APPROVED FORRELEASFHISTORICAL -

COLLECTIONDIVISION-HR70-14DATE: 05-21-2012

COUNTRY USSR

SUBJECT MILITARY THOUGHT: "The Submarine Operationof the Navy - the Naval Operation of the

- Future", by Admiral Yu. Panteleyev

DATE OF INFO: July 1961

APPRAISAL OFCONTENT Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B) .

Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled"The Submarine Operation of the Navy - the Naval Operationof the Future", written by Admiral Yu. Panteleyev.

This article appeared in the 1961 Third Issue of aspecial version of the Soviet military journal Voyennaya

Mysl (Military Thought). This journal is publishedirregularly and is classif ied TOP SECRET by the Soviets.The 1961 Third Issue went to press on 10 July 1961.

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The Submarine Operation

of the Navy - the

Naval Operation of the Future

. by

Admiral Yu. Panteleyev

In the past war the principal enemy of the fleet atsea was the aircraft armed with torpedoes and bombs. Thisis attested to by the statistics on losses of combat vesselsby the nations involved. Whereas, in a number of instances,a vessel could evade a submarine and then even pursue it,the evasion of an aircraft by a vessel was very difficult,and the overtaking and destruction of a departing aircraftwas completely impossible. It was hindered in this by itssignificantly slower speed and by the limited ceiling ofits antiaircraft artillery. In other words, in comparisonwith an aircraft, a vessel possessed neither the maneuver-ability nor the requisite firepower.

The submarine has actually remained all-powerful evers ince World War I .

In our time the aircraft and the submarine have becomethe major enemies of that leviathan of combat fleets,"the king of the oceans" - the battleship. And thisleviathan, which costs billions, has departed from the seasand oceans in ignominy; all naval powers have stopped build-ing it. The same fate has also befallen other large combatvessels. The missile/nuclear weapon has become the basicmeans of destruction even at sea. Its development has ledto the division of naval power into two parts: one part,consisting of nuclear/missile delivery vehicles immeasurablysmaller in size than the old battleships and cruisers,has taken to the air (jet aircraft); the other has goneunder water, into the depths of the seas and oceans(the submarine fleet) .

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We vis.lize. a future armed conflict primarily as abattle_ in the air and_underwater... Moreover, where airoperations have their own clear-cut organization anddefinite composition, the concept of "submarine operations"is entirely new and not reflected in our literature, andhas not yet received the "rights of citizenship" in ournaval art. Is this right? It would seem not. Thisconviction evolves from the following considerations.

The study of the history of military operations atsea in past wars must be carried out neither exclusivelynor largely for the purpose of learning and defining thecourse and results of the events themselves, but rather forestablishing the new trends .in naval art which took placein a given war, what the prospects are for their development,and what results they might produce.

It will be recalled that "submarine warfare" has beenmentioned more than once in naval art. The Germansespecially declaimed about this; nevertheless; neitherin the First nor Second World War, after having declaredmerciless submarine warfare against the Allies, were theyable to bring the Allies to their knees. After carryingout a series of bandit attacks against hospital vessels,and after gaining, unquestionably, certain operational-tactical successes, the German submarine fleet was stillunable to achieve any kind of strategic goals withsubmarines alone. Although partly disrupted, the. supplyingof England proper was not stopped. The failure of German"submarine warfare" is explained by the fact that theirsubmarines,although able to sink enemy vessels at sea, werenot able to demolish his military economy entirely, todestroy the basis for the construction of new vessels,and to crush the antisubmarine defense. For each transportsunk toward the end of the war, the Allies constructed twowhich were more modern.

Thus, in past wars submarines primarily carried outoperational-tactical missions; strategic missions were notwithin their power to accomplish, primarily because of thestatus of equipment and the organization of the submarinefleet of those days.

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Is it correct at the present time to raise thequestion of the organization of purely submarine operationsas naval operations of the immediate future? It seems tous that it is . Moreover, a dela in deciding _this_guestioncan cause harm to the future increase of the defensive

~oweT ou~hrcountry.

First of all, let us attempt to define submarineoperations. The meaning of "operation" as a form andmethod of achieving operational or strategic goals hasa very definite connotation in our military art; it isknown to the reader and there is no sense in citing it here.Let us agree beforehand that we do not admit the possibilityof resolving all missions of a war, or the achievement ofits strategic goals, by any one type of armed force.Victor.inwar_..can be achieved only through the combinedeforts of all .types of armed forces in cooperation with one'another . Therefore, we view a submarine operation as anintegral.part of battle by the armed forces in a navalihater, carrying out the performance only. of. particular

o tional .or strategic tasks.

By a submarine operation we mean an operation ofsubmarine forces which is conducted in the depths of theocean or the sea without rising to the surface. Theterm "underwater vessel" was not applied accidentally.The designation "underwater boat" appears to us to be toogeneral, inexact, and not at all suitable for operational-tactical language. At the present time there are missile-carrying submarines with a displacement of several thousandtons, submarines for antisubmarine defense, and submarinesof other designations. It is natural, therefore,. that ageneric understanding be developed for all submarines,whether the submarine fleet or submarine forces whichoperate in their own peculiar element - in the depths ofthe oceans and seas.

A purely submarine operation can take place only whenpurely submarine missions are carried out in ocean depthsby a submarine fleet and where the possibilities exist fortheir fulfilment by submarine forces. In the immediate

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future, just as at present, the submarine forces mayconduct operations primarily in conjunction with theaviation and, in some instances, also with the surfacefleet. But such operations will not be designated sub-marine operations; it would be more exact to call themoperations of submarines.

As is known,at present submarines operate in closecoordination with aircraft and surface vessels which aresupporting their operations. We devote a great deal ofattention to this problem. Much is said about aerialreconnaissance on behalf of submarines and about thesupport afforded by surface vessels to the deployment ofsubmarines from their bases or to their return. Some ofthese situations have become prescribed requirements.During any naval exercise a thorough minesweep of thechannels of a naval base is instituted directly prior tothe departure of the submarines from the base. Also,in order to support this departure of submarines, allantisubmarine defense forces (protivolodochnaya oborQna -PLO) in the area of the naval base are deployed. (We havein mind destroyer escorts and aircraft of PLO.) Finally,a special direct escort is organized to support the departureof submarines from the bases. This great number of shipsat sea and aircraft circling about, all engaged in drivingoff enemy minelaying submarines and in "sweeping away"mines, without even knowing if there are any at all, mostblatantly reveal that an operation is being prepared.

Even during the past war a number of measures for theso-called support of submarine deployment started tobecome outmoded, while submarines more and more gained theright for complete independence of action. Today thistrend is becoming evident with an even greater force. Ofcourse, the execution of all or part of the measuresindicated above is not excluded even now in certain cases.However, it is entirely clear that such methods forsupporting the deployment of submarines or supportingtheir combat activity are rapidly becoming outmoded andit is necessary to seek new measures.

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One more example. In order to force the enemyantisubmarine defense line with our submarines, it isconsidered essential to carry out decisive strikes fromthe air and sea against his PLO forces. But the executionof this strike makes it patently clear that our submarinesare getting ready to force that particular line. In thismanner, our actions will serve as a distinct combat alertfor the enemy~PLO. Is it not time for the submarine forcesthemselves to secure the forcing of, the PLO line covertlyunderwater, without all the uproar on the surface of thesea and in the air? It seems to us that such a time is here,or practically here. Evidently, operations for forcingthe PLO line will constitute one of the first submarineoperations of the submarine forces.

What kind of operational and strategic missions can thesubmarine fleet resolve independently because of thisdeveloping situation?.

As is well known, the military leadership of NATOcountries still attaches special significance to its -

aircraft carrier large units; viewing them as mobile air-fields from which aircraft can take off with nuclearweapons. According to the plan of the NATO leaders, these"airfields", being mobile, must be in their positions atthe right time in the Atlantic, in the Norwegian Sea, andin the Indian and Pacific Oceans, from which they candestroy designated targets on the territory of the USSR.

Aircraft carrier 1_--*is, the fleet's"Enemy No.. 1",are pwerful but far from invulnerable. They can bedestroyed, first of all, by missile strikes of our aviation.

~~t the eiemymay ry to create strong counteractionswith his PVO forces and weapons against these strikes.At the present time it is extremely difficult to concealthe deployment of large masses or of separate groups ofaviation and their approach to aircraft carriers, becausethe eyes of tie enemy have become very keen and his earssharp. The "sudden" appearance of strike aviation frombehind the clouds is also excluded, inagmuch as to baikon the inadequacy of enemy equipment or on errors by hisleadership is worse than foolhardy. Aircraft also cannot

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"hover" in one zone for a long time, awaiting thearrival of the enemy. For the enemy can deploy hisaircraft carrier strike large unit (avianosnoyeudarnoye soyedineniye - AUS) prior to the beginning ofa war under the most plausible pretexts (cruises,trainingexercises, etc.).

The submarine fleet possesses incomparably greatcapa bilites for,. combat with the AUS. _I nmay be deployedian ccm lete secrecy, during the period of exacerbationofthe militaryfpolitica" situation, to thosevery areasof th&e O'cean or sea, desigrated by the enemy as zones foredeplfoyment..of his .forces .for a strike against our

.installa-ti.ons. And it may very well be that the enemy air-craft will not have time to take off for the delivery ofa strike, as they will go to the bottom together withtheir "airfield" after being attacked by nuclear weaponsof the submarine forces which had been covertly deployedbeforehand in the appropriate areas of the ocean or sea.

For the execution of an independent submarine operationto sink the enemy strike aircraft carriers, is it sufficientto have only atomic submarines with nuclear weapons? ,No,it is not sufficient! The resolution of this missionrequires an entirely -new organization of large units of thesubmarine forces. In the interests of ammunition supplyand technical servicing, submarines are still grouped inlarge units on the basis of class and type (submarineswith atomic engines, submarines with diesel engines,submarines with torpedoes, submarines with missiles, etc.).Such large units are not suitable for carrying out inde-pendent submarine operations.

Upon receiving a combat mission to destroy an AUS,a submarine (or a group of them) must, at the present time,first of all be guided to the target either by aircraft-or by a reconnaissance screen of submarines. The commanderof an attacking submarine does not see or know who isproviding his tactical support or where it is and is forcedto operate independently; he watches nothing except thetarget. Submarines beneath the ,.surface do not yetrepresent dependably controlled large units.

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It appears to us that. it is now essential to createseparat snomrine large units capable of independentlyresolving tac'-ical or operational missions. We have inmind submarine squadrons of vessels with atomic propulsionSuch a squadron must consist of strike submarines (withmissiles and torpedoes), reconnaissance submarines withpowerful hyd.oacoustical equipnent ,~ atis6binki-ine defensesubmarines, minelaying_submarines, and supply submarines.Upon receiing i cmbat mission for operations in aprescribed area of the ocean or sea, the submarinesquadron, independently, xith its own submarine reconnaissanceforces, must find the assigned target and direct its strikeforces against it. On ^he basis of his intelligence data,the commander of the operation must plan the main directionof the strike and determine the forces to be used againstthe main target. the operational makeup of these forces,and the forces to be used in a strike along the auxiliaryaxis. In a number of instances the covert laying of miner(.anchored or floating) may delay enemy deployment andi. this manner support the operations of the strikesubmarine forces. It, is doubtful that the existing hydro-acoustical equipment of the enemy will be able to deerdfineacd-6T-eZETthe entire depth of the operational makeup ofthe submarine forces and the large number of attackingsubmarines deployed at various depths. In any. event," theranges of this eauioment are still much less than theranges--tf"cour modern long-range torpedoes, let alone missiles.

It is evident that an ocean-going atomic submarine,carrying powerful nuclear armaments, must have its ownreliable defense under water from enemy submarinesfantisubmarine defense) and from mines (while moving atcorresponding depths) . in order that the submarine commandercan. devote all his attention to the major task - the attackof the assigned. tr.rget. With the development of the meansof underwater television, sonar, and communications, thecontrol of a submrariue squadron becomes possible andsubmarine batt.es and engagements with all their under-water aspects - reconnais.sance.: deployment, strikesagainst :protective forces and against. -thle main target -assume realistic forms. ,

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Of course, an operation for the destruction of anAUS may be conducted, as we have already indicated,either by aircraft alone or in coordination with submarines.We do not exclude such a variant. for it does notcontradict the basic views indicated above. But wereiterate that even for joint operations with aircraft,the submarine forces must be organized along a new principle.This is primarily necessitated by the strengthened defenseof the AUS and by the rising cost of atomic missile sub-marines, which require considerable support in all theiroperations. (We have in mind reconnaissance, PLO, andPVO, i.e., those types of defense which a battleshiprequired for itself on the surface of the seas in itstime.) It can be said that since "naval power" .hasgone under water, all of its defense must also go underwater.

We have already spoken of the impossibility of aviation'sremaining a long time in waiting zones, of its significant-ly lower capability than submarines for covert tacticaldeployment, and of the great dependen.ce of aviation uponthe condition and availability of an airfield network.To this must also be added the dependence of aviationcapabilities upon the weather. Thus, by no means canaviation always guarantee the complete success of itsoperation against the AUS on all expanses of the world'soceans.

Th struggle for securing the possibility of the firstrike_ inthe initial. period .cf war will .be ar. important

problem for bcTh sides;.therefore, ir. a number of instances,1:he operatiocal deployment of forces even during peacetimewill be unavcidable. Even today submarine forces canoccupy necessary wa~ting posit.ions and from them conductcovert and prolonged observation of the. enemy. Aircraftcaniot do this. Sonar is incapable of determining eitherthe hull number or the designation of a submarine;for this reason,~ during an i:termittent sonar soundingfir submarines it is difficult to determine immediatelythe number of submarines operating in a given area., sincethe same submarine may be detected several times.

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We are correct in asserting that "underwater danger"is more serious than aerial danger, for it is more difficultto gain rapidly the particulars of a.n underwater situationthan of an aerial one. After intercepting the enemy,the submarine forces are capable of delivering strikesagainst. him repeatedly and of organizing a pursuit whilereloading the.ir torpedo nuclear weapons underwater. Allthese considerations speak for the advantages and thereality of submarine operatior.s .

Although recognizing tb.e vulnerability of aircraftcarriers from the sea, as well as from the air, foreignauthors fcr the time being are still timid but, nonethe-less, are expressing views on the growing obsolescenceof aircraft carriers as floating, maneuverable "airfields".The attentir of these authors is turning to missile-carry-ing submari.es which ca.n use their missiles from the depthsof seas and oceans and, especially, from the areas ofthe Arctic (through the many unfrozen patches of waterin the mids". of ice) where an aircraft carrier cannotoperate at all. It is natu:ral, that in contrast to theAUS. with its cumerous support vessels and aircraft,the appearance of our missile-carrying submarines in theocean and their tactical deployment at great depths can,as we have indicated, be carried out covertly without theknowledge of the surface fleet of the enemy, his aviation,and, even more so, the shore facilities for the detectionof submarines. Neither aircraft carriers nor the mostpowerful aircraft can coun':eract the arrival of submarinesin the Arctic area.. The sinking of one or two submarinesduring their passage into the Arctic by surface vesselsor aircraft will not have a decisive effect. In the nearfuture only enemy submar ines will be able to ,cunteracttie "apl6yment of our submarines. And only our submarinefrc-es~ ,"rganized into submarine squadrons and carryingout submarine operations, can counteract this formidableforce of the enemv.

We shall. discuss briefly the plan of operations forthe destructicn cf enemy missile-^arrpig submarines inthe Arctic area. i.e., under Tire ice in the depths of the

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Arctic Basin. Here, neither an aircraft nor a surfacevessel can aid a submarine in The usual manner in anyway. Our submarine squadron (a large unit of submarineforces in a given theater) must first of all have its ownunderwater reconnaissance, consisting not only of reconnais-sance submarines but also of technical equipment forsubmarine detection, installed by special minelayingsubmarines under the ice (buoys for detecting enemy sub-marines, mine obstacles, and nets). The creation of suchmeans is not an insoluble prcblem. In addition, ourstrike missile-carrying and torpedo submarines for combatagainst enemy missile-carrying submarines in the oceandepths under the ice must have a mobile underwater patroland a direct underwater defense consisting of PLO submarinesand submarines for detecting mine obstacles (submarinemine detectors, a type of submarine mine-sweeper) . Asquadron commander must ccmmnd such an operation from onecf the submarines. Control of the forces must be basedon. reliable means of underwater communication andtelevision. The validity of such an operation has alreadybecome apparent; however, the materiel base for its _resolution is still more thoretical than practical. Letus recall that this is not the first year that Americanatomic submarines have studied the under-ice Arctic area.

During the conduct of submarine operations it isabsolutely necessary that each submarine know its place inthe formation and its place in relation to the bottom ofthe ocean or sea-and to, the :n°arest banks and islands,first of all for security of navigation, as well as forthe tasks of tactical deploymert and placement of technicalmeans of combat (bucys, mires, nets). One of the mostimportant navigational aids for helping submarines determinetheir position must be a well-made naval chart showingdepths of the Arctic basin and. a series of other iiportantdata (underwater currents,. the steepness and unevenness ofthe bottom, as well as its characteristics) . Such a"submarine" cha-t should be i . the making now and shouldbe periodically updated with new data (areas of soundchannels and other hydrological elemerns) for the mostdetailed portrayral of the en-ire ur-Cdev'.er environment.However, the availability of E-ven the most detailed charts

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cannot guarantee that there will be an exact pinpointingof the submarine's position. A question arises concerningthe creation of underwater hydroacoustic beacons forsubmarines, concealed from the enemy and operating whentriggered by our submarines. Theoretically, the creationof such a beacon, operating on the basis of a coded format,also presents no problem.

We do not deny, of course, the possibility ofsubmarine forces' detecting enemy submarines through theuse of technical equipment installed on the ice surface orin the water through holes cut into the ice. But in viewof the great mobility and hummocking of Arctic ice and ofthe vulnerability of these technical means from the air,it should be taken into consideration that these technicalmeans will be used only occasionally. Therefore, theyshould not be the principal basis on which the reliabilityof an entire submarine operation is planned.

Thus, we arrive at the conclusion that combat againstmissile-carrying submarines under the ice in the Arcticis exclusively a submarine operation, in which theparticipation of other types of armed forces is completelyinsignificant. On the basis of all that has been stated,it is now time to consider the creation of submarine sailingdirections for the seas and oceans.

Combat with enemy missile-carrying submarines outsidethe Arctic basin must be planned on the same principles asthose in the Arctic. To escape aerial and surfacepursuit, modern enemy atomic submarines more and more areincreasing the depth of their dives, which are now measuredin hundreds of meters. In our time, it is not the structureof the submarine itself, but the depth of the sea or ocean,that will soon limit the diving depth. Combat by oursubmarine forces against enemy missile carriers at greatdepths will also be a purely submarine operation with allits inherent characteristics.

The significance of the potential enemy's. communication !Proutes from America to Europe, scrcss t'he Atlantic Oceanand, to a lesser extent, the Pacific Ocean, is well known. d

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It is necessary to understand correctly the compositionand role of ocean shipments in order to assign a missionto the fleet skilfully and to select appropriate forcesfor the resolution of that mission without expecting more fromthem than they can accomplish and, at the same time, notassigning them missions which are impossible for them tocarry out. Strikes against a convoy on the communicationsroutes, carried out by a group of submarines or by aircraft,can destroy part of.the guard vessels and part of thetransports. However, this will have no perceptible influenceon the situation on the ground front or on the course ofthe war as a whole, for in a given instant only tacticalsuccess is achieved at a time when all ocean communicationsroutes as a whole will have strategic significance. Theresults of a strike against a convoy must not be judgedby individual transport sinkings out of an entire convoy,but by the sinking of the entire convoy, or at least three-fourths of it .

It should be remembered that in a number of instanceseven the destruction of a convoy in its entirety will, notby any means immediately influence the situation at thefront, in a campaign, or in the war as a whole. This isall the more reason why it is necessary to destroy a convoyand not to settle for partial tactical successes in thebattle against communications routes.

How, then, and by what means, can the destruction of anentire convoy be achieved, a convoy which in a number ofinstances will proceed in separate groups (large units) whichdo not fall into the zone of one nuclear bomb? In addition,it should be taken into consideration that some of thevessels will proceed without cargoes .for purposes ofcamouf lage .

In the immediate future the resolution of an assignedmission only by missile forces from our own territory is notyet very realistic, since an enormous number of missiles willbe required even for one convoy of 100 transports with itsescort if a high rate of probability for its destruction isdesired. In resolving this sam. mission aviation willrequire reliable, uninterrupted reconnaissance of the ocean

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and, since it is capable of only a single attack, will notbe able to reload in the air, but will be forced to returnto the airfields. We are by no means deprecating thesignificance of strikes against convoys by aircraft,but we must also note all. the weak spots of this type offorce.

The matter is different insofar as the capabilitiesof submarine forces are concerned. Even now, unlikeaircraft which can only search for hours, submarine forcescan search for convoys independently underwater for tensof days; they can wait until the convoy approaches, overtakeit and, without surfacing, take up advantageous positions;then they carry out strikes against the escort forces,break through them for strikes against the transports, andmoreover, deliver these strikes repeatedly with the use ofunderwater nuclear explosions. Naturally, the strike ofone submarine squadron will serve as reconnaissance andguidance for another, which can, in several hours, deployfor the completion of the first squadron's strikes againstthe convoy.

At the present time, and for the immediate future, itis difficult to assume that the enemy convoy escort willquickly and easily detect all the submarine squadrons(2 to 3) deployed in a given zone of the ocean at variousdepths and be able to determine where, how many, and whattype of submarines are deployed. Atomic submarines willa.lways have superiority over a convoy in speed with allthe benefits ensuing from this, including the guaranteeof concealment of actions.

The place of departure of convoys and their place ofassembly at sea can be established not only by aviation,but by reconnaissance submarines; and in the future theentire mission for the destruction of a convoy can beresolved completely within the framework of a submarineoperation. It should be kept in mind that the developmentof PVO means makes aerial reconnaissance very complex andless reliable than reconnaissance with the aid of submarines.

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The parameters of a submarine operation for thedestruction of a convoy are already indicated. In itsbattle against communications routes the German-Fascistfleet adopted "wolfpack" methods with the use ofreconnaissance submarines. And only the weakness oftechnical means during the period of World War II - thelack of underwater television and means of reliable covertcommunication,-prevented the Fascists from resolving theproblem of submarine operations completely. Alliedcommunications routes were not disrupted. At the presenttime the means and methods of radiocountermeasures in ourcountry and abroad have improved significantly. Theachievements in this field are not to the advantage ofguided missiles and aircraft but do not at all affect theocean depths, where the means of hydroacoustic concealmentand counteraction by submarines are still a long way fromresults capable of decisively breaking up a maneuver andstrike by submarine forces.

Thus, a submarine operation during operations againstenemy communications routes becomes plausible in all .respects.In a given case we also do not exclude the coordinatedoperation of submarines with aircraft when this is possible,we say, that a purely "submarine operation" is more effectivewhen it is conducted with decisive goals in mind againstcommunications routes where not a single, but a prolongedand methodical, action is required.

- To the extent. that the threat to sea communicationsroutes from missile strikes increases, a future war could,unquestionably, see the appearance of submarine tankers,submarine vessels for transporting troops and cargo, and,finilly, special .submarine amphibious-force-landing vessels.During the past war there were attempts in our country andabroad to create submarine transports. Thus, we deliveredammunition and supplies by submarines to the besieged navalbases'of Hanko and Sevastopol. True, these were not specialsubmarines,but combat vessels with limited capabilities fortaking on various cargoes, but the idea of creating submarinetransports and unde-rwater communications routes receivedits first practical application.

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-~ Thus, in a future war there will undoubtedly be missionsfor the destruction of enemy underwater communicationsroutes and for the protection of our underwater communicationsroutes. It is apparent that missiles and aircraft willnot be able to destroy submarine transports in the oceanand sea depths. Of course, it is possible that they couldachieve partial tactical successes as a result of an under-water atomic explosion capable of destroying one or twosubmarine transports. However, these successes will notlead to the breakdown of communications routes or to thedisruption of deliveries over them.

Underwater communications routes will be at various'depths and along different courses, and the submarinetransports will proceed in a dispersed manner. Under theseconditions, who will be able to find quickly and destroysuch a submarine convoy? It is apparent that only properlyorganized submarine squadrons of the.-submarine forces arein a position to resolve this important operational and,in a number of instances, even strategic, mission. Aircraftand, even more so, surface vessels, certainly cannot do it.

It is necessary to mention certain special missionswhich, though not tied in with strategic tasks, have comeup in the past and apparently will face the fleet in thefuture. We are referring to diversionary_ operations ofdifferent magnitudes, carried out for the purpose .ofdestroying radar stations and radio stations of communicationsotspecial designation, and also to resolve other missionsof~the most varied nature, especially on islands or ona sparsely populated and poorly protected shore. Thesemissions cannot by any means always be resolved by a missile,no matter how it may be delivered. Modern technical meanspermit an installation to be reliably protected even froma ground nuclear burst. Very frequently it will be .necessarynot only to-knock this. or that installation out of.commission,but, what is much more important, to obtain documents andseize *fe."tongue''... Neither an airborne landing nor amissile can accomplish this mission.

For the resolution of a number of missions of adiversionary nature the terpora'y presence of subunits ofour armed forces at an enemy installation will be requ:ed.

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Only submarine forces can suddenly and covertly land sucha force and also quickly and covertly remove it. In pastwars there were many examples of such use of submarines,but the scale of these operations was limited.

We have reviewed a number of operations, the aims ofwhich, in our opinion, can most effectively be achievedeven today by submarine forces and even more so in theimmediate future. We have discussed the destruction ofaircraft carriers and missile-carrying submarines, thedisruption of surface and underwater communications routesin oceans and seas, and certain diversionary actions ofsubmarine forces.

This is, of course, far from a complete list of allof the missions which could be assigned to the navy and,especially, to its submarine forces. To this should beadded the contribution of missiles fired by submarines .against naval bases, shipbuilding yards, and other enemymilitary installations located on shore and in the zoneof interior of the enemy country; also, missions involvingcoordinated action with troops of our maritime front -bylanding forces in the enemy's rear. However, it appears tous that while these missions can be assigned to oursubmarine forces today, in the future they can be accomplishedwith equal success by missile units and long-range aviation.In the resolution of these missions, .strategic missiles willcompletely replace submarine forces, but nothing can replacesubmarine forces in their battle under the ice and in thedepths of the oceans and seas against enemy missile-carry-ing submarines, his submarine transports, and his aircraftcarrier strike large units. Therefore, the question arisesas to whether it would not be better to orient oursubmarine forces in the future chiefly toward those typesof operations, the execution of which depends entirely uponthem, and in which a missile (ballistic or from an aircraft)cannot at present replace.a submarine? Without exception,every type and arm of the armed forces must first of allexecute those missions which it has been designatedto accomplish and which no one else can accomplish.

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It was not just for sport that our naval reconnaissanceseaplanes (MER-2) bombed troop concentrations on the groundfront at Leningrad iuring the first months of World War II.Of course, during this period no one conducted aerialreconnaissance at sea, since it was impossible 'in thosedays to replace a naval reconnaissance plane with anyother aircraft - all aviation operated on the ground front.Many seaplanes were lost, but the grave situation at thefront at that -time necessitated such sacrifices. Suchuse of naval aviatior. cannot serve as an example for thefuture, for this was a unique and atypical case formethods of conducting military operations at sea.

The approach of our missile submarines to the enemyshore to carry out a missile salvo will always entailtheir entry into the enemy antisubmarine defense (PLO)zone; therefore, if the salvo is carried out from adistance, outside the PLO zone, from an area of completesecurity (more than 500 to 600 miles from shore), thenis it not befter in -such a case to use the ballistic

Tnissiles of the missile troops or to use long-rangeEVlation? For the ocean-going atomic missile submarine isa very expensive weapon; it not only carries expensiveequipment, but large groups of highly qualified specialistsare on board. There is no one on a strategic missile andthe results will be the same, and perhaps even greater,than from missiles fired from a submarine. Why risk anexpensive submarine weapon and its entire crew in such apoor cause? We might be asked - yhy then is the.NATOfleet preparing to fire missiles at USSR installationsspecifically from. their submarines? It appears to .us thatthis is explained by the fact that neither the USA norEngland at the present time has strategic missiles withthe'range and, mainly, the accuracy of flight, to. justifytheir being fired from USA bases against all ourinyortant installations.

If, nevertheless, our submarine fleet will be assignedthe mission of destroying enemy shore and rear areainstallations, in this case the submarine forces must beorganized in a new manner. Individual gubmarine operationsoff enemy shores must be dropped,, because the enemy anti-submarine defense has become very effective. :Te strike

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submarine, or a group of them, must have their owndirect underwater protection from enemy submarines; andtheir own reconnaissance submarines to clear the approachroutes and the firing area, which is covered not only bythe enemy PLO submarines but also by his mine obstaclesand other technical means. Thus, even in this case thereis a need for a special large unit of submarines, which wehave already mentioned.

In no way by our discussions are we preparing. todeprecate the significance. of missile strikes from submarinesgainst enemy naval bases or other of his installations.We''re 'discussing only the selection of the most effective,economical, and reliable weapon for the accomplishment ofa given mission. It appears to us that with the develop-ment and perfection of strategic missiles, missions forthe destruction of shore installations by submarines willbe eliminated.

The role and significance of first strikes in theinitial period of a war have been sufficiently delineatedin our military literature. The effectiveness of thefirst strike depends, first of all, upon the secrecy andtimeliness of the deployment of the forces during athreatening period. In a number of military-politicalcircumstances, it will be necessary to carry out such adeployment even during peacetime for, so to speak,protective purposes, without the least violation ofexisting international practices. Which type of weaponcan do this with the most secrecy? Who can covertlyoccupy positions in the area of probable deploymentagainst us by enemy aircraft carriers and missile submarines,or in the area of appearance of a large convoy with troops?Obviously, only submarine forces can accomplish this,because as we have already indicated, it is a very .complicated matter to detect their deployment, to saynothing of determining their exact position and the exactnumber of submarines in the depths of the ocean and sea.

A few words concerning the supply of submarine forces .Submarine vessels are designated for a long stay underwater, which their equipment alr'eady guarantees. It is

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.~ ..- ~. ~. .~ . . . . . . . . .-. : _---

also necessary to provide for the replenishment underwater of certain types of supplies for submarines. Nottoo long ago the possibility of refueling a jet aircrafttraveling at an enormous speed and height seemed un-realistic, yet today this problem has been resolved.Surface vessels already take on fuel from other vesselswhile underway, as dell as while in anchorage, fromstorage containers hidden in the depths of the sea.Submarines, however, still come to the surface to take onsupplies, and in so doing deprive themselves of all theirsubmarine qualities. It is time to create special supplysubmarines for supplying submarine squadrons underwaterand underwater depots from which a submarine could takeon supplies while lying on the bottom.

It should be kept in mind that the possibility ofcounting on stationary surface floating bases is becoming'iiire and more problematical. There is an urgent need forunderwater submarine supply bases in bays near our shoresor for special submarines to furnish supplies away frombases. The technical solution of this problem is entirelypossible.

What kind of deductions can be made from all that hasbeen discussed?

First of all, it appears to us that the appearance of 1A

independent submarine operations in naval art is completelynatural. The object and goal of these operations will besuch that no other types or arms of the armed forces exceptsubmarine forces will be able to engage in or achieve them.We have in mind combat with enemy missile-carrying submarinesin the Arctic, under the ice, or in the depths of non-freezing oceans and seas, and also, the destruction ofunderwater and surface communications routes. In thefuture, submarine operations will be able to achieveoperational, as well as strategic, goals.

Submarine operations will also be conducted in thoseinstances when the accomplishment of a mission jointly with *aviation, or by aviation alone, is difficult or, for manyreasons, temporarily impossible.' We are referring to the

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conduct of submarine operations involving the destructionof the carrier strike large unit (AUS) and the destructionof naval bases and the forces stationed there, as well asa number of diversionary operations, including the landingof tactical amphibious forces.

During the conduct of submarine operations with anytype of goals, in a number of instances, when it ispossible, a joint operation of submarines with various typesand arms of the armed forces is not excluded, first ofall with the missile troops and aviation; but at the sametime it should be remembered that forms of coordinatedoperations,besides strategic ones, are becoming more andmore complex.

In order to support the conduct of submarine operations,it appears to us that it is necessary now to resolve anumber of organizational and technical problems:

-first of all, to work out the organization of strikesubmarine large units (squadrons);

-to orgar.ize a system of covert underwater communicationsand television in order to ensure navigational securityof movement in the depths and to maintain position in anunderwater formation, as well as to control the large unitduring the delivery of strikes against the enemy underwater;

-to create navigational charts especially for theoperation of submarine forces at all depths attainableby them (with an indication on the charts of the temperature,density, and transparency of the water, and the relief ofthe bottom, currents, and other data);

-to work out and create materiel-technical means 'forunderwater navigation (underwater beacons with codedformat) in our own as well as in neutral waters; and also,means of obstruction, placed covertly from submarines(light nets in combination with mines);

-to work out a system for all'types of underwater supply,for submarines lying on the bottom at points of dispersal

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Land at definite depths and not moving;

-to create a class of special submarine tankers andsubmarine transports for the shipment of combat supplies,equipment, and contingents of personnel.

None of these proposals is fantastic, for a ntumberof them already are coming into being. The task nowconsists of creating an orderly system of theoreticalpostulates and to give clear-cut "orders" to ourtechnology on the basis of these, lest the realitiesof combat operations of submarines catch us unawares .

In this article we have attempted to present and, whereverpossible, to substantiate, certain problematical questionsof submarine operations which are subject to detailedelaboration, because submarine forces must, above all,prepare themselves for the conduct of submarine operationsas the naval operations of the future .

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