discourage new refineries, Federalair quality regulations, which have the sameeffect, and sharply inflated construction costs.Another major factor is the oil industry’s deci-sion, faced with growing opposition to refin-eries and encouraged by Federal tax policiesand import quotas, to develop an alternatesystem for supplying Mid-Atlantic oil prod-ucts from Caribbean and Gulf Coast refin-eries. Industry is not likely to abandon thesystem as long as its costs are relatively closeto the costs of refining oil on the Atlanticcoast.
Oil consumption in the United Statesdropped in 1974 and then leveled off in 1975at 16.3 million barrels a day, principallybecause of the 1974–75 recession. Recentforecasts estimate that consumption will climbto 20 million barrels a day by 1985.16
As much as half of the projected 1985 sup-ply may be imported because domestic oilproduction has continued to drop since 1970.Even with production on Alaska’s NorthSlope, domestic output is not likely to returnto its 1970 peak of 11.2 million barrels, at leastin the near future.
Oil consumption in New York, New Jersey,Delaware, and Pennsylvania is expected toclimb to 3.8 million barrels a day by 1985, anincrease of 1.1 million barrels a day over the1975 levels. During that time, total imports ofcrude oil to refineries supplied through NewYork Harbor and the Delaware Bay may in-crease from 1975 levels of 1.2 million barrels aday to 2 million barrels a day only it there areexpansions in refinery capacity,
Estimates in figure IV–38 were developedfrom a February 1976 forecast of demand bythe Federal Energy Administration. Crude oilimport figures assume that there will be some
Figure IV-38. 1976 projections of petroleum supply anddemand
IN MILLIONS OF BARRELS PER DAY
A. UNITED STATES TOTAL
1975 1985
Total Demand 16.3 20.0Imports 6.0 10.0
B. MID-ATLANTIC REGION(New Jersey, Delaware, New York, and Pennsylvania)
1975 1980 1985
Total Demand 2.7 3.4 3.8Total Imports 2.2 2.9 3.3Crude Oil Imports° 1.2 1.5 2.0
‘Likely to f low through any deepwater port
Source Federal Energy Administration, “National Energy Outlook, ” 1976 (for1965 reference case) and with present crude oil to total import ratio extrapo-lated
refinery expansion so that area refineries willcontinue to supply about 55 percent of theregion’s petroleum products.
Increases in excess of refinery capacity inthe Mid-Atlantic will be in product whilecrude oil moves to the Gulf Coast for refiningand redistribution coastwise by small tankersor overland by product pipeline.
About one-third of all oil products used inthe Mid-Atlantic in 1974 were residual fuelswhich were transshipped from the Caribbeanfor generating electricity. Although theFederal Energy Administration forecasts ashift of about 12 percent of electric powergeneration from oil-fired to nuclear or coal-fired plants over the next 10 years, its projec-tions still imply a continued heavy reliance onresiduals. 17
In recent years, State land use and environ-mental policies have discouraged the con-struction of new refineries in coastal areas ofNew Jersey and Delaware.
The Delaware Coastal Zone Act flatlyprohibits construction of refineries or pipelinelandings in the coastal area. Existing Federaland State air quality regulations make con-struction of new refineries along the DelawareRiver and Bay unlikely in the foreseeable futurealthough existing refineries may be expandedwithout exceeding pollution standards.18
Since 1970, an Amerada-Hess refinery inthe Mid-Atlantic region has been closed; plansto double the capacity of a Mobil Oil Co. refin-ery in New Jersey have been canceled; andconstruction has not begun on a Shell Oil Co.refinery, originally planned for a site inDelaware and then for a site in New Jersey.
Because a decision to build a deepwater portwould logically follow—and not force—adecision to build new refineries, a port islikely to be postponed at least until the Mid-Atlantic refinery picture changes.
1’ , 1,
tion of a deepwater port, pushing the costs ofa port inside Delaware Bay from $193 millionto more than $400 million. The estimated costof dredging some 15-million to 20-millioncubic yards of bay bottom for a channel to theport that would handle 250,000-dwt tankershas increased in that time to more than $40million. 19
In 1971, the Delaware Bay TransportationCo. estimated that oil could be transferredthrough its proposed port for 12 cents a bar-rel. At the inflated construction costs, the pricein 1975 would be closer to 25 cents and possi-bly as much as 39 cents if Delaware were totax incoming oil at 1 percent of its marketvalue. 20
At those prices, most of the cost advantageof using supertankers would be lost and theport would provide an economic advantageonly for tankers on the longest trips betweenthe Persian Gulf and the Mid-Atlantic region.Even on that route, savings would be signifi-cant only with tankers of 250,000 dwt ormore. There would be little or no cost advan-tage over lightening for tankers between100,000 dwt and 200,000 dwt. Deepwater porttransfer costs actually could be higher thanlightening for small tankers or for largetankers on shorter runs from Africa or SouthAmerica.
The increased transfer costs would elimi-nate much of the economic advantage whichwas perceived by New Jersey and Delawareresidents to be a prime argument in favor of adeepwater port.
Citizens responding to OTA questionnairessaid they believed the port would reduce thecost of petroleum products by providing amore efficient transportation system.
Not all oil industry officials agree with thecost figures cited in this study, which weregenerated by the PenJerDel Corp., an affiliateof the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce, in
Inflation also has worked against construc- a 1975 study. Industry officials do agree,
however, that a Mid-Atlantic deepwater portwould be marginally feasible in the nearfuture, 21 particularly when its costs are com-pared with the 1975 lightening charge of 8 to11 cents per barrel.
However, one change in the existingDelaware Bay system could revive interest in adeepwater port—for environmental ratherthan economic reasons.
There never has been a major lightening ac-
cident in Delaware Bay. One accident or aseries of accidents could provoke political ac-tion to build a deepwater port not only toeliminate lightening but to reduce the numberof tankers that will be required to carry grow-ing supplies of imported crude oil to docks inthe Delaware River.
Many people responding to the OTA publicparticipation questionnaire said a reduction inthe risk of lightening accidents is a major argu-ment in favor of building a deepwater port.
DESCRIPTION OF DEEPWATER PORT TECHNOLOGYIN THE MID-ATLANTIC
If a deepwater port were constructed in theMid-Atlantic, it would probably be amonobuoy port located off southern NewJersey.
The OTA study investigated a range of tech-nical and siting options for a port underseveral demand assumptions. Because thecapacity to expand refineries is substantiallygreater in the Delaware Bay area than innorthern New Jersey, the study assumed theport would be oriented toward the DelawareBay refineries and located 30 to 32 miles offthe New Jersey coast. At such a site, the portwould be in waters under Federal jurisdictionand would be located far enough from thecoast to serve the largest supertankers in theworld fleet, the 480,000 dwt, which require110 feet of water depth for maneuvering. (Seefigure IV-39.)
Because of uncertainties about import pro-jections and the low level of industry interestin any near term project, this description ofport technology is confined to one logical-sized port and its impacts.
It should be emphasized that the site andtype of port selected relate only to technical
feasibility y. Basic changes in Governmentpolicy, the economics of oil distribution, andstandards governing air pollution would benecessary before the events described in thisreport could actually take place.
Several general categories of deepwaterports now operating around the world couldbe adapted to the east coast, including the in-tegrated, bulk cargo, island port—whichwould require much more detailed planningthan has been done to date—and the struc-tural pier built for alongside mooring oftankers—which would be a likely design foruse inside the Delaware Bay.
The OTA study assumed that the choicewould be a monobuoy, the least expensiveand most versatile system in the presentworld network of more than 100 deepwaterports. This is essentially the same technologyproposed for LOOP and Seadock in the Gulf ofMexico.
The technology for monobuoys has been muse since 1960. Foreign ports have demon-strated safe operations over several years ofintensive use. Although it is true that theUnited States has no experience with the ports
Figure IV-39. Hypothetical deepwater port site offshore New Jersey coast
I
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Source “Tankers and the U S Energy Situation, ” Poricelli and Keith.
in its waters, many of the ports in the world- Mooring system (CALM). (See figure IV-40.)wide system are owned by the multinationaloil companies which would be able to transfertheir knowledge to American sites. In addi-tion, the technology for component parts ofthe monobuoy system—the platforms,hookups, pumps, pipelines, and storagetanks—has been in use in offshore explorationand production, shipping, lightening, and dis-tribution of oil in the United States for severaldecades. .
Two types of monobuoys are presently inuse and could be adapted to the Mid-Atlantic.The most common is the Catenary Anchor Leg
The other, more recent, design is the SingleAnchor Leg Mooring system (SALM). (Seefigure IV-41.)
The CALM is a floating steel cyclinder 30-to 50-feet across and 15 feet thick which istethered to the sea bottom by 6 to 8 anchorsand chains. Rubber hoses rise from a connec-tion with a pipeline buried under the sea floorthrough the center of the buoy and float onthe ocean surface. Tankers tie up to the CALMand launch crews guide floating hoses to thetankers, hoist the hoses aboard, and securethem to discharge manifolds. Crude is then
Figure IV-41. Single anchor leg mooring (SALM)
MOORING LINES
MOORING BUOY
LOADING HOSE TO TANKER
Source “Tankers and the U S Energy Situation, ” Poricelli and Keith
pumped through the hoses, into the pipelineand on to shoreside storage tanks.
Because tankers can weathervane aroundthe CALM and maintain a heading into windand waves, there usually is no need for protec-tive breakwaters even offshore. But becauselaunches are required to help secure hoses to atanker’s manifold, mooring operations cannotbe conducted in seas higher than 6 to 8 feet.Once moored, however, a tanker can dis-charge crude oil in waves as high as 10 to 12feet and winds of up to 40 knots.
One drawback to the CALM is that there isa danger of tankers overriding the buoy andtearing the hose connections which aremounted on top of the buoy. The newer SALMsystem reduces that danger. In the SALMdesign, the steel buoy is tethered by one verti-cal anchor chain. Instead of rising through thebuoy, the rubber hoses connect to a pipeline
below the water at a point deep enough thatthe danger of a break in the hose-pipeline con-nection is reduced in the event a tanker col-lides with a buoy.
In addition to the monobuoy, the port com-plex would include one or more pumping sta-tions to force the crude through the pipelinesto shore. The stations would be mounted onstructural-steep platforms fastened to the seafloor with pilings similar to those that supportoffshore oil platforms. One or more deckswould be mounted to support pumps, ahelicopter pad, and crew quarters. The pump-ing station would be located at least 8,000 feetfrom the monobuoy to reduce the danger ofhaving it rammed by a tanker entering orleaving the port proper.
If a port off New Jersey were planned tohandle 1.6 to 2 million barrels per day ini-tially, it would consist of two monobuoys
situated about 5,000 feet apart. (See figureIV-42.) The port could be expanded at inter-vals of 5 years to increase capacity to 3.5million barrels per day to satisfy the area’sneeds for at least 20 years.
Several firms already supply monobuoys,which would be constructed at existing yardsand towed or carried on barges to the Mid-Atlantic site to be anchored in place. Pumpingplatforms and other equipment are also sup-plied by existing specialty firms and shipyardsso that, except for pipelines, the production ofequipment probably would not generateemployment for the Delaware/New Jerseyregion. Pipe could be fabricated on the eastcoast,
Construction of the offshore portions of thedeepwater port would require about 2 yearsafter a license was granted.22 During the con-struction phase, about 20 acres of waterfront
land would be required for support. Such sup-port includes construction crew and equip-ment staging, repair, and pipeline supply. Thisland could be used for headquarters opera-tions after the port was completed.23
Pipelines from port to shore would be putin place by lay barges using procedures identi-cal to those for laying pipes for Outer Conti-nental Shelf oil and gas production. Thepipeline from a port off New Jersey couldcome ashore between Townsend’s Inlet andSea Isle City, N.J. If that occurred, a tank farmwould be built in central Cape May Countywith the pipeline continuing overland to theCamden area and to the refineries,
Typically, tank farms for deepwater portswill store 10 times the port’s daily capacity toassure refineries of a continuous supply ofcrude even if the port is shut down because ofbad weather or an accident. A typical storage
Figure IV-42. Hypothetical deepwater port layout including onshore facilities
TANK FARM(15 Million Barrels ] \ PLATFORM
on 125 Acres)I
RETAINING
\
-
SHORE SUPPORT FACILITY
. - . . ---T A N K S V
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
tank holds 600,000 barrels of crude; therefore,the initial two-buoy port discussed herewould require 25 tanks on 125 acres of land tostore a 10-day supply of 1.6 million barrelsper day. If the port were expanded to 3.5million barrels per day capacity, 58 storagetanks on 250 to 300 acres of land would be re-quired.
If new refineries were built, distributionpipelines to these could be added from thetank farm.
There is substantial public concern over po-tential oil spills associated with deepwaterports, especially large spills which may reachNew Jersey and Delaware beaches. But an oilspill risk analysis prepared for this study indi-cates that the likelihood of spills in rivers, har-bors, and coastal waters out to 50 miles isreduced by about one-half if a super-tanker/deepwater port system, rather thansmall tankers, is used to move oil.24
Two principal factors make the risks of oilspills from deepwater ports lower than therisk from small tankers., First, a deepwaterport reduces the number of tankers that mustbe used to move a given quantity of oil. Sec-ond, if oil is spilled at a deepwater port, thedistance between the port and the shorelinemay reduce damage to the coastal areas.
The OTA oil spill risk analysis for a deep-water port of 1.6 million barrels per daycapacity located about 30 miles off the NewJersey coast was based on data from regionaland worldwide spills from ports and tankersof all sizes. The results of the analysis indicatethat over a 15-year period there is a 50 percentchance that 150,000 barrels of oil will bespilled within 50 miles of shore by a deep-water port/supertanker system. During thesame period, there is a 50 percent chance thatsmall tankers will spill 310,000 barrels in thesame area. Total spillage from the port systemin the same time period and area could rangefrom a low of 50,000 barrels to a high of720,000 barrels. Total spillage from the small
tankers could range from a low of 32,000 bar-rels to a high of 1.4 million barrels. The highestimates include the pessimistic assumptionof a major tanker accident. (See figure IV-43. )
The statistical average of these estimatesgives deepwater ports a two-to-one advantageover small tankers based on total spillagewithin 50 miles of shore.
When spills in the seas beyond 50 miles areconsidered, there is less difference betweenthe two systems. This is because of two factorswhich are common to both systems: 1) mostdischarges from routine tank cleaning occurfar at sea; and 2) most spills from major acci-dents such as structural failures have occurredfar at sea.25
Because there are fewer supertankers andthey have been in use a shorter time, the max-imums used for the deepwater port/super-tanker figure are higher and more uncertainthan those for small tankers.
The OTA Working Paper on oil spill riskassessment describes the data and basis forestimating this potential oil spillage. Fromthese spillage estimates, the study concludesthat a deepwater port system would offer en-vironmental advantages over small tankers inexisting ports. This study assumes that pollu-tion control technology and the tankers them-selves utilizing deepwater ports will havesafety features equivalent to the smallertanker alternative.
The Coast Guard has prepared for OTA ananalysis of potential oil spill movementsshould a spill occur at the deepwater port. Thedata indicates that with a stagnant summerhigh pressure system producing steady southto east winds, a spill could be expected tomove ashore within 3 days.26 Such projectionsare subject to great uncertainties because thestate of knowledge about the movement of oilat sea is limited and little data is available.
Regulations recently issued by the Depart-ment of Transportation (DOT) for deepwater
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Figure IV-43. Fifteen (15) year totals of oil spills from one 1.6 million barrel per day deepwater port comparedto small tanker alternative
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment, Working Paper #3
port operations require an operator to provideonsite oil spill containment and cleanupequipment for spills of less than 1,000 barrelswhich might result from malfunctions in portoperations. In addition, the operator musthave “readily accessible” equipment to cleanup larger spills on a scale that might resultfrom a tanker accident.
Equipment will be subject to approval
based on port capacity, operating conditions,weather, experience of the operator, andavailability of equipment. The operator will berequired to prepare an operations manualdescribing procedures for use of his ownresources as well as possible use of the Na-tional Contingency Plan.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Ad-ministration (NOAA) deepwater ports project
office is responsible for evaluating environ-mental risks associated with deepwater portsand for relating those risks to specific States. Arecent NOAA attempt to assess environmentalrisks to Florida, Mississippi, and Texas fromthe proposed LOOP and Seadock terminals,however, confirmed the shortcomings of ex-isting data for use in quantifying and forecast-ing damage and costs. NOAA is exploringmethods to improve both the data base andanalytical techniques.
The situation off Florida, Mississippi, andTexas also surfaced another problem—the ap-parent confusion over which States shouldshare in the benefits and protections of theDeepwater Port Act when a port is locatedoffshore.
The. Deepwater Port Act gives “adjacent”coastal States a role in approving a license andbenefiting from the protections and provi-sions of the law. But, except for those Statesdirectly connected by pipeline, the Secretaryof Transporation makes the final determina-tion of which States are adjacent to a proposeddeepwater port.
Because of the benefits of adjacent statusand the fact that there are a large number ofStates close together on the east coast, severalStates may ask to be designated as adjacentcoastal States if a deepwater port should beconsidered for licensing off the coast of NewJersey and Delaware.
Recently, Florida asked to be declared anadjacent coastal State in connection with thelicensing of LOOP and Seadock deepwaterports off Louisiana and Texas. The Floridacase brought attention to an ambiguity in thelaw which may also figure in any applicationsfor adjacent status made by Mid-AtlanticStates.
Florida asked for adjacent status because itfelt its beaches and coastal wildlife preservesand parks would be subjected to an added risk
through the Florida Straits to and from thedeepwater ports. The Florida request wasdenied by the Secretary of Transportation on aquestion of statutory interpretation.
The Secretary ruled that tankers in transit toand from the port should not be considered indetermining the risks to States. That rulinghas now been appealed in the courts.
Citizens who participated in the OTA studyseemed satisfied that the existing technologyand regulations for deepwater ports are ade-quate for safe operation. But there was con-cern that the supertankers using a deepwaterport would be major sources of pollution,
A recent OTA report, “Oil Transportationby Tankers: An Analysis of Marine Pollutionand Safety Measures, ” examines the evolutionof tankers and the pollution and safetyproblems they cause.27 It presents approachesfor reducing pollution and improving thesafety of operations and reviews the interna-tional and domestic regulation of these opera-tions. The world fleet of tankers spill about11.1 million barrels of oil into the seas everyyear: 7.5 million barrels during routine opera-tions such as cleaning tanks and dumpingballast, 1.6 million barrels as a result of acci-dents, and 2.0 million barrels during drydock-ing operations. 28 This spillage accounts fornearly one-third of all ocean oil pollution.
Both the Coast Guard and internationalorganizations are attempting to solve some ofthe problems of oil pollution of the seas byimplementing stricter tanker standards.
In 1973 the International Conference onMarine Pollution drew up a treaty which re-quired new tankers of 70,000 dwt or more tohave a segregated ballast capability but the re-quirement has not been approved by all mem-
ber nations. The concept of segregated ballastis that a tank vessel must have sufficientspaces set aside for carrying ballast waterseparately so that in all but unusually rough
of oil spills as a result of tankers moving weather conditions it will not be necessary to
introduce ballast water into cargo tank spaces.The concept has gained worldwide acceptanceas offering major environmental benefits. 29
The Coast Guard has implemented a similarrequirement for U.S. tankers in domestic serv-ice and proposed the same for U.S. tankers inforeign service and foreign tankers visitingU.S. waters.
In addition, the International Conferenceon Marine Pollution recommended thatgovernments undertake concerted efforts toreduce the discharge of oil from ships into thesea with a view to complete elimination of in-ternational pollution by the end of thisdecade.30
To follow up on that recommendation, theCoast Guard is now considering an extensionof the segregated ballast concept to make itmandatory for all existing U.S. tankers of
70,000 dwt or more. The Coast Guard hasasked for comments on the feasibility andeconomic impact of retrofitting U.S. tankersand has publicly said that the agency believesthe retrofit is possible. According to a noticepublished in the Federal Register on May 13,1976, the Coast Guard favors the change nowbecause: 1) the present tanker tonnage surplusis expected to last for at least 5 years, allowingtime for necessary shipyard alterations with-out much disruption in the transportationsystem; 2) most vessels will require onlyminor changes to the cargo and ballast pipingsystems; and 3) increases in consumer cost ofoil as a result of the change will have only aminimum impact on the present inflationarytrend because transportation costs are arelatively small part of the price consumerspay for oil products.31
The Proposal for a FloatingMid-Atlantic
BACKGROUNDThe need for vast amounts of cooling water
has ruled out many potential sites for nuclearpowerplants around the Nation. Late in 1972,New Jersey’s largest public utility companyconcluded that the answer to its own sitingproblems would be floating nuclear plants,moored off the coast where they would havevirtually unlimited amounts of seawater forcooling. The company also concluded thefloating plants could be built for less moneyand be less environmentally damaging thanland-based plants. Access to cooling waterwas crucial to Public Service Electric and GasCo., which generates more than 60 percent ofthe State’s power. Its customers were usingelectricity at rates that meant doubling PublicService’s generating capacity every decade orso and water supply problems were ruling outmany potential sites for new generatingcapacity.
Today, after 3 years of analyzing theoffshore power concept, staff members of theNuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) andsome other Federal agencies have come to thesame general conclusion about floatingnuclear powerplants. These staff judgmentsare tentative and are not in any sense formalendorsements of the concept or the construc-tion plans. The Public Service proposal stillmust work its way through a series of reviews,public hearings, and decisions by State andFederal agencies and meet challenges from en-vironmental groups, New Jersey beach com-munities, and some nuclear scientists andengineers who say that the systems are un-necessary and may be unworkable or unsafe.Before an offshore nuclear plant can startgenerating power it must clear three separatestages of licensing. The first of these probablywill not come before 1977.
Nuclear Powerplant in the
The preliminary NRC staff reviewsnevertheless have provided enough en-couragement to the companies involved in thefloating nuclear powerplants—the AtlanticGenerating Station Units 1 and 2—that theyhave spent more than $120 million thus far forplans, environmental studies, and in tooling-up for production.
Nothing on the scale of the offshore com-plex of floating plants and protective break-water has ever been built in ocean waters any-where in the world. More cubic yards of rockand concrete will go into the breakwater thatwill create a lagoon of calm water for theplants and shield them from the pounding ofocean waves than went into many major damsin the United States. The gantry crane in theFlorida shipyard where the plants will be builtcould straddle the dome of the U.S. Capitol.
The powerplants will be assembled byOffshore Power Systems, a subsidiary ofWestinghouse Electric Corp., at a shipyard ona manmade island near Jacksonville, Fla., 8miles up the St. John’s River from the eastcoast.
The platform for each plant will be a steelbarge measuring nearly 400 feet square and 44feet deep, reinforced with bulkheads to form ahoneycomb of watertight compartments. Apressurized water reactor (PWR) similar toWestinghouse reactors now operating in land-based powerplants will be mounted on eachbarge inside a 17-story domed containmentstructure with steam turbines, generators, andoffice buildings clustered around it.
The domed containment structure will risenearly 18 stories above the ocean surface andfrom the shore will look much like the distantskyline of a small city.
] ‘) ,s I I { I [ ‘I{( ~1’( )> \ I 1 ( ~i; \ I I ~ ) \ [ I “\~ ‘\. \ ( I I \ [{ I ‘( J \ “1 I 1< I ‘ 1 \ \ I I ‘\ I 1 I I \ 1 I I ) \ I I \ ‘ . I I (
Figure IV-44. Size comparison of proposed Atlantic Generating Station
Source Public Service Electric& Gas Company and Off Ice of Technology Assessment
While the floating plants are being built,construction workers will build the largeststructure ever placed in ocean waters-amassive, curving breakwater of 5.6 milliontons of stone and cast concrete that will span49 acres of ocean floor and rise 64 feet abovethe water surface.
Powerplants will be towed at intervals of 2years from Florida, moored, sealed in thebreakwater with a wall of concrete caissons,and connected to 4 miles of underwater cableleading to shore and the power distributiongrid, Public Service plans are to have the firstplant operational in 1985 and the second in1987.
Each plant is designed to generate 1,150megawatts (MWe) of power, a supply thatPublic Service estimates will provide aboutone-third of the additional power it must begenerating each year by 1987. The plants have
a design life of 40 years, after which they maybe shut down and decommissioned.
When Public Service began exploring theoffshore plant concept in the late 1960’s,electrical energy consumption in its servicearea had been increasing at an annual rate ofnearly 8 percent.1 The eastern blackout of1965 still was a recent memory and there wasstrong pressure not only to keep up with ris-ing demand but also to maintain reserves ofpower to prevent future blackouts andbrownouts,
There were counterpressures as well. PublicService customers are in the most denselypopulated wedge of land in the most denselypopulated State in the Nation and the com-pany had to compete with homes and otherindustries for both land and water.
By the early 1970’s, environmental restric-
( I I ! \ \ J]<( I ~.’- 1( ) \ ( ) I 1 I i 1 ! ~ ~ 1 ‘ i ! ~I , )(,
Figure IV-45. Visualization of a floating nuclear powerplant in comparison to the USS Franklin D. Roosevelt
Visualization of a floating nuclear powerplant
Roosevelt Source Public Service Electric & Gas Company
tions on air and water pollution also were tak-ing effect, making the search for sites evenmore difficult and adding months and, insome cases, years to the lead times forpowerplant construction.
The 1973 oil embargo and four-fold rise inprices that followed the embargo took some ofthe pressure off Public Service. The price ofelectricity rose sharply with the price of oil,which was then being used to generate 77 per-cent of New Jersey’s power. Higher energyprices coupled with a recession drove downconsumption so that by 1976, Public Serviceestimated that the growth in consumption inits area would be only slightly more than 4percent a year through 1985, about two-thirdsof the preembargo growth rate. z
Even at this slower growth rate, New Jerseywill need the equivalent of four new 1,150megawatt powerplants for baseload powergeneration by 1995 in addition to the AtlanticGenerating Station (AGS) and other newplants that are scheduled for operation by1987. 3
During the period of steep growth in de-mand in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, theoffshore plant was a critical element in PublicService’s long-range plans for providing newgeneration facilities. Its construction schedulecalled for having large amounts of newgenerating capacity in place by the early1980’s. Two land-based nuclear plants nearSalem, N.J., were running 5 years behindschedule. Construction of two more nuclearunits was delayed when objections to the useof Newbold Island in the Delaware Riverforced Public Service to relocate the project toHope Creek, just north of the Salem plants.Lead times for land-based plants elsewhere inthe State were running between 8 and 12years.
The sharp drop in electricity demand in1974 and 1975 allowed the company to slip itsconstruction schedules. But by 1976, with leadtimes for land-based plants expanding rather
Figure IV-46. Annual observed and forecast values forenergy consumption and peak-hour demand, 1963-1987, for Public Service Electric & Gas Company area.The planned generating capacity is also shown for 1975-1987.
b I
1970 1975 1960 1965 1990
Source Draft Environmental Statement—Atlantic Gas Service
than shrinking, the AGS was seen by the com-pany as its best hope of meeting projected de-mands for electricity with nuclear power.
The first design for a floating nuclearpowerplant was commissioned in themid-1960’s by the Atomic Energy Commis-sion (AEC) which was searching for a way toinsulate nuclear plants from earthquakes.4
The concept was endorsed by the EnergyPolicy Staff of the President’s Office of Scienceand Technology in August 1970. s The staff, incooperation with an interagency task force,stated that, “The use of offshore siting adja-cent to coastal cities would circumvent theproblems of land availability, objections on
esthetic grounds, and assure the adequacy ofcooling water. ”6
Public Service adapted the concept andasked the Nation’s four reactor manufacturersto test its feasibility. Westinghouse, GeneralElectric Co., and Babcock & Wilcox Corp. re-sponded with proposals. In December 1970, aWestinghouse study team concluded that thefloating plant could be built and the next yearOffshore Power Systems was created as a jointventure of Westinghouse and Tenneco Inc. tomanufacture floating plants. Tenneco with-drew from the venture in early 1975. In Sep-tember 1972, after conducting its own site sur-veys off the New Jersey coast, Public Servicecontracted to buy the first two floating plantsto be produced by Offshore Power Systems. In1973, Public Service signed a contract for twomore floating plants.
Several advantages of supplying electricityfrom offshore stations have been advanced inrecent years by supporters and some analystsof the concept. Promoters of offshore plantstake the position that:
. Unlimited supplies of cooling water areavailable at ocean sites and the environ-mental consequences of dischargingheated water into the ocean will beminimal compared with the conse-quences of discharging heated water intorivers, lakes, and bays.
. Offshore construction eliminates the dis-ruption of coastal marshlands and estu-aries to a great extent.
. The floating powerplant concept movesin the direction of standardized nuclearplant designs, a g o a l t h e N u c l e a rRegulatory Commission (then theAtomic Energy Commission) set in 1972.
. Shipyard construction of plants willshorten the time required to put a nuclearplant in operation after a decision ismade to build it.
. Volume production can cut costs and im-prove quality control.
Federal and State agencies have beenreviewing the offshore powerplant proposalinformally since late 1971 and formally sinceJuly 1973, when the AEC docketed anOffshore Power Systems application for a per-m i t t o b u i l d e i g h t f l o a t i n g n u c l e a rpowerplants.
During that time, the AGS has received en-couragement from the staff of the Council onEnvironmental Quality, which views the pro-posal with “guarded optimism.”7 The NRC’sOffice of Nuclear Reactor Regulation hasdeclared the project “generally acceptable” asto environmental impact and risk. 8 The sameoffice concluded in a Safety Evaluation Reportpublished in September 1975 that with somemodifications in design “there is reasonableassurance that . . . (the reactors could be in-stalled) without undue risk to the health andsafety of the public.”9
On June 7, 1976, the NRC’s independentAdvisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards(ACRS) issued an interim report on the float-ing nuclear plant saying that if a number ofissues were resolved “the floating nuclearplant units can be constructed with reasonableassurance that they can be operated withoutundue risk to the health and safety of thepublic.” 10
Several major contentions challenging someof these claims have been raised by inter-venors11 in preheating conferences since 1974.Among those admitted by the Atomic Safetyand Licensing Board (ASLB) for further con-sideration are:
. The plant will be vulnerable to externalhazards such as ship collisions, airplanecrashes, and severe storms, and damageto the plant could result in dispersal ofradioactive materials injurious to humanhealth and aquatic life.
● Transportation and handling of radioac-tive fuel and wastes involve risks tohuman safety and health and to themarine and coastal environment.
. Evacuation in case of an accident will bedifficult, especially in summer months,and there are no adequate plans or pro-cedures for such emergencies.
● Fear of nuclear accidents will reduce theappeal of the area for recreational usesand have a detrimental effect on theregion’s tourist -based economy.
● Inadequate consideration has been givenin the environmental cost-benefit balanceto the adverse somatic and genetic conse-quences to marine, animal, and plant life.
● Inadequate attention has been given tothe radiological impact on humans whomay boat or swim in the vicinity of thefacility and to the cumulative effects ofradioactive substances injected along thefood chain from plankton throughhumans.
● Operation of the plant will cause thermalpollution and under some circumstancescould result in fish kills and otherdamage to marine life.
● The breakwater may cause changes inwave and tidal patterns and adverselyaffect the shoreline.
. Other impacts that could be adverse in-clude industrialization of the oceanaround the site, onshore supportfacilities, dredging, and defects in under-water electrical transmission lines.
● NRC should prepare a comprehensive,programmatic EIS on the construction offloating nuclear powerplants locatedoffshore on or above the ContinentalShelf.
Among other contentions raised by the in-
tervenors but not admitted by the ASLB are:
●
●
●
●
●
●
Radioactive discharges during the nor-mal operation of the plant or from an ac-cident would pose a risk to public healthand safety and cause damage to marineorganisms.
The floating nuclear powerplant is an un-tested technology and the coastal area ofAtlantic County will be a virtual testingground near major population centers.One intervener urged full-scale pro-totype testing before any plant is in-stalled.
There is uncertainty as to the reliabilityof the safety systems, including the con-tainment structure.
There are risks from the corrosive effectsof the marine environment on the plant’sstructure, and the effects of erosion andshifting of the ocean floor on the stabilityof the breakwater.
The plant will be vulnerable to sabotage.
There should be more thorough studiesof alternatives to the plant.
The State of New Jersey, which has notsought official intervener status, has raisedthe following points in a May 4, 1976, letter tothe NRC by Environmental Protection Com-missioner David J. Bardin:
● The possible consequences of a “severe”accident should be considered in thelicensing process.
● All safety risks from the plants should beaddressed.
New Jersey and Delaware residents whotook part in a public participation programcarried out as part of this study are generallywell aware that advantages and disadvantagesmust be weighed in deciding whether to buildfloating nuclear powerplants.
Information gathered in two regional
workshops, from 1,000 responses to an OTAquestionnaire, and from press reports andstatements at public hearings show that thepublic sees the disadvantages as involvingquestions of safety, environmental degrada-tion, and high construction costs. The advan-tages include increased energy supplies withresulting economic expansion and cheaperpower than would be possible with continueduse of oil-fired generating plants. Safety con-cerns include a perception that floatingnuclear powerplants are experimental andthat there is limited experience on which tobase estimates of risk and reliability.
Among the advantages cited in question-naires and workshops are that nuclearpowerplants are less polluting generally thanfossil-fueled plants. In turn, participants sawadvantages in floating plants over land-basedplants in their distance from shore and theelimination of pressures on New Jersey watersupplies for cooling water.
In this study, OTA has analyzed availableinformation on costs, benefits, environmentalimpact, safety, waste disposal systems,transportation, and decommissioning ac-tivities associated with the floating plants, Thestudy does not attempt to evaluate generalcontroversies about the safety and perform-ance of nuclear plants; these are beyond thescope of the coastal effects analysis. It con-centrates, instead, on exploring differences be-tween the designs of floating and land-basedplants and comparing the advantages and dis-advantages of each.
As a result of this comparative analysis, thestudy finds that:
● Although the costs of the first two float-ing nuclear plants, AGS 1 and 2, areabout the same as the costs of a similarland-based plant, volume production andstandardization eventually could slowdown the rapid escalation of capital costs
of nuclear powerplants.
● Offshore siting of nuclear plants wouldreduce thermal pollution and eliminatedisruption of marshlands and estuariesthat would be associated with land-basedor shoreline nuclear installations.
. Routine operations would produce lessair pollution than would routine opera-tions of a coal-fired plant equipped withflue gas desulfurization and other ad-vanced pollution control equipment.
. The NRC has not evaluated and does notplan to evaluate risks from accidents infloating nuclear plants comprehensively
enough to permit either a general com-parison of the relative risks from land-based and floating plants or an assess-ment of the specific risks associated withdeploying Atlantic Generating StationUnits 1 and 2.12
● Several technical problems of design andoperation remain to be resolved, includ-ing procedures for transporting nuclearfuel to a floating plant and carryingradioactive wastes to shore, the processof decommissioning a floating plant, andthe techniques of towing plants fromFlorida to the Mid-Atlantic coast.
● There do not seem to be any significantdifferences between land-based andfloating powerplants as to releases ofradioactive material and other pollutantsduring routine operations.
. Although the nuclear reactor steam sup-ply and turbine generator systems andthe floating barge are, separately, proventechnologies, the combination is not. Inaddition, there are unique features in-cluding the barge-to-cable connection,the breakwater, and the mooring systemthat have not been tested by experience.
TECHNOLOGY
The operating principle of all steam electricplants is similar, whether the source of heat iscoal, oil, gas, or a nuclear chain reaction. In allsuch plants, heat turns water to steam whichpowers turbines to drive electric generators.The steam is recondensed to water andpumped back through the steam-generatingsystem.
In an AGS plant, the process will begin in-side a reactor vessel, a steel tank five storieshigh and weighing 550 tons. When thousandsof thin metal rods packed with uranium diox-ide are clustered at the bottom of the reactorvessel, atoms of uranium-235 begin splittingin a chain reaction to produce the plant’s heatsource.
A closed loop of pipes—the coolantsystem —in which water is pumped underpressure through the reactor vessel andaround the fuel rods serves two purposes. Thewater moderates the fission process and at thesame time draws off the heat energy and car-ries it through tubing in four steam-generatortanks. The average temperature of water in thecooling circuit is about 600°F. The system ispressurized to prevent the water from boilingat that high temperature.
If all cooling systems failed, the core wouldrapidly overheat, reaching temperatures near5000°F at its center within 30 minutes and fall-ing in a molten mass to the bottom of thepressure vessel within hours. An emergencycore cooling system (ECCS) is designed to pre-vent such a core-melt, which could producean accident with large public consequences.
A second closed loop of water turns tosteam when it flows along the hot tubes insidethe generator tanks which are some seven sto-ries tall and 22 feet in diameter. There are foursteam-generators in the AGS plants.
In the final phase of the process, steam ex-pands through turbines to drive generators
and into a chamber where a stream of water,flowing through condensor tubes at a rate of 1million gallons a minute, cools the expendedsteam and condenses it to water which then ispumped back through the steam-generatingcycle.
The open ocean provides a virtuallyunlimited supply of water for cooling at leastsmall numbers of offshore plants.
Nuclear Reactor
The reactor vessel and steam-generatingtanks are enclosed in a steel-lined cylinder ofconcrete 3 feet thick that has a domed top andstands 169 feet tall—the containment struc-ture. The domed containment building isdesigned primarily to prevent steam andradioactive materials from escaping into theatmosphere as the result of a major accidentthat might involve a rupture in the coolant-water loop or the steam-generating system.Each AGS containment building will hold 2.5million pounds of ice designed to condensesteam rapidly and reduce pressure on thewalls of the containment building in the eventof a major accident. One ice-condenser systemalready has been installed as part of an operat-ing land-based plant; ice condensers will beused in nine other land-based plants nowunder construction. Between the reactor vesseland the containment building, steel and con-crete shields are used to prevent the escape ofradiation produced in the fission process.
Steel buildings will be mounted on the plat-form around the containment structure tohouse turbines, generators, power-transmis-sion circuits, the reactor control center, andoffice and living space for 120 plant personnel.
Platform
The powerplant is mounted on a steelbarge nearly 400 feet square and 44 feet deepwith watertight compartments, some of which
Figure IV-47. Cutaway diagram of a floating nuclear plant containment building
of the Steam-electric system
ICE CONDENSER
-% CONTAINMENT BUILDING
STEAM GENERATORSTEAM LINES TO TURBINESREACTOR
Simplified Flow Diagram - .
I
r
SECONDARYCOOLANT SYSTEM
rTURBINES
ILCOOLANT “’--- ’ “
I H r
CONDENSERS
u4 II i
Source (Top Diagram) Offshore Power Systems
(Bottom Diagram) Pages 3-7, Part 11, Draft Enwronmental Statement on the Manufacture of Floating Nuclear Powerplants
, ,
can be filled or drained for use as trim tanks tokeep the huge platform level,
Cooling water is drawn through six intakescreens on the landward side of the plat-form-each measuring 27 feet by 15 feet. Acorrosion-prevention system using sacrificialanodes on the floor of the mooring basin willbe installed.
Breakwater
One massive, D-shaped breakwater willshield both floating plants from ocean move-
ment and from ships and will provide a basinof calm water in which the platforms willfloat.
In the first phrase of construction, 10 emptyconcrete caissons about 200 feet long, 100 feetwide, and 50 feet deep will be floated into asemicircle and filled with sand to sink them tothe ocean floor. The caissons provide a baseagainst which some 3.5 million tons of rockand a covering layer of 17,000 cast-concreteforms called dolos will be piled to form theseaward protection for the powerplants. Most
Figure IV-48. Offshore siting rubble mound breakwater, Atlantic Generating Station. - — . . . . = .
Graded Rock. Sea Level.
.:
I STATIONARY CAISSON
:BREAKWATER CROSS SECTION!~
—~I
‘ \
\STATIONARY
CLOSUREi Crowni! BREAKWATER~ El. 32.0’
STATIONARY c/
E
/ MAIN BREAKWATEREl. 0.0’ Paved Surface CAISSONS
RUBBLE MOUND3
Source Public Service Electric & Gas Company
of the dolos weigh 42 tons; some range up to62 tons. Before the powerplants are mooredinside the semicircle, a straight line of sevencaissons will be sunk to the bottom on thelandward side of the mooring basin to com-plete the protective shield. Two of these willbe removed to float each barge into place andthen repositioned.
! I i’ ‘ ~ “
Power Transmission
The generating station’s combined outputof 2,300 megawatts of electricity, enough tomeet the needs of a community of more than 1million people, will be transmitted to shorethrough oil-cooled copper cables sheathed inplastic and a lead-alloy casing and buried 10feet beneath the stable ocean floor.
DEPLOYMENT
The Public Service schedule for the AGScalls for one powerplant to start producingelectricity in 1985 and a second to be online in1987. Between now and then, eight Federalagencies and the State of New Jersey must ap-prove one or another aspect of the project. Thecrucial clearances are those required from theNRC and the New Jersey Department of En-vironmental Protection.
The NRC will make three separate licensingdecisions on the project. Clearance for con-struction of the barge-mounted plants will beshared by the Commission and the U.S. CoastGuard, which have signed a memorandum ofunderstanding under which approval of bothagencies will be required before a floatingplant may be moved to a generating site. Ap-proval also will be required from the U.S.Army Corps of Engineers, the EnvironmentalProtection Agency, the Federal Aviation Ad-ministration, the National Oceanic and At-mospheric Administration, the Department ofJustice, and the Department of the Interior atsuccessive stages of the project.
Site
The minimum water depth for the floatingplants of the AGS is 45 feet. Some dredgingwill be done to level the bottom to obtain thisdepth. With less than 45 feet of water, there isnot enough clearance between the platformand the basin bottom to assure the barge will
not be grounded in hurricane waves, a tidalwave, or a tornado.13
The AGS will be inside the 3-mile limit,which places the plants inside U.S. territorialwaters and under Federal jurisdiction, andwithin the legal jurisdiction of the State ofNew Jersey. Both powerplants will berelatively close to existing transmission grids,which both limits the costs of new transmis-sion facilities and reduces the amount ofpower lost in transmission. The generatingstation will be about 15 to 20 miles from ma-jor ship traffic in the Atlantic coastal shippinglanes. (Figure IV–49.)
Licenses
A series of more than 70 Federal, State, andmunicipal licenses and permits will be issuedfor the AGS in a review and decision processthat will span 12 years.
A steering committee of Federal agencies,chaired by the NRC, has been created to moni-tor the licensing process and exchange infor-mation on various aspects of the project. 14
Represented on the committee are the Com-mission, the Coast Guard, the Corps ofEngineers, the Council on EnvironmentalQuality, the Department of the Interior, theEnvironmental Protection Agency, the FederalAviation Administration, the Federal EnergyAdministration, the Federal Power Commis-sion, and the National Oceanic and At-
I
Source’ Off Ice of Technology Assessment and Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
CH l\’ —DISCUSSION OF THE TECHNOLOGIES 209
mospher ic Adminis trat ion.
The first-and the most important—Federallicense is a permit to manufacture the floatingpowerplants. The Office of Nuclear ReactorRegulation has been reviewing environmentaland safety aspects of the plants at the stafflevel since mid-1973. The ACRS, an independ-ent panel of scientists and engineers ap-pointed by the Commission, is conducting anindependent appraisal of the project andreviewing the work of the reactor licensingstaff. When these safety and environmentalreviews are completed, an Atomic Safety andLicensing Board, also appointed by the Com-mission, will hold public hearings, review therecord on the project and recommend for oragainst a license. The decision is subject to ap-peal before an Atomic Safety and LicensingAppeal Board and may ultimately go beforethe Commissioners for a final decision.
A license for Offshore Power Systems tomanufacture eight plants would be issuedunder a policy adopted in April 1972 by theAtomic Energy Commission, now the NuclearRegulatory Commission.15 Before that time,all nuclear powerplant designs were reviewedin detail, even in cases where a new plantwould be identical to designs that already hadbeen cleared by the Commission. The 1972policy was adopted to move the nuclearpower industry toward a pattern of standard-ized powerplants to shorten the planning andreview process and, in turn, the lead time forconstruction of nuclear plants. Under thepolicy, a design for a plant that has been ap-proved by the Commission can be usedrepeatedly during at least a 5-year periodwithout further detailed review. Twenty-oneapplications for approval of plants that dupli-cate earlier designs were on the Commission’sdocket as of December 31, 1975.16
The Coast Guard will review those aspectsof a floating plant design that relate to thebarge and must certify the barge as seaworthybefore a completed plant can be moved from
the Jacksonville shipyard to a permanent in-stallation. Under a memorandum of under-standing between the NRC and the CoastGuard, a floating plant will not be cleared toleave the shipyard without both Coast Guardand NRC approval.17
A second round of Federal permits is re-quired for Public Services Electric and Gas Co.to construct a breakwater and prepare the site,The NRC must approve the site for a nuclearinstallation. The U.S. Army Corps ofEngineers must approve dredging and otheraspects of the project under the Rivers andHarbors Act of 1899 and other acts.18
The NRC site-review process is similar tothat for a manufacturing license. A decisionwill be made by an Atomic Safety and Licens-ing Board after staff analysis of the plants andpublic hearings in the Atlantic City area. Adecision is subject to appeal before an AtomicSafety and Licensing Appeals Board and—insome cases—to a final review and decision bythe Commission itself. A Commission deci-sion can, in turn, be appealed in Federal court.
A third Federal permit, an operatinglicense, is required before fuel can be placed ina reactor vessel to prepare a plant for opera-tion. Public Service will initiate this finalreview for the AGS about 3 years before itsfirst plant is scheduled for completion by sub-mitting a Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)and an Environmental Report. The Office ofNuclear Reactor Regulation will conduct onemore analysis of the project, as will the Ad-visory Committee on Reactor Safety. A publichearing is mandatory if one is requested bycitizens in the construction region, TheAtomic Safety and Licensing Board will ap-prove or disapprove startup of the plant ifthere is a hearing. If there is no hearing, NRCstaff issues the operating license. The sameavenues of appeal are available in the operat-ing-license process as in the site-approvalprocess. 19
More than half of the licenses and permitsfor the AGS must be issued by State and localgovernment in New Jersey.
The State of Florida must approve dredgingthe St. John’s River that would link theshipyard to the sea. It has approved water andair quality control systems for the manufac-turing plant site. The City of Jacksonvillealready has issued permits for construction ofthe manufacturing facility, which was under-way in 1976.
Permits for construction of the AGS break-water and burying of transmission cables toshore must be issued by the Department ofEnvironmental Protection in New Jerseywhich administers New Jersey riparian lands,the State’s Wetlands Act, and the Coastal AreaFacilities Review Act.
The Department also must issue permits fortransmission lines that cross streams and forany construction of onshore facilities in theState’s coastal area.
The New Jersey Department of Labor andIndustry must issue a permit for constructionof the breakwater and installation of floatingpowerplants. Local governments must ap-prove onshore support facilities and laying ofunderground cable between the coast and aTuckerton, N. J., switchyard. The State mustgrant riparian rights to PSE&G for the site,which may require the passage of speciallegislation.
The New Jersey Department of Environ-mental Protection also must issue a permit aspart of the final licensing process for loadingnuclear material into the floating plant’s reac-tor vessel.
Public Role in Licensing
Any citizen or group of citizens who candemonstrate economic, environmental, orother interests in the outcome of a licensingcase may petition for status as interveners. In-tervenors, who also may include government
agencies, may petition either to support or op-pose an application, and are presentthroughout formal hearings, cross-examiningwitnesses and presenting expert testimony oftheir own. Interveners are selected from thelist of petitioners by the ASLB after a series ofpreheating conferences on the basis of specificareas of concern which they describe in theirpetitions. A rejection of a petition to intervenemay be appealed to the Atomic Safety andLicensing Appeals Board or to the courts.
Six interveners were chosen for hearings onthe Offshore Power Systems manufacturinglicense after preheating conferences thatlasted from February 1974 to December 1975.
Formal hearings began in March 1976, inJacksonville, Fla., the site of the shipyardwhere the floating powerplants would bebuilt. Because the licensing process for float-ing plants is unique in that plants will be builtin one location and installed in another, thehearing was continued the following week inAtlantic City, N.J.
In all formal hearings, the general public ispermitted at the outset to make brief state-ments either for or against a license. Afterthese opening statements, public participationis limited to formal interveners.
Although the Atlantic City hearings weretechnically confined to the environmentaleffects of building floating plants in Florida,Board Chairman Thomas Reilly opened theAtlantic City hearings to a broad range ofquestions and statements by the generalpublic.
Hearings on the manufacturing license willproceed in four stages. The first hearings wereheld in Jacksonville in late March. These hear-ings covered environmental aspects of themanufacturing facility. Following the hear-ings in Jacksonville, two days of special hear-ings were held in Atlantic City to enable thecitizens of that area to make limited ap-pearances before the ASLB.
.
The second phase of hearings was inprogress in Bethesda, Md., in mid-1976 cover-ing radiological, safety, and health issues. Thethird phase will also cover safety issues andwill follow the Nuclear Regulatory Commis-sion’s publication of its final Safety EvaluationReport. The final hearings will cover generalenvironmental questions, including the find-ings of a Liquid Pathways Generic Study inwhich the NRC will discuss the environmen-tal impacts of a severe accident at the Mid-Atlantic Ocean sites which include the Atlan-tic Generating Station. These hearings willbegin in late fall of 1976 or early the followingyear after the Liquid Pathways Generic Studyhas been released.
A similar series of hearings will be held inor near Atlantic City on the Public Service ap-plication to prepare an offshore site for twofloating nuclear plants (the Atlantic Generat-ing Station). These hearings will probably notbegin before June of 1977.
Interveners in the manufacturing licensehearings are the Natural Resources DefenseCouncil, the Atlantic County Citizens Councilon the Environment, Atlantic County, N. J., thecity of Brigantine, N.J., the State of NewJersey, which so far has not adopted a positionfor or against the license, and Ken Walton, aresident of Brigantine.
Interveners in the application by PublicService for a license to prepare a site off theNew Jersey coast will include the six inter-venors in the manufacturing license case aswell as a seventh, Ocean County, N.J.
costs
One argument in favor of floating nuclearplants has been that the use of standardizeddesign and a centralized work force couldreduce the capital cost of floating plants belowthat of land-based plants. However, any costadvantages will be offset to some extent by theadditional expenses associated with a floatingplant, most importantly the massive break-
! ; ! ,
Figure IV-50. Cost estimates of nuclear units at time oforder vs. actual finished cost or estimate as of Decem-ber 1975
Average Unit Cost,$/kWe800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
12/75 EST. OFFUTURE UNITS
R
AVERAGE OF THEORIGINALLY ANNOUNCED
1965 ’67 ’69 ’71 ’73 ’75Source F.C Olds, “What Happened to the Nuclear Plant Program in 19757, ”
Power Engineering, 4/76, pp 83-85
water and buried transmission lines requiredfor an offshore site. Since the costs of con-structing a land-based plant and of siting anoffshore plant depend heavily on specific sites,it is difficult to make generalizations about thepossible overall cost advantages of the floatingplant.
An analysis for OTA concludes that thecapital costs of the AGS and a land-basedplant of identical capacity would be compara-ble.20 Assuming no unforeseen delays or over-runs in either case, the AGS is expected to cost$1.9 billion and a ‘comparable land-basedplant to cost $2.0 billion—a difference of
about 5 percent in a floating plant’s favor. Thepossibility of error in forecasting could changeeither or both of these figures as well as thefloating plant’s cost advantage.
The analysis also concludes that because ofthe fixed-price contract that Public Service hassigned with Offshore Power Systems, delaysor overruns in construction costs wouldwiden the price advantage for the floatingsystem to about 10 percent.
About 80 percent of the total cost of theAGS is represented by the floating plants.Offshore Power Systems, and not Public Serv-ice, will be responsible for cost overruns inplant construction. In the standard land-basedconstruction contract, a utility company hasonly about 20 percent of its total costs fixed bycontract and is responsible for any overruns
in the remaining 80 percent of the total cost.
The largest additional costs that could beassociated with the AGS are for the break-water and underwater power cables, whichare now estimated at $250 million withoutescalation or overruns. Public Service wouldbe responsible for overruns on these items.However, the floating plants would comparefavorably with land-based plants even if thecosts of a breakwater were to exceed thebudget by 50 percent.
Under the worst circumstances, the analysisshows, the costs of the AGS probably will notbe higher than the costs of a comparable land-based plant.
Assembly
Offshore Power Systems has completed
Figure IV-51. Floating nuclear powerplants manufacturing facility, Jacksonville, Florida
Source Offshore Power Systems, Inc
several buildings at its Jacksonville, Fla.,shipyard and begun dredging a graving dockor drydock and a slipway some 415 feet widewhich will be the center of the assembly pro-cedure for floating nuclear powerplants,
Fabrication of each floating plant beginswith construction of a barge in the gravingdock at the upper end of the slipway that runsbetween a series of production shop areas.When the barge is completed, it is floated,towed along the slip, and moored at suc-cessive production areas where workersassemble and mount elements of thepowerplant on the barge. The final stage ofconstruction takes place at the lower end ofthe slip where the powerplant is tested, cer-tified, and towed down the St. John’s River.
Offshore Power Systems estimates that thefirst plant will take about 4 years to build butthat at peak production the facility could turnout four to five plants a year with an averageconstruction time of 27 months per plant anda peak work force of 13,800.21
Before a floating plant leaves the Jackson-ville shipyard, it will be tested under NRCsupervision to verify that it meets designstandards. Coast Guard inspectors will inspectthe barge to certify its seaworthiness. Electri-cal systems, controls, and steam-generatingsystems will be tested under simulated operat-ing conditions. No nuclear fuel will be placedaboard a floating plant until it is moored in-side its breakwater.
Breakwater Construction
It will take a crew of about 350 offshoreworkers 4 years to build the breakwater,working around the clock in 8 hour shifts.Less than half of these workers will actuallywork at the site. On an average, two bargeswill arrive each day from quarries in NewJersey or New England, carrying rock for thebreakwater.
Dredges will prepare the breakwater site bycutting away nearly 1 million tons of ocean
floor to expose more stable sediment thannow exists at the site, A layer of rock over thedredged area will form the bottom of themooring basin. Mooring caissons will beplaced inside the breakwater before the firstfloating plants are installed. To complete theshield, a line of seven concrete caissons—ranging in length from 100 to 300 feet—willbe floated into position behind the firstpowerplant and filled with sand to settle themto the bottom. Two caissons later will beemptied, refloated, and moved out of the wayto allow installation of the second floatingplant.
A gap of about 180 feet between the rockbreakwater and the landward line of caissonswill permit a flow of cooling water to thepowerplant intakes and access for serviceships.
Transmission System
About 100 workers will be involved over aperiod of more than 2 years in building a linkbetween the breakwater and Public Service’sdistribution network.
Fifteen cables will be laid between thebreakwater and the shore, buried 10 feetbeneath the stable ocean floor with jettingdevices that carve a trench in bottom sedimentwith high pressure streams of water and com-pressed air directed through nozzles. Jetting isa device commonly used in burying com-munication cables and pipelines. Between thecoast and a switchyard at Tuckerton, N. J., adistance of about 7 miles, the cable will beburied under Great Bay Boulevard. Overheadtransmission lines will carry the AGS powerfrom Tuckerton to Forked River where it willbe directed into the distribution network.
Plant Installation
After the breakwater and transmissionsystem are completed, the first floating plantwill start north from Jacksonville, towed byfour seagoing tugs at a speed of about 3 knots.The trip, which will take 10 to 14 days, will be
, i 1(1 ! > , , . , , , / , , , , ~, ,I ‘\ .\ ‘, ‘, r
supervised by the Coast Guard in consultationwith the National Weather Service to reducethe risk of encountering storms.
The final phase of preparing plants foroperation will involve mooring them to con-crete caissons inside the breakwater withmetal struts about 72 feet long which havedouble-action hinges at each end. Eight strutsrun between the sides of a barge and thecaissons. The hinges permit the struts to holdthe barges in position but still accommodate arising and falling motion inside the breakwater.
When the barges are moored, six outfallpipes-each nearly 8 feet in diameter andcurving at right angles to the barge platform—will be positioned over catchment basins builtinside the breakwater. Cooling water will bedischarged through the pipes, into the catch-ment basin, and will flow into the open seaaround the breakwater through a culvert builtthrough the central closure caisson.
Operation
The procedures that will be followed in put-ting the floating plants into operation will besimilar to those used for land-based nuclearplants.
Nuclear fuel will be placed aboard floatingplants after they are secured inside the break-water and after final clearance from the NRCand the New Jersey Department of Environ-mental Protection. Arranging fuel rods to pro-duce a critical mass of uranium within thereactor vessel takes 4 to 6 months and ismonitored step-by-step by NRC inspectors.
During operations, two full crews, totaling87 employees among the two plants, will beaboard the floating plants for periods of 3days, one manning the plant and the other onstandby, Personnel normally will commutefrom shore by boat, although the breakwatersor an adjacent site may have helicopter padsto permit shuttling personnel or equipment byair,
, ,1, I \
Key powerplant personnel are licensed bythe NRC and any member of the plant crewwho will manipulate any of the reactor con-trols must pass a written NRC examinationbefore being licensed.
Fuel Supply
About 30 metric tons of fresh fuel will becarried to each floating plant annually toreplace some 30 metric tons of spent fuel,which will be temporarily stored on the plantplatform, and then carried to shore to bestored until U.S. reprocessing plants are backin operation.
The fission process which powers a nuclearplant occurs when an atom of uranium-235 issplit apart (fissioned) by a slow neutron, dis-charging an average of 2.5 new neutrons,which can in turn split other U-235 atoms tocontinue the chain reaction and produce heatfor steam generation. Plutonium is created asa byproduct of fission when slow neutronsare captured by U-238 atoms rather thanU-235 atoms, the only fissionable uraniumisotope.
Over a period of a year, the fission processin a reactor core depletes the U-235, much as aburning coal becomes encased in ash, to thepoint that one-third of the rods must bereplaced. The spent fuel rods are removed andreplaced with fresh rods.
Because a fuel rod continues to generateheat, even after removal from a reactor core,spent fuel is kept in storage pools of circulat-ing water for several months until radioactiveisotopes have decayed enough to reduce theoutput of heat. Spent fuel rods then should bepacked and shipped to reprocessing plantswhere residual uranium-235 and plutoniumare removed for recycling into new fuelpellets.
As of early 1976, no reprocessing plantswere operating in the United States. A newplant in Barnwell, S. C., was nearing comple-
tion. A second plant in West Valley, N. Y., hadbeen closed since 1972 for modification andexpansion and was not scheduled to reopenbefore 1978.22 Future operations depend on afinal decision on whether to recycleplutonium.
Recent practice has been for nuclear plantsto hold spent fuel in storage basins at the plantsite until such time as the Barnwell and up-state New York reprocessing plants are open.In its 1975 annual report, the NRC said that asmany as 10 nuclear plants would fill theirholding areas to capacity by 1978.23 Land-based plants generally have the space to ex-pand storage facilities, but a floating plantwould have limited space for expansion eventhough storage pool capacity can be trebled ifstorage racks are placed closer together.
An implicit assumption appears to havebeen made in planning for floating nuclearplants that the reprocessing system will be inoperation by 1985 and that the question ofspace for long-term storage of spent fuel froma floating plant will be moot. If, on the otherhand, no central storage area has been ap-proved by the time the floating nuclear plantsare in operation, the storage question couldpresent an obstacle to operational licensing.
Waste Handling
Waste handling practices aboard a floatingnuclear plant will be similar to those requiredby the NRC at land-based plants.
In addition to spent fuel, a nuclearpowerplant with a capacity of 1,150 MWe willproduce about 1,000, 55-gallon drums of otherradioactive waste a year. Bombardment of areactor vessel and its coolant system withneutrons creates radioactive isotopes, par-ticularly in material that enters the coolantthrough wear or corrosion and is carriedthrough the fuel core. Radioactive gases alsoare created in the coolant cycle. Other radioac-tive particles lodge in tools, laboratoryglassware, and protective clothing.
Radioactive particles are continuouslyfiltered from the coolant and steam-generat-ing systems. Radionuclides with long lives areseparated from waste water and mixed withcement and vermiculite to form a sludgewhich is packed into 55-gallon drums forshipment to shore and storage underground.
Figure IV-52. Annual shipments of radioactive materialsto and from the two-unit Atlantic Generating Station
OPERATION SHIPMENTS PER YEAR
Barge Land
to shore transferpoint.
2. Shore transfer pointto offshore power-plant.
Spent (irradiated) fuel: a
1. Offshore powerplantto shore transferpoint.
2. Shore transfer pointto fuel reprocessingfacility.
4 to 10 bargesc
120 trucks or20 rail cars
Solid radioactive wastes:1.
2.
Offshore powerplant 4 to10 bargesc
to shore transferpoint.Shore transfer point 92 trucks or 22
to licensed radio- rail carsactive wastedisposal facility.
aThe shipment of empty fuel casks and casks for ir-radiated fuel will require essentially the same numberof shipments as when loaded. However, the radio-activity hazard will be negligible.
b Initial loading of reactor requires about 18 truck-~ loads of unirradiated fuel. Shipment of unirradiated ~t fuel by rail is usually ruled out because of length of ~. transit time. 1
c Number depends on capacity of barge. {—
Source Atlantic Generating Station, Draft Environmental Statement
Water containing radionuclides with shortlives is stored in holding tanks until the parti-cles have decayed and then is discharged intothe sea. Contaminated gases go through asimilar filtering and holding process. Con-taminated clothing and other solid materialalso are packed into 55-gallon drums for ship-ment to storage areas ashore.
Even with these filtering systems, traceamounts of radioactivity remain in some oft h e l i q u i d d i s c h a r g e d f r o m n u c l e a rpowerplants. For example, tritium, a radioac-tive form of hydrogen, is released fromnuclear facilities after it combines with oxygenin the form of water.
Tritium has a half-life of 12.3 years. It is ex-tremely difficult to separate out from ordinarywater because water formed with tritium ischemically indistinguishable from ordinarywater.
Nuclear fuel will be loaded into the floatingnuclear powerplants after each unit has beentowed to the AGS site, properly installedwithin the protective breakwater, prepared foroperation and licensed to operate by the NRC.All handling of fuel and radioactive wastematerial within the plant and transportationto and from the plant is the responsibility ofPublic Service Electric and Gas Co. and regu-lated by NRC.
The potential environmental impact oftransporting fuel and radioactive wastes toand from land-based nuclear powerplants hasbeen evaluated by NRC.24 As a result of thatstudy, major emphasis is placed on packagingof radioactive materials because radioactivematerials could be involved in accidents be-tween shore and an offshore plant. Allpackaging must meet the regulatory standardsestablished by NRC, DOT, and State govern-ment. There are memoranda of understandingbetween NRC and other governmentorganizations, drafted to avoid unnecessaryduplication of standards.
The potential environmental impact oftransporting fuel and radioactive waste to andfrom the floating nuclear plant site is evalu-ated in similar language in environmental im-pact statements for both the manufacturinglicense of Offshore Power Systems and theconstruction permit of the AGS.
The standards and tests required by NRCfor shipping containers are both rigorous andexhaustive. However, NRC has not specifiedunique design and test requirements for casksand drums for floating nuclear powerplants inparticular. Nor has it outlined special pro-cedures for handling these casks and drums. Asample survey of environmental and safetyoperating license documents issued by NRCfor land-based nuclear powerplants finds thathardware design criteria and procedural re-quirements are not described in more detailthan language in the NRC study of transportof radioactive materials, which states that:
Safety in radioactive materials transportis achieved through design standards onpackaging and implementation of aquality assurance program, includingproof-testing and independent reviews,to assure conformance, to correctproblems, and to help assure continuedsatisfactory (design) performance overthe lifetime of the package under normaland accident conditions.25
The draft environmental impact statementfor the AGS describes a most likely pattern forthe fuel and waste handling system. 26 Thecasks and drums will be similar to those cur-rently in use with land-based nuclear power-plants. Each shipment to or from AGS is ex-pected to be by barge or ship. Current CoastGuard requirements mandate that irradiatedfuel be carried in a type-A, or double-walledand “less likely to sink” vessel. Casks must besecured aboard a vessel so they will be easierto find and recover in case the vessel sinks.Ships and barges carrying radioactive wastesare restricted—to the extent possible—to
operations where water depths do not exceed150 meters. NRC regulations require a caskdesign that will withstand an externalpressure equal to the pressure at a water depthof 50 feet, but most designs will withstandpressures at greater water depths.
About 30 metric tons of fresh nuclear fuel,30 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel, andseveral hundred drums of solid radioactivewastes must be transported annually either toor from each floating reactor. The transfer ofnuclear fuel and radioactive materials to andfrom floating plants will involve the transferof loaded casks to a barge or ship. A shorefacility or transfer point also will be required.These transfer conditions are different fromthose at land-based nuclear powerplantswhere transportation is by truck or rail. Ex-cept for the transfer, shipments to a fuelreprocessing plant or to a waste disposalfacility will follow the same pattern as thosefor land-based nuclear powerplants.
The estimated number of shipments an-nually to and from AGS appears in figureIV-52. The total number of shipments byvessel range from 10 to 24 per year, dependingon the capacity of the vessel. The number oftruck and/or rail shipments depends upon themethod of transportation. Coast Guardstatistics are used in the NRC reports to esti-mate the probability of a barge accident, but itis unclear how these may apply to the openocean site because those accident statistics arebased largely on inland waterways traffic.However, the NRC conclusion is that there areonly small differences in the accident prob-abilities among truck, train, and barge. Theradiological impact on the general populationof transporting fuel and waste from the AGS isexpected to differ little from that associatedwith a land-based plant.
OTA supplemented the NRC analysis bymaking a detailed comparison of fuel-han-dling operations between AGS and two 1,150MWe land-based nuclear powerplants—the
D.C. Cook and Sequoyah plants—that aresimilar in many respects to the proposedoffshore plants.27 Topics included in the com-parison were fuel type and radioactive inven-tory, transportation of new and irradiatedfuel, fuel handling in the plant, new fuelstorage, spent fuel storage, and fuel handlingaccidents. No differences were found amongthe three plants in terms of the amounts offuel handled or general fuel handling pro-cedures. There are specific differences in fueland cask handling associated with the transferof a shipping cask from land to a transfer boator barge and between a barge and a nuclearplatform. There are differences, too, in han-dling fuel on a floating plant under a condi-tion of one-half degree combined pitch androll.
There is insufficient information to verifywhether loading and unloading featuresunique to the floating plant pose significantlygreater risks than fuel handling at a land-based nuclear plant, However, engineeringjudgment suggests that cash transfers and theother fuel-handling operations can bedesigned and performed without undue risk.
Transportation of materials to and fromland-based nuclear plants involves trucks andrailroads. With a floating nuclear powerplant,barge transportation will be added to thelogistic pattern.
There appears to be no inherent reason whywater transportation would involve greaterrisks than truck or railroad transportationprovided that handling procedures areanalyzed and specified in advance. However,no detailed procedures or system designs havebeen prescribed for the segment of transporta-tion of materials for floating nuclear plantsthat will involve barges. The Department ofTransportation has responsibility to formulateregulations for transportation of radioactivematerials.
This study concludes, however, that the
step-by-step analysis of transferring materialsfrom truck to barge or boat at a waterfront siteand the precautions that might be necessary toprotect a barge enroute to a floating nuclearplant has not been made. By the same token,there are no procedures that specify steps tobe taken, for example, in transferring spentfuel from a floating plant to a barge and froma barge to a truck or railroad car on shore.
Decommissioning
Earlier studies of methods for decommis-sioning a floating nuclear powerplant sug-gested that a plant might be sunk ormothballed for 50 years until highly radioac-tive elements of the plant could be removedmanually.
The OTA analysis indicates that neither ofthese options would be workable under pres-ent guidelines and that the plant’s radioactiveelements probably would have to be removedwith remotely controlled equipment on thesite.
The fuel elements are the only radioactivematerial in a nuclear reactor when it beginsoperations. However, bombardment by theneutrons released in the nuclear fission proc-ess make other components of the reactor,particularly the reactor vessel and its internalparts, highly radioactive during the course ofoperation. Because these levels of inducedradioactivity are dangerously high, the ownerof a nuclear powerplant must take steps to en-sure that public health and safety are pro-tected after the end of the plant’s useful life.
Forty years is the maximum period forwhich a license to operate a nuclear plant isissued by NRC.28 An operator then mustrenew the license for an additional period orapply for termination of the license and forpermission to dismantle a plant and dispose ofthe radioactive components.29 If technical,economic, or other factors dictate, the opera-tor may elect to terminate operations earlierthan the expiration of the operating license.
The applicant must demonstrate when he ap-plies for the original operating license that hepossesses “or has reasonable assurance of ob-taining the funds necessary to cover the esti-mated costs of permanently shutting thefacility down and maintaining it in a safe con-dition.’’ 30 The activities of shutting downoperations and dismantling the plant-ormaintaining it in a safe condition—arereferred to as “decommissioning.”
Current NRC positions also require mainte-nance of a “possession-only” license for aslong as there is significant residual radioac-tivity in a decommissioned facility.31 The con-ditions of the license require plant protectionfor public health and safety.
The NRC now acknowledges three basicmodes of decommissioning—mothballing, en-tombment, and dismantlement.32
Mothballing is sealing to prevent radioac-tive releases from the pressure vessel, thebiological shield, or other buildings. Protec-tive maintenance is required as long as levelsof residual radiation within the plant exceedspecified criteria.
Entombment is a much more complete seal-ing, accomplished by encasing the pressurevessel and all other residual activatedmaterials within a poured concrete structureintegral with the biological shield. The pri-mary difference between mothballing and en-tombment is the degree of protection needed.The mothballed plant may require a full-timeprotective force until residual radiation nolonger poses a health and safety hazard. Theentombed plant may or may not require a pro-tective force.
For dismantling, activated components arecut up within the biological shield (includingthe pressure vessel and its contents) anddeposited in a licensed burial site. A com-pletely dismantled facility has no licensing re-quirements because it no longer containsradioactive materials that could pose a hazard
Figure IV-53. Probable actions to be taken in decommissioning a floating nuclear powerplant by variousmethods
—. .- - —.
PLANT COMPONENT
Barge
Biological shield
Equipment withinbiological shield
Rest of plant onthe barge
METHOD 1.
Permanent Iay-upa
Seaworthiness must bemaintained
Sealed to prevent accessand loss of radioactivematerials and to reducedeterioration of contentsPressure vessel sealedwith inert gas or othermeans to prevent corro-sion; all other equipmenttreated to prevent corrosionand deterioration
Individual buildings sealedwith provisions for main-tenance access; equipmenttreated to reduce corrosionand deteriorate ion
METHOD 2.
DismantIing and onshoredisposal b
Seaworthiness must bemaintained until plant is atdismantling siteSealed during transit fromoffshore-site to dis-mantling site
Sealed during transit fromoffshore site to dis-mantling site
Some equipment may besalvaged or scrapped atoffshore site; remainderof plant tied down fortransit to dismantling site
a If lay-up is at offshore site, the entrance to the breakwater would probably bemight be- installed on the barge to protect the plant from sea and storm action
b Breakwater has to be partly dismantled to permit barge egress
METHOD 3.
Decontamination andsinkingb
Seaworthiness must bemaintained until plant is atsea dumping siteSurfaces coated wherenecessary to prevent loss ofradioactive material c
Pressure vessel probablyfilled with concrete andsealed to prevent exposureto seawater at depth; allother equipment treated toreduce corrosion rate anddeteriorate ionAll salvageable material re-moved while plant is inbreakwater; nonsalvageablematerial likely to float madesinkable
closed. Additional structures
c Adequate protection against loss of radioactive materials after dumping may require extensive modification ofthe biological shield and will have to be balanced against the almost negligible hazard of radioactivity released byrusting reinforcing steel in the shield
Source Atlantlc Generating StatIon, Draft Enwronmental Impact Statement.
to the public health.
Three primary alternatives for decommis-sioning the floating plants have been pro-posed: permanent layup (mothballing), dis-mantling (with onshore disposal of theradioactive materials), and decontaminationand sinking. A fourth option—a 50-year layupfollowed by dismantling—also has been sug-gested.
Figure IV–53 summarizes the NRC’s viewof the actions that might be taken for each ofthe three basic options, which are subse-quently discussed in turn.
Decommissioning Alternatives
NRC studies suggest that all of the decom-
missioning options listed here may be possi-ble. However, OTA’s brief analysis disclosesuncertainties about all alternatives except thatof dismantling and removing the radioactivecomponents on-site. It is the most expensiveof the options. The NRC environmental im-pact statement is based on an Offshore PowerSystem analysis which did not directly calcu-late the radioactive inventory that would befound in the plant at the end of its life. Itsimply used estimates derived by extrapolat-ing the results from decommissioning small(less than 50 MWe) power reactors.
PERMANENT LAYUP
A floating plant could be decommissionedby placing it in permanent storage, either
within its breakwater or in an estuary or river.A possession-only license would be requiredas long as radioactive parts posed a publichealth and safety threat. If the internal equip-ment were sealed and not entombed, this op-tion would require protective custody for theduration of a possession-only license.
If layup were undertaken at the originalbreakwater site, the cost would include main-tenance of the breakwater as well as a protec-tive force. However, if the barge were seawor-thy at the end of the life of the plant, it couldbe towed to a specialized shore facility(perhaps the original construction facilitymodified to handle radioactive materials)where the plant could be permanently storedunder surveillance.
Simple layup of a plant would not bereasonable under present guidelines becausesome long-life isotopes could be presentwhich would require guaranteed plantsecurity for not only the several hundredyears required by Ni63, but possibly for aslong as the 500,000 years that Ni59 would posea health hazard.
Layup with in-place entombment of the in-ternals does not appear feasible either becausethe integrity of the entombment structure con-taining the radioactive materials for such ex-tended periods cannot be assured.
Past experience indicates that 200 yearsmay be the limit for structural integrity of anentombed plant. For example, in entombingone reactor that had been active for far lessthan 40 years, a portion of the core internalshad to be removed and disposed of at a burialsite due to excessive Ni63 activity which wouldhave required structural integrity of the en-tombment for a period exceeding 200 years.Consequently, some degree of dismantling ap-pears necessary for decommissioning powerreactors of the size scheduled for floatingplants.
DISMANTLING AND ONSHORE DISPOSALOF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Unlike the layup option, dismantling wouldentail removal of radioactive components,their disposal at a licensed burial site onshoreand salvaging or scrapping the remainder ofthe plant. The NRC environmental impactstatement suggests that this could be done fora floating plant at less cost than for a land-based plant if a specialized onshore disassem-bly facility were available and if the floatingbarge were seaworthy enough. However, italso appears technically and economically.feasible to dismantle and remove radioactivecomponents at the original plant site insidethe breakwater before towing to a drydock fordisassembly, this option probably would notcost less than decommissioning a land-basedplant.
Immediate dismantling and removal ofradioactive components for disposal at alicensed burial site appears to be a viable alter-native for decommissioning floating plants. Itwould require the same type of toolingdevelopment as required for any land-basedlight water reactor —the development ofremotely operated equipment such as aplasma torch manipulator for cutting up thepressure vessel and its internal parts. Thereappear to be no unique risks or engineeringrequirements associated with dismantling anFNP as compared to a land-based plant.Equivalent land-based disposal sites would berequired. OTA has compared recent costanalyses for this option and concluded thatthe cost of dismantling each floating nuclearplant would be under $50 million.33
Technically speaking, dismantling could bedone either at the original plant site, or at aspecialized shore-based facility, as suggestedby the Offshore Power Systems. However,dismantling at a location other than the plantsite would require towing the radioactiveplant which would, in turn, entail the risk that
the plant might sink enroute with all theradioactive components in place.
The plant would be sealed before towing,but even a completely entombed plant couldpose a hazard if sunk because of the long half-lives of some elements in the radioactive in-ventory. Thus, there may be some risk associ-ated with any of the options in which theradioactive plant is towed. However, the NRCenvironmental statement on the AGS con-cludes that it is most likely that decommis-sioning would be done at a site other than theoperating site.
The risks involved in towing a plant to anearby shore site may be small, but they couldbe much greater if it were towed back to theoriginal construction facility in Jacksonville,as has been suggested. The removal of theradioactive components in place before tow-ing the barge elsewhere for salvage appears tobe the most viable option until the level of riskis properly assessed.
DECONTAMINATION AND SINKING
One possible option for decommissioningfloating plants not available for land-basedplants has been suggested by Offshore PowerSystems. It involves on-site salvage of allmaterials of value and removal of all radioac-tive materials except the pressure vessel andits internals. All remaining radioactive pipingand vessels then would be sealed and the plantwould be towed to a deepwater site and sunk.Projected costs for this option are by far thelowest, and land-burial site requirements aremuch lower.
The problem of guaranteeing the integrityof an entombed plant long enough forradioactivity to decay to safe levels applies tothe sinking option as well. The problem maybe more severe with sinking because of the ad-ditional corrosive effect of seawater on the en-tombment structure.
NRC has not yet established any special
( I { l\ — I ‘)1’i L +\l( )K ( ~1
decommissioning criteriaclear whether integritymaintained as long for a
for the FNP. It is notwould have to besunken plant as for
an onshore plant . The plant wouldautomatically be isolated from human contactand would be shielded by the water, but otherproblems may result from corrosion ofradioactive components if the seals werebreached. These uncertainties would have tobe resolved before sinking could be con-sidered a viable option.
FIFTY-YEAR LAYUP FOLLOWED BY DISMANTLING
A combination of mothballing and later dis-mantling could reduce the overall decommis-sioning cost by cutting dismantling costs. Theplant would remain intact in the breakwateror at another site for about 50 years by whichtime Offshore Power Systems projects that in-duced radioactivity would have decayedenough to considerably reduce the difficultyin dismantling.
The Offshore Power Systems analysis indi-cates that a 50-year layup period would allowthe levels of radioactivity in the reactor todecay enough to simplify the process of dis-mantling which would, in turn, reduce thecost of decommissioning.
OTA’s analysis, based on the study of theactual end-of-life inventory that could be ex-pected in a reactor of the size used in a floatingplant, indicates that dismantling would be arelatively simple operation only after a layupperiod of about 110 years.
Under the combination layup-and-disman-tling, the plant would be moved from astorage site at the end of the layup period to afacility where the barge and nonradioactiveparts of the plant could be scrapped orsalvaged (after dismantling the radioactivecomponents).
The extended layup period may present aproblem because of the difficulty of maintain-ing the barge in seaworthy condition for a
total of 150 years (40 years of operation plus110 years of storage). Consequently, it appearsthat immediate dismantling may be morefeasible, even though the cost is somewhathigher. 34
In summary, there is doubt about some ofthe principal options proposed for floatingplant decommissioning because of the size ofthe end-of-life radioactive inventory of thereactor and the very long half-lives of some ofthe particular isotopes in the inventory. Theextremely long protective storage period thatis required before radioactive pressure vesselinternals decay to safe levels rules out perma-nent storage. Intentional sinking or alterna-tives that run the risk of accidental sinking ofthe activated plant during towing may not beacceptable because of the difficulty of guaran-teeing the structural integrity of seals for morethan 200 years or so, far less than the time re-quired for radioactivity to decay to acceptablelevels. However, the option of simply disman-tling the radioactive internals at the plant siteand disposing of them appears to be tech-nically feasible and economically viable.
River and Bay Sites
A floating nuclear powerplant can be lo-cated in a river, lake, bay, or inland lagoon aswell as at sea as long as there is a channel tothe site. An access channel must be at least 500feet wide and 35 feet deep. This could requiredredging that would cause more environmen-tal damage than would installing a plant inthe open ocean.
Installing a barge-mounted powerplantnear shore or in a lagoon would mean givingup the advantage of unlimited supplies ofcooling water that an ocean site provides. Ifcooling towers are required for a land-basedplant, they will be required for a floating plantin the same general area.
Dredging will be necessary to tow a floating
nuclear plant to any near-shore site inDelaware Bay.
A breakwater probably would be required,but it will cost substantially less than a break-water off the Atlantic coast. In many areas, acauseway can provide access to a near-shorefloating plant as well as a base for overheadtransmission cables.
Licensing procedures for a near-shore orlagoon-based plant are similar to those for anoffshore plant. One exception in Delaware Bayis that the Delaware River Basin Commissionwill be added to the list of licensing agencies.EPA guidelines may require cooling towersfor all nuclear steam-electric plants inDelaware Bay estuaries.
Conventional Nuclear Plants
New Jersey’s three major public utilities arebuilding or awaiting approval of six land-based nuclear powerplants, the last of whichwould come on-line in 1984.
Two Salem County plants are scheduled forcompletion by 1979. Two other plants are tobe built at Hope Creek, near the Salem plants,the second plant to begin generating power in1984. Jersey Central Power and Light Com-pany is building one nuclear plant at ForkedRiver, N.J., on the Atlantic coast north ofAtlantic City. It is sharing the cost of buildinga plant at Three-Mile Island in the Susquehan -na River near Harrisburg, Pa. Both arescheduled to start operating in 1982.
Population densities and limited water sup-plies in northern New Jersey probably willdictate southern sites for any nuclear plantsbuilt in addition to the six already planned.
Public Service and Atlantic City Electricjointly own 5,400 acres of land near the com-munity of Bayside about 10 miles south of theHope Creek site. In theory, the acreage couldaccommodate at least four, 1,500 megawatt,nuclear generating Plants..
Figure IV-54. Three siting alternatives for floating nuclear plants
1. Nearshore siting-open-cycle cooling
2. Inshore siting—cooling towers
3. Riverine siting-open-cycle coolingSource Offshore Power Systems, Inc
COASTAL EFFECTS
During this study, OTA analyzed the tech-nical, safety, and environmental reports onoffshore nuclear plants published by OffshorePower Systems, NRC, Council on Environ-mental Quality, Public Service Electric & GasCo., and others, and the comments of inter-venors in the licensing process.
This critical review has been supplementedby additional research on issues which earlierstudies did not explore in sufficient depth orabout which there were substant ia ldifferences of opinion between intervenersand nuclear specialists.
This section discusses the effects of install-ing and operating offshore nuclear plants intwo categories: 1.) areas in which there seemsto be general technical agreement about thecon sequences o f installing offshorepowerplants, and 2.) areas in which OTAresearch raises questions about some aspectsof published studies.
The first category includes such areas ofconcern as the effects of an AGS on land use,water supply, job opportunities, the ocean en-vironment, traditional uses of the ocean, andthe New Jersey energy supply. It also includeseconomic benefits which may occur from thefloating nuclear plant concept.
The second category includes issues ofsafety, fuel handling, decommissioning, andthe particular relationship between AGS andthe coastal communities that depend heavilyon tourists for their livelihood.
NRC published a draft environmental state-ment in April 1976 covering the proposedAGS project. The environmental statement in-cludes a comprehensive analysis of energyand economic benefits, monetary costs, andenvironmental costs of the proposed projects.The statement concludes that the project “willhave accrued economic and social benefits
that outweigh the economic, environmental,and social” costs. ” Figures IV–55 and IV–56are reproduced from this environmental state-ment,
Direct Benefits
The direct benefits estimated by NRC fromthe proposed AGS include the production of15.7 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity an-nually, divided about equally among residen-tial, industrial, and commercial users.35 In-direct benefits include employment of about850 local workers with a $100 million payrollduring construction and 250 with a $5 millionpayroll annually during operation of theplants, taxes of about $80 million annuallydistributed to municipalities, and about $10million annually of local material purchases.
Construction of barge-mounted nuclearplants offshore will provide substantiallyfewer direct construction jobs in the NewJersey region than would land-based plants.As with any new generating plant, however,the additional electricity would support exist-ing jobs and make new job opportunitiesavailable in the State.
The NRC uses a peak-employment figurefor land-based plants of slightly more than2,000 employees.36 Peak local employment fora floating nuclear station off Atlantic City esti-mated by Public Service is about 500 workers,few of whom will be the kinds of skilledworkers, like welders and electricians, whoare needed for construction of a land-basedplant.
Public Service estimates for employmentare that about 350 workers will be requiredover a 4-year period for construction of abreakwater, including barge crewmembers.About 100 workers will lay cables and buildthe overhead transmission lines. About 50workers will be required to build a staging
Figure IV-55. Benefits from the proposed Atlantic Gen-erating Station
, DIRECT BENEFITS
, Electrical energy generationCapacityAnnual electrical energy generation(millions of kilowatt-hours)
At 0.78 plant factorAt 0.6 plant factor
Proportional distribution of electricalenergy
PSE&GResidentialIndustrialCommercialOther
State of New JerseyResidentialIndustrial and commercialOther
INDIRECT BENEFITS
EmploymentConstruction (excluding FNPmanufacture)
Construction (total)Operation (annual)
to municipalities annually, millionsof 1995 dollars
. Local material purchases, millions of
Construction (total)Operation (annual)
2300 MWe
15,70012,100
27%417031 %
1%
32%66.570
1.570
850200-300
1005
69-90
1510
. . . . . . . . . .Source Table 104, Draft Environmental Statement on the Atlantic GeneratingStation
area. Other workers will be required to workin a dolos casting yard which may be also lo-cated in New Jersey.
If all of the expanded generating capacity ofNew Jersey were to be provided by offshorepowerplants between now and 1995, the Statecould lose workers of certain skills to otherStates in which land-based plants were beingbuilt. On the other hand, there is presently ashortage of certain skills such as welders inNew Jersey and other States today.
3
Figure IV–56
Economics
displays NRC’s estimatescompared to Public Service estimates ofcapital and operating costs for the AGS. Theeconomic consequences of these costs com-pared to those of an equivalent land-basedplant were analyzed by OTA and are dis-cussed in staff working paper No. 10. The con-clusion of this analysis follows.
An absolute reduction in electricity pricesfrom nuclear reactors remains a hope ratherthan an accomplishment because of continu-ing increases in the capital costs of nuclearpowerplants. The trend of actual capital costsof land-based plants as the units come intooperation is consistently much higher thanoriginal estimates. Costs of three timesoriginal estimates have not been uncommon.
Cost increases for nuclear plants have con-sistently exceeded overall inflation rates.Although the nuclear industry and even re-cent Government publications maintain thatthis trend will not continue, there is no evi-dence that the constant dollar costs of nuclear
Figure IV-56. Monetary costs of construction and oper-ation of the Atlantic Generating Station
,! ,, . . . .- -- ..-”...- -!.. ..... -- ..- ..-- —.-..-. . . . . . --- - -.
IN MILLIONS OF DOLLARS
Applicant a
Capital costs, 1985 2285
Annual operating and main- 15.6tenance costs (O&M)c
Annual fuel costsc 53.4
1985 present worth of fuel 649and O&M costs
Total 1985 present worth 2934
aComputed by the staff from data in the Environmental Reportb
Derived independently by the staff
Staff b
2300
26.7
149
1659
3959
‘Operation at 0.78 plant factor
Source Table 105, Draft Environmental Statement on the Atlantic GeneratingStation
powerplants have begun to stabilize. In fact, switchyard. Most of this land, however, willall available evidence points clearly to further be under Great Bay Boulevard and will not in-constant dollar increases in nuclear plant volve additional disturbance of the marshcapital costs. area.
As noted earlier, the floating plant concept WATER USEmay help resolve the problem of escalatingcosts if the pattern of fixed-price contracts that The once-through cooling system proposedhas been established for the AGS is extended for the AGS will circulate more than 2 millionto all floating plants. By the same token, some gallons of seawater per minute through thefixed-price contracts could probably be ap- two plants.plied to all nuclear plants. They have in thepast, by means of turn-key projects, but ven-dors lost a great deal of money because of costoverruns.
Environmental and Social Effects
The NRC summary of environmentaleffects is displayed in figure IV–57. Theseeffects include the categories of land use,water use, impacts on marine ecology, impactson land ecosystems, local community impacts,and radiological impacts on man and otherlife.
LAND USE
The largest requirements for onshore landare for a 100-acre switchyard at Tuckerton,N.J., and for 1,870 acres37 for rights-of-wayfor overhead transmission lines through thePine Barrens between Tuckerton and ForkedRiver, some 22 miles to the north. However,Public Service plans to build both of thesetransmission facilities to move power from its
All 1,150-MWe plants run roughly 1million gallons per minute through their con-densers. Cooling towers make it possible torecycle the cooling water and reduce thermalpollution, but about 10,000 to 20,000 gallonsper minute is lost in cooling towers throughevaporation. 38
Discharge of cooling water at 16.1 degreesabove the intake water temperature will heatsurrounding ocean waters above normal in aplume extending 200 or 250 feet from thebreakwater. Beyond 1,750 feet, mixing thatresults from jet diffusion as well as wind andwave action will dilute the plume to threedegrees- or less above normal temperatures.
The NRC’s draft environmental impactstatement estimated that under the worstplausible conditions of wave and current, aplume could reach the Great Bay Estuary attemperatures 1 degree higher than ambientwater temperatures.
Salem and Hope Creek nuclear plants and theland would be needed whether or not the AGS
WATER USE CONFLICTS
is built. The most important conflict which the
Public Service anticipates that a 4-acrewaterfront site will be required for a stagingand support area during construction of theoffshore facility and for office space after theplant is in operation.
A corridor through about 5.5 miles of saltmarsh between Great Bay Peninsula and
breakwater will pose with present ocean usesis for shipping. Although Public Service esti-mates that there is only slightly more than 1chance in 1,000 that a large ship would ramthe breakwater in any year, the breakwaterdoes represent a new potential for collision.The Public Service estimate is based on com-parisons of ship collision data in the Gulf of
Tuckerton will be required for buried cables to Mexico near offshore oil platforms and traffictransmit power from the offshore plant to the in the New York area.39
The area in which the generating station isto be built is a popular sport and commercialfishing area. Because the breakwater willpreempt a relatively insignificant amount ofwaters available for fishing and because reefstend to attract fish, the area around the break-water eventually may increase fishing oppor-tunity.
The NRC analysis (see figure IV–57) con-cludes that increased water surface trafficassociated with construction results in minorconstraints on other users.
The NRC summary estimates of environ-mental and community impacts from con-struction and normal operation of the AGS arealso given in figure IV–57.
Routine discharges of radioactive gas, li-quids, and solids are similar for both barge-mounted and land-based nuclear power-plants. As has been noted, the filteringsystems are the same for both designs.
Chlorine, chromates, phosphates, acids, hy-droxide, hydrozine, and morpholine would beused in various parts of floating plant systems,but discharges into the open sea would be atlevels within standards imposed by EPAregulations.
MARINE LIFE
The NRC environmental impact statementestimates that about 287 tons of fish produc-tion will be lost each year—roughly 0.3 per-cent of the New Jersey catch—as a result ofzooplankton and larvae being caught (orentrained) in the cooling water system.
Breakwater construction will destroy about100 acres of burrowing marine life, and thelaying of transmission cables will disrupt
marine life over a 127-acre corridor of theocean floor. The NRC estimates that about 0.2percent of the New Jersey commercial surfclam fishery for 1974 will be destroyed butthat recolonization will take place 12 to 18months after construction is completed. TheNRC reported that samples in the areashowed that the lowest density of surf clamswas at the breakwater site.
OTA has prepared an independent analysisof the environmental effects of floating plants,particularly the effects on marine life. Thepurpose of this analysis was to determinewhether floating plants would have environ-mental effects significantly different fromthose of shore-based plants with ocean, lake,or river cooling. This analysis indicates thatfloating plants located nearshore or in estu-aries would have effects similar to those ofland-based plants in the same areas, with theexception of the dredging required to bring afloating plant to its site, while offshore break-water siting could reduce the environmentalimpacts. 40
MONITORING
The NRC requires a plant operator to moni-tor specific discharges and the general en-vironment for radioactivity in the regionaround a nuclear plant. The New JerseyDepartment of Environmental Protection con-ducts independent monitoring for radioac-tivity.
NRC and EPA inspectors visit nuclearpowerplants an average of four times a year toappraise both safety systems and environ-mental conditions. Monitoring includes sam-pling fish, milk, and plant life in regionswhere a nuclear plant is operating to measureconcentrations of radioactive particles.
1 ,.“1, ’ i , ! , , , I I
Figure IV-57. Environmental costs of the proposed Atlantic Generating Station
Effect
LAND USELand required for station
Land required for underwatertransmission lines
Land required for under-ground transmission linesand switchyard
Land required for overheadtransmission lines
Land required for personnel
WATER USEOnce-through cooling and
iand auxil ary water require-ments, two units
Thermal discharge to ocean,two units
Temperature riseThermal plume description
from physical model1 F temperature rise3 FO temperature rise5 F° temperature rise
Chemical discharge to oceanChlorine
Copper
NickelUse of surface
Table 3.1,Sect. 4.4Sects, 3.12,4.4
Table 3.1,Sect. 3.12
Sect. 3.12
Table 3.1,Sect. 4.1
Table 3.1
Sect. 3.4
Sect. 3.4
Sect. 5.2,Table 5.3
Sect. 5.3
Sect. 4.2
IMPACTS ON AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMSConstruction
Dredging Sect. 4.4
Sedimental ion Sect. 4.4Turbidity Sect, 4.4
OperationImpingement Sect. 5.3
Entrainment Sect. 5.3
Thermal effects Sect. 5.3Cold shock Sect. 5.3
Chemical discharges Sect. 5.3Breakwater existence Sect. 4.4
Summary description I
47 acres of ocean surface and ocean bottom, 2.8 miles from shore,removed from natural use
127 acres of ocean bottom disturbed in a 582-acre right-of-way
68 acres for cables: temporary disturbance and vegetation changes;100 acres for switchyard: improves a former disturbed area
1870 acres altered, 95 acres cleared; primarily wooded
A few acres in urban area
4600 cfs (2,060,000 gpm)
15.5 X 10 Btu/hr at full power
16,1 F“
Does not impingeon shoreDistance from discharge1750 ft; area affected, 525 acresDistance from discharge, 650 ft; area affected, 46 acres
0.1 ppm total residual for 2 hr/day per FNP unit. AcceptableEenvironmental impact: meetsPA standard
Less than 7 ppb increment added to available 5.5 ppb average sea-water concentration. No environmental effect expected due torapid dilution
Less than 1 ppb increment with no expected environmental effectIncreased water surface traffic associated with AGS construction
results in minor constraints on other users. This is localized,temporary, and dispersed
Destruction of some blue mussels and surf clams, 339,000 lb valuedat $6000: less than 1 % of annual surf clam harvest in New Jersey
Little effect on benthic organismsTemporary; insignificant impact on finfish
An occasional operational problem because of schooling fish butwill not affect fishery
Loss of less than 0.5% of plankton, fish e s, and fish larvae willfnot alter aquatic population dynamics o New Jersey coastal zone
Little or no effect on finfish or benthic communitiesExpected occurrence of once per year. Impact on ecosystem is
negligibleVery little effectIncreased finfish production and diversity because of reef environ-
ment; potential benefit of more than 14 tons per year of increasedfinfish production
— — . . — .
Source Draft Environmental Impact Statement, Atlantic Generating Station,
Figure IV-57. Continued
Effect
IMPACTS ON TERRESTRIAL ECOSYSTEMSConstruction
Shore support facilityUnderground transmission
cables
Switchyard
Overhead transmission line
OperationUnderground transmission
cableSwitchyardOverhead transmission line
COMMUNITY IMPACTSHousingSchoolsHospitalsMunicipal servicesHighway use
Economy
RADIOLOGICAL IMPACT ON MANCumulative population
Radioiodine and particulate doseto thyroid from all pathways
Occupational
Sect. 4.3Sect. 4.3
Sect. 4.3
Sect. 4.3
Sect. 5.1
Sect. 5.1
Sect. 5.5
Sect. 5.5
Sect. 5.5
-
Summary description
Negligible if in urban or industrial areaDestroys less than 0.1% of spartina marsh habitat within 10 miles.
Temporary loss of bird nesting habitat. Alters upland habitat with little impact on animal life
May improve abandoned sandpit by stabilization of pit slopes andplanting of vegetation
Clearing corridor destroys some forest habitat but increases grasshands rub habitat. Potential loss of rare white cedar bog
environment
Little or no impact unless oil leak occurs; then, impact depends onleak rate and quantity and speed of repair
NegligibleNo herbicides will be used. Maintenance activities will use existing
roads, No ozone at ground level. Bird losses are not expected tobe severe
Very littleVery IittIeNoneVery littleintermittent local congestion near shore support facility; moderate
congestion along Great Bay Boulevard during underground cableiinstallation activ ties
Slight increase due to local purchases of materials and input of new worker incomes
C 14 man-rems compared with 125,000 man-rems due to naturalenvironmentAdult at nearest residence, 0.05 millirem; child using milk from
nearest dairy farm, 0.2 millirem900 man-rems ,
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE TO AQUATIC ORGANISMSBarnacle on FNP hull Sect. 5.5 20 rads/yearOrganisms in discharge plume Sect. 5.5 <1 millirad/year
RADIOLOGICAL EXPOSURE TO TERRESTRIAL ANIMALSBirds feeding on food in discharge Sect. 5.5 <1 millirad/year
gfplume
Animals on shore Sect. 5.5 Approximately the same as for man ii/!
RISKS AND SAFETY
Accident Risks
The most serious accident possible in anoperating nuclear powerplant is overheatingthat causes the fuel core to melt. If the uppercontainment of a powerplant were to ruptureas a result of a core-melt, the radioactivematerials released into the atmosphere couldhave severe health and economic impacts. Nocore-melt accident has occurred in any com-mercial light water reactor and the 1975 Reac-tor Safety Study (WASH- 1400),41 commonlyknown as the ‘Rasmussen Report, estimatedthe probability of such an accident in a land-based reactor as 1 in 20,000 years of reactoroperation. WASH-1400 also concluded thatonly about one in six pressurized water reac-tor core-melt accidents would lead to therelease of significant amounts of radioactivematerials to the open air.
Under current NRC policy, the possibleconsequences of core-melt accidents are notconsidered in reviewing and approving eitherplant designs or proposed sites, although lesssevere accidents are considered. The rationalefor this policy is the contention that the prob-ability of severe accidents is judged to be sosmall that the total risk from such accidents(the probability of an accident multiplied bythe expected consequences of the accident) isextremely low, so low that they can be safelyignored even though the consequences couldbe far worse than those of other malfunctions.The low level of risk from core-melts calcu-lated in WASH-1400 has been cited by theCommission as a justification for concludingthat no immediate changes in its safety andenvironmental regulations are required. 42
The val idi ty of the conclusions ofWASH-1400 concerning the accident risks innuclear powerplants is a matter of controver-sy, as is the subject of reactor safetygenerally. 43 Any resolution of the general
debate would be far beyond the scope of thisstudy of the onshore effects of offshore energysystems. Recognizing that there is disagree-ment over whether the risks associated withland-based plants are fully understood, OTAfocused on the question of whether there aresignificant differences in the risks associatedwith floating nuclear powerplants and land-based plants, either on a generic basis or as faras deployment in the study area is concerned.
To determine whether there is adequate in-formation available for such an analysis, OTAcommissioned a preliminary study whichcompared the floating nuclear powerplantwith the pressurized water plant (the Surryplant) examined in WASH-1400. 44 This com-parison was designed to evaluate the ap-plicability to the floating nuclear plant ofWASH-1400’S conclusions about the prob-abilities and consequences of core-melt acci-dents. In addition, the preliminary studyassessed the methodology being used in a Li-quid Pathways Generic Study, a comparisonof the radiological consequences of release ofradioactive materials into water at land-basedand floating plants being conducted by theNRC as a result of concern by the ACRS aboutthe unique safety issues posed by floatingnuclear plants. In examining both WASH- 1400and the Liquid Pathways Generic Study, OTAfocused on their applicability either to ageneric comparison of the relative risks fromland-based and floating nuclear plants, or toan assessment of the specific risks fromdeploying floating plants in the study area.The results of the analysis are summarizedbelow.
Probability of Core-Melt Accidents
Comparison of the floating nuclearpowerplant with the land-based pressurizedwater plant studied in WASH-1400 reveals
three areas of differencerelative probabilities ofplants:
which could affect thecore-melts in the two
● External hazards, The floating plant willface several unique external hazards, such asthe risk of ship collisions, which could in-crease the probability that an accident se-quence would be initiated. At the same time, itwill be less sensitive to hazards posed to land-based plants by floods and earthquakes.
● Marine environment. Floating plants lo-cated in offshore breakwaters will be sub-jected to continued low-level stresses fromoperation in the marine environment, such asplatform motion and corrosion from saltspray and air. In addition, floating plants maybe subjected to unusual stresses while they arebeing towed from the Florida manufacturingfacility to their operating sites,
● Design. The reactor system used in thefloating plant incorporates new features, suchas the ice-condenser pressure-suppressionsystem, some of which could decrease andothers increase the probability of a core-melt.
A more detailed discussion follows of theareas of difference between floating and land-based plants which were addressed in theOTA analysis.
EXTERNAL HAZARDS
Because floating plants may be located atsea, they may be exposed to stresses that couldnot occur on land. The most obvious hazardsare ship collisions, buffeting in storms, anddisturbance by tidal waves. NRC has dealtwith these hazards by establishing perform-ance criteria for the plant and breakwaterdesigned to reduce the possibility that anyunusual stresses could trigger malfunctions inthe reactor system. OTA’s analysis indicatesthat if the design criteria are met, such hazardsdo not appear to have a significant potentialfor initiating core-melt accidents.45 At thesame time, because WASH- 1400 indicated thatearthquakes and floods are negligible con-tributors to core-melt probabilities, the fact
that floating plants are less subject to thesehazards than land-based plants would notlead to any significant reduction in core-meltprobabilities for the floating plant.46
EFFECTS OF THE MARINE ENVIRONMENT
Floating nuclear powerplants will be sub-ject to ocean-induced stresses both duringtowing to their sites and during the 40 years ofoperation. They will be exposed to salt waterand spray which could degrade the reliabilityof exposed components such as externalvalves, the links with the underwater cables,and the mooring system. This exposure couldalso adversely affect the electronic equipment,even though there are provisions to limit theexposure. They also will experience more orless continuous motion because of wind andcurrents. While the breakwater must bedesigned to keep these motions within thedesign limits of floating plants, they will besubjected to open ocean conditions whilebeing towed from the manufacturing facilityto its site. The stresses of towing, combinedwith the cumulative effect of the small stressesof normal operation, may be sufficient toaffect the reliability of crucial parts of thesystem. For this reason, the ACRS has recom-mended that instruments be installed in theplant to monitor and record stresses in orderto verify structural behavior during towingoperations. 47
WASH-1400 concluded that the probabilityof a core-melt is relatively insensitive even tosubstantial variations in the reliability of in-dividual components. However, exposure tothe marine environment could reduce thereliability of enough componentssimultaneously to increase the probability ofan accident. As with other features of floatingplants, this question cannot be answeredwithout an extensive risk analysis.
DIFFERENCES IN REACTOR DESIGN
The reactor design for floating powerplantsis different in several significant details fromthe Surry plant on which WASH-2400’S con-
elusion about pressurized reactors was based.
Of the eight differences considered by OTA,seven are also incorporated in land-based ice-condenser plants using Westinghouse reactorsystems. Hence, they are relevant only todetermining the applicability of WASH– 1400’sconclusions to the floating plant, rather thanto analyzing general differences in accidentprobabilities between floating plants andland-based plants.
OTA evaluated the implications of eachdesign difference by analyzing more than 60accident sequences that could contribute to acore-melt and then factoring the floatingplant’s design differences into each sequenceto the extent possible with the information athand. This evaluation indicates that thesedesign differences do not produce any signifi-cant difference in the probability of a core-melt in the floating nuclear plant as comparedto the Surry plant.
After OTA had completed this analysis, anadditional safety issue was raised at the begin-ning of the formal hearings on the manufac-t u r i n g l i c e n s e f o r f l o a t i n g n u c l e a rpowerplants. Mr. Ernst Effenberger, a formeremployee of Offshore Power Systems, allegedthat the turbine-generator on the floatingnuclear powerplant was the most dangerouspiece of equipment onboard and could disin-tegrate during destructive overspeed (180 per-cent of operating speed) thus producingmissiles that would tear the plant apart. Inresponse to these allegations, OTA conducteda survey of the issue. The turbine missileproblem in general has been recognized byOffshore Power Systems, the NuclearRegulatory Commission, and the AdvisoryCommittee on Reactor Safeguards. In mostways, there is no difference between land-based and floating nuclear powerplants interms of the relative dangers. For land-basedplants, the production of turbine missiles isnot considered to be a significant contributingfactor to the probability of a core-melt. For the
floating plant, missile barriers and specialspeed control mechanisms have been designedso that the probability of a safety system beingdamaged by the turbine-generator duringdestructive overspeed is within the low levelsprescribed by NRC. Specific responses toEffenberger’s allegations will be made duringthe* September 1976 hearings by OffshorePower Systems and the Nuclear RegulatoryCommission. Based on the information todate, it does not appear that the production ofturbine missiles is an important issue thatwould change the conclusion of OTA’sanalysis.
Taking all the differences that might alterthe probability of a core-meltdown into ac-count, OTA’s preliminary analysis indicatesthat the probability of a core-meltdown acci-dent in a floating nuclear powerplant is com-parable to the value of 1 in 20,000 per year ofreactor operation that was calculated for land-based plants in WASH– 1400, although sub-stantial additional effort would be required tovalidate that conclusion. The effects of a tow-ing and continued operation in a marine en-vironment were not analyzed in detail becausethat would require an examination of. in-dividual component failure rates that isbeyond the scope of this study.
Consequences of a Core-Melt
The most serious consequence of a core-melt in a land-based nuclear plant is therelease of radioactive materials to the at-mosphere. According to the analysis inWASH-1400, even if a core-melt occurs in aland-based PWR plant, it will rupture the up-per containment structure and permitradioactive materials to escape into the at-mosphere only about one in seven times. Howsuch a release would affect public health andsafety would depend on weather conditions,population density around a plant, the effec-tiveness of evacuation plans, and other fac-tors.
The human consequences range fromdeaths that would result within a matter ofdays from direct exposure to relatively intenseradiation to deaths and illnesses over a periodof years as a result of low-level residualradioactivity y. There also can be economiclosses, such as the costs of evacuation, loss ofcontaminated crops, and loss of productiveuse of lands placed under quarantine for ex-tended periods.
The OTA analysis indicates that the conse-quences of a core-melt on a floating nuclearplant may be significantly different from thosefor a land-based plant. One reason is that inthe case of a core-melt on a floating plant thecore eventually would melt through the bot-tom of the barge hull and release large quan-tities of radioactive material directly into theocean, where it could contaminate beachesand be taken up into the food chain. While acore-melt in a land-based plant could also leadto waterborne contamination, e.g., if the coreentered an aquifer after melting through thebottom of the containment, such effects werenot considered in detail in WASH- 1400. Con-cern about this type of release prompted theAdvisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards torequest a special study of the effects of acci-dental releases of radioactive materials intowater as part of its review of floating nuclearpowerplants. The NRC subsequently decidedto conduct a Liquid Pathways Generic Studyto analyze the effects of such releases fromboth land-based and floating nuclear plants.
A second reason to expect different conse-quences for a floating plant is that it appearsthat in case of a core-melt a release ofradioactive materials to the atmosphere isabout seven times more likely with the reactorsystem used in the floating plant than with theWASH-1400 land-based PWR plant. On theother hand, this may be offset to some extentby design features of floating plants whichcould reduce the amount of radioactivematerial released in case of an accident.
The following discussion will summarizeOTA’s critique of the methodology of the Li-quid Pathways Generic Study and the scope ofits coverage, and an analysis of the at-mospheric releases that could be expectedfrom a core-melt in a floating nuclear plant.
Liquid Pathways
The Liquid Pathways Generic Study is beingconducted jointly by Offshore Power Systemsand the NRC staff in an attempt to comparethe consequences of accidental releases ofradioactive materials into water for variousrepresentative land-based and floatingnuclear powerplant sites.
The study was initiated by the AdvisoryCommittee on Reactor Safeguards to answer aseries of questions and concerns that wereraised during the Committee’s review of thedesign concept and of plans submitted to sup-port Offshore Power System’s application fora manufacturing license for eight floatingnuclear powerplants.
In the first phase of the study, the AdvisoryCommittee asked Offshore Power Systems toanalyze the dispersal patterns of radioactivematerial that might be released into the openocean as a result of a number of postulatednuclear accidents on a floating powerplant.After analyzing the OPS study, NRC decidedto conduct a generic study of the environmen-tal effects of the release of radioactivematerials into water from either land-based orfloating plants.
The NRC staff is concentrating on land-based plants sited near rivers, the Great Lakes,estuaries, and desert areas. The OPS staff iscontinuing its study of hypothetical sites forfloating plants, including sites off the Mid-Atlantic States and the Gulf of Mexico. Boththe’ NRC and OPS studies are examiningpossible methods of mitigating potential nega-tive impacts.
The results of the Liquid Pathways GenericStudy will be incorporated into the licensing
processes for the manufacture of eight floatingnuclear plants and for construction of the AGSin several ways. The analysis of the conse-quences of radioactive releases resulting fromso-called “design-basis accidents, ”48 whichmust be considered in environmental andsafety reviews and which exclude core-meltdowns, will be included in new environ-mental statements for each licensing action. Inaddition, the NRC will publish a separatereport containing the analysis of severe acci-dents (core-meltdowns) as well as design-basis accidents.
Because the study has not been completed,OTA has reviewed only the methodologybeing used by NRC and Offshore PowerSystems. The methodology appears to be validand based on conservative assumptionswhich, if anything, will tend to overestimatethe consequences of a release. Furthermore,the study is being subjected to extensivereview by a wide range of experts prior torelease. As a result, OTA expects the study toproduce adequate analysis of the questions ithas addressed.
Nevertheless, the Liquid Pathways GenericStudy has serious limitations in the range ofquestions it addresses. Specifically, it does notconsider the full range of consequencesanalyzed in WASH-1400. First, while it doescalculate the radiological-dose-to-populationresulting from releases into liquid pathways,it does not translate the dose into healtheffects such as illnesses and deaths. Second, itdoes not attempt to estimate the economicconsequences of such releases, even thoughthese may be very great. A core-melt at anoffshore floating nuclear powerplant couldprohibit commercial and recreational fishingfor a wide area around a plant. It could lead toan extended quarantine of nearby waters andbeaches for recreational uses, which couldhave extremely serious economic conse-quences for Atlantic and Ocean Counties in
survey intended to estimate both positive andnegative effects of a nuclear powerplant ontourism at various locations in the UnitedStates including the Atlantic City area, it isstudying only the effects of the fear of an acci-dent as a negative effect and is not assessingthe reduction in beach visitors that couldresult if an accident actually occurred.
These restrictions in the scope of the LiquidPathways Generic Study mean that it will per-mit only a partial comparison of the conse-quences of accidental releases of radioactivematerials into water pathways in land-basedand water-based nuclear powerplants. Therange of consequences considered would haveto be expanded if the study is to be used in acomprehensive comparison of the overallrisks associated with the two kinds of plants.
One additional feature of the Liquid Path-ways Generic Study limits its usefulness, in itspresent form, in a comprehensive comparisonof risks. Specifically, the study assumes thatall of the radioactive material that WASH-1400indicates might be released into the at-mosphere if the containment fails during acore-meltdown would, with a floating plant,be released directly into the water. While thisassumption gives a conservative estimate ofthe consequences of liquid pathway releases, itdoes not readily fit into a realistic assessmentof overall expected consequences of a core-melt, which would have to take into accountthe probabilities and consequences of at-mospheric releases as well. The question of at-mospheric releases will be considered in thenext section.
ATMOSPHERIC RELEASE
The Liquid Pathways Generic Studyassumes that the consequences of the releaseof radioactive materials into the atmosphereare comparable for land-based and water-based plants. This assumption may not bevalid. Even if a given quantity of radioactive
New Jersey. While NRC is sponsoring a material would have roughly the same conse-
quences whether it escaped to the air onshoreor offshore, it is not reasonable to assume thatthe expected magnitude of atmosphericreleases would be the same for onshore andoffshore plants. Because there are significantdesign differences between the reactor systemused in the floating nuclear plant and theplant analyzed in WASH-1400, OTA examinedthese differences to determine whether theywould significantly limit the applicability ofWASH-1400’S conclusions to floating plants.This examination suggests that the probabilityof atmospheric releases from a core-melt in areactor system of the design used in the float-ing nuclear powerplant would be significantlygreater than for the land-based PWR plantconsidered in WASH-2400. At the same time,the consequences of a release may be lesssevere because lower amounts of radioactivitymay escape. For these reasons, the conclusionsof WASH-2400 about the expected conse-quences of atmospheric releases cannot bedirectly applied to floating plants withoutmodification.
The source of these differences is the ice-condenser, pressure-containment system usedin the floating nuclear powerplant, as well asin one plant in operation and nine under con-struction onshore. This system, which uses 2.5million pounds of berated ice as a heat sink tocondense steam and thereby reduce contain-ment pressure in case of an accident, allowsthe use of a smaller and lighter containmentbuilding, a distinct advantage for a floatingplant. OTA’s comparison of this design withthe Surry plant indicates that the smallerpressure containment used in the floatingplant ice-condenser system is about seventimes more likely to rupture in the case of acore-melt than is the larger and heavier con-tainment of the onshore plant analyzed in theRasmussen Report. In fact, it appears that ev-ery core-melt sequence on a floating plant islikely to lead to a rupture of the containmentabove the water line, while only one in sevencore-melt sequences in the Surry plant would
produce an above-ground containmentfailure, The reason for this difference is thatthe smaller volume and lower design-pressureresistance of the floating plant containmentstructure would make it much more vulnera-ble to the pressure pulses that would occur atvarious points during any core-melt sequenceas the molten core fell into various pools ofwater within the containment, and ultimatelyreached the water under the plant. This higherprobability of an atmospheric release from acore-melt on a floating plant would tend tomake the expected consequences of a core-melt proportionately greater for a floatingplant than for an onshore plant similar to theSurry installation.
Despite the higher probability of a contain-ment rupture, the ice-condenser system hascertain features which would tend to reducethe amount of radioactive material released tothe air from the failed containment. The ice-condenser itself would trap radioactive iodine,one of the more dangerous radioactivematerials, while the higher ratio of surfacearea to volume in the containment structuremight increase the amount of vaporized corematerial that is deposited on surfaces withinthe containment. These tentative conclusionsalso require validation.
It should be emphasized that these findingsindicate that the analysis of atmosphericreleases in WASH- 1400 would requiremodification before it could be applied to anyice-condenser plant, whether located onshoreor offshore. These findings do not imply thatthere is a generic difference between floatingand land-based plants as far as atmosphericreleases from containment failures are con-cerned, because Westinghouse ice-condenserplants are under construction, and in one casein operation, onshore. A comprehensive com-parison of risks of floating and land-basedplants would have to examine differences be-tween the same type of plants located in thetwo environments.
While such a comprehensive analysis wasbeyond the scope of this study, several genericdifferences between floating and land-basedplants can be identified. First, in the case of acore-melt in a floating plant the core wouldeventually melt through the bottom of theplatform and contact the water on which theplant was floating, This probably would pro-duce large quantities of steam because boilingconditions could be expected to exist at thesurface of the core for a day or more after meltthrough, 49 50 This steam could in turntransport into the atmosphere significantquantities of radioactive material, includingfine particles produced in the interaction ofthe molten core with water.51 While the possi-ble interaction of a molten core with ground-water is a potential mechanism for similar se-condary atmospheric releases in some land-based plants, there are some factors that maylead to differences in the effects of suchreleases on the generic risks of floating plantsas compared to land-based plants. For onething, the potential for such releases exists forall plants located on water, and only for someland-based plants, depending on the site. Inaddition, the release would occur later in timeafter initiation of a core-melt sequence in aland-based plant because of the thicker con-tainment base mat that the core would have tomelt through before encountering ground-water; this could reduce the population at riskby allowing additional time for evacuation.However, since WASH-1400 did not considerthis type of release, further analysis would beneeded to determine whether the potential forsuch secondary releases leads to a differencein the generic risks of land-based and floatingplants.
A second possible generic difference be-tween land-based and floating plants is thefact that floating plants can be located awayfrom shore, which guarantees a permanentzone of zero resident population for severalmiles around the plant. This could reduce theexpected consequences of an atmospheric
release compared to some onshore sites.However, this difference applies only tooffshore sites, and would not affect nearshoresites as compared to land-based plants locatednear the coast.
In summary, OTA’s preliminary analysisindicates that the conclusions of WASH-1400about the expected consequences of at-mospheric releases cannot be directly appliedto the floating nuclear powerplant. Further-more, substantial additional analysis wouldbe required to enable a generic comparison ofthe types and effects of atmospheric releasesresulting from core-melt accidents in land-based and floating nuclear plants.
Accident Risks in the Study Area
Because the objective of this study was toassess the three offshore technologies by ex-amining the potential impacts of their deploy-ment in a specific geographic area, New Jerseyand Delaware, OTA’s analysis of the safety offloating nuclear plants considered the risksfrom an accident at the AGS, as well as thegeneric risks of floating plants.
Several unique aspects of the AGS site couldlead to more severe consequences in theunlikely event of a core-melt accident thanwould be the case with many land-basedplants or floating plants at other sites. The firstof these is the fact that the economy of the areaaround Atlantic City depends heavily on sum-mer recreational use of the nearby beachesand ocean. An accident that released largequantities of radioactive materials into theocean could have a severe regional economicimpact.
The influx of summer tourists also greatlyincreases the number of people who could beexposed to radiation in case of an accident. Forexample, the year-round population of Atlan-tic City, which is estimated by city officials tobe 43,000, increases to around 400,000 onsome summer weekends.52 The population ofLong Beach Island, whose southern tip is 2.8
miles north of the AGS site, increases from10,000 to a summer daytime peak of morethan 100,000.53 In the unlikely event that asevere accident occurred on a July weekend,some 500,000 people, few of whom could beexpected to know emergency evacuation pro-cedures, could be in the area.
Finally, the prevailing winds in the AtlanticCity area are from the south from Aprilthrough August, and could be expected to car-ry atmospheric radioactive releases from theAGS directly towards Long Beach Island. 54
Because the winds average about 10 miles perhour in those months,55 an accidental releasecould be carried to populous beach areas onthe island within an hour. Furthermore, theisland is connected to the mainland by a singlefour-lane bridge, which can delay motoristsleaving the island by as much as 2 hours intraffic jams under normal summer conditions.This suggests that evacuation procedureswould be only of limited usefulness in reduc-ing the consequences of an accident during thedaytime in the summer.56
These peculiar aspects of the AGS site leadto the conclusion that both the Liquid Path-ways Generic Study and WASH-1400 haveonly limited applicability in assessing theoverall risks from deploying floating nuclearpowerplants in the study area. As notedearlier, the Liquid Pathways Generic Study isnot considering economic impacts, WhileWASH-1400 did analyze economic impacts, itscalculations of the expected consequences ofaccidents are based on site characteristics
developed by averaging the characteristics of68 sites expected to be in use by 1981. Theaveraging technique makes it impossible todetermine from WASH-1400 the effects ofpeculiarities of particular sites such as theAGS. For this reason, WASH-1400’S conclu-sions do not appear to be directly applicable toanalysis of the risks from locating a floatingnuclear powerplant at that site. A comprehen-sive risk assessment of the AGS would requiresome modification of existing analytical tech-niques, since neither WASH-1400 or NRCprocedures for analyzing the consequences ofdesign-basis accidents take into account cor-relations between wind direction and seasonalpopulation peaks.
CONCLUSION
OTA’s review of NCR studies related to therisks from accidents in floating nuclearpowerplants indicates that these studies arenot comprehensive enough to provide either ageneric comparison of the relative risks fromland-based and floating plants or an assess-ment of the specific risks from deployingfloating plants in the study area.
While substantial additional effort wouldbe required to perform these analyses, areview of relevant literature indicates thatthere exists a substantial amount of informa-tion applicable to assessing the consequencesof a core-mel t in a f loat ing nuclearpowerplant, and that research programs areunderway to provide additional relevant in-formation. 57
Alternatives To Offshore TechnologiesThe Coastal Effects study has been con-
cerned to this point with the consequences ofdeploying any or all of three offshore energysystems proposed for the waters off NewJersey and Delaware.
This phase of the study examines the conse-quences of not deploying the offshore systems,with particular attention to the question ofalternative sources of energy for New Jersey,Delaware, and other Mid-Atlantic States.
Although the analysis includes a discussionof a range of alternatives, it concentrates onthose that are judged to be realistic optionsduring the period 1976-90.
Based on analysis of existing and potentialenergy sources and possibilities for reductionsin energy consumption, this assessment findsthat:
● Even if offshore Mid-Atlantic oil andnatural -gas systems and nuclearpowerplants are producing at presentlyprojected levels in the 1980’s and 1990’s,the Mid-Atlantic States still will dependon other sources for at least 80 percent oftheir energy.
. It may be possible to develop conserva-tion programs that would make up theenergy lost if the offshore systems are notdeployed, but such programs would needstrong national leadership and wouldhave to begin at once.
. Without strong national programs toconserve energy and develop alternativeresources, the Mid-Atlantic States will belocked into existing energy patterns wellinto the next century.
● Utility managers will choose existing andtested technologies that are most apt tomatch the consumption levels in theirforecasts and will assign reliability of
power supply a higher priority than cost.
The most promising alternatives forstretching out supplies of fossil fuels areprograms to improve insulation ofhomes and offices, changes in automobiledesign to increase mileage, and the use ofexisting technologies to increase theamount of power generated per unit offuel.
Coal is a potential substitute for everybasic fuel in the United States and sup-plies could last for more than a century,even if consumption were to quadruplewithout improvements in mining tech-niques. However, massive conversion touse of coal would entail such majorchanges as transportation networks,some changes in air quality standards,new mining techniques, and new minertraining and safety programs.
Utility companies and other energy sup-pliers in Mid-Atlantic States will not fac-
tor supplies of oil and natural gas fromthe Baltimore Canyon Trough into theirfuture plans until exploration establisheslikely production levels.
No single new technology or change i nthe way existing technologies are used islikely to provide more than a small per-centage of total energy requirements forNew Jersey and Delaware before the endof the century. Solutions to energyproblems will be found by puttingtogether many relatively small conserva-tion and supply programs.
Given existing laws, regulations, fuelsupplies, and technologies, New Jerseyutilities would favor building floatingnuclear powerplants as their first choice.If these are not permitted, the utilitieswould opt for shoreline floating plants,
land-based nuclear plants, and coal-firedplants, in that order.
. Solar programs will not contribute muchto energy supplies before the end of the
—.
CONSTRAINTS ON ALTERNATIVES
century unless Federal programs to cutsolar installation costs and private plansto market solar products are given higherpriorities than they now enjoy.
Without strong national leadership in con-servation and fuel supply programs, the mostlikely course for the Mid-Atlantic region overthe next 20 years is to expand and extend theenergy system that is already planned or inplace, including floating nuclear plants.
One likely sequence that emerges from anexamination of the study region is as follows:
In the case of electric power, only exten-sive conservation is likely to reduce thegrowth in consumption below predictedlevels. Lacking assurance that growth in de-mand will be slowed down by new nationalpolicies, utility executives will scheduleconstruction of new generating capacity ac-cording to their own forecasts, which factorin relatively modest changes in consump-tion growth rates. Because of the long lead-times for planning and building largepower-generating plants, this sequencetends to lock regions into existing tech-nologies for many years into the future. Forexample, Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,New Jersey’s largest public utility, signed acontract in 1973 for two floating nuclearpowerplants it did not intend to put intooperation for 12 years. 1
In scheduling construction of new generat-ing plants, utility managers choose technologythat is both available and time-tested. For atleast the next 15 years, that inclination islikely to limit the choices to nuclear or coal-fired powerplants for baseload generators.
Several options to present plans for expand-ing central generating capacity are being.
studied in New Jersey and Delaware. Witheach alternative there are uncertainties as toperformance, questions about cost, or legal or
institutional barriers.
A June 1976 report concluded that enoughelectricity could be generated in New Jersey asa byproduct by producing steam or heat forindustrial purposes to postpone for 10 to 15years a need for new baseload powerplants. 2
The report noted that 29 percent of theelectricity in West Germany is generated as abyproduct of industrial operations and thatonly 2 percent of the power supply i n NewJersey involves joint production of steam andelectricity y. However, there has been nodetailed study of the cost of expanding jointproduction in New Jersey. There is no inven-tory of plants that could be converted and,therefore, no estimate of the potential outputfor the State.
In theory, about 5 percent of baseloadpower in the Public Service Electric & Gas Co.service area could be generated by burningmunicipal refuse. But the only attempt tobuild a refuse-burning powerplant in NewJersey has been delayed for more than a yearby problems of site selection, transportation,and guarantees of delivery of refuse in suffi -cient quantities to keep a plant operating. 3
New Jersey and Delaware utilities COuld in-crease purchases of power from the Penn-sylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) Inter-connection as an alternative to building newcentral powerplants in either State. The Inter-connection is a power pool that links 11
power companies and permits them to operate capacity to supply New Jersey and Delawareas a single, integrated system.4 Beyond some on the grounds that both States would be tak-point, however, other Mid-Atlantic States ing the benefits of power without paying themight balk at increasing their generating potential costs of pollution.
ENERGY PATTERNS IN THE MID-ATLANTIC STATES
Present plans call for a steep increase innuclear-generating capacity and a drop in theshare of energy supplied by petroleum tobring basic changes in Mid-Atlantic energypatterns over the next 20 years.
According to a 1976 Bureau of Minesforecast, the share of energy supplied bypetroleum in the Mid-Atlantic States—NewYork, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania—willdrop by the year 2000 from a present 57 per-cent, which is well above the national average(46 percent), to just over 40 percents Duringthat time, nuclear generating capacity is plan-ned to increase by about 85 percent. By theturn of the century, nearly half of the region’stotal energy would be supplied by nuclear andcoal-fired powerplants.
The forecasts make several assumptionsabout consumption and availability of fuels.
Because States in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic are much more dependent on foreignoil than are States in other regions, forecastsprobably are least reliable where they arebased on assumptions about availability ofpetroleum. Sharp price increases, embargos,or decisions by producing nations to cut backoutput all could change the energy picture forthe Mid-Atlantic States more drastically than
for the Nation as a whole.
As with oil forecasts, several assumptionsin the projections of growth in nuclear-generating capacity are open to question.
New Jersey utility companies plan to usenuclear power for virtually all of the increasein their baseload generating capacity betweennow and 1987.6 By 1987, about 70 percent ofthe baseload capacity in New Jersey is ex-pected to be nuclear powered, compared withsome 40 percent in 1975.
However, escalating costs, scarcity ofcapital and questions about the availability ofuranium have held back completion ofnuclear plants to about two-thirds of thelevels that were forecast as recently as 1974.Recent studies also raise questions about howclose nuclear plants come to operating at theirrated capacity. T Design changes in new plantsnow under construction may increase on-linegenerating time but there is no experience tosupport a judgment.
Despite these potential problems, NewJersey utilities have concluded that nuclearpower is the least expensive technology athand and have scheduled expansion accord-ingly.
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS ALTERNATIVES
The only direct substitute for oil and Trough during at least the next two decades isnatural gas from the Baltimore Canyon an increase in imports.
For the near term, conservation programs family homes can be cut by more than 50 per-could reduce the rate of growth in foreign im - cent with better roof and sidewall insulation.ports. Over a longer period of time, an acceler-ated switch from the usc of oil and gas to heatbuildings to the use of solar power couldachieve dramatic reductions in petroleumconsumption,
Based on present estimates of offshoreresources, substantial increases in oil importswill be necessary over the next 20 years in ad-dition to offshore production if nothing isdone to reduce projected increases in con-gumption. 8
Washington Natural Gas Co. found that at-tic insulation cut the fuel requirements forheating a single-family home by 22.7 percentand that wall insulation cut fuel requirementsby another 28 percent. 10 The firm also foundthat appeals to conserve fuel were less effec-tive than a marketing approach based onpromises of lower home-heating bills. In Apriland May of 1974, while an insulating subsidi-ary of the company was stressing conserva-tion, its crews insulated 17 homes. In the same
There are alternatives that could reduce de- 2 months of 1976, after the company began
mand for oil in Mid-Atlantic States without a emphasing lower fuel costs in its advertising,
need for new technologies. None of these can it installed insulation in 1,404 homes.
alleviate the problem by itself, but in com -bination they could ease the strain on energysupplies in New Jersey and Delaware, OTA isassessing the potent i a 1 for conservationprograms in residences for a report to bedelivered to Congress in early 1977. Theassessment includes an examination of tech-nology and institutional barriers to deployingthe technology. The following are some exam-ples of such programs:
It is not possible to compare theWashington experience with the potential forNew Jersey and Delaware without a detailedstudy of insulation in those two States, but i fthe pattern of uninsulated homes in N e wJersey and Delaware is comparable to that inWashington State, a widespread insulationmarketing program could cut consumption ofoil and gas for heating purposes by 24 to 40percent.
Insulation Solar
About 32 percent of the oil consumed inMid-Atlantic States in 1974 was used for heat-ing space and water. 9 That represented about400,000 barrels of oil per day.
The promise of energy savings throughwidespread insulation programs so far existslargely on paper. No definitive studies of netenergy savings have been done. No workableprogram to accelerate insulation on a nationalscale has been devised. But there is at least oneprogram that seems to be working withoutnational leadership and using accepted
Solar heating systems probably could
replace many of the oil and gas systems nowused to heat Mid-Atlantic homes, apartmenthouses, office buildings., and stores. But thestatistics that are emerging from research anddemonstration projects indicate that the use ofsolar energy for heating will spread too slowlyto make a significant contribution to totalenergy supplies before the turn of the cen-tury. 11
Automobile Efficiency
marketing techniques. That program, run byWashington Natural Gas Co. of Seattle, could Another alternative to offshore oil produc-
tion and increased imports lies in increasingserve as a model for other regions. the energy-efficiency of automobiles. In 1974,The results of that program indicate that more than 40 percent of petroleum products
consumption of energy for heating single - sold in the Mid-Atlantic were used for
. .
t r anspor t a t ion . 12 C h a n g e s in design of direction by setting standardsautomobiles could double the number of miles mileage in the Energy Policyper gallon of fuel. Congress has moved in that tion Act of 1975.
for automobileand Conserve -
FLOATING NUCLEAR PLANT ALTERNATIVES
Interconnection
The Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland(PJM) power pool is a clear alternative to con-struction of floating nuclear powerplants or toshoreline or inland plants in New Jersey andDelaware.
New Jersey already imports about half of itselectric power, either from PJM companies orfrom powerplants located outside the Statebut partially owned by New Jersey utilities.Public Service plans to buy 650 megawatts(MWe) of power from the pool in the early1980’s to meet forecast demands until it canbring new nuclear plants into operation.
The power pool includes 11 members andaffiliates, operating in five States and the Dis-trict of Columbia. The members and affiliatesserve 21 million customers with a peakgenerating capacity of 43,000 MWe. Thepower pool’s 117 generating plants are linkedby 5,293 miles of transmission lines and arecontrolled from a central computer complexin such a way that power demands fromanywhere in the system are met by activatingthe least-costly unit elsewhere in the systemthat is not already operating at capacity.
Utility executives do not flatly rule out thePJM power pool as an alternative to newgenerating plants offshore or in the State.However, their plans for new generatingplants are based, in part, on a conclusion thatlower operating costs of scheduled nuclearplants will make it possible to reduce powercosts in the State, which now run about 60percent higher than the national average.
Conservation
Neither insulation programs or solar-heating systems would reduce electrical de-mand in the Mid-Atlantic region significantlybecause only about 1 percent of all homes areheated electrically.
Estimates of savings in consumption thatcould be achieved by reduced levels of light-ing, higher efficiency of electrical appliances,and improved building design are largely ex-trapolated from a relatively small base of ac-tual experience.
Reduction in electrical consumption alsowill come slowly because of the long lead-times for replacing existing equipment andappliances with more energy-efficient equip-ment. The Energy Policy and ConservationAct of 1975 requires that most appliances soldin 1980 and thereafter be 20 percent more effi-cient than similar appliances sold in 1972.However, the replacement cycle for some ap-pliances is 16 years or more.
The California Energy Resources Conserva-tion and Development Commission voted onSeptember 15, 1976, to require air-condi-tioners sold in the State* after 1979 to be 30percent more energy-efficient than theaverage existing models. 13
Technology is not a barrier to higher effi-ciency in air-conditioning. Several modelsnow on the market will meet the new Califor-nia standards. But air-conditioning manufac-turers oppose higher standards because theymean higher price tags for air-conditionersand a possible decrease in sales volume.
After a recent study, one New Jersey utilitycompany concluded that standards similar tothose set in California would reduce the com-pany’s need for peak power-generatingcapacity in 1990 by 7 percent. 14 Peak power isgenerated largely with the most expensivefuels-ail and natural gas—and its costs arefive to six times as high as baseload electricity.
The New Jersey company tried to persuadethe State legislature to write higher energy-efficiency standards into law. Air-condition-ing manufacturers in the State opposed thelaw and the proposal was abandoned. 15
Cogeneration
Cogeneration of electricity refers to generat-ing both electricity and heat for manufactur-ing processes in a single plant. This dual use ofenergy is not a new concept in the UnitedStates. About 4 percent of the Nation’selectricity is generated by steam which is thenused in manufacturing.
A preliminary assessment of the potentialfor cogeneration in New Jersey concludes thatsomewhere between 10 and 90 percent of theState’s electricity could be produced by plantsthat already generate steam for industrialuse.16 The actual number of plants that couldgenerate electricity as a byproduct would de-pend on the number of plants that could con-vert to cogeneration and projections of futureneeds for steam or heat in manufacturing proc-esses. The preliminary assessment preparedby the Princeton University Center for En-vironmental Studies recommends an in-depthsurvey of industry to determine the potentialfor cogeneration.
A prime argument for cogeneration, ac-cording to the report, is that fuel costs forelectricity could be about half those for powergenerated in central stations because fuel effi-ciency would be 62 percent compared with anaverage 32 percent in existing powerplants.
one unit of fuel is used to perform two func-tions, power generation and production ofsteam or heat for industrial use.
The study did not anlayze the costs of in-stalling dual-purpose steam generators on alarge scale. Nor did it include a detailed studyof water and transportation needs that wouldbe involved in cogeneration on a large scale.
A common type of cogeneration already inuse involves piping waste steam frompowerplants to factories within a mile or sowhere the steam is used for industrial pur-poses. Advocates of cogeneration propose toreverse the process so that electricity wouldbecome a byproduct of industrial steam andheat generation.
Coal
Coal is a potential substitute for every basicfuel in the U.S. energy system-oil, naturalgas, and uranium. There is enough coal in theUnited States to last well over a century, evenif consumption were to quadruple and therewere no improvements in mining technoiogy..
However, any such increase in coal produc-tion would require major investments in newmines, new transportation networks andequipment, adjustments in air quality stan -dards, new mining techniques, and improvedsafety systems.
Coal can be converted to fuels like oil andgas but existing technology for conversion isrelatively primitive and expensive and has notbeen perfected for widespread commercialuse. OTA is assessing the coal technologiesthat are or will be available between now and1990 and evaluating methods of reducing en-vironmental impacts of increased utilizationof coal. A report on the assessment will bemade to Congress in early 1977.
For at least a decade, coal could be used as asubstitute for offshore energy resources by
The higher efficiency results from the fact that burning in conventional powerplants or for
heating homes and commercial buildings. It is,in fact, the last of the fallback fuels on the listsof New Jersey utilities which are investing inoffshore nuclear powerplants.
According to the most recent estimate of theEnergy Research and Development Ad-ministration, new coal technologies that willburn fuel much more efficiently and with farless pollution will not be tested on a commer-cial scale before 1990. By that time, construc-tion may already have begun on the last offour floating nuclear plants which PSE&G has
RESEARCH
The foregoing examination has concen-trated on near-term alternatives, those likelyto be available for widespread commercialdeployment within the 20-year time frame ofthis assessment. They include alternatives thatwould involve changing the pat terns ofenergy use and distribution and alternativeswhich would adapt existing technology tonew uses.
Longer term alternatives could cover amuch broader range of possibilities and manydepend on research on new and promisingtechnologies. The research is now being con-ducted on many levels in government and pri-vate industry.
Major federally sponsored research isbeing conducted on thermonuclear fusion as agenerator of electricity and many expect theresearch will show fusion to be capable of pro-viding long-term, environmentally safeenergy in large quantities. Other research isdirected toward more efficient conversionsystems for coal such as the magnetohydro-dynamic generator.
Still other research efforts are directedtoward more effective use of solar energy, the
agreed to buy.
The coal technology most likely to serve asan alternative to any of the proposed offshoresystems during the next 10 to 15 years is aconventional powerplant. The capital cost of aconventional plant currently is between $700million and $900 million, including advancedpollution control equipment. A 1,000megawatt (MWe) plant1,000 acres of land andbuild.
would require abouttake some 4 years to
most plentiful and long-lasting fuel known.
Technology already exists for using solarenergy to heat water and space. Similar tech-nology is under development to power cool-ing systems that now are operated largely byelectricity y.
An OTA analysis has found that neitherpublic nor private programs in solar energyare likely to lead to large-scale deployment ofsolar equipment in the next 20 years unlessthey are expanded and intensified.
The Energy Research and Development Ad-ministration estimates that at the present paceof development less than 6 percent of the heat-ing and cooling systems in U.S. homes will besolar powered by the year 2000. The OTAanalysis concludes that the potential for solarpower is large enough to warrant moreemphasis on development and marketing. TheOTA study, which will be sent to Congressearly in 1977, focuses on barriers to morewidespread use of solar energy to generateelectricity for individual residences and smallcities and examines possible courses of actionfor removing the barriers,
The stakes forand Delaware are
solar power in New Jerseyhigh in energy terms. As ha’s
been noted, about 32 percent of all oil andabout 63 percent of all natural gas now con-sumed in those States is used for space heatingand water heating. A major shift to solarpower would make possible significant sav -ings in both scarce fuels and in the need forfuture imports.
The OTA analysis of energy alter-natives iscontinuing beyond this and other studies.
One assessment now underway involves aninvestigation of renewable ocean energy tech-nology, including methods of extractinguseful energy from ocean tides, waves, winds,currents, and thermal differences i n water-layers.
The study will assess the amount ofresearch necessary to make such technologycommercially feasible and the consequences ofdeveloping renewable ocean energy systems.A preliminary assessment is to be completedearly in 1977.
CONCLUSION
No new alternative technology is likely to and Delaware, in which new energy optionsprovide a significant share of energy supplies may become available for both States.in the Mid-Atlantic States between now and A very important policy question involvesthe end of the century. The alternatives to the alternative energy sources for easing theproposed offshore energy systems in that problems of transition from existing energytime- frame are, by and large, restricted to ex - systems to more efficient and less pollutingtending the existing pattern of oil and gas im - systems. That transition can be difficultports and land-based coal and nuclear because of the long lead times and the longpowerplants. operating lives that are involved in existing
Two courses of action that are open to theStates, with or without Federal support, offer-some hope of reducing the rate of growth ofoil imports and slowing the pace at which newpowerplants are built.
● Conservation n programs, includingwidespread improvement of insulation ofhomes, could reduce the rate at which oiland natural gas imports grow over thenext 20 years.
energy systems, particularly in electric powergenerators.
New Jersey public utilities have contractedfor four floating nuclear powerplants to be in-stalled off the Mid-Atlantic coast. * The last ofthese plants is scheduled for completion in1992 and designed to operate for 40 years, un -til the year 2032. Four land-based nuclearplants already are under construction in NewJersey, all of which would be operating past
● Cogeneration of electricity as a by-prodthe turn of the century.
uct of industrial steam or heat could The more central powerplants that are builtreduce the rate at which new central using existing technology in the next 10 to 20powerplants would be built. years, the more difficult it will be to replace
because they could buy time for New Jersey “cond pair Of plants
them with new technology that may be moreefficient and less polluting than may be com-mercially feasible after 1990. An analogy ex-ists in the case of older coal-fired powerplantsthat now are used primarily for generating in-termediate loads of power in the two States.Newer coal-fired systems already exist thatare more fuel efficient and less polluting. Butit is not economic to shut down the olderplants and replace them with new plantsbecause the older plants, most of them located
near urban areas, still have many years ofoperating life.
Similar transition problems will exist in thefuture as new technologies come online whileit is still economical to operate existingsystems. Conservation, cogeneration, a n dother alternatives would ease the transitionproblem and make it possible to put new tech-nologies in place with less delay and difficultywhen they are ready.
!Il 11<
Footnotes: Chapter IVDESCR1PTION OF STUDY AREA
1.
2.
3<.
4.5.6.7.
8.9.
10.11.
12.
13.
14.15.
16.
17.
New Jersey and Delaware Statewide Com-prehensive Outdoor Recreation Plans.Council on Environmental Quality, 7’IIcDtJlai(117)’t’ 1< ;?~cr R(7siI~: A II E}IZIi)OI~)}I(>IIt(71A SSLYS))lCII t O( T h r e e Ce)/t/{rics O( C/~/71~(S(>,Au~ust 1975.Jenny, Mar-y and Jo~Jl Goodman, A St~Id~/ ()[t)lc S(l~-io-E~-ollo)}li(- [-~7ch)rs Rc/flti17(y h 1)~~~ Or(fcr
Co~~li~~c~/f~l/ .%cl( ()~ lhc )~~ i d - A ll(71~f;1- CW751,
\rol. 1, p. 62.Ibid, p. 62.Ibid, p. 95.Ibid, p. 95.N. J. Testimony at Department of the in-terior, Draft En\riron mental Impact State-ment Hearing, Atlantic City, N. J., Januar}r27, 1976.Ibid.U.S. Department of Commerce, %cial andEconomic Statistics Administration, Sf~lf;sfi-ca 1 A IIS frac f 01 /)71’ U} I I’ fd .$i~ fcs, 7 Q 74,Wash in~ton: Go\~m-nment Printing Office,1974.Ibid.Delaware Depart rncnt of Corn m u n itvAffairs and Economic Development, 1974EC()~Z(JIIIiL- A ~z(711/\i5 ()( T()~{l-i~f~ (717(f fl~() D()/(li(T(l/(]Traz’1’l IIIi.siIIL’si.
Op. cit., Council on Environmental Quality.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, W(7fl’rlu)r~ll’Conlnrucr 0( the Ullitc[i St f7tLJS.
Working Paper #2.Virginia Institute of Marine Science, SpecialReport #93, prepared for U.S. Fish andWildlife Service, A }1 ASSLJSSI)IC)II of Esl//(7ri/~(’mId fNcarshorc M~ri/lc E}l~~i~’tl~~//~t’i~t, M a r c h1976, pp. 82-90,U.S. Department of the Interior, final EI/-Z)jrollllllvltfll lnl~wct Sffitr))lc}lf Sale #40.Interviews with New Jersey officials.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF OFFSHOREPETROLEUM TECHNOLOGIES IN THEMID-ATLANTIC
1. Council on Environment’jl Quality, Letter (JtTransmittal, p. 3. The Council’s report, OCSOil and Gas: An Environmental Assessment,was issued in April 1974.
2. Secretary of Interior Morton’s statc~mc~ntbefore the Joint Hearin~s, Serial NtJ. 94-1-1(92-104), P. 42.
3. United States General Accounting Otficc~,“Report to the Congress: Outlook forFederal Goals to Accelerate Leasing of Oiland Gas Resources On the Outer Continen-tal Shelf,” March, 19, 1975, p. iii.
4, It is important to note that it was the C’~}un-c i 1 on Env iron mental Qua I it}’, n ~Jt t hcDepartment of the Interior which inir{~l~txlthe State governments and affected p,l rtic~+in this year-long study.
5. U.S. Congress, Office of Technolog\ Assess-ment, “Feasibility of Separating Ex~~lc~ratit~nfrom Production” of Oil and Gas on theOuter Continental Shelf,” May 1975, p. 21.
6. Unpublished U.S. Geolt)gical Su rt~~}~ dat,l.7. US. Department of the Interior, Bureau of
Land Management, Budget Office.8. Interviews with Bureau of Land hlana~LJ-
ment officials, January and Februa r-}’, 1976.9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.11. Ibid.12. Interviews with New Jersey and Del,l ~~arc~
officials, May and August, 1975, Fc’bruar\~,1976.
13. Interviews with Interior officials, February,1976.
14. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau (JfLand Management, (news rclcast.>) March,1975.
15. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau ofLand Management, (news releast’) August,1975.
16. Interviews with Bureau of Land hla nagc~-ment and State of ficia Is, Jan ua rv and f:c~bru -ary, 1976,
17. Department of the Interior Manual 5 16–-Release No. 1341—is issued 9/27/7 1; Burc~auof Land Management manua 1 was r~’lc’as~d5/4/72. A Bureau of Land Mi-inagcm~~~nt in-structional memorandum dated 12/31 /75makes some procedural changes i n the’ lc~t -ter.
18. Inter\~iew’ with Bureau of Land Managementofficials, Februaryr, 1976.
19. I n t er ~’ i e w ~v i t h N e ~v J e rse v - Del a w a rc.officials, February, 1976.
20. Interview with U.S. Department of the In-
,.
21,22.23,
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.30.
31.
32.
33.34.35.36.
37.38.
39.40.
41.42.
43.44. 1
1
1
1
terior, Office of Outer Continental ShelfCoordinator, May 12, 1976.Working Paper #5.Working Paper #7.Council on Environmental Quality Letter toDepartment of the Interior, January 23,1976, recommending a delay in the lease salein Alaska until certain environmentalstudies are completed.Personal conversations with State membersof the Outer Continen ta I Shelf Ad y’ is(~r~’Commit tee on February 18, 1976. -
Interviews with New Jersey and Dt~l.~ ~t,l reofficials, Mav and August 1975 and f:ebru -ary 1976, -Interview with official of Department of theInterior, Office of Outer Continental ShelfCoordinator, May, 1976.Interview with U.S. Department of C(Jm-merce, National Oceanic and Atm(Jsph~’ricAdminis t ra t ion , Office of Ct~astal Zt~neManagement and Bureau of Land M,ln,~ge-ment staff, Jan uarv and February, 1976.Interviews with D-elaware t~fficials, Janll,lry4, 1976.Ibid.Interview with Cape May County planningstaff, February 4, 1976.U.S. Department of the Interior (newsrelease), December 1975.U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau ofLand Management (news release), July 16,1976.Working Paper #1.Ibid.Ibid.Mid-Atlantic Go\~crnors’ l)twiti[~n [),1 per,Trenton, N. J., January 197S.Ibid.Testimony on Draft En\irt)nmental impactStatement, Atlantic City, N. J., Januar} 29,1976; intervicw?s with State t)tficia Is, January~nd February, 1976.[bid.Reeves, H. W., A ~1 OT?(’rz)i[’[{1 of” 1)~~’ (Jf/~)/(Jr[’Pl~I((~r//J l/~d//strI/, Novtm~ber 1975.Working Paper #1.Letter from U.S. En\’ironmcntal Prot~~cti(~nAgency to Mr. Curtis J. Berklund, Director,Bureau of Land Management, February 12,1976.Working Paper #6.[nterviews with officials in New Jersey andDelaware, January and February 1976.
45,
46.
47
48.49.50.
51.52.53.
54.55.
56.
57.
58.
59,
60.
61.
62.
63.
i)
Extrapolated from, Cazcno\~e & Cc)., TIIIJNort)z !iell: TIIC ,1’[irc}~ for o i l l?)zli G(ZS (l)lli t/Icl}~~plicfltio~~s ft~r /~/tILYII~I(JI/f, September 1972,p. 47.Offshore Tech nology Con fercncc Paper,‘~ Deepwater Pipelining in the Central N(~rthSea”, 1973. Also, Santa Barbara ChannelPipeline Project Environ mental 1 mpactStatement, December 1974.Offs h o r e Tech n 01 ox y C o n fe r e n c e,“Electronic Survey Helps Assure Integrity t~tOffshore Pipelines”, 197.7.Working Paper #2.Working Paper #?.Miller, Martin C., Jerry C. Bacon, I\’an M.Lissauer, Office of Research and De\clop-ment, U.S. Department of Tra nsp(~rtatit~n,U.S. Coast Guard, A Ctll)ljlflt[’r .Si)ll//l(7fio\l
Tecl~~~iq~(t~ for Oil S~lills 0 1 ( f)r[’ N(~i(~ /(Irs(’!/-Delaware Coastline, Report No. CG-D- l/1975,Springfield: NTIS, September 1975.Working Paper #3.Op. cit., Miller, Martin C., et al.Statement of Clayton D, McAuliffe, Chc\’r(~nOil Field Research Company, Januar} 1976.Working Paper #2.Dr. Norbert Psuty, director, Marine SciencesCenter, Rutgers Un ikrcrsity, tcstifving inTrenton, N.J., Fd?ruary 14, 197!5. ‘Major Guy F. Muziani, Wild\\’ (mcl, N. J., andothers i n testimony at Atlantic City, J,l n LI,l r}’28, 1976. Also, N~]i(~ Y(Jrk Ti~~/[+, lanuar~’ 11,1976.Briefing by U.S. Geological Survey’s R&DOffice on December 15, 1975.U.S. Department of the Interior, final En-zlironmwztnl zmpm/ Statement. Sale #40, July1976, VO1. 2, pp. 334-38.Sheen Technical Subcommittee, “Environ-mental Aspects of Produced Waters from LIi 1and Gas Operations i n Offshore and Coasta IWaters, ” September, 197s.Gulf Universities Research C(~nsort ium( 1 9 7 4 ) , Fi/1[71 Pr~~jtYI Pl(~)///i,y,y C~~//}/ci/ C~J}IstIII-SIIS R c~wrt, Offshore ECO1OSV 1 n \’cst i~a t ion,Report No. 138, September 20.Proceedings, 1975 Conference on Pr~wen-Lion and Control of Oil Pol Iuticln, Amt~rica nPetroleum Institute, March, 1975.U.S. Department of Commerce, Natic}nalOceanic and Atmospheric Administration,“Report to the Congress on Oct~,ln Pollutit)n,Overfish ing, a n d Of fsh LJ re De\’cl t~pm cm t,January, 1975.Working Paper #5.
\! Ii:,
64. U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau ofLand Management, Final Enz~ironmerzfal im-pact Stnfenre)rt, Proposed increase in Oil and GasLeasing on the Outer Continental Shelf, ” Febru-ary 1975.
THE POSSIBILITY OF DEEPWATER PORTS INTHE MID-ATLANTIC
1. U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-m e n t , Oil Tr(?}l\~~i)rt/llioll /JI/ T(711kcrs.’ A 1 1A tzlzl~/sis [)( ,Vl ITri\lc po//l, ~/())l ( 7 / i d .S(7((]I.V
Mc(7sl/rt>s, Washington: Government Print-ing Office, 1975.
2. Jacobs, John, W o r l d Tanker Fleet Rez~ieul,December 1975.
3. Op. cit., Office of Technolo~}r Assessment.4. Interview with Interstate Oil Co. t~fficial.5. Office of Technology Assessment, Tanker
Report and description of January 1975, col-lision of two tankers in the Delaware Riverat Marcus Hook.
6. Op. cit., Office of Technology Assessment.7. %)rros Assoc. Inc., O((slrtlr(> T~’r~tri}~[7/ SI/~fcItIs
COIICL>/IK, September 1972.8. Ibid.9. Delaware Bav Transportation Co., Project
Report, A Pro~M).sC~f D(70/~i(’(71(>r T~7/lk(]r T[>r~//i/l/71(7)/ d 0/1 S)lorc Pi~l~’lill(’ Dish’ ihlltloll s~/5h’Hl,April 4, 1968.
10. Statement by William T. Cahill, p. 1145,Joint Senate Committee Hearings on Decp-water Ports Legislation, Ju Iy 23, 1973.
11. Deepwater Ports Project Office, Draft En-vironmental Impact Statement for proposedoffshore Texas terminal.
12. Ibid.13. Personal conversation with representati~res
of LOOP Inc., July 1976.14. Working Paper #1.15. August 4, 1976 telephone conversation with
Jacksonville Division.16. Federal Energy Administration, N(7ti(v1(71
bzergy O[{tlook, February 1976.17. Working Paper #5.18. Ibid.19. Pen Jer Del Corp., “Oil Port Update,” May
1975.20. Ibid.21. Interview with industr}’ executi\’t’, hlarch
1976.22. July 7, 1976 letter from John E. Lescroart,
Director of Dcepw’atcr Ports, U.S. Dc)phrt-ment of Transportation.
23. Ibid.
24. Working Paper #.;.25. Op. cit., Office of Technology Ass~wn~cmt.26. Miller, Martin C., Jerrv C. Bacon, Ikan M.
Lissauer, Office of Research and Dc\’cJlcJp-ment, U.S. Department of Transportation,U.S. Coast Guard, A C[vII~)IIf~’r .Si)III/l~~IioI~Techniql[c for oil 5)~ills o(I” fh[’ ,Nci(I /rr5cj/-Delnuwre Comtli)~r, Report No. CG-D- 1 / 1975,Springfield: NTIS, September 1975.
27. Op. cit., Office of Technology Assc~ssnl~mt.28. Ibid.2 9 . Federnl Re<yistrr, v o l . 41, No. 94, h!,l~~ 1 3 ,
1976.30. Ibid.31. Ibid.
THE PROPOSAL FOR A FLOATINGNUCLEAR POWER PLANT
1. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cornrn ission, Officeof Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Draft En-vironmental Statement Related to Construc-tion of Atlantic Generating Station, Units Iand 2, Public Service Electric and Gas Com-pany, Docket Nos. STN 50-477 and STN50-478, NUREG-0058, April 1976, Table 8.3,p. 8-8, Hereafter denoted as AGS-DES.
2. AGS-DES, P. 8-16.3. Corn m u n icat i ons w i t h PL] bl i c Se r-i’ i ce
Electric and Gas company, AL1gust 1976.4. Daniel, Mann, Johnson, & MendL~nh.~11, A
Flontill(y Et7rthqlff7kc \ < L>S/Sf(711/ ~’1[(-1(’(7)’ /)( J[(’(’l’
Statio}i, Report No. 182-1-1, prep,lred torOak Ridge National Laboratory, U.S. At(~micEnergy Commission, April 1968.
5. The Energy Policy Staff, Office of Scitmceand Technology, Executive Office of thePresident, Electric Power and the Enz’ironment,in cooperation with the Atomic EnergyCommission, U.S. Department of Health,Education, and Welfare, U.S. Department ofthe Interior, Federal Power Commission,Rural Electrification Administration, Ten-nessee Valley Authority, and Council on En-vironmental Quality, Washington: Govern-ment Printing Office, August 1970.
6. Ibid., p. 37.7. Council on Environmental Quality, O~~shore
Nuclear Powerplank, A CEQllnteragmcy TmkForc~~ Study, 1976, p. Il.
8. Op. cit., AGS-DES, p. iii.9. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, SafetyEvaluation Report related to Offshore PowerSystems Floating Nuclear Plants (l-8),Docket No. STN 50-437, NUREG-75/100,
September 30, 1975, p. 156. Hereafterdenoted as SER.
10. Dade W. Moeller, Chairman, AdvisoryCommittee on Reactor Safeguards, “interimReport on Floating Nuclear Plant, ” letter toMarcus A. Rowden, Chairman, U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, June 7, 1976, p. .3.
11. The interveners are: City of Brigantine;Kenneth Walton, Brigantine; Ocean CountyChosen Board of Freeholder; AtlanticCounty Chosen Board of Freeholder-s;Atlantic County Citizens Council on the En-vi ron men t; a n d t h 6> N a t Li r a I R eso L] rcc~sDefense Council, Inc.
12. A comprehensive study of risks associatedwith land-based nuclear plant operationwas published in October 1975, entitled:Reactor %ft’t!j Stlld~/: A II Assess)/l(vlt ()/” AccidL’IItRisks ill U.S. Cmllr?lercilll Nrlclf’f7r l>[)Z(lL’I’/ll[l);t5,WASH-1400, NUREG-75/014. The report,also known as the Rasmussen Reportt hasbeen criticized and defended by nuclearscientists and others. For details of the con-troversy, see: U.S. House of Representatives,Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,Subcommittee on Energy and the Environ-ment, Hearings on “Matters Pertaining tothe Reactor Safety Study (RasmussenReport)”, June 11, 1976, Transcripts to bepublished.
13. SER, p. 31.14, U .S, Nuclear Regulatory Corn m ission,
“Report of the Interagency Rcgu latorvSteering Committee for the Coordination (~fFederal regulatory Activities relative to theLicensing of Floating Nuclear Powerplants ”,July 1975.
15. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Regula-tion, Directorate of Licensing, [))’[),~r(7/)//)/(7fi(-/)/(ornrf7tio)/ for //lc I.ic(vrsill,y 0/’ Sff7//ddr(fi2(’[iN 1{ C- 1 c o r PO u’ t’ rj~ 1 (I )1 ts, W A S H -1 ,? 41,Washington, August 1974, Amendment 1,December 1974.
16. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, AH-HLMI Report 1975, pp. 20–24.
17. “Memorandum of Understanding Betweenthe United States Coast C,uard and theUnited States Atomic Energy Commissionfor Regulation o f FI oa t i n g N LI c1 ea rPowerplants”, f-cdt>r~ll R~’,~is/rr, ~ol. 3 9 , N o .12, Thursday, January 17, 1974, p. 2124.
18. “Memorandum of Understanding Bctw’eenthe Corps of Engineers, United States Arm}~,and the United Stattis Nuclear Re~u [atorv.
Commission for Regulation of NuclearPowerplants”, fcdcrol Rc,yish>r, Vol. 40, No.165, August 25, 1975, p. 37110.
19. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Officeof Public Affairs, “Licensing of NuclearPower Reactors”. Also, Annual Report 1975.
20. Working Paper #8.21. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Re~ulation, Fi//(7l EI1 -l}iro)l~~l(~jl f~/ st~tt~~~l(~jl t \<[~/(7/L~(f /() M (7jI l[fll(-tllr(~of Fiooti/l<y Nl(clcnr P(n(v’r\Jl17/lts [J~/ ojfdlorcPouvr SI/stwIs, Pnrt 7, A}l E}lzji)’()/l//l~~~ltl7l Stntc-mcl~t Co}lsilit~ri~~,q the O/wr17fio/l of the MIIIIIIf[Ic-turi~z,y Fncilihy ill )ilckso}~z~illc, Flori[in, NUREG75/091, Docket No. STN 50-437, Springfield:National Technical Information Sertice, Oc-tober 1975, p. 3-24.
22. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, A) I-HIIO1 Rtyort 197.5, p. 54.
23. Ibid., p. 58.24. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director-
ate of Regulatory Standards, E/r~~i)’()/r)~/t~}/t(71S11 rz~e}/ 0( Trfl/lsportf7 tiolz ()( R f7fi io(7~-li l~rMnterr~ls t o ll)ld froI~I N11cl(J17r Poi(ll~/’/)l(l)lf~,WASH-1 238 (Dec. 1972) and U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, Office of StandardsD e v e 10 p m e n t, S LI p p 1 e m e n t 1 t oWASH-1238, NUREG-75/038. (April 1975).
25. Ibid., Wash-1238, p. 1.26. Op. cit., AGS-DES, p. 5-74, and p. 7-3.27. Working Paper #9.28. 10 CFR 50-51.29. Ibid,30. Ibid.31. Regulatory Guide 1.86.32. Ibid.33, Working Paper #9.34. Ibid.35. At 78 percent plant factor. If the plant were
in operation 60 percent of the time, which isthe present average for all U.S. nuclearplants, this would be reduced to 12.1 billionkilowatt-hours.
36, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, Director-ate of Regulatory Standards, Nf //clc(7r f)(n(~(’rFncility Pcr~orulo}lc~~ Cllnrnctl’ristics {or M17kiil,qE )1 v i r o )1 ItI c }1 t 01 ! 1)1 j) 17 L- I A ss css III c II fs,WASH-1 355, December 1974, p. 4-114.
37. Less than 50 acres of this would actually heused for the placement of transmissiontowers.
38. Op. cit., U.S. Atomic Energy Commission,Directorate of Regulatory Standards.
39. Public Service Electric and Gas Co., Prelin~in-~ry Sa~ehj Annlysis of Atlantic Generating Sta-fion.+—-llnits 1 & 2.
40. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comrn ission, RII[rt--tor S~l(CtI/ S/IIdI/, A/~ AssL+s))/L~)/t ()~ Risks III /-1,.S.Comwer;i(ll NI(L-1(’(7r /)07(1(])-)~l(7111s, \f’A.S}/- /400,”(N UREG-75/0 14). Springfield Nationa ITech n i ca 1 I n formation S~~r\’ i CLJ, October1 9 7 5 .
41. U.S. Atomic Energy Commissi~~n, InterimStatement of I>olic}’, “Protection Against Ac-cidents in Nuclear Power Rc’actt~rs, ” l“t)(l(’r{7/
Rc,y Isk’)’, vol. 39, N o . 167, Tut’sday, August27, 1974, p. 30965.
42. A summary of the contrt~~rers}’ can be f[~undin: Hearings on “Matters I>c~rta in ing tt~ theReactor %fcty Study (Rasmus\en Rc~port), ”June 11, 1976, U.S. HOLIW of Rq3rcwmta-ti~es, Committee on Interic~r and insularAffairs, subcommittee on Ener~v and theEnviron ment.
43. Working Paper #8.44. Ibid.45. Ibid.46. Op. cit., Dade W. Moeller, p. 2.47. These are accidents that are jud~ed to IN
likely enough to warrant a na I ysis. Adescription c~f Nuclear Regulator-y Commis-sion po] icv about the consideration of acci -dents is f[~unci in the discussion of safety inthe ISSUC section.
4 8 . O f f s h o r e Power S\rstems, C(~)~st’[~[/(’)/((IS ()(1<(’lc~lscs ttl l.i{~[(i(i l;(lf)li(’(l?/~, Report N o . T R091 A89, June, 1976, p. 3-9.
49. Buston, Lawrence D. and Lloyd S. Nelson,“Reactor Explosion Research”, E)~viro)~/)Ic)/tMn~azine, June 1976, p. 6-8.
r50. Working Paper #8. A so Advisory Commit-tee on Reactor Safeguards, Minutes of theFloating Nuclear Plant/Atlantic GeneratingStation Subcommittee Meeting, February 4,1975, Washington, D. C., p. 4.
51. Private communication from Atlantic Citvofficials.
52. Long Beach, N. J., Chamber of Commerceestimate, August 12, 1976.
53. EG&G Environmental Consultants, S11}~1))1~7rIi0( Ocef7tlo,qrf7ph ic (l17srriwtio)ls ill N(’i(l /1’rW 1/
Coastal Waters Near Latitude .39° 28’ N. andLongitude 74° 15’ W. Durinx the Period May1972 Through April 1973, A Report to PublicService Electric and Gas Company, July1974, Table T5-1, P. 5-50. ‘
54. Ibid.
55. A critique of the adt?quac~r 01 radi,ltion
emergency procedures is fOLI nd in: Gc~ncr,l IAccounting Office, Cornptrollcr Gt~n~~r,~l t~ithe United States, .$fro~~(~rr f[’~f~’r~?l A ~>isf~~~~~-(’to Stf7f~Ts Nc(’dcd (or 1< f7di~lf iol~ /./)l(’l-,yt’JrCI/Rcsjul}lw’ PllzJl12ill,q, R E D 76-73, (Alarch 18,1976).
56. Working Paper #8.ALTERNATIVES TO OFFSHORE
TECHNOLOGIES1. Offshore Power Systems, Flontin$ Nuclear
Power Generation Editorial Fnct BOOk, 197s-77,1976.
2. Williams, Robert H., Center ft~r En\’iron-mental Studies, “The Potential t~~r El~~ctricit\Generation as a Byproduct t~f Inciu>tri.ilSteam production in Netv Jw-se\~, ” Princ~~t~~nUniversity, 1976.
3. Transcript, Office of Technol(~~} Assc~ssmt.~ntSeminar - on Energy Altm-nati\~w, PrincL~tonUniversity, June 25, 1976.
4. Handbook on Pennsyl\ran ia-Ne\\’ Jt~rsc~\-Maryland interconnection, April, 1976. “
5. Working Paper #5.6. Nuclear Regulator Commissit)n, Draft En-
vironmental S t a t e m e n t , Relateci tc) CLJI1 -s t r uc t i on of Atlantic C,enerat in; Stat ionUnits 1 and 2, Docket Nos. STN 50-477 andSTN 50-478.
7. For differing evaluations, scw Ct~mc~}’, D,~\’idD., Bullrti}l ()( th~) A towi(- .’icitv~fisls, Nt~\’~~mber1974; A tollzic ]lldlisfri~l~ F(lrI/J~I, [>LIbl ic Atfairsand Information program pLI b] icd tion on
plant capacity factors, 1975.8. Op. cit., Working Paper #5.
9. Ibid,
10. Report by Navarre, C. C., \’icc’ pr~~sidcnt (~fmarketing, Washington h’atu ral Gas Co.,Seattle, Wash., to the Energy Etticic~ncv as aNational Priority Conference, Washil~gt(~n,D. C., May 20-21, 1976.
11. Draft report, Office of Technol(~8}’ Assc~ss -ment Solar Energy Project.
12. Op. cit.. Working Paper #5.
13. Private communication with staff, [~ner~~’.,.Resources Conservation and llwc~lt~pmcntCommission, Sacramento, Calit.
14. Op. cit., transcript, Office t)t’ TechnologyAssessment ener~y seminar.
15. Ibid.16. Op. cit., Center for E n \ iron m en ta I
Studies,
.
“..
Chapter V
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
Public Participation: A Pilot ProjectThe public participation element of this
assessment was a n effort to bring about a n ex -change of information between OTA andcitizens in the study region. This two-wayflow of information was intended to con-tribute to public understanding of the tech-nologies being assessed, and to obtain infor-mation directly from the affected citizens.about impacts of greatest public interest andconcern.
The data obtained from the public par-ticipation program helped OTA ensure thatfactors which citizens consider relevant andimportant were adequately addressed in thestudy. The public participation program alsohelped OTA to make the assessment as com-plete as possible so as to assist the Congress inanticipating, understanding, and considering,to the fullest extent possible, the consequencesof technological applications, as mandated bythe Technology Assessment Act of 1972.
In addition to contributing to the content ofthis particular assessment, the public par-ticipation program was intended to help OTAlearn how the public could participate in ameaningful way in the assessment of tech-nology. The process of involving the publicand integrating the results of such an effortinto a technology assessment is an experimen -.tal one. There is virtually no practical ex-perience upon which to draw, nor does theprocess lend itself to standardized formulas,models, or techniques. This pilot project was
therefore designed to evolve throughout thecoastal effects study so as to meet the needs ofthe assessment team and of the public partici-pants.
Overall, OTA learned through responses toits public participation program that citizenswere most interested in the economic benefitsand losses, the social and environmental ad-vantages and disadvantages, possible changesin their way of life, and the possible risk ofmajor accidents associated with the threeenergy systems or their alternatives.
With regard to the current system for infor-mation gathering and decisionmaking,citizens were concerned that the States and thepublic lack an effective partnership role andthat the various Federal agencies do not suffi-ciently coordinate their roles and activities.
Repeatedly, participants in the programsaw an urgent need for a national energypolicy in which each energy system could beconsidered, and serious research and fundingcould be given to determining conservationmeasures, identifying alternative sources o fclean and renewable energy, and developinginnovative energy systems.
The need for a national energy policy wasstressed by many respondents, and their col-lective views are well expressed by a respond-ent from Hillside, N. J., who put it this way:
Before these options are explored, the Stateand the Nation must develop a comprehen -
255
sive energy conservation policy, includingdevelopment of mass transit and recycling ofall usable products. As a second step, allminimum polluting forms of energy-—such assolar, wind, and geothermal—-should beutilized wherever possible. If offshorefacilities are eventually developed, legislationshould spell out clearly that they must con-form to all existing environmental legislation.This is especially important regardingonshore development which will definitelyaffect air quality maintenance planning. -
More than 15,000 persons were reached byOTA during the project. Those who partici-pated in the assessment by returning ques-tionnaires, attending workshops, or com-municanting with OTA in other ways, repre-sented industry, trade associations, profes-sional associations, consultant groups,academic groups, citizen organizations, andlocal, State, regional, and Federal officials, aswell as the general public.
Since no attempt was made to obtain arepresentative sample, participants may ormay not be representative of the entirepopulation of the study area. Nor was any at-tempt made to conduct a public opinion pollon support for, or opposition to, the tech-nologies. OTA was seeking substantive infor-mation and as many points of view as possibleto ensure a thorough and reliable assessmentof offshore energy systems.
Participation in the assessment was inresponse to OTA efforts to reach as many per-sons as possible in New Jersey and Delaware,but the study was not confined exclusively tothat area.
The process of public participation wasfacilitated by the following factors:
(1) the limited size of the study area;.
(2) the existence of actual proposals in thearea for:
-offshore oil and gas exploration anddevelopment,
—a floating nuclear powerplant,-deepwater ports; and
(3) the neutral position of OTA relative toeach of the technologies being studied.
Response to the public participation projectwas mostly favorable. Participants indicatedthey were pleased to be consulted by theGovernment at a time when they felt theiropinions would make a difference in thestudy. Dissemination of information to thepublic was indicated as a major step towardencouraging citizen involvement and OTAwas encouraged to find more ways of dis-tributing information and involving thepublic by the most efficient and least costlymethod.
Responsibility for planning, directing, andconducting the public participation projectwas assigned to one member of the OTAOceans Program staff, but other members ofthe assessment team, including the ProgramManager, also attended workshops, preparedmaterials, and evaluated i n formationreceived. Thus, all members of the team wereaware of the relevance of information beinggenerated and public participation activitieswere integrated into the assessment process.Instead of being viewed as a separate part ofthe study, public participation was consideredby the entire Oceans Program staff to be anecessary and integral part of the effort toprovide Congress with relevant information,including public perceptions and views aboutthe consequences of the technologies beingassessed.
The following methods of communicationwere used for this information exchange:
an initial OTA news release announcingthe study;
distribution of 100 copies of a staff-pre-pared briefing paper about the assess-ment;
three public workshops which drew atotal of about 90 participants;
attendance by OTA staff at public hear-
●
●
●
●
●
b
●
●
●
●
●
ings and at meetings sponsored by othergroups;
distribution of 15,000 i n formationbrochures, “Proposed New TechnologiesOff the Shores of New Jersey andDelaware”;
more than 1,000 responses to question-naire i ncluded in brochure;
in-depth interviews conducted by the.assessment team;
correspondence and position papers sup-plied to OTA by participants;
review of background papers by OTA ad-visory pane] members and public partici -,pants;
specially convened industry, govern -,ment, and academic panel on alternativessponsored by OTA;
meetings with the OTA Coastal EffectsAdvisory Panel and the TechnologyAssessment Advisory Council;
review of OTA draft report by panel,public participants, and governmentofficials involved in the technologies;
s u r v e y r e s u l t s a n d c o n s t i t u e n tcorrespondence supplied by congres-sional offices;
monitoring of press reports on theassessment and the proposed offshoretechnologies in Delaware, New Jersey,N e w Y o r k , P h i l a d e l p h i a , a n dWashington, D. C.; and
interaction with members of Congressand their staffs.
The process of identifying and reaching po-tential participants was, by design, an evolu-
tionary one. Initial contacts were expected toprovide additional names, and they did. Thosesources in turn provided more names. Lists ofpotential participants were also obtained frominterested persons and organizations, con -gressional offices, testimony at hearings, pressreports, and requests for information receivedby OTA.
Supplementary sources of information,such as testimony at Government hearings,press reports on energy systems in genera],and similar sources not generated by OTA,were also used to determine whether therewere any major d inferences between views ex-pressed in those forums and views being ex-pressed to OTA, and to detrmine whetherrelevant segments of the public were beingreached by the OTA effort.
The public participation project was a con-tinuous loop of information exchange fromthe assessment team to the public and back tothe team. The information exchange made itpossible for the OTA staff to confirm ongoingwork or modify or expand the study i n.response to concerns and information needsidentified by participants.
The following sections of this chapter detailmajor findings, the ways in which OTA madeuse of the information gathered through thepublic participation program, and how theprogram was conducted. Throughout the dis-cussion, the actual words of respondents areoften used to illustrate the level of public in-terest, understanding, and concern about theenergy systems being studied.
Major Findings for All TechnologiesBACKGROUND of information: lists of the positive and nega -
From responses to a questionnaire (see tive impacts expected from the three energyfigure V-1 ) distributed during the public par- systems, and comments on all aspects ofticipation program, OTA obtained two groups offshore energy development..
Figure V-1. Public participation questionnaire
such development, please note these below:
and Coastal Zone Assessment
Public Participation— - -- —
1. If you would like to be kept informed about the
A d d r e s s —
2.
3.
City State Zip 5. If you or your organization have developed any information relative tothe subjects of this study that you would like to send along with thisquestionnaire, please note below the nature or title of the materials:
If you belong to any organization(s) that would have an interest in theassessment, please indicate
Organization
Address — —
City — State Zip
President
Organization Please mail this questionnaire, along with any other informationshare with OTA to:
you wish to
City State Zip Please fold here
President
If offshore energy systems were developed off the coasts of New Jerseyand Delaware, what effects would you foresee for yourself, your com-
POSTAGE AND FESS PAID
munity. and the nation? Do you think these effects would be generallyOFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
positive or generally negative?
Possible effects?(Please Iist)
Offshore Drilling for Oil and Gas
1
2.
3.
Floating Nuclear Power Plants
2.
3.
Deepwater Ports for Supertankers
1.
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
P E N A L T Y F O R P RI V A T E U S E , $ 3 0 0
Positive Or Negative, ( Please check)
P o s
Pos c
Pos ❑
Pos. D
Pos. G
Po, (1
Pos. IJ
POS. p
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Emilia GovanPublic Participation, Oceans ProjectOffice of Technology AssessmentUntied States CongressWashington, DC. 20510
Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
The lists supplied by respondents allowedOTA to determine which anticipated impactswere most important to participants. Theyalso made it possible to compare responsesfrom various areas of New Jersey andDelaware to determine if there were signifi-cant differences in views based on place ofresidence.
The comments, which were made inresponse to an open-ended question on thequestionnaire, provided the quotes used in
OVERALL FINDINGS
The public participation program showedthat:
. Questionnaire respondents attributedmore positive than negative effects tooffshore oil and gas systems and to float-ing nuclear powerplants, but more nega-tive than positive effects to deepwaterports.
● More respondents perceived mixedeffects—i e., some positive, some nega -tive—from offshore drilling, than fromfloating nuclear powerplants or deep-water ports.
. For all technologies, the important posi-tive effects related to increased energysupply, lowered energy costs, stimulus tothe economy, fiscal advantages, increasedemployment, and environmental advan-tages.
● For all technologies, the primary negativeimpacts related to degradation of theonshore and marine environment, thedangers and consequences of major acci-dents such as oil spills or nuclear mal-functions, adverse economic impacts—especially potential losses to the tourist-recreation industry—and adverse energy.use impacts such as depletion of non-renewable sources, disincentives to con-servation and to alternative energysource development.
this chapter and advised OTA of alternativesand other actions which the respondentsbelieved important, relative to energy sup-
plies.
The following pages give the overall find-ings from the questionnaires and the findingsfor each of the three systems studied. For eachsystem, the findings are grouped as they relateto anticipated effects, how the technologieswill be implemented, and preferences or alter-natives expressed by respondents.
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●
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The major positive effect perceived foroffshore drilling was increased energyavailability y.The major positive effect perceived forfloating nuclear powerplants was also in-creased energy availability.The major positive effect perceived fordeepwater ports was lower energy costs,The major negative effect perceived foroffshore drilling was undesirableonshore impacts.The major negative effect perceived fordeepwater ports was the possibility oflarge oil spills.The major negative effect perceived forfloating nuclear powerplants was poten-tial nuclear hazards.
In addition, respondents expressed apreference for alternatives other than nuclearor oil-related offshore developments. Thesecan be summed up by the following state-ments by participants:
ConservatiOn of energy, wind, and solarpower should be used, not stepped-up pro-duction of oil or dangerous nuclear power-the ocean belongs to the world and should beprotected at all costs. (From Paramus, N.J.)
More effort must be made to use solar energy.Nuclear, fossil fuels are at best stop-gapmeasures. (From Waldwich, N. J.)
The only real solution to the energy problemis a commitment to development of SOurces
other than fossil fuels or nuclear fission. Anall out effort to develop solar, wind, geother-mal sources, etc., would meet with public ac -ceptance. (From Chatham, N. J.)
FINDINGS BY REGIONThe number of respondents -who listed pre-
dominantly positive or predominantly nega-tive effects for each technology was tabulatedand this i n formation was sorted according tothe counties in which the respondents live.This analysis allowed the study team to deter-mine whether residents of coastal countiesperceived effects which were significantlydifferent from those perceived by residents ofnoncoastal areas. The major findings of thisanalysis are as follows:
NEW JERSEY
Delaware River Counties of New Jersey(Cumberland, Salem, Camden, Gloucester,and parts of Cape May Counties):
● more positive than negative on nuclearplants, offshore drilling for oil and gas,and deepwater ports; but
. largest positive margin on oil and gas.
Southeastern New Jersey (Cape May, Atlan-tic, Ocean Counties):
●
●
●
positive on oil and gas, but by smallermargin than other parts of New Jersey;
about evenly divided on nuclear, butnegative percentage larger than in otherparts of New Jersey;
more positive than negative on deep-water ports, but by fairly small margin.
Northeastern New Jersey (Monmouth,Middlesex, Union and Essex Counties):
It’s time to develop new means of supplyingenergy in the United States. ( FromMontclair, N. J.)
. largest number of respondents;● more positive on oil and gas and nuclear;● more negative on deepwater ports;. more positive on floating plants than
Southeastern New Jersey or DelawareRiver Counties;
Non-coastal New Jersey:●
●
9
larger margin positive for oil and gasthan other New Jersey or Delawareregions;
larger margin positive for floatingnuclear plants than other New Jersey orDelaware regions;
larger margin negative on deepwaterports than other New Jersey regions.
DELAWARENew Castle County, Delaware:
● more positive for oil and gas;
● more positive for floating plants;
● more negative on deepwater ports.
Kent and Sussex County, Delaware:●
●
●
●
smallest number of respondents;
more negative than positive on all threetechnologies;
more negative on offshore developmentand floating plants than deepwater ports;
margin of negative for all three tech-nologies greater in Sussex than Kent.
OFFSHORE DRILLING FOR OIL AND GAS
Anticipated Effects. the perceived negative effects. The benefits ofThe perceived positive effects of offshore OCS oil and gas were seen mainly as economic
drilling focused on very different factors from and energy-related, with emphasis on energy
self -sufficiency and employment oppor -tun i ties; whereas the adverse effects wereassociated main 1 y with anticipated degrada -tion of the coastal and marine environment,the quality of life, and the risks of major acci-dents causing losses to the economic base ofthe region—the recreational industry whichdepends on a clean environment. (See figurev-2.)
Concerning the positive effects, a Bloom-field, N, J., resident saw offshore drilling as “apositive step in the direction of providing thiscountry with the energy it needs. ” AMontclair, N. J., respondent saw offshore drill-ing as “absolutely necessary for our futureeconomy. Another Bloomfield resident sawOCS development as “good for the State inthat it provides much needed jobs and taxrevenue, and a Pompton Lakes, N .J., personsaid that offshore drilling “should help thevery bad economic and unemployment situa -tion now existing in New Jersey. ”
A Wilmington, Del., resident summed upthese responses by saying “I favor offshoredrilling as benefits seem to more than offsetthe risks. ” Finally, a Basking Ridge, N. J., mansaid, “The United States should do all it can todevelop energy supplies not related to othercountries. ”
In contrast, a respondent from BarnegatLight, N. J., summed up many of the negativeperceptions by saying he felt that “suchdevelopments would ruin the N.J. shore. ” AWilmington, Del., resident was “against suchdevelopment” because it “would supply verylimited amounts of oil over a very short com-mercial life but would radically alter theecology, both animal and human along thecoast” and “may impose additional taxes oncurrent residents. ” And a South Orange, N.J.,resident said “Tourism is N.J. ’s number onebusiness. Unattractive onshore developmentshould not be allowed to damage this busi -ness. ”
Process of Implementing the Technologies
The responses to an open-ended query onthe questionnaire distributed by OTA con-firmed the findings of workshops and inter-views that the manner and timing of Federaldecisions relating to offshore oil and gasdevelopment, as well as the State and publicrole in such decisions, are matters of concern.The way in which the offshore drilling tech-nology is managed and regulated was alsocriticized by some, and the absence of ade-quate liability and compensation programs inthe event of major oil spills was noted. Propo-nents of offshore drilling were less critical ofthe present system of implementation andmanagement and many felt that changes inthe process would cause undesirable delay indeveloping offshore oil and gas sources.
GOVERNMENT INVOLVEMENT
There were some widely divergent views onthe nature and extent of appropriate govern-ment involvement in offshore oil and gasdevelopment. Views ranged from those of theNeshanic Station, N.J., resident who favored“minimal government interference in thedevelop merit,” that of a Westfield, N. J., re-spondent who said “offshore exploration andproduction should be done by industry, notFederal or State agencies, ” and the Mendham,N. J., man who wanted “a minimum of neces-sary government controls, ” to those of aLeonia, N.J., resident who said “nationalize allenergy industry, ” and the Bayone, N. J., resi-dent who felt that “if offshore developmentoccurs it should be undertaken by the Federalor State government for maximum publicbenefit.”
There were some who said, as did a SouthOrange, N. J., respondent that “the presentOCS leasing system works very well” and that“pending OCS legislation looks like anotherattempt to destroy private enterprise, andsubstitute big government bureaucracies.” Anumber of respondents cited the desirability
Figure V-2. Results of public participation questionnaire: offshore drilling for oil and gas
ANTICIPATED POSITIVE EFFECTS
Lower /
Availability
(1207 Positive Effects = 58% of Oil andGas Effects Listed)
ENERGY AVAILABILITY 47%Increased supply of energy to 52%the nation or region in general
Enhanced energy independence 4770and national security
Other 1%
ECONOMIC/FISCAL ADVANTAGES 20%Stimulate economy 57%Increase tax revenues 17%Industrial development 17%Balance of payments, other 9%INCREASED EMPLOYMENT 19%(Increase employment -decrease unemployment)LOWER ENERGY COSTS 12%(Cheaper oil and gas,cheaper transport costs)
ENVIRONMENTAL ADVANTAGES 2%(Less pollution from tankers, etc.)
Total Positive Effects: 100%
ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Gas Effects Listed) 1ONSHORE IMPACTS 32%Damaged beaches, shore 29%Industrial development 21%Increased support/service facilities 17%Increased population 13%Aesthetics 7%Other quality of life impacts: Boom 13%town, air pollution, traffic con-gestion, community dislocation
GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL 21%IMPACTSHarm to environment/ecology 65%Pollution 35%OIL SPILLS 20%Oil spills 69%Accidents (including pipeline 31940
leaks, blowouts)ADVERSE MARINE IMPACTS 15% IHarm to ocean ecology in general 61 % IHarm to wildlife, marine life 30%Damage to wetlands 6%Damage to ocean floor 3%
8%Losses to tourist-recreation 64% - -
industryDamage to fishing industry 24%Other losses (property values, 12%
farmland)
ENERGY IMPACTS I(Decrease conservation, furtherdependence on oil, use up non-renewable sources, delayenergy alternatives)
Total Negative Effects: 100%
I
Ii
of separating exploration from the develop-ment of offshore oil and gas or suggestedseveral related ways to change the presentleasing system. One respondent, fromChatham, N. J., said that “the United Statesshould do its own exploration work to deter-mine the oil and gas resources, then perhapslease lands. These are public resources and ifdeveloped the public should receive a betterreturn than has been true in the past. ” ABrookside, N. J., respondent said, “I think ex-ploration for oil and gas is important in termsof knowing our resources. However, develop-ment should not be undertaken until otherresources are exhausted. ”
And, finally, a Red Bank, N.J., respondentsummed up the views of many public partici -pants as follows: “The development of OCSoil resources must be done on a thoroughlyplanned basis. This requires a preliminary ex-ploratory phase. After the total resources areknown, then a rational national energy plancan be developed which will match the Na-tion’s energy needs over the long term whileminimizing environmental impact. ”
STATE-LOCAL ROLES AND COMPENSATION
There were many general comments, relat-ing to all technologies, that offshore develop-ments should take place with adequate Stateand local participation in decisions. One sum-mation of this view is that of the Newark, Del.,resident who said, “The States of Delawareand New Jersey should have a strong voice inall proceedings. No ‘Federal-experts-know-best’ attitude, Some ‘experts’ simply are notgreatest authorities on all matters, especiallylocal ones.” Cooperation among levels ofgovernments was seen by a Dover, Del., re-spondent as especially needed with regard tooffshore drilling: “Department of the Interiorand the oil companies have a serious cred-ibility problem. Top management is either in-sensitive or too arrogant. Offshore explora -
tive program between local, State, and Federalgovern merits.”
Several aspects of the State and local role inOCS development were discussed by partici-pants. A Glen Ridge, N. J., woman said “Ibelieve New Jersey should have a say as towhere the drilling will be done. . . .“ Severalrespondents expressed views similar to that ofa Fanwood, N. J., man who felt that “NewJersey should receive some compensation foruse of the the land and natural resources” andthe Selbyville, Del., resident who said, “If it isnecessary, the States should be financiallycompensated to provide the facilities that willbe needed for the increase in population. ”
ORDERLY DEVELOPMENT
A recurring theme among questionnaireresponses was that development should bepreceded by proper planning and safeguards.As a Highland, N.J., man put it, “The OCSshould be developed but with proper plan-ning given to the many environmental im -pacts that will result. ” A Fort Lee, N. J., re-spondent added, “1 cannot overemphasize theneed for careful environmental planning,especially in regard to the effects on the localcommunities. It must be dealt with as a com-plete ‘system’ including access roads, pollu-tion abatement, and recreation for the in-creased population. ” A Wilmington, Del.,woman wrote, “I would favor some offshoreenergy development (excluding nuclear) if itwere undertaken with adequate safeguards forthe environment and in a time frame allowingDelaware communities to plan for the result-ing growth. ” On the other hand, a Statelegislator from Centerville, Del., felt that“Coastal zone management and statewideland use plans must be developed with inputsfrom the total community. ”
A Wilmington, Del., resident said, “I favoroffshore drilling with control to minimizespills, ” and a Washington, D. C., respondent
tion can be speeded up with a ‘true’ coopera - saw the need for “strict adherence to environ-
mental protection measures—provision forprompt remedies in case of spills, accidents,etc. ” A Phillipsburg, N. J., resident, who ex-pressed support for drilling, wrote: “The tech-nology exists to control spills and leaks fromany oil-related activity. ”
Strict control over the technological systemswas also emphasized by respondents like onefrom Wenonah, N. J., who saw a need for“constant reliability check on equipment andoperators of vital equipment. Operators mustbe very well selected for ability to acceptresponsibility and to perform consistently. ”
A Westfield, N. J., man added that,“Enforceable stiff rules on spill preventionshould be developed. ”
LIABILITY AND COMPENSATION FOR OIL SPILLS
Many respondents wanted, as did aWilmington, Del., resident, to “make sureenough money is set aside to compensate forspills and damages. ” A Belleville, N. J., resi-’dent wrote, “People should have quick inex-pensive recourse for restitution for damagesdue to spillage. ” A Millville, N.J., residentstated that “any private company should berequired to post bond of sufficient amount tocover cost of spill cleanup and restoration ofwild life,” and the Belleville, N. J., respondentadded that “Legislation should include oilcompanies to put up bond for cleanup and alldamages from an oil spill. ”
Preferences and Alternatives
Some of the respondents made choicesamong the technologies.
For example, a Budd Lake, N. J., residentsaid, “Oil and gas is necessary for develop-ment of the United States and has many andvaried uses. Nuclear power would make usless dependent on oil, but radioactive waste isa nearly prohibitive problem which should bedealt with before any further nuclear industry
development. ” Similar views were expressedby a Lawrenceville, N. J., respondent who said,“Fossil fuels are a more sensible alternative tonuclear energy development”, primarilybecause of “nuclear debris generated duringproduction of fuel elements. ” A resident ofWilmington, Del., stated: “I fully supportthese developments based on oil and gasenergy. I’m concerned about nuclear-powerdevelopment because of its potentialhazards.” He cited disposal of radioactivewastes and the potential for sabotage at seawith offshore nuclear plants.
A resident of Ridgewood, N. J., added:“Offshore energy should be developed in oiland gas after full measures of the social andenvironmental impact have been made. Thehazards of offshore nuclear facilities anddeepwater ports do not warrant their develop-ment at this time. ”
While most of the comments on energypolicy and energy alternatives were general toall three technologies, some participants didexpress specific views about oil resources ingeneral and offshore drilling in particular.Some felt, as did a Mountain Lakes, N. J., resi-dent, that “oil, at best, is a short-term solutionto our national energy needs. A concentratedeffort to develop suitable long-term solutionsis required. Why run the risk of environmen-tal disaster to achieve a short-range solu-tion?” A Lewes, Del., woman felt that “lessdependence on oil should be our first priority;with more Federal money being spent on thedevelopment of solar energy. ” A Pt. Pleasant,N. J., respondent, on the other hand, said “Thisoffshore drilling for oil and gas is a short-termsolution to energy-source problems. Energysources other than burning of fossil fuels(with the exception of coal which is in goodsupply in this country) should be developed(i.e., tidal, solar, nuclear).” A somewhat simi-lar view was expressed by a Wilmington, Del.,man who said, “Petroleum development isonly a stop-gap measure as supply will runout shortly. I suggest increased support of
solar technology, wind power, and nuclear fu-sion supplies of energy. ”
In addition, the alternative of energy con-servation was advocated by a large number ofparticipants. As a Montclair, N.J., woman putit, “The proper alternative to offshoredevelop men t is conservation .“ A WestOrange, N. J., man elaborated on these themesas follows: “Devoting large amounts of capitalto oil and gas exploration will ‘lock us in’—itwill commit us to stick with these energysources, since investors will not allow their in-vestment to yield no return. The only way toescape from this development-consumptioncycle is to break away and concentrate on aprogram o f conservation a n d alternatesources .
Finally, the priority and nonpriority uses ofoffshore oil were discussed by a Fanwood,N. J., resident who asked, “Why offshore drill-ing? If this energy is going to be used for masstransportation and industry, OK, but let’s notdo this to lower the price of automobile gas.
The only thing this alternative would do islower our undersea oil reserves. I say moremass transportation. ” A Franklin Lakes, N. J.,respondent said, “Rather than flounderingaround for oil in the short term, we should taxthe stuff out of use as a fuel except foraircraft-develop fusion, wind, and solarpower and start the withdrawal from our oiljag before the whole world has to go ‘coldturkey ’.”
A respondent from Chatham, N. J., summedup the point of view of a number of partici-pants by saying, “The total expected reservesoff New Jersey and Delaware represent asmall fraction of our energy needs. Develop-ing it now will not bring us that much closerto energy independence, but it will be deplet-ing a valuable resource for future generationswho may, hopefully, use oil for more produc-tive purposes than generation of power wherecoal could be used instead. Oil is extremelyversatile and valuable as an organic buildingblock for drugs, plastics, synthetic food, etc. Itshould be preserved where possible for theseuses. ”
DEEPWATER PORTS
Anticipated Effects
While many of the perceived effects ofdeepwater ports focused on lower energycosts, other economic advantages, increasedenergy supply and more jobs, a significantproportion of respondents saw such systemsas safer and less harmful to the environmentthan the smaller tanker traffic closer to shore.On the negative side, however, a large propor-tion of respondents were concerned about thepotential for larger oil spills from super-tankers. Greater danger of accidents andgeneral offshore and onshore environmentaldegradation were also seen as negative effects.Many of these respondents saw such ports asencouraging continued dependence on foreign
oil and therefore inconsistent with energyself-sufficiency. (See figure V–3. )
A Florham Park, N. J., respondent summed
up many of the negative perceptions asfollows: “The use of deepwater ports forsupertankers would only marginally affect theeconomics of oil delivery. While it may beargued that the decrease in number of vesselsinvolved reduces the chances of accidentalspills, the increase in severity of one accidentoffsets this consideration. ” A Sea Girt, N.J.,resident said, “See no need for deepwaterports, since these are intended principally forimport of foreign oil which we ought to be
Figure V-3. Results of public participation questionnaire: deepwater ports
ANTICIPATED POSITIVE EFFECTS
Environmental andSafety Advantages
(770 Positive Effects = 48% of DeepwaterPorts Effects Listed)
LOWER ENERGY COSTS 30%Cheaper oil, energy 61 %Cheaper transportation costs 39%ENVIRONMENT AND SAFETYADVANTAGES OVERPRESENT METHODS 28%Fewer spills, less water 4970pollution
Less tanker traffic in rivers 29%and ports
Less general environmental 13%impact
Fewer collisions, port fires, 9%other accidents
ECONOMIC ADVANTAGES 16%Stimulate economy 40%Industrial development 30%Help business activity, refinery 24%operation, shipbuilding
Tax revenue 6%ENERGY AVAILABILITY 15%(Increase needed energy
supplies)EMPLOYMENT 11%(Increase jobs)
Total Positive Effects: 100%
Source Office of Technology Assessment
ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Marine Environment
Other
(835 Negative Effects = 52%. of DeepwaterPorts Effects Listed)
OIL SPILLS ANDOTHER ACCIDENTS 38%Larger oil spills 70%Safety hazards, accidents 30%
including pipeline ruptures,collisions, bad weather effects, fires
POLLUTION OF MARINEENVIRONMENT 24%General pollution including water 76%.Harm to marine life, wildlife, wet- 24%
lands, ocean ecosystem, ocean floor
ONSHORE IMPACTS 20%Industrial development 29%Damaged beaches 27%Aesthetics 8%Other land use impacts 36%onshore support facilities,increased population
ENERGY IMPACTS 10%Encourage continued 71 %dependence on imported oil
Postpone long-range 27%alternatives, conservation
Other 2%ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES 6%Potential losses to tourist- 49?40recreation industry
Expensive to build, higher 27%energy costs
Other—lower property values, in- 24%creased taxes, balance of payments
OTHER 2%Use of supertankers, increaseship traffic, target for sabotage
Total Negative Effects: 100%
curtailing, ” and a Ridgewood, N. J., residentsaid, “Supertankers . . . are notorious spillersof oil. ”
A Wilmington, Del., respondent S aw itdifferently. “The present method of lighteningis more dangerous, potentially, than a deep-water port under controlled condition s.” putanother way, a Summit, N .J., resident stated,“Offshore tanker ports would add an impor-tant safety increment to our east coast ports.Much tanker traffic now operates in confinedbodies of water at greater hazards. ” Finally, aLincroft, N. J., man said, “The NortheasternUnited States needs to be less dependent onthe other areas of the country for supplies ofgas and oil. ” He asked, “Would a deepwaterport give it an advantage over other areas?”
Process of Implementing the Technologies
Some respondents indicated that the risksassociated with this system should be elimi-nated or minimized before the technology isdeployed.
A Wilmington, Del., man put it this way:“The supertanker ports would be unaccepta-ble to me unless new regulations were en-forced in order to reduce the chance of majoroil spills. At present, oil company policies arelax and attempts at self-regulation haveseemed to fail. ” A Whitestone, Va., residentpointed out that “we will lose small amountsof surf clams” from offshore development butproper precautions “will keep this to aminimum. Pipelines buried from deepwaterterminals and from wells can circumnavigatemost shellfish areas. ”
The themes of State and local role, orderlydevelopment, the assignment of responsibility yfor oil spills, and providing adequate compen-sation to persons and businesses damaged byoil spills, were concerns also expressed by re-
spondents with regard to deepwater portdevelopment.
Preferences and Alternatives
Some respondents expressed preferencesamong the three technologies as follows: ARidgewood, N. J., man said “We should pro-ceed with offshore drilling and nuclear float-ing powerplants. Supertankers do not solvethe problem of foreign oil dependence. ” AWilmington, Del. , respondent made adifferent choice. “I favor offshore drilling ...1oppose floating nuclear plants-risks of land-based plants seem less. I favor deepwaterunloading ports. This may reduce pollutionfrom spills. ”
A Washington, D. C., woman wrote, “Since Iquestion the efficiency of Project Independence Ibelieve the importation of oil to be the mostefficient policy, since the proposed projectswould increase capital costs, raising prices tothose of imported oil anyway. In the interimperiod, we should explore the large-scaledevelopment of large-scale solar energy morefruitfully.”
Others saw alternative energy systems aspreferable to deepwater ports. A resident ofEast Hanover, N. J., stated, “I am positively op-posed to DWP’s [deepwater ports] as an in-terim solution. Only a total effort to cut de-pendence on petroleum makes any sense. Thatmeans power rationing, efficient mass transit,and properly engineered atomic-energyplants.” A Silver Spring, Md., man saW
T it thisway: “Deepwater ports imply a continuedreliance on imported oil—this is self-defeat-ing. . . . Atomic power alone goes in the rightdirection, away from reliance on fossil fuels,until alternative sources (solar, thermal, etc. )can be developed.” A Cinnaminson, N. J., re-spondent concluded, “Reliance on oil shouldbe reduced. Increase use of coal and rationgasoline. Reduce imports. ”
FLOATING NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS
Anticipated Effects
The major advantages of floating nuclearpowerplants perceived by public participantswere that such plants would increase the sup-ply of needed energy, advance energy self-sufficiency, and provide electrical power atlower costs than would otherwise be the case.Increased employment and stimulus to theeconomy were also seen as benefits. Some re-spondents indicated that these plants wouldhave less harmful environmental impact thanoil-related energy systems, that they wereclean and safe, that floating plants had en-vironmental and safety advantages over thosebuilt on land, that such plants contribute to agood energy policy by helping to end depen-dence on oil and gas and by conserving fossilfuels.
The major concern of respondents whocited negative effects focused on the specifichazards and problems that they associatedwith such plants. Many of the participantspointed to the risk of nuclear accidents and ofradioactive contamination with its attendantdangers to the natural environment and tohuman health, and to the unsolved problem ofdisposing of radioactive nuclear wastes. Somerespondents said the plants were too experi -mental and there were too many unknownsafety factors. Most of the other negativeeffects involved adverse i m pacts on themarine and onshore environment and, in par-ticular, the potential thermal pollution fromsuch plants. Others saw economic disadvan-tages, including the high expense of suchplants and the potential losses to the touristand fishing industries. Some said investmentin these plants would take funding away fromsafer alternatives. A small portion cited risksof sabotage and theft. (See figure V–4. )
Some of the positive factors were men-
tioned by a Bloom field, N. J., resident whosaid, “Nuclear power is our most efficient andpollution-free source and should be utilized, ”and a respondent from Cranford, N. J., whowrote, “Floating nuclear powerplants appearon the surface to be the safest short-term tech-nology for development of New Jersey andDelaware. I feel there is better technology andfewer hazards with this development. ’ AWoodbridge, N. J., man said, “The nuclearenergy proposal would result in the ‘cleanest’way of helping to develop our resources. ”Support for nuclear, but not for the floatingplants, came from a Cherry Hill, N.J., manwho said, “Nuclear powerplants are needed,but building them at sea creates additionaldesign problems and risk which I do not thinkare offset by the advantages. Additionalnuclear plants should be built on land. ”
On the negative side, a Wilmington, Del.,respondent summed up many of the concernsabout the risks of such plants by saying, “1 amopposed to the establishment of floatingnuclear powerplants because of the greatersafety hazards involved and the tremendouspotential impact of a nuclear accident. In addi-tion, I would not like to have the first suchplant located near Delaware. ”
A Linden, N. J., man cited “heat andradioactive waste problems. ” An EastBrunswick, N. J., man mentioned the “effect ofwater-temperature rise on marine life andmigration behavior. ” A Marlton, N. J., respon-dent said that nuclear power stations “willmost likely negatively affect the ecologicalbalance of marine life and lead to the inevita-ble destruction of same. ” A Ridgewood, N, J.,man said that, “Powerplants create an un-natural Gulf Stream water temperature towhich marine life becomes accustomed. If shut
Figure V-4. Results of public participation questionnaire: floating nuclear powerplants
$ ANTICIPATED POSITIVE EFFECTS
Lower Energycosts Energy
Availability
GoodEnergyPolicy
(977 positive effects =53% of FNP Effects Listed)ENERGY AVAILABILITY 24%.Increase energy supplies 81%Advance energy self-sufficiency 19%
ENVIRONMENTAL ANDSAFETY ADVANTAGES 20%Advantages over land-based 5070
plants (isolation from people,reduced thermal pollution, lessrisky,better land utilization,unIimited supply of cooling water)
Clean and Safe 28%(clean electricity, minimize air andwater pollution, safe, good for fish)
LOWER ENERGY COSTS 19%ECONOMIC BENEFITS 11%Stimulate economy 4170Industrial development 37%Other: higher standard of living, 22%
tax benefits. increased land values
GOOD ENERGY POLICY 9%Stop dependence on oil and gas 7570(save these for petro-chemical industry, other)
Conservation of fossil fuels 25%.
8%OTHER 9%
Total Positive Effects: 100%
ANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EFFECTS
Risk ofSabotage/Theft
(872 negative effects = 47%. of FNP Effects Listed)NUCLEAR HAZARDSAND PROBLEMS 47%Accidents 26%.Safety risks (unsafe, too experi- 22%
mental, unknown safety factors)Radiation contaminant ion (includ- 33%
ing leakage, fallout, health hazards)Nuclear waste disposal 190/0ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 32%Thermal pollution 29%.Harm environment, ecology 21 %Harm marine life, ecosystem 18%Pollution (including air and water) 17%Onshore impacts: industrial 1 20/0
development, increased popula-tion, service facilities, congestion
Aesthetics 3%ECONOMIC DISADVANTAGES 90/0Expensive to build, drain on 46%.capital funds
Losses to tourist/fishing industry 24%Cheaper to build on land 15%Take funding away from safer 100/0alternatives
Lower property values; higher taxes 50/.RISK OF SABOTAGE/THEFT 3%- ,-OTHER 9%
Total Negative Effects: 1000/~
Source Office of Technology Assessment
down, the water temperature drops back tonormal and many thousands of species arekilled. Environmentally, a powerplant causesmore harm than good. ” A Bethany Beach,Del., resident stressed the uncertainties bysaying “Nuclear power has yet to prove it-self. ”
A Ridgewood, N. J., woman foresaw “totaldestruction if terrorists were to sabotage anenergy system”, and a Sewell, N. J., residentsaid the offshore plants “become extremelyvulnerable to an enemy. ”
And, finally, a local official in Brigantine,N. J., stated: “Consider the vast touristdevelopment along the Jersey shore whichwill be hurt by even the threat of offshore oilor offshore nuclear development. Considerthe problems of evacuating huge crowds inthe event of a catastrophe. ”
Process of Implementing and Managingthe Technologies
If offshore nuclear plants were to bedeployed, some respondents want certainsafeguards included. These people, like aHockessin, Del., resident, believe that “withcareful design and operation, environmentaland safety problems can be circumvented. ” ASparta, N. J., man said, “Floating nuclearpowerplants pose slight risks from stormdamage and problems with underwatertransmission of electricity. Conservativedesign would minimize these problems. ” Anda Washington, D. C., resident said it is “essen-tial to build into the systems measures to pre-vent introduction of . . . nuclear waste into theocean, ”
One respondent, a visitor from Arizona,had a specific technical suggestion, “Floatingnuclear powerplants could be serviced bymobile shipboard fuel recycling factories. Thiswould eliminate the risk of high jacked or lostnuclear fuel en route from a generator to aland recycling factory. In effect, the factorywould go to the fuel. ”
The siting of offshore plants requiresrethinking, according to participants like aRidgewood, N. J., resident who asked, “Whydoes it have to be Delaware and New Jersey?Why not some remote area where human lifeand marine life will not be affected?” and theBrick Township, N. J., person who suggested,“Select new site for offshore nuclear plantaway from estuary. ” A Pennsauken, N. J., manpointed out, “The development is situateddirectly in ‘hurricane alley’ (and) will be sub-ject to hurricane damage. ”
There were also respondents who saw thepresent risks and uncertainties about nuclearplants so great as to make deployment un-desirable until those problems have beensolved. A South Orange, N. J., man wrote,“Nuclear powerplants are entirely out of thequestion until feasible safety measures aredeveloped,” and a North Beach Haven, N. J.,woman stated, “Until safe disposal of radioac-tive wastes is guaranteed, no more nuclearplants should be put in anywhere. ” APhillipsburg, N. J., resident echoed this view:“We still don’t know what to do about nuclearwastes. I would . . . oppose any nuclear plantuntil radioactive-waste disposal has been per-fected.” A similar view was expressed by re-spondents such as the resident of Freehold,N. J., who said of all three technologies, “en-vironmental effects should be minimized nowto prevent opposition later. ” Finally, anElmer, N. J., resident said that “Dangers ofnuclear power have been overrated and exag-gerated, ” but also expressed the view that we“need more research on utilization and dis-posal of nuclear-power wastes.”
Preferences and Alternatives
Some respondents preferred nuclear plantsoffshore to oil-related developments. AWilmington, Del., man stated, “Let’s pushnuclear so we don’t have to import oil. ” AFlorham Park, N. J., respondent said, “Firstpriority should be nuclear—step up oil andgasoline conservation. ” An Essex Falls, N. J.,
resident said, “Nuclear energy should getpriority over all. ” On the other hand, an EastBrunswick, N. J., respondent said, “I prefer thenuclear option, but cautious oil explorationand development should be acceptable. ” AWoodbridge, N. J., resident saw advantages ofthe offshore plants in these terms: “The Jerseycoast offers recreation to millions and theaesthetics of the shore line can best bepreserved by the floating plant, not oil rigsand platforms. I have seen too many ‘tar balls’on the sands of our coastline to allow en-couragement of any offshore oil develop-merit. ”
A respondent from Princeton, N. J., said,“Offshore drilling and deepwater ports arewell developed and should cause noproblems. I doubt that our technology is amatch for the sea in the construction ofnuclear powerplants; thus, chances of nuclearaccidents are greater than in land-basedplant. ”
A Fords, N. J., resident saw it this way: “Inthe present overall economic and energysituation, offshore oil development should berecommended. Floating nuclear powerplantsare undesirable due to various importantreasons. ” Some such reasons were expressedin the form of questions by the Wilmington,Del., resident who said, “I fully support thosedevelopments based on oil and gas energy. I’mconcerned about nuclear power developmentbecause of its potential hazards. What is theplan for disposal of radioactive wastes?Sabotage at sea more likely?” To answer theseand other questions, a Linden, N. J., residentsaid that while “offshore drilling and loadingports are a must and much needed . . . nuclearpowerplants still require more research intotheir safety and hazards of handling wastes. ”
Aside from the alternative of siting theplants on land, which was preferred by somerespondents, there were many participantswho wanted non-nuclear alternatives pur-sued.
A New Brunswick, N. J., man said, “Energyconservation methods should be more greatlystressed. Further pushing for nuclear powerwithout adequate safeguards is simply con-tinuing madness. ” A Princeton, N. J., residentwrote, “Should have a crash program inrenewable energy sources, solar, wind. Firmlyagainst nuclear power. ” A Wilmington, Del.,man said, “Coal should be the number onesource of energy for the immediate future, ”and an Ocean View, Del., resident said, “Ac-celerate methods to use coal in a non-pollut-ing manner. Consider use of solar energy. ” AFlorham Park, N. J., man said, “Energy conser-vation should be the keystone of fulfillingenergy needs (and) would go hand-in-handwith environmental needs. I believe thereshould be priority over nuclear fuels indeveloping needed new energy sources. ”
A Millingtown, N.J., respondent said, “Ibelieve that more attention (and funds)should be allocated to energy conservationsuch as solar heat, restrictions on cars, publictransportation. Any studies on fossil ornuclear energy must include the full impacton ecology and public welfare. If this is done,the alternates become more attractive. ” And aRoselle Park, N.J., man said, “Energy shouldbe conserved before offshore powerplants arebuilt. Incentives should be formulated to con-serve energy and reduce automobile traffic. ”A Roebling, N. J., respondent wrote, “Moreresearch money can be spent on fusion, solarpower, wind power as alternates to nuclearpower.” A Wilmington, Del., resident asked:“Have you considered using the strong tidesand currents in the Delaware River to gener-ate energy?” A Townsend, Del., man also sug-gested “using tides to produce energy. ” ANewark, Del., man suggested, in addition totidal sources to generate and store electricalenergy, that “thermal gradient between sur :
face water and ocean trough could be har-nessed to generate power. ”
A Margate, N. J., resident who expressed op-position to nuclear powerplants said, “I prefer
safe alternatives. Prof. [William] Heronemoushas suggested a string of windmills eitheroffshore or along the Garden State Parkway.Also, tidal power is a possibility worthdeveloping. And solar power is the cleanest,safest method of power production. Govern-ment should finance it heavily. ” A Watchung,N. J., resident added, as an alternative,“development to burn garbage for energy. ”
A Westfield, N. J., resident saw this set ofalternatives as desirable: “Limit nuclear-plantconstruction to demonstration plants for each
promising reactor system. In view of the acci-dents that have already occurred, I want atleast another decade of intense R&D and test-ing before widespread use. Fusion may thenbe more practical too.” The same respondenthad these recommendations: “Conservepetroleum for ultimate use in chemical syn-thesis. Build coal conversion plants for liquidand gases and fuels. Expand solar energydemonstration program—aim for solar andspace heating in all new buildings. Use wind,geothermal, to the maximum extent feasible. ”
How Public Participation Affected the OTA AssessmentOTA responded to many of the specific con-
cerns identified during the public participa-tion program by redirecting ongoing work,initiating additional studies, or broadeningstudies already underway.
The following are key examples of how thissystem worked:
1. Public Expressions—The potential ad-verse impacts of offshore oil developmenthave social as well as economic dimensions.That is, increased industrialization of thecoastal zone with consequent increases inpopulation, transportation congestion, airpollution and noise would make the area lessdesirable for residents and tourists.
OTA Response to Expressions—OTA ex-amined the types of facilities that would be re-quired onshore for a range of estimates ofrecoverable oil and gas, but found that exist-ing data did not permit a precise prediction ofsecondary land use and other impacts.
OTA Conslusion—Adequate informationabout offshore oil and gas development is notavailable and more involvement in the deci -sionmaking process by the State and localcommunities would enable them to betterplan for impacts.1
2. Public Expressions—Onshore facilitiesand other aspects of offshore drilling may be afinancial burden on State and local com-munities.
OTA Response to Expressions—OTA ex-panded its examination of fiscal impacts ofoffshore development.
OTA Conclusion—The capital-intensivenature of most facilities might produce subs-tantial sales and property tax statewide afterthe first 2 or 3 years of development if OCS oiland gas were landed in the same State inwhich the main support bases were located.However, there are many factors that couldmake it possible that individual States orlocalities within a State would experience ad-verse budgetary impacts during some periodof development. z
3. Public Expressions—Some thought thenuclear powerplant would make more energyavailable and that therefore costs of electricitywould go down. Others thought the highcapital costs of the f loat ing nuclearpowerplant could have the effect of raisingenergy prices.
OTA Response to Expressions—OTA in-vestigated nuclear powerplant costs and ex -
plored the uncertainties involved in predict-ing the final cost of a floating nuclear plant.
OTA Conclusion—While the cost advan-tage of the Atlantic Generating Station over aland-based facility of comparable generatingcapacity is small, in the long run the floatingnuclear power plant concept may provide amethod of controlling the escalating costs ofnuclear powerplants. 3
4. Public Expressions—Pipelines andpipeline leaks may harm the wetlands.
OTA Response to Expressions—OTA in-tensified its examination of the effects ofpipeline and pipeline leaks on estuaries andwet lands.
OTA Conclusion —The placement ofpipelines i n coastal areas requires carefulplanning and the lines should be routed toavoid marshlands. The danger of an oil spillstriking a beach would increase if it occurredas a result of a pipeline rupture near shore.Special consideration of pipeline design andinstallation is needed. q
5. Public Expressions—Air and waterquality may be lowered as a result of OCS anddeepwater port development.
OTA Response to Expression—OTA ex-panded its study of air and water qualitystatus and standards in the two States and therelative impacts to be expected due to refineryconstruction.
OTA Conclusion—Air quality in many po-tential locations already violates standardsand additional discharges would not be per-mitted under present guidelines. 5
6. Public Expressions—Offshore energydevelopment would provide needed jobs andsecondary employment from increased energywould reduce unemployment, but many ofthe employment opportunities may not accrueto the New Jersey-Delaware region, and po-tential losses to fishermen and tourism couldoffset employment and income gains..
OTA .Response to Expressions—OTAfollowed up on this subject by talking to in-dustry representatives about their practicesand by refining estimates of peak employ-ment, proportion of jobs likely to accrue to theregion, and other aspects of the issue.
OTA Conclusion—Direct employment ad-vantages would peak at about 4,500 jobs for amedium-sized oil discovery. On the otherhand, it is not possible to predict accuratelyeither what secondary employment mightdevelop or what employment - losses mighttake place.6
7. P u b l i c E x p r e s s i o n s — T h e r e i s apossibility the NRC is not seriously investigat -ing the risks of a major nuclear- accident andits consequences.
OTA Response to Expressions—OTAreviewed the work of the NRC on the subjectof accidents and initiated some special studies.
OTA Conclusion—The Nuclear RegulatoryCommission is not evaluating the risks fromaccidents in floating nuclear plants com -prehensively enough to permit either ageneric comparison of the relative risks fromland based and floating nuclear plants, or a-nassessment of the specific risks from deploy-ing floating plants off New Jersey.7
8. Public Expressions—The problem of dis-posing of nuclear wastes has not been solved.
OTA Response to Expressions-OTA ex-amined the waste disposal plan for the float-ing nuclear plant.
OTA Conclusion—Fuel and waste handlingsystems and the decommissioning proceduresfor the floating plant have not yet been ade-quately analyzed and decommissioningproblems have not received the necessary at-tention.8
9. Public Expressions—The major advan-tages of offshore energy development may beincreased energy availability for the regionand lower energy costs.
OTA Response to Expressions—OTA ex-panded its study of the regional energy supplyand demand situation.
OTA Conclusion—Most supply networksand prices are determined on a nationwidebasis and little change in regional supply orprices can be expected. Lower transportationcosts might give New Jersey and Delaware aprice advantage compared with some otherregion of the country, but future prices woulddepend, in part, on oil and gas price-controlpolicies and on world prices. Transportationof imported crude oil by supertanker to deep-water ports would similarly not create impor-
-. — — —
tant price cuts. For the floating nuclear plant,it was found that cost and price changes couldnot be predicted. g
10. General Concerns —In response tomore general concerns surfaced through thepublic participation program, OTA also con-vened a panel of industry and government ex-perts in New Jersey to discuss the need forconservation and alternative energy sourcesand to determine what actions industry andgovernment are taking to foster conservationand to investigate possible alternatives to theexisting energy systems. 10
— —
Sources and Uses of Public Participation DataThe major sources of public participation
data were the OTA-sponsored workshops,questionnaire responses, interviews and in-formal meetings, and review comments ondraft materials. Several of these activities wereconducted simultaneously and each yieldedsomewhat different types of information.
The assessment began in the fall of 1974,with a major data-gathering effort. This effortproduced descriptions of the technologicalsystems, deployment scenarios, legal-institu-tional systems and procedures, and theecological setting.
Workshops
During this phase of the assessment, OTAheld three public workshops (Washington,D. C., in May; Newark, N. J., in June; AtlanticCounty, N.J., in August, 1975). It also heldnumerous informal meetings in the studyregion to obtain preliminary informationfrom representatives of affected and interestedpersons about potential positive and negativeimpacts of priority concern, policy issues rel-ated to the technologies, and alternatives tothe technologies.
The Washington workshop was held for thespecific purpose of obtaining data from na-tional environmental, civic, and sport fishingassociations, about potentially adverse andbeneficial environmental effects of the pro-posed systems. The two New Jerseyworkshops were held to obtain data from abroad and balanced representation of affectedand interested publics in the region (includingindustry, utilities, labor, State and localofficials, academic, environmental, and con-sumer groups) on a wide range of impacts andissues of regional as well as national rele-vance.
These workshops, held early in the assess-ment, provided timely information on areas ofinquiry and analysis considered most relevantby persons with knowledge, interest and ac-tive involvement in these subjects. (See figurev–5.)
In addition, workshop participants raisedquestions about the process by which the tech-nologies are implemented and managed at theFederal, State and local level. These discus-sions helped OTA begin to identify factorswhich participants felt were not being ade-
Figure V-5. Sites of OTA contacts during public participation program..- ————— —
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Source Off Ice of Technology Assessment
quately addressed throughcess, and the difficultiescitizens and local officials
the current pro-encountered bywho wished to
become involved in that process.
The workshops also provided informationabout participants’ views of the s c o p e ,assumptions and methodology of this assess-ment. Some participants raised questionswhich they wanted the assessment to address;others suggested sources of additional infor-mation relevant to the assessment.
The workshop format, with its free-flowingand informal exchange among participantswith diverse viewpoints and perceptions, pro-vided OTA with a perspective not attainablethrough questionnaires or interviews. Thegive-and-take discussion enabled participantsas well as study-team members to address andfollow up on comments made by other partici-pants. This helped OTA understand the extentto which viewpoints were shared, the level ofdifferences in views, and the relative impor-tance assigned to various factors by differentparticipants representing different elements ofthe affected public.
Questionnaires
A questionnaire appended to an informa-tion brochure describing the assessment wasdistributed from August through December,1975. (See figure V– 1.) During this time, thestudy team was starting the detailed analysisof potential impacts and the preliminary iden-tification of policy issues. The questionnaireresponses were examined periodically with aview toward providing the assessment teamwith more detailed data on impacts and issuesof importance as seen by respondents. Thesedata were useful in confirming, sharpening orsupplementing information already obtainedfrom workshops and from the study team’sanalysis.
One of the questions was:
If offshore energy systems were developed offthe coasts of New Jersey and Delaware, what
effcts WOUld you foresee for yourself, yourcommunity, and the Nation ? ‘Do you thinkthese effects W ould be generally positive orgenerally negative?
The responses to this question yielded themost systematic information on anticipatedeffects. The effects listed by respondents weretabulated in order to provide some indicationof the frequency with which certain categoriesof effects were mentioned and to indicatewhich categories were viewed as positive ornegative.
This analysis helped OTA staff to identifypriorities among the anticipated positive andnegative effects attributed by respondents tothe three technologies.
The number of respondents who labeled theeffects which they listed as all positive, allnegative, or some of each, was also tabulated.This analysis provided OTA with a com-parison among the technologies of the propor-tion of respondents who saw impacts as posi-tive, negative, or mixed.
Finally, a tabulation was made of the num-ber of respondents who anticipated predomi-nantly positive or predominantly negativeeffects for each of the technologies. This infor-mation was used to identify the differences inperceptions by residents of various parts ofthe study region.
The quantification of responses in thisreport must be read with the knowledge thatnot all respondents answered all questions orlisted the same number of impacts for eachtechnology, and that some responses were nottabulated because they were illegible, couldnot be categorized, or did not indicatewhether effects listed were positive or nega-tive.
Another item on the questionnaire said:
If you have other comments on any of theSubjects related to offshore energy develop-ment in the New Jersey-Delaware area, oralternatives to such developedopment, please notethese below,
While OTA did not ask for an indication ofsupport or opposition to the technologies,many persons responded to this item of thequestionnaire with an indication of support oro p position t o t h e t e c h n o l o g i e s . M a n yrespondents expressed their opinion as towhether one, some, or none of these systemsshould be implemented. Some qualified theirsupport or opposition by saying that certainthings should be done before the energysystems are implemented. Some expressed apreference for alternative energy systems orpolicies. Others gave their views on the proc-ess by which decisions to implement thesystems are made, and the manner in whichthe technologies are managed. The role ofvarious levels of government and of the publicwas addressed by some respondents.
Some of these statements illustrated andelaborated upon the “anticipated effects”replies. Other explained the reasons for re-spo n d en ts preferences among the tech-nologies or preferences for alternatives to thetech no logies. Many of the statementsparalleled the types of information obtainedfrom the workshops; some touched ondifferent points.
The questionnaire did not ask respondentsto indicate organizational affiliation. It didpermit respondents to indicate whether theybelonged to any organization that would havean interest in this assessment. Very few re-spondents answered this question. No attempthas been made, or could be made, to correlatereplies with affiliations.
Brochures and questionnaires were mailedinitially to nearly 2,000 persons and organiza-tions on the preliminary mailing list compiledby OTA. Additional brochures were sent uponrequest for distribution by congressionaloffices, libraries, and various government orprivate organizations for a total distributionof more than 15,000. The office of SenatorClifford P. Case of New Jersey, distributed6,100 copies, and another 100 copies were dis-tributed by the office of Congresswoman
Millicent Fenwick of New Jersey. Fourhundred copies were distributed to NewJersey libraries through the New Jersey Li-brary Association. In addition, the followingorganizations were among those who re-quested and presumably distributed morethan 100 copies of the brochure and question-naire:
Many people who learned about the ques-tionnaire from press reports, from newslettersof various organizations, or from personswho had received one in the initial distribu -tion, requested copies.
The brochure and questionnaire enabledthe OTA team to reach and ot obtain informa-tion from a larger number of people than waspossible with other methods.
Followup
The findings of the workshops and thequestionnaires were supplemented with inter-views and, in many cases, with furtherdetailed analysis by OTA staff, or by addi-tional studies on specific subjects and issuesraised during the public participation ac-tivities.
Many of the issues relating to impacts orprocess were pursued in interviews and meet-ings with industry and utility representatives,citizen group leaders, and with Federal, Stateand local government officials. interviewswere conducted throughout the assessmentbut most intensive use of this method took
place just prior to identification and analysisby OTA staff of the issues and options to beemphasized in the assessment report (Januarythrough July, 1976). During this period, OTAstaff also attended several public hearings andother official proceedings of Federal decision-making agencies and advisory bodies in orderto obtain first-hand information on which tobase an evaluation of the process.
Finally, in order to examine energy projec-
June, 1976. The review comments helped OTAreevaluate, sharpen or expand upon the state-ments of findings, issues, and options. In somecases, additional options were suggested, orthe potential consequences of options dis-played in the draft reports were discussed byreviewers. These comments were consideredin preparing the final report.
Summary
tions, energy alternatives and energy policies The public participation activities, whichmore fully, OTA convened a day-long session included workshops, questionnaires, inter-with government, industry, utility, and views, and review comment, were importantacademic specialists. factors in this technology assessment. Infor-
mation obtained from these activities wasReview of Draft Documents analyzed and evaluated throughout the
When background documents on tech-nology, institutional and ecological descrip-tions were completed, OTA made a copyavailable for study by the public in the OTAlibrary, and also sent copies for review as toaccuracy and completeness to personsknowledgeable in the subject areas who hadparticipated in the assessment. This reviewtook place during the period of Februarythrough April, 1976.
As OTA staff completed drafts of interimreports on each part of the assessment, thesewere sent out to the advisory panel for subs-tantive review and, after release by the OTABoard, to key participants in the assessment.Summaries of the draft interim report were
assessment. These data provided valuableguidance as to appropriate modification,emphasis or elaboration of the analysis by theOTA study team. The public participationfindings were one of the important elementsused by the OTA team for determining whichissues would be emphasized in the assess-ment.
The results of this public-participationeffort confirmed that such a program can adda useful and essential dimension to the assess-ment of technology for the U.S. Congress. Italso confirmed that reliable information onhow citizens perceive they will be affected bynew technologies can best be obtained bydirect contact with those citizens.
distributed for review to those who had at- Finally, the public participation effort pro-tended workshops, replied to questionnaires, vialed some experience on the basis of whichor requested copies. This review, for the oil public participation activities could be ex-and gas section, occurred in April, May, and tended to other OTA assessments.
Footnotes: Chapter V1. Chapter IV, Development of Offshore Oil and Gas 6. Op. Cit., Chapter IV.
in the Mid-Atlantic. 7. Working Paper #8.2. Working Paper #6. 8. Working Papers #9.3. Working Paper #10. 9. Working Paper #5.4. Working Papers #2 and #3. 10. Chapter IV, Alternatives to the Three Technologies5. Working Papers #4. Studied.
.’
Chapter VI
GLOSSARY
Accident risk—The possibility of loss or in-jury to people or property. The risk of aparticular consequence during a period oftime is measured by the estimated frequen-cy of the event over that period of time andthe magnitude of the consequences of thatevent.
ACRS—The Advisory Committee on ReactorSafeguards.
Availability y—The percent of time that a plantor an electric power system is actually capa-ble of pet-forming its mission. Periods dur-ing which a plant is not available includeboth forced outages (due to equipment mal-function, etc. ) and planned shutdowns(notably for refueling and planned mainte-.nance).
Ballasting—The taking on by tankers of waterto replace off-loaded oil and thereby im-prove stability.
Barrel—A unit of volume for petroleum prod-ucts. One barrel is the equivalent of 42 U.S.gallons, or 35 imperial gallons, or 159 liters.One cubic meter equals 6.2897 barrels.
Blowout preventer—Equipment installed atthe wellhead for the purpose of controllingpressures in the space between the casingand drill pipe or in an open hole duringdrilling and completion operations. Theblowout preventer is the first line of defenseagainst blowouts.
Capacity factor—The ratio of the average loadon a plant for the period of time considered,
to the load capacity for which the plant israted by the manufacturer. For an electricgenerating unit, the capacity factor in agiven 1 -year period may be calculated bydividing the total kilowatt-hours of electricoutput for the year by the number of hoursin the year, and then dividing the averagekilowatts thus calculated by the generatingunit’s electric-kilowatt-capacity rating.
Christmas tree—The collection of valves,pipes, and fittings, usually high pressure,used to control the flow of oil and gas fromthe well casing.
Class 9 accident —For analytical purposes, theNuclear Regulatory Commission dividesthe spectrum of postulated nuclearpowerplant accidents into nine categories.These categories are ordered according tothe severity of consequence ranging fromminor accidents (Class 1 ) to the potentiallycatastrophic but highly improbable core-melt accident (Class 9).
C o n t a i n m e n t —A gas-tight shell or otherenclosure around a nuclear reactor to con-tain radioactive vapors that would other-wise be released to the atmosphere in theevent of a major reactor accident.
Cooling system—A method of dissipatingwaste heat from nuclear (or other heat-engine-based) electric generating units.
Cooling tower—A structure through whichwater is circulated in order to reduce itstemperature. In a dry cooling tower, the water
283
is recycled after passing through tubes overwhich cooling air flows, in a manner simi-lar to that of an automobile radiator. In awet cooling tower, water cascades through thetower, in which air is passed either bymechanical or natural draft to cause partialevaporation of the water. A wet-dry coolingtower contains both dry-cooling andevaporative systems; these can be used.altern atively o r i n combination.
Core-melt accident—Any accident in anuclear reactor that leads to melting of thefuel elements in the core. This type of acci-dent has the most serious potential conse-quences of any accident that can occur in a.nuclear reactor.
Dead weight—The difference, expressed intons, between a ship’s displacement at loaddraft and at light draft. It is comprised ofcargo, bunkers, stores, fresh water, etc.
Decommissioning—The activities of shuttingdown operations of a nuclear plant at theend of its operational life and either dis-mantling the plant or maintaining it in asafe condition.
Design-basis accident—NRC policy requiresthat nuclear power reactors be designed toinclude engineered safety features and pro-tection systems to prevent or mitigate theeffects of design-basis accidents, which in-clude accidents in the first eight accidentcategories (see “Class 9 accident”). Class 9accidents, i n vol v i ng melting of the co i-e, arenot included among design-basis accidentson the grounds that their probability of oc-Currence is so low that they can be safely ig-nored.
Development and production—Basically,development of an oil and gas field beginsafter discovery o f accumulations i n com -mercial quantities. It includes definition ofthe extent of potential reserves, productionrate estimates, and construction and in-stallation of facilities for production of the
field, including the means to deliver theproduct to a loading point. Production ofthe oil or gas begins only after a reasonableestimate has been made of the approximateamount and potential flow rates of the oilor gas found and completion of the installa-tion of necessary facilities and the drillingof producing wells. (Oil and gas can occurtogether in a field or separately. There isusually some gas associated with all oilfields, but there can be significant occur-rences of gas with little or no oil. )
Development well—A well drilled in aproven field for the purpose of completingthe desired pattern of production. Some-times called an exploitation well.
Downhole safety equipment—Valve or otherdevices installed below the Christmas treein production wells to prevent blowouts.The blowout preventor is the first line ofdefense against blowouts. The downholesafety equipment is a second defensesystem.
Drill pipe—In rotary drilling, the heavyseamless tubing used to rotate the bit andcirculate the drilling fluid. Individual pipelengths are normally 30 feet and arecoupled together with tool joints.
Drill string—A “string” or column of drillpipe.
Economic impact —The effects upon the pro-duction and consumption aspects of societywhich introduction of an installation orother innovation into the area is expected toproduce. These would include effects on thelabor force, industry, financial structure, in-frastructure, tax rates, etc. - -
Environmental impact —The effects upon thephysical and biological characteristics of anarea which i nt rod uct ion o f a n i nst a l la t ionor other innovation into the area is expectedto produce. As used in this report, environ-mental impact does not include the effectsupon human characteristics, except those
which are an indirect result of the physicaland biological effects.
Exploration—Simply defined, exploration in-volves two major steps: geophysical sur-v e y s a n d ex p lo ra t o ry drilling. Morebroadly, exploration for oil and gas is theentire process of broad and specific surveysa n d collecyion o f indicative data o n an areafollowed by detailed Geophysical delinea -tion of geologic features and by drilling ofholes into potentially productive traps. Ex-ploration is completed if oil or gas is found.Additional exploration work—the drillingof more holes—may be done after a disco\’-ery to further delineate a field. Explorationi n\’elves a high economic risk, since there isthe high probability that no discoveries willbe made, particularly in frontier areas. Inthe offshore oil industry, even after detailedSurveys are conducted, only one drill hole,in ten can be expected, on the average, toshow a commercial discovery, and there arewide but unpredictable variations, in par-ticular cases, from the average.
Exploratory drilling—Exploratory drilling isthe second phase of an expl o r a t i o nprogr m. In offshore areas it is ac-complished by means of some type ofmobile drilling rig, which can be movedfrom place to place to drill into traps locatedby geophysical methods. The primary pur-pose of exploratory drilling is to get a “yes”or “no” answer as to whether there is, infact, oil or gas in a given trap. Coring anddata logging techniques within the explora-tory well may be necessary to make thisdetermination and to provide certain addi-tional geologic information. Data logginginvolves the lowering of a sensor (acoustic,gamma-ray, etc.) down a drill hole to ob-tain formation data.
Fission—The splitting of a heavy nucleas(such as uranium-235), accompanied by the.release o f energy a n d two or moreneutrons. In a nuclear reactor, most of the
energy released in fission manifests itself asheat, which is used to generate steam todrive turbines.
Frontier areas—Frontier areas of the OuterContinental Shelf are those which have notyet been explored and are generally con-sidered suitable for leasing. A number ofspecific regions in the Atlantic, the Gulf ofMexico, the Pacific, and around Alaska areidentified as frontier areas. The principalones are:
Georges Bank (North Atlantic)Baltimore Canyon Trough (Mid-Atlantic)South AtlanticGulf of Mexico (beyond all present dis-
coveries)Southern California OffshoreWashington and Oregon OffshoreGulf of Alaska and Outer Cook InletBering Sea, Bristol Bay, and Norton
Sound (Alaska)Chukchi Sea (Alaska)Beaufort Sea (Alaska)
Fuel cycle—The sequence of steps throughwhich the nuclear fuel used i n nuclear reac-
tors passes, including mining, milling, con-vers i on, enrichment, processing, fabrica -tion, utilization, reprocessing, radioactivewaste management, and the storage ofradioactive waste products.
Fuel element—A rod, tube, plate, or othermechanical shape or form into which thefissionable material used to produce energyin a reactor is fabricated. In prevalentpower-reactor practice, a fuel element is amechanical array or assembly of rods; therods contain the fissionable material.
Fuel reprocessing-Chemical treatment ofspent fuel to separate the uranium andplutonium from the fission products cre -ated as byproducts of the fission process.
Gathering lines—Flow lines which run fromseveral offshore oil wells to a single storagesystem..
Geophysical surveys—Geophysical ex-ploration is an indirect method of mappingsubbottom geological forms and features toshow submerged structures and interfaces.The principal method used is the seismic(or acoustic) survey, a technique of produc-ing precise sounds (of discrete frequenciesand intensities) which are variouslyreflected and refracted from undergroundlayers and then measured at the surface.The measurement of natural gravity andmagnetic fields also helps define thegeology of an area. Having become a majorcomponent in oil exploration, the seismicsurvey is typically employed extensively inany offshore area prior to drilling. Seismictechniques have become much moresophisticated in recent years and are usedboth to identify good potential traps and tolocate the most promising site for drillingan exploratory hole.
Ice condenser system—A pressure suppres-sion system included in the floating nuclearpowerplant, as well as some onshore plants,that uses millions of pounds of ice as a heatsink to condense steam and thereby reducecontainment pressure in case of an accidentin the reactor.
Isotopes—Variant forms of a given chemicalelement, differing from each other only inthe number of neutrons in their nuclei.
Jack-up rig—A mobile drilling platform withextendible legs for support on the oceanfloor.
Lay barge—A barge used to lay underwaterpipelines.
Light-water reactor—(See PWR) The twobasic types of LWR are the pressurized-water reactor (PWR) and boiling-waterreactor (BWR). Most U.S. power reactors inexistence or being built at this time areLWRS.
Lightening—A method of offloading tankersat sea or outside of ports, usually from large
tankers to smaller ones which, in turn, con-tinue into a discharge port. Lightering is acommon practice at entrances to certainports which cannot handle the deep draftsof large tankers.
LOCA—A Loss-of-Coolant Accident, involv-ing a break in one of the lines carrying thewater that transfers heat from the reactorcore to the steam system. The LOCA is oneof the two possible initiating events for acore-meltdown.
Megawatt (MW)—1000 kilowatts. The symbol“MWe” is sometimes used to denote electri-cal power or capacity, in order to dis-tinguish it from the thermal power of thereactor (MWt), which is typically aboutthree times as high.
Mud—A water or oil based slurry used tocounteract pressure in oil or gas wells andremove cuttings during drilling operations.It is circulated by pumps.
MW, MWe—See Megawatt.
NRC—The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
OCS (Outer Continental Shelf)—The sub-merged lands extending from the seawardlimit of the territorial sea to some undefinedouter limit. In the United States, this is theportion of the shelf under Federal jurisdic-tion.
Oil and gas reserves—Reserves of oil and gasin any field are those quantities which havebeen identified through drilling, sampling,and calculating specific quantities.“Proved” reserves are those quantities in afield which can be recovered with reasona- -ble certainty under existing economic andoperating conditions. Only a portion(usually from 20 percent to 40 percent) ofthe total reserves in place can be recovered.
PWR—Pressurized water reactor. A type ofpower reactor that employs ordinary watera s c o o l a n t a n d m o d e r a t o r a n d i s
pressurized to keep the exit coolant streamfrom boiling.
Radionucl ides— Radioactive nuclei ofisotopes of various elements.
Rasmussen Report—See WASH– 1400.
Reliability y—The probability that a powergenerating system will function withoutfailure over a specified time period oramount of usage.
Segregated ballast—A term describing theprovision of separate tanks for ballast wateronly, thus eliminating the need to carryballast in cargo oil tanks. Tankers must car-ry about one-third or more of their totalcapacity in ballast when on an empty leg ofa voyage to improve stability and controlthe draft of the ship. Usually sea water isused for ballast.
Seismic-line mile—Seismic surveys are nor-mally conducted from a ship equipped withgeophysical data-gathering instrumenta-tion. The ship proceeds along predeter-mined lines following a grid on the surfaceabove a given area. Many miles of closelyspaced crossing lines are necessary tosurvey a major area. A seismic-line mile is atypical unit of measure of these surveylines.
Seismic survey—A geophysical explorationtechnique in which generated sound wavesare reflected or refracted from underlyinggeologic strata and recorded for lateranalysis.
Subsea completion—A production well inwhich the Christmas tree assembly is lo-cated at or near the ocean bottom ratherthan on a platform. The produced liquidsor gases are then transferred from thewellhead either to a nearby fixed platformor to a shore facility for processing. Somesubsea competitions are presently in use inoffshore U.S. water.
Subsea production system—A production
system in which the wellhead assembly andall equipment for processing are located onthe sea floor. There are presently no com-plete subsea production systems in use inU.S. offshore waters.
Supertanker —Tankers of great size and carry-ing capacity; generally considered to be anytanker of over 100,000 deadweight tons.Such tankers are typically more than 1,000feet in length and 50 feet in draft. Thelargest supertanker afloat (480,000 dwt) is1,250 feet long, 203 feet wide, and 90 feet indraft. Supertankers of 533,000 dwt are nowunder construction.
Surry Plant—The pressurized water reactornuclear powerplant at Surry, Va., whichwas the basis for calculations made in theWASH– 1400 study. (See WASH– 2400).
Territorial sea—The sea area immediately ad-jacent to a coastal nation within which itclaims comprehensive jurisdiction.
Tract—An at-sea area of up to 5,760 acres (3miles square), defined in the OCS Lands Actof 1953 as the maximum unit offered ineach lease sale issued pursuant to the Act.
Trap and field--oil and gas are found i ncommercial quantities because these hy-drocarbons tend, by geologic processes, toconcentrate in particular rock formationsover long periods of time. Certain kinds ofsubterranean geologic features are knownto have acted as “traps” for oil and/or gas,and such traps are commonly described bygeologists as having the potential of con-taining hydrocarbons. The process of ex-ploring for oil and gas is thus focused onfinding traps where petroleum may havebeen collected. When a trap has been iden-tified and subsequently, through explora-tory drilling, found to contain commer-cially producible quantities of oil or gas, it isthen designated a “field.” A field is thus asingle trap or many traps in which com-mercial amounts of oil or gas have been dis-covered.
WASH 1400-The formal NRC designationof the Reactor Safety Study: An Assessment ofAccident Risks in U.S. Commercial NuclearPower Plants, published in final form in Oc-tober, 1975. This study, which considered arange of possible accidents including core-melt accidents, was performed under thedirection of Professor Norman Rasmussenof Massachusetts Institute of Technology,and is commonly known as the RasmussenReport. Only land-based, light water reac-tor plants were considered.
Waste disposal—The placement of radioac-tive waste in a locale where it can remainindefinitely isolated, and from whichretrievability may or may not be considerednecessary.
Waste management—A program which in-volves all aspects of the transfer, and ulti-mate storage or disposal, of high-levelradioactive nuclear materials which are nolonger useful from the nuclear facilities inwhich they are produced,
Waste storage—The holding of radioactivewaste in a locale from which it can beremoved or retrieved at some future time.
Wellhead—The equipment used to main-tain surface control of a well. It is formed ofthe cas ing head, tubing head, andChristmas tree. Also refer to variousparameters as they exist at the wellhead:Wellhead pressure, wellhead price of oil,etc.