cndi diplomatic focus tradeoff da

Upload: atrasicarius

Post on 14-Apr-2018

225 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    1/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA.....................................................................................................................................................11NC 1/3.........................................................................................................................................................................................21NC 2/3.........................................................................................................................................................................................3

    1NC 3/3.........................................................................................................................................................................................4________________.......................................................................................................................................................................6***Uniqueness***........................................................................................................................................................................6Uniqueness Committed Israel/Palestine War..........................................................................................................................7Uniqueness Committed Six Party Talks..................................................................................................................................8Uniqueness Committed Asia...................................................................................................................................................9___________...............................................................................................................................................................................10***Links***................................................................................................................................................................................10Link Generic.............................................................................................................................................................................11Link Military Change...............................................................................................................................................................12Link Japan................................................................................................................................................................................13Link South Korea.....................................................................................................................................................................14Link Iraq (1/2)..........................................................................................................................................................................15

    Link Afghanistan......................................................................................................................................................................17Link Turkey..............................................................................................................................................................................18__________________.................................................................................................................................................................19***Internal Links***...................................................................................................................................................................19Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Plan Cost...........................................................................................................................20Internal Diplomatic Capital Key North Korean Conflict......................................................................................................21Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Asian Stability...................................................................................................................22Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Israel/Palestine War (1/3).................................................................................................23_____________...........................................................................................................................................................................26***Impacts***............................................................................................................................................................................26Impact North Korean Conflict..................................................................................................................................................27Impact Asian Stability..............................................................................................................................................................29________________........................................................................................................................................................... ..........30***Aff Answers***.....................................................................................................................................................................30Uniqueness Dip Cap Low Iraq..............................................................................................................................................31Uniqueness Dip Cap Low Bush............................................................................................................................................32Uniqueness Dip Cap Low Obama Failure.............................................................................................................................33Uniqueness Dip Cap Low Obama Squandering....................................................................................................................34Link No Link Tradeoff..........................................................................................................................................................35Link Link Turn South Korea K Aff.......................................................................................................................................36....................................................................................................................................................................................................36

    1

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    2/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    1NC 1/3

    A. Uniqueness The US is currently spending an immense amount of political capital to defend

    Israels nuclear arsenal.

    Culture of Life News 2010(US Verbally Assaults Important Allies, Turkey and Brazil, May 29, 2010,http://emsnews.wordpress.com/2010/05/29/us-verbally-assaults-important-allies-turkey-and-brazil/)

    All the Arab OPEC nations demanded the US sign this treaty and begin the first efforts , feeble as theyare, to disarm Israels nuclear weapons. The US cant promise to protect Saudi Arabia from Israelinukesbecause the Zionists control our political and military systems at this point in time. The need toprotect Israels illegal nuclear arsenal is proving to be immensely expensive for our diplomatic capital inthe world. The latest sign of this is the rising US battle to crush Turkey and Brazil, two allies, for daring to cooperate withIran in following US demands to send nuclear materials out of the country to be processed.

    B. Links

    1. Diplomatic capital is finite each new issue trades off with another one.

    Anderson and Grewell 2000(Terry L., Executive Director of the Property and Environment Research Center, J.Bishop, former research associate for PERC. He is a graduate of Stanford University, the Yale School of Forestry and

    Environmental Studies, and Northwestern Law School, The Greening of Foreign Policy, PERC Policy Series: PS-

    20, December 2000, http://www.perc.org/pdf/ps20.pdf)

    Greater international environmental regulation can increase international tension. Foreign policy is a bag of goods thatincludes issues from free trade to arms trading to human rights. Each new issue in the bag weighs itdown, lessening the focus on other issues and even creating conflicts between issues. Increasedenvironmental regulations could cause countries to lessen their focus on international threats of violencesuch as the sale of ballistic missiles or border conflicts between nations. As countries must watch over more and

    more issues arising in the international policy arena, they will stretch the resources necessary to dealwith traditional international issues. As Schaefer (2000, 46) writes, Because diplomatic currency is finite . . .it is critical ly important that the U nited S tates focus its diplomatic efforts on issues of paramountimportance to the nation. Traditionally, these priorities have been opposing hostile domination of key geographicregions, supporting our allies, securing vital resources, and ensuring access to foreign economies.

    2. Diplomatic focus is key to preventing an Israel-Palestine conflict.

    Ben-Meir PhD IR Oxford 09(Alon, professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU.He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies, Obamas peace offensive, Yemen

    Observer, http://www.yobserver.com/opinions/10016963.html, 7-28-9)

    Considering this paradoxical reality, both Israelis and Palestinians have shown that they are simply incapable of

    resolving this conflict on their own. This is why the Obama administration must pursue an aggressivepolitical agenda with unwavering commitment to produce concessions from all sides to provide the basis foran agreement. The United States cannot equivocate with the Israelis, the Palestinians or the Arab states as to what is required

    to forge a lasting peace. But for peace to occur, the Obama administration must secure a number of prerequisitesto avoid the pitfalls of previous administrations and capitalize on the changing political environment inthe Middle East especially among the Arab states that favor peace with Israel. Ending the Settlements Expansion:Ending the settlements expansion is one of the most critical elements in changing the dynamic of the Israeli-Palestinian

    negotiations. More than anything else the settlements send a clear message that Israel has no intention ofseriously relinquishing territory and that the idea of a two state solution is dead. If Israel were to stop

    2

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    3/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    expansion, it could strengthen Mahmoud Abbas hand as he would be able to claim credit for an extraordinary

    1NC 2/3

    Israeli concession. To resolve the conflict on this issue between the Obama administration and Israel, both sides mustagree on a moratorium for a specific period of time (instead of an open-ended freeze) pending a resolution to the bordersdispute. The expansion can then be resumed on the settlements that would be incorporated into Israel proper by agreementwith the Palestinians. The Israeli government must also control the settlers currently residing in the West Bank who have on anumber of occasions resorted to violence against the Palestinians. In return for an Israeli cooperation and a moratorium on thesettlements, the Obama administration must demand and receive from the Palestinian Authority an immediate cessation of allincitements against Israel in the Palestinian media, especially those in Arabic. This must include the revision of text books, asis being promoted by the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East. Moreover, although violent attacks against Israel havebeen reduced dramatically since the Gaza war, the PA must demonstrably continue to take whatever action needed to preventfuture acts of violence. In addition, the PA must undertake a major public relations campaign to foster the virtues of peacefulcoexistence with Israel. Promoting a Palestinian Unity Government: Establishing a unity government remains central to

    promoting a lasting Israeli-Palestinian peace. The Obama administration must exert tremendous pressure onEgypt and Saudi Arabia to do everything in their power to advance a unity government between Hamasand the Palestinian Authority. Every effort must be made to pressure Hamas to accept the Arab Peace

    Initiative. It is unlikely that Hamas will abandon their charter and recognize Israel outright; therefore, accepting the ArabPeace Initiative as an act of solidarity with the 22 Arab states may allow its leadership to save face. It would also allow Israeland the US to come to an indirect agreement with Hamas should they start looking seriously at the Arab Peace Initiative as a

    viable framework for peace. Having been substantially weakened by the Israeli Gaza offensive late last year,the continuing closure of border crossings and the growing disenchantment of its policies by Palestinians in Gaza and other

    Arab states, Hamas may now be more inclined to forge a unity government than at any time before .Moreover, Hamas leadership seems more open to discuss a two-state solution in order to have a say inthe peace process. Otherwise, the growing chasm between Hamas and the PA will not serve the interest of any of theplayers in the conflict and will only perpetuate the possibility of large scale violence.

    Nuclear war.

    Nawash JD Thomas M. Cooley Law School 9 ( Kamal M, BA, business management, Southeastern Louisiana

    University, master of laws, international legal studies, American University, Legal Director of the American-ArabAnti-Discrimination Committee, Israel/Palestine Conflict May Lead to Nuclear

    War,http://muslimmedianetwork.com/mmn/?p=3501, 15 January)

    Once again the Palestinian/Israeli conflict spirals out of control. However, this particular battle has producedcircumstantial evidence that the conflict has become more dangerous than ever before . Unless apermanent solution is found soon, the violence may increase in severity until the conflict ends tragically .In the latest fighting, Israel has bombed the HAMAS controlled city of Gaza for the stated reason of neutralizing HAMASand stopping them from firing rockets into Southern Israel. As of the date of this article, approximately 900 Palestinians and15 Israelis have been killed. HAMAS stated reasons for firing the rockets is to end the siege of Gaza by Israel whichHAMAS alleges is preventing the free movement of people and goods and causing a humanitarian crisis. Israel denies theexistence of a humanitarian crisis and refuses to end the siege of Gaza unless HAMAS recognizes Israel or is out power. In

    general, what makes the Palestinian/Israeli conflict so dangerous is that half the world , (three billion people(Jews, Christians & Muslims)) are emotionally, historically and religiously attached to the land known asIsrael/Palestine. This fact was demonstrated in the last few days as demonstrations erupted in more than 95 countries around the world. Moreover,due to the affordability of satellite TV, in even the most underdeveloped countries, billions of interested people are exposed to 24 hour graphic coverage ofthis latest battle in Gaza. Western News stations like BBC and CNN no longer have a monopoly on reporting news. Many Middle Eastern TV stations havesurpassed the reach of BBC, CNN and other western media. As to graphic images, dozens of news stations like Aljazeera have been broadcasting live and

    prerecorded graphic images of Palestinian babies blown up into pieces by the Israeli military. One particular gruesome scene that was played over and overagain was that of a three year old little girl with her heart protruding out of her body after a bomb fell on her house. Another station, Al Alam, repeated thescene of four dead babies who were placed next to each other in the same refrigerator of a morgue because of the large number of dead in Gaza. The graphicand often emotional coverage of this latest battle is inspiring the fury of the masses which in turn are putting enormous pressure on their governments to jointhe fight on the side of the Palestinians. This conflict is much more dangerous than most people realize. For example, Egypt is receiving so much negativemedia coverage for not opening its border with Gaza that People throughout the Arab and Muslim world started calling for the overthrow of the Egyptian

    3

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    4/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    government and demonstrators attacked Egyptian embassies in several countries. The pressure on Egypt is so intense and ruthless that a shaken Egyptianpresident was forced to hold two press conferences to explain his governments position and to distance Egypt from Israel. Similarly, the friendly nation20ofJordan came under so much pressure for not breaking diplomatic relations with Israel that King Abdullah held a publicity stunt in which he was seendonating blood for the people of Gaza and for the first time in recent memory he referred to Israel as the Enemy.

    1NC 3/3

    Even the Saudi government was not immune from attacks and calls for the overthrow of the Saudi government. Media outlets repeated scenes ofdemonstrators burning the effigy of the King of Saudi Arabia with the Israeli flag wrapped around him for hundreds of millions of people to see. SaudiArabia is perceived as a secret ally of Israel in the desire to destroy HAMAS and the refusal of the Saudi government to allow demonstrations against Israelonly reinforced this belief. Whatever the truth, the Saudi government was so shaken by the attacks against it and the constant portrayal of the Saudi Kingwrapped in the Israeli flag that the official Saudi media began publicizing Saudi efforts to raise money for the people of Gaza. The conflict between Israeland the Palestinians is becoming extremely dangerous and can only be described as a ticking NUCLEAR BOMB. Currently, only Israel has nuclear weaponsin the Middle East. But Iran may also go nuclear and if that happens the Arabs will try to do the same. Without a doubt, there is no conflict on earth that hasthe same global impact as the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Because of the potential for global instability, the entire world must do all it can to bring peace

    between the Palestinians and Israelis. The question is can this conflict be solved after many wars failed to end the conflict? The answer is YES but time isrunning out. Currently, there are four proposals to the Israel/Palestinian conflict and three have been attempted and failed. The first is that the Israelis andPalestinians continue fighting until one submits to the other, a plan that has been tried and failed. The second is a plan where both people separate bycreating two separate countries. This plan is referred to as the two state solution and all attempts to implement it have failed. The third is to divide thePalestinian territories and place them under the control of Egypt and Jordan. This solution has been tried (1948-1967) and also failed because it did notaddress the core of the conflict. The fourth solution is based on integration of both Israelis and Palestinians in one nation and is the only solution that has

    proven successful. For the last 20 years the world has focused on the two state (two country) solution which has clearly failed. However, contrary to

    unanimous belief,neither the Palestinians nor the Israelis are to blame for the failure of the two state solution.

    The two state solution failed because the concept of creating two separate countries by dividingIsrael/Palestine was and still is a difficult pill to swallow for Israelis & Palestinians. It is a fact that Israelisand Palestinians have religious, historical and emotional attachments to every square inch of the land thatinclude s Israel and Palestine and neither side is eager to embrace permanent separation or amputation asdescribed by Israeli novelist Amos Oz. Consequently, it is highly unlikely that permanent separation will lead to permanent peace. In light of the above factssome may think that a solution is impossible. NOT TRUE. The Palestinian/Israeli conflict can be solved as long as both sides give up the notion that theydeserve exclusive control and rule over Israel/Palestine. In light of the attachments that both parties have for the same territory, the solution cannot be inseparating but in finding a formula for living together. Many Israelis and Palestinians agree that Israel/Palestine is indivisible. Thus, the solution lies inuniting Israelis and Palestinians in one country while guaranteeing both sides equality and absolute security. What is being proposed here is the creation oftwo sovereign states similar to New York and New Jersey, joined together in a confederation to form one country. To illustrate further, after occupying theWest Bank and Gaza in 1967, Israel could have annexed those territories into Israel by providing the Palestinians with Israeli citizenship. Israel did not dothis and instead chose to treat the West Bank and Gaza as part of Israel without granting the Palestinians citizenship, equality or political participation.Legally, Palestinians were and continue to have the same status as American blacks in the 19th century. Israel did not integrate the Palestinians into Israel

    because Israelis were afraid that the Palestinians may one day outnumber the Jews and vote Israel out of existence. While this is a legitimate concern, Jewsand Israelis who fear equality for Palestinians assume that granting the Palestinians equality would lead to the destruction of Israel. This is a false

    assumption. The world has produced many successful formulas for different people living together and sharing power and a formula can be found in thiscase. An example of a formula is the creation of a confederation of Israel/Palestine based on the principles of free trade and the free movement of labor and

    people. As to the national government, Israel and Palestine can each contribute 50% to the national parliament, a formula that would guarantee security, andeliminate political dilution from demographic changes and make certain that extremist become marginalized. The above formula is an example that givesPalestinians and Israelis most of what they want while allowing both people to be independent and secure. Moreover, with this solution, Jerusalem becomesa non-issue and borders become less relevant. As proof that integration can work, consider that Israel has one million Palestinians with Israeli citizenshipwho are often referred to as Israeli Arabs. It is important to note that they are not participating in violence. This is because Palestinians who are citizens ofIsrael have civil and political rights while the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza have nothing. Without a doubt most readers of this article will thinkthat the author is nave, idealistic, stupid, Zionists or trying to destroy Israel. We understand your beliefs. However, please ask yourself if Israel destroysHamas or Islamic Jihad will there be peace between Israelis and Palestinians? Consider that Hamas was created in 1987. Before HAMAS was created, Israelfought five major wars and numerous other battles. Moreover, before HAMAS there were the PLO, Fatah, PFLP, PFLP-GC, 15 May Organization, Abu AliMustapha Brigades, Al-Asifah, Arab Liberation Front, Force 17, Black Hand , Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine Special Command, PopularResistance Committees, Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Black September, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine,Doghmush, Omar Ben al-Khatib Warriors, Palestinian Liberation Army, Palestinian Popular Struggle Front, Palestinian fedayeen, Swords of Truth,Rejectionist Front, among other organizations. Today most of the above organizations have been destroyed or just vanished. However, the conflict has notended as the above organizations have been replaced by Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Holy Jihad Brigades, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, Army of Islam, As-Saiqa, Tanzim, Al-Quds Brigades, among others. The point here is that even if Israel destroys HAMAS, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians would

    not be solved and it would only be a matter of time before a new group forms to replace HAMAS . Israelis and Palestinians must realizethat what they have done for the last 70 years will never bring peace to either Palestine or Israel underthe best of circumstances. Under the worst of circumstances this conflict may lead to an all out nuclear warwhere millions will die and this is no longer an exaggeration . To summarize, Israel and its neighbors have foughtnumerous wars and no side has given up on their fundamental claims. For the last 20 years, both sides have tried toseparate by creating two separate countries but this approach has failed because all sides have attachments to Israel andPalestine. The only solution that has a record of success is integration as demonstrated by the Palestinians who are citizens ofIsrael. If peace is not found then the day may soon come when the governments of the Middle East maybe overthrown by

    4

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    5/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    people who want to directly intervene on behalf of the Palestinians. If an uprising erupts throughout the Middle Eastthen nuclear war may soon follow. Therefore, the choices are between total annihilation or equality forPalestinians and security for Israel. There are no other choices.

    5

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    6/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    ________________

    ***Uniqueness***

    6

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    7/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Uniqueness Committed Israel/Palestine War

    The US is using diplomatic capital to protect and stand by Israel.

    National University of Singapore 2010 (EAI Weekly Talking Point**, June 1, 2010,http://www.nus.edu .sg/NUSinfo/EAI/)

    A counter-argument is that China's siding with North Korea is analogous to US' siding with Israel. Inmany ways, Israel also consumes unproportional amount of economic, political and diplomatic capital.But US will not ditch Israel because of its strategic significance . Similarly, China should not abandon NorthKorea for strategic reasons. North Korea could be an economic burden but a bargaining chip for China. Moreover, it is notin US, China and Japan's interests to have a unified Korea. A unified Korea would mean a nuclear state with a population ofabout 75 million. This is not good for China, because a unified Korea with nuclear weapons is more likely to be pro-US withcapital in Seoul. It may even claim a part of southeast China and could spell legitimacy problems for China, being the lastfour communist regimes in this world.

    Israel and Palestine peace talks are back on but on shaky ground and can be easily derailed.

    Klug 4/30(Foster reporter at huffington post, 4/30/10, Hillary Clinton middle east peace talks back on, 7/1/10)

    Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton said Friday that the Mideast peace process will get back on track nextweek, though not the U.S.-brokered direct talks involving Israeli and Palestinians that the Obamaadministration wants to see. George Mitchell, the special U.S. envoy to the Mideast, will mediate the discussionswhen he travels to the region. His visit will follow a weekend meeting of Arab League diplomats. Mitchell is expected toleave on Sunday and spend the week holding discussions with Israelis and Palestinians, U.S. officials said. For now, it's

    indirect talks, with Mitchell and aides meeting with one side at a time, then shuttling to the other. There aren't anynegotiations planned with Israelis and Palestinians at the same table. "Ultimately, we want to see theparties in direct negotiations and working out all the difficult issues that they must," Clinton told

    reporters after meeting with Kuwait's foreign minister, Mohammad Sabah al-Salem al Sabah. Palestinian negotiator SaebErekat said his side was making "every possible effort to begin these talks." A final decision, he said, would comefrom Arab foreign ministers and the Palestinian Liberation Organization's leadership. Israeli government officials had no

    immediate reaction to Clinton's announcement. An attempt last month to resume indirect talks fizzled whenIsrael announced a new Jewish housing project in east Jerusalem, which the Palestinians claim as afuture capital. That drew fierce criticism from the United States and led to the worst rift in decadesbetween Washington and its chief Mideast ally. Since then, the Obama administration has sought torepair the damage with a series of recent meetings and speeches from senior officials, including Clintonand Obama's national security adviser, James Jones. "The Middle East will never realize its fullpotential, Israel will never be truly secure, the Palestinians will never have their legitimate aspiration fora state unless we create the circumstances in which positive negotiations can occur," Clinton said.

    7

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    8/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Uniqueness Committed Six Party Talks

    US still diplomatically committed to six party process despite NK missile tests

    Voice of America News 3/28/2k8(North Korean Missile Firings Not Constructive, LN)

    The United States said Friday North Korea's latest set of missile tests was not constructive, and thatPyongyang should devote its energies to meeting disarmament obligations . VOA's David Gollust reports fromthe State Department. The Bush administration says North Korea broke no international agreement with its reported test

    firing Friday of three or four anti-ship missiles. But the White House said the action was not constructive, and thatPyongyang should focus on meeting commitments under the six-party nuclear accord , including providing adeclaration of its nuclear holdings and activities The missile tests came a day after the North expelled several South Koreanofficials from a joint north-south industrial site in apparent reaction to the tougher line on North Korea by the newgovernment in Seoul. In another development Friday, North Korea, through its state-run news agency, threatened to stop thedisabling of its nuclear complex at Yongbyon, because of what were termed unreasonable U.S. demands. In a talk with

    reporters however, State Department Sean McCormack said the Bush administration is not about to give up

    on the six-party process despite the week's events. He said considerable progress has been made on thedisablement of the Yongbyon reactor, which produced the plutonium for North Korea's small weapons arsenal.McCormack said while the promised declaration is now nearly three months late, the administration believes the diplomaticprocess is still viable and has set no cut-off date for its completion: "We all view that there's life left in diplomacy here andwe're working hard to make it succeed," he said. "We're beyond the deadline that the parties had set for themselves, and sowe'd like to see this move forward as quickly as possible. But you've also heard the Secretary [of State Rice] say that she

    hasn't circled any dates on the calendar in that regard. We're going to engage in patient diplomacy here, but theNorth Koreans need to move it forward."

    8

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    9/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Uniqueness Committed Asia

    Obamas diplomatic capital is now locked in Asia.

    Zengerie and Bohan 2k9 (Patricia, Caren, Obama pushes for greater U.S. involvement in Asia, Reuters,http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP14946620091113, 14 November 2009)

    TOKYO, Nov 14 (Reuters) - President Barack Obama will promise greater U.S. engagement in Asia and pushfor deeper trade ties with the region in a major speech in the Japanese capital on Saturday, administration officialssaid. Tokyo is the first stop in Obama's nine-day Asian tour, which also takes him to Singapore for an Asia-Pacific economicsummit, to China for talks likely to feature climate change and trade imbalances, and to South Korea, where North Korea's

    nuclear ambitions will be in focus. "This is obviously the fastest growing economic region in the world... Itsupports millions of jobs, a huge amount of our trade," Ben Rhodes, deputy national security adviser for strategiccommunications, said at a briefing where he previewed the speech for reporters. "There is potential there for morecommerce between us, including the potential to create more American jobs through exports ," he said.Obama is scheduled to deliver his speech at 10 a.m. local time (0100 GMT) on Saturday to an audience of about 1,500people at Tokyo's Suntory Hall. He will also discuss U.S. ties in the region on security concerns, whichRhodes listed as "climate change, nuclear proliferation, extremism" and its plans for increasedengagement in regional groupings, such as APEC. Although Obama will talk about China more during his visit toShanghai and Beijing from Sunday to Wednesday, the speech will address U.S.-Chinese relations. RISING CHINA "You'llhear him speak to our partnership with China on a range of global issues, such as the global economic recovery, climate

    change and nuclear proliferation," Rhodes said. Fresh government figures on the U.S. trade deficit could addurgency to Obama's efforts to seek greater export opportunities in China and other Asian countries .America's trade gap ballooned in September by 18.2 percent to $36.5 billion, according to U.S. Commerce Departmentfigures released in Washington on Friday. It was the largest monthly increase in more than 10 years and was driven both byhigher oil prices and a surge in imports from China. The import growth may reinforce U.S. concerns that China's currency is

    undervalued against the dollar, which U.S. manufacturers say gives Chinese companies an unfair trade advantage. Obama

    will also underscore the strength of Washington's alliance with Tokyo in the speech. On Friday, he and Japan'snew prime minister, Yukio Hatoyama, pledged to revitalise their strained security alliance as they adapt to a rising China, setto overtake Japan as the world's No. 2 economy.

    9

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    10/36

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    11/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Generic

    Renegotiating treaties like SOFAs to withdraw troops take large amounts of diplomatic capital

    because many parties have veto power.

    Meyer Fellow Institue for Global Conflict 2009 (Timothy, Public Policy and Nuclear Threats Fellow,Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation and the National Science Foundation; Ph.D., Jurisprudence and Social

    Policy, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., University of California, Berkeley School of Law, Fordham University

    School of Law Fordham International Law Journal, 32 Fordham Int'l L.J. 888, February 2009, SOFT LAW AS

    DELEGATION, Lexis)

    ... Binding international agreements (i.e., treaties) often exacerbate the difficulties with renegotiationbecause unless a treaty provides otherwise, every party to a treaty exercises a veto over amendments . ...Flexibility as a Device to Promote Agreement Other scholars have suggested that a variety of flexibility-enhancing devicesare available to states to promote agreement in situations in which the parties might otherwise be unable to reach anaccord. ... Because the rule prohibiting the transfer of X is not directly binding, perceptions about the relationship between

    the two rules may vary, which has the effect of reducing the reputational sanction for violating the soft law rule (because notall states will see a violation of the one as a violation of the other). ... Because states are likely to have ex ante expectations

    about who the first movers will be, establishing a soft law regime recognizes that the benefits to permitting thosestates to update legal rules over time outweighs the costs in terms of an opportunistic updating of suchrules, as well as opportunistic violations of the soft regime that could have been deterred by a hard regime. ... From anevolutionary standpoint, however, in which rules change over time to account for new conditions, flexibility can enhanceglobal welfare over time, holding expected levels of compliance constant, by permitting adjustment ofthe legal rules and expectations. ... However, the cost to the United States of trade sanctions from a minor tradingpartner may be small compared with the benefits of such a violation because of the relative importance of the tradingrelationship to each state. ... The U.S. sought to make India an exception to the NSG rules that transfers can only be made tonon-nuclear weapons states that have accepted safeguards on all of their nuclear operations (India, like the nuclear weaponsstates, would not put safeguards on its military nuclear operations). ... First, as an export control regime, PSI's purpose is to

    enforce international nonproliferation obligations by making it more difficult to acquire sensitive technology, material, andequipment. ... This increase in the supply of counterproliferation is a public good that in some measure offsets the cost toother states of accepting their less-preferred counterproliferation rules.

    11

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    12/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Military Change

    Military reforms and changes to our SQ policy require tons of diplomatic capital consultation

    and reviews will happen at all levels of government.

    The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 (QDR Report prepared for Congress, February 1, 2010)

    Part of the Departments obligation to defend and advance U.S. interests while taking care of our people is the imperative toreform how it does business. The Department is working to help build a whole-of-government approach to the provision ofsecurity assistance, improving our defense acquisition and logistics processes to better support our personnel in harms way,strengthening our technology and industrial bases to facilitate innovation, and crafting a strategic approach to climate and

    energy challenges. Given the complex security environment and the range of missions, capabilities, andinstitutional reforms necessary to protect and advance U.S. interests, the QDR highlights the importance ofrevitalizing defense relationships with allies and partners in key regions. An important element of revitalizing keyrelationships is the need to craft an approach to the U.S. defense posture that emphasizes cooperation with allies and partners

    and retailoring military forces, facilities, and defense agreements across regions. This QDR benefited from extensive

    engagement with key stakeholders. As the QDR generated insights and interim findings, these were sharedwith and reviewed by a wide range of experts, both within DoD and beyond. Over the course of the review,QDR staff consulted with and briefed congressional staff as well as representatives of allied and othergovernments. DoD officials also engaged with their counterparts elsewhere in the U.S. government tofurther the kind of integrated security approaches long advocated by the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of

    State. For example, Defense leaders and staff worked closely with the Departments of State and HomelandSecurity, as well as the Intelligence Community, as they undertook their Quadrennial Diplomacy andDevelopment Review, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, and Quadrennial Intelligence Community Reviewrespectively, sharing insights regarding analysis, key missions, capabilities, and plans in overlapping issue areas.

    12

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    13/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Japan

    Renegotiating the SOFA will be costly internal political struggles in Japan will prevent quick

    passage of the plan.

    Al Jazeera 10 (1 February 2010, US envoy to discuss Japan bases, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/02/20102133033203868.html)

    The US assistant secretary of state for East Asia is due to arrive in Tokyo on Monday for talks on the future ofAmerican military bases in Japan. Kurt Campbell's visit comes after thousands of people from across Japanjoined protests at the weekend against plans to relocate a US base on the southern island ofOkinawa. Some47,000 US troops are stationed in Japan, with more than half on the island. Local residents have long complained about noise,

    pollution and crime around the bases. In 2006, the two countries signed a pact that called for the realignmentof American troops in the country and for a marine base on the island to be moved to a less populatedarea. But the newly elected Japanese government is re-examining the deal, caught between increasingpublic opposition to US troops and its crucial military alliance with Washington. 'Cornerstone' allianceMizuho Fukushima, a cabinet minister, called for the removal of the US base [Reuters] Last month Campbell called on Japanto stick to the 2006 deal and relocate the US Futenma air base in Okinawa. In written testimony before a Senate ForeignRelations Committee subcommittee on January 21, Campbell said the alliance with Japan was a "cornerstone" of the USengagement in Asia. Campbell also reiterated Washington's desire to see that the US Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma be

    transferred to another area on the island by 2014. He said the US is assisting the Japanese government, led by primeminister Yukio Hatoyama, with its review of the Futenma relocation plan. Decision postponed However, Hatoyama hasrepeatedly postponed his decision on the pact, with members of his own government divided on how toproceed. Last week, he pledged to resolve the issue by May, just before national elections. But the issue is adifficult one for the prime minister to juggle, with members of his coalition government calling for allUS troops to leave Japan. At a rally against the base, Mizuho Fukushima, a minister in Hatoyama's cabinet, told a crowdprotesters that she wants to see the Okinawa base closed and US troops moved out of Japan entirely. Meanwhile,

    opposition to the US-Japan pact is growing louder, as thousands marched through central Tokyo onSaturday. Labor unionists, pacifists, environmentalists and students called for an end to the US troop presence. Theygathered for a rally at a park, under a banner that read "Change! Japan-U.S. Relations".

    13

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    14/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link South Korea

    Plan unpopular: Public wants US troops to stay until North Korea denuclearizes

    Cheon 09 [Seong-whun, Writer for the Korea Herald, Transfer of troop control: A Bush legacy,Korea Herald, 1/23/09, Acc. 6/24/10 through LexisNexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?

    docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T9622716431&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1

    &resultsUrlKey=29_T9622562285&cisb=22_T9622716436&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=158

    208&docNo=1]

    The South Korean public wasperplexed at the gushing of official reports and remarks from the United States.Some even think that Washington is ready to accept the DPRK as a nuclear state as long as it is notcommitted to proliferation. The vast majority of South Koreans don't question the authenticity of theprofessional judgment of the U.S. military. Their insufficient knowledge of the North Korean nuclear threat largelyresults from deliberate propaganda of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. They manufactured a false

    sense of peace and security while intentionally ignoring or making little of the nuclear threat. Still, South Koreansquestion whether it is right to implement the decision - the OPCON transfer and the CFC dissolution - atthis moment. Remembering that the United States saved their country from North Korean aggression and also is the onlyforeign country the ROK has ever fought for in the history of Korea, they question what the alliance is all about. Concerning

    the unpreparedness of the ROK military against a North Korean WMD attack, they ask, couldn't we postpone thedecision until at least denuclearization of North Korea is completed? The OPCON transfer and the CFCdissolution is not a simple military issue but a complicated matter where hard power and soft power are combined. Using softpower is the ability to attract the South Korean people to the American side. Successfully exercising soft power in thealliance means that the United States should win over South Koreans by paying careful attention to what they believe.Recently, there was an auspicious example in this regard. General Sharp sent USFK officials at Incheon Airport to receivethe remains of Kim Suk-im who died when an American jet fighter crashed into her San Diego home last December. He alsosent a delegation to express his condolences to the family of Kim. His decision is in full harmony with Korean culture and

    emotion, spreading quiet ripple effects on Korean society. We need to exercise similar wisdom. Simply because theNorth Korean military is most delighted to see the OPCON transfer and the CFC dissolution, thedecision is worthy of delay. We should not send any hint of a wrong signal to Kim Jong-il. That is priority number oneof the alliance at this juncture.

    14

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    15/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Iraq (1/2)

    Renegotiating the SOFA for a rapid withdrawal will demand large amounts of attention Allawi

    wants US troops to stay for legitimacy and will delay negotiations.

    Allawi, 10[Ayad, leader of the Iraqiya List, which finished first in votes in Iraqs national elections in March. Heserved as prime minister from 2004 to 2005., Editorial: How Iraq can fortify its fragile democracy, YaLibnan,

    http://www.yalibnan.com/2010/06/12/editorial-how-iraq-can-fortify-its-fragile-democracy/]

    Moreover, we hope that the United States and the United Nations will help bring Iraqs political blocs togetherto achieve a government in the national interest. I sincerely hope that the United States will remainactively engaged in Iraq, to help shield our fragile democracy from foreign interference and forces that wishto undermine democracy. Washington still has unrivaled leverage in Iraq, as well as a moral responsibilityto the Iraqi people whom it freed from tyranny to do all it can to deliver sustainable peace and stability. VicePresident Biden recently said that the United States was going to be able to keep our commitment toreduce troop levels in Iraq to 50,000 by this summer. While I have long supported the withdrawal of U.S.troops, Iraq cannot be allowed to revert to an unstable state of sectarian strife, dominated by regionalinfluences. Such an outcome would insult the tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians whose lives werestolen in terrorist attacks and the thousands of U.S. soldiers who sacrificed their lives; it would also putat risk every U.S. and international policy priority in the region the planned troop withdrawals, nuclearcontainment, a stable energy supply, even the chances of success in the Israeli-Palestinian issue

    15

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    16/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Iraq

    Renegotiating SOFAs for troop withdrawal requires considerable diplomatic capital Iraq

    proves.

    Lynch Professor Political Science 09(Marc, associate professor of political science and international affairs atGeorge Washington University , Bush's finest moment on Iraq: SOFA, not the surge, ForeignPolicy, 28

    January 2009, http://lynch.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/01/18/sofa_not_the_surge)

    Peter Beinart today bravely repeats the emerging would-be conventional wisdom. Rather than simply denounce everythingRepublican, he argues, Democrats should admit that the "surge" worked and -- uniquely echoing a thousand recent op-eds --was President Bush's finest moment. I have a hard time imagining anything as tedious as rehashing those tired debates fromthe campaign about the "surge" -- perhaps we could have another round of arguments as to whether the surge brigadesarriving in the spring of 2007 caused the Sunni turn against al-Qaeda in the fall of 2006? But in the interests of post-

    partisanship, I am willing to offer an alternative as Bush's finest hour in Iraq: the Status of Forces Agreement. Signing aStatus of Forces Agreement requiring the full withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Iraq on a fixed

    three year timeline demonstrated a real flexibility on Bush's part. It demonstrated apragmatism and willingnessto put the national interest ahead of partisanship that few of us believed he possessed. It is largely thanks to Bush's acceptanceof his own bargaining failure that Barack Obama will inherit a plausible route to successful disengagement from Iraq.Conservatives now like to claim the SOFA as a "Bush-negotiated" success. But Bush entered the SOFA negotiations looking

    for something entirely different than what emerged at the end. The U.S. went into the SOFA talks intent onobtaining legitimacy for a long-term military presence in Iraq once the Security Council mandate ended. Whennegotiations began, it was widely assumed that Bush would extract from the Iraqis an agreement which made the removal of

    U.S. troops entirely contingent upon American assessments of conditions on the ground. There were widespreaddiscussions of permanent U.S. bases and a Korea-style presence for generations, an assumption that the U.S. wouldretain a free hand in its operations, and an absolute rejection of an Obama-style timeline for withdrawal. But Iraqi leaders,to most everyone's surprise, took a hard line in the negotiations. Their toughline was encouraged by Iran, no doubt,as stressed by many frustrated American commentators. But it also reflected Iraqi domestic considerations, including

    several rounds of upcoming elections and an intensely strong popular Iraqi hostility to the U.S. occupation under any name.The Iraqis were also helped by the calender. As negotiations dragged on, the December 31 deadline loomed large,threatening to leave the U.S. troops without any legal mandate to remain in the country and forcing the hand of Americannegotiators. Finally, the Iraqi leaders clearly kept a careful eye on the American Presidential elections and used Obama'sstance to strengthen their own hand in negotiations. And here's where I will offer some sincere praise for Bush and his team.When the Iraqis insisted on an Obama-style timeline for U.S. withdrawal instead of a Bush/McCain- style conditions-basedaspirational time frame for U.S. withdrawal, he could have insisted on the latter. This would have fit with his administration'soften-repeated preferences. He could have continued to push for this conception closer to the December 31 deadline, playinghigh-stakes chicken at the expense of American military planning for the coming year and at the risk of the Iraqi political

    system not having adequate time to ratify the deal. But he didn't. To his credit, Bush agreed to the Obama-styletimeline for U.S. withdrawal. Granted, he hedged -- he didn't authorize Ambassador Ryan Crocker to sign off on the dealuntil after the Presidential election (on November 18). But at that point he bowed to the political realities in the U.S.

    and Iraq and agreed to a SOFA which far more closely matched Obama's avowed vision for Iraq --withdrawal of U.S. forces in three years, no permanent bases -- than his own. Thanks to this pragmatism, Obama can nowwork closely with the Iraqi government in managing the drawdown instead of spending his first months in office trying towriggle out of an unacceptable deal. And this, I might speculate, is among the reasons why Robert Gates will continue asSecretary of Defense. And thus I offer Bush's willingness to sign the SOFA mandating U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, and notthe surge, as his finest moment in Iraq.

    16

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    17/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Afghanistan

    Pulling troops out of Afghanistan will delay other priorities Afghanistan wants us to stay and

    will prolong negotiations

    Bowman 9 (Karlyn, War In Afghanistan, Forbes, 23 February, http://www.forbes.com/2009/02/21/war-afghanistan-troops-opinions-columnists_obama.html)

    Last week, President Barack Obama authorized sending another 17,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan to"stabilize a deteriorating situation." The deployment fell short of the 30,000 troops requested by General DavidMcKiernan, who heads the U.S. and NATO command there, but it was more than some of Obama's anti-war supporters

    would have liked. The president also ordered a review of policies in Afghanistan to be completed before April'sNATO summit, where he is expected to ask allies for more help. What does the public have to say about the situation inAfghanistan? Is public opinion turning against the "good" war? Can we expect help from our European allies? And what doAfghans have to say about conditions on the ground? U.S. support for the mission remains robust. Answering a PewResearch Center question from January, 64% of respondents said the U.S. made the right decision to use military force there,

    while 25% said the country had made the wrong decision. In January 2006, those responses were 69% and 20%, respectively.At the same time, however, views about how the war is going have deteriorated. In a March 2003 CBS News/New YorkTimes poll, 76% said it was going very or somewhat well for the U.S.; by August 2008, only 28% gave that response. In aDecember 2008 CNN/Opinion Research Corp. survey question, 36% said the U.S. was winning in Afghanistan; 60% said itwas not. In Pew's January 2009 poll, Americans were more positive about the military effort in Iraq than they were about thatin Afghanistan. Questions about troop levels asked by three major U.S. pollsters in mid January show that around one-thirdof Americans believe the U.S. should increase the number of troops in Afghanistan. In CBS News/New York Times andABC News/Washington Post polls, slightly fewer--28% and 29%, respectively--said the number should be decreased. InPew's poll, nearly half of Democrats surveyed (48%) wanted to reduce U.S. military presence. In Europe, the 2007Transatlantic Trends/German Marshall Fund survey found 64% of Europeans supported international reconstruction efforts inAfghanistan. When asked about conducting combat operations against the Taliban, just 30% of Europeans expressed support.In the same poll, 30% of Europeans agreed that "under some conditions, war is necessary to obtain justice." Comment OnThis Story In 2008, Transatlantic Trends found that more than 70% of respondents in the five European countries with themost troops in Afghanistan supported providing security for economic reconstruction projects and for helping to stemnarcotics production. They were less enthusiastic, though, about helping train the Afghan police forces or combat troops. Sowhen it comes to getting additional combat support from Europe, Obama's popularity on the continent is unlikely to trump its

    residents' pacifism. In its fourth survey of opinion of Afghans, ABC News, with the BBC and ARD German TV,found a sharp deterioration in views of Afghanistan's president, Hamid Karzai (83% deemed him excellent orgood in 2005; 52% do now), and the U.S. government (68% called it excellent or good in 2005; 32% do now). Fifty-eightpercent of Afghans said the greatest danger their country faces is the resurgence of the Taliban. (Drugtraffickers were a distant second, at 13%.) Sixty-three percent support the presence of U.S. military forces intheir country, a figure down from 78% in 2006. In another question, 18% of Afghans wanted to increase U.S. andNATO/ISAF troops in their country, while 44% wanted to cut the numbers. A strong plurality, in answer to another question,said coalition forces should withdraw only after security has been restored.

    17

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    18/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Turkey

    Hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons remain in NATO non-nuclear states, including Turkey, and

    Turkish officials have no plans to request the withdrawal.

    Sariibrahimolu 09(Lale, Turkey to face pressure over US nukes on its soil. Todays Zaman. 4/4/09).http://www.todayszaman.com/tz-web/detaylar.do?load=detay&link=174286&bolum=100

    According to the US-based Arms Control Association, under NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, an estimated 480tactical nuclear weapons remain deployed in five NATO non-nuclear-weapon states (Belgium, Germany, Italy,the Netherlands and Turkey) and in the United Kingdom, which also possesses an independent nuclear arsenal.Canada and Greece ended their participation in nuclear sharing. At this stage Turkish diplomatic sources decline to commenton what Ankara's policy will be if NATO presses and finally agrees on a unanimous decision to withdraw the weapons from

    Turkish soil, too. But Mustafa Kibarolu, an associate professor at Ankara's Bilkent University and an expert onarms control issues, told Today's Zaman that Turkish decision makers, i.e.,both the political and the militaryleadership, are for maintaining those weapons on Turkish soil to continue their deterrence capabilities inthe region, which includes the Balkans, the Middle East and the Mediterranean. Second, Turkey sees the US as thebackbone of deterrence in the region and does not favor the idea of scrapping the nukes from its soil.Kibarolu, in an article he had published by the Routledge publishing house in December 2005 under the headline "Isn't itTime to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?," gives an in-depth analysis of the rationale behind the Turkish reluctance over theidea to scrap US nukes on its territory. Kibarolu states in his article that the attitude of Turkish officials toward US nuclearweapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on theirthreat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey.

    18

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    19/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    __________________

    ***Internal Links***

    19

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    20/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Plan Cost

    The plan would have to be spun to control perceptions this requires extensive diplomatic focus.

    The Quadrennial Defense Review in 2010 (QDR Report prepared for Congress, February 1, 2010)

    As part of the U.S. government's integrated civilian-military efforts to interact effectively with a variety of audiences andstakeholders, DoD will continue to improve key capabilities that support strategic communication. Effective strategic

    communication requires close collaboration across interagency lines at all stages, and DoD worksparticularly closely with the Department of State to support States core role in communicating withforeign governments and international publics. Effective strategic communication also requires theorchestration of multiple lines of operation. Chief among these are policy implementation, forceemployment, information operations, public affairs, civil affairs, and public diplomacy and engagement. Together,the effects of these activities support national objectives. Strategic communication is essential in COIN, CT, andstability operations, where population and stakeholderbeliefs and perceptions are crucial to our success, and

    where adversaries often enjoy the advantage of greater local knowledge and calibrate their activities to achieve sophisticatedinformation objectives.

    20

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    21/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Internal Diplomatic Capital Key North Korean Conflict

    Diplomatic capital key to prevent north Korean conflict

    Korea Times 6 (Nuke Talks to Be Held by Middle of December, http://translate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=ko&u=http://news.empas.com/print.tsp/20061114n09299/&sa=X&oi=translate&resnum=1&ct=result&prev

    =/search%3Fq%3D%2522In%2Ba%2Brelated%2Bdevelopment,%2BChun%2Bconfirmed%2Bthat%26hl%3Den

    %26client%3Dfirefox-a%26rls%3Dorg.mozilla:en-US:official%26hs%3DkyJ, 11 April 2006)

    In a related development, Chun confirmed that diplomats from the two Koreas recently met in New York toexchange''`` valuable opinions on the six-party talks that have been stalled over the past year. ``When thetalks are resumed, it's important to confirm the North's intention to scrap its nuclear programs ,'' Chun said. `` Ithink the United States is ready to go ahead with the talks sincerely if the North's sincerity toward thetalks is confirmed.'' Wi Sung-lac, minister for political affairs at the South Korean Embassy in Washington, met withKim Myong-kil, who recently replaced Han Song-ryol as North Korea's deputy chief to its UN mission. Chun also said hedoes not expect Washington's new North Korea policy coordinator, who is set to be named next month, tohave a `` big impact'' on the talks, underlining that what's more important is how much Washington isdetermined to invest ` `''diplomatic capital to resolve the nuclear standoff.

    21

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    22/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Asian Stability

    The United States should use its diplomatic capital to show that it supports countries in the Asia-

    Pacific region.

    Cossa 2009(Ralph, President of the Pacific Forum Center for Strategic and International Studies**, The UnitedStates and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration,

    http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/issuesinsights_v09n01.pdf)

    The United States should invest diplomatic capital to counter perceptions of U.S. indifference towardAsian multilateral institutions. This involves more than just showing up. Multilateral initiatives, including the U.S.-ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Enhanced Partnership and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Asia-

    Pacific should be revalidated and expanded. The United States also needs to more clearly articulate its supportfor the East Asia community-building process in general and the East Asia Summit in particular.Washington must work more actively toward rapprochement and enhanced cooperation among the threedominant states of the Asia-Pacific region: China, Japan, and the United States. There should also be moredurable and entrenched cooperation and trust between two of Asias great democracies, Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan.

    Reinvigoration of high-level U.S.- Japan-ROK talks should be a high priority.

    22

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    23/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Israel/Palestine War (1/3)

    Obama must use his diplomatic capital to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict.

    Vicenzino 8(Marco, Analysis: Obamas Foreign Policy Challenges, Foreign Policy Association, Global StrategyProject, 6 November 2008, http://globalstrategyproject.org/?page_id=244)

    On Israel-Palestine, the President-elect Obama must not repeat the actions of his predecessors, Presidents Bushand Clinton, who both attempted to resolve a decades-old conflict in less than a year of their respectivepresidencies. President-elect Obama must use his new diplomatic capital to guide both sides toward a finalagreement. Obviously, the outcome of Israels election in early 2009 is crucial to this process as is dealing with thedivisions in the Palestinian leadership. Since America plays an essential role in the resolution of this conflict and massive

    U.S. taxpayer dollars go to this region, the President-elect must engage ordinary Americans on this issue andexplain clearly and unequivocally whats at stake for America and highlight the realities, needs and grievances ofboth Israelis and Palestinians.

    23

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    24/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Israel/Palestine War (2/3)

    Obama needs to jump headfirst into the Middle East peacemaking process the groundwork has

    already been laid.

    Ben-Meir PhD IR Oxford 09(Alon, professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU.He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies, NEGOTIATING AN ISRAELI-

    PALESTINIAN BREAKTHROUGH, 2 February 2009, http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:n8seUc-

    KUEAJ:www.alonben-meir.com/uploads/essays/Negotiating_an_Israeli-

    Palestinian_Breakthrough.pdf+diplomatic+capital+currency+obama+middle+east+israel+palestine+unify!

    +diplomacy!&hl=en&gl=us&pid=bl&srcid=ADGEESj9SGgBZP1LXGP4EeQFHFELR4m4XcEd-

    QtlIwzdKuUEG4Y8knkBsU0ecPlsGc8dNiiuoA3FPQNyBPMAqS0PUp3Qio9yBoyN8l4lS_WJaS2iwGc7BeXkylwjBkK

    PyYr-gBpSYWD1&sig=AHIEtbSxrBpjrjFFwS9QDB81BwXpCOvIbQ)

    Fourth, the prospect of the Obama administration offers another momentous opportunity to change thegeopolitical dynamics of the Middle East in a way that can accelerate regional peacemaking. As the

    United States turns to repair its reputation and its dangerously low esteem in the region, it must first make adetermined effort to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Unlike the Bush administration which largely left theIsraelis and Palestinians to their own devices, the Obama team seems to be fully cognizant of the need for theUnited States to interject itself immediately into the peace process, as Mitchell is already preparing his secondtrip to the region. America is the only nation that has the sway on both sides to induce the necessary Israeli and Palestinianconcessions vital to arriving at a peace agreement. To that end, there are a number of essential strategic steps andrequirements that the United States must pursue simultaneously. Immediate and direct involvement Unlike Presidents Clinton

    and Bush who plunged into the Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking only during the final year their administrations, PresidentObama should tackle this conflict head-on during his first few months in office . Although no majorbreakthrough was achieved by the two previous administrations, a significant progress nevertheless was made fromwhich a framework for a peace based on a two-state solution has emerged. The existence of rejectionistelements among the Israelis and the Palestinians who are hard at work to undermine the peace process makes it doubly urgent

    not to allow a vacuum in the peace negotiations. Whether it is the Clinton Parameters or the Road Map, the Obamaadministration is inheriting a clear formula for peace that can be pieced together provided a determinedeffort is made and unabated momentum is kept. To succeed, the United States must become actively anddirectly involved and remain relentless in the pursuit of a peace agreement which both Israelis andPalestinians can accept and build upon.

    24

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    25/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Internal Diplomatic Capital Key Israel/Palestine War (3/3)

    American diplomacy should be spend focusing on creating a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian

    conflict.

    ATFP 2009(The American Task Force on Palestine**, The Obama Administration and the Unavoidable Issue ofPalestine, February 5, 2009, http://www.americantaskforce.org/policy_and_analysis/policy_focus/2009/02/05/12355

    93351_3)

    While it is important to keep permanent status negotiations going, and while it is essential that the incoming Administration

    strongly reaffirm its unwavering commitment to a two-state solution by word and deed, the initial bulk of theAmerican diplomatic focus should shift towards improving conditions, both on the ground anddiplomatically. Such improvements would facilitate creating conditions in which a peace deal can, infact, be realized. This would require maintaining, stepping up and fine-tuning the ongoing efforts in the economic andsecurity spheres, in addition to pushing for a settlement freeze and working with the Arab world to develop the potential ofthe Arab Peace Initiative (API). It must be emphasized that such measures on the ground important as they may be are

    not sustainable nor are they fully realizable if the overall political environment is not changed . Specifically, as long asthe occupation remains in place, economic and security progress will be stunted. This, however, shouldnot be an excuse for not developing these areas within the context of a viable political and diplomaticprocess.

    25

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    26/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    _____________

    ***Impacts***

    26

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    27/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Impact North Korean Conflict

    North Korean war causes extinction.

    Hayes and Hamel-Green 2009Peter, Professor of International Relations, RMIT University, Melbourne; andDirector, Nautilus Institute, San Francisco, and Michael, Dean of and Professor in the Faculty of Arts, Education and

    Human Development, Victoria University, Melbourne, The Path Not Taken, The Way Still Open: Denuclearizing

    The Korean Peninsula And Northeast Asia, The Asia-Pacific Journal, 50-1-09, December 14,

    http://japanfocus.org/articles/print_article/3267

    Korea and Northeast Asia are instances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear usearguably have increased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threatprojection against the DPRK as part of a general program of coercive diplomacy in this region,North Koreasnuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns overChinas increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US extended

    deterrence (nuclear umbrella) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection . The consequences of failing to

    address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and related political andeconomic issues, are serious , not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole internationalcommunity. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack , whether by intention, miscalculation, ormerely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities . On the Korean Peninsula itself,key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles . The whole of Japan is likely to comewithin North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border)

    11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust ofunprecedented proportions . But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. New researchindicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quicklythan global warming . Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is,individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease

    in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westbergs view: That is not global winter, butthe nuclear darknesswill cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over thecontinents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also followThe period of nucleardarkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of people will die fromhungerTo make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earths protective ozone.4These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on

    a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts , and thefollow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the presentglobal financial crisis pale by comparison . How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons statesrespond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regime s. There could be manyunanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships 5, with subsequent nuclear breakoutand geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control over fissile material or warheads in the

    chaos of nuclear war , and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving otherpotential proliferant states .The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration fromthe international community. North Korea is currently believed to have sufficient plutonium stocks to produce up to 12nuclear weapons.6 If and when it is successful in implementing a uranium enrichment program - having announced publiclythat it is experimenting with enrichment technology on September 4, 20097 in a communication with the UN Security

    Council - it would likely acquire the capacity to produce over 100 such weapons. Although some may dismiss KoreanPeninsula proliferation risks on the assumption that the North Korean regime will implode as a result ofits own economic problems, food problems, and treatment of its own populace, there is little to suggestthat this is imminent. If this were to happen, there would be the risk of nuclear weapons falling into

    27

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    28/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    hands of non-state actors in the disorder and chaos that would ensue.

    28

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    29/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Impact Asian StabilityAsian Instability Risks A Big Nuclear War

    Paul KENNEDY, Professor, History, Yale University, 21st CenturyDialogues on the Future/Globalizations Sway

    in Evolution fo States Put in Focus, THE DAILY YOMIURI, January 10, 2000, p. 1.

    Kennedy: I do not think that we should discuss only positive aspects of globalization. Today, there is an arms race going

    among many Asian countries. There is also a nationalist passion at work in the region. All this comes withincredible pressure in the form of environmental problems, population growth and ethnic violence. Thismight well mean that some nuclear weapons could be let off in Asia, while a very big war could occur inthe area by 2010 or 2015.

    29

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    30/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    ________________

    ***Aff Answers***

    30

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    31/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Uniqueness Dip Cap Low Iraq

    For the past seven years the US has been bleeding diplomatic capital in Iraq, which has caused

    other countries to build their nuclear arsenals.

    Atal 2003(Subodh, Washington independent foreign affairs analyst**, The War on Terror: Two Years Hence,September 11, 2003, Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3235)

    The international consensus on the war on terror has been replaced by acrimony over Iraq, and counter-balancing moves by other nations. Russia continues to support the Iranian nuclear program. With theUnited States preoccupied in Iraq and burning considerable diplomatic capital in the process, NorthKorea was free to begin processing nuclear fuel and is now in a much stronger position to negotiate .China's interests in a nuclear-free Korean peninsula have been overridden by a need to counter regionalUS influence. India, smarting from American coddling of Pakistani President Musharraf, is making overtures to China andhas refused to help in Iraq.

    31

    http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3235http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=3235
  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    32/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Uniqueness Dip Cap Low BushThere is low diplomatic capital now because of President Bushs mistakes.

    Patel 2007(Nirav, Fellow at the Center for a new American Security**, North Korea: The unsung success, AsiaTimes Newspaper**, July 19, 2007,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IG19Dg01.html)

    Pundits from the left and right ends of the political spectrum have lambasted Bush's foreign policy forundermining international security and ushering in an era of preventive war and global instability.Bush's foreign-policy blunders have generated tremendous international condemnation that negativelyimpacts America's diplomatic capital. This is highlighted by Russian President Vladimir Putin'sprovocative comments toward the United States, Iran's saber-rattling, and numerous countries' decisionsto question and back away from US security and economic assistance . If this is the case. why is North Koreaseriously engaging the US and international community to pursue steps toward nuclear disarmament?

    32

    http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IG19Dg01.htmlhttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IG19Dg01.htmlhttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/IG19Dg01.html
  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    33/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Uniqueness Dip Cap Low Obama Failure

    Obama has failed in international diplomacy.

    The Washington Times 2010(Obamas diplomatic flop, June 10, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/10/obamas-diplomatic-flop/)

    Talk is cheap, but true diplomacy is difficult. Mr. Obama has been coasting on the initial burst of public acclaimhe received when he entered office. As time passes, he is finding it hard to deliver on the promiseddiplomatic achievements he thought he could secure by charisma alone. It turns out that global politics ismore complex than it once seemed on the campaign trail. Perhaps the president should take a trip to Dallas to pickup a few pointers from Mr. Bush about how to rally the world behind the policies that are in America's best interests.

    33

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    34/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Uniqueness Dip Cap Low Obama Squandering

    President Obama is destroying the diplomatic capital that America had during the Bush

    Administration.

    The Washington Times 2010(Obamas diplomatic flop, June 10, 2010, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jun/10/obamas-diplomatic-flop/)

    During the campaign, then-Sen. Barack Obama made light of what he saw as his predecessor-to-be's lack of diplomatic skill.

    As Wednesday's U.N. Security Council vote on sanctions over Iran's nuclear program showed , Mr. Obama's team couldlearn a few things about diplomacy from George W. Bush. The vote sent "an unmistakable message" toIran about the international community's commitment to stop nuclear proliferation, according to theWhite House. The vote tally also communicated a secondary point: President Obama is losing the internationalconsensus that Mr. Bush once had. In three rounds of Bush-led U.N. votes on sanctions from 2006through 2008, there were no negative votes and only one abstention, from Indonesia. By contrast, theresolution Mr. Obama spearheaded was met with two "no" votes, from Turkey and Brazil, and oneabstention, from Lebanon. This is a very poor showing, especially given Mr. Obama's smugness abouthis ability to improve America's image before the world.

    34

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    35/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link No Link Tradeoff

    Diplomatic capital doesnt trade off the state department can collaborate and hire more people

    to avoid any tradeoff.

    GAO 2003 (Government Accountability Office, U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts butFaces Significant Challenges: GAO-03-951., 4 September 2003, GAO-03-951, EBSCO)

    To improve the planning, coordination, execution, and assessment ofU.S. public diplomacy efforts, we recommendthat the Secretary ofState develop and widely disseminate throughout the department a strategy that considers thetechniques of private sector public relations firms in integrating all of States public diplomacy efforts and directing them

    toward achieving common and measurable objectives; consider ways to collaborate with the private sectorto employbest practices for measuring efforts to inform and influence target audiences, including expanded use of opinion research and

    better use of existing research; designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs sections toreduce the administrative burden; strengthen efforts to train Foreign Service officers in foreignlanguages; and program adequate time forpublic diplomacy training into States assignment process.

    35

  • 7/29/2019 CNDI Diplomatic Focus Tradeoff DA

    36/36

    Berkeley 2009

    Diplomatic Focus DA

    Shackelford/Lazarevic

    Link Link Turn South Korea K Aff

    Link Turn: US focus should shift from military power and towards gender policy. Such a change

    would significantly increase diplomatic capital.

    Culpepper 2010(Brenton, Lawyer and writer in the Vanderbilt Law School Journal of Transnational Law**,Congresss Attempted Response to the Worlds Demand for the Violence Against Women Act, The Vanderbilt

    Journal of Transnational Law, LexisNexis, May 2010, http://web.lexis-nexis.com/scholastic/document?_m

    =235f2b6f28fe5116dc52324e38ebfe4c&_docnum=1&wchp=dGLzVlz-zSkVk&_md5=bcef5cca117ffa071d3621

    bd40b67ba6)

    Congressional activism on gender policy provides an avenue for shifting the image of the U.S. from oneof military hard power to a moral and diplomatic leader. 113 This shift increases U.S. diplomatic capital,which can - in much the same way a President spends political capital to achieve policy objectives onCapitol Hill - translate into success for U.S. foreign policy goals. 114 Credibility in one human [*749]rights arena (e.g. gender equality) often serves to enhance credibility in an unrelated human rights arena (e.g.

    child labor). 115 Professor Joseph Nye describes the above phenomenon as "soft power": "Soft poweris the abilityto get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments." 116 Nye argues that "whenAmerican policies lose their legitimacy and credibility in the eyes of others, attitudes of distrust tend tofester and further reduce our leverage." 117 "Problems arise for our soft power when we do not live up to our ownstandards," including international standards to which the United States committed. 118 Areas of legal and moralcontradiction, such as those present in gender policy, create the loss of the legitimacy and credibility necessary to build softpower. 119 Readers should be cautious not to overestimate the value of U.S. credibility on gender equality issues. Certainly,this Note does not mean to suggest that if Congress passes legislation that addresses gender problems in America, all of thedamage currently spanning the U.S. moral ethos would dissipate. However, "soft power grows out of our culture, out of ourdomestic values and policies," and reclaiming legitimacy by addressing domestic gender-motivated violence as a humanrights issue can communicate this cultural value. 120 In particular, Congressional legislation serves the dual purpose ofrestoring the U.S. image as a champion of gender equality as well as signaling that Congress takes its responsibility for

    fulfilling international human rights obligations seriously. In this way, gender legislation advances U.S soft power interests.