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The Challenge of Consociation in Northern Ireland1

BY JOHN COAKLEY

ABSTRACT

This article assesses the role played by the principle of consociational governmentin promoting Northern Irelands peace agreement. It reviews the central concept ofconsociation as it has evolved in recent comparative studies of the politics ofdivided societies. It describes the stages by which this concept moved to the centreof the political agenda in Northern Ireland, resting on contributions by policy-

makers, academics, journalists and others. It reviews the difficult history of effortsto translate this principle into practice, contrasting the failed attempt to promotethis formula in 1973 with the much more successful experiment in 1998. Using theclassical literature on consociation, an effort is made to explain the differencebetween these outcomes, a difference with implications for Northern Irelandsfuture stability.

AS media and academic interest in the Northern Ireland conflictdiminishes in circumstances where normal politics seems to haveasserted itself, it is easy to take for granted the stability of this innova-tive political and constitutional agreement. The path to stable peacewas a complex and multidimensional one, and has attracted a greatdeal of scholarly attention, much of it centred on the role of onecentral ingredient, the institutional mechanism known as consociation.More than a dozen years after the decisive installation of this device asthe linchpin of a broad-ranging agreement in 1998, it is appropriate toassess its capacity to serve as an alternative political channel to theroute of armed conflictespecially in the light of an earlier failedattempt at a solution along similar lines in 1973. This raises a questionthat is important for our understanding both of the Northern Irelandcase and of consociational theory more generally, as well as havingimportant practical implications for the stability of the agreementitself: how had the conditions that made the 1998 agreement possiblechanged since 1973?

Given uneven familiarity with the concept of consociational govern-ment, the article begins with a discussion of this institutional device,and of its role in divided societies generallya discussion that alsosuggests ways in which certain theoretical and empirical difficultiesmay be resolved. The second section looks at the stages by which this

Parliamentary AffairsVol. 64 No. 3 # The Author [2011]. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of theHansard Society; all rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]:10.1093/pa/gsr011

Parliamentary AffairsVol. 64 No. 3, 2011, 473493Advance Access Publication 14 April 2011

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principle was introduced in Northern Ireland, from its first tentativemention in 1969 to its full implementation in the years following theGood Friday agreement (1998). The third addresses the central ques-tion identified above by exploring the circumstances underlying therelative success of consociational government in Northern Ireland, andconsiders the implications of this development for the future.

The nature of consociational governmentThe character of consociational government may best be appreciatedby considering that which it is not. The concept was developed pre-cisely as a reaction against the dominant model in the political scienceof the English-speaking world in the 1960s, with its understanding ofpolitical conflict as a type of intense, winner-takes-all competition

between two parties or blocs, between which the level of ideologicalcompetition is relatively mild. As expressed in the British Westminstermodel, this took the form of majoritarian government, with winningparties monopolising political office and railroading their legislativeand policy programmes through centralised decision-making structures,while altogether ignoring the opposition.

But two papers presented in 1967 at the Brussels world congress ofthe International Political Science Association represented a new bodyof literature that began from a quite different starting point.2 The first,

by Gerhard Lehmbruch, summarised his work, already published inGerman, on Proporzdemokratie (proportional democracy) in Austriaand Switzerland, adding the further example of Lebanon. These, heargued, were political systems in which conflicts were settled bynegotiated agreement between all relevant actors, with the majorityprinciple confined to limited domains, while public offices weredistributed among all important groups.3 He also used the termKonkordanzdemokratie (concordant democracy) to describe thispattern, though later interpreting Switzerland as a special variant of

this model rather than an ideal example.4

The second 1967 paper was that of Arend Lijphart who, likeLehmbruch, recognised the difficulty of accommodating certain smallerEuropean democracies to the classifications of political systems thendominant in English language political science, but who pushed theissue of typology further.5 He described a new type of democraticsystem, consociational democracy, defined as a combination of frag-mented political culture with coalescent elite behaviour, and rep-resented by Austria, Switzerland, the Benelux countries, Lebanon,

Colombia and, until 1967, Uruguay. This was elaborated later in anarticle that became the cornerstone of writing on consociationaldemocracy; in this the term was defined more fully as government byelite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented politicalculture into a stable democracy.6 Lijphart later expanded this into abook-length study covering a wider range of cases, and also developed

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the concept further.7 Several extensive reviews have appeared over theyears.8 It is important to look separately at the two main dimensionsof consociation: the manner in which a particular society is divided,and the nature of the constitutional formula adopted to overcome,supersede or otherwise sidestep these divisions.

THE SOCIETAL DIMENSION: FRAGMENTATION. The question of whatconstitutes a divided society is not always clear. Lijphart had in minda form of social segmentation where a major political cleavage reflectsa profound underlying fracture. In other words, it refers tocircumstances where distinct subcultures with clearly definedboundaries coexist within the same state. But how are these subcultures

to be measured? They have been compared to the traditional zuilen(pillars) in Dutch society, and to the Lager ( political camps) inAustria. But although these terms are evocative (the notion of a zuil, apillar or column, is potent in suggesting parallel structures which donot touch), identifying them in practice is far from easy. Since Lijphartrelied on Lorwins definition of a related conceptone which indeedcomes close to the classical description ofverzuilingor pillarisationit is appropriate to consider it further here:

a political system is one of segmented pluralism when its cleavages have pro-duced competing networks of schools, communications media, interest groups,leisure time associations, and political parties along segmented lines, of bothreligious and antireligious nature.9

This offers a clear set of indicators, and implies an appropriateexample, though one that Lorwin dismissed: Northern Ireland. Here,there have for long been two segments, each with its own network ofelementary and secondary schools, newspapers, social organisationsand sports structures, each supporting its own party or set of parties.

But when we consider the core consociational cases, our firstdilemma is that the number of segments is unclear, even if we confineourselves to the period of classical consociation, up to about 1970. InAustria, for example, the existence of Catholic and Socialist segmentswas undoubted; but was there also a third German national one? Inthe Netherlands, similarly, it was clear that there had for long beenseparate Catholic, Protestant and secular segments; but was the last ofthese in reality two, i.e. were there separate Socialist and Liberal seg-ments? The scholarly consensus in the Austrian case was on two seg-

ments, and in the Dutch case on four; but the very fact that the issuemay be raised illustrates the difficulty in measuring extent of divisionand reflects the challenge of finding objective quantitative evidence tosupport qualitative assessments. Second, there is a big differencebetween the four original core European cases and Northern Ireland,with its profound intercommunal division. It is true that the

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Flemish-Walloon relationship in Belgium resembles the division inNorthern Ireland, but this became fully politicised only in the 1970s.The earlier deep divisions in Belgium, as in Austria, Switzerland andthe Netherlands, were rooted in religious and class divisions.

THE POLITICAL DIMENSION: POWER SHARING. Consociation implies adistinctive institutional formula to hold divided social segmentstogether. Initially, Lijphart simply described elite cooperation, asexpressed most characteristically through a grand coalition cabinet, asthe defining political criterion of consociation. He later specified theform that such cooperation might take more exhaustively by referenceto four characteristics:10

government by grand coalition: the leaders of all significant seg-ments participate in the governing process, typically by theirinclusion in a grand coalition (this can take diachronic form, inthat not all segments need to be included simultaneously, but nonemust be excluded permanently; and other devices such as extra-cabinet decision-making structures may have a role to play);

mutual veto to protect minorities: each segment is given the right toveto any measure that is seen as threatening its vital interests;

proportionality as the principal standard of political representation,civil service appointment and allocation of public funds: thisimplies proportional allocation of parliamentary seats through theelectoral system, of civil service posts through the recruitmentprocess and of public funds through some kind of proportionalformula (this may be adjusted to provide for over-representation ofminorities, or even of parity representation of all segments);

high degree of segmental autonomy: in those areas where joint

decision-making is not needed, each segment is free to formulateand implement policy (territorial autonomy or federalism would bea characteristic expression of this, but it may also take the form ofnon-territorial autonomy).

Lijpharts discussion of the defining characteristics of consociation hasbeen criticised for treating class, ethnicity, religion and language asobjective factors, or, in effect, for reifying them, and for going to theextent of using and devising indexes and angles of cross-cutting social

cleavages in different societies.

11

But more sustained criticism hascome from the opposite direction: it has also been criticised on thegrounds that it is lacking in conceptual clarity, and that it does notlend itself to empirical measurement.12 From the perspective of theanalysis of ethnic conflict and its resolution, it is possible to respond tothe first of these criticisms simply by pointing out that measurement



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does not imply reification; the criteria used are typically indicators ofunderlying, invisible characteristics, and should clearly be regarded assuch. As to the second set of objections, although efforts to operationa-lise indicators of consociation and to measure them have infrequentlybeen made, this reflects a gap in scholarly endeavour; the main individ-ual components of consociation (such as power sharing, proportional-ity and even degree of group autonomy) are in principle measurable.

Notwithstanding criticism at theoretical and empirical levels, conso-ciation continues to have its defenders, however conditionally theycouch their arguments. Thus, McGarry and OLeary continue to offer atrenchant case for consociation as a conflict management option ingeneral, and as one which is applicable to Northern Ireland in particu-lar.13 OFlynn, standing back from the debate about the principle itself,

points to the potential of this approach not just in managing conflict inthe short or medium term but, if carefully calibrated along lines derivedfrom theories of deliberative democracy, in resolving it in the longerterm.14 In a perceptive critique of prescriptions for the politicisation ofthe European Union (EU), Papadopoulos and Magnette highlight theconsociational lessons to be learned from such cases as Belgium andSwitzerlandnot, they acknowledge, perfect models, but significantlycloser to the nature of the EU than are those other states whichimplicitly act as models, with their majoritarian approach to

decision-making.15

While the core concept of consociation has survived its critics, itmerits further consideration. It could be argued that Lijpharts definitionof consociation discussed above implies two, not four, defining criteria.The first is that the principle for the allocation of political and adminis-trative positions and resources is proportional rather than competitive(or, in extreme cases, monopolistic). Thus, Lijpharts third criterion(proportionality as the principal standard of political representation)could be seen as absorbing his first one (government by grand coalition).

The second is that the basis of decision-making is consensual rather thanmajoritarian (or, in extreme cases, hegemonic). This corresponds toLijpharts second criterion (group veto). Lijpharts fourth criterion (seg-mental autonomy) may be dropped, as belonging to a different order ofconflict resolution strategies from the one defined here: it is based on thenotion of division of power (between different levels of government)rather than of sharing of power (at the same level of government).Dropping the segmental autonomy condition also undermines animportant empirical objection to consociational theory: the absence of

autonomy of this kind in most of the cited cases of consociation.

16

The world of consociational government is a relatively small one. Asindicated above, Lijphart based his analysis on four well-knownEuropean cases, but he also extended it to countries outside Europe,including Lebanon, Malaysia and Cyprus, while considering also somemore marginal contenders. Other authors have considered the cases of



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Surinam, Netherlands Antilles, Israel, South Africa, Canada, NorthernIreland, India and the EU, as well as a number of less plausibleexamples, with predictably mixed verdicts as to the applicability of theconsociational model.17 More recently, attention has extended to otherareas. Fiji, for example, flirted with power sharing from 1997 to 2006,as did New Caledonia after 1998.18 Notwithstanding the practical dif-ficulties with which it was faced, Iraqs 2005 constitution has beeninterpreted as containing consociational elements.19 In former BelgianAfrica, a moderately successful experiment in consociation waslaunched in Burundi in 2000 and reinstituted in 2004, though theoutcome of a similar experiment in the Democratic Republic of Congoin 2002 was more doubtful, and an effort to adopt this approach inRwanda in 199394 collapsed.20

Consociational government in Northern IrelandThe introduction of consociational government in Northern Irelandwas one of several shocks to the British constitutional system that haverevolutionised its content. Indeed, British policy-makers have in recentdecades shown a degree of innovation and flexibility that would havemade Bagehot wince; his characterisation of the political system as dis-playing connected outward sameness, but hidden inner change hasfallen victim to very visible and far-reaching constitutional transform-

ation.21

Radical innovations include use of the popular referendum asa mechanism for collective decision-making; intrusion of the EU in thearea of constitutional law; replacement of a hereditary second chamberby an appointive one; launch of generous if asymmetrical regimes ofregional autonomy; and abolition of the plurality electoral system atseveral levels, with its continuation even in House of Commons elec-tions a matter of current uncertainty.

The UK government had, however, always been prepared to be par-ticularly adventurous in managing the affairs of its western island. This

was obvious already in the nineteenth century, when the British admin-istration in Ireland oversaw policy innovation in certain areas that wasmore radical than anything that would have been contemplated at thesame time in Englandin such domains as local government, policing,health and welfare, education, and, after 1870, land reform.22 Thiswillingness to experiment was evident also in the system of devolvedinstitutions created by the Government of Ireland Act, 1920, whichpartitioned Ireland. Although this replicated the Westminster model,the new Houses of Commons were to be elected by an unusual system

of proportional representation, the single transferable vote (STV)areform designed not just to protect religious minorities in the two newjurisdictions but also to dent the impact of Sinn Feins electoralsuccesses.

But the logic of the Westminster model in Northern Ireland was per-manent majority rule by the party supported by almost all Protestants,



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the Ulster Unionist Party. As is well known, that party moved decisivelyto assert its hegemony, abolishing STV and reintroducing the pluralitysystem in single-member districts in 1929a change that not onlymade Northern Ireland more British but that also gave a furtheradvantage to the Unionist Party. That party always enjoyed a clearmajority in the 52-member House of Commons, with its parliamentaryparty ranging in size from 32 to 40 over 12 elections, 192169. Thenumber of nationalists in the 26-member Senate (mainly elected bythe House of Commons) never exceeded five.23 The composition of thegovernment was even more thoroughly Unionist: between 1921 and1969 only one non-member of the Unionist Party was appointed toministerial office (in the 1940s), but even he later joined the UnionistParty.

Following the collapse of the old institutions of government inNorthern Ireland in 1972 in the face of widespread civil unrest andarmed opposition by a revived IRA, direct rule from London, througha new UK government minister, the Secretary of State for NorthernIreland, was introduced. It quickly became clear that the oldWestminster model, resting on majority rule, would be laid aside, andsubsequent efforts to devise new institutions of government were basedon the principle of power sharing.24 This was later reinforced by thenotion of proportionality in public sector employment and resource

allocation. By the end of the century, the principle of mutual veto hadalso been incorporated, resulting in the classic consociational mix. Theefforts to reach this point were clustered around two initiatives separ-ated by a quarter of a century: an initial experiment in power sharingin 1973, and a comprehensive agreement in 1998.

AD HOC POWER SHARING, 1973. It is easy to forget that the idea of powersharing in Northern Ireland was first placed on the political agenda

well before the original majority rule institutions collapsed in 1972.The deputy editor of the Guardian, John Cole, with a long-trackrecord as a journalist in Belfast, first proposed the idea of a crisiscoalition in an editorial in 1969, arguing that the deeply dividednature of Northern Irish society rendered inappropriate the puremajority rule model.25 This idea was developed further by a prominentpolitical scientist in Queens University Belfast, Dr John Whyte, whosuggested adoption of the Swiss system, under which political partiesare represented in government in proportion to their parliamentarystrength. Northern Irelands parties, he argued, were no morefundamentally opposed to each other than their Swiss counterparts, soeven politicians as far apart as Ian Paisley and John Hume should beable to work together.26 This position was later endorsed by the SocialDemocratic and Labour Party (SDLP), which had replaced the



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Nationalist Party as the voice of the Catholic population. The SDLPadded a significant external dimension: the power-sharing governmentshould operate under the oversight of two commissioners appointed

by the British and Irish governments.

27

British governments showed a pragmatic attitude in pursuing a sol-ution. Unparalleled experience in governing other divided societies in avast empire had left a rich residue of experience in the management ofethnic conflict, and in many cases decolonisation had given a particularimpetus to the design of imaginative constitutional structures for newlyindependent but deeply divided states. Thus, experiments with power-sharing arrangements had been undertaken in such different contextsas Ceylon/Sri Lanka, Malaya/Malaysia and Cyprus. The green papersuggested that, aside from milder options where executive powerwould extend no further than to committee chairs, there were fourmain approaches to broadly based government:

(1) Entrenched government, whereby certain minority elements must by con-stitutional requirement be included in a government. This course could presentvery difficult problems of definition, and impede the development of non-sectarian party structures.

(2) Proportional Representation government, whereby all substantialelements elected to the legislature would, in proportion to their representativestrengths, secure representation in a government. This course could, however,exclude the possibility of any opposition as currently understood in the legisla-ture and would not be made easier by the very broad range of politicalopinion.

(3) Bloc government, whereby the party or parties commanding a majorityin the legislature would be required to coalesce with the party or parties com-manding a majority of the minority. This would ensure some residual opposi-tion, and make possible the exclusion of small irresponsible groups on theextreme wings of politics, but it in practice would be apt to prove a somewhat

complex, inflexible and artificial device.

(4) Weighted majority government, whereby an incoming government wouldrequire the endorsement of the legislature not by a simple majority, but by amajority so weighted as to make necessary a broad range of support. In orderto ensure that support would not come from representatives of a single com-munity, the percentage required could hardly be less than 75. The require-ments of a weighted majority could be applied solely to the endorsement of agovernment and subsequent votes of confidence, or to a wider range of parlia-mentary business.28

The governments thinking crystallised relatively quickly, and was speltout more explicitly in a white paper in 1973. This proposed an assemblyelected by proportional representation, with an executive made up ofthe chairs of a network of committees. But the government also drew aline in the sand, insisting in effect on the inclusion of nationalists in the



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executive. It stipulated that the executive itself can no longer be solelybased upon any single party, if that party draws its support and itselected representation virtually entirely from only one section of adivided community.29 As given flesh in the Constitution Act of 1973,an assembly elected by proportional representation was to replace theold bicameral parliament of Northern Ireland, but the process by whichthe political executive was to be formed was vaguely expressed. Anyproposed executive was required to satisfy the Secretary of State forNorthern Ireland that it would be likely to be widely accepted through-out the community having regard to the support it commands in theAssembly and to the electorate on which that support is based.30

This formula, radical though it was in the context of NorthernIrelands history and the UKs constitutional tradition, was by no

means all-inclusive. Elections in June 1973 to the new assembly sawa consolidation of the nationalist side around the SDLP, the maturingof a new cross-communal Alliance Party, and the splintering ofunionism, with the Ulster Unionist Party divided on the issue ofpower sharing and two smaller anti-power sharing parties, IanPaisleys Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) and the VanguardUnionist Party (which had broken away from the Ulster Unionists),gaining a significant foothold. Under pressure from the Secretary ofState for Northern Ireland, William Whitelaw, agreement was never-

theless reached on the formation of an 11-person executive, headedby former Northern Ireland prime minister Brian Faulkner of theUlster Unionist Party, but including also representatives of the SDLPand of the Alliance Party.

The executive took office on 1 January 1974 following the con-clusion of a supplementary agreement between its members and theBritish and Irish governments in December 1973 (the Sunningdaleagreement, dealing mainly with the creation of a Council of Irelandlinking the two jurisdictions). But divisions within the Ulster Unionist

Party quickly came to a head. The dissenting faction which hadopposed Faulkners compromise with nationalists succeeded in gainingcontrol of the party organisation in early January 1974. The Britishgeneral election of February 1974 showed that these militant unionists,together with the two smaller unionist parties implacably opposed tothe new arrangements, were capable of mobilising formidableresources. Their electoral coalition won all but one of NorthernIrelands seats in the House of Commons, with 51% of the vote.Though it retained a majority in the assembly, the executive was

morally weakened, and soon collapsed in the face of a general strikeorganised by militant unionists in May 1974.

SYSTEMATIC CONSOCIATION, 1998. It had taken about a year to launchthe first experiment in power sharing in 1973; it took almost a quarter



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of a century to launch the second. A prolonged stalemate followed theinitial attempt at restoring devolved government to Northern Ireland.The most ambitious effort to find a new route followed the election of

a Constitutional Convention in 1975, designed by the Britishgovernment to place responsibility for producing a new blueprint(which the government insisted must incorporate power sharing) on theshoulders of the Northern Ireland parties. In the Convention, the SDLPcontinued with its calls for power sharing, and the Alliance Partysupported a modest compromise, suggesting that a set of committeechairsan embryonic executivebe selected by proportionalrepresentation.31 But the three unionist parties opposed to powersharing had a majority in the Convention, the content of whose report

they were thus able to shape. This report summarised the dominantunionist view: it called for a system similar to the one which haddisappeared in 1972, but with a unicameral assembly. In itscomposition and functioning, the government would conform to thepractices and precedents of the Parliament of the UK; the primeminister thus should not be compelled to include members of anyparticular party or group, particularly in respect of any person whosepolitical philosophy and attitudes have revealed his opposition to thevery existence of that State.32

This appeared to shut the door on nationalist participation in gov-ernment, but careful reading of the document indicates that the reportobjected only to compulsory sharing of power with nationalists.Indeed, discussions took place between the Vanguard Unionist Partyand the SDLP on the formation of a voluntary coalitionan initiativethat crumbled in the face of broader unionist hostility.33 TheConvention report continued for the next decade to be an importantbenchmark in unionist policy, but the fact that it rejected institutiona-lised power sharing rendered it unacceptable to the British government.

Some years later, the British made another effort to devise an agree-ment based on devolution. Following inconclusive inter-party talkshosted by Northern Ireland Secretary Humphrey Atkins (1980), a moreambitious rolling devolution plan was launched by his successor,James Prior (1982). This entailed election of an Assembly to whichpower would be devolved progressively in areas where at least 70% ofthe membership agreed on this. The Assembly election in 1982 markedthe appearance of the five-party system that has persisted to thepresent, with Sinn Fein, essentially the political wing of the IRA, chal-lenging the SDLP electorally for the first time (though neither partyattended Assembly meetings), and unionist opinion consolidatingaround two parties, the Ulster Unionists and the DUP. There were signsof fresh thinking on the part of the Ulster Unionist Party, which by1984 had moved to endorsing a form of administrative devolution inwhich offices would be shared among committee chairs, some of



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whom could be opposition representatives.34 But the gap between thisposition and the SDLPs insistence on full power sharing and an Irishdimension proved unbridgeable, and the Assembly was wound up in1986.35 In any case, the main unionist parties and the SDLP werelooking over their shoulders. For many unionists, full integration withGreat Britain was a more attractive alternative than devolved govern-ment with power sharing. For many in the SDLP, closer links withDublin were a long-term goal, and these were promoted particularlythrough a discussion forum that linked the SDLP with the mainsouthern Irish parties.36

Fresh thinking was also injected into the process from outside thepolitical world. A broad range of options (including an eight-memberexecutive elected by popular vote using proportional representation)

was outlined in 1976 by Richard Rose.37 As part of the Atkins talks in1980, two academics from Queens University Belfast, Sydney Elliottand Jack Smith, made a submission to the Northern Ireland Office thatfocused more specifically on power sharing.38 Elliott later developedthis idea in a prescient paper, demonstrating how the dHondt systemmight be used to select a 10-member executive, and committee chairs,on the basis of the 1982 Assembly election results. His calculationssuggested that at that time the Ulster Unionists would win four seats,the DUP three, the SDLP two and the Alliance Party one.39 Ten years

later, a similar proposal was made by a group (mainly of academics)within the British Labour Party, though they suggested theSainte-Lague rather than the dHondt formula.40 This would have beenmore favourable to smaller parties, and its adoption would haveincreased the chances that the Alliance Party, the DUP and Sinn Feinwould be included in the executive.41

A major stimulus towards serious negotiations on power sharingcame from an unusual direction: the Anglo-Irish agreement of 1985, abilateral deal between the British and Irish governments over the heads

of the Northern Irish parties.42

This gave the Irish government aformal, consultative voice in the domestic affairs of Northern Ireland,and set up machinery to manage this process. But the agreement alsogave unionists a powerful incentive to negotiate an alternative arrange-ment. It held out the prospect of the exclusion of the Irish governmentfrom areas for which a power sharing government would be respon-sible, should such a government be established. Thus, notwithstandingrefusal by the leaders of the two unionist parties to engage in discus-sions on constitutional issues in the face of what they saw as a colossal

betrayal by the British government, moves took place behind the scenesto explore alternative options. A special task force headed by thedeputy leaders of the two parties drew up a proposal for a more inclus-ive system of government that would include power sharing with theSDLP.43 At around the same time, associates of a paramilitary group,the Ulster Defence Association, took up the ideas outlined by Sydney



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Elliott in 1983, endorsing a form of automatic power sharing in theexecutive.44 This bold initiative failed, however, to attract significantsupport, with the DUP and Ulster Unionist leaders publicly rejectingany such approach.45

It seems clear, nevertheless, that the unionist task force had contem-plated proportional allocation of posts. Although the details were notpublished until later, serious consideration was given to the notion of anetwork of committee chairs who would be selected by parties inaccordance with the dHondt formula.46 This reflected a long-standingunionist attraction to the notion of a committee system (where commit-tee chairs would exercise a quasi-ministerial role) as a way of gettingaround formal power sharing. Indeed, many Northern Ireland poli-ticians had become familiar with the notion of proportional represen-

tation of parties in committees in the European Parliament, and acertain measure of office sharing had developed at local level. Thisbegan on a modest scale after the first elections to the reformed localgovernment system in 1973, and by 1998 almost half of all councilshad power sharing arrangements.47 These arrangements were facili-tated by their voluntary and informal character, but the domains ofadministration to which they applied were limited. In common withthe position in other divided societies, the political complexion of theminority representatives was determined by the locally dominant

parties which agreed to share office with them, rather than by thevoters of the minority community.48

It is neither possible nor necessary to discuss here the intense inter-party negotiations chaired by Senator George Mitchell that resulted inthe Good Friday agreement of April 1998a process in which pressurefrom the British and Irish governments and intervention by the USClinton administration played a central role. But it is important topoint to two contrasts between this document and its predecessor in1973. The first has to do with the range of parties involved. In 1973,

William Whitelaws strategy had been to bring together the more mod-erate parties on either side. The militant unionist parties wereexcluded, while the IRA and the loyalist paramilitary groups continuedtheir campaigns. Following the paramilitary ceasefires of 1994,however, parties representing these groups were admitted to the nego-tiations. The only major force to dissent from the 1998 agreement wasthe DUP, but in a supplementary agreement reached at St Andrews,Scotland, in October 2006 the DUP agreed to participate in the newinstitutions in return for minor modifications.

The second difference between the 1973 and 1998 agreements has todo with their content. The 1973 package comprised essentially aconcise agreement on the composition of a three-party executive inNovember, and a short communique agreed at Sunningdale, England,in December 1973 in which the executive-designate and the British andIrish governments agreed to the establishment of a Council of Ireland,



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and the Irish government recognised the constitutional position ofNorthern Ireland. The 1998 agreement was a multi-dimensional one,covering not just power sharing in Northern Ireland but also relationsbetween the two parts of Ireland, and between Ireland and the UK; italso extended over a wide range of other politically sensitive areas,including policing, human rights, equality, demilitarisation, disarma-ment and prisoner release. Its reach was further enlarged in a secondsupplementary agreement at Hillsborough, Northern Ireland, inFebruary 2010, providing for the transfer to the devolved institutionsof control over policing and justice.

Our concern here is, however, with the consociational elements ofthe agreement. These are represented in the first place in the require-ment that all members of the Assembly self-designate as unionist or

nationalist (though selecting other is permitted, an option exercisedby the Alliance Party). This is designed to permit an alarm-bell pro-cedure, under which certain decisions of particular concern to one orboth communities can only be made with the support of an overallmajority of 60% of Assembly members and of at least 40% of eachdesignation (in certain cases this is raised to 50%). The dHondtformula was adopted as a mechanism for the allocation of cabinetseats and committee chairs in proportion to Assembly strength.

While the agreement was rendered more palatable (or less unpalata-

ble) to various interests by some of its other measures (such as thoserelating to prisoner release, demilitarisation or policing), calculationsbased on the probable outworking of consociational features played apart. For nationalists, the post of Deputy First Minister was guaran-teed, and their growing electoral strength meant that they would haveeither four or five of the 10 ministerial posts. For unionists, the pain ofsharing so much power was counterbalanced by the return of devolvedinstitutions in which there would be a unionist majority, however qua-lified its capacity to act unilaterally.

Use of an automatic formula in selecting office holders had severaladvantages over election, including speed and objectivity; but it alsooffered unionists a political fig leaf, in that they could blame theformula for the inclusion of Sinn Fein in the executive.49 This sensitivitywas particularly acute in respect of the position of First Minister andDeputy First Minister, who were initially to be jointly elected by theAssembly, with a requirement of majority support among both unionistand nationalist members. Under the St Andrews agreement of 2006,however, this was replaced by an automatic formula that would absolve

the DUP of responsibility for electing Sinn Fe ins Martin McGuinness:the post of First Minister would go to the largest party in the largestdesignation (in effect, those declaring themselves unionist) and thedeputy post to the largest party in the other (in effect, nationalist)designation. As translated into legislation, a subtle but profound changewas made: the First Minister post would now go to the largest party in



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the Assembly, regardless of designation, thus raising the prospect of aSinn Fein First Minister. In important respects what is striking aboutthese provisions is not that it took so long to implement them initially(the agreement was reached in April 1998, but the executive took officeonly in December 1999) or that they were suspended for such a longperiod (200207), as that they have survived at all.

Assessing consociational government in Northern IrelandIt is appropriate now to turn to the question outlined at the beginningof this articleabout the extent to which underlying circumstancesmight have changed sufficiently by the end of the twentieth century tofacilitate a power-sharing deal. The implications of this change for

the future political stability of Northern Ireland need also to beconsidered.

CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS. In seeking to explain why an apparentlydurable agreement emerged in 1998 but not in 1973, we may considerfirst general explanations of broadly based agreements. One majoroverview of the literature on peace agreements concluded that whilethe outcome is a function of the content of the agreements that mark

them (including institutional arrangements and provision forthird-party enforcement), they are also shaped by backgroundconditions. The prospects of success, according to the general thrust ofthis literature, improve in the calmer international atmosphere after theend of the cold war, in countries where there is an establisheddemocratic tradition, where the underlying cleavage is not an ethnicone, and where the level of conflict has been relatively low, butprolonged.50 Of these conditions, those relating to timing and to theintensity and duration of the conflict were satisfied in 1998 but not in

1973, but the other conditions remained stable: the conflict was anethnic one (making resolution more difficult); but there was a strongdemocratic tradition (facilitating resolution).

A second type of explanation focuses on the more specific conditionsfor the prospects for consociational government. Lijphart identifiedcertain features as being conducive to this, and assessed their signifi-cance for Northern Ireland in 1973, concluding that at that time threeof them were present, though in modified form, while a further threewere altogether lacking.51 The first positive feature is the matter of

scale: the small size of Northern Ireland, which eased the burden ondecision-making (though Lijpahrt noted that this also reduced thereservoir of political talent). Second, and more surprisingly, the lowlevel of intercommunal contact was seen as helpful, on the principlethat good fences make good neighbours. As in the case of the firstfeature, there has been little change in this since the late 1960s.52



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Third, however, Lijphart took the view that another helpful factor hehad identified needed to be revisited: his earlier work had suggestedthat an external threat would promote cooperation between domesticelites, but he now noted that unless such a threat were seen as commonto both communities it would serve to widen the gap rather than tobridge it. This was precisely its role in Northern Ireland: the Republicsconstitutional claim to Northern Irelands territory was reassuring toone community but threatening to the other, serving to drive the com-munities further apart. It is true that in the Sunningdale agreement theIrish government formally recognised the status of Northern Ireland aspart of the UK; but a case in the Irish High Court in January 1974forced the government to argue that this declaration was compatiblewith the territorial claim embedded in the constitutionfurther antag-

onising unionist opinion on the deal. In 1998, by contrast, formalremoval of this claim and explicit recognition of partition in the Irishconstitution was a key feature.

There were three other helpful features that Lijphart saw as beingabsent in 1973, but whose significance seems to have changed later.The first is the existence either of a multiple balance of power (as inthe Netherlands at that time, with four segments, none of them amajority) or of a near-equality between the segments if there are onlytwo of them (as in Austria, where the Catholic and Socialist blocs were

of almost equal size). Clearly, this condition was not satisfied in 1973,when the unionist bloc was more than double the size of the nationalistbloc; but by 1998, due to increase in the Catholic share of the popu-lation and an enhanced level of nationalist mobilisation, the two blocswere more evenly matched.53

The second feature that changed between the two agreements waspolitical culture, and, in particular, attitudes towards power sharing. In1973, unionists were strongly wedded to British models of govern-ment not simply because these would give an advantage to the majority

community but precisely because they were seen as representing valuesto which unionists were emotionally attached. As Great Britain and theworld changed, however, as office sharing at local level became com-monplace, as political leaders became more familiar with the operationof the proportionality principle in the European Parliament, and asequality legislation designed to rectify imbalances in socio-economicrelations between the two communities took effect, the principle ofproportionality in the public sector, and, indeed, in large private sectorbodies, began to appear less alien.

Third, there seem to have been changes in respect of overarchingloyalties in Northern Ireland. Lijphart correctly took the view thatthere was little national solidarity in the Northern Ireland of 1973,with Catholics and Protestants looking in different directions. This isstill substantially the case; but there are some signs of convergence oneither side. Sizeable minorities of Catholics (in the region of 25%) have



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for long opted for the self-designation Northern Irish, rather thanBritish or Irish, and since 2005 Protestant identification with thislabel has been even more pronounced. Even larger proportions describethemselves as neither unionist nor nationalist.54 While the significanceof this should not be exaggerated (unionist and nationalist surveyrespondents, for instance, still indicate a near-complete reluctance tocontemplate voting for the other bloc), loyalties seem to be less exclu-sive than they once were.

Aside from the features considered by Lijphart, though, NorthernIreland is distinctive in the world of consociational politics: it is not asovereign state. Its dependent status means that it is subject to severe ifnot decisive pressure from the sovereign government in London. Thusit was possible for Brendan OLeary to describe the Anglo-Irish agree-

ment of 1985 as coercive consociationalism. While this can give riseto a misunderstanding about an agreement that contained no consocia-tional elements, his explanation of this expression shows his interpret-ation of the agreement as instrumental: it sought to provide incentives,creating conditions for power sharing to work.55 Indeed, the criticalrole of the British and Irish governments in defining the content of the1998 agreement package should not be underestimated: parties couldagree to anything provided it included power sharing and certain otherkey features, and were thus negotiating within strictly defined par-

ameters, not as free agents.56

By the 1990s, the governments weredetermined to secure peace by insisting on a domestic agreement; in the1970s the British government had merely hoped that peace mightfollow from such an agreement.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE. What of the future of the consociationalformula? Public opinion data, though not always unambiguous in theirimplications, suggest a supportive public climate for continuance of thecurrent arrangements. By the end of the first decade of the twenty-firstcentury, it seems that the most enthusiastic supporters of the system areto be found in the former political extremes, in Sinn Fein and theDUP. In the centre, the Alliance Party has always had reservations overwhat it saw as the sectarian carve-up that consociation necessarilyimplies; the Ulster Unionist Party has been reconsidering the currentarrangements; and even the SDLP has been a selectively critical voice.Aside from these reservations within particular parties, there are two

broad types of development that threaten the stability of theagreement: differences on public policy, and political and electoralinstability.

Public policy differences between the unionist and nationalist partieshave been well rehearsed. The most fundamental, substantially resolvedby a further agreement at Hillsborough, Northern Ireland, in February



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2010, related to the devolution of responsibility for justice and poli-cing, a project close to the hearts of Sinn Fein members, but one onwhich the DUP had serious reservations. Policy on academic selectionat secondary school level (and in particular the eleven plus examin-ation) is another example. In these cases, an outside observer could beforgiven for failing to predict what positions would be adopted bycommunal parties: it is not immediately obvious that the specific pro-posals that have been so divisive are clearly in the interest of one com-munity and not the other. Rather than being reassuring, though, thissuggests that the two sides have profound reservations about the wholesystem of power sharing in the devolved institutions, so that each iscapable of adopting an unpredictable but entrenched position in anarea where it feels it can fly the communal flag. Disputes over such

issues as the Irish language are, by contrast, easier to understand, sincethere is a long-established divergence of opinion between the commu-nities on such cultural matters.

There is another potential time-bomb ticking in Northern Irelandsdevolved institutions. Unionists were prepared to accept a 5050 divisionof ministerial posts in the first executive formed after the 1998 Assemblyelection, and did better subsequently (with a 60 40 balance on theexecutive in their favour). Any significant fragmentation on the unionistside has, however, the potential to be more destabilising, though the chal-

lenge seemingly posed by an uncompromising breakaway from the DUP,Traditional Unionist Voice, in the 2009 European election seemed tohave fallen back in the 2010 Westminster election. Such fragmentationcould mean loss not just of a unionist majority on the executive, but ofthe post of First Minister, with all the trauma that would bring. Whilethere is some risk of further splintering in nationalism, with small dissi-dent republican groups challenging Sinn Fein, the record to date suggeststhat they will be easily brushed aside. Ultimately, the same externalforces that pushed the Northern Ireland parties into agreement pose a

risk to its derailment: their very existence offers a safety net that is notavailable when consociation is installed in a sovereign state. If consocia-tion collapses, the alternative is not necessarily civil war, but direct rulefrom London, coloured by influence from Dublin.

ConclusionThe consociational roots of the Northern Ireland agreement flowed,then, from the imperative of finding a stable solution to the conflict;but they also owed much to the varied and halting history of consocia-

tional government in Europe and elsewhere. It has been argued herethat while the consociational experiment in 1998 was more inclusivethan that of a quarter-century earlier, its success may be attributed to asignificant change in the latter part of the twentieth century. First, thecontext in 1998 was more favourable: the international climate wasmore hospitable and there was an element of war weariness among the



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contending groups. Second, some features were much more conduciveto consociation in 1998 than they had been in the 1970s: among otherchanges, the pattern of clear unionist political dominance had yieldedto one of near nationalist unionist parity, and the ideology ofmajority rule, or the tyranny of the Westminster model, had beenfatally undermined. Third, increased convergence in the positions ofthe British and Irish governments, a growing willingness among nation-alists to accept the reality of Irish partition and fears on the part ofunionists about the consequences of continuing domestic stalemateeased the path towards compromise.

It has, however, been argued that the challenge in Northern Irelandand in other divided societies is not just to manage conflict in the shortterm, but to resolve it in the longer terma challenge that ironically

may be made more difficult by consociations dependence on segmentalidentities. The evidence of Europes original consociational democra-cies suggests that while institutional design may be calculated to over-come division by recognising it, it may also have the effect ofundermining it in the longer term.57 Has this happened in NorthernIreland? Recent electoral evidence suggests a continuation of traditionalattitudes.58 Nevertheless, there have been signs of a softening in pos-itions. It has been argued that increased support for the two most mili-tant parties, Sinn Fein and the DUP, has been motivated not by growing

extremism but rather by the role of these forces as tribune partiesparties seen as the most effective defenders of their communities.59

Thus, even those with reservations about the potentially divisivecharacter of consociation acknowledge the fact that it has enjoyedsome recent successes.60 While it has the capacity to deepen differ-ences by recognising and building on them, it also has the potentialto render itself unnecessary by constructing bridges across the verychasm that lies at its basis. As it has been put, in fragmentedsocieties, disloyal oppositions may be rendered loyal by bringing

them into the government, if their outlook is basically democratic.61

While neither the SDLP nor Sinn Fein are likely ever to embrace theemotionally laden epithet loyal, there is evidence that they andtheir supporters may well find current structures satisfactory not justas an intermediate step towards Irish unity but in its own terms.Should unionists collectively conclude that the pain of this compro-mise is worth the guarantee of Northern Irelands constitutionalstatus that it brings, the future of the innovative institutions of 1998may be secure, adding to the small number of cases of apparently

successful consociational government.

School of Politics and International RelationsUniversity College Dublin

Dublin, [email protected]



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1 Thanks are due to the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences for its support

of the research on which this paper is based, and to three anonymous referees for their helpful

comments.

2 In addition to the two authors mentioned here, others tackling similar issues at the time included Val

R. Lorwin, Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller

European Democracies, Comparative Politics, 3, 1971, 14175; Ju rg Steiner, The Principles ofMajority and Proportionality, British Journal of Political Science, 1, 1971, 6370; Eric A.

Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, Center for International Affairs, Harvard

University, 1972; and Alvin Rabushka and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Politics in Plural Societies: A Theory

of Democratic Instability, Charles E Merrill, 1972. See also Hans Daalders overviews: On Building

Consociational Nations, International Social Science Journal, 23, 1971, 35570; and The

Consociational Democracy Theme,World Politics, 26, 1974, 60421.

3 Gerhard Lehmbruch, A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies:

The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon, in Kenneth McRae (ed.), Consociational Democracy:

Political Accommodation in Divided Societies, McClelland and Stuart, 1974, pp. 907; and

Consociational Democracy, Class Conflict and the New Corporatism, in Philippe C. Schmitter and

Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds),Trends Towards Corporatist Intermediation, Sage, 1979, pp. 5361.

4 Gerhard Lehmbruch, Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland, Publius, 23,1993, 4360.

5 Arend Lijphart, Typologies of Democratic Regimes,Comparative Political Studies, 1, 1968, 324.

6 Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy,World Politics, 21, 1969, 20725, at p. 216.

7 Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: a Comparative Exploration, Yale University Press,

1977; Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, Yale

University Press, 1999; The Wave of Power-Sharing Democracy, in Andrew Reynolds (ed.), The

Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy, Oxford

University Press, 2002, pp. 37 54; Constitutional Design for Divided Societies, Journal of

Democracy, 15, 2004, 96109.

8 For example, MPCM van Schendelen, The Views of Arend Lijphart and Collected Criticisms,Acta

Politica, 19, 1984, 1955; Rudi B. Andeweg, Consociational Democracy, in Nelson W. Polsby (ed.),

Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 3, Annual Reviews, 2000, pp. 50936.9 Lorwin, Segmented Pluralism, p. 142.

10 Lijphart,Democracy, pp. 2544.

11 Paul R. Brass,Ethnicity and Nationalism: Theory and Comparison, Sage, 1991, pp. 3389.

12 For example, Sue Halpern, The Disorderly Universe of Consociational Democracy,West European

Politics, 9, 1986, 181 97; Ju rg Steiner, The Consociational Theory and Beyond, Comparative

Politics, 13, 1981, 33954, at pp. 34045; van Schendelen, Views, pp. 3435; Ian S. Lustick,

Lijphart, Lakatos and Consociationalism,World Politics, 50, 1997, 88117, at pp. 98100.

13 John McGarry, and Brendan OLeary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational Engagements,

Oxford University Press, 2004; Consociational Theory, Northern Irelands Conflict, and its

Agreement, Government and Opposition 41, 2006, 4363 and 41, 2006, 24977; Power Shared

after the Deaths of Thousands, pp. 1384, and Under Friendly and Less Friendly Fire, in Rupert

Taylor (ed.), Consociational Theory: McGarry and OLeary and the Northern Ireland Conflict,

Routledge, 2009, pp. 33188.

14 Ian OFlynn, Deliberative Democracy, the Public Interest and the Consociational Model,Political

Studies, 58, 2010, 57289.

15 Yannis Papadopoulos and Paul Magnette, On the Politicisation of the European Union: Lessons

From Consociational National Polities, West European Politics, 33, 2010, 71129.

16 In the four classic cases (Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland before the 1970s), for

instance, the level of group autonomy in respect of the social segments in question was slight; and

although Austria and Switzerland were federally organised, the components that made up the federa-

tion did not match the social segments. This point is elaborated further in John Coakley,

Implementing Consociation in Northern Ireland, in Taylor, Consociational Theory, pp. 12245; it

is criticised in McGarry and OLeary, Under Friendly and Less Friendly Fire, pp. 34751, though

on the basis of a different understanding of the concepts of segmental autonomy and grand coalition.

17 For a listing, see Arend Lijphart, Power-sharing in South Africa, Institute of International Studies,University of California, Berkeley, 1985, p. 84.

18 Jon Fraenkel, Power Sharing in Fiji and New Caledonia, in Steward Firth (ed.), Globalisation and

Governance in the Pacific Islands: State, Society and Governance in Melanesia, Australian National

University E-Press, 2006, pp. 317 48.

19 John McGarry and Brendan OLeary, Iraqs Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociation as Political

Prescription,International Journal of Constitutional Law, 5, 2007, 67098.



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20 Rene Lemarchand, Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the

Democratic Republic of the Congo, African Affairs, 106, 2007, 120.

21 Walter Bagehot,The English Constitution, Chapman and Hall, 1867, pp. 12.

22 Oliver MacDonagh, Ireland: The Union and Its Aftermath. Rev. edn., George Allen and Unwin,

1977, pp. 3352.

23 John F. Harbinson,The Ulster Unionist Party, 1882 1973, Blackstaff Press, 1973, pp. 17880.24 Joanne McEvoy, The Institutional Design of Executive Formation in Northern Ireland,Regional and

Federal Studies, 16, 2006, 44764.

25 Brian Walker, The Rocky Road from Crisis to Cooperation,Belfast Telegraph, 9 February 2010.

26 John Whyte,The Reform of Stormont, New Ulster Movement, 1971, p. 11.

27 Towards a New Ireland, SDLP, 1972.

28 The Future of Northern Ireland: A Paper for Discussion, HMSO, 1972, pp. 2728.

29 Northern Ireland Constitutional Proposals. Cmnd 5259, HMSO, 1973, p. 13.

30 Northern Ireland Constitution Act, 1973 (c. 36), s. 2.1.

31 Northern Ireland Constitutional Convention Report, HMSO, 1975, s. 85.

32 Constitutional Conventiont Report, s. 89.

33 Richard Rose,Northern Ireland: A Time of Choice, Macmillan, 1976, pp. 12832.

34 Devolution and the Northern Ireland Assembly: The Way ForwardA Discussion Paper Presentedby the Ulster Unionist Assembly Partys Report Committee, Ulster Unionist Council, 1984.

35 Cornelius OLeary, Sydney Elliott and RA Wilford, The Northern Ireland Assembly 1982 1986: A

Constitutional Experiment, C Hurst, 1988, p. 201.

36 Report of the Forum for a New Ireland, Stationery Office, 1985.

37 Rose,Northern Ireland, p. 151.

38 Coakley, Implementing Consociation, p. 137.

39 Sydney Elliott,The Election of an Executive, Department of Political Science, The Queens University

of Belfast, 1983.

40 Brendan OLeary, Tom Lyne, Jim Marshall and Bob Rowthorne, Northern Ireland: Sharing

Authority, Institute of Public Policy Research, 1993, pp. 13944.

41 The Sainte-Lague and dHondt formulas each aim to allocate seats in a mathematically proportionate

way, but they differ in the manner in which they deal with fractional remainders, with the formertending to be more favourable than the latter towards smaller parties or groups; see Coakley,

Implementing Consociation, pp. 14041.

42 Jennifer Todd, Institutional Change and Conflict Regulation: The Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) and

the Mechanisms of Change in Northern Ireland, West European Politics, 34, 2011, forthcoming.

43 Harold McCusker, Peter Robinson and Frank Millar,The Task Force Report: An End to Drift. An

Abridged Version of the Report Presented to Mr Molyneaux and Dr Paisley 16th June, 1987 [UUP

and DUP], 1987.

44 Common Sense: Northern IrelandAn Agreed Process, Ulster Political Research Group, 1987.

45 Feargal Cochrane, Unionist Politics and the Politics of Unionism Since the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

New edn, Cork University Press, 2001, p. 217.

46 Unionist Working Group, Administrative and Legislative Devolution, Irish Times, 3 July 1991

[paper produced in December 1987].

47 Margaret McKay and Gregory Irwin,Local Government Power-Sharing: A Study of District Councils

in Northern Ireland, Institute of Irish Studies, Queens University, 1995, pp. 6, 38; Colin Knox and

Paul Carmichael, Making Progress in Northern Ireland? Evidence from Recent Elections,

Government and Opposition33, 1998, 372 93, at pp. 391 2.

48 Christopher Farrington, Ulster Unionism and the Peace Process in Northern Ireland, Palgrave

Macmillan, 2006, pp. 85119.

49 Dean Godson, Himself Alone: David Trimble and the Ordeal of Unionism, Harper Perennial, 2004,

pp. 33940.

50 Caroline Hartzell, Matthew Hoddie and Donald Rothchild, Stabilising the Peace after Civil War: An

Investigation of Some Key Variables,International Organisation, 55, 2001, 183208, at pp. 18893.

51 Arend Lijphart, Review Article: the Northern Ireland Problem: Cases, Theories, and Solutions,

British Journal of Political Science, 5, 1975, 83106, at pp. 99101. Here, Lijphart does not discuss

yet another conducive factor that he had earlier identified: cross-cutting cleavages, which have beenof little importance in Northern Ireland, where, for instance, class divisions have never been able to

rival religious ones. For critiques of these factors see Adriano Pappalardo, The Conditions for

Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique, European Journal of Political

Research, 9, 1981, 36590, and Matthijs Bogaards, The Uneasy Relationship between Empirical and

Normative Types in Consociational Theory, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 12, 2000, 395423.



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52 Comparison of survey data from 1968 and 2008 suggests that the proportion attending mixed schools

had not changed at all between these two dates, and the proportions with friends predominantly from

their own community, and with neighbours predominantly from this community, had barely changed;

computed from Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus: An Irish Perspective, Faber and Faber,

1971, pp. 474510, and Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, available at www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/

results/.53 In the 78-member Assembly elected in 1973 there were 50 unionists to 19 nationalists, with the

centre (Alliance Party and Northern Ireland Labour Party) accounting for 9 seats; in the 108-member

Assembly elected in 1998 there were 58 unionists to 42 nationalists, with the centre (Alliance Party

and Womens Coalition) accounting for 8 seats. The depth of the gap between the two blocs remains

profound, as shown by the views of election candidates in 2003; Karin Gilland Lutz and Christopher

Farrington, Alternative Ulster? Political Parties and the Non-constitutional Policy Space in Northern

Ireland, Political Studies, 54, 2006, 715 42. Survey data over the period 19892007 broadly

confirm this, though with some variation over time and between blocs; James Tilley, Geoffrey Evans

and Claire Mitchell, Consociationalism and the Evolution of Political Cleavages in Northern Ireland,

19892004, British Journal of Political Science, 38, 2008, 699717; and John Garry,

Consociationalism and its Critics: Evidence from the Historic Northern Ireland Assembly Election

2007, Electoral Studies, 28, 2009, 45866.54 James W. McAuley and Jonathan Tonge, Britishness (and Irishness) in Northern Ireland since the

Good Friday Agreement,Parliamentary Affairs, 63, 2010, 26685.

55 Brendan OLeary, The Limits to Coercive Consociationalism in Northern Ireland, Political Studies,

37, 1989, 56288, at p. 580.

56 Eamonn OKane, Learning from Northern Ireland? The Uses and Abuses of the Irish model ,

British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 12, 2010, 23956, at pp. 24853.

57 James Anderson, Partition, Consociation, Border-crossing: Some Lessons from the National Conflict

in Ireland/N

coakley (2011). the challenge of consociation in northern ireland 473-93

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