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UN ITE ST TES RMY IN WORL W R II

The War Department

STR TEGIC PL NNING FOR

CO LITION W RF RE

1941 1942

byMauric e Matloif

and



Preface

This volume is a contribution to the study of national planning in the fieldof military strategy. National planning in this field extends from the simplestatement of risks and choices to the full analysis of an immense undertaking.Strategic decisions are rarely made and military operations are rarely conductedprecisely in the terms worked out by the planning staffs in the national capital.But the planning, which may at times seem superficial and futile even to thestaffs, is the principal instrument by which political leadership arrives at anaccommodation between the compulsions of politics and the realities of war,exercises control over military operations, and allocates the means necessary tosupport them.

This volume is the history of plans affecting the missions and dispositions ofthe U. S. Army during the early part of World War II, when it was quite un-certain how the military planning of the United States would be brought intokeeping with the requirements of a w orld-wide war between two coalitions. The

volume deals briefly with the joint war plans of the Army and Navy up to thefall of 1938, when the planners first explicitly took into account the possibilitythat the United States might be drawn into a war of this kind. From the fallof 1938, it follows the story of plans, as they directly concerned the Army, untilthe beginning of 1943. From that point in World War II, conveniently markedby the Casablanca Conference in January 1943, the role of the Army in strategic

l h d ll b h f h



by Dr. Ray S. Cline. The Operations Division represented the Chief of Staff ofthe U. S. Army in national and international planning for military operations inWorld War II, and the history of the plans and operations is interwoven with thehistory of that division. Dr. Cline undertook to write the history of the divisionitself, in a volume published in this series, with the title: Washington CommandPost: The Operations Division. The study of the plans and their execution,continued and amplified by his former associates, became the basis of the presentwork.

The text of this volume was drafted in two main sections, one tracing theconflicts in plans for the employment of U. S. Army forces, from their appearanceto their first resolution in 1942 (Snell), and the other dealing with the primaryeffects of the resolution of these conflicts on plans for carrying the war to theenemy (Matloff). In the process the authors drew on each other's ideas, basicresearch, and writing. Each of the authors worked at length on the volume as

a whole, one in the course of original planning and composition (Snel l) , and theother in the course of final preparation and revision (Matloff). The text as itstands represents a joint responsibility.

The present volume owes a great deal to Dr. Cline, and to Lt. Col. DarrieH. Richards, who worked on the project as associate historian for more than twoyears. Both contributed in many ways to the general stock of ideas and infor-mation that the authors had in mind in undertaking this volume and left the

authors several fully documented studies in manuscript. This volume drawson Dr. Cline's studies of staff work on strategy in the early months of the war,and the authors have made extensive use of a narrative by Colonel Richards thatfollows the history of strategy in the Pacific into midwar.

In writing and rewriting the text, the authors had the help of Mrs. EvelynCooper, who assembled and analyzed much of the statistical information used,



The authors are greatly obliged to several other members of the Office of theChief of Military History—to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian ofthe Office and the first and most attentive critic of this volume, who suggested agreat many improvements; to Cols. John M. Kemper, Allison R. Hartman, andEdward M. Harris, who early interested themselves in this work; to Cols. ThomasJ. Sands and George G. O'Connor, who were helpful in the final stages of thework; to Dr. Stetson Conn, Acting Chief Historian in the summer of 1949 duringDr. Greenfield's absence, and Dr. Louis Morton (Acting Deputy Chief His-torian), who encouraged this work; and to Drs. Richard M. Leighton and RobertW. Coakley, for their special knowledge. Dr. Conn gave many valuable sug-gestions in the final revision of the manuscript.

We are also obliged to Miss Mary Ann Bacon, who gave the volume a thought-ful an d watchful final editing. The pictures were selected by Capt. KennethE. Hunter; the outline maps were prepared by Mr. Wsevolod Aglaimoff Copy

editing was done by Mr. Ronald Sher, indexing by Mrs. Bailey, and the pains-taking job of final typing for the printer by Mrs. Ablahat and Miss Norma E.Faust.

The authors are also obliged to those others that read all or parts of the textin manuscript—to Capt. Tracy B. Kittredge, USNR, and Lt. Grace PersonsHayes, USN, of the Historical Section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; to Dr. WesleyF. Craven of Princeton University, co-editor of the series, THE ARMY AIR

FORCES IN WORLD WAR II; to Professors William L. Langer and SamuelEliot Morison of Harvard University; to Brig. Gen. Frank N. Roberts, Cols.William W. Bessell, Jr., and George A. Lincoln, and Lt. Col. William H. Baumer;and to other officers that figured, some of them conspicuously, in the eventsrecounted in the pages that follow.

MAURICE MATLOFFEDWIN M



Contents

Chapter

I . THE WAR PLANS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Th e Study o f War with Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1Alternatives i n a World W a r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4Allied Operations i n t he Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

II. GERMAN VICTORIES AND AMERICAN PLANS: MAY 1940-JANUARY 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

Planning fo r th e Worst . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2T h e Planners Overruled . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3British Strategy a n d American Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1

III. BRITISH-AMERICAN PLANS: JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1941 . 32T h e Terms o f Reference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2T h e Washington Conversations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4Rainbow 5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 3T h e First Difficulties over Troop Movements . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8Introduction t o Grand Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 1

IV. THE SHOWDOWN WITH JAPAN: AUGUST-DECEMBER1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3

T h e Singapore Conversations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 5Reinforcement o f t h e Philippines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 7



Chapter Page

VI. ARMY DEPLOYMENT AND THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN:DECEMBER 1941-MARCH 1942—ContinuedLoss of Malaya, Fall of Singapore, and Ground Force Dispositions ... 126The Decision to Send the 41st Division to Australia . . . . . . . . 128The Isolation o f Java and Air Force Dispositions . . . . . . . . . 131A i r Commitments i n Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3 8T h e Siberia Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4 2

VII. ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC AND GRANDSTRATEGY: JANUARY-MARCH 1942 . . . . . . . . 1 4 7

Army Deployment in the Atlantic: January—February 1942 . . . . . . 147Deployment Hawaii-Australia: January-March 1942 . . . . . . . 1 4 8T h e Question o f Additional Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 4T h e Eisenhower Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 6Joint Study o f Priorities f o r Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 9J C S Decision o n Deployment Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 1Strategic Deployment in the Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 2Strategic Responsibility and Command in the Pacific . . . . . . . . 1 6 4

VIII. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRATION IN THE BRITISHISLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 4

T h e Cancellation o f Super-Gymnast . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 5

T h e Washington Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 7T h e Bolero Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 0

IX . PRIOR CLAIMS VERSUS BOLERO: APRIL 1942 . . . . . . 198T h e Defense o f the Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 8Anglo-American Collaboration and the Support of China . . . . . . . 202T h S i L d L P 2 0 5



Chapter Page

XII. THE ELIMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES: JULY-AUGUST 1942—Continued

The President o n th e Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 3Roundup o r Torch: CCS 9 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 7 9Th e Decision T o Invade French North Africa . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 2T h e Time a n d T h e Place . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 4

XIII. T H E

INTERPRETATION O F C C S 9 4 :

AUGUST 1942 . . . . 2 9 4T h e Final Decision on Torch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 4

CCS 94 and the Arcadia Statement of Grand Strategy . . . . . . . . 295T h e Middle East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 7T h e Pacific . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 9 8

XIV. COUNTING THE COSTS OF TORCH: AUGUST-NOVEMBER1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 7

T h e Order o f Priorities fo r Shipping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 0 8Allotment and Preparation of Ground Troops . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 13Provision o f A i r Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 1 8Effects o n Plans fo r a Cross-Channel Operation . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 2

XV. BRITISH AND AMERICAN PLANS AND SOVIETEXPECTATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 8

T h e Caucasus Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2 9The Persian Gulf Service Command . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 6A i r Collaboration i n Alaska a n d Siberia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 9Soviet Plane Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 6Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 8

XVI. STRATEGIC INVENTORY: DECEMBER 1942 . . . . . . . . 3 5 0



Appendix—Continued Page

E. Geographic Distribution of Army Strength in Overseas Theaters—Early December 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 9

F. Shipment o f Divisions—1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392G. Dead-Weight Tonnage of Vessels under Army Control in Pacific and

Atlantic Areas from November 1941 through December 1942 . . . 396

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES . . . . . 397

GLOSSARY O F ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 0GLOSSARY O F CODE NAMES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 5

INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 9

IllustrationsAboard the H. M. S. Prince of Wales during the Atlantic Conference . . . . . 54Members of the War Department General Staff and the War Plans Division,

November 1941 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 7Draft Memorandum fo r the President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89The Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110Chief of War Plans Division and His Deputies, January 1942 . . . . . . . 116War Plans Division, March 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 7General Marshall and War Department Chiefs . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184Memorandum from the President, 6 May 1942 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220Churchill at Parachute Troop Demonstration, June 1942 . . . . . . . . 241Alternate Sets of Suggestions in the President's Handwriting 274



STRATEGIC PLANNING FORCOALITION WARFARE

1941-1942



CHAPTER I

The War Plans

During the years between the end ofWorld War I and the beginning of WorldWar II there were always a few officers atwork in Washington on the war plans of theArmy and Navy. It was the duty of these

officers to study situations that could sud-denly arise in which the federal governmentmight resort to the use of armed force, andto propose the courses of action that theservices should be ready to take. From timeto time the War or Navy Department ap-proved one of these studies as a war plan to

guide the special plans and preparations oftheir staffs and operating commands. Sev-eral war plans were prepared jointly and ap-proved by both departments for the com-mon use of the Army and Navy.

During these years national policy was

D. Roosevelt became more and more anx-ious over the diplomatic and military weak-nesses of the United States. But it was notuntil the summer of 1939 that he took offi-cial notice of the joint war plans of the Army

and Navy. The planners had just finisheda study of the situations in which the UnitedStates might enter a war begun by Germanyand Japan. By the outbreak of W orld WarII in September 1939, the Army and Navywere hard at work on their first strategicplan for coalition warfare, on the hypo-

thesis that the United States would join theEuropean colonial powers in defendingtheir common interests in the western Pa-cific against attack by Japan.

The Study of War With Japan



STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

States, and the withdrawal of the UnitedStates f rom its temporarily close associationwith the European colonial powers. In thePacific the Japanese had strengthened theirposition early in World War I by taking the

Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls. J ap -anese control of these strategically locatedislands was confirmed in 1920 by a mandatefrom the League of Nations. After theWashington naval treaty of 1922, the UnitedStates began to fall behind Japan in theconstruction of new naval vessels.

The Army and Navy watched with grow-ing anxiety during the 1930's as Japan ac-quired control of Manchuria, seized strate-gic points on the north China coast, and for-bade access to the mandated islands. TheJapanese Government acted with growing

confidence, in the belief that the UnitedStates, the Soviet Union, and the Europeancolonial powers were not likely to take con-certed action against its expansion. In 1933the Japanese Government exhibited thisconfidence by withdrawing from th e League

lines, to establish "a secure line of commu-nications to the Western Pacific." l Theplanners then faced the question of whetherthe makers of national policy meant to runthe risk and incur the obligation of engaging

in such a war. The State Department hadnot relaxed its opposition to Japanese ex-pansion on the Asiatic continent. This op-position, for which there was a good deal ofpopular support, involved an ever-presentrisk of armed conflict.

After the passage of the Philippine Inde-pendence Act (Tydings-McDuffie bill) in1934, the belief gained ground in the WarDepartment that the United States shouldnot run the risk no r incur the obligation offighting the Japanese in the western Pacific.When the question finally came up in the

fall of 1935, the Army planners took theposition that the United States should nolonger remain liable for a fruitless attemptto defend and relieve the Philippines and thecostly attempt to retake them. The seniorArmy planner Brig Gen Stanley D Em-




Alternatives in a World War

The rising danger of war with Japan wasin keeping with the growing insecurity of allinternational relations during the 1930's.

Every nation with which the United Stateshad extensive political and economic rela-tions was affected by the prolonged eco-nomic crisis of the 1930's and by its socialand political consequences. In Europe theprincipal phenomena were the renascenceof German military power and aims under

the National Socialist Party and the pas-sivity of the British and French Govern-ments, paralyzed by conflicts in domesticpolitics, in the face of the new danger.

In 1938 the American military staff ex-tended the scope of war planning to takeaccount of the reassertion of German im-

perial aims. The immediate cause wasthe German demand made on Czechoslo-vakia in September 1938 for the cession ofa strip of territory along the border. Thearea contained a large German-speakingminority, among whom the Nazis had re-

nent—an evident objective of German do-mestic and foreign policy since Hitler's ac-cession to power in 1933. After consolidat-ing his power at home, Hitler had acceler-ated German rearmament, reintroduced

military conscription, and remilitarized theRhineland. Thereafter, by forming an al-liance with Italy (already dedicated to aprogram of tyranny, autarchy, chauvinism,and conquest), and by intervening in Spainand absorbing Austria, he had greatlystrengthened the German position and

weakened the British and French position inCentral Europe and the Mediterranean.To complement these military measures hehad sought to neutralize opposition abroadby subsidizing parallel political movements,propaganda, and treason and by negotiat-ing bilateral trade arrangements and cartelagreements.

The British and French Governments,weighing the value of the French alliancewith Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Unionagainst their own unpreparedness, militaryand political had an extremely hard deci-



6 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

France would give Germany the necessaryassurances or that Japan would decide toattack. They nevertheless believed that thekind of problem posed—resulting f rom con-certed aggression by Germany, Italy, andJapan—was one that should be taken intoaccount in fu ture planning, and recom-mended steps to be taken "to overcome sa-lient deficiencies in our readiness to under-take the operations that might be re-quired." 8

This study having been approved by theJoint Board, the planners proceeded to dis-tinguish the principal courses o f action opento the United States as a belligerent in thecrises that seemed most likely to develop outof future German an d Japanese moves andthe delayed responses thereto in Americanforeign and domestic policy. They pro-

posed to assume that to begin with "theDemocratic Powers of Europe as well as theLatin American States" would be neutral.But they also proposed to set forth in eachsituation that might arise "the specific co-operation that should be sought" from these

were called ORANGE). The most limitedplan ( RAINBOW 1) would provide for thedefense of the Western Hemisphere south tothe bulge of Brazil (10° south latitude) —the Western Hemisphere being taken to in-clude Greenland (but not Iceland, theAzores, or the Cape Verde Islands) to theeast, and American Samoa, Hawaii, andWake (but not Guam or the Philippines)to the west. Two other plans would pro-vide alternatively for the extension ofoperations from this area either to thewestern Pacific ( RAINBOW 2) or to the restof South America (RAINBOW 3). Thedirective also called for modification of thefirst three plans under the contingency(RAINBOW 4) that Great Britain andFrance were at war with Germany and Italy(and possibly Japan), in which case it was

assumed that the United States would beinvolved as a major participant. 10

After a few weeks' work under theseterms of reference, the Joint Planning Com-mittee concluded that the requirementsunder this fourth contingency were "so dif-



THE WAR PLANS 7

Marquesas, Societies, Samoa, and PhoenixIslands, as well as the extensive English andFrench possessions in the Western Pacific, andthe United States possessions in the Pacific.

The committee therefore recommended thatin addition to the three plans against the

contingency of a war with Germany, Italy,and Japan, two plans, rather than one,should be drawn up to cover a war in whichnot only the United States but also GreatBritain and France were involved againstthat coalition.

One plan should provide for a large-scale American effort against Germany; theother for a large-scale American effortagainst Japan. The committee stated thesetwo cases as follows:

The United States, England, and Franceopposed to Germany, Italy, and Japan, withthe United States providing maximum par-

ticipation, in particular as regards armies inEurope.

The United States, England, and Franceopposed to Germany, Italy, and Japan, withthe United States NOT providing maximumparticipation in continental Europe, butmaintaining the Monroe Doctrine and carry-

war, and in doing so should clarify the pos-sible or probable war task that would be in-volved. 11

On 30 June 1939 the Joint Board ap-proved the recommended changes, includ-ing the recommended change in order of

priority.12

The revised description of theRainbow plans, as approved, read as fol-lows:

a. Joint Army and Navy Basic War PlanRainbow No. 1:

Prevent the violation of the letter or spiritof the Monroe Doctrine by protecting that

territory of the Western Hemisphere fromwhich the vital interests of the United Statescan be threatened, while protecting theUnited States, its possessions and its sea-bornetrade. This territory is assumed to be anypart of the Western Hemisphere north of theapproximate latitude ten degrees south.

This plan will not provide for projecting

U. S. Army Forces farther south than theapproximate latitude ten degrees south oroutside of the Western Hemisphere.

b. Joint Army and Navy Basic War PlanRainbow No. 2:

(1 ) Provide for the missions in a.(2) Under the assumption that the United




c. Joint Army and Navy Basic War PlanRainbow No. 3:

(1 ) Carry out the missions of the JointArmy and Navy Basic War Plan—RainbowNo. 1.

(2 ) Protect United States' vital interestsin the Western Pacific by securing control inthe Western Pacific, as rapidly as possibleconsistent with carrying out the missions in a.

d. Joint Army and Navy Basic War PlanRainbow No. 4:

(1 ) Prevent the violation of the letter orspirit of the Monroe Doctrine by protectingall the territory and Governments of theWestern Hemisphere against external aggres-

sion while protecting the United States, itspossessions, and its sea-borne trade. ThisPlan will provide for projecting such U. S.Army Forces as necessary to the southern partof the South American continent or to theEastern Atlantic.

e. Joint Army and Navy Basic War PlanRainbow No. 5:

(1 ) Provide for the missions in a.(2 ) Project the armed forces of the UnitedStates to the Eastern Atlantic and to either orboth of the African or European Continents,as rapidly as possible consistent with carryingout the missions in a above, in order to effectthe decisive defeat of Germany, or Italy, or

ence of RAINBOW 2.14 Work on RAINBOW

2 went on during the fall and winter of 1939and into the spring of 1940.15 During thistime—the period of the German-Soviet con-quest and partition of Poland, the Sovietwar against Finland, and the "sitzkrieg" onthe Western Front—RAINBOW 2 seemed tobe, as the planners had expected it to be, thewar plan most appropriate to the militarysituation. Great Britain and France wereat war with Germany and its allies. Theycontrolled northwestern Europe and north-ern Africa. Their fleets controlled the At-lantic and—though less securely—theNorth Sea and the Mediterranean. Itcould be assumed that only a Japanese at-tack would involve the United States inwar, and that, in case of Japanese attack,the United States, while taking precautions

in the Western Hemisphere, would set out—

with the blessings of the British and FrenchGovernments—"to sustain the interests ofDemocratic Powers in the Pacific, to providefor the tasks essential to sustain these inter-ests, and to defeat enemy forces in the

16



THE WAR PLANS 9

was indeed complicated. The plannersfaced a war far more complex than that en-visaged in the ORANGE plan, with an im-mensely greater range of possible Japaneseoperations to consider, and with very diffi-cult problems of harmonizing American op-erations with those of the forces of Australia,New Zealand, and the European powersconcerned.

The planners first had to assume how farthe Japanese would have extended their con-trol south and west at the moment theUnited States and the other "DemocraticPowers" began to act. The Navy plannersat the outset set up three alternative hy-potheses. The first was that Japan wouldnot have begun moving southward fromFormosa. In that case the U. S. Fleet mightmove to Manila Bay, "with certain groupsvisiting Singapore, Kamranh Bay, andHong Kong." Ground forces might bemoved to the western Pacific at the sametime or later. The Navy planners thoughtthat these acts might prevent Japanesemoves southward, and hence prevent a war

Since extensive operations in the South-west Pacific seemed less likely under the firstand third hypotheses, planning fo r RAIN-BOW 2 proceeded on the second hypothesis. . . that Japan has captured Hong Kong;occupied Kamranh Bay; dominates the coastof Indo China and has initiated operationsagainst the Dutch East Indies, including Brit-ish Borneo, and that Japan has forces avail-able to undertake immediate operationsagainst Guam and the Philippines when itbecomes evident that armed forces of theUnited States will be moved in strength to theWestern Pacific. 18

In this case, the main initial movement ofAmerican forces in the Pacific would be toSingapore and the East Indies. The Armyplanners emphasized that to retake the po-sitions occupied by the Japanese would bea slow, step-by-step process, and that

"every day's delay" in the arrival of Ameri-can forces would allow the Japanese "toeffect establishments that may requiremonths to dislodge." As a result, they con-tinued, it might be necessary to defer opera-tions against the mandated islands and to




Islands), Suva (Fij i Islands), SimpsonHarbor (Rabaul), Molucca Sea, and JavaSea.19 These forces would be suppliedover the long route across the Atlantic,around the Cape of Good Hope, and across

the Indian Ocean, although the plannersexpected that the United States could andwould send air reinforcements by way ofthe South Pacific, either along the routetraced above or by a more southerly routefrom Hawaii to Palmyra and Christmas,Canton and Hull islands, Suva, NewCaledonia, New Guinea, Port Darwin, andSurabaja (Java). In this war, the jointtasks, in concert with British, French, andNetherlands forces, would be to establishU. S. forces in the East Indies area, obtaincontrol of the area, and drive the Japaneseout. The peace settlement would entailJapanese evacuation of Hong Kong, thePhilippines, and Guam. 20

In trying to lay down assumptions as tothe military position of Japan at the timewhen the United States would act , theplanners also ran di tl into a d

of the President's implicit approval—was asine qua non even of a hypothetical explora-tion of the politically explosive question ofsending U. S. Army forces to defend Euro-pean colonial possessions in the Far East.

The planners had therefore no choice but torecommend that the United States Govern-ment should propose conversations with theBritish, French, and Netherlands author-ities "as soon as the diplomatic situationpermits." They also recommended thatthe diplomatic conversations "should beconducted in coordination with representa-tives of the Chief of Staff of the Army andthe Chief of Naval Operations." 21

It was logical for the planners to expectthat the role of the United States in coali-tion strategy would be to protect and, ifnecessary, defend and re-establish its ownposition and that of the European powersin the western Pacific. The planners hadselected this hypothesis for study after tak-ing into account the physical facts of themilitary situation at the beginning of WorldW II d f b ttl di t d



CHAPTER II

German Victories and American

Plans

May 1940-January 1941

The very basis of planning for militaryoperations in case the United States shouldenter World War II was changed by theGerman campaigns in Europe during thespring of 1940. The success of the Ger-man campaigns, which virtually disarmedFrance and threatened to disarm GreatBritain, conclusively disposed of the possi-bility that the United States, should it be-come involved in war, could count on hav-ing allies strong enough to contain Ger-

ery and quickly gained control of the prin-cipal airfields. The British soon had nochoice but to give up the attempt to estab-lish Allied forces at Trondheim in centralNorway. On 10 May, as a direct result ofgreat discontent in Parliament over the con-duct of the campaign in Norway, the Cham-berlain government fell, and Winston S.Churchill took office as Prime Minister.The battle for Norway was over, althoughAllied forces continued to fight in the north




from those to the west. On 28 May theBelgian Arm y surrendered. On the follow-ing day the British began evacuating thegreater part of their expeditionary forcefrom Dunkerque. The evacuation, unex-pectedly and almost unbelievably successful,even though all equipment had to be leftbehind, was completed on 4 June. Onthe next day the Germans began the attacksouthward on the re-formed French lines,which rapidly gave way. On 10 June,confident of the outcome, the Italian Gov-ernment declared war on Great Britain andFrance. On 17 June the new head of theFrench Government, Marshal Henri Pétain,asked for an armistice.

Planning for the Worst

It seemed probable that Germany wouldnext attempt to invade the British Isles. Inany event, whether or not in preparation forinvasion, Germany would certainly setabout reducing the British Isles by bom-bardment and blockade if the British re-

mated that the military measures the UnitedStates could take during the next twelvemonths were not enough even to comple-ment the political and economic measuresthat the United States might be forced totake to counteract the threat that Germanymight acquire colonies and allies in theWestern Hemisphere. They recommendedaccordingly that the United States shouldtake no action involving possible militarycommitments outside the Western Hemi-sphere.

On 22 May the Army planners recom-mended this view to General George C.Marshall, the Chief of Staff, as the basisfor an immediate strategic decision byhigher authority. 1 The planners reasonedthat since the United States could noteverywhere meet the dangers that threat-ened American interests—in the Far East,in South America, and in Europe—higherauthority should at once decide "whatmajor military operations we must be pre-pared to conduct." From the same facts,they also reasoned that the decision must



GERMAN VICTORIES AND AMERICAN PLANS 13

The planners repeated:Intelligent, practical planning, and later

successful action, require an early decision re-garding these matters:

1st—As to what we are not going to do.2nd—As to what we must prepare to do. 2

On the same day General Marshall wentover these points with President Roosevelt,Admiral Harold R. Stark, Chief of NavalOperations (CNO), and Under Secretaryof State Sumner Welles. Mr. Welles fullyagreed. The President and Admiral Starkdid not disagree. According to Marshall,they, too, "felt that we must not become in-volved with Japan, that we must not con-cern ourselves beyond the 180th Meridian,and that we must concentrate on the SouthAmerican situation." 3

The immediate effect on the war planswas the preparation of a new joint plan forthe defense of the Western Hemisphere.The planners suspended work on plans forfighting a war across th e Pacific (RAINBOW2 and RAINBOW 3) and recommended thedeferment of their next project, plans fo r

Purpose of the Plan:— To provide for themost effective use of United States' naval andmilitary forces to defeat enemy aggressionoccurring anywhere in the territory andwaters of the American continents, or in theUnited States, and in United States' posses-sions in the Pacific westward to include

Unalaska and Midway.4

RAINBOW 4, drafted on these assumptions,was finished at the end of May and approvedin due course by the Joint Board, theSecretaries, and the President. 5

The Planners Overruled

The President was much less disposedthan the military planners to believe thatthe Germans would be able to make peacein Europe on their own terms. Even dur-ing the dark days of June 1940 he madeplain his desire that the nation and thearmed forces should not plan simply onpreparing for the worst. He himself meantto act instead on the hypothesis that theBritish Government and the British Isleswould probably hold, and that the military



G ER M A N VICTORIES AND AM ERICA N PLANS 15

as it concerned American participation inthe war as a belligerent, f inding it unreason-able in the light of the "long-range nationalinterests of the United States." In makingthis assumption the President was in effectanticipating decisions that were his to make,

and the planners, in response, were trying,in anticipation, to discourage him frommaking those decisions. After explainingwhy they thought American interventionwould be too weak and too slow to havemuch effect, they restated their main posi-tion—that the United States was in noshape to get into a war:

Belligerent entry by the United States in thenext few months would not only disperse andwaste our inadequate means, but would re-sult in leaving the United States as the onebelligerent to oppose the almost inevitablepolitical, economic, and military aggression of

totalitarian powers.Our unreadiness to meet such aggression onits own scale is so great that, so long as thechoice is left to us, we should avoid the con-test until we can be adequately prepared.

Early entry of the United States into thewar would undoubtedly precipitate German

for combat. General Marshall evidentlyshared their anxiety over these develop-ments.

The U. S. Fleet, which had moved toHawaii in April 1940 to conduct its yearlyexercises, received orders to remain at Pearl

Harbor instead of returning to the westcoast, as it normally did. On 27 May, inanswer to a question from Admiral JamesO. Richardson, the fleet commander, Ad-miral Stark stated that the fleet would con-t inue there until fur ther notice, with thepurpose of dissuading the Japanese Govern-ment from moving southward to take ad-vantage of the defeat of the Netherlandsand the desperate situation of France andGreat Britain. 8 The specific move thatseemed imminent, as the battle of Francedrew to its disastrous end, was the occupa-tion of French Indochina.

The War Department staff believed thata show of strength in the Pacific might betaken by the Japanese Government as anoccasion to open hostilities. On thisground the Army planners strongly objected




ing conflict with the United States, themeasure was not strong enough to bringabout—it was of course not meant to bringabout—a showdown decision on long-rangeJapanese policy. Its effect on short-rangepolicy was to give the Japanese Govern-ment the option of ignoring the impliedchallenge or of accepting it on the mostfavorable terms. The Army planners be-lieved that the United States should eitherwithdraw the fleet from Pearl Harbor orprepare seriously for hostilities, consciouslydeciding "to maintain a strong position inthe Pacific," and "in order to do so, to avoidany commitment elsewhere, the develop-ment of which might require the weakeningof that position." The retention of the fleetin the Pacific might cause Japanese leadersto review and revise their plans, but it wouldact as a deterrent "only so long as othermanifestations of government policy do notlet it appear that the location of the Fleetis only a bluff." 9

The planners did not draw the conclu-sion to which this belief naturally led—that

accompanying his formal comments on cur-rent plans for the defense of the WesternHemisphere, he repeated his long-standingobjections to U. S. policy in the Pacific:

What seems to me of first importance atpresent is definitely to accept the fact that wecannot carry out the plan and also intervenein the Far East. Lippmann's article of yes-terday, advocating an understanding withJapan is the plainest kind of common sense.I hope our State Department and the SenateForeign Affairs Committee can be made to seethat a reversal of their past provocative atti-tude is a military essential of first importance

in the new World situation.10

The other feature of current nationalmilitary policy that disturbed the Army wasthe transfer of munitions to the Europeanallies. During the second half of MayBritish and French purchasing agents inWashington were desperately seeking earlydelivery of munitions, over and above thosefor which they had contracted, both fromorders placed by the Army and Navy andfrom Army and Navy stocks on hand—air-craft and engines, guns of all kinds from




committed and lost a great part of their ownstocks of such equipment in France. TheArmy objected to several of these transac-tions on the ground that they would soonbring the United States to the point of risk-ing its military security on the chance thatAmerican forces would not have to fight. 11

Major Walter Bedell Smith, AssistantSecretary of the General Staff, made thisclear, very informally, to Brig. Gen. EdwinM. Watson, military aide to the President,in connection with th e transfer of five hun-dred 75-mm. guns. This transfer, directedby the White House, was opposed by G-4and by the War Plans Division as "danger-ous to the national defense," since most ofthe matériel on hand would be needed "im-mediately upon mobilization and the re-mainder very shortly thereafter." Toconduct a year's operations in the field, theArmy would need almost as much morematériel as there was on hand, and it wouldtake two years to produce this additionalamount. 12 Major Smith left a record withGeneral Watson in which he stated, "if

deal might hope to be found hanging froma lamp-post." 13

General Marshall shared the fears of theplanners, and early on the morning of 17June he held a staff meeting to discuss cur-rent strategic policy. He pointed out that,should the French Navy pass under German(or Italian) control, the United Stateswould face "a very serious situation" in theSouth Atlantic, which Germany might bringto a head in a few weeks. He thereforeasked:

Are we not forced into a question of re-f raming our naval policy, that is, purelydefensive action in the Pacific, with a maineffort on the Atlantic side?He went on to explain:

There is the possibility of raids with re-sultant public reaction. The main effort maybe south of Trinidad, with any action norththereof purely on the basis of a diversion toprevent our sending material to SouthAmerica. 14

13 Memo, W. B. S. [Maj Smith] for CofS, 11 Jun40, no sub, OCS file, Foreign Sale or Exch of Mun.




able to guarantee to some of the SouthAmerican governments the occupation andholding of certain key ports," as he hadearlier proposed to President Roosevelt, Ad-miral Stark, and Under Secretary Welles.In any case, he thought that it was time to

mobilize the National Guard, and GeneralsStrong and Andrews agreed with him. 18

On sending more munitions to EuropeGeneral Marshall had no doubts, and hisadvisers apparently had none either. Hestated, "With respect to further equipmentfor the Allies as per the President's state-ment, we have scraped the bottom so faras the Army is concerned." 19

General Marshall ended the conferenceby directing the officers present to considerthe questions raised. 20 One consequencewas that all the planners recommended, inview of the possibility of a Japanese sur-prise attack on the Panama Canal or onnaval installations at Pearl Harbor, thatGeneral Marshall should order an immedi-ate alert of Army field commands to takeall defensive precautions that could be

taken without arousing public curiosity oralarm. General Marshall took the warn-ing seriously enough to direct the staff toissue such an order, which was to remain ineffect until further instructions were issued. 21

General Strong also drew up a statementof the views of the staff on the questions thathad been raised with regard to strategyduring the morning meeting. He recom-mended that General Marshall and AdmiralStark should consider asking the Presidentto adopt the following policies:

1st A purely defensive position in thePacific.

2d No further commitments for furnishingmaterial to the Allies.

3d An immediate mobilization of nationaleffort for Hemisphere Defense in order tomeet the coming emergency.

General Strong elaborated on all three

points. To adopt a defensive position in thePacific meant "non-interference with Jap-anese activity in the Orient, loss of our pre-carious position in China, and possible seri-ous limitation on sources of supply of stra-tegic raw materials " of which rubber was




Finally General Strong described the meas-ures that should be undertaken upon fullmobilization. These measures included, ofcourse, adding to the Regular Army, callingthe National Guard into federal service, andsharply increasing the production of muni-

tions. They also encompassed an eco-nomic and military program in the WesternHemisphere:. . . immediate preparation for protectiveseizure of key British and French possessionsin the Western Hemisphere; preparation forimmediate active military support of existing

Governments in other American Republicsand the furnishing them at the earliest pos-sible date of means of defense on long termcredits. It likewise involves a readjustmentof our economic set-up to include otherAmerican Republics on a basis approximatingequality. 22

The Navy staff was on the whole in sym-

pathy with these views, and Admiral Starkand General Marshall jointly submitted asimilar set of recommendations to the Presi-dent. The President, however, had enoughfaith in his own estimate of the situation to

i d h h h ld d

ish and warnings to the Japanese, withinthe range of what was possible and of whatseemed prudent for a President nearing theend of a term in office, standing fo r re-elec-tion. His policy ran very close—as close asconsiderations of domestic politics would al-

low—to the proposals that Churchill hadsent him a few days after taking office asPrime Minister. On 15 May, having de-scribed the desperate situation in the BritishIsles and having warned of the danger thatGreat Britain might give way, Churchill hadasked that the President should then under-take to do everything possible "short of ac-tually engaging armed forces." In particu-lar, he wanted the United States (1) to sendcritical munitions—forty or fifty old de-stroyers, several hundred of the most mod-ern planes, antiaircraft guns and ammuni-tion, and other goods, notably steel; (2)to give some assurance that the flow of ma-terials should continue after the Britishcould no longer pay for them; (3) to ar-range for a naval squadron to make a visit,"which might well be prolonged," to the




staked his military policy on the chance thatthe British would remain able and willingto resist, he had the Prime Minister's requestsconstantly to consider in the critical sum-mer of 1940, and, given the difficulties re-flected in the opinion of his military ad -

visers and the political uncertainties hefaced at home, the President acted withgreat boldness.

During the summer he sought, and theCongress granted, authority under whichhe was able to stop exports to Japan—stra-tegic commodities, including machine tools,

aviation gasoline, and iron and steel scrap. 26

As his authority came to be interpreted, hewas also authorized to release equipment ofthe American armed forces to foreign gov-ernments, providing the Chief of Naval Op-erations and the Chief of Staff would certifythat to do so would not endanger nationalsecurity. 27 This authority he used, most no-tably in arranging with the British for theexchange of fifty old destroyers for a long-term lease of British bases in the WesternHemisphere. Finally he asked Congress to

Congress responded by passing the SelectiveService Act and authorizing the Presidentto call out the National Guard and Organ-ized Reserves, with the proviso that men in-ducted into the land forces, as well as theNational Guard and Reserves called up,

should not be employed beyond the WesternHemisphere except in United States terri-tories and possessions. 28

British Strategy and AmericanPlanning

In the fall of 1940, seeing that the British,though so weak as to have to depend in thelong run on American support, were stillstrong enough to make good use of it, theArmy planners began to show less anxietyover the immediate effects and more overthe remote consequences of furnishing thatsupport. They realized that as the dangerto the British Isles became less acute, to sup-port Great Britain might well amount tosupporting, at first indirectly and then di-rectly, British positions throughout the




Pacific. Both of these assumptions figuredexplicitly in the expectations and futureplans of the British Chiefs of Staff.

The Army planners had their first formalbriefing on British expectations an d futureplans in late September 1940, upon the re-turn from London of two high-rankingArmy officers, Maj. Gen. Delos C. Emmons,head of the GHQ Air Force, and GeneralStrong, chief of the Army planning staff.They had spent several weeks in Englandtogether with Rear Adm. Robert L. Ghorm-ley, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations,who was assigned to London on extendedduty as a "special observer." AlthoughEmmons and Strong had gone for only afew weeks, it was significant that they hadbeen sent at all, for it was the first time thatany Army officer had been given theauthority, and the opportunity, to discussfuture plans with the British. In authoriz-ing this visit the President had taken an im-portant preliminary step toward authoriz-ing the development of joint Army-Navyplans consistent with his belief that the

British Strategy

On American material aid, the BritishChiefs made their position very plain. Ad-miral Ghormley asked

. . . whether, in making their plans for the

future, the Chiefs of Staff were relying onreceiving the continued economic and in-dustrial support of the United States, andwhether they counted upon the eventual activeco-operation of the United States.

Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril L. Newall,Chief of Air Staff, answered simply and

directly. . . that in our plans for the future we werecertainly relying on the continued economicand industrial co-operation of the UnitedStates in ever-increasing volume. No ac-count, however, had been taken of the possi-bility of active co-operation by the UnitedStates, since this was clearly a matter of highpolitical policy. The economic and industrialco-operation of the United States were funda-mental to our whole strategy. 30

The British Chiefs could not, of course,count on any commitment of American




because the British could no longer expectto send a fleet to the Far East. The changehad not only altered plans for defendingSingapore, which now required holdingMalaya as well, but had left the Britishheavily dependent on the presence of the

United States Fleet in the Pacific, since thethreat of American counteraction in theCentral Pacific was the main deterrent toJapanese action against the NetherlandsIndies and Malaya. The British wanted toavoid war with Japan, though they grantedthat "the question as to how far we can af-ford to go in this respect" was "naturally anextremely difficult one." It was evidently"very much in the British interest," as Ad-miral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, FirstSea Lord, remarked, that the United StatesFleet should stay in the Pacific. As SirCyril observed, active American co-opera-tion would be of "immense value" if wardid break out: "The support of the Ameri-can battle fleet would obviously transformthe whole strategical situation in the FarEast." 31

Egypt, possibly from Libya, as imminent,and were currently reinforcing their garri-sons in the Middle East to meet it, not onlyfrom India and from South Africa but alsofrom the British Isles. To hold the MiddleEast was vital to their long-range plans for

defeating Germany. These plans calledfo r bombarding and blockading Germany,especially with the hope of creating an acuteshortage of oil, but the British did not regardsuch means as sufficient. They intended,as they acquired striking forces, to "developand exploit to the full" their possession ofnaval forces in amphibious operations"against the widely extended coastline ofour enemies whenever opportunity offers."Their chief objective at this stage was theelimination of Italy from the war:

We regard the elimination of Italy as astrategic aim of the first importance. Thecollapse of Italy would largely relieve thethreat to the Middle East and free our handsat sea to meet the Japanese threat, while atthe same time increasing the effectiveness ofthe blockade against Germany.

In connection with this aim they were also




"whether the Chiefs of Staff considered thatth e final issue of the war could only be de-cided on land." Sir Cyril replied. . . that in the long run it was inevitable thatthe Army should deliver the coup de grace.We hoped, however, for a serious weakening

in the morale and fighting efficiency of theGerman machine, if not a complete break-down, which would make the task of the A rmymuch more easy. 32

Whether to stake heavily on the realizationof this hope, helping meanwhile to try tosecure and exploit British positions in the

Middle East and Far East, was a questionto which the American planners must sooneror later address themselves.

The visit of Generals Emmons and Strongto England had mixed effects on the Armyplanning staff. The Army representativeshad returned greatly influenced by what

they had seen and heard. Like all Ameri-cans in England at the time, they had beenmightily impressed by the coolness, con-fidence, and determination of the Britishunder attack. As professional officers theyspoke with new respect of British organi-

General Emmons and Col. Carl Spaatz whohad accompanied him, but also to the Mid-dle East. And as to dealing with the Brit-ish, he alluded to General Pershing'sexperience in World War I with their"confirmed beliefs," and admonished hisstaff that the Germans "had always beensix months ahead of the Allies," declaringthat "in regard to war, their deductionswere analytically sound." 33

Perhaps as a result, Emmons and Strongwere at pains to be cautious in their writtenreport. 34 And the views expressed by theArmy planning staff at that time remainedmuch the same as those it had expressed inthe spring. The staff was as far as everfrom conceding that it was sound to deferAmerican defensive preparations in orderto meet British operational requirements.The one significant change was in the esti-mate of the time factor. The staff nowthought it reasonable to expect that the"British hold on the British Isles cannot beso weakened as to make the withdrawal ofthe British Fleet therefrom necessary in less




six months or more to train German andItalian crews to operate surrendered Britishvessels—it would be at least a year beforeGermany and Italy would be free to act inthe Western Hemisphere, even if a part ofthe British Fleet, contrary to the stated in-tentions of the Churchill government, weresurrendered, unless in the meantime theUnited States should become "seriously in-volved in the Far East." Even so, the staffstood by its earlier conclusions. The staffstill thought that the U. S. Government was

in duty bound to prepare fo r " the worstpossible situation." The United Statesmight have to act in Latin America, in theSouth Atlantic, or in the Pacific. The dan-ger of a Japanese attack might become moreacute

... if the Japanese Government should be-come increasingly embarrassed by embargoson exports from the United States to Japan,and at the same time should become con-vinced that despite protests by the UnitedStates it was only throwing a bluff and wouldb k d i th f f i it ti 35

the subject. 36 Admiral Stark cited fourfeasible lines of action. Should the UnitedStates enter the war at an early date, headvocated the fourth course, Plan D, whichwas very similar to RAINBOW 5 . From PlanD the memorandum came to be referred toas the "Plan Dog" memorandum. 37

Admiral Stark's memorandum beganwith an allusion to an earlier statement ofhis to Secretary Knox. . . that if Britain wins decisively against Ger-many we could win everywhere; but that ifsh e loses the problem confronting us wouldbe very great; and, while we might not loseeverywhere, we might, possibly, not win any-where.

The defeat of Great Britain and the conse-quent disruption of the British Empirewould greatly weaken the military positionof the United States not only directly, by ex-posing the Western Hemisphere to attack,but also indirectly, by its constricting effecton the American economy. Without aprofitable foreign trade the American econ-omy could "scarcely support" heavy arma-




idea of "unlimited" commitment in thePacific, the great objection, of course, beingthat it would strictly limit activity in theAtlantic and aid to Great Britain. He thenstated the objections to a "limited" offen-sive. The object of a limited war against

Japan "would be the reduction of Japaneseoffensive power chiefly through economicblockade." Should limited operations beundertaken on an Allied basis,. . . allied strategy would comprise holdingthe Malay Barrier, denying access to othersources of supply in Malaysia, severing her

lines of communication with the WesternHemisphere, and raiding communications tothe Mid-Pacific, the Philippines, China, andIndo-China.In this event the United States, of course,would have to reinforce Alaska and Hawaii,establish naval bases in "the Fiji-Samoan

and Gilbert Islands areas," and deny Japanthe use of the Marshalls as forward basesfor light forces. It might be possible toreinforce the Philippines, particularly withplanes. A very important condition, fur-thermore was that the United States would

would seriously limit its ability to withdrawnaval units from the Pacific to the Atlantic.A third objection was that it might be veryhard to prevent a limited from becomingan unlimited w a r, if only as a result ofpublic impatience.

Admiral Stark's unwillingness to risk anunlimited war in the Pacific rested on hisbelief that the British were not strongenough by themselves to hold their empiretogether and perhaps not strong enough tohold even the British Isles. Offensively theBritish were, in his opinion, still less ableto carry out their aim of defeating Germanyand would require "assistance by powerfulallies" in men as well as in munitions andsupplies. He raised the same question thatAdmiral Ghormley had raised in London—whether land invasion would be necessary—

and concluded that although blockade andbombardment might conceivably beenough, the only certain way of defeatingGermany was "by military successes onshore, facilitated possibly by over-extensionand by internal antagonisms developed by




of war, fo r great land operations across theAtlantic and remain on "a strict defensive"in the Pacific. After taking up the prob-able disposition of American naval forcesin case the United States were drawn intothe European war, remaining at peace withJapan, he repeated:

This purely naval assistance, would not , inmy opinion, assure f inal victory for GreatBritain. Victory would probably depend up-on her ability ultimately to make a land of-fensive against the Axis powers. For makinga successful land offensive, British man power

is insufficient. Offensive troops from othernations will be required. I believe that theUnited States, in addition to sending navalassistance, would also need to send large airand land forces to Europe or Africa, or both,and to participate strongly in this land offen-sive. The naval task of transporting an armyabroad would be large.

The soundest course of action, in otherwords, seemed to be to direct Americanefforts "toward an eventual strong offensivein the Atlantic as an ally of the British, anda defensive in the Pacific." Admiral Starke plained:

need to support Great Britain against itsmajor enemy outweighed these risks. Inthe near future the proper course would beto continue in statu quo, leaving the fleet inthe Pacific and providing material help tofriendly powers. 38

That it was the Navy rather than theArmy staff that first tried to think throughthe relation between American and Britishplans was perfectly natural. The Navy hadhad continually to deal with the British andto reckon with their capabilities and inten-tions, because of the generally complemen-tary relation between British and Americanfleet dispositions. The Navy, moreover,viewed with detachment, and with whatseemed at times a certain complacency, thetreacherous issues with which the Armymust deal in raising and using huge con-script

forces. It was entirely

in character,

therefore, for the N avy staff to take the leadin making due allowance for British plansand policies and in analyzing the conditionsand acknowledging the difficulties.

What was really surprising was that the




planners to initiate action to prepare a jointplan similar to the one proposed by AdmiralStark. 41 Later in the month when thisstudy had got under way, he made it clearthat, insofar as the War Department agreed,the Army planners should simply adopt Ad-

miral Stark's memorandum without changeand get ahead with the study as fast aspossible. 42

The American Position

The President in no way committed him-self to the theory of strategy outlined inAdmiral Stark's memorandum to the Sec-retary. Whatever he had had to say toAdmiral Stark about the memorandum inmid-November apparently did not become amatter of record. 43 An attempt by theNavy to have Admiral Stark's memorandumresubmitted to the President for formal re-view as a joint Army-Navy paper, withState Department support, finally came tonothing since the Secretary of State, al-though he was in "general agreement" with

The President, however, did authorizeconversations between representatives of theAmerican and British staffs to explore theproblems raised by Admiral Stark, as Ad-miral Stark had recommended, and as theBritish themselves were eager to do. 45 On

2 December—the very day of General Mar-shall's reply to Admiral Stark—the WarDepartment learned through AdmiralGhormley the names of the British staff offi-cers who were to come to Washington forthe conversations. They were to comeostensibly as members of the civilian BritishPurchasing Commission in order to avoidpublic notice and comment, which mighthave very serious consequences. 46

In mid-January, a fortnight before theconversations were due to begin, the Presi-dent held a conference on military policywith the three Secretaries, at which AdmiralStark and General Marshall were also pres-ent. The President began by consideringhow great was the likelihood that Germanyand Japan might take concerted hostile ac-tion against the United States. He believed



G ER M A N VICTORIES AND AM ERICAN PLANS 29

... he mentioned the "Rainbow" plan andcommented on the fact that we must be real-istic in the matter and avoid a state of mindinvolving plans which could be carried outaf ter the lapse of some months; we must beready to act with what we had available.On the critical question in war plans—whether to plan for a major effort in the At-lantic or one in the Pacific—he took theposition that the United States should standon the defensive in the Pacific with the fleetbased on Hawaii. On one point the Presi-dent laid down a policy to govern the UnitedStates in case of war—the maintenance ofmaterial aid to Great Britain:

He was strongly of the opinion that in theevent of hostile action towards us on the partof Germany and Japan we should be able tonotify Mr. Churchill immediately that thiswould not curtail the supply of materiel toEngland.

His chief current preoccupation was, in fact,to maintain aid to Great Britain. As a basisfor calculating what the United States couldsafely send, he took the needs for defendingthe Western Hemisphere eight months later

. . . that the Army should not be committedto any aggressive action until it was fully pre-pared to undertake it; that our military coursemust be very conservative until our strengthhad developed; that it was assumed we couldprovide forces sufficiently trained to assist toa moderate degree in backing up friendly

Latin American governments against Naziinspired fifth column movements. 47

Although the President was somewhatimpatient with his military staff fo r wantingto deal with problems lying months or evenyears ahead, he did not object to their doingso in their conversations with the British

representatives, and he understood thatthey would present their own views of theseproblems. He read and edited the agendafor the conversations drawn up by the JointPlanning Committee which stated theseviews in some detail.

The planners hoped that the Americanparticipants would not be unduly influencedby British ideas of strategy. After somepessimistic comments on recent British po-litical and military leadership, the commit-tee stated:




the formation of coalition strategy. Inspite of the objections of Mr. Stimson, thefollowing passage was retained in the ver-sion presented to the British:

The American people as a whole desire nowto remain out of war, and to provide onlymaterial and economic aid to Great Britain.

So long as this attitude is maintained, it mustbe supported by their responsible military andnaval authorities. 53

53 (1) See App II to Incl (A) to ltr cited n. 48.(2 ) For a discussion of Stimson's views in the winterof 1940-41 and the spring of 1942, see Stimson andBundy, On Active Service, pp. 368—70.



CHAPTER III

British-American Plans

January-November 1941

The partial dissociation of militaryplanning from national policy limited theusefulness of the American military plans,yet it had a beneficial effect. It left thePresident and the Army Chief of Staff in afairly loose relationship in which they couldtake the measure of each other's problemsbefore entering the invariably difficult re-lationships between a wartime politicalleader and his professional military adviserson strategy. Moreover, it left the Armyplanners a great deal of freedom to discuss

The Terms of Reference

The British-American staff talks openedin Washington on 29 January and con-tinued to 29 March 1941. The meetingscame to be referred to as the ABC meetings(American-British Conversations), and thefinal report by the short title, ABC-1. 1

The head of the American delegation wasGeneral Embick, who then represented theArmy on the Permanent Joint Board onDefense (Canada-United States). Embick



BRITISH-AMERICAN PLANS 33

representative on equal terms. The otherArmy members were Brig. Gen. Leonard T.Gerow, the new head of the Army planningstaff; Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, the ActingAssistant Chief of Staff, G-2; and Col.Joseph T. McNarney, an Air officer who

was thoroughly familiar with current warplanning. 2 The Navy section was headedby Admiral Ghormley, the Special NavalObserver in London, who returned to theUnited States for the conferences. He wasaccompanied by Capt. Alan G. Kirk, thenaval attache, Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee,

the Army attache, and the British delegationto the conference. 3

The British representatives were RearAdm. R. M. Bellairs; Rear Adm. V. H.Danckwerts; Maj. Gen. E. L. Morris; Lt.Col. A. T. Cornwall-Jones, who had ac-companied the newly appointed ambassa-

dor to the United States, Lord Halifax; andtw o officers stationed in Washington, AirCommodore J. C. Slessor of the British Pur-chasing Commission and Capt. A. W.

Clarke, RN, the British assistant naval at-tache. 4

General Marshall and Admiral Starkwelcomed the British representatives anddwelt on the need for secrecy, warning thatpublic knowledge of the mere fact that con-

versations were in progress might have anunfavorable effect on the lend-lease bill,which was then before the Congress, andindeed "might well be disastrous."

At the first meeting the British delegationmade clear that they had come as a corpo-rate body representing the Chiefs of Staff in

their collective capacity as military advisersto the War Cabinet, and had complete free-dom to discuss the general strategic positionand to consider dispositions in the event theUnited States should enter the war. Anyconclusion reached, however, would have tobe confirmed by the British Chiefs of Staff

and the British Government. This reserva-tion was similar to the one imposed by theChief of Staff and Chief of Naval Opera-tions—that any plans agreed upon would becontingent upon future political action of

2 b




United States and Great Britain; con-sideration of the strategy of joint militaryand naval action by the United States andthe British Commonwealth in both the At-lantic and the Pacific; operations to carryou t the proposed strategy; and agreementson the division of responsibility by areas,forces to be committed, skeleton operatingplans, and command arrangements. 7 TheBritish accepted this agenda but proposedto extend the discussion of courses of jointaction to include strategy in the Mediter-ranean and the Middle East as well as in theAtlantic and the Pacific.

The Washington Conversations

Before the opening of the conversationsthe American staff had very little chance to

study the latest views of the British repre-sentatives. Admiral Ghormley and GeneralLee had tried to secure answers to a long listof questions that the American staff wantedanswered—among others the relative im-portance to the British Empire of North

that might make time a vital consideration. 8

This feeling of wariness unquestionablyexisted throughout the American staff at thebeginning of the conference.

Grand Strategy and theIssue of Singapore

At the opening of the conversations theBritish representatives presented a clear,complete summary of their views. Theybegan with three propositions of general

strategic policy:

The European theatre is the vital theatrewhere a decision must first be sought.

The general policy should therefore be todefeat Germany and Italy first, and then dealwith Japan.

The security of the Far Eastern position,including Australia and New Zealand, is es-sential to the cohesion of the British Common-wealth and to the maintenance of its wareffort. Singapore is the key to the defence ofthese interests and its retention must beassured. 9

The first two propositions were evidently in




cannot prejudice the main effort of theUnited States and the British Common-wealth in the principal theatres of war." 10

Read in the light of British views on grandstrategy, this declaration amounted to aproposal that the United States. should

underwrite th e defense of Singapore.The British representatives frankly ex-plained their position. As they pointed out,the United Kingdom, the Dominions, andIndia "must maintain dispositions which, inall eventualities, will provide for the ulti-mate security of the British Commonwealth

of Nations." It was a "cardinal feature"of British policy to retain "a position in theFar East such as will ensure the cohesionand security of the British Commonwealthand the maintenance of its war effort"—the naval base at Singapore. 11 It was,therefore, the aim of the British to persuade

the Americans to recommend the adoptionof this feature of British strategic policy as afeature of Anglo-American strategic policyand to agree that the United States, in recog-nition of the importance of holding Singa-

States "keep the Japanese quiet in the Pa-cific, using Singapore in any way con-venient" and gave notice that he wouldbring up the question again. (It was atthat time that the U. S. Fleet was orderedto stay at Pearl Harbor.) 13 Early in the

fall, soon after the Japanese Governmenthad announced its adherence to the allianceof the Axis Powers (the Anti-CominternPact), the Prime Minister had proposed thatthe United States send a naval squadron toSingapore. 14 Admiral Stark and GeneralMarshall had then recommended strongly

against taking any such step.15

The American staff representatives wereparticularly attentive to the revival of thisproposal since the British Government wasonce again urging the same views on theUnited States through diplomatic chan-nels.16 The American representatives, re-

emphasizing the nonpolitical nature of thestaff conversations, protested what ap-peared to them to be an attempt to secure

13 The message is quoted in full in Churchill,Th i Fi t H pp 23 25 See also Sherwood




political pressure to influence their decisionon Singapore. 17

On 11 February the British, at the requestof the Americans, presented their views inwriting. 18 The U. S. Army members wereunanimously of the opinion that acceptance

of the British proposal would be contrary tothe instructions that had been approved fortheir guidance and would constitute "astrategic error of incalculable magnitude,"and so informed the Chief of Staff. 19 On13 February they met with their Navycolleagues to go over the British paper.

Admiral Turner, who had prepared a state-ment in reply, traced the history of the suc-cessive British requests for American navalaid at Singapore, back to the fall of 1938when President Roosevelt and Secretary ofState Cordell Hull had "more or less com-mitted the United States Fleet to actions in

conjunction with the British forces in theFar East." 20 The Army and Navy repre-sentatives were alike fearful that thePresident might accede to the urgent Brit-ish demand a n d , at the suggestion of

the Chief of Naval Operations and, finally,to the British. The British representativesacknowledged, indeed insisted, that it wouldnot be necessary to hold Singapore in orderto protect Australia and New Zealand or toprevent the movement of a large Japanese

fleet into the Indian Ocean. The success-ful defense of Singapore would not preventthe Japanese f rom operating against Britishcommunications in the Indian Ocean, sincethe Japanese could certainly take and useKamranh Bay or Batavia fo r this purpose.An American fleet in the Pacific, actively

threatening th e Japanese left flank, wouldbe enough to prevent the Japanese fromextending their operations so far from home.

The British representatives made it veryplain that Singapore was none the less im-portant to their government as a symbol ofBritish ability and determination to p ro-

tect the British Dominions and colonies andthe overseas trade with them and with othercountries in the Orient. The loss of Sing-apore, irrespective of its military value,would weaken the hand of those political




become vitally important at the point whenthe war against Germany and Italy shouldhave taken a turn for the better. If theBritish still held Singapore, they could hopeto re-establish their position in the SouthChina Sea; if they had lost Singapore, they

could not hope to do so. They concluded:Even if we were able to eliminate Italy and

the Italian fleet as an active enemy; even ifwith United States' assistance the situation inthe Atlantic and home waters were to undergosome drastic change for the better, such aswould enable us to reduce our naval strengthin the west—even if Germany as well as Italywere defeated, it is at least highly problemati-cal whether we could ever restore the positionin the East. To carry out a successful attackand gain a foothold against opposition in EastAsia and the Indies, thousands of miles fromour nearest base, would be a colossal under-taking. It is open to doubt whether it wouldbe a practicable operation of war in any cir-

cumstances. In the conditions in which itwould have to be faced, when we should beexhausted by the strain of a long and desper-ate struggle from which we had only justemerged, we are doubtful whether we shouldeven be able to attempt it. 22

prestige of the British Empire in the FarEast and at home. They replied that theconcern of the British Government on thisscore, as well as on the accompanying mili-tary disadvantages, in particular the loss ofimportant sources of the rubber and oil of

the East Indies, was very natural. But, tothem, losses in the Far East seemed to be ofsecondary importance:

The general moral effect of the loss ofSingapore and the Philippines would besevere. Singapore has been built up in publicopinion as a symbol of the power of the Brit-ish Empire. The eastern Dominions, theNetherlands East Indies, and China, lookupon its security as the guarantee of theirsafety. Its value as a symbol has become sogreat that its capture by Japan would be aserious blow. But many severe blows havebeen taken by these various nations, and othersevere blows can be absorbed without leadingto final disaster. 24

This comment, to be sure, did not dealwith the effect on Great Britain itself of theweakening or loss of the British position inthe Far East, upon which (as the Britishrepresentatives had pointed out) the econ-




if th e United States were to concentrate fromthe beginning on their own expansion. 26

In deciding how to answer the Britishproposal the American staff committee hadfirst to take into account the need to pro-vide air forces for the security of the United

States and the rest of the Western Hemi-sphere should the British Isles fall. TheArmy Air Corps estimated that forces re-quired to meet this contingency to be 54trained combat groups ( the First AviationObjective) plus personnel and facilities fo rimmediate expansion to 100 combat groups

(the Second Aviation Objective).27

Therewas every reason to believe that Germanyhad accurate knowledge of American pro-duction capacity and potential and wouldassume that American aid to Great Britaincould not materially affect the relative airstrengths before the winter of 1941-42.

For the same reason, however, Germanycould be expected to launch intensified airattacks and an invasion against the BritishIsles before the winter of 1941-42. Onthe basis of this reasoning, the critical period

The details of the agreement were workedout in a separate report known by its shorttitle, ABC-2. 29 It provided that the firstcharge on American plane productionwould be the allocations made to the Britishand that until such time as the United

States might enter the w a r , the Britishwould receive the entire output from anynew aircraft capacity. If the United Statesshould enter the w a r, increases in outputwould be divided about equally between theUnited States and Great Britain. Thoughdeferring fulfilment of the 54-group pro-

gram, the U. S. Army Air Corps would starton a 100-group program to provide train-ing facilities for 30,000 pilots and 100,000technicians a year.

The policy adopted by the United Statesstaff committee for active American air par-ticipation, should the United States enter the

war, entailed protecting a U. S. naval baseto be established in Iceland and furnishingair support to the Royal Air Force in theBritish Isles. Colonel McNarney explainedthis policy at the meeting of the United




operate against objectives in Germany, butwould, of course, operate against invasionports or other vital objectives, in accordancewith the demands of the existing situation. 30

Three groups of pursuit aviation were to besent to the British Isles during 1941 as theybecame available, initially to Northern Ire-land, where there would be two naval bases.Eventually, when these pursuit groups werebroken in, they would be sent to more activesectors in England. Three groups of heavybombers and two groups of medium bomb-ers were to be sent to England to operate

under U. S. commanders in the BritishBomber Command. No commitments weremade in the course of the staff conversationsfor air participation in the Far East or inthe Middle East. 31 But the Air Corps wasexploring the possibility of sending aviationunits to the M iddle East some time later:

We have avoided any commitments in thisarea. However, in 1942 and 1943 it willprobably be impossible to crowd any moreoperating units into the British Isles. We arenow studying the possibility of supporting alarge air force in Egypt, Asiatic Turkey and

would disagree accordingly over long-termplans. But there was still a great deal ofcommon ground in the belief that theUnited States, like Great Britain, had muchmore to fear from Germany than from anyof the other great powers. The importance

of this for Army plans lay in the willingnessof the British to agree that U.S. Army forcesshould be used "in areas which are the mostaccessible to them, namely in the generalarea of the Atlantic." 33 It was entirelyfeasible to adjust British strategic plans withthis policy, for as the United States began

to concentrate forces in the North Atlanticarea, the British Government would be freeto continue sending some additional forcesto the Middle East and Far East.

Even apart from reasons of strategicpolicy, the American staff had a very strongreason for desiring such a solution. The

concentration of American forces in theAtlantic theater would enormously simplifyrelations between British and Americancommands. Rear Admiral RichmondKelly Turner restated the principle, which




Only on this basis could the American staffhope to minimize the vexing problems re-sulting from the gradual intrusion of Amer-ican forces into areas in which Great Britainhad, and the United States did not have, alarge political and economic stake and a

clearly formulated policy, together with con-trol of communications, a monopoly of in-telligence, and long experience in dealingwith the civil authorities.

For these reasons the American staffs wereeager to develop plans for collaboration inthe North Atlantic, and, since the Britishwere ready to join in the project, it was inthis field of planning that th e conversationsproved most fruitful. The tentative agree-ments reached by the representatives dealtmainly with the disposition of Americanforces up to the time of full American par-

ticipation in the war and for a few monthsthereafter. The general theory then wasthat the United States should prepare totake over as far and as fast as possible re-sponsibility fo r defenses in the North At-

Mediterranean will initially be considered ofsecondary importance. 35

For the Army, concentration in the At-lantic meant, to begin with, the garrisoningof Iceland, in addition to the leased bases,and of American naval bases in the British

Isles. In the early stages of Americanparticipation, the Army would establish airand ground forces in Great Britain.American air strength in Great Britainwould be used not only to defend UnitedStates land and naval bases but also to takethe offense, in conjunction with the RoyalAir Force, against German military power.All these moves would relieve the pressureon the British high command, allowing itto continue deploying forces to the MiddleEast and Far East with far greaterassurance.

Exchange of Military Missions

Besides reaching these tentative agree-ments, the British and American representa-




British military mission in Washingtonwould consist of three members—a flag of-ficer of the British Navy, a general officer ofthe British Army, and an officer of the RoyalAir Force—with a joint planning staff, aNavy staff, an Army staff, an Air staff, and

a secretariat. The Dominions of Canada,Australia, and New Zealand would be repre-sented on the British mission in Washingtonby their service attaches.

Should the United States enter the war,these two missions were to be announced asthe representatives of their respective Chiefs

of Staff, and would then be set up, organizednot only to collaborate in formulating mili-tary plans and policies but also to representtheir ow n military services vis-á-vis those ofthe government to which they had beenaccredited.

At the conclusion of the agreements of

ABC-1, recommendation was made that"nucleus missions" be exchanged at once.The Army War Plans Division (WPD) on7 April 1941 recommended that the Ameri-can nucleus mission be set up in London,

designated the Special Army Observer,London, responsible directly to the Chiefof Staff.37 Maj. Gen. James E. Chaney,the Air Corps officer that had been sent toLondon to study British air defenses in thefall of 1940, was selected for the post. He

was instructed to negotiate with the BritishChiefs of Staff on military affairs of com-mon interest, specifically those relating tocombined action by American and Britishmilitary officials and troops in British areasof responsibility, but not with a view tomaking political commitments. He was to

try to arrange fo r American officials inEngland to take up military matters with theBritish through his group and not directly. 38

Admiral Ghormley, who had been inLondon as the Special Naval Observer(SPENAVO) since the fall of 1940, re-ceived similar instructions from Admiral

Stark.39

On 19 May General Chaneynotified the War Department that he hadestablished the Special Army ObserverGroup (SPOBS) in London. 40

Meanwhile the Navy Department had




nucleus British military mission advised theWar Department that the heads of the Brit-ish mission would be Admiral Sir CharlesLittle, who had been Second Sea Lord andChief of Naval Personnel; Lt. Gen. H. C. B.Wemyss, who had been Adjutant General

to the Army Forces; and Air Marshall A. T.Harris, who had been Deputy Chief of theAir Staff. These officers, with the remain-ing members of their staffs, would be leav-ing the United Kingdom early in June andwould set up their offices in a leased houseadjoining the British embassy in Washing-

ton.41

With the establishment of these "nucleusmissions," the exchange of views and in-formation between the British and Ameri-can staffs became continuous, and the prob-lems of coalition warfare came to be a famil-iar part of the work of the Army planners.

Rainbow 5

The strategy recommended by AdmiralStark and presented by the American staff

quiring that the plan be based on ABC-1and on Joint United States-Canada WarPlan 2 (ABC-22) which was then beingdrafted. 43 The first Army draft of RAINBOW5 was completed on 7 April and three weekslater the plan was submitted by the Joint

Planning Committee for the Joint Board'sapproval.The general assumptions on which RAIN-

BOW 5 was based, were as follows:

That the Associated Powers, comprisinginitially the United States, the British Com-monwealth (less Eire), the Netherlands EastIndies, Greece, Yugoslavia, the Governmentsin Exile, China, and the "Free French"are at war against the Axis Powers, com-prising either:

a. Germany, Italy, Roumania, Hungary,Bulgaria, or

b. Germany, Italy, Japan, Roumania,Hungary, Bulgaria and Thailand.

That the Associated Powers will conductthe war in accord with ABC-1 and ABC-22.That even if Japan and Thailand are not

initially in the war, the possibility of theirintervention must be taken into account.

That United States forces which mightb i th F E t A ill b bl t fill




United States and the British Common-wealth would be to secure the WesternHemisphere from European or Asiaticpolitical or military penetration, maintainthe security of the United Kingdom, andprovide such dispositions as would ensure

the ultimate security of the British Common-wealth of Nations. The strategy of theoffensive against Germany and its allies setforth in RAINBOW 5 (as in ABC-1) was asfollows:

(a) Application of economic pressure bynaval, land, and air forces and all other means,

including the control of commodities at theirsource by diplomatic and financial measures.(b) A sustained air offensive against Ger-

man Military power, supplemented by air of-fensives against other regions under enemycontrol which contribute to that power.

(c) The early elimination of Italy as anactive partner in the Axis.

(d) The employment of the air, land, andnaval forces of the Associated Powers, at everyopportunity, in raids and minor offensivesagainst Axis Military strength.

(e) The support of neutrals, and of Alliesof the United Kingdom, Associates of theUnited States and populations in A is

forces will be limited to such operations aswill not materially delay this effort.

In accord with these principles the UnitedStates Army and Navy would be requiredto assume the general tasks, in co-operationwith other Associated Powers, of defeating

the Axis Powers and guarding UnitedStates national interests by the following:

a. Reducing Axis economic power to wagewar, by blockade, raids, and a sustained airoffensive;

b. Destroying Axis military power by raidsand an eventual land, naval, and airoffensive;

c. Protecting the sea communications of theAssociated Powers;

d. Preventing the extension in the WesternHemisphere of European or Asiatic militarypowers; and by

e. Protecting outlying Military base areasand islands of strategic importance againstland, air, or sea-borne attack. 45

The specific tasks assigned to the Armyand the Navy under RAINBOW 5 were eitheralready listed in ABC-1 or derived there-from. In the western Atlantic the Army(in conjunction with the Navy) would be




tions were formulated; a plan must be formu-lated upon a situation and no prediction ofthe situation which will exist when such aplan can be implemented should be madenow. One of the principal policies enumer-ated in Rainbow 5 is "The building up ofthe necessary forces for an eventual offensiveagainst Germany." 49

RAINBOW 5 was based on the time originof Mobilization Day (M Day), whichmight precede a declaration of war or theoccurrence of hostile acts. As a precaution-ary measure, the War and Navy Depart-ments might put certain features of the plan

into effect before M Day. The shippingschedule for overseas transportation ofArmy troops had been predicated on theassumption that M Day would not fallearlier than 1 September 1941. U. S.Army commitments to the British underABC-1 would not become effective before

that date. In the first few months of thewar, under RAINBOW 5, 220,900 troops andat least 666 aircraft would have to be trans-ported to overseas garrisons—44,000 troopsto Hawaii, 23,000 to Alaska, 13,400 to

coast of South America; 83,000 troops andaircraft for transatlantic destinations, pre-pared to embark 20 days after M Day; and,finally, an expeditionary force of one army,two corps, and ten divisions, prepared toembark 180 days after M Day. 50

On 14 May, at its regular monthly

meet-ing, the Joint Board approved RAINBOW 5and ABC-1. 51 On 2 June, following ap-proval by the Secretaries of War and Navy,RAINBOW 5 and ABC-1 were sent to thePresident, with the information that theBritish Chiefs of Staff had provisionally

agreed to ABC-1 and had submitted it tothe British Government fo r approval. 52

The President read both documents and on7 June returned them to the Joint Boardwithout approval or disapproval. M a j .Gen. Edwin M. Watson, the President's mil-itary aide, offered th e explanation:

The President has familiarized himself withthe two papers; but since the report of theUnited States British Staff Conversations,ABC-1, had not been approved by the BritishGovernment, he would not approve the reportat this time; neither would he now give ap




107,000 men, exclusive of a reinforced di-vision for Iceland. All of the units wouldoperate under British strategic direction.Material support in the main would haveto be drawn from the United Kingdom.All, except the bomber force and the Ice-

land force, would be under British tacticalcommand. General Chaney recommendedthat a supreme U. S. Army headquarters beestablished in England, and that this head-quarters exercise the functions prescribedin ABC-1 for the Commanding General,U. S. Army Forces British Isles (US AF BI)

as well as those of the United States Armymember of the military mission. TheAmerican commander would act as a thea-ter commander and would be responsible forseeing that American troops were used inaccordance with American strategic pol-icy. 57 How far General Chaney's specific

proposals would govern action upon Ameri-can entry into the war remained dependenton a great many unpredictable contingen-cies and on the resolution at that time ofseveral disagreements. 58

The First Difficulties Over TroopMovements

The War Department staff was most re-luctant to establish any new garrisons or ex-peditionary forces. By midsummer of 1941,

as the result of the Selective Service Act andth e federalization of the National Guard,the Army had, for the time being, plenty of"bodies." By August 1941 the Regular,Reserve, National Guard, and SelectiveService components of the Army totaledabout 1,600,000 officers and men. There

were twenty-nine infantry divisions, fourarmored divisions, two cavalry divisions, anda tactical air force of about 200 squadronsand approximately 175,000 men. 59 By theend of 1941 only two additional divisionswere activated—the 5th Armored and 25th(Reserve) Infantry Divisions. The train-ing of all these units and their supportingelements was just beginning. The shortageof materiel, particularly of new models—airplanes, tanks, guns, and small arms am-munition—handicapped training and im-




Army, planes and ammunition especially,was being diverted to the British, and to theNavy and Marine Corps. The War Depart-ment was consequently confronted with theproblem of deciding whether to give thepieces of equipment that were beginning toemerge from the factories to soldiers intraining or soldiers in the overseas garri-sons. 60 Since the needs of the latter wereusually more urgent, troops in training oftenhad to make shift with old matériel, or noneat all. Even if all the troops had been readyand equipped, they still could not be sent

overseas immediately. Large numbers ofprofessional soldiers were needed as cadresin th e United States to train other soldiers,and sufficient shipping space was not avail-able. Though combatant ships of the "two-ocean" Navy, troop transports, and cargovessels were under construction, it was clear

that the movement of troops overseas wouldlong be limited for want of ships. 61

Given the acute lack of experiencedsoldiers and the heavy competition fo rmateriel, even the small-scale precautionary

time, the Army's mobilization problemswere further complicated by existing legis-lative restrictions on the sending of troopsoutside the United States. Neither se-lectees nor National Guardsmen could besent outside the Western Hemisphere. Itwas,

moreover, impracticable

to give thesemen overseas assignments even in the West-ern Hemisphere, since the Army had to beready to release them after twelve monthsof service.

The Army's difficulties were discussed re-peatedly during the spring and summer of

1941 in connection with plans to set asideexpeditionary forces and to garrison Ice-land. Admiral Stark thought it was moreimportant at this time for the Army andNavy to prepare and assemble a highlytrained amphibious force than it was toprepare a garrison for Iceland. The Ad-

miral had in mind, of course, the possibilitythat the President might, on very shortnotice, order the Army and Navy to under-take an overseas expedition. 63 Consider-ing the Army's training and equipment




brought up his idea, the President directedthe Army and Navy to prepare a JointArmy and Navy expeditionary force, to beready within one month's time to sail fromUnited States ports for the purpose of oc-cupying the Azores. He declared in ex-

planation that it was in the interest of theUnited States to prevent non-Americanbelligerent forces f rom gaining control ofthe islands and also to hold them for use asair and naval bases for the defense of theWestern Hemisphere. 65 The Joint Boardagreed that the operation would be carriedout by Army and Marine Corps troops, sup-ported by a naval force from th e AtlanticFleet, with 22 June 1941 set as a tentativedate for the departure of the expedition. 66

Accordingly, the staffs prepared a jointbasic plan for the capture and occupation

of the Azores.67

The decision for an operation against theAzores was perforce to be deferred whenthe President decided in early June to takethe first steps toward the occupation of Ice-

68

As a result of the presidential directivesof the last week of May and early June, theWar Department planners realized that ex-peditionary forces might be called for inany of several areas on short notice. Thispossibility was brought home to them with

still greater forcefulness at a meeting on 19June of the President with the Chief ofStaff and the Secretary of Wa r. At thismeeting the President inquired whether itwould be possible for the Army to organizea force of approximately 75,000 men to beused in any of several theaters— for example,in Iceland, the Azores, or the Cape VerdeIslands. The Chief of Staff and the Secre-tary of War again called to the President'sattention that the Army could not, underexisting legislative restrictions, send forcesoutside the Western Hemisphere for any

extended period without com pletely destroy-ing the efficiency of all units directly or in-directly involved. General Marshall alsopointed to the risks involved in sendinghalf-trained and poorly equipped U. S.




of immediately relieving the entire Britishgarrison had been abandoned. On 7 July1941 the marines landed in Iceland. Im-mediately thereafter a pursuit squadronwith necessary service units was ordered toIceland as the first Army contingent. 72

But it proved extremely difficult to set up anArmy force to relieve the marines. Thepassage of legislation in August 1941 per-mitting the retention in service of theselectees, Reserve officers, and the NationalGuardsmen still left the problem of restric-tion on territorial service—a problem which

was to remain with the Army until PearlHarbor brought a declaration of war. 73

In the end, the Army force deployed toIceland during 1941 was to number onlyabout 5,000 men, the marines were requiredto stay to swell the American garrison to10,000 men, and only a token British force

was relieved fo r duty elsewhere. Afterweeks of strenuous staff work had been com-pleted in Washington, the second Army con-tingent sailed on 5 September 1941 underthe command of Maj. Gen. Charles H.

74

shall decided that the marines would not berelieved by Army forces until 1942. 75

Introduction to Grand Strategy

In the early spring of 1941 German sub-marines were sinking ships in the Atlanticso fast that the President seriously con-sidered ordering aggressive action by Ameri-can warships in spite of the evident risk thatit would bring the United States into thewar. He finally decided not to take thechance and instead ordered into effect themore cautious plan

of having American

ships merely report German movementswest of Iceland. 76

While the question was under considera-tion, the Army planners had to make uptheir own minds what decision would bewise. In keeping with a suggestion by Mr.

Hopkins that the President needed profes-sional military advice, General Embick,who had gone on leave after the staff con-versations with the British, was brought backto Washington for a series of discussions




should we recommend a war status? Or is itof importance to do something immediately?Is immediate action necessary?

As General Marshall observed, the situa-tion facing him as Chief of Staff of the Armywas embarrassing since, if the Presidentshould make a decision at that time, any-thing that could be done immediately wouldhave to be done by the Navy and not by theArmy—Army forces would not be preparedfor action until the fall. Secretary Stim-son's view, he reported, was that any mili-tary action at all by the United States, inwhatever locality—Iceland, Greenland, theAzores, or Martinque—should be under-taken with an overwhelming force, and witha high degree of efficiency, even if contactwith enemy forces were not imminent.General Marshall summed up the problemthus:

What I must be prepared to suggest is whatshould the President do. What do we thinkshould be done. Of course, the President isalso governed by public opinion. There aretwo things we must do: Begin the educationof the President as to the true strategic situa-

limitation of shipping, any operations thatmay reasonably be required in the Caribbeanor in Northeast Brazil.

So far as Army operations were concerned,the staff could only advise the postpone-ment of American entry into the war, de-claring :... it must be recognized that the Army can,at the present time, accomplish extremely lim-ited military support to a war effort and fromthis point of view it is highly desirable that wewithhold participation as long as possible.

On the other hand, the staff believed that

it might well prove sound, from a militarypoint of view, to enter the war before theArmy could be of much use:

Upon the assumption, which appears rea-sonable, that the United States will enter thepresent war sooner or later, it appears to theWar Plans Division highly desirable that ourentry be made sufficiently soon to avoid eitherthe loss of the British Isles or a materialchange in the attitude of the British Govern-ment directed toward appeasement. 79

It appeared from their study that theplanners despite their caution were in




Lt. Col. Lee S. Gerow and Colonel Bundystated that they agreed completely withColonel McNarney. Col. Jonathan W.Anderson, although in general agreement,was unwilling to take as strong a position asthe rest. 80

General Embick strongly disagreed. Thesituation did not seem to him so dangerous,in part because he did not believe that theloss of the Middle East would be fatal, eventhough it would be a heavy blow to theChurchill government. He acknowledgedthat should the United States enter the warfewer supply ships would probably be sunkin the Atlantic, and agreed that the loss ofships was a vital problem. But he declaredthat he himself would not advise enteringthe war and believed that to do so "wouldbe wrong in a military and naval sense"and unjust "to the American people." 81

During the summer of 1941 the Armystaff came around to the view expressed byGeneral Embick. The German attack onthe Soviet Union, launched on 22 June1941 d bt dl diti d thi h

The change in the situation had quite theopposite effect on the views of the Presidentand the British. The President decided tosend additional Army forces to positionsoverseas, in spite of the earnest insistence ofthe War Department staff that the Army

was not ready. The British, for their part,relieved by the German attack on theUSSR, but at the same time anxious to fore-stall a possible reorientation of U. S. Armyefforts toward the Pacific, ceased to dwell onthe oft-repeated demand for American navalforces in the Southwest Pacific and began tourge an early entry of the United States intothe war against Germany and the desirabil-ity of American collaboration in theMediterranean.

The Atlantic Conference

The changes in the positions of the Brit-ish and American staffs were evident in stafftalks held during the Atlantic Conference inthe summer of 1941 between PresidentRoosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill




greatly increase if Soviet resistance were tocollapse or the German campaigns were toslacken on the Eastern Front.

During the staff talks the British broughtup explicitly for the first time (on the mili-tary level) the possibility of employingAmerican troops in a combined operationin French North Africa and of using Ameri-can help to reinforce the Middle East.Through these undertakings in particular,they believed that early American inter-vention would entirely change the wholemilitary situation. The American staffthus began to become acquainted with theBritish notion of what operations Americanintervention in the war would make pos-sible. At the same time they also learnedof the general methods by which the BritishChiefs proposed to gain victory in Europeafter blockade, bombing, subversive activi-

ties, and propaganda had weakened thewill and ability of Germany to resist:We do not foresee vast armies of infantry

as in 1914-18. The forces we employ will bearmoured divisions with the most modern

i t T l t th i ti

During the conference the Americanmilitary staff remained noncommittal onthe British proposals and strategic views. 86

But after th e conference the War Depart-ment prepared comments which becamethe basis of a formal reply by the Joint Boardto the British in the early fall of 1941. TheWar Department staff objected primarily tothe proposition that early American inter-vention would insure victory—perhaps evena quick victory—over Germany. Theytook the position that

Actually we will be more effective for some

time as a neutral, furnishing material aid toBritain, rather than as a belligerent. Ourpotential combat strength has not yet beensufficiently developed. . . . We should . . .build, strengthen, and organize for eventualuse, if required, our weapons of last resort—military forces. 87

The Joint Board, elaborating on this view,

characterized as "optimistic" the Britishconclusion that American interventionwould make victory not only certain butalso swift, an d replied:

While participation by United States naval




a superior enemy under unfavorable logisticconditions. 88

Lend-Lease

By the middle of 1941 there was everyreason to expect that the adjustment ofAmerican national policy to the rapidlygrowing requirements of a world conflictwould demand of the U. S. Army "a piece-meal and indecisive commitment of forcesagainst a superior enemy under unfavorablelogistic conditions." This was entirelyconsistent with th e President's strategicpolicy, in which the readiness of the U. S.armed forces was a subordinate considera-tion. The main expression of Americanstrategy was the program evolved by thePresident during 1940 of aiding other na-tions already defending themselves againstmilitary aggression. The first stage incarrying out this policy was to supply themwith munitions.

The Lend-Lease Act of 11 March 1941provided th e basis for an extension of the

d i i h l

of the United States. The principal re -cipient of American aid, on an ever greaterscale, remained Great Britain. But the ap-plication of the Lend-Lease Act to Chinalater in the spring of 1941 was an extremelyimportant step in the clarification of Ameri-can national policy, since it evidently dis-posed of any remaining possibility that theUnited States might be willing to acquiescein the accomplished fact of Japanesehegemony on the Asiatic mainland. 89 Andthe extension of the Lend-Lease Act tocover the Soviet Union, formally announcedin November 1941, was of great conse-quence as a measure of the President'swillingness to base American internationalpolicy on the principle of the common inter-national interest in supporting resistance toarmed aggression.

The War Department participated in

the development of the critical aspect

of thelend-lease program—the provision of mu-nitions—but only by providing technicaladvice and handling the machinery of pro-curement and distribution. 90 The one im-

i h bli h d b




were obviously of potential use as nuclei forU.S. Army theater headquarters.

In September 1941 the plans staff sug-gested to General Marshall "the need for aUnited States military mission in any majortheater of war where lend-lease aid is to

receive emphasis." General Chan ey's ob-server group in London was "expected, inaddition to other duties, to support the sup-ply and maintenance phase of Lend Leaseactivities in the United Kingdom." 91 Thestaff recommended the appointment ofspecial missions to do similar work elsewhere.

Similar proposals came from G-2 and fromMaj. Gen. James H. Burns, Executive Offi-cer of the Division of Defense Aid Reports.

One such military mission had, in fact,already been established on the other sideof the world. In August 1941 the WarDepartment had charged Brig. Gen. JohnA. Magruder with facilitating the flow oflend-lease materials to China. The first ofthe lend-lease missions, the American Mili-tary Mission to China (AMMISCA), wasthe prototype of missions sent elsewhere 92

was supervising lend-lease activities, includ-ing American supply depots and mainte-nance facilities in support of British opera-tions. 93 General Maxwell set up his head-quarters in Cairo on 22 November 1941.

Soviet entry into the war against Ger-

many and Italy in June 1941 called fo rfurther extension of the lend-lease program.A series of conferences was held by a U. S.mission headed by W. Averell Harriman inLondon and by the Beaverbrook-Harrimanmission in Moscow during September1941.94 The agreement reached at Mos-

cow in terms of munitions to be furnishedthe Soviet Union was incorporated in theFirst (Moscow) Protocol. This accord wassigned by Mr. Harriman, Lord Beaver-brook, and Foreign Commissar VyacheslavM. Molotov on 1 October 1941. A monthlater President Roosevelt and MarshalJoseph V. Stalin endorsed the agreement. 95

At the request of Harry Hopkins, Col.

93 For pertinen t papers on the establishment ofthe Maxwell Mission, see: (1) WPD 4511-9, (2)WPD 4559 3 (3) It 6 E 4 d (4) WPD




Philip R. Faymonville remained in Moscowto act as lend-lease representative there. Amilitary mission to the USSR was consti-tuted at the end of October 1941, underMaj. Gen. John N. Greely, but never se-cured Soviet permission to go to Moscow. 96

Another military mission assisted moredirectly in the dispatch of lend-lease sup-plies to the Soviet Union. By agreementbetween the British and Soviet Govern-ments, their troops had entered Iran in lateAugust—Soviet troops had occupied thenorthern part and British troops the south-ern part. Of the few routes left fo r sendingsupplies to the USSR, the route via thePersian Gulf ports and Iran was the mostpromising. The U. S. Military IranianMission, set up in October 1941, underBrig. Gen. Raymond A. Wheeler, was as-signed the task of assuring the establishment

and operation of supply, maintenance, andtraining facilities for British, Soviet, andany other operations in the general area ofthe Persian Gulf, including Iran and Iraq. 97

He began operations in Baghdad on 30

agencies through which the War Depart-ment began dealing with the practical prob-lems of several important overseas areas—terrain and climate, transportation andcommunications, politics and administra-tion, the performance of American equip-ment, and the treatment an d behavior ofAm erican military personnel. The experi-ence that the missions began to acquire inthe fall of 1941 constituted an all too briefpreparation for the tasks that the War De-partment was to face in supporting andcontrolling its far-flung overseas operationsin World War II.

Victory Program

The most searching examination of long-range problems of strategy made by theArmy to date, came in the summer of 1941

when the War Department staff undertookto estimate the size and composition of theArmy forces that would be required to de-feat Germany. Until then the Americanplanners had only touched on the question




Planning for American production ofmunitions had been continually complicatedfor over a year by conflicts between theneeds of the Army and requirements result-ing, at first, from British and French pur-chases and, later, from lend-lease alloca-tions. Future conflicts were certain toprove far more serious, should the UnitedStates enter the war. In July 1941 thePresident formally asked for an estimate ofthe munitions requirements of the armedservices to help formulate a comprehensivenational industrial plan. 100

The responsibility for carrying out thePresident's instructions within the War De-partment, for both the Army's ground andair arms, devolved initially upon the Army'sWar Plans Division. Its chief, GeneralGerow, soon pu t forward his idea of themethod to follow in setting up industrial

objectives:We must first evolve a strategic concept ofhow to defeat our potential enemies and thendetermine the major military units (Air,Navy and Ground) required to carry out thestrategic operations

To adjust ultimate production to a strategicconcept of how to defeat the nation's po-tential enemies, it was necessary to estimatethe "strategic operations" and "major mili-tary units" that would be required toexecute them. On this basis the War De-partment proceeded to make its strategicestimates and to calculate ultimate Armyrequirements for the initial "Victory Pro-gram" of September 1941.

Major Albert C. Wedemeyer played theleading role for the General Staff in con-ducting Army-wide studies on requirementsof manpower. 102 He assembled estimatesof the strength and composition of taskforces, of the theaters of operations to beestablished, and of the probable dates atwhich forces would be committed. Hethus became one of the first of the Washing-ton staff officers to attempt to calculatewhat it

would cost to

mobilize and

deploya big U. S. Army. 103

As a basis for estimating the munitionsand shipping that the Army w ould need, theArmy planners calculated on an ultimate

h h

STRATEGIC COALITION




production. 104 The Army would consistlargely of a i r, armored, and motorizedforces. Aside from the provision of servicetroops for potential task forces, relativelylittle attention was paid to the requirementsof service troops in the build-up of overseastheaters. According to the Army esti-mates, approximately 5,000,000 men wouldeventually be moved overseas, requiring themaximum use of about 2,500 ships at anyone time. 105

For purposes of estimating the Army'srequirements, the planners made five pri-mary assumptions about U. S. nationalpolicy:

a) Monroe Doctrine: Resist with all meansAxis penetration in Western Hemisphere.

b) Aid to Britain: Limited only by U. S.needs and abilities of British to utilize; insuredelivery.

c) Aid to other Axis-opposed nations:Limited by U. S. and British requirements.

d) Far-Eastern policy: To disapprovestrongly Japanese aggression and to conveyto Japan determination of U. S. to take posi-

tive action. To avoid major military andnaval commitments in the Far East at thistime.

e) Freedom of the Seas. 106

Other Army assumptions were that theprincipal theater of wartime operationswould be Europe and that the defeat of

potential enemies, among whom were listedItaly and Japan, would be "primarily de-pendent on the defeat of Germany." Forwant of essential equipment, U. S. fieldforces ( a i r and/or ground) would not beready for "ultimate decisive modern com-bat" before 1 July 1943.

In making its estimates the Army staffnecessarily projected U. S. military opera-

104 The detailed s tudy of Army air needs, for theinitial Victory Program estimates, had been p r e -pared by the newly established Air War Plans

Division in a paper known as AWPD/1. This doc-ument, based on ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5, con-tained the blueprint for AAF expansion. It calledfor 2,164,916 men and some 60,000 combat planes.(For a detailed discussion of AWPD/1, see Cravenand Cate, AAF I, pp. 131-32, 146-47, 149-50,

106 "Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Re-quired to Defeat Our Potential Enemies (Septem-b 1941) " A II P t I JB 355 707 11

BRITISH AMERICAN PLANS 61




tions into the future, in the frame of refer-ence of ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5. The stepsto be executed before M Day or the be-ginning of hostilities required the UnitedStates to defend the Western Hemisphere;reinforce the Atlantic bases, Alaska, and the

overseas garrisons; insure the delivery ofsupplies and munitions to Great Britain andother friendly powers; and prepare U. S.troops for active participation in the war. 107

Finally the "Brief" outlined military opera-tions, at first defensive an d then offensive,that would lead to victory over Germany

once war had been declared. Before thefinal ground operations were undertaken,overwhelming air superiority in Europewould have to be achieved, utilizing to thefull air base facilities in the British Isles;enemy vessels would have to be swept fromthe Atlantic and the North Sea; and thefoundations of German military powerweakened by dispersion of enemy forces,blockade, subversive activities, and propa-ganda. No specific military measures fo rdefeat of the potential enemy in the Far

blockade, propaganda, subversive activi-ties, air superiority, the application of pres-sure upon Germany "wherever soft spotsarise in Europe or adjacent areas," and "theestablishment of effective military bases, en -circling the Nazi citadel," they appeared to

be in accord with British strategic theory.108

However, there was a sign of an incipient di-vergence from British theory—a belief that,sooner or later, "we must prepare to fightGermany by actually coming to grips withand defeating her ground forces and defi-nitely breaking her will to combat." 10 9

Vague as the Army strategic planners wereabout the preliminary preparations and con-ditions, they were disposed to think in termsof meeting the German Army head on.110

The great disputed issues of wartimestrategy had not been—as they could not yetbe—joined, much less resolved. As Gen-eral Gerow observed, the strategic estimatesfor the Victory Program calculations werebased upon "a more or less nebulous Na-tional Policy, in that the extent to whichour government intends to commit itself with



CHAPTER IV

The Showdown With Japan

August-December 1941

By far the greatest weakness of the mili-tary planning undertaken during 1941 asa result of Admiral Stark's original recom-mendations and the conversations with theBritish was that the Army staff, notwith-standing the warning given by AdmiralStark, was unwilling that the plans shouldtake account of the possibility that theUnited States might become committed tolarge-scale support of military operationsacross the Pacific. The Army plannerspersisted in this unwillingness despite thestiffening of American policy in the FarEast.

Th fi i f h iff i f A i

March 1941, the very day on which thePresident signed the Lend-Lease Act. Atthe end of March Dr. T. V. Soong, who hadbeen representing the Chinese Governmentin negotiations in Washington, presented alist of the military requirements of China—a modern air force of 1,000 aircraft, withAmerican instructors and technical advisers;weapons and ammunition to equip thirtydivisions of the Chinese Army; and suppliesfor the development of the remaining over-land line of communications between Chinaand the West, by way of the Burm a Road. 1

During April the War Department reviewedthese req irements nd Mr Hopkins nd

64 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WARFARE




in lend-lease transactions. By mid-Maythe first lend-lease ship for China had leftNew York, carrying trucks, spare parts, andraw materials.

During the summer of 1941 the Presi-dent made a second move in the develop-

ment of Far Eastern policy—the impositionof a de facto oil embargo on Japan. Thismove, like the decision to extend compre-hensive military aid to China, developedout of already established policy. SinceJuly 1940 the President had had authorityto control exports to foreign countries in theinterest of American security and had cutoff shipments to Japan of scrap metal, avia-tion gasoline, and most types of machinetools. To include oil among the exports tobe licensed and, in fact, to shut it off, wasan even more drastic step. The UnitedStates thereby would virtually compel theDutch and the British to join in defyingJapan, which was almost entirely depend-ent on outside sources for oil, unless theywere willing to dissociate themselves com-

l t l f A i F E t li 3

own terms, in the face of the strongly im-plied American commitment to oppose suchaction with military force. This choice theJapanese would have to make—or review,if they had already made it, as they appar-ently had—while they still had a few months'oil reserves, and before American militarystrength could become great enough to en-danger their chances of seizing and holdingthe Netherlands Indies.

During July the President reflected uponthe course to be followed by the UnitedStates now that Germany and the USSR

were at war and Japan was preparing forthe conquest of the European colonial em-pire situated about the South China Sea.When the possibility of imposing an oil em-bargo came up for discussion, Admiral Starkand General Marshall recommended againsttaking the step, on the ground that it wouldforce Japan either to surrender its long-range strategic aims— which w as unlikely—or to strike for oil in the NetherlandsIndies—which would mean war. 4

On 24 July the President proposed to the

THE SHOWDOWN WITH JAPAN 65




Japanese Government announced that theFrench regime at Vichy had consented toadmit Japan to a joint protectorate overFrench Indochina. Japanese forces (whichhad already been stationed in large numbersin northern Indochina) at once extended

military occupation over the entire colony.The President, meanwhile, had an-nounced that he wanted trade with Japanput under a comprehensive controlling orderby which he could at will reduce or increaseoil shipments to Japan. On 26 July he is-sued an executive order from Hyde Parkfreezing Japanese assets in the United Statesand halting all trade with Japan. TheAmerican press welcomed the President'sorder as an "oil embargo," and as time wenton without any export licenses for oil beingissued, it became evident that, whatever

Stark and Marshall may have believed thePresident was going to do, he had in factimposed an embargo on shipments of oil toJapan. The Dutch and British also joinedin freezing Japanese assets. On the as-

The Singapore Conversations

During the months immediately follow-ing the ABC-1 conversations it was not theplanners in Washington but the Army andNavy staffs in the far Pacific that first took

part in an effort to draw up an allied opera-tional plan against the contingency of aJapanese attack. In April, as agreed be-tween Stark and Marshall, on the one hand,and the British Chiefs, on the other, theBritish Commander in Chief, Far East, con-vened a meeting in Singapore of militaryrepresentatives of the Netherlands, Ameri-can, Australian, and New Zealand Govern-ments for the purpose of devising such a planunder the terms of ABC-1. 7

The American-Dutch-British ( A D B )meetings conducted in Singapore from 21 to

27 April were based on the following as-sumption :Our object is to defeat Germany and her

allies, and hence in the Far East to maintainthe position of the Associated Powers against





be operated from Luzon, expeditions tothreaten Malaya or the Netherlands East In-dies from the East are out-flanked. 8

The representatives worked out a generalstatement of strategy for the whole area,comprehending aid to China, for which theBritish already had a project. The Britishproject called for the operation of air unitsand guerrillas in China, a much less am-bitious program than the one then underdiscussion in Chungking and Washington.The conference arrived at the followingconclusions:

To ensure that we are not diverted fromthe major object of the defeat of Germany andItaly, our main strategy in the Far East atpresent time must be defensive. There are,however, certain measures open to us whichwill assist greatly in the defence of our inter-ests in the Far East, but which are themselvesoffensive.

It is important to organise air operationsagainst Japanese occupied territory andagainst Japan herself. It is probable that hercollapse will occur as a result of economicblockade, naval pressure and air bombard-ment. This latter form of pressure is the mostdi t d hi h J ti l l f

entry of the United States of America, theBritish Empire, and the Netherlands East In-dies into a war against Japan would auto-matically restrict Japanese trade to that withthe coast of Asia. Since China will be in thewar against her, and our submarine and airforces should be able to interfere considerablywith trade from Thailand and Indo-China, a

very large measure of economic blockadewould thus be forced upon Japan from theoutset. 9

Maj. Gen. George Grunert, who was incommand in the Philippines, and his as-sistant chief of staff, Col. Allan C. McBride,who had represented him at Singapore, both

perceived that the recommendations of theSingapore conference were out of keepingwith existing American plans. In forward-ing the conference report to Washington,Grunert called attention to the discrepancy:

It will be noted that the conference em -phasized the importance of the Philippines,particularly Luzon, as a strategic area fornaval and air bases from which offensive op-erations could be conducted against Japaneseterritory and sea communications, and as ofadvantage to the Japanese in the event theywere captured hence the recommendation




THE S OW OW WITH J 67

The Army and Navy staffs in Washing-ton came to much the same conclusion andso informed the British military mission,declaring, moreover, that the United Statesintended "to adhere to its decision not toreenforce the Philippines except in minorparticulars." 11 More than a month later,early in July, Admiral Stark and GeneralMarshall formally stated that they couldnot approve the ADB report because it wasat variance with ABC-1 and did not con-stitute a "practical operating plan for theFar East Area." They, too, announcedthat the United States was not planning toreinforce the Philippines as recommendedin the report b u t , in significantly morecautious terms,

Because of the greater needs of otherstrategic areas, the United States is not nowable to provide any considerable additionalreenforcement to the Philippines. Underpresent world conditions, it is not consideredpossible to hope to launch a strong offensivefrom the Philippines. 12

Reinforcement of the Philippines

1941, comprehended the forces of the Phil-ippine Department, and the PhilippineArmy, which by presidential proclamationwas called into the service of the UnitedStates for the duration of the emergency.General MacArthur, who had completedhis tour of duty as Chief of Staff in the fallof 1935, had since 1936 been serving asMilitary Advisor to the new Common-wealth Government of the Philippines. Toassume command of USAFFE, he wascalled back to active duty with the rank ofmajor general and was at once promoted tothe rank of lieutenant general. 13

The War Department staff, which ap-parently learned of the whole transactiononly after it had been arranged with Gen-eral MacArthur, began to modify its plansto suit the new situation. 14 The staff atonce recommended, and General Marshallapproved, sending guns, light tanks, andantitank ammunition to the Philippines.The dispatch of 425 Reserve officers was ap-proved the next day, and a little later, inresponse to a request from USAFFE, the




Marshall declared that it was the policy ofthe United States to defend the Philippines,with the qualification that the execution ofthe policy would not "be permitted to jeop-ardize the success of the major efforts madein the theater of the Atlantic." 16

The shift in plans continued in early Au-gust as the War Department scheduled addi-tional shipments of arms, troops, and equip-ment for the Philippines. Soon after assum-ing command of USAFFE, General Mac-Arthur had been notified that plans wereunder way to send him twenty-five 75-mm.guns during September, another twenty-fiveduring October; a company of M3 lighttanks as soon as possible; a regiment ofantiaircraft artillery (National Guard) assoon as legislative authority for their re-tention in the service was secured; and 24,-000 rounds of 37-mm. antitank ammuni-tion.17 Following a staff conference on 15August, General Marshall approved plansfor the shipment to the Philippines of tank,antiaircraft, and ordnance units—about2,350 men—by 5 September. All necessary

manent improvements except as a measureof economy." 19

At the same time the terms and probableconsequences of American Far Easternpolicy became more sharply defined. On6 August Ambassador Kichisaburo Nomurapresented his government's proposal for asettlement in the Far East. The JapaneseGovernment proposed that the UnitedStates should abandon its current policies—aid to China, refusal to recognize the statusof Japan in Indochina, control and virtualelimination of trade with Japan, and thereinforcement of the Philippines. In re-turn , Japan offered not to advance beyondIndochina, to evacuate Indochina when the"China Incident" was terminated, and, "atan opportune time," to guarantee the neu-trality of the Philippines. 20

A few days later, at the Atlantic Confer-ence off Argentia, Newfoundland, the Brit-ish presented a draft, "Parallel Communi-cations to the Japanese Government," fo radoption by the British, Netherlands, andAmerican Governments, containing the




did not act on this proposal—which would,in effect, have committed the United Statesto joint action with the British and theDutch, but, shortly after his return from theconference, the American Government in-dependently notified Japan to much thesame effect, on a strictly American basis.In a note given to Ambassador Nomura on17 August, the United States declared:

This Government now finds it necessary tosay to the Government of Japan that if theJapanese Government takes any further stepsin pursuance of a policy or program of mili-tary domination by force or threat of force of

neighboring countries, the Government of theUnited States will be compelled to take im-mediately any and all steps which it may deemnecessary toward safeguarding the legitimaterights and interests of the United States andAmerican nationals and toward insuring thesafety and security of the United States. 21

This action gave added significance to theestablishment of USAFFE. By early fall theWar Department staff regarded it as Amer-ican policy to reinforce the Philippines asmuch as possible in order to "deter or min-imize" Japanese aggression even though

that has led the planners so often to rejectthe idea, grew out of a new approach tothe problem of operations in the westernPacific, involving the use of long-rangeArmy bombers to neutralize Japanese offen-sive capabilities. The Army Air Corps'long-range bomber, the B-17, had gone intoproduction in 1938. Lack of funds andcompetition with other types of planes andproduction had delayed deliveries of B-17's,and by the summer of 1941 not a singleArmy Air Forces group was completelyequipped with the "modernized" B-17.But enough planes were coming off the as-sembly lines to justify planning for opera-tions.23 By deferring the fulfilment ofother urgent requirements for the B-17—topatrol the approaches to Hawaii, the Pan-ama Canal, Alaska, and the continentalUnited States—and by deferring plans fo rstrategic bombing across the

Atlantic, a

fairly strong bomber force might be built upin the Philippines by early 1942 to take theplace of the strong naval forces that neitherthe U. S. Navy, on the one hand, nor the




port of the Philippines. 24 A bomber forcewould threaten the movement of Japanesenaval units and Japanese troop and cargoshipping south of Formosa, thus coveringthe Philippines and its communicationssouth to the Netherlands Indies. By devel-oping this threat, the United States might beable to force the Japanese either to accept astate of armed neutrality in the far Pacific,freeing American and British forces for op-erations against Germany, or to open hos-tilities before American forces should be-come heavily engaged across the Atlantic.In either case the U. S. Army was partlyinsured against the risk of being called uponto send large forces across both oceans inthe early stages of hostilities.

In early August the Secretary of War ap-proved a program for sending modernplanes to the Philippines as soon as they be-

came available. The Air Force, USAFFE,formerly the Philippine Department AirForce, then consisted of one squadron of P-40B's, two squadrons of P-35A's, onesquadron of P-26A's, and two squadrons of

ferried the first B-17's to Hawaii in May,was selected for permanent transfer to thePhilippines and given priority in assignmentof B-l7's. 25 Yet so urgent was the need forheavy bombers in the Far East that the AAFdid not wait for the 19th Group to pioneeran air route to the Philippines. A provi-sional squadron from the Hawaiian AirForce flew from Hawaii via Wake and Aus-tralia to Manila in September. As B-17'sbecame available in October and Novemberthey were flown to the Philippines. By thesecond week of November it was planned tosend "all modernized" B-17's from theUnited States to the Far East. 26

The South Pacific Ferry Route

A corollary to the program of reinforcingthe Philippines was the development of analternate route for ferrying bombers to thePhilippines, less exposed to Japanese at-tack than the route via Midway and Wake.It was necessary both to develop and todefend such a route, not only in order to



Shipping Schedules

It quickly became the main immediateconcern of the War Department to gettroops and equipment to the Philippines.Nearly all the shipping availab le to the Armyin the Pacific was assigned to this task, andthe Army was also relying on the use of twolarge transports which had earlier beentransferred to the Navy to help move thelarge forces involved in the initial plan tooccupy Iceland. When, in August, theNavy proposed the immediate conversion ofthe transports Mount Vernon, Wakefield,and West Point to aircraft carriers, thoughfor th e purpose of supplying Army planesand personnel to the overseas bases as wellas for Navy use, the Army took strong ex-ception, pointing out that no large troopmovement approaching 12,000 troops ormore could be carried out without the useof at least two of these ships. 29 The JointBoard, taking up the problem recom-mended, on 15 October 1941, that the Armywithdraw its objections to the conversion

its troop reinforcements to General Ma c -Arthur in smaller increments which couldbe carried on ships available in Novemberand December. 31

The schedule of shipments finally estab-lished in November provided fo r sendingto the Philippines some 20,000 troops,about one third of them Air Forces units, oneleven troopships to sail from San Franciscobetween 21 November and 9 December1941. 32 The Holbrook, carrying 2,000troops and equipment ( t h e 147th FieldArtillery Regiment and the 148th FieldArtillery Regiment minus one battalion),and the Republic carrying 2,630 troops andequipment (the 2d Battalion of the 131stField Artillery Regiment, the 7th Bombard-ment Group, and 48 Air Corps officers),sailed from San Francisco 21-22 Novem-ber. Convoyed by the USS Pensacola,they were due to arrive in the Philippineson 4 January 1942. Sailings for 15,000troops were scheduled for 5-9 December.The President Johnson with 2,500 troops( the 2d Battalion of the 138th Field Artil-



a significant contribution to the militarycapabilities of China. 36

Yunnan War Scare

At the end of October, Chiang Kai-shekadvised General Magruder that he fearedthe Japanese were about to attack Yunnanand seize Kunming, thereby cutting theBurma Road. In the Generalissimo's opin-ion, Kunming was the key city of the FarEast—if it were lost, China would fall, theJapanese would attack Malaysia, and noth-ing could stop war in the Pacific. Air sup-port would be the only help that couldreach China in time. The Generalissimoasked General Magruder to inform Wash-ington that he desired President Rooseveltto intercede with the British Government tohave air support furnished China by Britishair forces at Singapore. In addition, hewished the United States to bring diplo-matic pressure to bear on the Japanese.General Magruder concurred in Chiang'sestimate that only British or American air

It is desirable that large Japanese forcesbe kept involved in China. However, fromthe larger viewpoint, prospective Chinese de-feat would not warrant involvement of theUnited States, at this time, in war with Japan.

Political and economic measures should beused wherever effective to deter Japaneseaction.

Most effective aid to China, as well as tothe defense of Singapore and the NetherlandsEast Indies, is now being built up by rein-forcement of the Philippines. The safety ofLuzon as an air and submarine base shouldsoon be reasonably assured by the arrival ofair and ground reinforcements. Strong diplo-matic and economic pressure may be exertedfrom the military viewpoint at the earliestabout the middle of December, 1941, whenthe Philippine Air Force will have become apositive threat to Japanese operations. Itwould be advantageous, if practicable, to de-lay severe diplomatic and economic pressureuntil February or March, 1942, when thePhilippine Air Force will have reached itsprojected strength, and a safe air route,through Samoa, will be in operation.

Material aid to China should be acceleratedconsonant with the studied needs of Russiaand Great Britain.

Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China




question, and Admiral Stark and GeneralMarshall recommended to the PresidentThat the dispatch of United States armed

forces for direct aid to China be unfavorablyconsidered.

That material aid to China be acceleratedconsonant with the needs of Russia, GreatBritain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Groupbe continued and accelerated to the maximumextent.

That no further ultimatum be issued toJapan. 39

Finally, on 8 November, Dr. Soong askedthe President for one third of the Navy'sdive bombers, and submitted a restatementof Chinese ordnance demands, withoutwhich, he stated, the Chinese could nothope to resist a Japanese attack on Kun-ming. The War Department replied toSoong, as it was advising General Magruder,that all the United States could do wasspeed the flow of lend-lease supplies andfacilitate the build-up of the American Vol-unteer Group. 40

This statement of policy was in accord-h W D ' d i

send them to China, later allocating to theU.S. troops 90-mm. guns then on lend-leaseorder. 41 In a telephone conversation withCol. Victor V. Taylor of Defense Aid, on 4November, General Marshall explained, "itwould be an outrage for me to deny to Mac-Arthur something that we send on a round

about voyage up into China and I can't giveany to MacArthur because I've got theseregiments with only one battery, that . . .have been in now for a year . . . ." 42 Thisremark summed up the whole problem ofthe War Department—a disparity betweenpolicy and capabilities that answered theirworst fears. The last hope was that theJapanese, upon learning—as they soon mustlearn—that the United States was fully com-mitted, might reconsider. General Ma r-shall fixed on 10 December as the date ofthe arrival of the first "really effective re-inforcements" in the Philippines, observingthat "after that date, but not before," itwould be advantageous for the Japanese tolearn of them. 43




British staff continued to seek an under-standing on the terms o f American militarycollaboration in the event of war withJapan. In August, at the Atlantic Con-ference, it was agreed that the British Chiefsof Staff would prepare a fresh draft of theADB report to bring it into accord withABC-1. Two months later the U. S.Chiefs of Staff rejected also this draft(ADB-2) as not meeting the "present sit-uation in the Far East." 44

As the situation in the Far East movedtoward a climax, the British informed the

Americans that they were forming a capitalship force to send to Far Eastern waters.At the same time the British First Sea Lord,Admiral Pound, wrote to Admiral Stark:

I do not consider that either ADB-1 orADB-2 meet the new conditions [change ofgovernment in Japan] and I would suggestthat the need for a conference to draw upstrategic operating plans for Far Eastern Areabased afresh on ABC-1 has now becomeurgent. ... If you agree in principle to theabandoning of further discussions on ABD-1

should be implemented by a sound strategi-ca l operating plan" drawn up between Brit-ish, Dutch, and United States naval andair forces.46 Less than a week later anothercommunication from the United StatesChiefs of Staff to the British, acknowledgingthe 5 November message, "cordially" con-curred in the British decision to send morevessels to Singapore. They indicated thatthe American reinforcements were on theway to the Far East and urged the Britishto send air reinforcements to Singaporewithout delay "as a powerful deterrentagainst a possible Japanese move to theSouth." They reiterated that "ADB-1 andADB-2 do not meet the new conditionsabout to be established in the Far EastArea," and stated that "ABC-1 with cer-tain revisions of assigned tasks is an appro-priate major directive upon which satisfac-tory operating plans can be directly based."Finally, the United States Chiefs of Staffsuggested new conferences to be held inManila by Vice Adm. Sir Tom Phillips,



spot" in terms of their own problems.48

Be-fore the outbreak of war in the Pacific, Gen-eral MacArthur was able to report on hisdiscussions with Admiral Hart and AdmiralPhillips, and on 7 December listed thearrangements he proposed to effect with theNavy and—unless otherwise directed—withArmy and Air commanders of "potentialallies." 49

The noncommittal attitude that theAmerican planners continued to exhibitduring the late summer and fall of 1941toward American collaboration in the de-fense of the Malay Barrier had actually sur-vived the view of national strategic policywith which it had originally been associ-ated—the assumption that American forceswould not be committed to that area. Itowed its survival largely to the circumstancethat the United States, although it had as-sumed great military obligations in the FarEast, had assumed them independently andon terms that virtually precluded close col-laboration between the British and Amer-ican military staffs. American plans fo r

quirements but also to make the defense ofthe Burma line of communication to Chinafar more important to the United Statesthan it was to the British themselves, whowere planning to make their main standagainst the Japanese before Singapore. TheBritish preoccupation with Singapore wasalso irreconcilable with American policy inthe Southwest Pacific. The United Stateswas undertaking to make the Philippines de-fensible. The very likelihood that the Jap-anese would forestall the completion of thisundertaking raised questions of Americanpolicy so obvious and so fundamental thatno one except the President of the UnitedStates could open formal discussion of them.He did not do so, and the military staffswere therefore obliged to avoid the momen-tous question whether the United States inthat contingency would withdraw from op-erations in the Southwest Pacific or con-tribute to the defense of the Malay Barrier.

Reaction to Pearl Harbor




Admiral Stark continued to the last to seekmore time. They informed the President,on 27 November, that "if the current nego-tiation ended without agreement, Japanmight attack: The Burma Road; Thailand;Malaya; the Netherlands East Indies; thePhilippines; the Russian Maritime Prov-inces." They observed that "the most es-sential thing now, from the United Statesviewpoint, is to gain time." Although con-siderable Navy and Army reinforcementshad been rushed to the Philippines, "the de-sirable strength" had not yet been reached.Ground forces totaling 21,000, they de-clared, were to sail from the United Statesby 8 December and it was "important thatthis troop reinforcement reach the Philip-pines before hostilities commence." FinallyMarshall and Stark recommended: "Pre-cipitance of military action on our partshould be avoided so long as consistent withnational policy." 51

In the first week of December ominousintelligence reports began to arrive withnews of Japanese naval and troop move-

nese were up to some "deviltry" was clear,but precisely when and where they wouldstrike was not clear. On the morning of7 December, while official Washingtonanxiously reflected on the hard decisionthat the President might have to make—incase Japan should strike in the area of theSouth China Sea, bypassing for the momentthe Philippines—the War Departmentlearned, through an intercepted Japanesemessage, that Japan would present to theUnited States later in the day a note whichwould put an end to further negotiations.At noon last-minute warning messages weresent by the War Department to the Philip-pines, Hawaii, Panama, and the west coast.Through a series of fateful mishaps themessage to Army headquarters at FortShafter, Hawaii, was delayed in trans-mittal. 53 While it was still on its way, thefirst wave of Japanese carrier-basedplanes—whose approach had gone, not un-detected, but unheeded—came in from thenorth and leveled off for their bombing runover the Pacific Fleet riding at anchor un-



THE SHOW DOW N WITH JAPAN 8157



possible.57

During the first week of war,though there were many other affairs thatdemanded and shared his attention, Gen-eral Marshall spent several hours daily atArmy staff conferences and Joint Boardmeetings that were mainly taken up withmeasures to reinforce Hawaii, Panama, and

the west coast.58

The movements to whichhe was most attentive were quite small—themovement of antiaircraft guns and six regi-ments of antiaircraft artillery to the westcoast, the movement to Hawaii of thirty-six heavy bombers (by air) and (by trainand ship) of ammunition, 110 pursuitplanes, and some 7,000 men with their unitequipment. In addition the War Depart-ment ordered ammunition, air warningequipment, eighty pursuit planes, nine heavybombers, and 16,000 men sent to Panama asfast as possible, and two pursuit groups andlarge ground forces (including two infan-try divisions) to the west coast. It was anenormous job for the War Department asthen constituted to keep track of these hur-ried movements, especially movements of

munitions. Marshall insisted that his im-mediate subordinates "follow up" on them,especially the very officers upon whom healso relied for plans an d recommendationson strategy—Arnold, Gerow, and the mem-bers of their staffs.59

Behind their immediate fear of air raids

on vital installations was the knowledge thatthe Japanese had forestalled Americanplans to bring American military strengthin the far Pacific up to that required tocarry out American foreign policy in theFar East. The Far Eastern Air Force inbeing, though forewarned, was still by no

means equipped, trained, or organized todefend an outpost so far from the UnitedStates and so near to Japan. 60 The resultsof the first Japanese raids of 8 Decemberon the Philippine Islands were a con-vincing demonstration. They left Mac-Arthur with only seventeen heavy bombersand fewer than seventy pursuit planes. 61

59 For movement of antiaircraft units and equip-ment in the United States, and of planes, ammuni-tion, and units to Hawaii and Panama, and Mar-




His air force, already half destroyed, wasscarcely more of a threat to Japanese opera-tions than the submarines and inshore patrolleft behind in the Philippines by AdmiralHart's Asiatic Fleet. 62 The Japanese werefree not only to land in the Philippines butalso to move forces southward into the

Netherlands Indies with every chance toisolate the Philippines before reinforce-ments should arrive in the area. It washard to avoid the conclusion that the UnitedStates must accept the loss of the Philippinesas inevitable and concentrate on strengthen-ing the local defenses of Hawaii, Panama,Alaska, and the west coast.

Up to this point the War and Navy De-partments were in substantial agreement. 63

But Secretary Stimson went further. Hehad been in entire accord with the growingfirmness of American policy toward Japanduring 1941, and was convinced that toshow any sign of an intention to withdrawfrom the conflict, even temporarily, woulddiscredit the whole policy. He understood,moreover, that the people of the United

with the professional soldiers and the Amer-ican people a strong sense of obligation to doeverything humanly possible to supportMacArthur's forces. As he had good reasonto expect, Marshall supported and the Presi-dent shared and approved his views. Allagreed that it did not matter what the likeli-

hood was of getting reinforcements to thePhilippines nor what risks the attempt mightentail. The United States could not with-draw from th e Southwest Pacific.

The Pensacola Convoy

The development of this policy openedwith a decision on a specific problem—thedisposition of five ships bound for Manila,unde r the escort of the U SS Pensacola, thathad been in the South Pacific on 7 Decem-ber. This convoy, the vanguard of severalthat had been scheduled to arrive in thePhilippines during the early winter, put inat Suva in the Fiji Islands to await orders.There were some 4,500 men aboard, in-cluding one regiment and two battalions of




he had to consider the position of Mac-Arthur, and the assurance he had includedin the instructions he had sent him on theafternoon of 7 December: "You have thecomplete confidence of the War Depart-ment and we assure you of every possibleassistance and support within our power." 66

He could not reconcile this pledge with theJoint Board's decision of 9 December.

The next morning Marshall stated theproblem at the close of a conference withStimson, Gerow, and two of the latter'sassistants. 67 He "pointed to the catas-trophe that would develop if Hawaii shouldbecome a Japanese base, and he said thatthis thought was guiding the Navy in itsactions." On the matter of the convoy,Marshall said that... he was concerned with just what to sayto General MacArthur. He did not like totell him in the midst of a very trying situationthat his convoy had had to be turned back,and he would like to send some news whichwould buck General MacArthur up. 68

Secretary Stimson at once went to thePresident, who ended the impasse by askingthe Joint Board to reconsider its decision.The Joint Board took up the President'srequest at its meeting that afternoon:

In view of the President's desire that theManila-bound convoy continue to the Far

East, concurred in by the Secretary of War,the Board weighed the following factors:a. The risk involved in proceeding to Aus-

tralia as compared to the risk in returning toHawaii.

b. The possibility of ultimately getting someof the supplies, in particular airplanes andammunition, into the Philippines.

c. The utility of the supplies to the DutchEast Indies or Australia should it not be pos-sible to deliver them to Manila. In partic-ular, some might be available to defend theNavy base at Port Darwin.

d. The immediate requirements of theOahu garrison fo r defensive material.

e. The capability of supplying Oahu with

defense material from the United States.During the discussion that followed, Armymembers abandoned the position they hadtaken the day before and instead advancedh i i h H ii ld b li d

66 Msg (originator W P D ) , Marshall to Mac-



On Sunday, 14 December, Stimson wentover the problem with Marshall, and foundthat he, too, felt that the United States couldnot abandon the effort, however desperate,since to do so would be to "paralyze the ac-tivities of everybody in the Far East." TheSecretary again went to the President, who

at once agreed and instructed the Navy toco-operate. 74 The War Department there-upon assured M acArthur :

Your messages of December thirteenth andfourteenth have been studied by the President.The strategic importance of the Philippinesis fully recognized and there has been and

will be no repeat no wavering in the determi-nation to support you. The problem of sup-ply is complicated by Naval losses in thePacific but as recommended in yours of De-cember fourteenth bomber and pursuit rein-forcements are to be rushed to you. Keep usadvised of the situation as you see i t. 75

On 15 December Marshall ordered two

transports to be loaded to take pursu it planesand ammunition to Australia.76 On thefollowing day and the morning of 17 De-cember two additional shipments were

h d l d hi h ld b i 230 h

Australia to the Philippines was somethingelse again. General Marshall had askedAdmiral Stark to see whether the Navywould make an aircraft carrier available. 78

Meanwhile, General Arnold was hurryingpreparations to send eighty heavy bombers(B-24's) via Cairo, three a day, for use in

ferrying critical supplies between Australiaand the Philippines. 79

Conferences on Coalition Strategyagainst Japan

The determination to do what was pos-sible did not signify that the War Depart-ment thought there was much chance of sav-ing the Philippines. But it did representa step in defining American strategy in thePacific. The President, in adopting thepolicy of reinforcing the Philippines, hadclearly indicated the direction of Americanstrategy in the Far Eastern area. The nextstep was to correlate American strategy withthe plans of the other powers arrayed againstJapan. Several days before Roosevelt de -


83



representative) to consult on strategy on theAsiatic mainland, and one at Singapore toconsult on operations in the Southwest Pa-cific. The purpose of these meetings wasto consider plans to occupy Japanese forceson all fronts in an effort to prevent themfrom concentrating forces on one objective

after another.81

M a j . G e n . George H.Brett, then in India, was designated the WarDepartment representative for the proposedChungking conference, to be assisted byGeneral Magruder, already in Chungking.Lt. Col. Francis G. Brink, the U. S. militaryobserver in Singapore, was named War De-partment representative for the conversa-tions at Singapore.

The President may have been under theimpression that Japanese forces were over-extended, presenting, in the words of Mac-Arthur, a "golden opportunity" for a mas-

ter stroke." General MacArthur himselfhoped that the Soviet Union would takeadvantage of the opportunity, and the WarDepartment at first shared his hope. 82 But

Soviet Union was not going to do so.MacArthur for some time persisted in thebelief that the U. S. Pacific Fleet shouldmake a diversionary counterattack west ofHawaii, but the fleet was actually much tooweak to do so.84 The Chinese Army wasincapable of offensive action. There was,therefore, no real threat to prevent the Jap-anese from concentrating air and navalstrength against one after another of thewidely separated positions then held by theAllies in the Southwest Pacific and south-eastern Asia.

The conferences held at Chungking (17and 23 December) and at Singapore (18and 20 December) nevertheless served todemonstrate that the United States Gov-ernment was not preparing to withdrawfrom the Far Eastern war but was, instead,determined to take a more active part. 85

83 Msg, Stalin to Chiang Kai-shek, 12 Dec 41,translated copy, initialed by Gen Gerow and BrigGen Dwight D. Eisenhower, in Tab China, Book 1,Exec 8.



B. Clagett was ordered from the Philippinesto take over command from Barnes untilBrett arrived.

The forces in Australia thus became thenucleus of a new overseas command eventhough they were still part of MacArthur'sU. S. Army Forces in the Far East and had

the primary mission of getting vitally neededsupplies to the Philippines. 91 It was evidentthat the establishment of this new commandimplied a more comprehensive strategy inthe Southwest Pacific than the desperateeffort to prolong the defense of the Philip-pines. Stimson at once saw this and statedthe thesis very clearly to three of his civilianassistants:

I laid before them the issue which was nowpending before us, namely as to whether weshould make every effort possible in the FarEast or whether, like the Navy, we shouldtreat that as doomed and let it go. We all

agreed that the first course was the one tofollow; that we have a very good chance ofmaking a successful defense, taking the south-western Pacific as a whole. If we are drivenout of the Philippines and Singapore, we cantill f ll back on the Netherlands East Indies

is taking steps to make a solid base at PortDarwin in Australia. 92

During the following week events madeit clear to all concerned that the UnitedStates was committing itself to the defenseof the Southwest Pacific, in collaborationwith its allies, and not simply to the rein-

forcement of the Philippines. The Manila-bound convoy arrived at Brisbane on 22 De-cember. On the same day General Clagettflew in from the Philippines to take tempo-rary command of Army forces in Australia,pending the arrival of Brett. Clagett re-ported that, after the unloading of the air-

craft, the convoy was to go on to Port Dar-win, picking up its escort from the AsiaticFleet at the Torres Strait (between NewGuinea and Australia), as ordered by Mac-Arthur, in the hope that Marshall wouldget the Navy to try to run the convoythrough to the Philippines. 93 But the Jap-anese had already made their first landingin Sarawak (in Borneo). and another forcewas on its way to Jolo (between Mindanaoand Borneo). The isolation of the Philip-




meanwhile had been getting ready for thei i f L d M A h f

forcements now on their way from theU S A i A t li ld i t th i



invasion of Luzon, and MacArthur foresawthat his forces would have to fall backthrough central Luzon to the final defensivepositions on Bataan peninsula, coveringCorregidor, according to long-establishedplans.96 In view of this estimate of the situ-

ation, the War Department discountedheavily the possibility of any pursuit planesat all getting to the Philippines, even if aroute could be found to fly them northwardfrom island to island. MacArthur was leftto extract such reassurance as he might from

the declaration that the War Departmentwould nevertheless "press in every way forthe development of a strong United Statesair power in the Far East based on Aus-tralia." 97 The same estimate of the situa-tion caused the War Department to sendword to General Brett at Chungking to get

to Australia as quickly as possible "to assumecommand of U. S. Army interests in thatregion." 98 On 24 December MacArthurannounced that he had ordered south to theN h l d I di d A li h

U. S. A. via Australia could arrive at theirdestination." He wanted them to be used"in whatever manner might best serve thejoint cause in the Far East." 00

The plan for establishing a "solid" basein Australia had by that time become a

major commitment of Army air forces. Theimmediate goal was to establish nine com-bat groups in the Southwest Pacific—twoheavy and two medium bombardmentgroups, one light bombardment group, andfour pursuit groups. A part of this force—

one group of medium bombers and two pur-suit groups—w as allocated to the defense ofthe Netherlands Indies. 101

This force represented the largest pro-jected concentration of American air poweroutside the Western Hemisphere, consider-ably larger than the forces that had been

scheduled for shipment to the Philippinesbefore 7 December, and a very substantialpart of the fifty-four groups that the Armyexpected to have by the end of the winter.F th it ld i h i


jected strength would evidently affect al lother strategic plans by further widening

of the men and most of the supplies andequipment would have to be shipped from



other strategic plans, by further wideningthe existing gap between planes and airunits available and planes and air unitsneeded to carry them out.

It was less evident at first, except to staffofficers working on detailed plans, that an-

other immediately critical effect on strategywould be to intensify the shortage of shipsand naval escort vessels. These officers be-gan estimating what it would take to buildairfields in Australia (at Townsville andPort Darwin), to finish building airfields onthe way from Hawaii to Australia, to con-

struct the port facilities required, to defendthese installations against raids, and to quar-ter and ration the troops employed. Most

equipment would have to be shipped fromthe continental United States. The firstdemand on ships and naval escort vesselswas to move goods to the United Kingdom.If the defense of the South and SouthwestPacific came next, what would remain tomeet other Allied demands, to reinforceoverseas garrisons, to deploy Americantroops in the North Atlantic, and to sendexpeditionary forces into the South Atlantic?These hard questions were much in Armyplanners' minds when the first wartime Brit-ish-American staff conference opened in

Washington, 24 December 1941, after twoand a half weeks of American participationin open hostilities.

CHAPTER V



CHAPTER V

The First Full Dress Debate Over

Strategic DeploymentDecember 1941-January 1942

The military conversations that began inWashington during the last week in De-cember 1941, which accompanied the firstwartime meetings of the President with thePrime Minister (the ARCADIA Conference),gave the American military staffs the chanceat once to reassure and to warn the Britishstaff concerning the military effects ofAmerican reaction to the Japanese attack. 1

On 14 December the Prime Minister andhis party, which included the British Chiefs

(v ) Set up joint machinery for implement-ing ( ii) , ( iii) and (iv). 2

Several of the War Department plan-ners, working together, hurriedly prepared"notes" on the British message.

Although the Army planners had some-thing to say in their notes about each of thefive points raised by the British Chiefs ofStaff, the discussions among staff officersthat followed and the discussions of the mili-tary leaders with the President amounted


unity of purpose. The possible movementsinvolving U S Army forces fell under five

Prime Minister then went to Florida forseveral days to rest After his return he and



involving U. S. Army forces fell under fivemain headings: (1) establishment of an airforce based in Australia; (2 ) strengtheningof other positions in the Pacific, especiallyin Hawaii; (3 ) reinforcement of Britishtroops in the Middle East; (4) "acquisition"of positions in the South Atlantic—in north-eastern Brazil, the Cape Verde Islands, oron the western or northwestern coast ofAfrica; and (5) relief of British garrisons inNorthern Ireland an d Iceland (and of theU. S. Marine provisional brigade on dutyin Iceland). The Army was most certainof the immediate need to undertake move-ments under the first heading, and the Presi-dent was most precise about the immediateneed for movements under the last heading.

The exchange of views indicated that thePresident and Chiefs of Staff were alike un-certain how to proceed with the discussionof strategy until they had had a chance totalk with their British opposites. As the con-ference was to show, much more clearlythan had yet been shown or could have

several days to rest. After his return he andthe President held two more meetings withthe Chiefs of Staff, on 12 and 14 January.Mr. Hopkins, Lord Beaverbrook, and (usu-ally) the Secretary of War and the Secre-tary of the Navy attended along with the

Chiefs of Staff and the senior planners. Atthese plenary sessions at the White Housethe President and the Prime Ministerreached or confirmed their military deci-sions, after a review of the conclusions ofthe Chiefs of Staff.4

The Army planners apparently expectedthat, after the preliminary British-Americanmeetings, the scope of military conversationswould be extended to include the represent-atives of Australia, China, and the SovietUnion. 5 But the military conversations atARCADIA—unlike the political conversa-tions, which led to the drafting and signingof the Declaration of the United Nations—involved only the British and Americanstaffs.

The British and American Chiefs of Staff




perhaps as early as the summer of 1943, "inseveral of the following countries namelyready to urge the idea of "the mass invasionof the continent of Europe as the goal for



p p y ,several of the following countries, namely,Norway, Denmark, Holland, Belgium, theFrench Channel coasts and the French At-lantic coasts, as well as in Italy and possiblythe Balkans." He explained:

In principle, the landings should be made

by armoured and mechanised forces capableof disembarking not at ports but on beaches,either by landing-craft or from ocean-goingships specially adapted. The potential frontof attack is thus made so wide that the Ger-man forces holding down these differentcountries cannot be strong enough at allpoints. An amphibious outfit must be p re-

pared to enable these large-scale disembarka-tions to be made swiftly and surely. The van-guards of the various British and Americanexpeditions should be marshalled by the springof 1943 in Iceland, the British Isles, and , ifpossible, in French Morocco and Egypt. Themain body would come direct across theocean.

It need not be assumed that great numbersof men are required. If the incursion of thearmoured formations is successful, the upris-ing of the local population, for whom weap-ons must be brought, will supply the corpus

h lib i F d

of the continent of Europe as the goal for1943," in three phases; first, "Closing thering"; second, "Liberating the popula-tions"; and third, "Final assault on theGerman citadel." 12 But the version ofBritish grand strategy that they presented

for consideration to the American Chiefs—unlike the version they had presented inAugust—was not at all explicit on the man-ner of invading the Continent, althoughquite explicit about British aims in theMediterranean. This version, presented bythe British Chiefs of Staff on their arrival in

Washington, began with a statement ofagreed principles, leading to the agreed con-clusion "that only the minimum of forcenecessary for the safeguarding of vital in-terests in other theaters should be divertedfrom operations against Germany." TheBritish Chiefs then went on to develop cer-

tain corollaries. First they listed the essen-tial features of grand strategy:

The realisation of the victory programmeof armaments, which first and foremost re-

FIRST DEBATE OVER STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT 101

stage was that of "Closing and tighteningthe ring round Germany," which they de-

with the Harriman mission. As he re-ported, they looked forward to using North



the ring round Germany, which they defined as "a line running roughly as follows:Archangel-Black Sea-Anatolia-the North-ern Seaboard of the Mediterranean-theWestern Seaboard of Europe." They ex-plained :

The main object will be to strengthen thisring, and close the gaps in it, by sustaining theRussian front, by arming and supportingTurkey, by increasing our strength in theMiddle East, and by gaining possession of thewhole North African coast.

They looked forward to limited offensives

on the Continent as the next stage, conceiv-ably in 1942 but more probably in 1943,"either across the Mediterranean or fromTurkey into the Balkans, or by simultaneouslandings in several of the occupied countriesof North-Western Europe." They pro-posed that the allocation of troops and mate-

riel should provide fo r carrying out suchoperations as a "prelude" to the assault onGermany, the direction and scale of whichwould evidently depend on the development

13

ported, they looked forward to using NorthAfrica "as a stepping stone to cutting Italyout, and finally closing in on the continent."As previously instructed by General Mar-shall, Colonel Bundy had been entirely non-committal as to the War Department view. 14

The American planners had remainednoncommittal. They did not go so far asto propose that the United States shouldeither accept or reject the British concept ofthe transition from the defensive to theoffensive against Germany. Before 7 De-cember the nearest they had come to stat-

ing a principle to govern decisions duringthe transitional period was to emphasize theneed for economy of effort in "subsidiary"theaters. They classified as subsidiarytheaters not only the Far East but alsoAfrica, the Middle East, the Iberian Penin-sula, and the Scandinavian Peninsula, in

accordance with their premise that theplains of northwest Europe constituted themain theater, where "we must come togrips with the enemy ground forces." 15 At




The current British successes in Libyawere merely the latest occasion for reviving

In August 1941, during the staff talks thataccompanied the conference of the Presi-



the expectation that influential Frenchleaders might "invite" an Allied occupa-tion of North Africa, in anticipation of theirbeing no longer bound or protected by theterms of the French-German armistice and

their loyalty to the government at Vichy.The Prime Minister believed it essential tobe ready to take advantage of this disposi-tion, in the hope of gaining important mili-tary objectives at small cost. He hoped toseize the moment when the cost would beleast—when French forces, released from

their allegiance to any government inmetropolitan France, might even help in-stead of opposing the operation—certainlymuch less than it would later become, whenthe Germans would have established politi-cal and military control over North Africa.

The American military staff was familiar

with the project of occupying French NorthAfrica. A statement of the advantages tobe gained from such a move had appearedin a report written for the Joint Board in

dent and the Prime Minister aboard thePrince of Wales, the British staff had men-tioned the project as one of the means bywhich early American intervention would"revolutionize" the military situation. TheAmerican

planners, in commenting

on thispoint in late September, had advised theJoint Board that the United States did notthen have "land forces adequate in strengthand suitably equipped for operations inNorth Africa." They added that the suc-cess of such an operation as the United

States might launch would depend largelyon co-operation by French forces, and thatFrench co-operation was too uncertain toplan on. 21 This remained the Americanposition till the time of the ARCADIA.Con-ference.

American planning during 1941 had pro-

vided for assembling an expeditionary forcefor possible use in the South Atlantic duringth e period after full mobilization. Themost ambitious task contemplated for such


General Marshall ordered Maj. Gen. JosephW. Stilwell to Washington with the inten-

posed to attack through Spanish Morocco,and since lack of port facilities, railroads,



tion of putting him in command of an ex-peditionary force to be made ready for anoperation against Dakar. 24

Even this operation, according to theArmy planning staff, was more than the

United States should try.25

Col. MatthewB. Ridgway had the occasion to explain forVice President Henry A. Wallace why theUnited States should not carry out the op-eration. Ridgway explained that. . . difficulties of troop movement and logis-tical support by sea of the forces required,

would in my opinion, make this a very haz-ardous operation at this time, in view of ship-ping shortages and the ability of German andGerman-controlled forces to arrive in thatarea much more rapidly than ours could.

I added that in my opinion there was apsychological factor of tremendous import-ance. Our first major effort must be insured

of success beyond any reasonable doubt, fo rfailure would react to our profound disadvan-tage at home and abroad. 26

For operations in North Africa, againsthi h h bj i li d i h

and roads would slow the whole operation.The staff was also inclined to object to land-ings in northwest Africa as a diversionaryoperation, concluding that even the attain-ment of the final objective of control of all

North Africa, although "tremendouslyfavorable" to the anti-Axis powers, wouldbe only an "indirect contribution to the de-feat of the Nazis." 8

After the Prime Minister had made hisproposal, a far stronger statement of theseviews was drawn up by Maj. Gen. Stanley

D. Embick, who continued to be Marshall'ssenior adviser on grand strategy. GeneralEmbick objected to the British views onoperations in North Africa and the Mediter-ranean as "persuasive rather than rational"and as "motivated more largely by politicalthan by sound strategic purposes." He ob-

jected first of all to the assumption that thecontrol of North Africa was of so great stra-tegic importance, dissenting from the "sug-gestion that Allied occupation of North


that would be required if that area becomes atheater of operations prior to the time theGerman military machine is materially weak

effect, to have American troops somewherein active fighting across the Atlantic. 31



German mil i tary machine is materially weak-ened.He specifically foresaw "continuous andheavy losses" of troop carriers and navalescort which the United States and GreatBritain could ill afford and a serious risk ofstrong counterattack by German forcesthrough Spanish Morocco, at the end of aline of communication "completely pro-tected save for the short passage at theStrait." He concluded by expressing theconviction "that our acceptance of a com-mitment in North West Africa at this time,would prove to be a mistake of the first mag-nitude." 29

Whether or not Marshall shared thisview, he was careful not to say. 30 Whathe had to bear in mind was that the PrimeMinister's proposal interested the President.

As a political leader the President wasobliged to weigh essentially political as wellas "strictly" military needs in seeking com-mon ground on which to conduct Allied

To begin "Closing and tightening the ringround Germany" was a course of action ob-viously well adapted to this end. Through-out the conference the American Chiefs ofStaff avoided debate on the soundness of

the strategy of encirclement or of the pro-posed first step in carrying it out, the occu-pation of North Africa. General Stilwell,who had just begun to study the Dakaroperation, was reassigned to this operation.

The Planners' Estimates of the Forces•Required

The President's interest in the Prime Min-ister's proposal made the preparation of apreliminary estimate on operations in FrenchNorth Africa th e first business before theChiefs of Staff and the planners. On 26December the planners presented a draftpaper on the "Northwest Africa Project,"which served to show on what scale theoperation would have to be begun given


months of the operation—six divisions (in-cluding two armored divisions), supported

i d i (385 f ) d

indicated. They were willing to agree withthe British planners that the initial Britishl di t Al i h ld b ll



by a fair sized air force (385 a i rcraf t) , andby heavy antiaircraft defenses (114 heavyguns and 252 light guns) for port and basefacilities. The American ground forces tak-ing part would be an amphibious division,an armored division, and an infantry divi-sion. The American air units (the mainbody of the air force) would be two pursuitgroups, one medium bomber group, onelight bomber group, and one observationgroup. The British would furnish three di-visions, three fighter squadrons (forty-eight

planes), and the antiaircraft units. Britishand American forces would each providetheir own service units.32

Behind this compromise lay a serious dis-agreement on the concept of the operation.The British originally proposed using onlyone American division (a Marine division),

and about four British divisions during thefirst three months. The Americans orig-inally proposed using during the same pe-riod the equivalent of about one British and

landing at Algiers should be on a smallscale—one armored brigade (about thesame as an American regiment), one in-fantry brigade group (about the same as anAmerican regiment reinforced), threefighter squadrons, and two antiaircraft regi-ments. But they anticipated that ulti-mately the eastward extension of British andAmerican forces from their base on the At-lantic (at Casablanca) would involve largeforces. How large, would depend onwhether the area to be held would be only

the triangle Casablanca-Agadir-Oran, orwould include Algeria. Even in the formercase, the American planners calculated thata ground force of five infantry divisions andtwo armored divisions, supported by an airforce of seven pursuit groups and six to eightbombardment groups (including three

groups of heavy bombers) would be neces-sary. On this basis, the American estimatecalled for transporting over 200,000 men toNorth Africa as against the 100,000 men re-


heaviest attack that the Germans mightlaunch, the staff doubted that the Germans

id d h f gh i t

Africa against possible German attacksthrough Spain and Italy and to open theM dit t " B t b t ti g thi



considered the area of enough importanceto make so heavy an attack, and also pointedout that a force mainly dependent on theAtlantic ports and the rail and road com-munications therefrom could scarcely bemuch larger. 34

Although it was impossible to do anypractical planning by simply splitting thedifference between estimates based on twosuch different views of the North Africanproject, it was necessary for the planners toagree at once on a tentative estimate for sub-

mission to the President and the Prime Min-ister. 35 They therefore settled on a tem-porary compromise, whereby they pre-sented—as upper and lower limits—twosets of figures for ground forces and a fairlyhigh estimate for air forces (some 1,400planes) with a qualification that the size of

British and French forces would be "affectedby the assistance that may be furnished byFrench and Spanish units in North Africa."The force was still not large enough, from

Mediterranean route." But by stating thisobjective, the planners at least made itclear that the force had to be a large one,particularly in air units, which had to bestrong enough to undertake "offensive airoperations against Axis bases and ports inthe Mediterranean area" on which counter-attacks might be based. 36

The Report of the Shipping Experts

The planners at the same time presented

a preliminary study of questions affectingthe priority of projects in the Atlantic. Theprincipal one was availability of troopships.Even before the opening of the conferencethe American staff had been well aware ofthe shortage of American troop shipping. 37

Possibly the British had not fully realized

how little American shipping would beavailable; if so, they very soon learned.On 24 December, at their first meeting, theBritish-American planners set up a special


submitted a formal report on 26 December,with only a general statement on the British

from the British Isles to the Middle Eastand thence to the Far East. 40



shipping shortage but with a completebreakdown of all American troop shipping.The total troop lift of existing Americanflag shipping of all types, including someships not as yet converted to military use,came to about 200,000 men, but a very greatpart of it was already committed to main-taining present Army and Navy forces over-seas and to sending reinforcements alreadyordered. The subcommittee calculatedthat the maximum American troop lift

available for new operations in the Atlanticby mid-January would be about 25,000.Additional capacity would gradually be-come available in the Atlantic for new oper-ations—about 18,000 by 1 February, about15,000 more by 1 March, and an additional24,000 by 1 April.39

The three divisions, air forces, and serviceunits that would compose the Americanpart of the planners' estimated threemonths' force would run well over 60 000

The Relief of British Troops inIceland and Ireland

These reports, taken together, raised a

question to which the Chiefs of Staff and theplanners, British and American alike,needed an answer before they could go veryf a r : Should actual preparations for theNorth African operation, which might ormight not be undertaken, take precedence

over the loading and dispatch of troops formovement in the North Atlantic? TheNorth African operation would obviouslytake precedence over other operations in theAtlantic—the occupation of Brazil, the CapeVerde Islands, the Azores, the CanaryIslands, and Dakar—which were also con-tingent on negotiations with foreign powersand for which there would be little or noneed if the North African operation wereto be launched The movement of troops


the Middle and Far East. Although therewas no immediate prospect of an invasionof the British Isles the British could dispatch

troops for service in more active theaters,the President and the Prime Minister ex-pected that the arrival of American f



of the British Isles, the British could dispatchreinforcements to the Middle and FarEast—or undertake the occupation ofFrench North Africa—during the first halfof 1942 only by considerably increasing therisk of an invasion of the British Isles duringthe summer. On these grounds, the Amer-ican planners not only appreciated but wereinclined to emphasize the need for deploy-ing U. S. Army forces in the North Atlantic.

The plan adopted at the outset of theARCADIA Conference, in accordance with

the wishes of the President and the PrimeMinister, was to carry through the alreadyplanned relief of British troops and U. S.marines in Iceland by a U. S. Army divisionand to send a force of two or more divisionsto relieve the British garrison in NorthernIreland. 41 The Army had at once pro

ceeded to set up a Northern Ireland force(code name MAGNET) composed of the32d, 34th, and 37th Divisions, with anarmored division attached, together with

2

pected that the arrival of American forcesin the British Isles would be encouraging tothe British people and hoped that the re-placement of British by American forces inUlster might improve relations with theIrish Free State, which were of considerablepractical military importance. 43 The Presi-dent looked forward to the early relief of theU. S. Marine brigade in Iceland. AdmiralKing was very insistent on this point, ob-jecting to the further retention on garrisonduty of a very sizeable portion of the small

U. S. forces then trained for landingoperations. 44

The Army was ready to make the forcesfor the initial movements available at once.The division sent to Ireland did not needto be fully trained or equipped and there-fore could be sent without affecting the

Army's readiness to undertake overseasoperations. 45 The only thing that de-layed the movements was that all U. S.troopships then available in the Atlantic





enough shipping to go around. Marshallrecommended that ships should be gottentogether "and made ready for contingent

duced by Marshall to load the first ship-ments for Iceland and Northern Ireland, onthe basis as stated by the President that it



together and made ready for contingentuse." The President then declared the timewas not right to invade North Africa andsuggested that, since it was so uncertainwhen the right time might come, it wasworth considering whether they should notgo ahead with plans for the movement toNorthern Ireland, with the understanding,however, that so long as the ships were inport, they might still be diverted to the NorthAfrican operation. The Prime Ministerstrongly questioned the conclusion that there

was not enough shipping. Recollectingthat during World War I two million menhad been moved to France in five months,he asked how it was possible that the UnitedStates and Great Britain could not now movea quarter of a million men in three months.He felt that the shipping could be found,

and concluded by saying that he would be"frightfully unhappy if he had to adjustbetween expeditions." No formal deci-sion was reached at the meeting, but as the

the basis, as stated by the President, that itshould be done in "such a manner that theseoperations could be halted if other consid-erations intervened." The ships, whichwere then being loaded were to sail on 15January, with 14,000 troops fo r NorthernIreland and 6,000 for Iceland (4,500 to re-lieve the marines), but they could be un-loaded and used for the North African op-eration, with six days' delay, if the decisionto do so were taken before 13 January. 49 Assoon as the President and the Prime Minis-

ter had reached this tentative decision, theWar Department established an Army head-quarters in England, under the commandof General Chaney, the special Army ob-server in London, who was designated Com-mander, United States Army Forces in theBritish Isles (USAFBI), to whom the

Northern Ireland force (but not the Ice-land force) would report. This commandwas intermediate between the informal "nu-cleus mission," of which he had been in


that there was not enough shipping to goaround, the Chiefs of Staff on the next daywent over the planning committee's initial

the scope of the operation and the size of theforce it would ultimately require. Theyreported to the Chiefs of Staff that it was



went over the planning committee s initialreport on the North African operation(which had been given the British codename GYMNAST). Both the British andAmerican Air members, Air Chief MarshalSir Charles Portal and Lt. Gen. Henry H.Arnold, were deeply disturbed that so largean air force was allocated. Portal ex-plained. . . that in allocating planes, the largestrategy must be the primary consideration,rather than local requirements; that in thematter of Greece it was realized that therewas an insufficient number of troops andplanes, yet those available were allocateddespite the expectations that this force wouldbe knocked down. Although this happened,the strategic importance of this operation wasgreat because it delayed the attack on Russiafor two months. 51

General Marshall

made it clear that

he didnot believe in taking in North Africa thekind of risk that the British had taken inGreece. He was perfectly willing that the

h ld b k t th l i

reported to the Chiefs of Staff that it was"premature" for them to make any recom-mendations on those points. 53 The Chiefsof Staff in turn recognized that an operationon the scale acceptable to the American staffwould have an effect not only on projects inthe North Atlantic—the only effect the plan-ners had as yet considered—but also on thereinforcement of positions in the Pacific.On 31 December they returned the subjectto the planning committee to be restudiedin the wider context of strategy and in the

light of the American conviction that theoperation, even though it must still assumepolitical preparation, would not rely on theready collaboration of French forces inNorth Africa nor on a weak Germanreaction. 54

The study made from this new point of

view added to the evidence that any opera-tion the American staff would be willing toundertake was beyond the means available.On the assumption that it was necessary to


dence as yet. How long it would take toland a single convoy at Casablanca was animportant factor. The expedition would

made for such a project at this time. It isrecommended that the Chiefs of Staffs issuea directive on this point. 56



important factor. The expedition wouldfor a long time be dependent on the port ofCasablanca, partly because other Atlanticports could not take ocean-going vessels, andpartly because there would not be enoughair and naval cover for more than one port.With the long period for unloading at Casa-blanca (estimated at ten to fourteen days)went a correspondingly great risk of sub-marine attacks, especially on aircraft car-riers accompanying the assault convoy. Thecapacity of the port of Casablanca was a

limiting factor determining not only howlong it would take to unload the assaultconvoy but also how long it would take tounload the initial three months' forces, sup-plies, and supporting units through thatport. The planners expected this phase totake four months, no matter how many

ships were available. Incomplete and con-flicting intelligence presented another prob-lem. The military planners did not knowwhat to make of the various reports on the

a d ect ve o t s po t.In the afternoon the problem was discussedat great length, first in a staff meeting ofAmerican officers held by the Secretaries ofWar and Navy and then in an American-

British meeting convened by the Presidentand the Prime Minister. 57 At the lattermeeting the President and the Prime Min-ister confirmed the decision of 1 January togo ahead with the first shipments to North-ern Ireland and Iceland. As the PrimeMinister was well aware, these movements

themselves constituted an important, if in-direct, contribution to the opening of anoffensive in the Mediterranean. 58 He wasvery emphatic on the need for them andconcluded that the planners should go aheadwith SUPER-GYMNAST, "but make no diver-sion of shipping on the Ireland relief; thatwe should take no real ships from real jobs;and that we could talk about the matteragain in a few days." 59

The ARCADIAstudy of the North African


January, as a basis for future planning, theBritish planners reintroduced the estimatefor the first three months' force on which

from the desperate effort to contain theJapanese in the South and SouthwestPacific.61



the committee had originally agreed tocompromise. Except for the first Ameri-can and the first and second British convoys,they presented even these estimates as"guesses" of what the task force commandermight consider necessary, and the guessesincluded no estimate of air strength. TheBritish did not propose what, for planningpurposes, should be taken to be the totalstrength required for the operation. Theirpurpose was in fact only to present "a sug-gested convoy programme" that would fullyutilize the limited port capacity of Casa-blanca. This schedule indicated that themaximum forces that could be landed ( i n -cluding two convoys to Algiers) during thefour months following the first sailingswould be some 180,000 troops (about half

British and half American) .60

Reinforcement of the SouthwestPacific

During the conference the Americanplanners had been getting impatient withthe protracted study of movements in theAtlantic because it was holding up decisionon movements to the Pacific. They ex-pected the Japanese might "overextend"themselves until they had isolated the pro-jected American base in northern Aus-tralia. 62 By the end of the first week of theconference, the British staff, like the Amer-ican staff, began to show concern over the

danger to the northern and eastern ap-proaches to Australia and New Zealand.The British, quite apart from their dismayat the Japanese advances in Malaya andBurma, were obliged to consider the securityof Australia and New Zealand, if they wereto keep forces from these dominions in North

Africa and in India, as they very muchwanted and needed to do. The Britishplanners accordingly began to consider sym-pathetically the American planners' views.


agreed that, besides arranging for local de-fense of Palmyra, Christmas, Canton, Sa-moa, and Borabora, the United States

ahead with its preparations to garrisonPalmyra and American Samoa.

During the closing days of the conference



moa, and Borabora, the United Statesshould consider helping Australia and NewZealand with th e defense of New Caledoniaand the Fiji Islands, if the Australian andNew Zealand Governments could not make

adequate provision for it.64

While waiting for information on theFijis and New Caledonia, the War Depart-ment was rapidly drafting orders for ship-ments to the "island bases" in the SouthPacific that were the Army's responsibility. 65

The projected garrisons were 2,000 for

Christmas Island and 1,500 for CantonIsland. 66 In the next lower priority came aforce of about 4,000 troops, requested bythe Navy to garrison a refueling station onBorabora on the convoy route to Australia. 67

The orders called for only small Army con-tingents at these bases, on the assumption,

clearly expressed by Marshall, that the Navywould relieve the Army garrisons in case ofheavy attack. 68 In addition, the Army un-dertook to send a pursuit group (700 men)

During the closing days of the conference,the American staff also projected additionalforces for the Southwest Pacific. In viewof the growing possibility of air raids onnorthern Australia, the first step (using the

largest British liners on the Pacific run) wasto add antiaircraft units (numbering, withnecessary services, about 10,000 troops) tothe pursuit units and an air base group(numbering about 6,000) already approvedfor shipment. These 16,000 troops were inaddition to projected shipments of 10,000

air troops.69

A further increase was in-volved when it appeared that, for the nextsix months, Australia would have no forcesavailable to send reinforcements to NewCaledonia, where there was only a com-pany-sized Australian garrison and some3,700 ill-equipped Free French troops.

The planners regarded this island as thelogical target of a Japanese attempt to gaincontrol of the northern and eastern ap-proaches to Australia and New Zealand,




CHIEF OF WAR PLANS DIVISION AND HIS DEPUTIES, January 1942. Left


troopships from the Atlantic specifically toget reinforcements to Australia with allpossible speed. The British Chiefs of Staff

This disposition of American troop ship-ping did not mean the discontinuance of theNorth Atlantic convoys. Shipments to Ice-



possible speed. The British Chiefs of Staffagreed to refer the question at once to Gen-eral Somervell and his British opposite,Brigadier Vernon M. C. Napier, for studyand recommendations, and later in the same

meeting instructed them to study also thepossibility of sending American forces toNew Caledonia. 73

Under their new directive the shippingexperts quickly came forward with a solutionthat gave unquestioned precedence toAmerican shipments to Australia and Brit-

ish shipments to the Near and Far East, atthe expense of the North African operation,the reinforcement of Hawaii, and the move-ments in the North Atlantic. On the basisof the recommendation of the shipping ex -perts, the American Chiefs of Staff on 12January proposed to reduce the Icelandconvoy of 15 January from 8,000 to 2,500;the Ireland convoy, from 16,000 to 4,100.By using th e troop lift thus released, to -gether with the Kungsholm (then allocated

o t t a t c convoys. Shipments toland could go on at a rate of as many as2,500 troops a month. The British plan-ners were willing to recommend arrangingBritish schedules so as to help keep up ship-

ments to Northern Ireland.75

By the endof February over 20,000 troops would bedispatched to Northern Ireland. On thisbasis, the initial effect in the North Atlanticwas to postpone by about a month the re-lease of the first British division in NorthernIreland and the U. S. Marine brigade in

Iceland.76

The President and the Prime Ministerwere by then quite ready to accept these con-sequences of the evident need to give prece-dence to the defense of the Southwest Pa-cific. There was not much question butthat, in addition to the effect on deploy-

ment in the North Atlantic, the withdrawalof American troopships from th e Atlanticwould have the effect of postponing a full-scale planned operation in North Africa.


prematurely, for, as he pointed out, as soonas negotiations were begun the GermanGovernment would learn of them. He

than to supply the same number of troopssent as reinforcements to areas better de-veloped and less immediately threatened.



stressed th e need of landing before the Ger-mans would have had time to react, statingthat assault forces should actually be loadedbefore negotiations were begun. 77

General Marshall at once answered to thepoint by observing that the factor limitingAmerican participation in the North Africanoperation would not be transports but cargoshipping. 78 The following day the Ameri-can planners elaborated upon this answer ina report to the Chiefs of Staff. They con-cluded that th e mounting of the full-fledgedNorth African operation would have toawait the return from the Southwest Pa-cific not only of the troop transports—dueback about the third week of April—butalso of the cargo ships required by the troopmovements to the Southwest Pacific—which were not due back till after the mid-dle of May. Furthermore, American par-ticipation in any operation that might be

d li ld d d f d

Once the greater part of American troopshipping was diverted to the garrisoning ofthe island bases in the South Pacific, thedevelopment and local defense of the Aus-

tralian air base, and the development of airoperations north of Australia, the ratio oftonnage to troops greatly increased. G e n -eral Eisenhower commented, "Somervell(G-4) did a good job finding boats. We'llg et off 21,000 men ... to Australia; butI don't know when we can get all theirequip, and supply to them. Ships ShipsAll we need is ships " 8 0 The great NewYork convoy that was to leave for the South-west Pacific was only a part of what wasrapidly becoming a major movement ofAmerican and British troops for the purposeof containing the Japanese advance. Theprojected American shipments, besides the21,000 troops in the New York convoy tothe Southwest Pacific, then included the

i f h i l d b ( l 8 000)



CHAPTER VI



Army Deployment and the WarAgainst Japan

December 1941-March 1942

During the ARCADIA Co nference Japaneseforces took Hong Kong (which surrenderedon 25 December) and Manila (2 January),began heavy air raids on Rangoon, com-pelled the troops covering the southernmostpart of Malaya to withdraw south of KualaLumpur, landed at several points in Borneoand the Celebes, and made their first airattacks on Rabaul. The Japanese had forthe time so little to fear on other fronts, andtheir lines of communication f rom their

h i d b

exert an effort several times greater thanthat of which the Japanese were capable.Only then could the Allies counterbalancethe advantages that the Japanese had byvirtue of their head start, superiority in air-craft carriers, and relatively short interiorlines of communication from their produc-tion centers to the fronts and between sec-tors. But the ARCADIA Conference did nottake up the proposition, the force of whichwas more evident with every day that

d th t h Alli d i i l

ARMY DEPLOYMENT AND THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 121

Our immediate object must therefore be tohold:

a. Hawaii and Dutch Harbour [Alaska].b. Singapore, the East Indies Barrier, and

one group of heavy bombers. 4 The projectdid not come up during the conference, pre-sumably because th e British Governmenth d di i t d i lf f th tt t t



g p ,the Philippines.

c. Rangoon and the route to China. 1

The British statement entirely omittedone point that remained of interest to the

President and the American staff—the fu-ture role of the Soviet Union in Far Easternstrategy. Both had acknowledged the factthat the Soviet Government intended toavoid hostilities with Japan and recognizedthat it was logical for the Soviet Govern-ment not to enter into any arrangements

with the United States that might have theeffect of hastening Soviet involvement. 2

Nevertheless, it was American policy to laythe basis for American air operations againstJapan from Siberian bases, 3 and for this usethe Army Air Forces proposed to allocate

had dissociated itself from the attempt toencourage Soviet collaboration in the FarEast. 5 The President and the Chiefs ofStaff did mention the possibilities that inthe spring Japan might attack or the SovietUnion might intervene.6 The Americanrepresentatives made tw o additions to theBritish statement of Far Eastern strategy,both of which indicated that Americanviews still comprehended future collabora-tion with the Soviet Union against Japan.

To the above-listed three strategic positionsto be held in the Far East, the AmericanChiefs added " the Maritime Provinces ofRussia." At the instance of the U. S. ArmyAir Forces, the Chiefs also incorporated inthe paper a supplement listing air routes tobe established and maintained throughoutthe world, including a route via Alaska toVladivostok. This was the extent of AR-CADIA discussions of the role of the Soviet

7

1 Memo, Br CsofS, 22 Dec 41, s u b : Amer-BrStrategy, ABC 337 ARCADIA (24 Dec 41) , 2. Thisis the first version of WW-1, which in the revisedform accepted by the American Chiefs ( b u t not

b itt d t th P id t d th P i Mi i t


After listing the positions that the UnitedStates and Great Britain must make it their"immediate object" to hold, the BritishChiefs had concluded that the "minimum

tives in the region, without distinction, asAllied strategy. With slight modifications,the Chiefs approved the resolution:



Chiefs had concluded that the minimumforces required to hold the above" wouldhave to be "a matter of mutual discussion."This declaration stood in the final versionadopted by the British and AmericanChiefs. 8 But the Chiefs did not proceed toa "mutual discussion" of the dispositions oftheir forces. They evidently considered itto be contrary to current policy to acknowl-edge that the United States and Great Brit-ain must write off any of their "vital inter-ests in the Eastern theatre," or to reckonwhat it might cost to "safeguard" theothers.

For the Southwest Pacific an d southeastAsia, the British and American planners didcompile tables showing " the estimatedstrength of forces initially in the Area, and

the reinforcements ordered or planned tobe sent." 9 The planners compiled thesetables to accompany recommendationsdrawn up for the Chiefs of Staff, at their

(a) To hold th e Malay Barrier ... asthe basic defensive position in that [Far East]theatre, and to operate sea, land, and airforces in as great depth as possible forwardof the Barrier in order to oppose the Japanese

southward advance.(b ) To hold Burma and Australia as es-sential supporting positions for the theatre,and Burma as essential to the support ofChina, and to the defense of India.

(c ) To re-establish communicationsthrough the Dutch East Indies with Luzonand to support the Philippines' Garrison.

(d ) To maintain essential communicationswithin the theatre. 10

There was little else they could do. It wasthe policy of the British Government to as-sert that Singapore could and would be held,and to conduct on this basis its relations notonly with the American Government butalso with the Australian Government andthe Netherlands Government-in-exile. 11

10 ABC 4/3 31 Dec 41 The principal changes


The policy of the United States was anal-ogous, for it was desirable from th e Amer-ican point of view not to concede in advancethe loss of the Philippines or Burma It was

The basic strategic concept of the ABDAGovernments for the conduct of the war inyour Area is not only in the immediate futureto maintain as many key positions as possible,b k h h li



the loss of the Philippines or Burma. It wasAmerican policy to support the position ofGeneral MacArthur in the Philippines aslong as possible. It was also convenient toassumed that the British, with Chinese help,might hold Burma and thus postpone thedifficult decisions that would have to bemade, in case Burma were lost, with refer-ence to the American program for the sup-port of China.

The ABDA Command

By the time the planners were at workon their study for the Chiefs, th e ARCADIA

Conference had taken under considerationa proposal for establishing "unified com-mand" in the Southwest Pacific and south-

east Asia.12

The conference finally adoptedthis proposal, setting up the Australian-British-Dutch-American ( A B D A ) C o m -mand whose jurisdiction comprehended

but to take the offensive at the earliest oppor-tunity and ultimately to conduct an all-outoffensive against Japan. The first essential isto gain general air superiority at the earliestpossible moment, through the employment of

concentrated air power. The piecemeal em-ployment of air forces should be minimized.Your operations should be so conducted as tofur ther preparations for the offensive. 13

The act of setting up the ABDA Com-mand—though not the definition of strategynor the listing of forces, which remainedunchanged—represented an

adjustment to

the actual military situation. In agreeingto create the command and present the ac-complished fact to the Australian Govern-ment, the Netherlands Government-in-exile, and the Chinese Nationalist Govern-ment (whose interests were also a ffec ted) ,

the conference demonstrated that the Brit-ish and American Governments were readyand willing to take bilateral action in thefi ld of military ff i in spite of differences




or their subordinates, to interfere in thetactical organization and disposition of theirforces, to commandeer their supplies, or tocontrol their communications with their

deal only with strategy in the Southwest Pa-cific, on which the Australian Governmentand the Netherlands Government-in-exile,as well as the American and British Gov-



control their communications with theirrespective governments. Marshall agreedthat the limitations were drastic, but pointedout that what he proposed was all that

could then be done, and declared that "ifthe supreme commander ended up with nomore authority than to tell Washington whathe wanted, such a situation was better thannothing, and an improvement over the pres-ent situation." 19 It was this restricted au-thority that General Wavell was given over

the vast ABDA Command.20

When it came to providing for the"higher direction" of the AB DA Command,General Marshall found himself in agree-ment, not in disagreement, with the BritishChiefs of Staff, and it was not the PrimeMinister, but the President, who hesitatedlest the automatic interposition of profes-sional views on deployment of British andAmerican forces should make it harderrather than easier to reach politically accept

as well as the American and British Governments, would be represented. 21 ThePresident was himself inclined toward thissolution. 22 The British Government, on

the other hand, meant so far as possible tosettle questions of strategic policy in theSouthwest Pacific directly with Australianand Netherlands officials in London, anddid not want Australian and Netherlandsrepresentatives in Washington to take partin British-American deliberations there, al-

though they would, of course, be consultedby American officials and the American mil-itary staff in Washington. The BritishChiefs of Staff accordingly proposed to putthe ABDA commander under the British-American Chiefs of Staff committee inWashington. 23 Admirals Stark and King

agreed with Marshall to recommend thissolution to the President. 24 The Presidentreplied with a "re-draft" of their proposal,in which he reverted to the procedure orig-


The Chiefs of Staff stuck to their originalproposal, modifying it in form but not inessence. They explained their adherence toit partly on the ground that it would be

command as soon as possible. On 10January he set up temporary headquartersat Batavia. 28 On the same day the BritishChiefs proposed and the American Chiefs



p y gquicker and less confusing not to duplicatein Washington the machinery already in usein London for consulting the Dominions andNetherlands Governments. They also be-lieved that th e British-American Chiefs ofStaff committee in Washington was pecu-liarly qualified to make recommendationson the questions that must be brought be-fore the President and the Prime Minister—the provision of additional reinforcements,major changes in policy, and departuresfrom the basic directive to the ABDA Su-preme Commander. Sir Dudley Pound,they added, had just talked to the PrimeMinister and had come away with the im-pression that he would accept this solution. 26

The President, after talking it over with thePrime Minister, announced that he, too,would accept it. 27

Meanwhile, the British had arranged fo rGeneral Wavell to go to Java to assume

p pagreed that th e British Government shouldask the Australian and Netherlands Govern-ments to authorize General Wavell to takecommand of their forces in the area eventhough those governments were n ot satisfiedwith th e idea of making him responsible tothe Combined Chiefs of Staff, a body onwhich they were not represented. 29 G e n -eral Wavell assumed command on 15 Janu-ary (G. M. T. ) , although he was "not yetin a position to establish office or exercisesector operational control." 30

Loss of Malaya, Fa l of Singapore, andGround Force Dispositions

Within a month after th e ARCADIA

Conference, as the Japanese offensive con-tinued all along the extended "front" of theABDA Command, it became evident thatth e British an d American programs of re-

A R M Y DEPLOYMENT AND THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 127

front, and heavy Japanese pressure at weakpoints quickly undid successive attempts tohold a line across the peninsula in JohoreProvince By the end of January th e main

trying to divert "all or part" of the 7thArmoured Brigade to Burma, since he hadbeen impressed with the need fo r armoredtroops there at that season when the rice



Province. By the end of January th e mainbody of the defending troops had beenevacuated to the island of Singapore. Aweek later the Japanese, strongly supported

by planes and artillery, established a beach-head on the island. There after, they rap-idly repaired the causeway, drove into thetown of Singapore, and, finally, on 14 Feb-ruary gained complete control of the waterreservoirs of the island. On 15 Februaryth e British garrison surrendered.

The retreat from the mainland to theisland of Singapore at the end of Januaryresulted in changes in plans fo r disposingground forces assigned to the ABDA Com-mand. It was too late to do anythingabout the 18th British Division, one brigadeof which had arrived at Singapore on 13

January and the other at the end of themonth, or about the 44th Indian InfantryBrigade, which had also arrived at the endof th e month. But there were still large

troops there at that season, when the ricefields were dry. 31 On 12 February Wash-ington learned that he had ordered thischange. 32 There remained the questionof the two Australian divisions (and a pos-sible question of the disposition of a thirdAustralian division, th e 9th, which was alsodue to be returned from the Middle East).On 13 February, in anticipation of theearly fall of Singapore and in view of themovement of an escorted Japanese convoytoward

southern Sumatra, General

Wavellcautiously opened th e question of conced-ing the loss of Sumatra and , in turn, ofJava, and diverting one or both of the Aus-tralian divisions to Burma or Australia.He remarked that this course would be ad-vantageous "from purely strategic aspects,"

but would "obviously have the most seriousmoral and political repercussions." Inconclusion, he declared, "We shall con-tinue with present plans until situation en-


of view, would not be fatal. Efforts shouldnot therefore be made to reinforce Java whichmight compromise defense of Burma orAustralia.

H i d

would be reassuring, and would have thesame practical effect of releasing Imperialground forces fo r combat or police duty inthe Middle East and India, to which it was



He continued:Immediate problem is destination of Aus-

tralian Corps. If there seemed good chanceof establishing Corps in island and fighting

Japanese on favourable terms I should un-hesitatingly recommend risk should be takenas I did in matter of aid to Greece year ago.I thought then that we had good fightingchance of checking German invasion andin spite results still consider risk was justi-fiable. In present instance I must recom-mend that I consider risk unjustif iable fromtactical and strategical point of view. I fullyrecognize political considerations involved.

Wavell then recommended that the 7thAustralian Division, which was approach-ing Ceylon, and also, if possible, the 6th,should be diverted to Burma rather than toAustralia, on the following ground:

Presence of this force in Burma threaten-ing invasion of Thailand and Indo-Chinamust have very great effect on Japanesestrategy and heartening effect on China andI di I i l h i hi h ff

inexpedient to assign American groundforces.

The policy of the War Department, dur-ing and after th e ARCADIA Conference, hadbeen to postpone decisions on the commit-ment of Army ground forces to Australia.The planners, trying to anticipate the dis-position of Army divisions during 1942,had concluded that two infantry divisionswould probably be sent to the SouthwestPacific.35 But in the opinion of the seniorplans and operations officer for the area,General Eisenhower, this developmentwould be contrary to War Departmentpolicy:

The War Department concept of presentand future Army participation in the ABDATheater involves an Air Corps operation, ex-clusively. All other types of forces, auxiliaryservices and supplies dispatched to the areahave as their sole purpose the support of theAir contingent. We should resist any expan-


Brisbane on 22 December with the Pensa-cola convoy. The brigade had gone nofarther than Port Darwin, where it had beenbroken up. One of its regiments, the 147th

in War Department policy—a decision tosend reinforcements of ground and servicetroops to Australia. The original trooplist, presented by General Eisenhower and



Field Artillery, was assigned to the defenseof Port Darwin, which had been made partof the ABDA Command. The 2d Battalionof the 131st Field Artillery Regiment, partof the Texas National Guard, had beenmoved to Java. The remaining battalionand headquarters of the 148th FieldArtillery Regiment were under orders todefend Kupang, on the island of Timor. 37

The War Department also kept in mind thepossibility that General Patch's task force,aboard the large convoy that sailed fromNew York on 22 January, might on its ar-rival in Australia be assigned to Australiaor in the ABDA area, in case of emergency,instead of being transshipped to New Cal-edonia. 38

On 14 February, the day after Wavell'swarning message, came an abrupt change

orally approved by General Marshall,called for one reinforced infantry brigadeand 10,000 service troops. 39 The staffsoon revised the list and proposed, instead,to send to Australia 8,000 service troops,one t ank destroyer battalion of 800 men,and one triangular division (15,000troops). 40 General Marshall agreed, andselected the 41st Division, under Maj. Gen.Horace H. Fuller. The first movementorders were issued at once. 41

To get the ships for the movement Gen-eral Marshall appealed to the White House,He telephoned Hopkins on 14 Februarythat the Army was short of troop shippingfor 19,000 men and the "necessary com-plement" of cargo ships. Mr. Hopkinsanswered that he "would work on it." 42

After a conference at the White House,Rear Adm. Emory S. Land, War ShippingAdministrator, undertook to furnish the ad-

37 See msg, Gen Wavell to Lt Gen V. A. H. Stur-dee [Chief Australian Army Gen Stf] 31 Jan 42


all the troops that the War Departmentwanted to send, except for one regiment ofthe 41st Division. By 19 February, ship-ping for this regiment, too, had been made

the Sittang, which, although more defen-sible, was also the last barrier before Ran-goon. The Australian Prime Minister, aftersummarizing fo r Churchill what Australia



available, and the staff directed it to beshipped. 44

British and American political and mili-tary authorities had meanwhile been con-sidering General Wavell's recommenda-tions. It was evidently necessary to con-cede at once the loss of south Sumatra, theJapanese having already established them-selves at Palembang, and to establish a newline of defense across the Indian Ocean—Australia, Ceylon, and Burm a. Authori-ties in Washington and London both urgedthat the Austr lian Government should con-sent to the temporary diversion to Burmaof the 7th Australian Division, on the under-standing that the 6th and 9th Divisionswould be returned to Australia. 45

The Australian Government refused, inspite of the appeals of the President and theBritish Prime Minister. The prospects inBurma were most unce rtain. The Japanese

had already done to support the ABDACommand, recapitulating the agreementswith reference to returning Australian divi-sions, and referring to the dangers thenfacing Australia, stated the reasons of theAustralian Government for refusing todivert the 7th Division to Burma:

Notwithstanding your statement that youdo not agree with the request to send the othertwo divisions of the A.I.F. Corps to Burma,our advisers are concerned with Wavell's re-quest for the corps and Dill's statement thatthe destination of the Sixth and Ninth Aus-tralian Divisions should be left open as moretroops might be badly needed in Burma. Onceone Division became engaged it could not beleft unsupported and inferences are that thewhole corps might become committed to thisregion or there might be a recurrence of the

experiences of Greek and Malayan campaigns.Finally in view of superior Japanese sea powerand air power it would appear to be a matterof some doubt as to whether this division canb l d d i B d tt f g t


come to share, were soon borne out by the

disastrous Battle of Sittang Bridge (on 22-23 February), which was followed by theevacuation of Rangoon and the retreat

47

strategy embodied in the decision to send

the 41st Division to Australia.48

The Isolation of Java and Air Force



northward of the defending armies. 47

The action then taken by the UnitedStates, though it did not affect the imme-diate issue in Burma, established a policythat had a much wider application: thatof American intervention, based on Ameri-can aid, in settling th e future disposition ofAustralian ( a n d New Zealand) groundforces in the Middle East and India.Roosevelt, in appealing for Curtin's agree-

ment on the specific issue, clearly set aprecedent. In explanation of the Ameri-can decision "to send, in addition to alltroops and forces now en route, anotherforce of over 27,000 men to Australia," thePresident declared that the Allies must"fight to the limit" for the two flanks, "onebased on Australia and the other on Burma,India and China," and continued:

Because of our geographical position we

Dispositions

During the first three weeks of February,while the Japanese took Singapore and oc-cupied southern Sumatra, they also under-took, with complete success, an air offensiveto isolate Java. Given the extent of theisland of Java, the only chance of defendingit lay in the possibility that Allied navaland air action north of Java might gain

time to allow the development of an Alliedfighter air force in Java strong enough tocontrol the air over the island and the ap-proaches thereto. This aim achieved, Al-lied reinforcements could continue to movenorth from Australia, and Allied bomberscould prevent the Japanese from landingand supporting large ground forces in Java.

Attempt to Move Pursuit Planes


precedence over the fulfillment of the ur-gent needs of the Royal Australian AirForce (RAAF), which was quite inade-quate to defend Port Darwin and the north-

h A li 49

ary this program had been further increasedto provide, all told, about 640 pursuitplanes, most of the increase being P-39's(including FIDO's, an early inferior variant

) 52



eastern approaches to Australia. 49

By early February about 300 P-40's hadarrived in the Southwest Pacific. 50 Theprogram under which these planes had beenshipped, initiated before the ARCADIA Con-ference on the assumption that they wouldbe transshipped or flown to the Philippines,had been increased early in the conference toprovide about 330 P-40's. 51 During Janu-

of the P-39 designed for export). 52 TheP-39's and the balance of the P-40's weredue to be shipped during the next fewweeks.53

The immediate problem was not the lackof planes in Australia, but the want of prep-arations for getting them into Java. Itwould take so long to make these prepara-tions that there was no choice but to tryto move the planes to the front a few ata time, in violation of every principle laiddown in Air Corps doctrine, and notwith-standing the statement of policy hopefullyincorporated in General Wavell's directive:

The first essential is to gain general airsuperiority at the earliest possible moment,through the employment of concentrated airpower. The piecemeal employment of airforces should be minimized. 54

The American command in Australia at-tempted to assemble the pursuit planes at

49 For War Department policy on allocations of

aircraft between ABDA Command and the RAAFin early February, see: (1) msg, Marshall to Wavellfor Brett, 5 Feb 42, No. 77, Tab ABDA, Book 3,Exec 8; (2) memo, WPD for TAG, 6 Feb 42, sub:Far Eastern Sit ( this contained msg for Maj GenJulian F. Barnes) ; and (3) memo WPD for TAG,6 Feb 42, same sub (this contained a paraphrasefo r General Wavell of the message sent to Barnes).Last two in Tab ABDA, U. S. Reps, Book 3,

Exec 8.50 Memo [WPD] for CofS, 6 Feb 42, s u b : Subsfor Possible Discussion Other Than Those M e n -tioned by You on Tel, Tab Misc, Book 3, Exec 8.This figure corresponds to the following breakdown

ARMY DEPLOYM ENT AND THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN 133

planes arrived at Surabaja. 55 By the end

of January, before an y others had even setout from Brisbane, Wavell warned that th eJapanese might soon interdict this route and

k d h h i th t h i ht h

The CGS had ruled out Wavell's request

for an aircraft carrier to bring planes withinflying distance of Java, with the possible ex-ception of the British carrier Indomitable,

hi h d i h h h d f



asked whether in that event he might havea carrier to move planes to Java. 56 Thereality of the danger was borne home bydaily reports of enemy air attacks over Java,Bali, and Timor, one of which (on Bali, 5February) destroyed the greater part of asecond flight of P-40's en route to Java. 57

Besides these first tw o flights, three otherstook off from Port Darwin. The third,which left on 9 February, met bad weatherconditions, and all the P-40's crashed enroute. The fourth, leaving on 11 Febru-ary, got through to Java to join the sur-vivors of the first and second flights. Thefifth took off from Port Darwin on 19February an d turned back because of. badweather conditions. All but one of itsplanes were shot down in the overwhelm-ing air attack on Port Darwin that day.Several planes on the ground and six shipsin th e harbor were also destroyed, eight

which was due in the theater at the end ofth e month with a load of Hurricanes. 59

The attack on Port Darwin conclusivelydisposed of the alternative of shippingplanes from northern Australia. The oneway left of getting pursuit planes to Java(at least before the arrival of the Indomi-table ) w as to ship them from Western Aus-tralia to southern Java (Tjilatjap). On9 February Wavell had announced thatby this route the British ship Athenewould take in crated planes, and the Amer-ican seaplane tender Langley would carryin assembled planes. 60

By 19 February ABDA headquarterswas prepared to acknowledge that th e sit-uation in Java was irretrievable. Even be-fore receiving news of the raid on PortDarwin of that day, Wavell discounted th epossibility of getting reinforcements fromPort Darwin, in view of enemy landings in


timated that at the "present scale of fight-

ing the Allied fighter force in Java would not remain effective beyond next twoweeks, 61

What to do in this situation the CCS left

This decision came somewhat unexpect-

edly, since he had acknowledged the daybefore that as a result of the heavy losses inthe fighting of 20 February the air forcesleft in Java which he estimated as fewer



What to do in this situation the CCS leftup to General Wavell to the extent of giv-ing him "discretion to augment defence ofJava with available naval forces and with

U. S. aircraft now at y o u r disposal assem-bling in Australia." The same messagealso contained instructions governing Alliedtroops then in Java:

JAVA should be defended with the utmostresolution by all combatant troops at presentin the Island for whom arms are available.Every day gained is of importance. Thereshould be no withdrawal of troops or airforces of any nationality and no surrender.Amendments to these instructions caused byemergency changes in the situation should bereferred to Washington, and if this is not pos-sible will be decided by you on the spot. 62

The purpose of this paragraph of instruc-tions was to settle policy on evacuation, butWavell adopted it as a basis for deciding on22 February to send the Langley to Java. 63

left in Java—which he estimated as fewerthan forty fighters, about thirty mediumand dive bombers, and ten heavy bomb-ers—could "only hope to fight for few

more days at most." He had apparentlygiven up hope of getting in any moreplanes, unless by the Langley.

64 His de-cision of 22 February to send the Langleyto Java, he announced with the followingexplanation:

This may enable us to keep going untilarrival aircraft from INDOMITABLE but inabsence of continual and increasing flow offighters and bombers this is likely only to gaincertain time but is in accordance with yourinstructions that every day is of value. 65

Later on during the day Wavell sent a longerexplanation to the same effect:

To carry out instructions in your D. B. A.19 , it is essential that we should have fighterand bomber reinforcements. I have accord-


ingly ordered LANGLEY to proceed Java

as soon as possible to disembark fighters andBRETT is ordering few bomber aircraft im-mediately available from Australia to proceed.Hope also that aircraft from INDOMITA-BLE ill b t if till i time With th

the decision between the desperate hopeful-

ness of the Netherlands command and theevident hopelessness of the situation in Java.On 23 February command in the ABDAarea passed to the Dutch On 25 February



BLE will be sent if still in time. With thesereinforcements valuable time may be gainedby defence JAVA and blows inflicted onenemy naval and air forces. Otherwise ourair force will practically disappear within

veryshort period. 66

The real meaning of the decision came outin a third message of 22 February, whichreported the conference Wavell and Bretthad had with the governor general of theNetherlands Indies, with reference to the

liquidation of Wavell's headquarters. Inthis report, Wavell declared: "It should bemade quite clear to Dutch that withdrawalof ABDA HQ will NOT repeat NOT meanstoppage of warlike supplies to JAVA andpublic announcement to this effect shouldbe made." 67 About the only "warlike sup-

plies" of any consequence that were immedi-ately available fo r movement were Ameri-can planes. Wavell announced that hewas sending Brett to Australia the next day

area passed to the Dutch. On 25 February,in answer to a question from Lt. Gen.George H. Brett, who had thereupon takencommand of American forces in Australia,the War Department replied:

The purpose of the War Department tosupport the NEI defense by every practicablemeans has not repeat not been changed. Theextent to which pursuit planes should betransferred to Java must be determined byyou in accordance with the desires of theABDA Commander, the availability of ship-ping, and the practicability of landing theseplanes in Java and operating them effectivelytherefrom. 69

The "practicability of landing theseplanes in Java and operating them effec-tively therefrom" was soon thereafterdecided. The Langley, with its thirty-twoP-40's, went dow n off Java on 27 Februaryas a result of several direct hits by enemybombers. The pilots were picked up by two


that no more pursuit planes should be

shipped to Java unless there were a changein the situation that promised "greatersafety in transit." 70 Thus ended the at-tempt to build up a fighter command in

method of hopping the Barrier and eventually

taking up the offensive. ... It may be nec-essary to work from the flanks.

Brett's plan was to base air striking forces,with adequate protection by pursuit planes,



tempt to build up a fighter command inJava, an attempt that all told had cost per-haps half of the American pursuit planesand a great many of the pilots that had bythen arrived in Australia, and that had putinto action for about a fortnight one steadilydwindling provisional squadron in Java. 71

Transfer of Air Units to Burmaand India

Even while the attempt to send fighterreinforcements to Java was beginningABDA headquarters, the CCS, and theWar Department began to prepare againstthe probability that it would fail. On 7February General Brett, repeating and con-firming General Wavell's report of the des-perate situation of the fighter command inJava, went on to outline the problem of airoperations in the area for consideration byh

q p y p p ,in India and Burma and at Port Darwin.On operations based in India and Burmahe observed:

Burma can be occupied in depth with Indiaas bases from which fighters can easily beflown to fields in North Burma and even intoChina. Airfreight transport would be moreusable. Water transport might be difficult.The Burma Road and other supply lines lead-ing north from Rangoon would require ener-getic American action. The air operations

would have tendency to (one) relieve pres-sure on Singapore by action on Bangkok andSaigon (two) give a direct line of action to-ward Formosa, Shanghai and eventuallyJapan. 72

ABDA headquarters was especially in-terested in the development of an Ameri-can

bomber force based on Burma. To

prepare for the reception of such a force,as part of the American Volunteer Group,was the mission that had originally taken


Burma and China." As indicated by

Wavell's announcement, made at the sametime, that he intended to divert the 7thArmoured Brigade from Java to Burma,the immediate concern of ABDA head-

In spite of this general agreement, plans

in the theater waited on events and on de-cisions from Washington. On 16 Febru-ary, following the fall of Singapore, Gen-eral Brett announced in response to the



the immediate concern of ABDA headquarters was then with the reinforcementof Burma. 75

The War Department fell in with the ideaof transferring heavy bombers from Aus-tralia to Burma and suggested, "in view ofthe urgency of this situation and the neces-sity for earliest possible action," that Wavellalso transfer from Australia th e necessaryground crews and supply troops, rather thanwait six weeks or more for them to comefrom the United States. The ABDA Com-mand already had personnel for two groups(the 7th and 19th Bombardment Groups)and could expect another (the 43d), soon tosail from the United States. The War De-partment proposed he should send the 19thGroup to Burma. There it could be builtup with bombers being flown via the SouthAtlantic and central Africa, of which thirty-three were then en route. The War Depart-

i hi h h h d

eral Brett announced, in response to theproposal of the War Department, that hewas planning to send Maj. Gen. Lewis H.Brereton to Burma "to prepare for anyforce which you may organize to meet situ-ation there" and that he would "make effortto send maintenance crews to India an dBurma to assist in preparation for possiblearrival of combat equipment." 77

Brett's plan was to send to Burma or toCalcutta most of the ground units of the7th Bombardment Group, those of the 51stPursuit Group (less one squadron) togetherwith Headquarters Squadron of the 35thPursuit Group, and air base units, all ofwhich he had ordered moved from Mel-bourne to Fremantle in a convoy of fourships. Besides these units, all told nearly3,000 troops, the heavy convoy also carriedbombs, ammunition, and thirty-sevencrated P-40's. This convoy he expected


nor Calcutta. It went, instead, to Karachi,

on the northwest coast of India, to avoidthe rapidly growing danger from Japaneseoperations in the Bay of Bengal. The unitsleft behind much of their equipment and

evacuation of southern Burma in early

March.82

Air Commitments in Asia



left behind much of their equipment, andthe convoy carried only ten pursuit planes.The Sea Witch with its twenty-seven planeshad been diverted to Java, along with theLangley, which Brett had apparentlyhoped to send to Burma. 79

Circumstances also m odified the plan fordiverting heavy bombers to Burma. Brett'soriginal plan was part of the plan of ABDAheadquarters, following the fall of Singa-

pore, to shift major forces from th e defenseof Java to the defense of Burma. 80 Theunwillingness of the Australian Govern-ment to divert the 7th Australian Divisionto Burma, the Battle of Sittang Bridge, and,thereafter, the insistence in turn of GeneralWavell and of the War Department oncontinued support of Java, cut the groundout from under this plan. 81 Brett did sendBrereton to India (via Ceylon) on 25F b ith t h b b F

Concurrent with the abortive planningin the theater for the diversion of Ameri-can air forces to Burma, went the resump-tion and acceleration of planning in theWar Department for building up an airforce on the Asiatic mainland with the ulti-mate objective of bombing Japan. Theplans made in 1941 in connection with theAmerican Volunteer Group had called for

one pursuit group and one bomber group.At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor thepursuit group of the AVG was already es-tablished in Burma. Crews for the bombergroup were in Australia, and General Brettwas en route to Burma to make preliminaryarrangements for the reception of the force.83

After 7 December these commitments hadcontinued to figure in the plans of the ArmyAir Forces. 84 The War Department had




command the new force. 94 It was desig-

nated the Tenth Air Force, with head-quarters at Karachi. It would at first bemad e up of the bomber group and the pur-suit group, fo r which most of the ground

Haynes left with an advance detachment

of planes—one B-24, four B-17's, andsix C-47's. Besides the five bombers ofthis flight, the War Department countedon getting to General Brereton twelve



personnel were being sent from Australia;the air depot group and miscellaneous serv-ice units, which also were to be sent from

Australia; and an air force headquartersand headquarters squadron and an airdepot group, to be sent from the UnitedStates. 95 The War Department sent wordof the decision to Chungking on 25 Feb-ruary and followed on 28 February with asummary statement of the forces assigned. 96

On 2 March the War Department receivedword from General Brereton by way ofCairo that he had assumed command of theAmerican air force in India then assignedto General Stilwell, and that he would estab-lish his headquarters at Delhi, so as to benear the British authorities on whose co-operation he must so largely depend. 97

Headquarters and Headquarters Squad-ron, Tenth Air Force, and the 3d Air Depot

h

B-17's that were out of commission alongthe air ferry route across Africa and inIndia. To make up the complement of

fifty bombers for the Tenth Air Force,thirty-three others were to be sent "as soonas practicable." There were no pursuitplanes scheduled for the Tenth Air Force,aside from the ten that had arrived withth e convoy from Fremantle. 99

The employment of American air com-bat forces in Asia—the 23d Pursuit Group,HALPRO, th e Doolittle mission, and theTenth Air Force—was only one part ofthe program of the AAF, which had threeother projects that concerned General Stil-well and the Chinese. One was the estab-lishment of an air route into China from

northeast India, the only means of gettinglend-lease aid to China (and of supportingAmerican bomber operations in China)f l h h


shipped out since January, and another 50

were due for early shipment.100

The program as a whole was insubstan-tial, involving a far wider dispersion ofeffort, a much heavier overhead investment,

C. A new India-Burma Theatre may be

formed with which the above may be amal-gamated or at least integrated. 101

The Siberia Project



and correspondingly greater initial wastein proportion to the operational results tobe achieved than the original program of

1941. The original program of 1941 hadenvisaged an initial concentration of Amer-ican air power and supply in Burma, sup-porting at once British and Chinese opera-tions. American efforts were now to bedispersed across the entire subcontinent ofIndia and could be linked with Americanefforts in China only at a great expense oftime, men, and materiel. The War De-partment was aware of the existence of thedifficulty, if not yet of its proportions. On20 February, when the new program wastaking shape, Col. Clayton L. Bissell, whohandled it in the General Staff, and whowas to become th e senior officer for air op-erations on General Stilwell's staff, sent theArmy A ir Forces th e following estimate of" ibl d l "

The one part of the Air Forces' planningfor the Far East of which nothing at all

came during the early part of 1942 was theplanning that had to do with American airoperations in Siberia. The United StatesGovernment tried to open negotiations, inthe face of the declared Soviet neutralityin the Far East and the dissociation of theBritish Government from the whole proj-

ect, by asking the Soviet Government for in-formation on air facilities in Siberia, in or-der to make plans for the delivery of lend-lease planes via Alaska. 102 The War De-partment had been seeking this informationever since the first discussions, in the sum-mer of 1941, of sending aid to the SovietUnion. 103 During the fall of 1941, in plan-ning for early deliveries under the First(Moscow) Protocol, the Army has accepted


in attempts to get information on facilities

for air delivery via Alaska and Siberia,through the Harriman mission, through acourier sent from London by General Cha-ney, and finally, through the State Depart-

that Mr. Stimson apparently took the mat-

ter up with the President informally.108

TheAir staff again submitted the proposal inMarch during the course of a general reviewinitiated by the President "in regard to the



ment, which had instructed the Americanambassador, Admiral William H. Standley,to do what he could. 105

The failure of these attempts and the af-firmation of Soviet neutrality in the waragainst Japan, made in December 1941, hadleft it to American officers to adopt any ofseveral views on the matter of fu ture nego-tiations. One view, presented by ColonelFaymonville, the senior military representa-tive of the Lend-Lease Administration inthe Soviet Union, was that a general agree-ment on strategy was prerequisite to anyprogress on negotiations over the Alaska-Sibera route. 106 Another view, twice pre-sented by the AAF, was that negotiations

should be reopened with the proposal tocommit an American bomber force to op-erations against Japan from advance basesin the area of Vladivostok The AAF first

position of Great Britain and the UnitedStates" in the event of Soviet involvement inthe war against Japan. 109 As in January,the AAF assumed that the Soviet Unionwould co-operate as soon as the UnitedStates should commit itself to sending a forceof long-range bombers to Siberia. In antici-pation of favorable Soviet response, theAAF recommended that air units assigned

to other

theaters should be

tentatively re-

assigned to provide the force.110

General Marshall's plans and operationsstaff considered th e project impracticablein itself and inconsistent with Americanstrategy. A full analysis was written fo rsubmission to Marshall and transmission to

the Joint Staff Planners (JPS), to showthat of all lines of action open to the UnitedStates to help the Soviet Union againstJapan:


Pacific and the sooner our action clearly in-dicates to Russia that we shall do this thegreater advantage she can gain from thatassistance. 111

Another study listed the various reasons forconsidering the AAF project imprac-

thus reverted to the unanswered primary

question of how to get the Soviet Govern-ment to give any information or permit anAmerican survey party to gather it.113 Onthis question, as on the related question ofth value d practicability f American



considering the AAF project impracticable :

The logistical difficulties, personnel and

material losses that would be incurred, lackof adequate facilities in Siberia, inability ofRussia to supply vital necessities upon arrivaland during operation, and lack of sufficientU. S. shipping facilities available for this pur-pose preclude the possibility of sending sup-plies, reinforcements and airplanes to Siberiafor combat purposes in the event of war be-tween Japan and Russia.This study, too, held that "diverting actionin the South Pacific" was a "more logicalapproach to giving aid to Russia" andadded that "an offensive against G e r -many" was "the most logical approach togiving aid to Russia." 112

When the joint planning committees(the Joint U. S. Strategic Committee(JUSSC), and the Joint Staff Planners)took up the question they did not pass

the value and practicability of Americanoperations in Siberia, there was a disagree-ment between the Air staff, hopeful of

Soviet receptiveness, and Marshall's plansand operations officers, who were skepticalof the success of negotiations, at least underexisting circumstances. Marshall's ad-visers were willing to meet with Soviet staffofficers and explain to them how, in prac-tice, Soviet distrust must limit the scale and

effectiveness of American aid of any kind.But that was all they expected to accom-plish, and they were doubtful that th eSoviet Government would be receptive to aproposal to hold staff conversations. 114

The Army planners believed in any eventthat the Soviet Government had no incen-

113 The JCS referred the problem to the JPS (seemin, 5th mtg JCS, 9 Mar 42) in JPS 19/D, 10Mar 42. The JPS referred it to the JUSSC (see


tive to enter into formal negotiations and

also that it would be unwise for the Ameri-can Government to do so. They observedthat it was not "practicable" to couplelend-lease questions with strategic questions,and that it would be "impossible to restrict

about what we want." 118 The JPS con-

cluded that the only way to get informationon air facilities in Siberia "would be througha direct agreement between the highestUnited States and Soviet political author-ities " The JPS therefore recommended



and that it would be impossible to restrictthe discussions of our own plans to thosematters with respect to which we would be

willing to disclose our intentions." 115

Theyexpected that any agreements reached withthe Soviet Government in the field of mili-tary operations would be on the basis ofquid pro quo. and recognized that theUnited States had not yet tried to deal—and was actually not ready to deal—on

this basis with the Soviet Union:The fact is that it is we who want the in-

formation [about Siberian airfields], yet wecannot trade supplies for it. Russia is mostanxious to avoid belligerency in eastern Si-beria; but it is this area which interests us.Until we have some concrete offer with whichto trade, Stalin is unlikely to talk with us—heis suspicious of our motives and unimpressedby our military effectiveness. 116

Colonel Handy made the same point

ities. The JPS, therefore, recommendedthat the JCS request the President "to initi-ate steps on the political level looking toward

a more complete military collaboration be-tween the United States and the U. S. S. R."In case he should succeed, a survey of facili-ties in Siberia could be made, conversationsbegun on the staff level, and "realistic plans"developed. 119 On 30 March the JCS senta memorandum to this effect to the Presi-

dent, who read and returned it withoutcomment. 120 Plans and negotiations re-mained suspended on this note until the latespring of 1942. 121

The inconclusive end of these studiescould not have been so very unexpected tothe Air Forces, and it was obviously wel-come to the Army planners. As it was,U. S. forces, in particular U. S. Army AirForces, had evidently undertaken to do a


for a long time to come. The belated dis-

organized movements of U. S. Army forcesinto the Pacific and the Far East had asye t almost no effect on Japanese operations,but they had already called into questionthe extent to which the United States

do everything at once, fail to accomplish

even the most necessary tasks, and they hadalready set themselves to answer the ques-tion which, if any, operations againstJapan were now to be numbered amongthe essential missions of the U S Army



the extent to which the United Stateswould be able and willing to fulfill priorcommitments to help the United Kingdom

and the Soviet Union against Germany.The War Department planners were dis-mayed lest the United States, in starting to

the essential missions of the U. S. Army.They were quite sure that it was no longerpossible to evade or defer the question and

that U. S. Army deployment in the Pacificmust be controlled by the requirements ofgrand strategy.

CHAPTER VII

Army Deployment in the Pacific



And Grand Strategy

January-March 1942

The collapse of the ABDA Command

and the continued movement of Americantroops into the South and SouthwestPacific raised in acute form the great ques-tion of strategy that had been deferred byth e ARCADIA Conference—the relation be-tween plans for U. S. Army deployment inth e Pacific and plans for U. S. Army

deployment in the Atlantic. Of some132,000 Army troops that embarked foroverseas destinations from the beginning of1942 through th middle f March l

became, during February and March, the

chief concern of General Marshall and hisadvisers on the War Department staff, andthe focus of their discussion of fu ture planswith the Army Air Forces and the Navy.

Army Deployment in the AtlanticJanuary-February 1942

During th e weeks following the ARCADIAConference th e movement of U. S. Armyf i th Atlantic ent f d


mately 15,000 troops in six British returning

liners, their equipment in fifteen cargoships. The search for ships for these con-voys began almost immediately after th efirst contingent of troops fo r Northern Ire-land had left the United States. In the lat-

made for its execution. 5 At the same time

the Chief of Staff stated that he wished theplanned movement of 4,179 men to Icelandto be carried out and 800 additional men tobe sent there in a combat-loaded ship in thesame convoy, provided housing was avail-



land had left the United States. In the latter part of January 1942, the U. S. Chiefsof Staff and the Combined Chiefs of Staff

( C C S ) discussed a proposal for using U. S.Navy combat-loaded ships and accompany-ing cargo vessels for one movement of Armytroops to MAGNET in early February. 3 By25 January it had become evident that itwould be impossible to provide sufficientcargo ships for this move from either th e

American or British sources. The plan-ners therefore proposed that instead of Brit-ish liners, which had little or no cargo ca-pacity, U. S. Navy combat-loaded trans-ports and accompanying cargo vessels allo-cated to the U. S. amphibious force be em-ployed for one trip. The planners recog-nized that this proposal had certain militarydisadvantages. Since the ships would begone fo r five weeks, this plan would delay

same convoy, provided housing was available. 6 The delay caused by the lack ofBritish escort vessels postponed the sailing

of the second INDIGO-MAGNET convoyfrom 10 February to 18 February, when5,200 troops sailed for Iceland and 9,000fo r Northern Ireland. 7

Deployment to the smaller Atlantic baseswas largely neglected during this period.The Army began ordering contingents of no

more than a few hundred men at a time toislands in the Caribbean, to Bermuda, andto Newfoundland. At the same time de-tachments of the Marine Corps were sentto guard air bases in northeast Brazil. 8

Deployment Hawaii-AustraliaJanuary-March 1942

The main body of Army troops moved

A R M Y DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC AND GRAND STRATEGY 149

Francisco, and one large convoy sailed from

New York. In mid-February the QueenMary sailed from Boston and the Montereyand Matsonia from San Francisco. Earlyin March another large convoy sailed fromNew York, followed a week later by the

Except for the third and last contingent

of the 41st Division and a tank destroyerbattalion—some 8,000 men—these ship-ments completed the movements to Aus-tralia and New Caledonia that the WarDepartment had planned during January



, yQueen Elizabeth sailing from San Franciscoand, after the middle of the month, by a

convoy from San Francisco. These ship-ments to the Southwest Pacific amountedto about 79,000 troops, nearly four timesth e number of American troops that leftduring the same period to make the muchshorter voyage across the North Atlantic. 9

Of these 79,000, about 57,000 were for

Australia, 24,500 of whom were still en routeat the end of March. Of those that hadreached Australia by that time—altogetherabout 37,000, including those that had em-barked in December aboard the Pensacola

convoy and the Polk— as many as 2,000were dead or missing (including the 2d Bat-talion, 131st Field Artillery Regiment, lost inJava), and some 3,000 had been sent to theTenth Air Force, leaving the strength then

p p g yand February. The air combat units thatthe War Department meant to send to

Australia were two heavy bombardmentgroups, two medium bombardmentgroups, one light bombardment group, andthree pursuit groups. 11 By the latter partof March the last of these units, and of theaviation units allocated to support them,had arrived, and filler replacements were

on the way.12

The ground units present inen route to the Southwest Pacific are given there astotaling 30,000 (including 5,500 for New Cale-donia). The total present in Australia (withoutfinal correction fo r losses) is given as 34,000. (2 )List entitled: USAF in SW and S Pacific: Apr 6,1942, Tab Misc, Book 4, Exec 8. This list gives abreakdown (except for small miscellaneous serviceun i t s ) of all troops present in and en route toAustralia, but the strength of some units present isgiven as authorized rather than as actually present.Totals in this list show 23,500 en route and about


Australia were the 147th Field Artillery

Regiment, the 148th Field Artillery Regi-ment (less one battalion), and the equiva-lent of two regiments of antiaircraft artil-lery. About 4,000 service troops ( includ-ing a regiment of engineers and a quarter-

tained a pursuit squadron, which arrived a

few days later from Australia.15

Reinforcements for New Caledonia num-bering about 5,000 left the United Statesduring March. The original instructionsissued to General Patch, the commander



ing a regiment of engineers and a quarter-master battalion) had arrived. About12,000 more were on the way, along withabout half the 41st Division and one of thetwo tank destroyer battalions assigned toAustralia. 13

In New Caledonia there was a garrisonof about 17,000—the task force (codename POPPY) that had made up the

greater part of the shipment from NewYork on 22 January. The convoy hadlanded in the latter part of February atMelbourne, and the POPPY Force was therehurriedly reloaded for New Caledonia withpart of its supplies and equipment, whichhad been sent separately from the westcoast and had not all arrived. It sailed on7 March and arrived at Noumea on 12March. 14 The force consisted of a brigade

,of the New Caledonia force, were to plan"on the assumption that additional forces

will not be immediately available." 16

Butthe original plan had assumed that a regi-ment of light artillery, to be taken from thebrigade already in Australia, would therebe incorporated in the force. The War De-partment, having acceded to General Wa-vell's request to leave the entire brigade com-

mitted to the ABDA Command and havingrecognized, moreover, the need to strengthenthe ground defenses of Australia, wasobliged to send another regiment of artil-lery from the United States to New Cale-donia. 17 This regiment (72d Field Artil-lery, 105-mm. howitzers) sailed on 3March with the first contingent of the 41stDivision to bring the force up to theplanned strength of a triangular division,

ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC AND GRAND STRATEGY 151

The Army garrisons along the South

Pacific line of communications representeda much smaller commitment. To the FijiIslands (code name FANTAN), the linkbetween New Caledonia and Samoa, theUnited States was to send only a pursuit

The 27th was a square division (the only

square division sent overseas). On 7 Marchtw o battalions of infantry ( f rom th e 165thInfantry and the 108th Infantry) left SanFrancisco aboard the Grant. On 10 Marchthe Lurline and the Aquitania (lent by the



y psquadron, leaving it to New Zealand to re-inforce the ground garrison. The 70th

Pursuit Squadron—which with servicesamounted to 725 men—was put under ord-ers early in January and arrived at Suva atthe end of that month. 19 The Army gar-rison fo r Borabora (code name BOBCAT)in the Society Islands, which was to serveas a refueling station fo r convoys from th e

west coast to Australia, left on 27 Januaryfrom Charleston, S. C. This garrison num-bered about 3,900 men, including the 102dInfantry (less one battalion) and an anti-aircraft regiment (the 198th). 20 TheArmy garrisons for Christmas (code nameBIRCH) and Canton (code name HOLLY)

sailed from San Francisco on 31 January.The BIRCH garrison, aboard the PresidentJohnson, numbered nearly 2,000 men, in-

h

q ( yBritish along with the Queen Mary and theQueen Elizabeth) left with the 106th In-

fantry and a battalion of the 105th, tw obatteries of field artillery, and headquartersand medical troops. On 29 March theAquitania made a second trip, with most ofth e remaining troops of the 165th Infantry,tw o regiments of field artillery (105th and106th), and a regiment each of engineer

and quartermaster troops.22

The Shortage Along the LineHawaii-Australia

These shipments to the Pacific did notconstitute a completed program. In the

first place, they did not fill th e demand fo rground forces. In the latter part of Feb-ruary and again in early March, Admiral

d h h h ld

15 2 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

return of the two Australian divisions or-

dered home from th e Middle East (one ofwhich was already on its way), one Aus-tralian and one New Zealand divisionwould still remain in the Middle East.Early in March, upon the opening of a new

There was, moreover, a deficit to be met

in service troops for the forces recently sent(and any new forces to be sent) to the Southand Southwest Pacific. The amount of thedeficit was as yet undetermined, it being un-certain how far locally available labor would



campaign in the North African desert, theBritish Prime Minister requested the Presi-

dent to send two additional divisions to theSouthwest Pacific so that these Dominiontroops might remain in the Middle East. 24

Besides these new demands, the War De-partment had still to send to Hawaii theground troops it had promised to the newArmy commander in Hawaii, Lt. Gen. Delos

C. Emmons. From th e close of the ARCA-DIA Conference until the end of February,the shipment of men to Hawaii had beenentirely suspended (except for a small move-ment aboard the Republic, including theadvance party of the 27th Division), in fa-vor of the immediate execution of planned

movements to the South and Southwest Pa-cific.25 This delay, of which the War De-partment had warned General Emmons on

supply the needs for unloading and ware-housing cargo, construction of facilities, lay-

ing out of roads and airfields, and otherservices. But in any event the movementof over 40,000 additional ground troops toHawaii, two new garrisons (perhaps 10,000men) to the South Pacific, and two moredivisions (about 30,000 men) and the re-mainder of the 41st Division (about 7,500

men) to the Southwest Pacific—togetherwith the movement of service units to meetexisting deficits and those created by newmovements—would certainly involve thecontinued use throughout the spring of mostof the troop shipping available in the Pacific.It would, moreover, involve continued

heavy pressure on cargo shipping. Thescheduled movement of munitions andother supplies and equipment had not as yet

ARMY DEPLOY MEN T IN THE PACIFIC AND GRAND STRATEGY 153

"balanced" American air force in the

Southwest Pacific. By mid-March mostof the air and ground crews and air serviceunits assigned had arrived. 27 But delays,losses, and diversions had left too few me-dium and heavy bombers on hand in Aus-

There was a like shortage of planes, espe-

cially of heavy and medium bombers,throughout the Pacific. The other majorair force in the Pacific, the Hawaiian AirForce, had received no reinforcements sincethe emergency shipments of December



ytralia fo r operations of any kind. In mid-March the force had twenty-six B-17's.Of these, twelve were then in shape to op-erate, as against an assigned strength ( fortw o heavy bomber groups) of eighty op-erational planes plus reserves. There wereonly one or two B-25's, not in commission,as against an assigned strength ( for two me-dium bomber groups) of 140 operationalplanes plus reserves. Light bombers andpursuits were more nearly up to strength.There were forty-three A-24's and one ortwo A-20's in Australia, of which twenty-seven were operational, as against an as-signed strength ( for one light bombergroup) of fifty-seven plus reserves. Therewere about 350 pursuit planes (P-40's,P-400's, and P-39's), of which half wereoperational and the rest to be repaired or

g y p1941. From January through March thereremained a great gap between the numberof planes authorized and the number pres-ent. As in Australia, the status of pursuitplanes was relatively satisfactory. Thenumber on hand (a good many of themobsolete or obsolescent) fell from about 200at the beginning of January to about 180,as compared with 225 authorized. Thenumber of light and medium bombers wasabout twenty-five, and the allocationof these was decreased from thirty-nineto correspond to this actual strength.Ninety-six heavy bombers were allocated toHawaii, but the number present droppedfrom

forty-three in January to thirty-one in

mid-February. 29

The drop in the number of heavy bomberspresent was the result of the diversion of a


bombers operating between Hawaii and

Australia in February and March. TheArmy pursuit squadrons assigned to NewCaledonia, the Fijis, and Christmas (but notthose assigned to Canton and Palmyra)were present with their planes. But the one

to become bases for Army pursuit and bomb-ers. Then the Navy will have a safe placeto sail its vessels. But they will not go fartherforward than our air (A rmy ) can assuresuperiority.

The amount of air required for this slow,laborious and indecisive type of warfare isgoing to be something that will keep us f



bombardment unit assigned to the SouthPacific—a squadron of medium bombers

for New Caledonia—was due to be divertedfrom Australia only late in the spring, whenthe flight crews should arrive from theUnited States, and only over the objectionsof the Army Air Forces. 30 Of all the de-ficiencies in the planned deployment ofArmy forces on the main Pacific "line"

Hawaii-Australia (as also in Alaska), theshortage of bombers, and particularly thelack of bombers in the South Pacific, hadbecome and was to remain the focus of themost persistent criticism from the Navy De-partment and from both Army and Navycommanders in the Pacific. And it was the

point at which the War Department wasleast willing to revise and expand theplanned deployment of Army forces in the

going to be something that will keep us fromgoing to Russia's aid in time 31

The occasion for this declaration was Ad-miral King's proposal, formally addressedto General Marshall the following day, togarrison additional islands, in particular theisland of Efate, in the South Pacific. Theformal reply (drafted by Eisenhower or oneof his assistants and revised by Marshall)

described the proposal as "a joint projectwith rather far-reaching implications."Marshall declared that he wanted to do"anything reasonable" that would make"offensive action by the fleet practicable,"but asked for an explanation of thesequestions:

a. What is the general scheme or conceptof operations that the occupation of these ad-ditional islands is designed to advance? Areth t k l f t ti f


Divisional teams from which these troopswould have to be taken. 32

Marshall went on to state that Americanoperations in the Southwest Pacific (inwhich he included the South Pacific) must"for several reasons be limited to the stra-

i d f i " f i d d

bined Chiefs of Staff, is involved, the entiresituation must be reconsidered before we be-come involved more seriously in the build-upof Army ground and air garrisons in thePacific Islands. 38

When Admiral King repeated his pro-posal early in March, he requested ground



tegic defensive" so far as air and groundforces were concerned. The first reason w as

the "geography an d communications ofAustralia" taken together with "enemy ad-vantages in the layout of air fields and othercommunications facing Australia." Thesecond reason was the limiting effect of thetonnage required for the long voyage to thefa r Pacific, which restricted commitments

of ground forces. The third reason was thelimiting effect of demands on the Army airforces throughout the world:. . . the requirements for U. S. air units inother theatres (Burma–China, Alaska, Ha-waii, Panama–Caribbean, Great Britain forGerman bombing, now the Near East, a pos-

sible African expedition, and the U. S. Coastalregions) would seem definitely to limit forsome time to come the extent to which we canprovide for a further expansion in the Pa-

p y , q ggarrisons for only two islands—Efate andTongatabu—and to this proposal the WarDepartment quickly acceded. 34 In deter-mining the composition of the task force forTongatabu (code name BLEACHER), whichwas to be a base of naval operations, theplanners assumed that it would probablynot be attacked by major forces so long asthe Allies held Samoa, the Fijis, and NewCaledonia. They provided a force to dealwith raids and to deny the Tonga Islands toany Japanese force moving from the southagainst the Fijis or Samoa. This force, un-der the command of Brig. Gen. Benjamin C.Lockwood, Jr., was similar to the one pro-vided fo r Borabora—a regiment of antiair-craft, a regiment of infantry (reinforced)less one battalion, and a pursuit squadron(the 68th) which was to be sent from Aus-


plan for garrisoning Efate assumed the prob-

ability of a Japanese assault before attackingeither New Caledonia or the Fijis. TheNavy agreed to provide for air defense witha Marine defense battalion and a Marinefighter squadron. The Army agreed to

d f Ef ( d ROSES)

On 19 February he listed priorities for use

of American shipping in the war effort.The first priority was: "Maintenance ofexisting garrisons. Defense aid to Russia.Essential supplies to UK and critical items,only, to China." Second priority was for

d i f t t th S th t



send a force to Efate (code name ROSES)of about 4,900 men, consisting of a rein-

forced regiment of infantry (the 24th In-fantry) . The force commander, Brig. Gen.Harry D. Chamberlin, was to exercise unityof command over the joint forces. 36

The Eisenhower Studies

The joint agreement to send these twoadditional garrison forces into the SouthPacific did not indicate agreement betweenthe War and Navy Departments on the ques-tion of Army deployment in the Pacific.The leader in formulating the Army viewwas General Eisenhower. As chief War

Department operations officer for the Pa-cific, had recognized and had in fact insistedthat the movement of reinforcements to the

approved reinforcements to the SouthwestPacific, this to include approved new garri-

sons not adjacent to the lines of communica-tion, and possible items of lend-lease for theNetherlands Indies. Third, came approvedunits and material reinforcements forHawaii; fourth, for Panama and Alaska.British lend-lease had fifth priority (so faras use of American shipping was required);

approved reinforcements for the Caribbeanarea (less Panama), sixth; continuation ofNorthern Ireland and Iceland movements,seventh. Finally, Eisenhower mentionedfiller replacements for Hawaii. The abovelisting, Eisenhower noted, represented thedegree of urgency in actual or projected

operations at the time the memorandumwas prepared. 38

A few weeks earlier, on 22 January, Gen-


The idea took more definite form in Feb-ruary, immediately

after the

fall of Singa-

pore, when Eisenhower had become head ofthe Army plans and operations staff. Hewrote: "We've got to go on a harassing de-fensive west of Hawaii; hold India andCeylon; build up air and land f in

immediately vital to the successful outcome ofthe war. The problem is one of determiningwhat we can spare for the effort in that region,without seriously impairing performance ofour mandatory tasks.

In dealing with th e first of these threepoints, the memorandum applied the "stra-



Ceylon; build up air and land forces inEngland, and when we're strong enough,

go after Germany's vitals." 40

Again, threedays later: "We've got to keep Russia in thewar and hold India Then we can getready to crack Germany through Eng-land." 41

On 28 February, Eisenhower prepared aformal study setting forth his conclusions

and recommendations on world strategy aswell as on Pacific deployment. 42 The studypresented an outline of world-wide strategicobjectives and their application to theSouthwest Pacific. It defined in three mainpropositions what had remained indetermi-nate in Army, joint, and combined plans

since the ABC-1 conversations:[1] ... in the event of a war involving

both oceans, the U. S. should adopt the stra-

p , pptegic axiom" that the commander shouldfirst attack and defeat the weaker force of adivided enemy. Eisenhower reasoned thatalthough Germany and its satellites were"stronger in total combat power" than Ja-pan, Japan was still "relatively stronger"since it was not at war with the Soviet Unionand much less accessible to attack by themain forces of the other Allied powers.Moreover, it took three to four times asmany ships to transport and maintain agiven American force in the Pacific as inthe Atlantic. Therefore, Eisenhower con-cluded, "logistic reasons, as well as strategicaxiom, substantiate the soundness of the de-

cision to concentrate against the EuropeanAxis."

The memorandum recognized, however,


British comm unications to the Near and Mid-dle East and the physical junction of our twoprincipal enemies. Important, but less criti-cal, advantages will accrue to them, also,through conquest of Australia and the islandsimmediately to the east thereof.

Having asserted the second main postu-

But he went on to point out that the collapse

of the Malayan defenses and loss o f portionsof the Netherlands Indies erased one of theoriginal reasons for deciding to support theSouthwest Pacific—to deny to the Japanesethe natural resources in those areas. By 28February Japan controlled ample sources



Having asserted the second main postu-late, the doctrine of the "necessary" as dis-tinguished

from the "desirable," Eisenhowerlisted three objectives in the first category—always assuming that the "continentalUnited States and Hawaii, the Caribbeanarea, and South America north of Natal"were secure:

a. Maintenance of the United Kingdom,which involves relative security of the NorthAtlantic sea lanes.

b. Retention of Russia in the war as anactive enemy of Germany.

c. Maintenance of a position in the India-M iddle East Area which will prevent physicaljunction of the two principal enemies, andwill probably keep China in the war.

On the other hand he named as "things. . . highly desirable," even approachingthe necessary:

February, Japan controlled ample sourcesof oil and tin, and practically the entire

rubber resources of the world. Eisenhowertherefore listed present objectives, with thereservation that they were not vital to thewinning of the war:

a. To maintain a reasonably safe line ofcommunications t o Australia . . . .

b. To maintain the most advanced bases

possible for eventual offensives against theJapanese Empire.c. To create diversions in favor of the

vitally important India-Burma area.d. To deny the enemy free access to the

Southeastern Pacific and its natural re -sources . . . .

e. To support the battle in the N.E.I, aslong as possible, . . .

After a summary of the ground and airforces in the Southwest Pacific and a review

ARMY DEPLOY MEN T IN THE PACIFIC A ND GRAND STRATEGY 159

and one light squadron be retained tempo-

rarily in Australia and , as additional ma-terial became available, be withdrawn toHawaii to provide a mobile reserve for em-ployment to the southwest.

Eisenhower then introduced a specificrecommendation fo r offensive action a pro-

Joint Study of Priorities

for Deployment

The whole subject of scheduled move-ments overseas and long-run strategy hadmeanwhile come under study for the JCSand the CGS 43 On 11 February the Joint



recommendation fo r offensive action, a pro-posal that followed logically from his view

of the military situation as a whole and thatexplained his other recommendations. Inelaborating on what was meant by "task ofkeeping Russia in the war," he urged "im-mediate and definite action," first "by directaid through lend-lease," and second"through the early initiation of operations

that will draw off from th e Russian f rontsizeable portions of the German Army, bothair and ground." More specifically:

We should at once develop, in conju nc tionwith the British, a definite plan for operationsagainst Northwest Europe. It should bedrawn up at once, in detail, and it should besufficiently extensive in scale as to engagefrom the middle of May onward, an increasingportion of the German Air Force, and by latesummer an increasing amount of his ground

and the CGS. On 11 February the JointU. S. Strategic Committee, since it was al-

ready studying American aspects of theproblem, was directed to satisfy a CCS re-quest fo r recommendations fo r over-all de-ployment by the United Nations in thePacific areas. 44

The initial JUSSC papers comprised ma-jority and minority reports. 45 Although the

papers were devoted chiefly to a discussionof the Pacific areas, they had something tosay about the general strategic situation inthe world, especially as it affected the spe-cial situation in the Japanese theater of war.Both the majority and the minority reportsdwelt on the need to sustain the Soviet wareffort and to defeat Germany first, and con-cluded that the European situation indi-

t d "the lli it f


of force in other theaters in order to permit

concentration of effort against the principalobjective." The minority report placedeven greater emphasis on the ideas that Ger-many was the principal enemy and that itwas necessary to guard against any diversionof strength from the main objective the

Thus the minority—presumably the AAF

member—recommended virtual abandon-ment of the Southwest Pacific region—in-cluding Australia and the island base chainprotecting the approach to Australia fromHawaii. The majority report declared thatAustralia should be held and that sea and



of strength from the main objective, thedefeat of Germany. Both the reports

stated:The availability of shipping controls all

decisions concerning overseas movements dur-ing 1942. The total capacity available to theUnited Nations in 1942, even if the buildingprogram is accomplished, will not exceed thecapacity available in 1941. The shippingsituation is so critical as to necessitate effectivepooling of shipping and restriction of non-military use to an absolute minimum. Theremainder must then be used on the shortestruns practicable in the manner which willcontribute most to the early defeat ofGermany.

The principal point of difference betweenthe majority and minority reports related tothe capacity of the United States and GreatBritain to provide adequate air forces and

Australia should be held, and that sea andair communications with Australia must be

made secure if Australia were to be sup-ported and remain available as a base forfurther operations:

Since communications from Australia tothe westward are now liable to constant inter-ruption, due to the fall of Singapore, the im-portance of the Anzac area has been greatlyincreased. On the security of the Anzac areadepends the maintenance of communicationsbetween Australia and the United States.Not only must New Caledonia, Fiji and otherimportant shore positions in the area be gar-risoned. There must also be provided a mo-bile air force of long range aircraft to operatewith the mobile naval surface forces. 46

The minority felt that Australia should beheld by minimum forces and that the de-fense of Australia and New Zealand shouldbe a British responsibility It indicated

ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC A ND GRAND STRATEGY 161

The result of the planners' study was asignificant change in alignment. The mi-nority member acquiesced in the view thatthe United States could and should hold theline Hawaii-Australia, with the minimumforce necessary and at the same time pre-pare for a maximum offensive across the At-

Eisenhower's 28 February study—was listedas the third alternative. The three alterna-tives were:

(A ) Ensure the security of the militaryposition in the Pacific Theater by strong rein-forcements ... at the expense of executinga vigorous offensive against Germany with



pare for a maximum offensive across the Atlantic. Thereupon the argument among

the planners shifted to the question of whatthe minimum necessary forces in the Pacificwould be—a question on which the Navyplanners, rather than the Air planners,found themselves in the minority, insistingthat more Army forces, especially airforces, would be needed to hold the

Japanese.47

JCS Decision on Deployment Policy

The Joint Staff Planners unanimouslyrecommended "that the JCS at once decideon a clear course of action, and execute

this decision with the utmost vigor." 48

They reported irreconcilable differencesamong themselves and presented three pos-

United States Forces. Contain Japaneseforces in the southern portion of the Pacific

Theater; inflict attrition; and exert economicpressure by the destruction of vessels . . . .(B) While Russia is still an effective ally,

concentrate the mass of our forces for a vigor-ous offensive, initially from bases in England,with the objective of defeating Germany.Until Germany has been defeated, accept thepossibility that the Southwest Pacific may be

lost.(C ) Provide the additional forces in theSouth Pacific Area considered by the JointStrategic Committee as the minimum requiredfor the defensive position and simultaneouslybegin to build up in the United Kingdomforces intended for offense at the earliest prac-ticable time. This course of action contem-plates that the British would provide the bulkof th e forces for any offensive undertaken in1942 from the United Kingdom. 49

Thus squarely presented was the issue of


viewed the related question of defense forcesfor Hawaii. 51 This paper, approved byGenerals Arnold and Marshall, maintainedthat in providing rapidly for adequate de-fense of the Hawaiian Islands it was essen-tial to avoid overdefense, since all troopsand armament assigned there were being

Strategic Deployment in the Pacific

Soon after these decisions were reached,a number of changes had to be made in WarDepartment troop commitments, all of themmaking it even harder to carry out the com-promise policy of holding the line in the



a d g were gcontained by Japan without any drain on its

own military resources, and the amount ofshipping available for other purposes wasunnecessarily reduced. The Army plan-ners estimated that so long as the UnitedStates could keep reasonable naval strengthin the Hawaiian area and were engagingthe Japanese in the Southwest Pacific, at-

tacks on Hawaii would be limited to navaland air raids. The study concluded thatthe ground and air forces projected by theArmy, combined with the local naval de-fenses would "assure retention of the islands,prevent serious damage to installations . . .and permit freedom of action to the PacificFleet." It recommended that Army forcesshould be increased to authorized levels assoon as possible after commitments of higher

p p y gPacific while preparing for an offensiveacross the Atlantic. Early in March thePrime Minister had asked that the UnitedStates send one division to New Zealandand one to Australia in addition to the U. S.Army forces already allocated to Australia.The Dominions could on that basis consentto leave one New Zealand and one Austra-

lian division in the then critical Middle Eastbattle zone. The Prime Minister suggestedthat "shipping would be saved and safetygained by the American reinforcement ofAustralia and New Zealand rather than bya move across the oceans of these divisionsfrom the M iddle East." 53 The Army plan-

ners recommended that the United Statesagree to send the additional divisions forwhich the Prime Minister had asked, pro-

id d l th t A t li d N Z l d


its reply, which Roosevelt forwarded toChurchill , the CCS recognized the impor-tance of the area of the Indian Ocean andthe Middle East and agreed that the Aus-tralian and New Zealand divisions now inthat area should remain and that the UnitedStates would dispatch one division to New

American contribution to a land offensiveagainst Germany in 1942. 56 The jointplanners found that under the new commit-ments th e availability of troop transportswould become the limiting factor during thesecond and third quarters of 1942, afterwhich the availability of cargo shipping



pZealand and one to Australia as replace-

ment for their forces as follows:The 41st Division is leaving the U. S. by

the eighteenth of this month reaching Aus-tralia about April 10. The next convoy ofhalf a division could leave about April 15 andthe remainder about May 15. If the totalnum ber of New Zealand and Australian troopsretained for f ighting in the Middle East, India

or Ceylon are in excess of these two divisions,a third U. S. division can leave for the South-west Pacific about May 15.

These movements would require that sometwenty-five cargo ships be withdrawn fromlend-lease service to the Red Sea andChina. 55

The United States also agreed to furnishshipping to move two British divisions (40,-000 men) with their equipment from the

y g pp gwould again control. 57 Although the ten-

tative commitments might possibly havesome effect on transportation of troops tothe United Kingdom, all Pacific troopmovements were expected to be carried outas indicated in the previous schedules.58

The planners suggested that should theBritish not be willing to launch an offen-

sive in the European theater in 1942, theagreed strategic concept should be re-evaluated and the possibility of concentrat-ing American offensive effort in the Pacificconsidered.

One other change occurred in the JCS23 deployment schedules when the 27th

Division, previously authorized by the WarDepartment for Hawaii, replaced a Marineamphibious division which the JUSSC had

59


amounted to over 275,000—about 35 per-

cent of the total projected overseas deploy-ment of the U. S. Army and about half ofthe projected Army deployment outside theWestern Hemisphere. 60 (See Chart 2.)

St t i R ibilit d C d

certain the loss of Sumatra and Java. 61 On23 February they ordered General Wavellto dissolve his headquarters at Batavia, per-mitting command to pass to the Dutch,whose forces were still engaged, with someAllied aid, in fighting a delaying action inJava. 62 Although this transfer of authority



Strategic Responsibility and Commandin the Pacific

The debate over Army commitments inthe Pacific was accompanied, and its out-come was very largely determined, by aclarification of American responsibilities formilitary operations in the Southwest Pacific,following on the collapse of the ABDA Com-mand. Within the week after the fall ofSingapore the CCS accepted as virtually

60 The total forces "on shore in overseas posi-tions" in the Pacific recommended in JPS 2/6 andincorporated in JCS 23 were (in round numbers )416,000, of whom 225,000 were then present in the

areas or en route. ( J C S 23, Annex A, title:Forces Req to Secure SW Pacific.) The break-down (in round numbers, including projectedground and air strength for 1942) was as follows:

technically placed the United States forces

in the Philippines under Netherlands com-mand, MacArthur was to "continue tocommunicate directly with the War De-partment." 63 The two senior U. S. Armyofficers in the Batavia headquarters wereordered, upon release by Wavell, to proceedto the two flanks of the disintegrating ABDA

area—General Brereton to India, to becomeCommanding General, Tenth U. S. AirForce, with headquarters at Karachi, andGeneral Brett to resume command of allU. S. forces in Australia. 64 These interimreadjustments marked the end of the firstshort-lived experiment in international

unified command for World War II.61 Their first action was to readjust British com-

mand relations by returning Burma to the "opera-




A few days later the British Chiefs of Staffindicated that they were thinking along sim-ilar lines. 70

On 7 March the President proposed thatthe world be divided into three generalareas for the prosecution of the war againstthe Axis: (1) the Pacific area, (2) the

ing, that the CCS exercise general jurisdic-tion over grand strategy and the allocationof war material in all areas, in addition todirect supervision of all strategic and opera-tional matters in the European and Atlanticarea. In the Indian Ocean and MiddleEast area the British Chiefs of Staff were

i h f



Middle and Far East area, and (3) the

European and Atlantic area. The first re-gion would be an American responsibility,the second British, and the third combinedAmerican and British. 71 On the next dayGeneral Marshall discussed the issue at theWhite House. 72

General Eisenhower meanwhile prepared

a study along the lines of the President's pro-posal. Eisenhower defined the three areasof strategic responsibility as follows: (1 )The Pacific area, which included the Ameri-can continents, China, Australia, New Zea-land, and Japan, but excluded Sumatra andthe Malay Peninsula, was to be an area of

American responsibility. (2) The IndianOcean and Middle East area—the IndianOcean and all land areas contiguous thereto

to exercise jurisdiction; in the Pacific areathe U. S. Chiefs of Staff were to exercisejurisdiction. 73

On 9 March the President sent a personalmessage to the Prime Minister asking him,in view of the developments in the South-west Pacific area since the ARCADIA Confer-ence, to consider the operational simplifica-

tion that had been proposed in Washington.

The operational responsibility for the Pacificarea would rest on the United States, withdecisions for the area being made in Wash-ington by the U. S. Chiefs of Staff in con-sultation with an advisory council represent-ing Australia, New Zealand, the Nether-

lands Indies, China, and possibly Canada.The supreme command in the Pacific areawould be American. The middle area—

t di f Si t d i l di

ARMY DEPLOY MENT IN THE PACIFIC A ND GRAND STRATEGY 167



WAR PLANS DIVISION, March 1942. Left to right: Col. St. Clair Streett; Gen-eral Eisenhower, Chief; Col. A. S. N evins; Brig. Gen. R. W. Crawford; Col. C. A.Russell; and Col. H. A. Barber, Jr.


methods of achieving this would be capable ofbeing discussed by combined Chiefs of StaffCommittee in Washington . . . .

And in summing up:... I feel that your proposals a s I have ven-tured to elaborate and interpret them willachieve double purpose namely (a) integrityof executive and operational action and (b)

in Melbourne that operations in the Southand Southwest Pacific based on Australiashould be under unified command. 78

The J C S , after studying the recom-mendations of the Australian and NewZealand Governments, adopted instead theNavy's view that New Zealand belonged

ith th li f i ti d



of executive and operational action and (b)opportunity of reasonable consultation for

those whose fortunes are involved.75

Creation of SWPA and POA

While the President and the Prime Min-ister were reaching agreement on the world-wide division of strategic responsibility, the

JCS were considering the subdivision of thePacific theater, which they assumed wouldbecome a responsibility of the United States.The Navy was primarily concerned with the"threat to the line of communications be-tween the Americas and Australia–NewZealand," and Admiral King had made thefirst formal proposal for revision of com-mand arrangements in the Southwest Pacificimmediately after the fall of Singapore. 76

with the line of communication, and pro-posed the establishment of a new "Austra-lian area" that would include only "theAustralian continent and the direct enemyapproaches thereto, a strategic entity ap-propriate for unified command." 79 Eisen-hower pointed out that since Australia hadto serve as a base for all military operations

in the Southwest Pacific there were obviousdisadvantages in setting up an Australianarea which would not include New Zealand,New Caledonia, and the Philippines. Ac-cordingly the War Department recom-mended extending the area to include theseislands and proposed giving the area, so ex-

tended, the "more descriptive designation"of "the Southwest Pacific Area." 80 GeneralMarshall proposed to the Joint Chiefs that

ARMY DEPLOYMENT IN THE PACIFIC AND GRAND STRATEGY 169

the "Southwest Pacific Area" be estab-lished as a subarea command in the Pacifictheater "to comprise all land areas in thePacific for which the U. S. is made respon-sible, southwest of the line Philippines-Samoa (both inclusive), thence south alongthe meridian of 170° W." The participat-ing governments Australia New Zea

Navy responsible for operations in the restof the Pacific theater—the Pacific OceanArea—except for a small Southeast Pacificarea ( for which no command was estab-lished). 83 (See Chart 2.} General Mac-Arthur was to be Supreme Commander,Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA). AdmiralChester W Nimitz who was in command



ing governments—Australia, New Zea-land, the Netherlands Indies, and theUnited States—would select a supremecommander whose directive would be pre-pared by the U. S. Joint Chiefs of Staff incollaboration with representatives of thesegovernments. The sea and island areas inthe Pacific Ocean northeast of the Southwest

Pacific Area would be known as the NorthPacific Area and "placed under the com-mand of a U. S. Navy officer." 81

The JCS acting "in anticipation of finalapproval of the division of the world intothree major theaters," thereupon modifiedtheir proposal by extending the boundary

of the area northward to include the Philip-pines and renaming the area the SouthwestPacific Area. But they retained the separa-

l l d

Chester W. Nimitz, who was in commandof the Pacific Fleet, was to become Com-mander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Area(POA), directly controlling the South Pa-

cific subarea through a deputy whom hewould designate. 84

Organization of SWPA

On 10 March, in anticipation of GeneralMacArthur's arrival in Australia, the WarDepartment had sent to General Brett thefollowing instructions, as approved by thePresident:

Within the hour [of General MacArthur's

arrival in Australia] you will call upon thePrime Minister or other appropriate govern-mental official of Australia, stating that your


call is made by direction of the President.You are to notify the Prime Minister thatGeneral MacArthur has landed in Australiaand has assumed command of all U. S. Armyforces therein. You will propose that theAustralian Government nominate GeneralMacArthur as the Supreme Commander ofthe Southwest Pacific Area, and will recom-mend that the nomination be submitted as

his assumption of "Supreme Command inAustralia and region to north, includingthe Philippines," and that upon completionof British-American negotiations he prob-ably would be appointed formally as com-mander of the Southwest Pacific Area. 88

The first task facing MacArthur after hisarrival in Australia was to consolidate the



soon as possible to London and Washington

simultaneously.85

On 11 March MacArthur and his partyleft Corregidor for Mindanao, from whichplanes were still able to operate. When hearrived in Australia six days later, the WarDepartment announced that he would besupreme commander in that region, includ-ing the Philippines, "in accordance withthe request of the Australian Govern-ment." 86 On the same day Roosevelt senta personal message to Churchill telling himof MacArthur's arrival in Australia an dexplaining that both the Australian andNew Zealand Governments had suggestedappointment of an American supreme com-mander in the Southwest Pacific. "Thisaction," the President stated, "will in no

arrival in Australia was to consolidate theorganization of the land, sea, and air forcesof the United States and Australia that hadbeen put under his command. GeneralMacArthur had been instructed to take overfrom General Brett the command of U. S.Army Forces in Australia (USAFIA) butthe day after his arrival the War Depart-ment rescinded these instructions, explainingthat as supreme commander of an interna-tional command he would not be "eligibleto retain direct command of any nationalforce." The War Department informedhim that Brett, therefore, should "tempo-rarily resume his position as Commanding

General of USAFIA," indicating fur therthat, upon the reorganization of commandsin the Pacific, Brett should command Allied

l l

A R M Y D E P L O Y ME N T IN THE PACIFIC A ND GRAND STRATEGY 171

By agreement between MacArthur andthe Australian Government, Brett was atonce put in command of combined airforces, and MacArthur soon thereafter re-lieved him of responsibilities for USAFIA. 90

These responsibilities, primarily for the oper-ation of American base facilities in Aus-

ally become "to intimately involved in de-fense of Singapore an d Burma and not suffi-ciently detached in point of view to take careof interests of Philippines and NetherlandsEast Indies." The War Department con-cluded: "This basis for Supreme Com-mander has been accepted as the policy to

d b d



tralia, reverted to Maj. Gen. Julian F.

Barnes, who in fact had had a f luctuatingand uncertain share of these responsibilitiesever since his arrival with the first Americantroop convoy in Australia in December.MacArthur proposed that they should con-tinue to include command of Americangrounds forces in Australia. 91 But the WarDepartment continued to insist on the needfor a combined ground command, under anAustralian officer, in line with the precedentof the ABDA Command. The War De-partment emphasized th e importance o f fol-lowing that precedent, noting that it had

been developed "after much difficulty," andexplained that it had been set to avert a sit-uation where the supreme commander of

guide in future combined operations of

United Nations . . . . 92

MacArthur at once fell in with the policyoutlined by the War Department for com-mand of combined air, ground, and navalforces and proposed that Barnes' commandbe set up as an American service command,with purely administrative and supply func-tions, separate from Australian administra-tion and supply, which would continue tobe under the Australian Government. 93

Directive to MacArthur

The formal directive naming MacArthuras Supreme Commander, Southwest PacificArea and Admiral Nimitz as Commander


signed to MacArthur were to "hold the key

military regions of Australia as bases forfuture offensive action against Japan, andin order to check the Japanese conquest ofthe Southwest Pacific Area" and to "checkthe enemy advance toward Australia andits essential lines of comm unication . . . ." 94

ing to operational strategy, with the Army

Chief of Staff acting as agent for the JCS.General jurisdiction over grand strategicpolicy and related factors including the allo-cation of forces and war materials was givento the CCS.

Finally, and most tellingly, the scope of



its essential lines of comm unication . . . .Although his directive included the pro-vision that he should "prepare to take theoffensive," the mission assigned him was pri-marily defensive, in accordance with thestrategy in the Pacific that the U. S. JointChiefs of Staff had developed in March.He was to maintain the American position

in the Philippines and protect communica-tions and route shipping within the South-west Pacific Area. He was directed to exerteconomic pressure on the enemy by destroy-ing his transport vessels and to support theoperations of friendly forces in the PacificOcean and Indian theaters.

There were certain broad limitations onMacArthur's authority. As supreme com-

Finally, and most tellingly, the scope ofGeneral MacArthur's operations was re-stricted not by his directive but by the policythat the War Department had meanwhileadopted to govern the deployment of Armyforces in the Pacific. The War Departmentundertook to bring to full strength the airunits already assigned to Australia—two

heavy bomber groups, two medium bombergroups, one light bomber group, and threepursuit groups—and to send to Australiathe 41st and 32d Divisions. As soon asMacArthur arrived in Australia, the WarDepartment informed him that Army com-mitments to the Southwest Pacific Areawould be limited to these units, the limitsbeing "fixed by shortages in shipping, whichi f th t t i d b iti l

A R M Y D E P L O Y ME N T IN THE PACIFIC AND GRAND STRATEGY 173

when his air units should be reorganizedand equipped and his divisions adequatelytrained for combat operations. The forcesat his disposal were only a small fraction ofthose he would need to make good thepledge he had given the Philippine nationand to avenge the defeat and imminent sur-

render of the remnants, hungry and bitter,of the U. S. Army Forces in the Far East. 96

96 The War Department continued its helplesspreoccupation with the Philippines to the end of thePhilippine Island Campaign. For the detailed storyof the close of that campaign, see Morton, Fall ofthe Philippines.




itself.7 Plans were made for the invasion ofNorth Africa in case the French should issuean "invitation" some time soon. 8 But evenon this assumption, the War Departmentconcluded that the requirements of the op-eration could be met only by suspending allmovements to Iceland and Ireland, andreducing reinforcements to Australia and

Meanwhile, the President and the PrimeMinister were also reaching agreement tolay aside the North African project. On 4March the Prime Minister wrote to the Pres-ident: "I am entirely with you about theneed for GYMNAST, but the check whichAuchinleck has received [in Libya] and theshipping stringency seem to impose obstinate



Hawaii to a "trickle." 9 Furthermore, cargoships, which were critical in supportingSUPER-GYMNAST,, could be made availableonly at the expense of the Soviet aid pro-gram and Red Sea service. The British,too, were held back by a want of shipping,which made SUPER-GYMNAST "almost cer-tainly impossible from the British point ofview during 1942." 10

The conclusion drawn by the plannersafter several weeks of study was that plan-ning for the invasion of North Africa was"an academic study and should be treatedas such." 11 On 3 March 1942 the CCS

agreed to drop SUPER-GYMNAST as an im-mediate operational possibility. 12

and long delays." 13

A few days later, in a message discussingthe division of strategic responsibility, thePresident wrote to the Prime Minister: "Itis understood that this presupposes the tem-porary shelving of Gymnast." 14 The PrimeMinister, concurring in the President's pro-posals fo r movement of British troops tothe Middle East and for deployment of U. S.forces to the Southwest Pacific, implicitlyaccepted this conclusion. 15 In conformitywith the agreement reached by the CCS, thethree War Department commands weretold that "no forces, material, or shipping"

would be "held in readiness" fo r SUPER-GYMNAST, and air force an d service unitsassigned to the operation would be released

d l 16 h k d h d f h7 The Army planners remained of the opinion

THE PRINCIPLE OF CONCENTRATION IN THE BRITISH ISLES 177

planning begun in December 1941 for acombined British-American invasion ofNorth Africa and opened the way for theWar Department's proposal to concentrateforces in the British Isles.

The Washington Studies

scale of American involvement in the Pacificremained entirely undefined and unde-finable.

Finally, in March 1942, assuming thatthe War Department had succeeded in fix-ing limits to future claims for Army forcesin the Pacific and could ignore the prospectthat Army forces might be sent into North



As early as August 1941, a G-2, officerhad written a paper urging the creation ofa second land front as soon as practicableto divert German resources from the Rus-sian front, as the "only possible method ofapproach to an ultimate victory of thedemocracies." This study pointed out thata second land front would also serve as abase fo r possible future offensive operationsprovided its location was in a theater con-taining a vital strategic objective. Proceed-ing from the axiom that a line of supportingoperational bases had to form the base lineof an equilateral triangle with assault objec-tive at its apex, the paper advocated a land-ing on the French coast in the vicinity ofDunkerque in order to capitalize on sup-

l d

Africa, the War Department staff formu-lated and advanced its plan for future oper-ations against Germany—a plan essentiallydifferent from the plan that the British hadadvanced.

Preliminary American Studies

General Eisenhower recommended in his28 February study, "Strategic Conceptionsand Their Application to the SouthwestPacific":

We should at once develop, in conjunctionwith the British, a definite plan fo r operationsagainst Northwest Europe. It should bedrawn up at once, in detail, and it should besufficiently extensive in scale as to engage fromthe middle of May onward, an increasing


defeat the German armed forces. 20 Thecommittee stated the general principle: "Ifthe war is to be won in Europe, land forcesmust be developed and trained which arecapable of landing on the continent and ad-vancing under the support of an overwhelm-ing air force." This meant "strict economyof force in other theaters." The commit-

h d

were not enough for a major offensive, butthe planners believed that they would be"adequate to assist effectively in such anoffensive in the fall of 1942" and could beprogressively increased. "Their prospec-tive availability," they added, "should en-able the British to initiate an offensive evensooner." 22

l



tee emphasized the importance of support-ing the Soviet Union as the only power"actively and aggressively operating againstGermany" and listed as one means "a sup-porting offensive in 1942" based on the Brit-ish Isles. The committee did not assert thatsuch an offensive was possible, but didrecommend "a maximum effort in coopera-tion with the British in offensive actionoperations against Germany" after mini-mum forces had been allocated to secure thePacific area. 21

The planners estimated that a force largeenough to cause a "material diversion of

German forces from th e Russian front"would amount to about 600,000 groundtroops, supported by an air force of some

The planners were thinking in terms of aBritish-American air offensive to be begunin the last two weeks of July 1942 followedby an assault with ground forces six weekslater. 23 They concluded that the militaryprospects of the USSR were the crux of themilitary situation in Europe and perhaps inthe world, and that the United Nationscould most effectively assist the Soviet Unionin 1942 by:a) delivering the maximum quantities [of]appropriate munitions to the Red Army,and b) creating a diversion of the maximumnumber of German air and ground forcesfrom the Russian front by launching as strongan air and ground offensive as it is possibleto form from British and American Forcesavailable after all essential strategic deploy-


forth th e support of the people in occupiedFrance, and encourage other Europeanpeoples to resist the Axis. On the all im-portant matter of timing, they stated:

An analysis of the available U. S. and Brit-ish air and ground forces indicates that theBritish must furnish initially the bulk of theforces if the offensive is launched in time toaccomplish effective assistance to the Rus

by January 1, 1943, only 390,000 troops, in-stead of 435,000.

This delay in the movement of U. S. forcesto the British Isles obviously would preventeffective American participation in an offen-sive in Europe in mid-1942. The plannersdid not change their general strategic recom-mendations and listed several expedientsh i h h i i i d



accomplish effective assistance to the Rus-

sians. ... It is not possible at this time tostate the definite date on which the combinedUS-British air and ground offensive will beundertaken. However, preparations shouldbe based on a D day between July 15 andAugust 1st.

Before th e deployment issue finallyreached the JCS, estimates of United Statesforces had to be revised in the light of freshcommitments made subsequent to the orig-inal JUSSC study. One of these commit-ments involved the provision of UnitedStates shipping for the movement of 40,000British troops from the British Isles to theMiddle East and India, and the consequentwithdrawal of eleven lend-lease cargo shipsfrom sailings for Burma and the Red Sead d h d

that might ease the situation in regard totroop movements to the United Kingdom sothat it might still be possible to keep to theprevious schedule. 24

The British Plan for 1943

On 16 March, with very little recordeddiscussion, the JCS settled the dispute overArmy deployment in the Pacific, statingthat "of the courses of action available" itwas "preferable" for the United States torestrict Pacific forces to the number allottedin "current commitments" and "to beginto build up forces in the United King-dom." 25 At a meeting of the JCS a weeklater, Marshall reported that the British had


1943. This British plan conceived of apowerful fast-moving attack, landing troopsquickly on the Continent and advancingrapidly into the Ruhr. For this purpose themost suitable landing area would be eastand west of Le Havre. In addition to thenecessary RAF and Royal Navy forces,commandos, airborne and antiaircraft

estimates of the British and Americanplanners. 29

Combined Studies

The first study prepared by the combinedplanners concluded that the decisive limi-tation upon the proposed invasion, fo r either

d l i h h f



brigades, six armored divisions, and six andone-third infantry divisions would be neces-sary for the operation. American aid wasviewed as facilitating battleship cover, pro-viding sufficient escorts, an d permittingconversion of some British Army units fornecessary administrative duties. 27

At General Marshall's suggestion, theCCS directed the combined planners toreconcile the British views with those pre-viously set forth by the JCS (in JCS 23)which seemed, by implication, to recom-mend an invasion of the Continent, at leastby British forces, in 1942. 28 Specifically,

the planners were to report on (1) the pos-sibility of landing and maintaining groundforces on the Continent in 1942, and (2)

target date, lay in the shortage of cargoshipping. 30 This differed radically fromthe views of the U. S. planners, who hadconcluded that troop shipping would re-main the limiting factor for the greater partof the year. The combined planners tookthe position that the date of the invasionwould depend upon the amount of addi-tional cargo shipping that could be found.But even in the event that cargo shippingcould be found, there were not enoughlanding craft available or in sight for abeach landing either in 1942 or 1943. Afteranalyzing the factors important to invasionattempts

on 15 September 1942 and 1 April1943, the combined planners concluded that(a) it was not possible in 1942 to put on the


of German strength through the cre-ation of another front. These differencesnecessitated further study to determinewhether the Red Army could and wouldcontinue organized resistance even thougha second front was not created in 1942.Meanwhile, planning was to be continuedfor an invasion in 1943, with a provision inh l f i d h

the "immediately important tasks, asidefrom protection of the American continent,are the security of England, the retention ofRussia in the war as an active ally and thedefense of the Middle East. ... All otheroperations must be considered in the highlydesirable rather than in the mandatoryclass." He then declared that "the princi-

l t t f fi j ff i h ld



the plans for an attempt to invade the Con-tinent in 1942 in the event of an imminentSoviet collapse, or the development of acritical situation for Germany, which wouldmake that power vulnerable to an attack inthe West. 31

Eisenhower Memorandumof 25 March

While this study of a fu ture Europeanoffensive was going on in the combined staff,the War Department operations staff wastrying independently to reach a "coordi-

nated viewpoint" on the "major tasks of thewar." On 25 March Eisenhower, in amemorandum, urged on General Marshall

pal target for our first major offensive shouldbe Germany, to be attacked through westernEurope," and supported this choice with along list of reasons: Since the lines of com-munication to England had to be kept safein any event, operations in Western Europewould no t involve a further dispersion of airan d naval protective forces. By using theshortest possible sea route, the United Statescould maintain a large force with a mini-mum strain on shipping. The early gath-ering of air and ground forces in GreatBritain would carry a sufficient threat toprevent Germany from complete concentra-

tion against the USSR. A cross-Channelattack represented the direct approach bysuperior land communications to the center




1942 operations. 36 Army Air Forcesdrafted its own outline plan for air opera-tions in support of an attack on either 15September 1942 or 1 April 1943. It wasestimated that 733 combat aircraft wouldbe necessary and available by mid-Septem-ber 1942 and 3,296 by April 1943. 37 TheServices of Supply (SOS) provided esti-mates for the forces that could be shipped to

Department planners on 27 March drew upan outline of an invasion plan. This planwas a very simple sketch of the operations,giving the area of assault, the timing of thelandings, and the forces necessary. 39 AfterGeneral Eisenhower and Colonel ThomasT. Handy and Colonel Hull had discussedthe plan, they presented it to Marshall on 1April along with a memorandum repeating



mates for the forces that could be shipped tothe British Isles and maintained there.SOS believed that, with the shipping pro-spectively available, only three and a halfinfantry divisions, with supporting troops,a force of about 105,000, or two armoreddivisions and supporting troops numbering60,000 men, could be landed in the BritishIsles by mid-September. Of the more thanone million men that the War Plans Divi-sion had estimated to be the minimum num-ber to be assembled in Great Britain by thespring of 1943, probably not more than400,000 could be transported by U. S.shipping. 38

The Evolution of the Marshall

April, along with a memorandum repeatingstrategic justification for the choice oftheater. 40 General Marshall at once gavethe plan his approval and support, suggest-ing important changes in language whichEisenhower and his two assistants incorpo-rated. Marshall and Stimson presentedthe plan to the President the same day andsucceeded in winning his approval and com-plete support for it immediately. 41 Forsome time the President had been thinking

39 This plan was prepared by Lt Co l Voris H.Connor under supervision of Col Hull in FuturePlans Sec, S&P Gp, OPD, title: Plan for Opns inNW Europe, copy filed AAG 381 War Plans, Sec G.No copy retained in OPD files. An appendix insix sections is attached: I, Topography and Com-munications; II, Coast Line from the Seine to the




GENERAL MARSHALL AND WAR DEPARTMENT CHIEFS. Left to right:

Lt. Gen . H. H. Arnold, Maj. Gen . ]. T. McNarney, General Marshall, Maj. Gen .B. B. Somervell, and Lt. Gen. L. J. McNair.


It is the only place in which a powerfuloffensive can be prepared and executed by

the United Powers in the near future. Inan y other locality the building up of the re-quired forces would be much more slowlyaccomplished due to sea distances. More-over, in other localities the enemy is protectedagainst invasion by natural obstacles and poorcommunications leading toward the seat ofthe hostile power, or by elaborately organizedand distant outposts Time would be required

of an attack, by combined forces of ap-proximately 5,800 combat airplanes and 48divisions against western Europe as soon asthe necessary means can be accumulated inEngland—estimated at April 1, 1943."

The plan contemplated three mainphases:

a. Preparation, involving:



and distant outposts. Time would be requiredto reduce these and to make the attackeffective.

It is the only place where the vital air su-periority over the hostile land areas prelimi-nary to a major attack can be staged by theUnited Powers. This is due to the existenceof a network of landing fields in England an dto the fact that at no other place could massedBritish air power be employed for such anoperation.

It is the only place in which the bulk ofthe British ground forces can be committedto a general offensive in cooperation withUnited States forces. It is impossible, in viewof the shipping situation, to transfer the bulkof the British forces to any distant region,

and the protection of the British islands wouldhold the bulk of the divisions in England.The United States can concentrate and use

l f i W E th i

(1 ) Immediate coordination of procure-ment priorities, allocations of material andmovements of troops and equipment.

(2) Establishment of a preliminary ac-tive front.

(3 ) Development of preparations fo rpossible launching of an "emergency" offen-sive [in 1942].

b. Cross-Channel movement and seizure ofbeachheads between Le Havre and Boulogne.c. Consolidation and expansion of beach-

heads and beginning of general advance. 45

The plan was based on four assumptions:(1 ) the line Alaska-Hawaii-Samoa-Aus-tralia would be held an d Pacific garrisons

increased from present approximate strengthof 175,000 to about 300,000; (2 ) Americancommitments in troops and ships to New


made available eighteen divisions and 2,550combat aircraft, the combined forces would

be strong enough to establish air superiorityand make a landing on a six-division frontbetween Le Havre and Boulogne. OneAmerican airborne division and Americanand British parachute troops would be usedto slow German reinforcements, while"strong armored forces," drawn from the

presented even more serious problems, whichcould be met only through an accelerated

construction program.48

Finally, the Marshall Memorandum pre-sented in some detail a "Modified Plan" forthe "emergency" invasion that might haveto be launched in September or October1942. 49 This landing operation would takeplace if the situation on the Soviet front



g ,six American and three British armored di-visions assigned to ROUNDUP, "rushed in tobreak German resistance" and eventually tospearhead a general movement toward theBelgian port of Antwerp.

The admittedly weak point in the Ameri-can plan was that merchant shipping andlanding craft would not be available in suffi-cient quantity by the time that aircraft,ground equipment, and ammunition couldbe supplied. However difficult it might beto make up shortages in the latter categories,it was evident that shipping and landingcraft were the limiting factors. 46 It was esti-mated that American troop shipping couldtransport only about 40 percent of the forces

pbecame so desperate that only a British-American attack in the west would preventits collapse, or if the German position inWestern Europe "critically weakened."The maximum forces that could be trans-ported across the Channel would be used ifand when this operation were launched.Landing craft would be sufficient to sustainonly about five divisions, half British andhalf American, at any time in the fall of1942. In any case, only three and one-halfAmerican divisions, including the NorthernIreland force, could be shipped to theUnited Kingdom by 15 September 1942,and only about 700 American combat air-craft would be available.


attacks and minor coastal raids, whichwould be of some help to the USSR andwould make "experienced veterans of theair and ground units," as well as raise themorale of both the troops and the generalpublic. The planners dwelt on the advan-tage to be derived in the long preparatoryphase by giving the troops in the UnitedKingdom "intensive and specialized train-

material, training, and troop movementscould go forward. 51

Throughout the meetings the Americanrepresentatives dwelt on "two main consid-erations." The first of these was that theRed Army should be maintained as an effec-tive fighting force in 1942. Indeed, Col-onel Wedemeyer later stated that this wasthe "main objective" of the American plan.



g ping," beginning with "fundamentals oftechnique in loading and unloading ofboats," and advancing through "constantraiding by small task forces." The wholeprogram presented was directed toward amain effort in 1943 and, in this respect, was

quite different from the program earlier pro-posed by the JUSSC and by General Eisen-hower, which assumed a 1942 attack waspossible and necessary. 50

The London Conference

The American representatives arrived inthe British Isles on 8 April and, during thef ll i k t ith th B iti h Chi f

j pThe second was that the U. S. Army, thenbeing built up and trained, should engagein active operations on the ground and inthe air to gain combat experience. Suchexperience, incidentally, would lead to im-provements in equipment. 52

One reason the Americans were anxiousfor a speedy decision on the BOLERO planwas that it might check the tendency to dis-perse forces on secondary tasks. 53 Early inthe conference the British argued that it wasessential to hold the Mid dle East whateverelse happened, and also showed great con-cern for the Indian Ocean area. TheAmericans could not agree to the primaryimportance of the Middle East, India, and


American representatives exploited thebasic line of strategic argument developed

during the previous two months. As Wede-meyer phrased it:

The United Nations must adhere to thebroad concept of strategy, viz, that Germany isour principal enemy . . . [and therefore] thedissipation of our combined resources . . .should be discontinued or at least held to a

consonance

five groups of air forces and three and ahalf Army divisions could be moved to Great

Britain. Until that date the shipping re-strictions were so great that no forces, otherthan those required fo r minimum defensivepurposes, could be transported to the BritishIsles. As far as the timing of the emer-gency operation in 1942 was concerned,Marshall said that he could not press for



minimum, in consonance

with the acceptedstrategy of concentration on offensive opera-tions in the European theater, with concur-rently defensive operations in all others. 55

In reply to a British call for Americanfighters in the Middle East to enable theBritish to assemble a reserve in the UnitedKingdom fo r continental operations,Marshall stated that current American com-mitments to the Southwest Pacific, MiddleEast, and other theaters would be fulfilled,but that additional reinforcements wouldhave to be carefully limited. 56 Marshallemphasized that it was essential for theUnited

Nations to focus attention

on themain project—offensive operations on theContinent—lest it be reduced to the status

one before September since a substantialAmerican land force could not be sent overbefore then. If action became necessarybefore September, such American forces aswere in the British Isles would be available.His own belief was that it might be necessaryto take action on the Continent in the nextfew months, either because the Soviet Unionwould be in a serious position or because afavorable opportunity would present itself. 58

On 14 April the British Chiefs of Staffaccepted the American proposal, agreeingthat planning should begin immediately for

a major offensive in Europe in 1943 and foran emergency landing, if necessary, in1942 59 On the evening of the same day at


As General Marshall was well aware, thisagreement was only a beginning in dealing

with a very treacherous problem. Every-one agreed "in principle," he reported, but"many if not most" of the participants held"reservations regarding this or that." Itwould require "great firmness" to avoid"further dispersions." 61 The reservationsapplied directly to the projected operation

to hold the line Hawaii-Australia, for whichthe United States was responsible. It re-

mained uncertain whether, for the sake ofmounting a cross-Channel operation, theBritish would withhold reinforcementsneeded in the Middle East and India, as theAmericans proposed to withhold reinforce-ments needed in the Pacific.

During the conference the British Chiefs



for 1942 and only indirectly to the projectedoperation fo r 1943, th e fate of which wascertain to be determined by the decisionmade about the 1942 operation. ThePrime Minister has since recorded that hedid not even at that time believe that thecontingent operation fo r 1942 (SLEDGE-HAMMER) would prove feasible; that he re-garded the proposal as merely one addi-tional proposal to be considered during thespring along with the operations he himselfwanted to undertake (the North Africanoperation and possibly one in Norway) ; andthat his satisfaction in receiving GeneralMarshall's proposal and his readiness to ac-cept it grew out of his anxiety lest the United

made it quite clear how important they con-sidered the Middle East and India to be.After the conference the Prime Ministerwent over the same ground in a message tothe President. 63 The range of disagreementbetween the British and American staffsover th e defense of that whole area waswithin the same relatively narrow limits asthe disagreements within the Army and be-tween the War and Navy Departments onthe defense of the Pacific. Maj. Gen,Dwight D. Eisenhower had stated in verystrong terms the importance of preventinga junction of Japanese and German forcessomewhere east of Suez and west of Singa-pore. General Marshall had made it plainh h


meet the crisis that had developed in theIndian Ocean. In lieu of both these proj-

ects, they accepted the very modest tem-porary expedient of strengthening theAmerican bomber force in India (GeneralBrereton's Tenth Air Force) and putting itat the disposal of the British India Com-mand for operations in the Indian Ocean. 64

The broad question of the relation between

presented. The course of action urged bythe War Department was at variance with

the long-standing plans and expectations ofthe British Chiefs of Staff. Any agreementthat was not preceded by and based upona full and explicit analysis—even if not by areconciliation—of the differences was liableto be upset at any time by a reassertion ofthe differences.



this newly accepted American proposal andthe long-standing commitments of the Brit-ish in the Middle East and India simplyremained open.

From the American point of view therewas little more to say than what the Presi-dent said in answer to the Prime Minister'sdeclaration of the British concern over thedefense of Egypt and the Indian Ocean.The President tried to reassure the PrimeMinister that the juncture of German andJapanese forces seemed remote but agreedthat a close watch must be kept on the situ-ation. "In the meantime," he added, "wehave had a good crack at Japan by air[the Doolittle raid] and I am hoping that

k f h

The War Department staff was naturallydisposed to make the most of the Londonagreement. As Eisenhower noted uponMarshall's return, ". . . at long last, andafter months of struggle, ... we are alldefinitely committed to one concept of fight-ing If we can agree on major purposesand objectives, our efforts will begin to fallin line and we won't just be thrashingaround in the dark." 66 It was in this spiritthat the American planners in Washingtonapproached the problem of working out adetailed, long-range plan for the concentra-tion of American forces in the British Isles.This phase of the planning (which bore thecode name BOLERO) was the only phase in


operation, involving " 1) immediate co-ordination of procurement priorities, alloca-

tions of material and movements of troopsand equipment and 2) the establishment ofa preliminary active front." Only the mosthurried an d superficial investigation of thecomplex logistic problems involved hadbeen made before the London conference,and the conference contributed very little

been scheduled fo r MAGNET were not en-couraging. It appeared that, if ships were

to be provided to meet Army and Navycommitments fo r BOLERO, British andAmerican shipping schedules would have tobe drastically rearranged and aid to Russiaand other Allies would have to be reduced.This was a choice the President and thePrime Minister were loathe to make. 69 But



to an understanding of them or to agree-ment about them. Everything remainedto be done. 68

Phasing of Troop Movements

The first thing that the planners in Wash-ington tried to do was to schedule the ship-ment of troops for the next few months. Aslong as SLED G EH A MMER remained a possi-bility, it was important to move as manyground divisions and supporting units to theUnited Kingdom as was possible before Sep-tember. In the short run, this need waseven more pressing than that of hasteningtroop movements to relieve future conges-i C

by early June, as a result of the preliminarysearch for shipping and rearrangement ofschedules by Washington and Londonauthorities, the shipping prospects seemedmore hopeful. By then the estimated num-ber of United States troops that might beshipped in time fo r S L E D G E H A MME R hadbeen raised from 105,000 to about 150,000.For R O U N D U P in April 1943, it then seemedthat over 890,000 United States troopswould be present in the British Isles. 70 Theearly movements were scheduled so as tobuild, first, an air force and , second, aground force in the United Kingdom in timefor offensive operations on the Continentin 1942. The schedule also took account

U i d


The Landing Craft Problem

The most critical item in the planning ofall the invasion operations was the provisionof landing craft. The idea of using largenumbers of specially constructed craft forlanding operations was so new that no gen-erally accepted doctrine had been devel-oped. The Army knew very little about

The London conference had not gone intothe matter of the types o f landing craft and

the numbers of each type that would be re-quired, and no one expressed doubt whethersufficient craft could be produced in time.Although War Department planners hadfurnished him with a somewhat higher esti-mate, General Marshall proposed 7,000 forROUNDUP, a figure that turned out to be



landing craft and, during the first years ofthe war, the Navy was urging other types ofconstruction, with the result that landingcraft requirements were not determineduntil too late to affect SLEDGEHAMMER.72

The United States program for mass pro-duction of landing craft got under way inApril 1942. A White House conference on4 April resulted in a tentative constructionprogram being set up under which theUnited States was to make available 8,200craft in the United Kingdom fo r ROUNDUP,of which 6,700 were to be carriers for smalltanks and vehicles. The objective forSLED G EH A MMER was 2,500 craft, including2,000 tank and vehicle carriers. This num-b d b

much too low. 74 It was obvious that theBritish had given a great deal more thoughtthan the Americans to the problem of land-ing craft, and they took the initiative in thediscussions. From the first they questionedthe emphasis of the American constructionprogram on small craft. A British spokes-man pointed to the difficulty of movinglarge numbers of the small craft across theAtlantic in the limited shipping availableand urged greater emphasis upon UnitedStates construction of larger vessels thatcould cross the ocean under their own power.He also pointed out that larger craft werenecessary for crossing the Channel andestablishing beachheads. 75


cessfully presented their objections to theAmerican production program. 77 At the

President's direction, a new program of re-quirements was drawn up based on a shiftto larger, ocean-going landing craft.78

The very next day the "Special Commit-tee on Landing Craft for the Continent," asubcommittee of the Washington BOLEROcommittee, of which General Eisenhower

dent a comprehensive study, with an esti-mate of the number of landing craft that

could be made available by 15 September1942 and by April 1943. With an esti-mated force of from three to four Americandivisions in the United Kingdom by Septem-ber, the landing craft estimated as availablecould carry assault elements to the numberof 21,000 men, 3,000 vehicles, and 300



and Colonels Hull and Wedemeyer weremembers, met to prepare a statement for thePresident on the availability of landingcraft for operations in September 1942 andApril 1943. 79 At the meeting the plannersagreed that small craft could apparentlybe made available in considerable num-bers for an operation in September 1942,but that the production of ocean-goingtank landing ships (ATL's) could beincreased only by giving it precedence overother construction, including priorities forhulls, engines, and equipment. GeneralEisenhower described this meeting in hispersonal notes. "This morning I attendeda committee meeting on 'landing craft ' at

tanks. For ROUNDUP, current plans calledfor an assault force of approximately 77,000men, 18,000 vehicles, and 2,250 tanks,which meant that the United States wouldhave to build some 765 craft of several typesby March 1943. Construction in timewould be physically possible only if landingcraft were given priority over a ll other itemsin the defense program of production. 81 Asa result of this study and other findings, thePresident two days later called a meetingattended by General Marshall, AdmiralKing, Harry Hopkins, and Donald M. Nel-son, Chairman of the War ProductionBoard (WPB). A number of expedientsand proposed solutions were considered,




cally short items. 86 The acceptance of theBOLERO plan necessitated an amendment

to this directive. The effect of the amend-ment, as adopted early in June, was that"forces assigned to operations on the con-tinent of Europe" were placed in Priority Aand were to continue to have first priorityat all times after large operations on theContinent were begun. 87

I l i h l

According to this survey almost 540,000ground forces would be in overseas theaters

by 30 June, and this number would increaseto more than 685,000 by December 1942.Of this number, about 43,000 ground troopswould be in the United Kingdom by 30 June(including one infantry and one armoreddivision) and 185,000 by 31 December (in-cluding two infantry divisions, two infantry

i d di i i d h d di



It was also necessary to estimate the totalforces that would be present in each theateron given dates, since the assignment of muni-tions to the various theaters depended onthe size of the forces present. For this pur-pose the War Department planners, in earlyApril, prepared a survey of proposed de-

ployment of American forces for 1942.88

motorized divisions, and three armored di-visions ). Ten American air combat groupswith a strength of 37,900 men were pro-jected for the United Kingdom for 30 Juneand forty-two air combat groups, totaling151,000 men, for the end of the year.

The British then supplied similar infor-

mation on proposed British deployment for1942, and the British document combinedwith the American survey constituted "TheTentative Deployment of United Nationsfor 1942." 89 The CCS accepted this as aguide for the assignment of munitions. 90

Though revisions were made later in thesummer, it served the immediate purposeof providing an approximate calculation ofAlli d i f

86 The provision to give troops in training 100percent equipment was based on a recommendationof Colonel Handy, who feared that the policy sug-gested earlier by the British of strictly limiting theuse of equipment and ammunition except in combatareas would destroy the U. S. Army training pro-gram and relegate the United States to the role ofwartime arsenal. See (1) memo, Handy for JtSecretariat, 21 Mar 42, no sub, with CPS 17/1/D,and (2) WPD notes on agenda, 9th mtg CCS 3


BOLERO and 150,000 were for additional airrequirements fo r BOLERO.

91 Air units were

listed as first priority, essential service unitssecond, ground forces third, and additionalservice units to lay the ground work for thetroops to follow, fourth.92 This tentativeTroop Basis, the War Department empha-sized, was flexible and would permit sub-stitutions and changes in priority.

At th ti th Vi t P

the American position on the over-all com-mand organization fo r ROUNDUP—that one

man and not a committee must be in com-mand. General Eisenhower reported: "Itis quite apparent that the question of highcommand is the one that is bothering theBritish very much and some agreement inprinciple will have to be reached at an earlydate . . . ." However, no one thought it

t t th



At the same time the Victory Program,the Army's pre-Pearl Harbor estimate of itsequipment requirements, came under closescrutiny. Since the 1941 Victory Programwas premised on a strategic policy of offen-sive operations in Europe, which was stillofficial British-American policy, the WarDepartment planners concluded that nocuts should be made, and that the rate ofproduction of materiel should be increased. 93

Establishment of the EuropeanTheater of Operations

In the latter part of May, while themobilization programs were being reviewedi W hi t G l Ei h

necessary as yet to name the supreme com-mander fo r ROUNDUP, and, as far asS L E D G E H A M M E R was concerned, it alreadyhad been decided that an emergency opera-tion in 1942 would be under British com-mand. 94 Eisenhower got the impressionthat the British were skeptical aboutSLEDGEHAMMER and this impression was re-inforced by Vice Adm. Lord Louis Mount-batten, Chief of Combined Operations, inhis talks with the U. S. Chiefs of Staff inWashington a few days later. 95

Upon his return to the United States on3 June, General Eisenhower observed:"Our own people are able but ... it isnecessary to get a punch behind the job or

ll b d b 1943


and Navy Departments, and under the prin-ciple of unity of command, ETOUSA was

to be a joint command in which the Armyexercised planning and operational controlover all U. S. Navy forces assigned to thattheater. 98 The Commanding General,ETOUSA, was directed to co-operate withthe forces of the British Empire and othernations but to keep in view the fundamentalrule "that the forces of the U S are to be

Rear Adm. Henry K. Hewitt, chosen to beAdmiral Mountbatten's naval opposite, was

to leave within the week.These were the first steps in gearing the

command organization of U. S. forces to thecontemplated major offensive in the Euro-pean theater. General Marshall, in in-forming General Chaney of Eisenhower'sappointment, explained the reason for thechange It was necessary to have as



rule "that the forces of the U. S. are to bemaintained as a separate and distinct com-ponent of the combined forces."

The stage was now set for sending thenew American commander and his staff.On 10 June Marshall informed the BritishChiefs of Staff that General Eisenhowerwould soon leave fo r London with GeneralClark, designated to command the U. S. IIArmy Corps." Maj. Gen. Carl Spaatz, theAir commander, left the same morning and

change. It was necessary to have as com-manding general in the ETO an officer whowas "completely familiar with all militaryplans and affairs and who has taken a lead-ing part in the military developments sinceDecember seventh." 100 Eisenhower wassoon to have a chance to show, as a com-mander, the great adaptability he hadshown as a staff officer, for, ironicallyenough, before he and his party actually ar-rived in London—24 June—the whole viewof strategy that he had urged was beingsuperseded in favor of the Prime Minister's

long-cherished plan for invading NorthAfrica.

98 The ETO included Finland, Norway, Sweden,the British Isles, and Iceland; a considerable por-

tion of the Continent of Europe, including the Iber-ian Peninsula, Italy, France, the Low Countries, andGermany as then defined. (See msg, Marshall to

d d I l d



PRIOR CLAIMS VERSUS BOLERO 199

thorities on whose co-operation they de-pended, with the limitations of the small

staffs under them (mainly civilian techni-cians), and with the facilities and the locallabor at their disposal. The solution wasto send them service troops trained andequipped to do the job. 2

There were two objections to this solu-tion, both of which had been raised soon

after Pearl Harbor when General Maxwell

basis the policy of not sending service troopsto the Middle East. 5 General Eisenhower

had agreed with them, remarking:It seems foolish to put a lot of expensive

equipment into a place and then let it de-teriorate because of lack of maintenance.If translated into ship-tons we'd probablyfind it cheaper to provide tech. maintenanceunits than to ship more material. 6

Eisenhower's advice during the emer



after Pearl Harbor, when General Maxwellof the North African mission had requestedU. S. service troops for the Middle East.One objection, which had been decisive atthe time, was the lack of troopships. Theother was based on reasons of policy—American combat forces were not due tobe sent to the Middle East, and the WarDepartment, therefore, should not sendservice troops, since service troops shouldgo only to "areas w here they will eventuallycome under the control of a theater com-mander of our own combat forces." 3 TheWar Department had refused Maxwell's re-quest, although it had not entirely ruledout the possibility of favorable action later

4 l

Eisenhower s advice, during the emer-gency of March, was to do everything pos-sible to help the British except to sendcombat troops:

For many reasons the combat units in thisregion should be British, but our interest inthe whole matter is such that we should givethe British every possible encouragement andassistance in building up the defenses now.For example, I would go as far as to stripAmerican mechanized units down to baretraining requirements, and to find every pos-sible pursuit and bomber airplane that couldbe dispatched to the area without damagingour ability to expand, provided only the Brit-ish will guarantee to have the trained unitsthere to operate this equipment effectively.7


ish command in Egypt. 8 To commit inex-perienced American combat troops to the

Libyan front would be to risk serious publiccriticism should they suffer heavy casualtiesor should they be involved in a major de-feat. A second reason was that Americanforces stationed in other parts of the MiddleEast would be replacing Empire forceswhose duties were not only to defend but

also to occupy the territory and would there-

But at the same time, in response to Brit-ish requests, Marshall offered to send Amer-

ican air forces to Egypt—five groups, theplanes to come out of British allocations,the United States furnishing personnel andauxiliary equipment. 11

General Marshall explained his positionto the President. He spoke of the "disas-trous consequences" of the loss of the Middle

East which would allow German and Jap-



also to occupy the territory, and would there-by become involved in highly controversialquestions of British Middle Eastern policy.

These reasons applied mainly againstsending ground forces, and for the timeoutweighed the one strong reason for send-ing ground forces—economy in the use of

shipping. The United States by sendingdivisions direct to the Middle East couldachieve a net saving in the use of shippingby reducing movements from th e UnitedStates to the British Isles and from theBritish Isles to the Middle East, thereby notonly cutting miles-per-ton but also elimi-nating one series of loading and unloadingoperations and decreasing traffic in the dan-

East, which would allow German and Jap-anese forces to join in the Indian Ocean.He went on:

Agreements with the British, prior to De-cember 7, have always placed the MiddleEast in the sphere of exclusive British respon-sibility. However, the critical nature of the

present situation is such that I have alreadyinformed Sir John Dill that the War Depart-ment stood ready to assist, in every practi-cable way, in improving Middle East defenses.

He noted that the United States could helpwith personnel, but not with planes. Heconcluded:

Of course, the meat of the situation is thenecessity of meeting our responsibilities in theSouthwest Pacific, the reinforcement of


to be an "overstatement" and regretted thatMarshall had committed the War Depart-

ment to do everything possible to help inthe crisis. On the project of sending airforces to the Middle East he remarked, "Idon't see how we can do any of this." Onthe concluding paragraph listing the otherAmerican tasks, he remarked, "This shouldhave been put first." Secretary Stimson

himself ended by saying:

He contended that deliveries to the Britishcould be cut back since they already had

relatively large reserves.15

Early in April, when Marshall's proposalto concentrate American forces in the BritishIsles was under discussion in London, Sec-retary Stimson himself took to the PresidentGeneral Arnold's case for reducing planeallocations to the British. On 9 April he

reported:



himself ended by saying:The Middle East is the very last priority—

of all that are facing us. We have foreseenfor months that the British would be howlingfor help here that we really should not givethem—and I think now is the time to standpat.13

To equip American air units with Britishplanes for employment in a British theater,as Marshall had offered to do, presented away out of an impasse in combined plan-ning—the irreconcilability of scheduledplane allocations to the British and theprojected expansion of American air forces.At the end of the ARCADIA Conference Gen-eral Arnold had agreed with Sir Charles

reported:I showed the President the charts showing

the present allocation of the pooled produc-tion of the U.S. and U.K., and he seemedmuch impressed by the fact that th e U.S.was getting so little of the production. Heasked if our Air Corps- knew what the Britishwere doing with all of their allotments. Itold him that I did not think that we knew... I left the charts with him and also thememorandum with tabs. 16

Three days later the Secretary wrote to thePresident an eloquent presentation of Gen-eral Arnold's case. He owned that he him-self had not understood how long it took tocomplete th e training of air forces fo r com-bat and how costly it was to slight the later


would use in combat and dealing with situa-tions resembling those they would actually

meet in combat. The Secretary thereforeurged on the President the need for realloca-tion, and stated in general terms the policythat seemed to him required by the pro-posal Marshall and Hopkins had taken toLondon:

The sum and substance of this is that, unlesswe are to court disaster in our coming efforts

"h ldi " d " iki " d i hi

couraged. It reopened, moreover, the veryquestion of strategic policy that his offer of

air units had been intended to settle, at leasttemporarily—the question of allocations ofplanes to the British. 20

Anglo-American Collaboration andthe Support of China

General Marshall's readiness to collabo-t ith th B iti h i th d f f th



gof "holding" and "striking" during this yearof crisis, we must at once lend our majoreffort to accumulating and training the AirForces which we have planned for the pur-pose of holding our vital indispensable keypositions and striking the blow which we hopewill save Russia. Not an hour can be spared.

Not a plane can be unnecessarily given away.We are so far behind that it will requireHerculean efforts to catch up."

The project of sending air groups to Cairohad meanwhile been held in abeyance. 18

Finally, as a result of the negotiations inLondon, the project was dropped, partly in

order to send reinforcements to the TenthAir Force—to help meet the incursion ofthe Japanese in the Indian Ocean and

General Marshall s readiness to collaborate with the British in the defense of theMiddle East and India—an essential con-dition of British co-operation in mountingan offensive from the British Isles—was ex-tremely difficult to reconcile with the de-velopment of the program of aid to China.

The difficulty became conspicuous at thebeginning of April when the minusculeTenth Air Force was diverted to the missionof bombing the Andaman Islands, recentlyseized by the Japanese as a further moveinto the Indian Ocean. During early Aprilthe danger in the Indian Ocean became evi-

dent, with the appearance of a strong Japa-nese naval force which conducted air raids

C l d i t th I di t d


ance and American air units, particularlybombers, in the Indian theater. The con-

sequences, should the Japanese succeed inextending naval control into the westernIndian Ocean, would be disastrous for theAllied position in the Middle East. Mar-shall directed Eisenhower and Arnold toinform Admiral King and send him "asquickly as possible your appreciation and a

proposed reply." 21

Th W D t t l d d

American crews) and turn the planes overto the British on arrival. The War Depart-

ment pointed out that there was some doubtin Washington whether there were trainedBritish pilots and crews in India to operatethe planes under the second alternative.The message concluded:

We desire to remind you that the Tenth AirForce has been assigned to General Stilwell

with an original purpose of supporting hisoperations Since this diversion of the Tenth



p p p yThe War Department reply, read and ap-proved by the President, agreed that theBritish did need everything they requested,but indicated that the United States couldnot then send so much. The Navy couldnot release any major fleet unit for use in

the Indian Ocean, but Admiral King waswilling to use the aircraft carrier Rangerto ferry pursuit planes across the Atlantic.The planes could be assembled en route,then flown off to land on the west coast ofAfrica and follow the ferry route to India.The Army Air Forces had no planes avail-able for transfer to India or the MiddleEast, but there were in the United States

g p p pp goperations. Since this diversion of the TenthAir Force to another mission will adverselyaffect the Chinese situation and Stilwell'soperations we deem it especially importantthat no attempt be made to divert any of theairplanes required to keep the AVG at fulloperational strength and that former assur-

ances to the Generalissimo and Stilwell inthis regard be adhered to. 22

General Marshall decided in favor of re-inforcing the Tenth Air Force with planesallocated to the British and placing it underthe strategic direction of the British foroperations in the Indian Ocean and the Bayof Bengal, at the same time attempting toplacate the Chinese Government by giving

i i f i l


ish Eastern Navy, which would open upnortheast India to invasion and permit theenemy to cut air communications into China. 24

Stilwell, who had not been consulted, pro-tested the decision in view of its probableeffect on the Chinese Government, whichhad had a series of disappointments, includ-ing the news that the Doolittle missionwould be carried out as planned, in spite of

the objections of the Chinese.25

The realproblem which was yet to be explained to

tion of American munitions were workedout by the United States in close collabora-

tion with the British, witho ut consulting theChinese, and, moreover, without giving thesame consideration to commitments toChina or the demands of China that wasgiven to commitments to the Soviet Unionand demands of the Soviet Union. Thetext of Chiang's telegram to Soong read as

follows:



jproblem, which was yet to be explained tothe Chinese, or indeed to Stilwell himself,was not that British requirements in theMiddle East and India—as was strategicallynecessary—took precedence over commit-ments to China, but that even the minimum

British requirements could scarcely be metif the United States and Great Britain wereto carry out General Marshall's proposal fo rthe concentration of forces in the BritishIsles. If the primary effect of the BOLEROplan would be to leave very precarious theBritish position in the Middle East and

India, its secondary effect would certainlybe to leave nothing but token forces avail-bl Chi

With what has been happening lately, I amafraid you could no longer avoid having afrank heart-to-heart talk with the President,which I am sure he will not misunderstand.As you know, I have to fight continuallyagainst demoralizing doubts on the part ofmy officers, who concluded that American at-titude towards China is in essence no differentfrom that held by other nations, that both inthe all-important matters of joint-staff con-ferences and war supplies, China is treated notas an equal like Britain and Russia, but as award.

The President has consistently shown him-self to be the one great friend of China, and I

may say on our part we have been loyally re-sponsive. We have placed Chinese armiesunder American command, and we have


is kept out of the Munitions AssignmentsBoard, then China would be jus t a pawn in thegame. Gandhi told me when I visited India:"They will never voluntarily treat us Indiansas equals; why, they do not even admit yourcountry to their staff talks." If we are thustreated during the stress of war, what be-comes our position at the peace conference?You must insist that we have our own stand,and we have our own independent positionto uphold. 27

The long commentary that Soong wrote

further deterioration of relations withChina. It remained to be seen whether the

President would accept this consequence.

The Soviet Lend-Lease Program

A third conflict between previous commit-ments and the new strategy developedin the War Department had to do with

the Soviet lend-lease program. In the First(M ) P l f O t b 1941 h



g y gfor the President to accompany this messagemade the same points. He concluded:

Finally, the Generalissimo feels himself en-tirely out of touch with the main decisions ofstrategy, which profoundly affect China's fu-ture. Whether an offensive will start fromAustralia, whether it is considered feasible tohold Burma, what steps are taken to protectthe Indian Ocean route, what air forces willbe sent to India, Burma and China, on allthese vital questions his role is that of an oc-casional listener. Also, be it remembered itis from these decisions of strategy that stemsthe question of allocations of munitions. 28

In this conclusion Soong hit the vital pointof the whole issue. The development of ef-

p g(Moscow) Protocol of October 1941 theUnited States had undertaken to deliver tothe Soviet Union each month through June1942 given quantities of supplies. After theattack on Pearl Harbor the American armedforces had taken over critical munitions and

ships, including those allocated to the SovietUnion under the Moscow Protocol. 29 ThePresident had tried to put a stop to the diver-sion of munitions allocated to the SovietUnion and had warned that any deficitswould have to be made up by 1 April. 30

This was easier said than done. 31 Howcritical the shipping shortage was, the Presi-dent himself was forced to recognize at the




were in greatest demand by foreign govern-ments and by American commands over-

seas. Of all the Army training programs,moreover, the program for training air unitswas by far the most exigent in its demandsfo r extended advanced training with pre-cisely the equipment the units would usein combat. Allocations to the Soviet Unionwere involved only indirectly in Arnold's

recommendations at the end of March. Hecontented himself with observing that any

with existing protocol, the number of planesto Russia would have to be drastically re-

duced, if not altogether stopped, by Augustor, at the latest, in September." 41

The problem was by no means peculiarto the development of air power n or equallyserious for all aspects of the air programitself. The most critical issue of all at thetime was the allocation of transport planes.

The settlement of this issue would thereforeconstitute a test case. Transport planes had



contented himself with observing that anyincrease in allocations to the Soviet Union"should be met by an even fur ther reductionin commitments to the British," in orderto obtain the net reduction he consideredto be necessary. 39 Secretary Stimson agreed

with Arnold that the immediate step to betaken was to cut allocations to the British,on the ground that they already had re-serves beyond what they needed for opera-tions or could use in training. But he con-cluded his recommendations on policy witha sweeping statement that specifically in -

cluded allocations to the Soviet Union:A ll requests for planes for areas not essen-

constitute a test case. Transport planes hadnot been listed in the Moscow Protocol, butin November 1941 Soviet representativeshad requested 600 transport planes over asix-month period, later reducing the num-ber to 400, and finally asking for an im-

mediate allocation of 100 and 25 a monththereafter.42 At the beginning of April theMunitions Assignments Board found it nec-essary to review proposed allocations oftransport planes for the rest of 1942. 43 TheWar Department submitted to the Muni-tions Assignments Committee ( A i r ) the

Army's requirements as estimated by theAAF. 44 Having measured these and other


was "emphatically opposed" to this action,and on his initiative the JCS requested the

CCS to disapprove it.45

The JCS pointedout that the number of transport planesavailable was "entirely insufficient to meeturgent and pressing needs," and that it wasthen and had "for some time been impos-sible to assign more than a very few trans-port airplanes to the important mission of

training parachute and air-borne troops,which constitute an essential component for

soned explanation." Marshall agreed that"a very carefully phrased reply would have

to be made." He observed that "the op-erational effect of such a small number ofaircraft in Russia would be small althoughthe political effect might be considerable."For the projected cross-Channel invasion,on the other hand, even small numbers ofplanes were, at the time, of first importance.

Marshall explained:The t three months the critical



which constitute an essential component forthe contemplated U. S. effort." The JCSconcluded:

To meet the training requirements for andto have in combat the 200 transport airplanesin August and the 400 transport airplanes in

November, which have been allocated for themain effort, and to provide, in addition, theessential minimum requirements of the U. S.Ferrying Command, Air Service Command,and for overseas areas where the U. S. ArmyAir Forces are operating, will require everytransport plane that is now available or thatcan be provided by the entire U. S. p r o -duction. 46

On 21 April the CCS considered the

The next three months were the criticalones; and it was essential not to cut downtraining facilities. During his visit to Englandhe had seen exercises carried out by Britishairborne formations and the number of air-craft available [to U. S. forces] for this im-portant form of training (17) [transports]was hopelessly inadequate.After considering the statements of Gen-eral Arnold and General Marshall, theCCS agreed to countermand the order ofthe Munitions Assignments Board. 48

The subject was not closed. Before the

CCS had considered the JCS recommenda-tion, Admiral Towers had proposed, in a

PRIOR CLAIMS VERSUS B OLERO 209

could be assigned to parachute troop train-ing." 49

On the day following the CCS decisionAdmiral King forwarded Admiral Towers'memorandum to General Marshall, not-ing: "I am impressed with the above pres-entation—and think you should know ofit." 50 On 27 April Marshall replied atconsiderable length. On the assumption

that Admiral Towers was "not fully in-formed" of the BOLERO plan Marshall ex-

lend-lease shipments to the Soviet Union.He believed that shipments to the Soviet

Union should be increased "in every practi-cable way," and hoped in particular tofurnish the Red Army "with greaterstrength in mechanized items." But hereiterated his belief that whatever help theUnited States might send, " the greatestservice to Russia will be a landing on the

European continent in 1942, and we mustnot jeopardize that operation or risk the



formed of the BOLERO plan, Marshall explained that a critical weakness in the initialproposal made to the British had been thelack of plane s to transport parachute troops,airborne infantry, and gliders, and thatfuture allocations would not serve to trainunits for the invasion "in view of the timeschedule under which we are directed tooperate." On the basis of AAF estimateshe analyzed United States needs and showedthat allocations fell short by 379 planes.He concluded:

In the circumstances I can no more agreeto the diversion of additional transport planeequipment to Russia, while charged with a

i b l f h i f

not jeopardize that operation or risk thesacrifice of the troops engaged by scatteringth e vital materiel required fo r what weknow will be a hazardous undertaking."He therefore recommended "that we under-take no commitment involving the provision

of transport airplanes for Russia." 52

Marshall had also to counter a proposal,which had been made to the JCS by theAmerican members of the Munitions As-signments Board, that, in lieu of militarytransports from current production, theUnited States should transfer to the SovietUnion a "reasonable number" of transportsfrom commercial airlines. 53 Marshall and


the large civil air services still running." 56

If the President should then decide to reduce

those services, it was logical, in view of thelarge deficit expected, that the Army shouldget the planes withdrawn. Marshall there-fore recommended to the President that "alltransport planes of the U. S. Commercialairlines be immediately earmarked for Armyuse," being left "in their present status until

required for military operations." 57

The President replied that he "fully" ap-

Brig. Gen . Walter Bedell Smith circulatedamong the members of the JCS a proposed

draft of a

letter for

Hopkins to use in inform-

ing the Soviet ambassador that the UnitedStates would not furnish transport planesto the Soviet Union as requested, and ex-plaining why. The explanation was thesame that General Marshall had written toAdmiral King and to the President, except

that it was not accompanied by definitefigures, it did not allude to British doubts,



p y ppreciated the needs of the Army, but couldnot see why, if the Army and Navy neededplanes, it was enough simply to earmarkcommercial transports for future militaryuse. He asked just how many commercial

transports there were in the United Statesand what they could do, observing: " T h eold expression 'pigs is pigs' should be trans-lated into the modern terms 'planes isplanes.' " 5S The Secretary of War there-upon undertook to see what further reduc-tions could be made. 59

Although not satisfied with the Army'scautious approach to the question of com-

gand it dwelt even more on the interest ofthe Soviet Union in foregoing equipment es-sential to an early invasion of the Conti-nent.61 On 7 May Marshall learned thatHopkins had acted, although he had not

used the letter offered by the JCS, but in-stead had made the explanation himself,orally, "preferring to handle the refusal bypersonal contact." 62

The Immediate Reinforcement of thePacific

During April, while raising the questionl b di i


centration in the British Isles had gone tothe President, when Admiral King sent to

General Marshall a protest over the allo-cation of Army aircraft to the Pacific:In my opinion the strength of the air forces

planned to be sent to Australia, to the SouthPacific, and to the Hawaiian Islands is in-adequate to implement surely and effectivelythe strategic concept on which the detailedplans are based.

He objected specifically to the idea of rely-i h di i f h b b ig d

therefore recommended not only that th eArmy assign one group of heavy bombers

to the South

Pacific but also that

. . . movement of Army units, and particu-larly air forces, to positions in the Pacific begiven priority over movements to Europe andto the Indian Ocean and Middle EastTheaters. 64

The War Department reply came a fewdays later after the President had decided tosend Hopkins and Marshall to London.

h d b l



ing on the diversion of th e bombers assignedto Generals MacArthur and Emmons incase of an attack in the South Pacific. Hewas dubious of support from either source—from MacArthur since he was independentof Navy control, from Emmons since he wastoo far away and needed to keep all hisbombers in Hawaii. Admiral King there-fore recommended that "at least one heavybomber group should be assigned to theSouth Pacific Area, in addition to all air-craft planned by J.C.S. 23." 63

The essential difference between Ad-miral King's view of Pacific strategy andthe War Department view was that he pro

The War Department stood by its earlierfigures on deployment and the reasoningbehind them, and cited in support thePresident's "tentative decision" in favor ofimmediate concentration in the British Isles,

thus giving notice that the War Department,as was to be expected, meant to appeal tothat "decision" in order to close off furtherdebate on deployment to the Pacific.65

The President, however, had already re-opened the debate by asking the JCS to re-study the "adequacy of defenses of the Fiji

Islands and New Caledonia," concerningwhich the governments of Australia andN Z l d l d dis


reviewed the arguments. 67 At each stagethey ran into flat disagreement. Navy rep-

resentatives insisted on the need to stationbombers at the strong points on the linesof communication. Army representativesargued that bomber forces should be shiftedto these points, when it appeared necessary,from Hawaii and Australia. They acknowl-edged that this course involved greater risks,

but repeated the argument that the risksmust be accepted in order to go ahead with

Important as the mounting of BOLERO maybe, the Pacific problem is not less so, and iscertainly the more urgent—it must be facednow. Quite apart from any idea of fu tureadvance in this theater we must see to it thatwe are actually able to maintain our presentpositions. We must not permit diversion ofour forces to any proposed operation in anyother theater to the extent that we find our-selves unable to fulfill our obligation to imple-ment our basic strategic plan in the Pacific

theater, which is to hold what we have againstany attack that the Japanese are capable of69



p gplans for a bomber force in the BritishIsles.68

A month of study and fruitless debateended, early in May, with a deadlock. Ad-miral King then submitted to the JCS a

formal restatement of his objection to theArmy views. He pointed out that the Jap-anese were free to attack wherever theypleased and stated his belief that they woulddo so in such force that it was far from cer-tain that the American defenses would"hold." He then referred to the earlierJapanese exploitation of the weakness of Al-lied forces "spread out too thin," urging that

launching against us.69

The JCS could agree only to submit the dis-agreement to the President. 70

Meantime the issue had become stillbroader. While the JCS had been disput-

ing, the President had taken under consid-eration claims of the Australian Govern-ment and of General MacArthur. Theyhad for some time been representing alarge-scale Japanese attack on Australia asimminent. 71 Late in April Prime MinisterCurtin of Australia reopened with PrimeMinister Churchill the subject of the returnof Dominion forces to Australia. Speci-




do so and "for [ n o ] other purpose" thanCurtin's personal information. He assuredGeneral Marshall, "I have no idea of bring-ing pressure to bear through any channelsopen to the Australian Government in orderto support indirectly any views that I mayhold." He disclaimed all responsibility fortheir being put to any such use and toldGeneral Marshall "Our government should

pay no attention to anything attributed tome except that which I communicate toth i t " Fi ll h

on what basis he was making his criticaldecisions:

In the matter of grand strategy I find itdifficult this Spring an d Summer to get awayfrom the simple fact that the Russian armiesare killing more Axis personnel and destroy-ing more Axis materiel than all the othertwenty-five United Nations put together.Therefore, it has seemed wholly logical tosupport the great Russian effort in 1942 byseeking to get all munitions to them that wepossibly can, and also to develop plans aimedat diverting German land and air forces from



them over my own signature." Finally, heoffered what amounted to a justification, ongrounds of policy, of the views that he hadexpressed in Melbourne on the need foradditional reinforcements. He pointed out

that he could hardly continue as an Alliedcommander without the confidence of theAustralian Government, which was—andlong before his arrival had been—preoccu-pied with the security of Australia. 78

The President, to whom Marshall re-ferred the message (as he normally re-

ferred messages from MacArthur treating o fgrand strategy or policy), wrote a long con-l h h h d

at diverting German land and air forces fromthe Russian f ront .

The President acknowledged that Mac-Arthur would "feel the effect of this," butwent on to assure him that the United Stateswould (a) send him "all the air strength wepossibly can," (b ) "secure, if possible," thePacific lines of communication, and (c)strike "as often as possible" against Japa-nese communications. He dwelt especiallyon this last point, on the cumulative effect ofdestroying Japanese ships and planes inpreparation for later operations.

The President at the same time com-mented on the relations between Curtin and


reduce the strength of the British forces inthe Middle East by 60,000. He concluded

with a graceful reference to his dependence,as in this case, on MacArthur's fulfillmentof his peculiar two-fold mission: "I wellrealize your difficult problems, and thatyo u have to be an ambassador as well asSupreme Commander." 9

The President's message invited a reply,

not only by its tone throughout but also inspecific terms:

by providing an adequate effort in the onlytheatre which is charged exclusively to theUnited States." He then proceeded toadapt to the support of this view the Presi-dent's reason fo r approving th e BOLEROplan—the urgent need of supporting theSoviet Union. Since it was not practicableto send enough direct aid to the SovietUnion, a "second front," he agreed, was

necessary. He concluded: "That frontshould be in the Pacific theatre. Nowherei b l h d d



I wish you would let me have your personalguess on whether Japan will continue largeoperations against India and Ceylon or willstop at approximately the Calcutta line.Also, as to whether an all-out attack will be

launched against Australia or New Zealand.MacArthur replied at length to these ques-tions, restating his objections to the theoryof concentrating for an attack in Europeand estimating his additional needs. Hebegan with his estimate of the situation,concluding that the soundest course for

Japan was to attack southward, securing itsposition in the Pacific, before attempting

else can it be so successfully launched andnowhere else will it so assist the Russians."Just as Marshall had argued that an attackon the Continent would relieve Germanpressure, MacArthur argued that a second

front in the Pacific would relieve Japanesepressure, permitting the Soviet ally "eitherto utilize his Siberian resources in directsupport of his European front or to join hisallies in the Pacific attack." This courseof action would protect not only Australiabut also India, and more effectively, in his

belief, than India could be defended in theIndian Ocean. Finally, he repeated, a sec-


their planes and ships. Even though themilitary potential of Japan was in some re-spect diminishing, it was in other ways grow-ing—as a result of the conquest of richareas—and, what was far more important,the issue during the coming months would bedecided, not by Japanese potential, but byJapanese "strength at the point of applica-tion of power," at which the United States

was weakest:At that point, as has always been the case

h b i i f hi h h h

chosen objective and overwhelm the defend-ers through superiority of means although theactual numbers of the forces she utilizes maynot be large. 80

Thus, early in May the President had toreckon with th e objections to the BOLEROplan of General MacArthur as well as thoseof Admiral King. To carry out the planas General Marshall envisaged it would re-

quire the President to overrule the twosenior American officers that were preoc-i d ith t t g i th P ifi



since the beginning of this war, she has theadvantage in both numbers and quality oftroops. Due to her unchallenged commandof the seas she is able to concentrate on a

cupied with strategy in the Pacific.

80 Msg, MacArthur to Marshall, 8 May 42, CM-IN 2333.

CHAPTER X

Decisions in Favor of a"Second Front"

May 1942



yThe four cases of prior claims versus

BOLERO that arose in April 1942 all cameup again in May—those of the Pacific, the

Middle East, China, and the Soviet Union.In each case the President decided in favorof BOLERO, although with some reservationsand with the significant qualification thatthe basis for his decisions was not the de-sire to protect the long-range project for in-vasion in 1943 but simply his determination

to get "action" across the Atlantic in 1942.

The President remarked . . . that itwas his desire that the total number of planesassigned to the U. S. Army in Australia beraised to one thousand, the distribution asto types being left to the discretion of theJoint Chiefs of Staff.

Further, the President directed that I in-form the Chiefs of Staff that it was his desireto have in Australia 100,000 troops in additionto the personnel of air forces required to main-tain the plane program referred to in para-graph one of this memorandum. 1

General Marshall was out of Washingtonh f h


troops and about 100 planes) would cutabout in half ( from two pursuit groups toone) the initial American contribution toair operations based on the British Isles, andwould take enough ships to eliminate twoAtlantic convoys, cutting back scheduleddeployment to the British Isles by about50,000 men. The proposed increase introops and aircraft for Australia would com-pletely unsettle BOLERO schedules, and evenmore broadly, the whole basis of currentAnglo-American planning The staff con-

in tone, to send to the President. He beganby referring to the difficult time he had hadon h is trip to London in April, having at bestso little to offer an d facing the scepticism ofthe British staff. He went on to restate thearguments of his staff, took note of AdmiralKing's continued dissatisfaction with theallocation of planes to the South Pacific, andthen added an argument of his own. He

spoke of the needs of Hawaii

and Alaska,

and declared that if anything more were tobe sent to the Pacific he had rather it went



Anglo American planning. The staff concluded :

If new commitments and continuous re-inforcement of secondary theaters are to in-terfere with the execution of these plans thefaith of the British in our firm promises willbe destroyed, coordination will be lost andthe success of the plan will be doomed. 2

The War Department staff recognized itas altogether natural that the Navy and theAustralian and New Zealand Governmentsshould persist in demanding additional com-mitments to the Pacific and acknowledgedthat it would evidently be "desirable" tomeet their demands But having reviewed

be sent to the Pacific, he had rather it wentto those outposts, where the United Stateswas risking its own most immediate interests,than to Australia. He had preferred toaccept the risks at those points in the Pacific

"in order to stage an early offensive on theContinent of Europe." He would recom-mend against doing so any longer if it be-came a question of "reducing our plannedeffort from the British Islands in favor of anincrease in Australia." 4

Finally, three days later, Marshall

brought together in a longer paper the twomain claims involved in the case of the

DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF A SECOND FRONT" 219

to which our own risks are not comparable.They have accepted the "Bolero" project witha firm understanding that it would be theprimary objective of the United States. Ifsuch is not to be the case, the British shouldbe formally notified that the recent Londonagreement must be canceled.Leaving no doubt of his meaning, Mar-shall ended:

I present this question to you as Com-mander-in-Chief, and request that you dis-cuss the matter with Admiral King, GeneralArnold and me, and give us a formal directive

forcements for the Southwest Pacific.7

The note did not settle the question ofbombers for the South Pacific, for it did notdecide the very question at issue betweenMarshall and King—what the "present ob-jective" in the South Pacific was. Theyagreed that the objective was to "hold," butthey attached different meanings to the ex-pression. To King it meant "make se-

cure"; to Marshall it meant "defend" theisland bases. More specifically, they dis-agreed whether the Army should stand



Arnold and me, and give us a formal directivefor our future guidance. 5

The President at once replied:1. I have yours of May sixth regarding the

Pacific Theatre versus "Bolero." In regard

to the first paragraph I did not issue anydirective of May first regarding the increase ofcombat planes to Australia to a total of 1,000and the ground forces to a total of 100,000.I did ask if this could properly be done. Iunderstand now that this is inadvisable at thepresent time and I wholly agree with you andAdmiral King.

2. In regard to additional aircraft to theSouth Pacific Theatre, it is my thought thatall we should send there is a sufficient num-

agreed whether the Army should standready to "send" bombers into the SouthPacific to meet a particular threat or to"station" bombers there.

But it was possible to take the President's

general declaration that he did "not want'Bolero' slowed down" as covering the SouthPacific as well as Australia. The opera-tions staff so interpreted it, as confirmationof the War Department's policy governingdeployment throughout the Pacific.8 Onthe basis of this interpretation all that re-

mained to be done was to make up thedifference between actual and authorized



DECISIONS IN FAVOR OF A "SECOND FRONT" 225

to counter the expected Japanese blows. 22

At that point, the War Department re-directed its attention to Hawaii and Alaskaand, once again, to the west coast. By 20May arrangements were complete for hold-ing in Hawaii three bomber squadrons—two medium and one heavy—en route tothe South Pacific. 23 Upon the assurance ofLt. Gen. John L. DeWitt, commander gen-eral of the Western Defense Command andof the Fourth Army, that it would be feas-ible to operate aircraft from the most ex-

Despite the strong indications that theJapanese thrust would strike Midway andthe Aleutians, General Marshall remainedconcerned over a possible threat of raids onthe west coast, which Army intelligence, be-lieving that the Japanese would feel obli-gated to retaliate for the Doolittle raid onToyko, still considered to be a "firstpriority." 26 Marshall himself went to thewest coast to supervise dispositions, accom-panied by Brig. Gen. James H. Doolittle anda member of the operations staff.27 The



posed fields at Umnak and in the Cold Bayregion, the War Department also orderedlimited air reinforcements, including a fewB-17's, to the Eleventh Air Force in

Alaska.24

By 21 May the Army and Navyhad worked out plans for setting up a jointnaval and air defense force in the NorthPacific with Rear Adm. Robert A. Theo-bald, Commander, U. S. Naval Task Force8, exercising control of the joint force underthe principle of unity of command, and

Brig. Gen. William O. Butler, Eleventh AirForce leader, in command of air elements. 25

War Department, in addition to reorganiz-ing west coast air defenses, arranged to makeground forces in training (and thus underth e jurisdiction of Army Ground Forces),

available to General DeWitt if he shouldneed them. 28

The hurried activity to meet the expectedJapanese attacks in the Central and NorthPacific did not divert King from his effortto persuade Marshall to increase the allot-ment of Army bombers to the South Pacific.

General Marshall, on his return from thewest coast, found waiting for him a mem-d h h d l


King cast his views in the form of a mem-orandum for transmission from the JCS tothe CCS. Once again he called attention tothe fact that the "superiority of JapaneseForces, plus freedom to act on interior lines,"gave them the initiative. The Navy hadlately been able to hold its own since it had"timely information" of Japanese fleetmovements (gleaned from Japanese mes-sages intercepted and decoded) . But Kingwarned:

Even if this availability of timely informa-

air power, so far as it pertained to Army air-craft. He resummarized what the Armywas doing to meet the more immediate crisisin the Central Pacific and concluded that todo more was then out of the question: "Nomore heavy bombers can be sent out of theUnited States at this time without causinga very serious check or stoppage in the de-velopment of heavy bomber squadrons fo rBOLERO or anywhere else." 3 0 Thus, in spiteof General Marshall's appealing the ques-tion to the President three weeks before, and



y ytion continues, the continued successful op-position of powerful Japanese offensives ap-pear improbable with the means now in hand.If the timely information should become un-available in the future and the present dis-

parity in forces is allowed to continue, disasterin th e PACIFIC AREA is probable.

Admiral King proposed a concentrationof air and sea power in the zone Fijis-Aus-tralia by 1 July, the Army's part in whichwould be to increase air strength in thearea "as rapidly as possible, giving this ob-

jective first priority (even over BOLERO)."He proposed, specifically, that by this date

in spite of his readiness to co-operate inmeeting a specific threat of imminent at-tack, the disagreement on Pacific strategyremained unresolved at the end of May.

The Role of the United States in theMiddle East

During May the scale of American com-mitments to the Middle East remained un-certain, but there did not remain much

doubt that the Army would finally have tocontribute substantially to the defense of


But in the latter part of the month he wascompelled to act on the deadlocked questionof plane allocations for the British. On 19May he finally sent General Arnold andAdmiral Towers to London to negotiate di-rectly with Air Marshal Portal, on the basisof a compromise whereby American unitswould have a prior claim on Americanplanes, but would be committed to actionas soon as possible. He described the situa-tion to the Prime Minister in the followingwords:

of the fact that it was a major diversion fromBOLERO. They brought the compromiseback to Washington early in June for reviewand ratification by the CCS. 33

The Question of Support for GeneralStilwell

During May, as the deadline in the Pa-cific drew near and while the negotiationson British plane allocations approachedagreement, th e problem of supportingChi b i i l iti l Th



Today it is evident that under current ar-rangements the U. S. is going to have increas-ing trained air personnel in excess of combatplanes in sight for them to use. We aretherefore anxious that every appropriateAmerican-made aircraft be manned andfought by our own crews. Existing schedulesof aircraft allocations do not permit us to dothis.

He then announced his view on the policyto be adopted:

I think the maximum number of planespossible should be maintained in combat andthe minimum number consistent with security

China became increasingly critical. TheChinese plea for a voice in the determina-tion of strategy and the allocation of muni-tions, made in April after th e diversion ofthe Tenth Air Force, was still unanswered. 34

The Japanese had driven the British andChinese forces out of north Burma and werethreatening to launch a general offensivewith the apparent objective of capturingair bases in southeastern China. Towardthe end of May the chief of the recently ar -

rived Chinese Military Mission to theUnited States, Lt. Gen. Hsiung Shih-fei,




with the objective of reopening the BurmaRoad. The decision, of course, was up toChiang Kai-shek, and , added the WarDepartment, it would be "important thatChinese hopes fo r reopening of the roadshould not be prematurely raised." Thismessage, like messages to General MacAr-thur in similar circumstances, was first sub-mitted to the President and met with hisapproval. The President's approval madeit reasonably certain that the support ofChina would remain subordinate to the de-velopment of current B iti h and American

finished goods, machinery, raw materials,and food, of which Soviet representativeswould select for shipment about 5,000,000short tons. Except for 500,000-600,000tons included for movement in Soviet bot-toms across the North Pacific (subject tonegotiations between the Soviet and J ap -anese Governments), the United States andGreat Britain would be prepared to exportthese goods in their own ships—an esti-mated 3,300,000 tons in convoys aroundthe North Cape to Murmansk and Arch-angel an estimated 1 100 000 tons by way



velopment of current British and Americanplans.38

The Second Soviet Protocol and the

Second FrontOf all those problems raised or aggra-

vated by the development of the BOLEROplan, there was one on which the Presidenthad yet to declare himself— that of the rela-tion between the Soviet lend-lease programand the BOLERO plan. On 7 May the WhiteHouse circulated a draft of a second proto-

l t i i h d l b d b

angel, an estimated 1,100,000 tons by wayof the Persian Gulf. Allowance being madefor a 10 percent loss en route, about 3,000,-000 tons was expected to arrive at the Sovietarctic ports, and about 1,000,000 tons at thePersian Gulf ports. These amounts cor-responded to the estimated capacity of theseports and of the overland transportation sys-tems serving them. 40

Most of the military supplies and equip-ment itemized in the draft protocol wereexpected to become available as fast as theycould be shipped. These included tanks

d hi l h h d f b f


whether the United States, as assumed inthe draft protocol, could keep up the rateof shipments reached in March and Aprilunder the President's drastic directive ofmid-March. The weight of the GermanU-boat campaign in the western Atlanticbegan to be severely felt during these earlymonths of 1942, an d from March throughMay one fourth of all the ships the UnitedStates sent to Russia around the North Capewere lost. 42 The Combined Military Trans-portation Committee (CMTC) estimatedthat shipping losses in excess of replace-

current munitions protocol." 44 A subcom-mittee met on 19 May to consider the ques-tion, and found good reason to doubt thefeasibility of the program outlined by theMunitions Assignments Board. 45

The Munitions Assignments Board gavethe assurance "that all requirements inci-dent to manning a European front plus theother needs of the United States Army andNavy had been considered prior to arrivingat the figures shown." 46 Although the fig-ures themselves did not entirely bear outthat assurance the draft protocol did con-



that shipping losses in excess of replacements would leave the United States andGreat Britain till the end of 1943 with ton-nage far less than their anticipated needs. 43

On 1 May, before the draft protocol wascirculated, Admiral King had proposed thatthe joint planners should prepare a reporton the feasibility of meeting the President'sdirective. He pointed to the shortage ofships, the heavy cost of running convoys toMurmansk and Archangel—upon which

the program still so largely depended—and"the requirements incident to the manning

that assurance, the draft protocol did contain reservations that partly answered WarDepartment objections. It contained ageneral reservation which read:

It is understood that any program of thissort must be tentative in character and mustbe subject to unforeseen changes which theprogress of the war may require from thestandpoint of stores as well as from thestandpoint of shipping. 47

This qualification was much more sweepingthan the one included in the First (Moscow)Protocol in October 1941, which had pro-id d f lt ti d dj t t i


should be "transferred to other theatres ofwar." 48 Besides the general reservation, thedraft protocol included a reservation apply-ing only to planes. They were to be madeavailable at the same rate as before, but only"for th e first fe w months of the next proto-col period." During that time the UnitedStates and Great Britain would be studyingtheir resources and requirements "in thelight of new plans which are under con-sideration," and, when the study was com-pleted, would make commitments "for thebalance of the year " 9

ing been approved by the JCS, went to thePresident. 51

The question of the relation between theSecond Protocol and the "second front"came to a head at the end of May, duringconversations between President Rooseveltand Foreign Commissar Molotov. 52 Molo-tov came to Washington from London,where he had found the British Govern-ment prepared to meet the British sched-ules in the Second Protocol and noncom-mittal about opening a second front.53 InWashington he found quite a different view



balance of the year.General Marshall suggested changes in

both these reservations. He proposed tothe JCS that the general reservation shouldbe simplified to read: "You will of courserealize that any program of this sort mustbe subject to changes due to unforeseendevelopments in the progress of the war."He proposed to modify the reservation withregard to planes by providing that deliv-eries under the Second Protocol would not

begin till 15 August—by which date deliv-eries under the First Protocol should havel d d h h d

Washington he found quite a different view.The President declared that the AmericanGovernment "hoped" and "expected" toopen a second f ront in 1942, and presentedas the "suggestion" of General Marshall andAdmiral King the proposal that the SovietGovernment, in order to help, should ac-cept a reduction in tonnage during theperiod of the Second Protocol, from 4,-100,000 to 2,500,000 tons, by cutting ship-ments of general supplies, not munitions.

The President's assurance did not divertMr. Molotov from trying to increase the


allocations of critical items for the PersianGulf route over the current commitments,which had been renewed in the draft proto-col. Mr. Hopkins authorized his militaryexecutive, General Burns, to confirm thosecommitments—12 B-25's, 100 A-20's(through October), and 3,000 trucks amonth—and to announce the President'sviews on convoys. Burns' oral statementon these points was the only tangible resultof the negotiations on the Second Protocol. 54

The President's policy went a long wayto meet Admiral King's objections to the

the draft protocol. It did not meet Mar-shall's requests for reduction in plane allo-cations, and, what was a great deal moreserious from the point of view of the WarDepartment, it contained a strong commit-ment to open a "second front" in 1942.The President went so far as to issue acommunique drafted by Molotov that in-cluded the statement: "In the course of theconversations full understanding wasreached with regard to the urgent tasks ofcreating a Second Front in Europe in 1942."General Marshall objected that the state-



to meet Admiral King s objections to thelarge shipping commitments contained in

General Marshall objected that the statement was "too strong." It was indeed toostrong to apply to the negotiations just con-cluded. It was also much too strong tobode well for the BOLERO plan—with itsemphasis on 1943—in coming negotiationswith the British.

54 The Second Protocol was finally signed inWashington, 6 October 1942. It had meanwhile

served as a basis for the Soviet lend-lease program.(See State Dept rpt on War Aid Furnished byU. S. to USSR, p. 3, cited p. 205n, above.)

CHAPTER XI

Future Plans and CurrentOperations

June 1942



During the course of his conversationswith Molotov at the end of May the Presi-dent explained, first to General Marshalland Admiral King and then to the PrimeMinister, that his purpose in declaring hishope and expectation of opening a secondfront in 1942 was to reassure th e SovietGovernment. 1 The declaration did indeedcontain an implied assurance of Americanindependence in dealing with the SovietUnion, since it was quite different from th enoncommittal declaration that the British

We can therefore give no promise in thematter . . . . 2

The more encouraging words of thePresident, however they might be read asa clue to his intentions, did not cancel thewords of the B ritish Government, which hadthe more force since planning for the op-eration was centered in London and sinceBritish troops would bear the brunt of theoperation for some time. Molotov wasopenly skeptical and asked what answersh h ld "t k b k t L d d Mos


June 2d) from London, and with him LordMountbatten, Marshal Portal, and GeneralLittle, with whom it was planned to arrive atan agreement on the creation of a secondfront.3

The President's notion of a cross-Chan-nel operation in 1942 was very much likethat he had given his military chiefs ear-lier—a great air offensive over northwesternEurope that should be accompanied bylandings on a scale appropriate to the cir-cumstances. He explained his idea to thePrime Minister:

proportion to the risk of tactical failure—the stronger the German reaction, the moreprobable the result that Allied troops wouldonce again have to be evacuated in the faceof superior German forces, as earlier fromNorway, Dunkerque, and Greece.

The Revival of Gymnast

Whether or not the President was pre-pared to run such a risk, it was becomingquite plain that the British Governmentwas not on this occasion prepared to do so.



After discussion with the Staffs, I believethat the German air forces cannot be de-stroyed unless they have been forced to takethe air by preliminary or temporary actionsby ground forces. If we can start this phaseearly in August we can produce one of thefollowing results:

1. Divert German air forces from the Rus-sian front and attempt to destroy them.

2. If such air forces are not moved to thewest, we can increase our operations withground forces and determine on the estab-

lishment of permanent positions as ourobjective. 4

was this p pThe British Government, in the statementdelivered to Molotov, had already declareditself opposed to undertaking "for the sake

of action at any

price" an operation "which

ended in disaster and gave the enemy anopportunity for glorification at our discom-fiture." The opposition of the BritishGovernment was reinforced, if not p ro -duced, by the hope and expectation ofdiverting the President's interest in a second

front from a cross-Channel operation tosome other operation more in conformity




visaged the use of only American forces andan invasion to be supplied only through theAtlantic ports of French Morocco, princi-pally Casablanca. The use of Americantroops was expected to conciliate Frenchopinion and save shipping; the use of theAtlantic ports, to minimize losses of bothshipping and the naval escort committed tosupport the operation. The June studiesassumed full French co-operation, Spanishneutrality, and the availability of Britishshipping assigned to the Middle East run.They estimated the American force at

jections, however serious in themselves, wereincidental to his main objection, which heexpounded at length, that a North Africanoperation would be an untimely, ineffectualdeparture from BOLERO.S

Marshall and his staff had good reason tobe concerned over the possibility of a rever-sion to GYMNAST. On 17 June the Presi-dent took up the question with his militaryadvisers, in anticipation of the arrival of thePrime Minister and his staff in the UnitedStates. Secretary Stimson, who shared thebelief of Marshall and his staff, was no less



220,000, including six divisions and twenty-four squadrons of planes, as compared withth e force of about 150,000, including fourdivisions and the Eighth Air Force, whichthe earlier American plans had allotted toSUPER-GYMNAST. 7

General Marshall advised against under-taking the operation. He mentioned thereasons why the operation itself was risky—that it would gain momentum slowly andwould for some time hang on uncertainpolitical decisions. He also drew attention

l

concerned and he wrote a long memoran-dum of his own to the President—his "briefin defense of B O L E R O

9

On 19 June, the day on which the Secre-tary submitted his views to the President,the Prime Minister and his staff arrived inthe United States to take up the problemsdiscussed by the President and Mountbattenagainst the background of the already criti-cal situation in Libya. 10 The Prime Minis-ter went to Hyde Park to go over the groundwith the President and Hopkins. The

FUTURE PLANS AND CURRENT OPERATIONS 237

The staff conversations in Washingtonbegan on a note of agreement—agreementto wait and see before making new plans.The British and American chiefs alike hadunder them field and fleet commanderswhom they could not provide forehandedlywith adequate means to react to enemymoves, whether strong or weak. Over themwere their respective heads of government,inclined to minimize the dangers of leavingfield an d fleet operations so dependent ondecisions in the capitals and the arrival ofreinforcements sent hurriedly and belatedly

can invasion in the West, collapse may, as in1918, ensue with startling rapidity. 11

General Eisenhower welcomed the Brit-ish estimate, which brought into relief thevery point on which rested the case for arapid concentration of forces in the BritishIsles—the strong possibility of a quick shiftin the situation on the Eastern Front.Eisenhower commented: "Time for us todo something—whatever we c a n " Hesuggested to Col. John R. Deane that Gen-eral Marshall should consider sending theestimate to the President, for the sake of the



y yfrom home. As professional officers, theChiefs of Staff were uncomfortably awarehow quickly military situations could change

and how important it was to have uncom-mitted reserves in the field and at home. Inthis respect they were more cautious thanthe President and the Prime Minister.

Of the many contingencies for which al-lowance had to be made, the greatest wasthen, as before, a decisive turn in the Ger-man offensive in Russia. The key to the

statement it contained of the favorable andunfavorable factors in the campaign—Soviet morale, numbers, and production asagainst the superior German position, arm-or, and command, even though the estimateitself was perhaps "too rosy," as the BritishChiefs of Staffs had been inclined tobelieve. 12

The British Chiefs of Staff, in view of theuncertainty of the war on the Eastern Front,agreed with the American Chiefs thatAmerican and British plans should be left

f




would clearly not be possible unless all effortswere concentrated now on their preparation.If we changed our plan now, and opened upanother f ront , we should probably achievenothing. If we went ahead, we should atleast ensure the safety of the United King-dom, whatever happened in Russia, and anychange of plan could be made in about Sep-tember when we knew what the situation onthe Eastern f ront was going to be.

As a token of his willingness to come to

agreement on this basis, he at once agreedthat there was "no reason" why the UnitedStates should not send an armored divisionto the Middle East to help relieve the criti-

would have been presumptuous and useless,for the conversations that had been goingon meanwhile at Hyde Park had taken avery different turn from th e staff talks inWashington. The Prime Minister openedwith a dramatic appeal to the President'sknown desire for "action" in 1942. He de-clared that the British were making "ar-rangements" for a landing of six or eightdivisions across the Channel in September,as they had agreed to do. But, he went on,"no responsible British military authority"had so far been able to make a plan for



to the Middle East to help relieve the critical situation there. 17

The main points of agreement the CCSse t down in the form of a paper fo r sub-mission to the President and the Prime Min-ister. Their report advised against anyconsiderable operation in the Atlantic thea-ter in 1942 unless it became necessary or"an exceptionally favorable opportunitypresented itself." They advised furtherstudy of possible operations in WesternEurope given such a contingency—againstB h Ch l I l d h

September 1942 "which had any chance ofsuccess unless the Germans become utterlydemoralized of which there is no likeli-

hood." He asked whether the Americanstaffs had a plan:

If so , what is it? What forces would beemployed? At what points would they strike?What landing craft and shipping are avail-able? Who is the officer prepared to com-mand the enterprise? What British forces

and assistance are required?If he maintained a plan could be f d



CHURCHILL AT PARACHUTE TROOP DEMONSTRATION, Fort Jackson,S. C., during his visit to Washington, June 1942. Left to right: General Marshall;Field Marshal Sir John Dill; Prime Minister Churchill; Secretary Stimson; Maj.Gen. R. L. Eichelberger, Commanding General, U. S. I Corps; General Sir AlanB k


claring only that the United States wouldname a qualified American officer or ac-cept a qualified British officer. Finally, thestaff repeated the estimate Marshall hadoriginally presented—that the British couldsupply "at least 5 divisions and the bulkof its air force without undue hazard tothe United Kingdom." 23

The Army staff adduced three argumentsin support of S L E D G E H A M M E R . First, thestaff pointed out that the original agreementexplicitly envisaged a desperate operationagainst odds. Its aim would be to secure abridgehead on the Continent but like any

Third, the staff reasserted the closely re-lated proposition that the preliminary airoffensive against the Continent, togetherwith large-scale raids across the Channel,were more likely than attacks at any otherpoint "to directly or indirectly take someof the weight off Russia." The GermanHigh Command could not afford to disre-gard even the threat to establish a front onthe Continent. A "continuous air offen-sive" would "without a doubt bring on themajor air battle over Western Europe."This battle "in itself would probably be thegreatest single aid we could possibly give to



bridgehead on the Continent, but like anyoperation against odds, it might of course"lead to disaster." It would not be in ac-cord with the original agreement nor wouldit be in accord with the demands of the sit-uation predicated therein to make a stronglikelihood of success a. condition of launch-ing the operation.

Second, the staff pointed out that the"power of the immense British Air Forcein the U. K. alone, in support of operationswithin its effective range, would more than

b l h i h

greatest single aid we could possibly give toRussia."

In conjunction with this last point thestaff examined the Prime Minister's ques-tion of "standing idle" in 1942 and his pro-posal to reconsider GYMNAST. The staffoffered the proposition that to mount acontinuous air offensive an d launch large-scale raids against the Continent would notbe to "stand idle." The previously ex-pressed views of the President indicated thathe might find this argument acceptable.


ish and American forces together, couldcause withdrawal of German forces fromthe Eastern Front before 15 September:

British and American forces can execute anattack prior to September 15, 1942, some-where in the area between Holland inclusiveand Spain inclusive, of sufficient power pos-sibly to threaten German security and thuscause them to divert forces from the RussianFront. The success attained in such opera-tions will be based on many factors, such as:

Acceptance of sacrifice and danger in se-curing a lodgement and in conducting vigor-ous exploitation.

Intelligent and wholehearted adaptationof expedients and improvisations throughout

On 21 June the Prime M inister and Gen-eral Marshall presented their cases to thePresident at a long, heated meeting at the

White House, also attended by Hopkins,General Sir Alan Brooke, and Maj. Gen.Sir Hastings Ismay. 26 After the meeting wasover Ismay drafted fo r consideration by theAmerican chiefs a new version of the CCSreport on offensive operations for 1942-43,a version in keeping with the Prime Min-

ister's stated views on the subject. The newversion began as follows:

1. Plans and preparations for operationson the continent of Europe in 1943 on as large



of expedients and improvisations throughoutall phases of the operation.

The staff explicitly recognized that th e

BOLERO plan entailed a change in Britishstrategy:Prior to the acceptance of the Bolero Plan,

British deployments and operations appar-ently were undertaken primarily with a viewto maintaining the integrity of the BritishEmpire. The Bolero Plan insures coordina-tion and cooperation within the United Na-

tions and envisages the creation of conditionsthat will facilitate continuity of offensive

on the continent of Europe in 1943 on as largea scale as possible are to be pushed forwardwith all speed and energy. It is, however,essential that the United States and Great

Britain should be prepared to act offensivelyin 1942.2. Operations in Western Europe in 1942

would, if successful, yield greater political andstrategic gains than operations in any othertheatre. Plans and preparations for the op-erations in this theatre are to be pressed for-ward with all possible speed, energy and in-genuity. The most resolute efforts must bemade to overcome the obvious dangers anddiffi l i f th t i If d d


still more evident in the next conclusion,proposing an alternative to SLEDGEHAM-MER, which General Ismay formulated as

follows:3. Provided that political conditions are

favorable, the best alternative in 1942 is Op-eration Gymnast. Accordingly the plans forthis operation should be completed in all de-tails as soon as possible. The forces to beemployed in GYMNAST would in the main befound from BOLERO units which had not yetleft the United States. 28

This conclusion was quite different from theagreement of the CCS, who, having listed

th ti besides SLEDGEHAMMER

lated on 24 June. In this, the final draft,Ismay's version of the controversial passagewas modified to begin: "The possibilities of

operation Gymnast will be explored care-fully and conscientiously, and plans willbe completed in all details as soon aspossible." 31

American Commitments to theMiddle East

The Prime Minister's effort to reinstateGYMNAST as an Allied plan coincided withthe development of a very dangerous mili-t it ti i Lib A h d f



other operations besides SLEDGEHAMMERthat might be launched from the BritishIsles, had concluded that, risky as they were,

any of them "would be preferable to under-taking GYMNAST."The War Department staff at once seized

upon the statement. Working from Mar-shall's notes of the meeting, the senior Armyplanner (General Handy) and the U. S.Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

(General Smith) drafted a different versionwhich they believed to be "more in line"

tary situation in Libya. At the end ofMay the Afrika Korps had taken the offen-

31 CCS 83/1, 24 Jun 42. The original version byGeneral Ismay was also modified to provide forstudy of operations both against the Iberian Penin-sula and against northern Norway. (For later con-siderations of these alternatives, see below, Chs.XII and XIV.)

The Prime Minister, whose personal project itwas, expected the invasion of Norway to be an affairmainly for British forces. But partly in response to

his eagerness to invade Norway, the War Depart-ment organized a special regimental combat forcel d U S d C di l h Fi




mand to General Stilwell. 44 Stilwell hadhardly had a chance to put it to use whenth e order arrived from Washington on 23

June to send Brereton to Cairo with hisheavy bombers (twenty-four, ten of whichwere then in shape to go). 45 Brereton wasto return his force to Stilwell's commandwhen he had completed his mission of as-sisting the British in the Middle East. Onhis arrival in Cairo he took command of anew overseas headquarters, U. S. ArmyAir Forces in the Middle East. 46

A third emergency measure taken inWashington during June at the direction of

Air Force. 48 The President quickly ex-plained his reasons and corrected the mis-understanding, and held to his decision. 49

It was not until the end of July, when thesquadron was assembled at Khartoum, thathe released it to proceed to China. 50 Theseactions did not undo the effect of the diver-sions of air units and planes. The diver-sions themselves, and the fact that they weremade—as the earlier diversion of the Tenth

Air Force in April had been made—with-out even consulting the Chinese Govern-ment, precipitated a new, still more violentoutbreak of resentment in Chungking, and



Washington during June, at the direction ofthe President, was to begin moving fromthe United States a squadron of light

bombers (A-29's) assigned to the TenthAir Force and to order it held at Khartoumin the Sudan. The President did not in-tend these planes to be committed in theMiddle East except in case of extreme nec-essity, and then only at his direction. 47

The Chinese Government first learned of thedecision only after it was made and at once

the issuance of an ultimatum—the "three

48 The Chinese Government learned of the de-

cision, as then understood by OPD, from Stilwell,who had received an information copy (CM-OUT6083) of msg (originator OPD), Marshall toBrereton, 24 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6075 ( R ) . For theGeneralissimo's protest, see msg, Stilwell to M a r -shall, 26 Jun 42, CM-IN 8586 ( R ) .

The War Department's message was written inignorance of the President's precise intention, aresult of haphazard liaison with the White House.

See (1) memo, Brig Gen St. Clair Streett for GenHandy, 29 Jun 42, sub: Restrictions on Mvmt of


demands" of Chiang Kai-shek for Ameri-can support—that became the starting pointof a new set of negotiations with China. 51

The United States had meanwhile under-taken a much more ambitious project toreinforce th e Middle East ai r force, underthe compromise that General Arnold hadbrought back from London early in themonth. 52 This compromise was still un-ratified, and far from clarified, when theBritish Chiefs arrived in Washington. TheArmy planner then sent the other membersof the CPS a schedule listing eight groupsfor the Middle East, with a view to an early

Even before concurring in the proposedagreement, Marshall and King went aheadto direct the movement of the three groups

that Arnold had ordered prepared—a heavybomber group, a medium bomber group,and a fighter group. The 57th FighterGroup (P-40's) was ordered to begin load-ing at once on the USS Ranger, loaned bythe Navy to transport the planes and crewsto Takoradi (Gold Coast), whence theywould fly to Cairo. A group of B-24's (the98th Bombardment Group, H e a v y ) alreadypartly assembled in Florida and a group ofB-25's ( t h e 12th Bombardment Group,



settlement. Arnold at the same time di-rected that three groups should be preparedfor shipment early in July—a heavybomber group, a medium bomber group,and, if possible, a pursuit group. But thedetails of the final settlement were still souncertain that the operations staff thought it"inadvisable" to pass on the information toMaxwell in Cairo. 53

On 21 June General Arnold, AdmiralTowers, and Air Vice Marshal Slessor

Medium) then in California were sched-uled to fly to Cairo by the South Atlanticferry route, the first squadrons to depart assoon as they were ready. 55 Ground echelonsand equipment were to leave early in Julyby the SS Pasteur. 56 Finally, on 25 June,Marshall and King, having initiated actionto move the three first groups to the MiddleEast, tentatively and informally concurred

in the Arnold-Portal-Towers agreement, soas to settle the matter before the Prime


situation or in aircraft production." 57 Aweek later the CCS tentatively approvedthe agreement, subject to the same qualifi-

cation.58

Ground Reinforcements

The possibility of sending large Americanground forces to the Middle East came upduring the June conferences as one of thepoints the President had mentioned toMountbatten on his visit to Washington. 59

In the British summary of the President'sremarks the point appeared as follows:

created by the disagreement of the PrimeMinister and General Marshall.

On the basis of the initial rapproche-

ment with the British Chiefs, General Mar-shall made a modest opening bid toward asettlement. At the second meeting withthe British Chiefs (20 June), Marshall an-nounced that he "had been examining thepossibility of sending a U. S. armored divi-sion, desert trained, to the Middle East, and

saw no reason why this should not be done.The division was available." 62 Followingthe conference at the White House on 21June, the Combined Military Transporta-i C i di d id h



The possibility of economizing shipping bydispatching substantial U. S. forces to theMiddle East rather than by re inforc ing the

Middle East by British forces from th e UnitedKingdom. 60

The President's suggestion was pertinent tothe immediate situation, since the British de-ployment program then provided for send-ing three divisions (one of them an ar-mored division) to the Middle East by theearly part of August, and the British Chiefs

f S ff id i th t f

tion Committee was directed to consider theimplications, for shipping, of moving th e2d Armored Division to the Middle East. 63

The committee met on 23 June and drewup alternative schedules, variously affectingBOLERO.

64 The War Department was atthe same time considering what units wouldhave to go with the 2d Armored Division ifit were sent to the Middle East as part of atask force, under th e command of Maj.Gen. George S. Patton, Jr. 65


But the White House meeting of 21 June,which put the planners to work on theproject, also showed that the Prime Minister

was not to be diverted from his hope of in-vading French North Africa. As a result,the CCS did not act on Marshall's offer,though they did not entirely eliminate itfrom possible consideration. 66 When theCCS met on the morning of 25 June to con-sider the findings of the committee on de-

ployment to the Middle East, Marshall,though he did not withdraw his offer, madean additional proposal. The new proposalwas one he could offer and the British Chiefs

f S ff ld t b i lf i

the use of the American equipment sent tothe Middle East. 67 On the same day thePresident and the Prime Minister approved

this proposal and the War Department wentto work to carry it out. 68

The Crisis in Egypt

The American response to the crisis inthe Middle East, prompt though it was, af-

fected operations during the summermainly as a factor in the plans of the Brit-ish commands in London and Cairo andonly incidentally as a factor in the balancef f h Eg ti f D i



of Staff could accept by itself, noncommit-tally, while awaiting a determination of thequestion of operations in 1942, from whichthe disposition of the 2d Armored Divisioncould not be dissociated. Marshall pro-posed that the Army send to Egypt 300 M4tanks and 100 self-propelled 105-mm. gunsand 150 men specially qualified to work withtanks and self-propelled artillery (as well as4,000 Air Corps personnel, under the three-group deployment program for July). This

of forces on the Egyptian front. DuringJuly the actual striking force at GeneralBrereton's disposal in Egypt—the depletedHALPRO group, with the reinforcementsfrom India—was strong enough only tosend out a few planes at a time. 69 These

67 Min, 29th mtg CCS, 25 Jun 42.68 (1) Memo for rcd, Handy, 25 Jun 42, OPD

381 Middle East, 7. (2) Msg (originator OPD),

Marshall to Eisenhower, 26 Jun 42, CM-OUT 6557( R ) . (3) Memo, OPD for AGF and SOS, 26 Jun


flights continued the task already begun bythe HALPRO group, attacking shipping andport installations to prevent supplies and re-

inforcements from reaching th e AfrikaKorps.

It was several weeks before the planessent out from the United States could be-gin operating in Egypt. The USS Ranger,with the 57th Fighter Group, sailed on1 July; the first echelons of the bombergroups left in mid-July, and at the sametime the SS Pasteur sailed with the firsttroops and equipment. 70 The first planesarrived in Egypt at the end of the month. 71

and loaded on another. 73 The ships ar-rived in Egypt early in September. 74

These movements of American troops and

equipment were begun in a state of extremeuncertainty over th e outcome of the battlein the desert. In the last week of June,following the return of the Prime Ministerand his party to England, the British EighthArmy continued to fall back until it finallyestablished its main line of defense at El

Alamein, only seventy-five miles west ofAlexandria. On 29 June Maj. Gen.George V. Strong, Assistant Chief of Staff,G-2, believed that it would be a matter of

k l b f th "fi l ilit d



gypGround personnel and equipment began toarrive during the first part of August. 72

The ground force equipment took evenlonger to arrive. The guns and tanks wereat first to be shipped in two seatrains butwere loaded instead in three fast ships, whichsailed early in July. One ship was sunk;its cargo of tanks and guns was replaced

a week or less before the "final military de -cision and warned that the probability ofa British catastrophe must now be countedupon. He therefore recommended thatno more planes be sent to the Middle Eastand that all supplies at sea be stopped atMassaua (Erit rea) until the military situ-ation in Egypt becomes clarified. 75

On the following day Marshall asked hisstaff for an estimate of the situation to giveto the President. General Strong was70 OPD Daily Sums, 7-8, 16-17, 17-18 Jul 42,


Smith: I believe I'd cross off that statementon the bottom about there being a strong pos-sibility of their being in Cairo in 96 hours.I'm inclined to doubt that. They havescrapped [sic] up over 300 tanks.Handy: I said two weeks, he quoted me forthat. He quoted George Strong for 96 hours.That statement we had in there Strong dic-tated. He asked me in his office and I toldhim 2 weeks because I don't feel it's gone atall.Smith: These Johnnies up here feel there'sa darn good chance.Handy: Rommel's pretty well strung out.That depression [Qattara depression] mustbe a helluva place to do anything in. He'sgot Tobruk now and that's a good harborh h

(after blocking the Suez Canal, a pointabout which the President was particularlyinterested) would probably have to retreat

southward along the Nile into the Sudan.To stop the Germans in Syria and assureth e resistance of Turkey would requiremuch larger reinforcements than could besent in such a short time. Marshall advisedagainst trying to hold the Middle East onceEgypt was lost, saying that "a major effort

in this region would bleed us white." Hebelieved there was nothing more to do atthe moment but wait and see what GeneralAuchinleck, who had taken command inEg t ld do 78



they've never had before. Still another fel-lo w had it before he did.Smith: Apparently there's not much left

there. They got everything out of Matruh.Their idea is not to get pinned down anywhereand they're wise there. 76

The President had indicated his ownanxiety in his request for a report on thesituation, in which he asked for a detailedestimate of what would happen an d what

might be done in case the Germans gainedcontrol of the Niledelta within the next ten

Egypt, would do.The great concern of the President and

his advisers was reflected both in detailedinquiries as to the British plans and in ex-tensive correspondence with the Americancommanders in Cairo on their own plansfor evacuating American units and destroy-in g American equipment left behind. 79

But there was apparently no move on thepart either of the War Department or of

78 f id b


the President to suspend the shipmentsscheduled for the Middle East. In fact,early in July the President, at the instance

of the Prime Minister, asked Stalin to re-lease to the British forty A-20's at Basra,part of a month's consignment (of 100A-20's) for the Soviet Union. The SovietGovernment readily acceded. 80 Mar-shall acted with equal promptness in re-sponse to a request for ammunition . Earlyin July Sir John Dill reported that theMiddle East Command was low on 37-mm.ammunition and would be dangerouslyshort for a period of several days after th e

iddl f th month t i l th expected

munit ion arrived in time to help meet theshortage. 83

The President did take very seriously one

expression of American doubt and distrust—that of Col. Bonner F. Fellers, U. S. militaryattache in Cairo. Fellers held a low opinionof British leadership and slight hopes ofBritish prospects in the war in the desert, buthis estimates, although they doubtless con-tributed to the cautious advice of the War

Department G-2 (to whom he reported),had led him to recommend exactly theopposite course. 84 During the spring Fellersrepeatedly urged that the United Statesshould intervene by recruiting equipping



middle of the month, unti l the expected ar-rival of a large shipment. He asked Mar-shall to have the Air Transport Command(ATC) change its schedule of shipmentsto the Middle East so as to get 5,000 roundsof 37-mm. ammunition to Egypt in time tomeet the shortage. 81 Colonel Deane, Sec-retary of the General Staff, directed thischange on behalf of Marshall. 82 The am-

should intervene by recruiting, equipping,and taking command of an internationalcorps in the Mid dle East. 85 He had also rec-ommended sending a large American

80 Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 599.(1 ) Brereton with Maxwell's concurrence had

Shipt of 37-mm Am to Egypt. This memorandumlisted steps taken, noting that 900 rounds had beenlost in transit. Note and memos in WDCSA Mid-dle East (S).

83 Pers ltr, Dill to Marshall, 30 Jul 42, WDCSAMiddle East (S).

84

For Fellers' estimate of the situation in June,see, in particular, msg, Fellers to G-2, 17 Jun 42,


bomber force to the Middle East. 86 At theend of May he had urged, in addition toequipping six divisions in the Mi d dle East,transferring the Tenth A ir Force from Indiaand sending from the United States twoarmored and two infantry divisions and anair force of three hundred heavy bombers.After th e fall of Tobruk he repeated hisplea. 87 But by then he had come to dwellmore on the immediate need for planes, and,in particular, heavy bombers. 88

The recommendations made by Fellersmay have influenced (and may even havebeen influenced by) the discussions carried

d h i k i W hi

cisive." In introducing these familiar ar-guments, he stated:

The matter of locating large Americanground forces in the Middle East was dis-cussed Sunday night. The desirability of theUnited States taking over control of opera-tions in that area was mentioned. It is myopinion, and that of the Operations staff, thatwe should not undertake such a project.

Before submitting the paper (on 23 June)

Marshall added a postscript that testified tothe President's interest in Fellers' dis-patches :

The attached was prepared for your con-sideration before I had heard your comment



on and the actions taken in Washingtonduring the June crisis, but neither the Presi-dent nor the War Department adopted hisextreme view of the need fo r uninvited, un-limited American intervention. The pos-sibility of sending several American divi-sions to the Middle East, raised by the Presi-dent early in the month, came up at theWhite House meeting on 21 June. Settingdown the War Department's reasons foropposing the move, Marshall declared that

sideration before I had heard your commentthis afternoon regarding Fellers' last mes-sage, 1156. I would make this comment.

Fellers is a very valuable observer but hisresponsibilities are not those of a strategistand his views are in opposition to mine andthose of the entire Operations Division. 89

This answer did not dispose of ColonelFellers' recommendations, which the Presi-dent was to reconsider several weeks later, 90

But for the time Marshall carried his point,

with th e support of Stimson. 91 On 2 July

FUTURE PLANS A N D CURRENT OPERATIONS 255

The War Department followed this cau-tious policy in handling the problem of com-mand of Army forces in Egypt, leaving Gen-

eral Maxwell in control and thus reassuringthe British Chiefs that the War Departmentstill regarded the role of the U. S. Army inthe Middle East as that of a co-operativeauxiliary. The occasion for asserting thispolicy came soon after General Brereton ar -rived in Cairo. He objected in the strongest

terms to having to deal with the Britishthrough Maxwell, a ground officer junior tohim who had as yet commanded no troops.He inferred the War Department had notintended he should have to do so.93 A reply

confirmed General Marshall's disposition toleave things as they were. 98 Maxwell re -mained the American commander in the

Middle East.99

The War Department aim was simplyto co-operate with the British Chiefs ofStaff, as a condition of their co-operation ingoing ahead with th e BOLERO plan. A fewdays after th e close of the June meetings inWashington, General Marshall listed the

various extraordinary measures taken to getair reinforcements, guns, and tanks toEgypt. He characterized these measures as"concessions" made for the sake of agree-ment on the B OL E R Oplan, explaining:



intended he should have to do so. A replywent out at once to both officers, over Mar-shall's signature, stating that the War De-

partment had so intended and expectedthem to work in harmony. 94 They at onceanswered with assurances that they weregetting on well together. 95

The closing of the incident did not settlethe issue. Marshall sounded out Britishopinion and found that the Middle EastCommand preferred to leave things as they

96 G l A ld bj d h i

ment on the B OL E R O plan, explaining:

The visit of Prime Minister Churchill hasinvolved us in a struggle to keep diversions ofour forces to other theaters from interferingwith the Bolero plan. The Prime Ministerfelt that it was doubtful if we could do any-thing on the European coast in 1942. Duringthese conferences Tobruk fell which madematters worse. The Prime Minister favoredan attack on Africa to ease the pressure onthe British in this theater. The result of theconferences, however, was that we managed


Consequences of the Battle of Midway

The revival of the GYMNAST plan co-

incided with the development of newAmerican plans in the Pacific, which, likethe modification of American policy in theMiddle East, resulted from a sudden, if notentirely unanticipated, change in the mili-tary situation. The crisis of the latter partof May in the Pacific ended early in June

with the news of a clear American victory.As naval intelligence had predicted, themain Japanese force struck in the CentralPacific. On the afternoon of 3 June Armybombers made contact with the Japanese

in an attempt to seize a strategic position.The Japanese, had they won, could and pre-sumably would have seized Midway and

perhaps one or more of the other outlyingislands in the Hawaiian group. To meetand dispose of the constant threat that theycould have exercised from this advance po-sition, the Army would have been compelledto send large reinforcements to Hawaii.The American victory at Midway left the

War Department staff more than ever de-termined to maintain its position on deploy-ment to the Central Pacific.

General Eisenhower stated the case in-formally a few days later:



bombers made contact with the Japaneseforce west of Midway. In the three daysthat followed the Navy won a victorynotable in several respects. It was the firstclear American victory of the war; it wasdecided entirely in the air; it confirmed theNavy's belief in the tactics of naval air at-tack on surface vessels and in the greatnessof the advantage possessed by a fleet sup-ported by long-range land-based reconnais-sance; and finally, it reduced the Japanese

101

formally a few days later:General Handy has been asked to have en-

tire Hawaiian strength restudied. H o w -

ever—things in Pacific are better than whenwe made our first allocation. So why dis-perse further?? We may have made mistakesin our calculations, particularly as to groundforces; but I am more than ever convincedthat our authorized allocations in air are suf-ficient—if kept up to strength 102

Other members of the staff came to thesame conclusion as Eisenhower, even after

FUTURE PLANS A N D C U R R E N T OPERATIONS 257

staff finally recommended sending tw o regi-ments of the 40th Division, to complete tw otriangular divisions to garrison the outly-

ing islands of the Hawaiian group, then de-fended by the 27 th (squa re) Division. Thestaff also recommended sending a few otherbadly needed troops—air base securitytroops (n ine ba t ta l ions) , ordnance troops(part of a battalion), and quartermastertroops ( three service battalions) —over andabove previously allotted strength. 104 Inmid-July Marshall approved the recom-mendations. 105 The staff did not recom-mend, and Marshall did not then propose,

i i h b f l ll

North Pacific

The outcome of operations in the North

Pacific was less favorable. Japanese forceslanded unopposed in the western Aleutians,on Kiska and Attu, opening a new front thatAmerican forces were not prepared to de-fend. Army air forces in Alaska reactedweakly to this operation and to a raid onDutch Harbor which had preceded it, dem-

onstrating—if there were any need todemonstrate—the ineffectiveness of thehurriedly reinforced Eleventh Air Force andof th e extempore arrangement fo r jointArmy-Navy action. 106 But the Japanese



any increase in the number of planes allo-cated to the Central Pacific.

y y phad done only what the War Departmenthad long conceded they might do, and thestaff was still intent on postponing increasesin the strength of Alaskan defenses.10 7 TheWar Department did agree to several re-adjustments that could be reconciled withscheduled deployment to other commands.The War Department directed the reassign-ment of troops—infantry, antiaircraft, and

OPD 320.2 P TO , 7. (4) Memo, McKee forStreett, 16 Jun 42, sub: Hawaii, OPD 320.2 PTO, 4.

For Richardson's m ission see OPD 333 Gen Rich-ardson's Trip. For McKee's mission, see msg(originator OPD), Marshall to Emmons, 2 May 42,CM-OUT 0418 ( R ) .

104 The bsc study was memo, Col Joseph Smith(S&P, OPD), Col Carl D. Silverthorne (TheaterGroup, O P D ) , and Col Frederic E. Glantzberg

106 Of th d d li g ith the


field artillery—from the Western DefenseCommand (WDC) to Alaska, and from lessexposed positions in Alaska (Sitka and

Anchorage) to more exposed positions (inparticular to Nome) . 108 The War Depart-ment also agreed to send to Alaska for thetime being (in exchange for a squadron ofP-38's) a group of P-39's (54th FighterGroup) that had been diverted fromBOLERO to the Western Defense Command

in the emergency, and to send for the pro-tection of Nome a squadron of B-24'sequipped with air-to-surface-vessel radar. 109

Beyond these strictly defensive measures theWar Department did not go, although De-

South and Southwest Pacific

The specific consequences in the Central

and North Pacific of the Japanese attacksof early June, important as they were, wereincidental to the effect in the South andSouthwest Pacific. It was highly probablethat the Japanese would launch their nextattack, as Admiral King had at first ex-pected them to launch their last one, against

the American lines of communication toAustralia. But their attack an d defeat offMidway had cut the decisive advantagethey had had in aircraft carriers and, whatwas more, had lost them the advantage of



gWitt promptly submitted a plan for counter-action in the Aleutians, and the staff began,of necessity, to study the possibilities.

110

having forces deployed and organized toundertake the operation. Strategically,

the Japanese high command still had theinitiative. Japanese forces were still nu-merically superior and so could still concen-trate for an attack without fear of a con-centration of American forces in anothersector. But the American high commandhad the option of seizing the initiative, ifonly in a very limited sense. American

108 The units taken from WDC were the 53d In-fantry, the 203d Coast Artillery (AA), and the75th Field Artillery Battalion. See (1) msg, Mar-shall to DeWitt, 9 Jun 42, CM-OUT 2170 ( R ) ;(2) note for rcd cited n. 107; and (3) D / F, OPDfor TAG, 13 Jun 42, sub: Mvmt of Trs to Alaska,OPD 370.5 WDC, 52.

For the shifting of troops already assigned to

FUTURE PLANS A N D CURRENT OPERATIONS 259

General MacArthur. He told MacArthurthat he had a Marine raider battalion tolend him (if Admiral King were willing)

for landing operations against Tulagi (Sol-omons) or some other Japanese advancebase, supported by MacArthur's own navalforces. MacArthur liked th e idea of at-tacking, but he did not believe the battaliontogether with what he had available wouldmake up a force strong enough for such an

operation.11 1

The Army and Navy staffsin Washington took the same view. It wasleft up to Nimitz and MacArthur to goahead with plans for a raid on one of theJapanese positions, if they should agree it

and how shipping schedules could be ar-ranged to get them to him. 114 On receiv-in g MacArthur's proposals, the staff at once

opened discussions with the Navy.115

Re-markably enough, in view of the long effortof the War Department to restrict Armydeployment and operations in the Pacific,th e operations staff expressed entire agree-ment with the bold idea of advancing byway of eastern New Guinea and New Brit-

ain to Rabaul, the forward operating baseof th e Japanese forces in the South Pacific.To attack Rabaul would be to attack thevital point on the lines of communicationbetween Truk, the strategic assembly point



would be worth trying, but not to undertaketo land and hold a position without pre-vious approval from Washington.

112

The first proposal to come after the Bat-tle of Midway was MacArthur's. He hadplans of his own for much more ambitiousoperations in the New Britain-New I r e -land area, preparatory to launching an at-tack on Rabaul. He urged them at onceon the War Department. To carry them

some 700 miles to the north of Rabaul, andthe Japanese forward positions in the Solo-

mons. If the attack succeeded, the Japa-nese position in the Solomons "would al-most fall of its own weight." 16

Within a few days Marshall presentedthe War Department plan to Admiral King.It required a Marine division for the assaultand three Army divisions from Australiato follow up. The Army air component


would be out of range of American land-based pursuit planes, the Navy would haveto furnish three carriers (and escort forthem), in addition to the naval

forces of

MacArthur and whatever naval assistancethe British might provide. Marshall, aftersummarizing the plan, dwelt on the pointthat the operation, in order to succeed, mustbe mounted as soon as possible—some timeearly in July—and that they must reach a

decision at once. He asked Admiral Kingto meet him to talk over the proposedoperations. 117

General Marshall intimated to MacAr-thur that he expected complications, andM A h d hi h h

and second, to putting the operation underMacArthur. 119 About two weeks passedwhile the staffs did what they could. As

the Army operations representative com-plained to his chief: "Both their and ourdetailed plans become more and more dif-ficult of rapid accomplishment the longerthe bickering in high places continues." 120

Finally, Admiral King, speaking for him-self, wrote to Marshall explaining his own

plan (along the lines of RAINBOW 2). Itwas in essence a plan he had long since hadin mind, and it had no doubt been in hismind—and in Marshall's—during the de-bates over deployment and command in theP ifi 121 A h h d l i d h



MacArthur assured him that he well un-derstood "the extreme delicacy of your posi-

tion and the complex difficulties that faceyou there." 118 In making his proposal,Marshall had put himself in a position vis-a-vis Admiral King rather like his positionvis-a-vis the British two months before.The operation he proposed would dependvery heavily on Navy forces, especially at the

outset, and might prove very costly to them,d d

Pacific. 121 As he had explained to thePresident early in March, he looked for-

ward to striking in the South Pacific as soonas American garrisons had made reasonablysecure the "strong points" along the lines ofcommunication. These strong points beingsecured, the Navy would not only cover thevulnerable American lines of communica-tion to Australia but also—"given the navalforces, air units, and amphibious troops"—


could take the initiative, attacking the weak-est Japanese position:... we can drive northwest from the New

Hebrides into the Solomons and the Bismark[sic ] Archipelago after the same fashion ofstep-by-step advances that the Japanese usedin the South China Sea. Such a line of op-erations will be offensive rather than passive—and will draw Japanese forces there to opposeit, thus relieving pressure elsewhere . . . .

122

Admiral King, in proposing this course ofaction to General Marshall in June, set thefinal aim of seizing Rabaul and occupyingeastern New Guinea. Since General Mac-Arthur had meanwhile made explicit pro-vision for preliminary landings in the Solo-

Southwest Pacific area" and that it was"designed to add to the security of thatarea." 125

But Admiral King had the much strongerargument that Admiral Nimitz should con-trol the commitment or withdrawal of navalforces in the light of the whole naval situa-tion in the Pacific. King proposed that theNavy should logically retain control of pri-marily naval an d amphibious operations

such as these, by the same reasoning thathad led him to agree to Army exercise ofunity of command over operations againstGermany, which would be mainly on andover land. He stated, provocatively, that



vision for p e a y a d gs in the So omons as well as in New Guinea to seize air-fields an d thus provide protection fo r navalsurface forces, the operations proposed byKing and MacArthur were very similar inscope. 123 But King's idea of the operationwas nonetheless quite different from Mac-Arthur's, as Admiral Cooke's objections hadalready indicated. Admiral King held that

these operations should be under naval com-mand throughout not (as the working plan-

he thought the operation important enoughto be launched "even if no support of Army

forces in the Southwest Pacific area is madeavailable." 12S

General Marshall promptly objected tothe inference that Army support would becontingent on command: "Regardless ofthe final decision as to command, everyavailable support must be given to this op-eration, or any operation against the


tween the Army and Navy in the determi-nation of plans and control of operations,with the JCS supporting Army views and

control of operations against Germany andNavy views and control over operationsagainst Japan.

MacArthur quickly seized on the point,and made known his displeasure. Afterlearning that King had directed Nimitz togo ahead on the basis of the Navy proposal,

MacArthur declared:It is quite evident in reviewing the whole

situation that Navy contemplates assuminggeneral command control of all operations inthe Pacific theater, the role of the Army beingsubsidiary and consisting largely of placing

it would be hard thus to transfer commandbetween phases of the operation. Marshallrecognized the force of the objection, but

concluded that the proposed arrangementoffered the only basis on which the Armyand Navy could "successfully and imme-diately go ahead with this operation." 131

He therefore accepted the proposal anddrafted a joint directive, providing for anoperation in three phases: (1) to take the

Santa Cruz Islands, Tulagi, and adjacentpositions; (2) to take Lae, Salamaua, andth e northeast coast of New Guinea; and (3)to capture Rabaul and adjacent positions inthe New Britain—New Ireland area. Thefi h (T k O ) t b d th



subsidiary and consisting largely of placingits forces at the disposal and under the com-mand of Navy or Marine officers. ... Ishall take no steps or action with reference toany components of my Command except un-der your direct orders. 128

MacArthur, in his next message hastenedto remove any possible misapprehensionthat he meant to offer "anything short of thefullest cooperation" once it should have beendecided to go through with an operation. 129

first phase (Task One) was to be under thecontrol of Admiral Nimitz. MacArthur

would be in charge of the second and thirdphases (Tasks Two and Three). 132

Admiral King did not especially like thesolution. He had since made and still pre-ferred an alternative proposal to let AdmiralGhormley execute the operation directlyunder the JCS. 133 General Marshall hadbeen and remained opposed to this proposal,


initiating the first phase, and that arrange-ments for the second and third phases bemade not later than 20 July. 135 General

Marshall sent to General MacArthur ahopeful yet anxious comment on the re-sult:

I feel that a workable plan has been set upand a unity of command established withoutprevious precedent for an offensive operation.I wish you to make every conceivable effortto promote a complete accord throughout thisaffair. There will be difficulties and irrita-tions inevitably but the end in view demandsa determination to suppress these manifesta-tions. 136

In anticipation of these arrangements, the

forces along the line Hawaii-Australia. 139

The want of joint arrangements for unity ofcommand beyond the defense of the Ha-

waiian Islands group was a serious defect,as both the War and Navy Departments ac-knowledged. 140 In mid-February the Navyhad raised several questions relating to thisproblem, among them the question of Gen-eral Emmons' point of view "due to his lim-ited mission," and of Admiral Nimitz' au-

thority to move Army forces beyond theHawaiian Coastal Frontier. 141 These ques-tions had come up in connection with thediversion of the squadron of B-17's fromHawaii to the South Pacific to operate in

ti ith th ANZAC Task Force 142



War Department had meanwhile been re-examining the problem of jurisdiction overArmy forces in the South Pacific. Thisproblem had been a point of contention inWashington ever since January, when thefirst Army garrisons were sent. On 19January the War Department staff haddrafted a letter to be sent to General Em-mons, the Army commander in Hawaii,making him responsible, under the Com-

connection with the ANZAC Task Force.They had remained pertinent and impor-

tant questions throughout the spring, as aresult of the War Department's refusal toprovide a separate bomber force for theSouth Pacific. The most obvious solution

139 For the continued confusion over Emmons' re-sponsibilities, see: (1) msg, Emmons to Marshall,27 June 42, CM-IN 9002; and (2) msg (originatorOPD), Marshall to Emmons, 4 Jul 42, CM-OUT


was to establish Army command channelsin the Pacific parallel to the Navy commandchannels, so that General Emmons' views

on the strategic disposition of the bombersstationed in Hawaii would be based on thesame broad calculation of risks as those thatAdmiral Nimitz had to make in consideringthe disposition of the Pacific Fleet. Earlyin April, after the establishment of the Pa-cific Ocean Area, the Navy Department had

directed Admiral Nimitz to name a flag of-ficer to take command in the South Pa-cific.143 To correspond with this command,which was given to Admiral Ghormley,General Emmons in May had proposed thatan Army officer be appointed as his deputy

bile air force be set aside in Hawaii, to beused anywhere in the Pacific, at GeneralMarshall's discretion. 146

With this proposal the War Departmentin effect conceded that naval strategy shouldcontrol operations in the South Pacific.Even this concession was not enough. Ad-miral King took exception on two counts.He did not want the proposed Army com-mander's jurisdiction under Admiral

Ghormley to extend to the operations ofArmy forces, as the War Department hadproposed; and he wanted two mobile airforces set up—in Australia and Hawaii—rather than the one—in Hawaii—proposedby the War Department Marshall ac



an Army officer be appointed as his deputyto command Army forces in the South Pa-

cific.144

The War Department staff, whichhad first thought of setting up a separateArmy command in the area under GeneralPatch, had dropped that idea in favor ofhaving a single Army command in the Pa-cific, with a deputy in the South Pacific—an arrangement substantially in accord with

Emmons' proposal.145

But finally, in June,h l d l h l

by the War Department. Marshall ac-cepted the changes. 147 General Harmon,

who was given the new command as Com-manding General, U. S. Army Forces inthe South Pacific Area (CG USAFISPA,or in Navy form, COMGENSOPAC), re -ceived his formal letter of instructions on 7July. 148 Like -the other officers—Emmons,Stilwell, and Eisenhower—that General

146 (1) OPD f d b



CHAPTER XII

The Elimination of the Alternatives

July-August 1942

On 8 July the War Department opera-tions staff estimated that a decision "on anyemergency operations in the EuropeanTheater in 1942" could not be long post-

No substantial landing in France unless theGermans are demoralized by failure againstRussia. 2

In view of these declarations (the basisf th P i Mi i t ' l t l t



poned and that it must come "not laterthan August 1." 1 On the same day theBritish War Cabinet made a move towarda decision, a move that resulted almostautomatically from its action four weeksbefore (11 June), when it had declared,with reference to SLEDGEHAMMER :

(a ) We should not attempt any major

landing on the Continent this year unless weintended to stay there;

of the Prime Minister's eloquent appeal tothe President), the British Chiefs of Stafffound themselves, by 1 July, in the curiousposition of having authority to mount anoperation that their government evidentlydid not intend to launch. To prepare them-selves against this situation they had on 24June asked the Minister of War Transportto submit by 1 July an estimate of the costof withdrawing ships for use in SLEDGE-

THE ELIMINATION OF THE ALTERNATIVES 267

also suspend amphibious training for allforces not assigned to SLEDGEHAMMER.The result would be to slow down prepara-

tions for landings in 1943. The one justifi-cation for mounting the operation, in thejudgment of Mountbatten, would be a fixedintention of actually carrying out SLEDGE-H A M M E R .4

Against the disadvantages of mountingan operation so very unlikely to be launched,

the British Chiefs of Staff weighed theadvantages:

In the first place, our preparations arebound to keep the Germans guessing. Theymay not force them to withdraw troops fromtheir Eastern Front but they are unlikely to

The British Government soon acted onthe recommendation of its Chiefs of Staff.On 8 July the Joint Staff Mission in Wash-

ington received notification of the decisiontaken not to mount SLED G EH A MMER and ofthe hope expressed by the W ar C abinet thatth e United States would agree to the in-vasion of North Africa.6

The Pacific Alternative

The stated British objections to SLEDGE-H A M M E R had a great deal of force. Theheavy odds against successful landings inFrance in 1942 and the great cost of mount-ing a purely contingent operation were in-



their Eastern Front, but they are unlikely toweaken their Western Front, particularly in

air forces. Secondly, the mounting of"Sledgehammer" will be a useful dress-rehearsal for "Round-up," especially for Com-manders and Staffs.

But they concluded that beyond questionthe disadvantages outweighed the advan-tages, and declared: "If we were free

agents, we could not recommend that the

ing a purely contingent operation were in-deed fundamental objections, which could

have been urged with telling effect againstit when Marshall first proposed it. Therisks and costs were obviously great. Hadthe British in April refused, therefore, toplan for a contingent operation, as part ofthe whole scheme General Marshall pro-posed, it would of course have been opento the War Department to join the Navy


Atlantic and go, full out, as quickly as possi-ble, against Japan 7

In July the alternative to go "full out, asquickly as possible" against Japan still re-mained. It would greatly lessen the dan-gers perpetuated and the tensions createdby Army deployment policy in the Pacific.On 10 July Marshall proposed this alterna-tive. When the JCS met that afternoon heread the dispatch from the British War

Cabinet announcing the decision not tomount SLEDGEHAMMER. He did not touchon the reasons given by the British for thedecision, but passed at once to the two ques-tions raised by the decision: (a) should theUnited States agree to invade North Africa?

LERO, it would be the operation which wouldhave the greatest effect towards relieving thepressure on Russia. 8

Admiral King, of

course, was

ready tomake common cause with Marshall. He

repeated his own objection to GYMNAST—"that is was impossible to fulfill naval com-mitments in other theaters and at the sametime to provide the shipping and escortswhich would be essential should that opera-

tion be undertaken." Admiral Towerssupplemented the case against GYMNAST bydeclaring that the transfer of aircraft car-riers from the Pacific to the Atlantic forGYMNAST would result in a "most unfavor-able" disposition of forces. King also ex-



g(b) did the British really want to invade

the continent in 1943? Marshall repeatedhis objections to GYMNAST as an operation"expensive and ineffectual" and his convic-tion "that it was impossible to carry outSLEDGEHAMMER or R O U N D U P without fullaggressive British support." He then pro-posed a momentous change in strategy,

which would at once rule out the Northf i d l h b i f

able disposition of forces. King also expressed doubt of the British intentions, de-

claring:. . . that, in his opinion, the British had neverbeen in wholehearted accord with operationson the continent as proposed by the U. S. Hesaid that, in the European theater, we mustfight the Germans effectively to win, and thatany departure from full BOLERO plans would

result in failure to accomplish this purpose.

THE E L I M I N AT I O N OF THE ALTERNATIVES 269

and a heavy drain on our resources, and thatif we undertake it, we would nowhere be act-ing decisively against the enemy and woulddefinitely jeopardize our naval position in thePacific.The memorandum passed to a recommen-dation that the President should urge thePrime Minister "that we go through withfull Bolero plans and that we attempt noother operation which would detract fromthis major effort." The memorandumstated the consequences of British unwilling-ness to go ahead with BOLERO :

Neither Sledgehammer nor Roundup canbe carried out w ithout full and whole-heartedBritish support. They must of necessityf i h a large part of the f Giving up

basis and leave the decision to them. It mustbe made at once. My object is again to forcethe British into acceptance of a concentratedeffort against Germany, and if this proves

impossible, to turn immediately to the Pacificwith strong forces and drive for a decisionagainst Japan. 11

Marshall's reasoning was a consistent ex-tension of the very reasoning that had ledthe War Department to propose the con-centration of Army forces in the British Isles.

The War Department's aim was to committhe bulk of U. S. Army forces to one mainfront at a time, and thereby to realize theadvantages of long-range planning over asingle main line of overseas comm unication.The War Department had adopted this ap-



furnish a large part of the forces. Giving upall possibility of Sledgehammer in 1942 notonly voids our commitments to Russia, buteither of the proposed diversions, namelyJupiter and Gymnast, will definitely operateto delay and weaken readiness for Roundupin 1943.Finally, the memorandum offered an alter-native course to be followed should the Presi-

dent fail to persuade the Prime Minister:If th U it d St t i t i

The War Department had adopted this approach on the assumption that in order todefeat either Germany or Japan it wouldprobably be necessary to defeat very largeGerman and Japanese forces on their homesoil. For the War Department, the dangerin opening an additional front was to bemeasured, not in terms of the combat units

11

Memo, CofS for President, 10 Jul 42, s u b :Latest Br Proposals Relative to BOLERO an d GYM


initially committed, but in terms of theultimate effect on the employment of man-power, and specifically on the Army troopbasis. "Concentrating" Army forces in thePacific was in every way an inferior line ofplay to concentrating them in the BritishIsles (for all the reasons that the staff hadlisted in February and March), but themilitary staffs assumed it must be donesooner or later, and it was hence a develop-

ment more desirable than the opening of amain offensive front in the Mediter-ranean—a development that the War De-partment (and the Navy Department)hoped entirely to avoid.

Upon receiving the proposal, the Presi-

traced the lines of advance from the Southand Southwest Pacific—either "northwardalong the TRUK-GUAM-SAIPAN line"or "northwestward through the Malay bar-rier and Borneo to the Philippines" or alongboth lines—and mentioned the possibilityof operations from China and (in case ofwar between Japan and the USSR) fromSiberia.

The memorandum then explained, in

simple terms, the effect on the dispositionof forces and shipping. The effect on navalstrength in the Atlantic would be small,mainly to allow for "some strengthening ofanti-submarine measures." The effect onArmy deployment would be great. The



dent, who was then at Hyde Park, tele-

phoned to ask General Marshall and Ad-miral King to prepare a full exposition of"your Pacific Ocean alternative" and sendit to him that afternoon by plane. Hewanted:... a detailed comprehensive outline ofthe plans, including estimated time and over-

all totals of ships, planes, and ground forces.Also any proposed withdrawal of existing or

only ground forces to be moved across the

North Atlantic would be two divisions tothe British Isles and 15,000 troops to Ice-land, to fulfill commitments made at theARCADIA Conference. The air forces setup for BOLERO would be cut back by twothirds, leaving only eighteen out of fifty-twogroups due to be sent to the British Isles.

There would be a correspondingly great re-




would require an additional constructionprogram for approximately 400,000 troops.Under the Pacific alternative, as under theBOLERO plan, the limiting factor was likelyto be the amount of cargo shipping avail-able. He estimated that the lack of cargoshipping during the period might cut back,by perhaps 100,000 men, deployment forwhich troop shipping would be available, al-though, as he remarked in closing, no fore-

cast of available cargo shipping for so manymonths ahead could be very accurate. 17

As it turned out, General Marshall hadno occasion to go into the details of thePacific plan with the President, nor to re-argue the case against GYMNAST, of which

Middle East were discussed. All agreed tothe many arguments previously advancedamong military men in the Army and Navythat operations in the Pacific would be the

alternative if Sledgehammer or Bolero werenot accepted wholeheartedly by the British.However, there was an acceptance that ap-parently our political system would requiremajor operations this year in Africa. 20

The President objected to the very ideaof delivering an ultimatum to the Brit-ish. He made this perfectly clear to Stim-son and Marshall upon his return to Wash-ington on the 15th.21 He also held that itwould be a mistake to try to defeat Japanfirst. He thought it would be impracti-cable until the U.S. Navy had been greatly

h d 22 H l h ld i ld b



the operations staff, as instructed, prepared

a new version.18

On 14 July the Presidentsent word to Marshall that he did not ap-prove the Pacific alternative, that he wouldconfer with him Wednesday morning (15July) and probably with all the members ofthe JCS in the afternoon, and that he had"definitely" decided to send him with Ad-miral King and Mr Hopkins to London

strengthened. 22 He also held it would be

uneconomical to try to defeat Japan first,for much the same reason that the WarDepartment held a Mediterranean offen-sive to be uneconomical—that it would notcontribute to the defeat of Germany andwould be unnecessary after the defeat ofGermany. On 16 July he stated this view

formally in his instructions to HopkinsM h ll d Ki h i i i


ination of Europe and Africa. On the otherhand, it is obvious that defeat of Germany,or the holding of Germany in 1942 or in1943 means probable, eventual defeat of Ger-

many in the European and African theatresand in the Near East. Defeat of Germanymeans the defeat of Japan, probably withoutfiring a shot or losing a life.23

The Eastern Front and theAlternatives

The President, on his return to Washing-ton on 15 July, indicated that, as the JCShad inferred, he would require operationsof some kind in Africa in case the Britishwould no t agree to carry out SLEDGEHAM-M E R Of th i alternati es th JCS

6. Speed up Bolero preparations by Octo-ber—so that Bolero Roundup will be readyApril 1943.

7. Keep up aid to Russia, but via Basra. 24

Some of these points the War Depart-ment staff incorporated in a draft of in-structions for the conference, which Maj.Gen. Thomas T. Handy and General Mar-shall in turn revised. The draft was ad-dressed to Marshall and King (not Hop-kins). 25 The effect of the instructions pro-posed by the War Department, had thePresident adopted them, would have beensimply to rule out any change in Americancommitments, or any action by Americanground forces (aside from raids) across the



M E R . Of the various alternatives the JCS

had discussed,

he was apparently ratherinclined to favor the reinforcement of theMiddle East by several American divisions.On 15 July he gave General Marshall a pre-liminary statement of points to govern thenegotiations in London. The first page ofthe President's outline read as follows:

1. Proceed with Sledgehammer & stay in

Atlantic in 1942, except in case a collapse

of Soviet resistance seemed imm inent. Theeffect would also have been, in any event,to rule out operations against French NorthAfrica. In short, the War Departmentproposed to stand pat.

The President on the Alternatives




in 1942, whatever his present professions.26

But he was not disposed to resolve thesedoubts by means of an ultimatum, whichwould indeed have been ill-adapted to thepurpose of securing the "full," "whole-hearted" collaboration of the proud leaderof a great people. 27 Besides, he agreed withthe Prime Minister that a diversion to theMediterranean would not rule out a cross-Channel operation in 1943. 28 Finally, hiswillingness to take a chance on future Brit-ish intentions and on the consequences of

26 For the President's remarks on the point, seenotes taken by Hopkins on the President's conversa-tion, on the evening of 15 July, quoted in Sherwood,Roosevelt and Hopkins, p. 602.

For British professions with reference to ROUND

a diversion from BOLERO was reinforced byhis own determination to get "action" acrossthe Atlantic, which he asked for in his in-structions to Hopkins, Marshall, and King:"It is of the highest importance that U. S.ground troops be brought into action againstthe enemy in 1942." 9

Even these instructions did not in so manywords "require military operations inAfrica." Instead, the President simply re-quired that his emissaries in London

shouldreach a decision. The inclusion of Mr.Hopkins as a member of the mission itselfindicated that the mission had plenarypowers, and the President inserted after theformal opening sentence a second para-graph which explicitly stated the theme of



For British professions with reference to ROUND-UP , see: (1) msg, War Cabinet Offs to Jt Stf Miss,Washington, 8 Jul 42, COS (W) 217, Tab 6, and(2 ) msg, Prime Minister to Dill, 12 Jul 42, Tab 5,both in Item 1, Exec 5. The second message isan answer to a letter from Sir John Dill noting thatthe decision not to mount S L E D G E H A M M E R waslikely to lead the Americans to turn to the Pacific.(For this ltr, n.d., code JSM 293, see WDCSA381.) The Prime Minister in replying ignored thesubject. After alluding to the case against SLEDGE-HAMMER and recapitulating briefly the case for

graph, which explicitly stated the theme of

decision:2. The military and naval strategic changes

have been so great since Mr. Churchill's visitto Washington that it becomes necessary toreach immediate agreement on joint opera-tional plans between the British and ourselvesalong two lines:

(a) Definite plans for the balance of 1942.(b ) Tentative plans for the year 1943 ....


(c) Absolute coordinated use of Britishand American forces is essential.

(d) All available U. S. and British forcesshould be brought into action as quickly as

they can be profitably used.(e) It is of the highest importance thatU. S. ground troops be brought into actionagainst the enemy in 1942.30

A second step was to rephrase the policy tobe followed in supplying the USSR. Inplace of the bare reference to the continua-

tion of shipments via the Persian Gulf andthe suspension of the northern convoys, thePresident introduced a statement of goodhopes and good intentions:

4. British and American materiel promisesto Russia must be carried out in good faith.If the Persian route of delivery is used pref

was in the provision for discussions in Lon-don in case the American representativesshould conclude (and inform the President)that SLEDGEHAMMER was "impossible ofexecution with reasonable chances of serv-ing its intended purposes." The President'sown statement of his views was not that thetwo nations in that case should go aheadwith plans for ROUNDUP so long as it lookedas if the Red Army could contain largeGerman forces, but instead:

7. If SLEDGEHAMMER is finally and definite-ly out of the picture, I want you to considerthe world situation as it exists at that time,and determine upon another place for U. S.Troops to fight in 1942. 33

The passages that followed did not ex-



If the Persian route of delivery is used, pref-

erence must be given to combat material.This aid must continue as long as delivery ispossible and Russia must be encouraged tocontinue resistance. Only complete collapse,which seems unthinkable, should alter thisdetermination on our part. 31

A third step was to restate the draft pro-vision with reference to SLEDGEHAMMER,

which the American representatives were

The passages that followed did not explicitly limit the choice of "another place"for an operation in 1942. Instead, the Presi-dent simply passed to the point that a cross-Channel operation in 1943 would appar-ently depend on the outcome of operationson the Eastern Front, and thence to thedeclaration (in paragraph 8): The

Middle East should be held asstrongly asibl h h R i ll


native, and closed with the following ad-monitions :

10. Please remember three cardinal prin-ciples—speed of decision on plans, unity ofplans, attack combined with defense but notdefense alone. This affects the immediateobjective of U. S. ground forces fightingagainst Germans in 1942.

11 . I hope for total agreement within oneweek of your arrival. 34

The President's representatives arrived inLondon on Saturday, 18 July. They firstconferred with the Americans stationedthere—Admiral Stark, Lt. Gen. Dwight D.Eisenhower, and General Spaatz. Duringthe first three days of their meetings withthe British in London (20-22 July) they

be impossible to satisfy. On 22 July, at aconference attended by the Prime Ministerand his principal military leaders and ad-visers, the American representatives ac-knowledged defeat. 35

They reported the impasse to the Presi-dent, who owned that he was not altogethersurprised and agreed that the matter mightas well be dropped. He directed them tosettle with the British on one of five alter-

natives, listing them in order of preference:(1 ) a British-American operation againstFrench North Africa (either Algeria orMorocco or both); (2) an entirely Ameri-can operation against French Morocco( GYMNAST ); (3) combined operations



the British in London (20 22 July) they

tried to persuade the British Chiefs of Staffof the merits of a revised version of SLEDGE-H A M M E R that had been hurriedly workedup by General Eisenhower's staff—an oper-ation to secure a foothold on the Cotentin(Cherbourg) peninsula. They urged in itsfavor the good effect at the very least ofheartening the Soviet Government by giv

( ); ( ) p

against northern

Norway (JUPITER)

; (4)the reinforcement of Egypt; (5) the rein-forcement of Iran. 36

35 A detailed account of the plans and discussionsappears in Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack, Ch. I.An important account told from the point of viewof the two leading participants is in Sherwood,Roosevelt and Hopkins, pp 606—10.


Roundup or Torch: CCS 94

In view of the persistence with whichGeneral Marshall had argued the caseagainst GYMNAST, and the readiness withwhich he had modified his opposition tosending American forces to Egypt, it wouldhave been consistent for him at this pointto propose sending more American forcesto the Middle East. The latest instructionshe had from the President still listed it asan acceptable course of action. It was alsothe course that the War Department op-erations staff had recommended. In theseries of briefs compiled on 15 July, thestaff had compared the advantages and dis-advantages of the two courses of action.

the Middle East. 38 On this point, thePrime Minister was apparently in agree-ment, fo r unlike his Chiefs of Staff and inspite of the President's evident interest, hehad never shown any desire to obtainAmerican ground forces for the MiddleEast. Presumably Marshall also took ac-count of the circumstance that a NorthAfrican operation was the one operationthat would have the full support of boththe President and the Prime Minister—avery important consideration when it cameto requisitioning ships, planes, and navalescort to carry out an operation—and ofthe fact that the Allied assault forces andthe Allied commander would be American.

According to Mr Hopkins Marshall and



g

The advantages

of GYMNAST were that

itwould have a "shorter and more secure lineof communication," would remove thethreat of German operations in the SouthAtlantic, and would furnish bases for airoperations in the Mediterranean. The dis-advantages were that it involved opposed

landings without adequate port facilitiesd ld h l l di

According to Mr. Hopkins, Marshall and

King turned toward GYMNAST for two rea-sons: "first, because of the difficulty ofmixing our troops with the British in Egypt,and secondly because if we go to Syria wemay not do any fighting there." 39 Theirown explanation, given to the President assoon as they came back to Washington, was

that they chose the alternative of operations


collapse this Fall or a termination of thepresent campaign leaving Russia relativelyimpotent and incapable of offensive actionwould, however, make the objective of a con-

tinental operation in 1943 impossible of at-tainment. In this event the United Nationsare forced to a defensive, encircling line ofaction against Germany for the coming yearunless a crackup in German morale, of whichthere is no present indication, should occurunexpectedly. Combined operations againstthe West and Northwest Coasts of Africa forthe purpose indicated above is the logical lineof action in this alternative. 40

Thus, in effect, General Marshall and Ad-miral King reverted to the characteristicfeature of Marshall's initial agreement withthe British Chiefs of Staff on their June visitto Washington, a feature that the President

the year within the framework of the ac-cepted strategy of BOLERO. They proposedinstead:

That it be understood that a commitmentto this operation renders ROUND-UP, in allprobability impracticable of successful exe-cution in 1943 and therefore that we havedefinitely accepted a defensive, encirclingline of action for the CONTINENTAL EU-R O P E A N THEATER, except as to airoperation.

They proposed that the decision whetherto abandon ROUNDUP and to accept thestrategic defensive be put off till 15 Sep-tember, and be made then on the basis ofthe probable course of the war in Russiaas it would affect the prospects for suc-

f l invasion of the Continent in the



to Washington, a feature that the President

had eliminated from the draft instructionsof 15 July—the idea of waiting a while tosee what happened on the Eastern Frontbefore deciding to divert forces fromBOLERO.

On 24 July Marshall and King proposedthis approach to the British Chiefs of Staff.

They proposed in the first place to go on

cessful invasion of the Continent in the

first half of 1943.41

The memorandum of the AmericanChiefs was discussed and adopted, withamendments, by the American and BritishChiefs of Staff, meeting as the CCS. Ad-miral Pound tended to agree with GeneralMarshall and Admiral King that GYM-NAST as the operation in North and North


egy involved in undertaking operations inNorth and Northwest Africa, and thequalifying clause was added:. . . that the organization, planning, andtraining, for eventual entry in the Continentshould continue so that this operation can bestaged should a marked deterioration in Ger-man military strength become apparent, andthe resources of the United Nations, avail-able after meeting other commitments, sopermit. 42

As corollaries of the defensive strategy, ifaccepted, the American Chiefs proposed re-leasing fifteen U.S. air groups committed toBOLERO and, probably, shipping for themovement of a division to the SouthwestPacific. The British Chiefs of Staff agreed.Finally the American Chiefs proposed and

forces committed to the operation wouldrequire British assistance. In the memo-randum as proposed nothing more specificwas said about British troops. In the dis-cussion of the memorandum General Mar-shall stated that though assault troopsshould all be American, later military oper-ations to the eastward, inside the Mediter-ranean, according to the American under-standing, would be carried out mainly byBritish forces. 43 A provision to this effectwas incorporated by the CCS. Discussionalso made it clear that all were agreed onthe need to name at once a commander forthe projected operation. 44

Reconvening the following day (25 July),the CCS gave the code name TORCH to



Finally, the American Chiefs proposed and

the British agreed to fix a pair of limitingdates—the latest practicable dates forlaunching the operation and for beginningto assemble shipping, escort, and troops.They agreed that 1 December 1942 was thelatest practicable date for launching theoperation; the other date was to be deter-mined after study Neither the memoran

the operation and took up arrangements forcommand and for staff planning. Theyreadily agreed on the appointment of anAmerican TORCH commander, with head-quarters in London, to be responsible to theCCS for all training and planning forTORCH and, until it should be decided to

mountTORCH for SLEDGEHAMMER-ROUND-l


The Decision To Invade FrenchNorth Africa

The first report sent back by Hopkins,on 24 July, of the turn taken towardGYMNAST included a request that the Presi-dent should express his own ideas by cable.The President at once replied in favor oflanding in North Africa as soon as possible,"in order to forestall air concentrations bythe Germans." 46 On the same day GeneralMarshall and Admiral King sent to thePresident a message transmitting the sub-stance of their agreement with the BritishChiefs of Staff (CCS 94). 47

On 25 July, Hopkins again summonedthe President's aid, this time asking the

Marshall, the President's decision "hadbeen reached before we arrived and therewas no discussion as to the relative meritsof his decision and the plan recommendedin your 625" ( t h e message summarizingCCS 9 4 ) . The President did say (asquoted by McNarney) that "h e desired ac-tion and that he could see no reason whythe withdrawal of a few troops in 1942would prevent BOLERO in 1943." 50

By simply ignoring CCS 94, the Presi-dent created a curious situation, which theCCS recognized at their meeting on 30 July,their first meeting after th e return of Mar-shall and King from London. AdmiralLeahy, who ( for the first t ime) sat as thesenior American representative, opened the



President to name a date for the invasion,not later than 30 October 1942. He ex-plained :

Although I believe that the intention hereis to mount the operation aggressively, unlessthe written language of the orders is precisethere may be difficulties when it comes tocarrying out the orders by the secondarypersonnel 48

p p

discussion of CCS 94 by suggesting that thedate of launching TORCH should be ad-vanced as far as possible. 51 He gave it ashis impression:. . . that both the President and the PrimeMinister now firmly believe that the decisionto under take TORCH has already been reachedand that all preliminary arrangements areproceeding as rapidly as possible in order


cision to have been made. 53 He carefullybrought the discussion back to the thesis heand Admiral King had posed—that a de-cision to mount TORCH would be a decisionto abandon ROUNDUP. He was now tryingsimply to get the President and the PrimeMinister to acknowledge that this was so,and not to evade or postpone a decision.He stated that the staff was now at work ona study "of all implications of TORCH with

a view toward recommending that the oper-ation be launched at the earliest possiblemoment." He conceded that a decisionbetween TORCH and ROUNDUP should come"almost immediately because of the logisticconsiderations involved"—specifically the

i f hi f b l di

believed that the "whole case" should bepresented to the President and the PrimeMinister, including the problem—a corol-lary to TORCH as it had been to GYMNAST,as he and General Marshall both warned—of maintaining the security of the BritishIsles against invasion. 55

Admiral Leahy had little choice but toannounce "he would now tell the Presidentthat a definite decision was yet to be made."

He believed it would be "acceptable" to waita week, as Marshall and King proposed, forthe results of the staff study under way, solong as the result would be "a definite de-cision, with the date of landing set." TheCCS agreed that they would then report



conversion of ships for combat loading,which, according to a "flash estimate" bythe staff, would mean a lapse of over threemonths (ninety-six days) between a decisionand the landings in Africa. Since a deci-sion could not be postponed till mid-Sep-tember, it would not take the form of a de-

cision to abandon R O U N D U Pand as a corol

to the President and Prime Minister "recom-mending any necessary change in the datefor the decision to mount TORCH." 56

The President promptly forestalled thislast move to bring to his attention the "im-plications" of launching an invasion ofNorth Africa. On the evening of 30 Julyhe concluded the series of deliberations

284 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FOR COALITION WA R FA R E

the final decision to be made by September15th.57

The Time and The Place 8

The President's decision for TORCH didaway with the need for a report from theCCS "recommending any necessary changein the date for the decision to mountTORCH." But there remained the ques-

tion, then under study: What was the "ear-liest possible date" for landing in NorthAfrica? Was it in fact sound, from a mili-tary point of view, to plan on landings by30 October at the latest, according to thesuggestion sent back from London by Hop-kins and adopted by the President? Being

the British Chiefs of Staff set a provisionaltarget date of 7 October. 61 On the sameday Marshall and King put the Americanestimate before the President, tacitly con-ceding that the American and British staffswere not in agreement nor likely to agree. 62

They recommended that he should ask thePrime Minister to concur in an operationfor 7 November. 63 The President took thematter under advisement. 64

The difference between the Americanand British estimates went beyond a simpledifference in calculations of the time neces-sary to convert and assemble troopships forthe assault. Nine of the transports beingmodified for combat loading would be readyby 15 September, the tenth by 1 October.



told that the CCS were going to reporton this question, the President agreed toawait their recommendation before com-municating with the Prime Minister. 59 On2 August the War Department staff con-firmed the "flash estimate" to which Mar-shall had referred in the CCS meeting of

30 July and gave the Navy's estimate that

One additional Navy combat loader wouldbe available by 10 October. But the boatcrews and the landing troops would stillbe unprepared. The War Department staffhad allowed time not only to convert shipsbut also to complete amphibious trainingwith rehearsals in which the boat crews andthe assault troops would use the ships as


signed to them for the operation. 65 GeneralMarshall himself insisted on such rehearsals,this being a point the British were ready tosacrifice for the sake of speed. 66 Still an-other factor was the time needed to trainthe 2d Armored Division and the tank bat-talions attached to the 3d and 9th Divisions.These units were not due to be equippedwith the M4 tank, which they would usein battle, until 17 September. In callingattention to this point, the staff warnedagainst the dangers of improvised expedi-tions and alluded to the "disasters" suffered"by the British in Norway, France, theBalkans, and in Crete." 67

The disagreement over the target date forTORCH was symptomatic of disagreement

ground forces would finally amount to be-tween ten and twelve divisions. The opera-tion would be timed and aimed to securethe coast of Algeria and Tunisia before thecoming of winter on the Eastern Frontshould have eased German needs for troopsin Russia. According to this plan, landingson the Atlantic coast would not come at thesame time as the landings inside the Medi-terranean, but about three weeks later. TheBritish doubted that forces could landagainst opposition on the Atlantic coast,where there was usually a heavy surf. Andthey doubted that the forces landed on theAtlantic coast would be of much help to the"main" operation for some time, since theywould be held back by limited port facili-



y p g

over the scope of the operation, its objective,and the risks to be taken. The British plan-ners envisaged initial landings on a widefront in the Mediterranean, eastward atleast as far as Algiers, to be followed byforces strong enough to advance into Tu-nisia.68 They estimated that the TORCH

ties and poor land communications with theMediterranean coast. 69

During the second half of July, in re-sponse to the negotiations in London, theAmerican staff in Washington had changedover from the assumptions of GYMNAST(an all American force landing at Casa-

blan ca on the Atlantic coast of French


troops and simultaneous landings insidethe Mediterranean at Oran and Algiers). 70

They realized that the strategic aim of theoperation would be correspondingly moreambitious—"Eventual establishment ofbases and additional forces for offensiveoperations against LIBYA and ITALY."But they still thought of Casablanca as the"principal port of debarkation during theearly stages of the operation." 71 By rely-ing on Casablanca, the American staffhedged against the risk of heavy losses inships and escort vessels that might be in-curred in supplying the expedition entirelythrough Mediterranean ports and againstthe risk of a military debacle in case of rapid-ly developing strong opposition. As a cor-

The 9 August Plan

It fell to General Eisenhower to try toreconcile the divergent views of the oper-

ation. Just before he left London forWashington, General Marshall, on theafternoon of 26 July, had personally in-formed General Eisenhower that he was tobe the Allied commander of the expeditionto North Africa. General Marshall hadadded that it would take a little while be-fore the appointment would be made of-ficial, but that, in the meantime, Eisen-hower was to proceed promptly with thenecessary planning. 73 Eisenhower was for-mally designated Commander in Chief,

73 Ltr General of the Army Dwight D. Eisen-



ollary, both the speed and scale of oper-ations in Algeria and eastward into Tunisiawould initially be sharply restricted by thelimited port facilities on the Atlantic and theslender overland communications. Britishstaff members conceded that an operationplanned on these terms might be sounder—gi a d f i p rpose 72

Ltr, General of the Army Dwight D. Eisen

hower to Gen Ward, OCMH, 15 Apr 51, OCMHFiles. General Eisenhower, commenting on thedraft manuscript of this volume, filled a gap in therecord of the events of 26 July. He recalled:

That afternoon, about 3 or 4 o'clock, I got a hur-ried call from General Marshall, who was staying atthe Claridge Hotel. I walked into his room and,although he was in an adjoining bathroom cleaningup, we talked through the door, and he started tell-ing me at once about the decisions reached. Thegist of these decisions was that the Allies would con



288 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WA R FA R E

carriers to cover landings both "inside" and"outside" the Mediterranean, nor could thelack be made up by using Gibraltar as anadvance base, since it would be a "deadgive-away" to concentrate planes there be-fore the invasion:

The airfield there literally lies on the Span-ish border and there is no hope of concealingactivity from spies and agents. Because ofthe limitations upon the Gibraltar airfield,planes cannot be passed through at a sufficient

rate to meet minimum demands on both thenorth and west coasts, assuming reasonablesuccess in seizing airdromes. 78

The British Chiefs, to whom the Augustoutline plan was presented informally, re-iterated the British objections to the Amer-ican version of the operation. They reas-

The 21 August Plan

The criticism by the British Chiefs ofStaff of the 9 August outline plan had two

immediate results. On 12 August thePresident directed Marshall and King tohave the project restudied, stating that itmight become desirable or necessary tolaunch the operation on 7 October, as pro-posed by the British Chiefs, even with onlyone third the forces that could be used a

month later.80

The second result of Brit-ish criticism was that on 13 August GeneralEisenhower informed the War Departmentthat the American members of his staffwere now convinced of the soundness of theBritish reasoning. Therefore they weredrawing up a new plan in which they were



serted that the British purpose was theinvasion of Tunisia. "Indeed it can besaid," concluded the British Chiefs, "thatthe whole conception of 'Torch' may standor fall on this question of early Allied oc-cupation of Tunisia." In order to advancequickly into Tunisia, it was necessary to land

f B I d l d

g p p a yeliminating the landings at Casablanca andmoving up the date. 81 On 14 August heasked what General Marshall thought ofthis new version of TORCH ,82 In reply,Marshall stated the Washington view tobe that the operation as it was now pro-posed would have less than a fifty-fiftychance of success 83 Eisenhower replied


Patton, who was then in London to conferon plans for the task force under his com-mand that would sail direct from the UnitedStates. But they all believed that therewas nevertheless a better than fair chanceof success if Spain were to stay neutral andthe French were not to put up effectiveresistance. 84

Planning went ahead in London on thebasis of the British concept of TORCH, anda second outline plan was worked out.85

The second outline plan was finished on 21August and circulated on 25 August. Thedate of landings was moved to 15 October,this being itself admittedly tentative. Theobjective of the operation was in these plansdefined as follows :

Bone. Combat-loaded troops for the threelandings were to amount to about eightregimental combat teams: four at Oran,three at Algiers, and one at Bône. Theplan called for an initial Western Force of39,400, all elements included, and an es-timated total Western Force of about250,000, including two armored and fiveinfantry divisions. As tentatively estimated,four divisions, two American and two Brit-ish, with other troops in proportion, wouldmake up the Eastern Force, from the UnitedKingdom.

General Eisenhower's comment on the 21August plan was that in several ways it mustbe regarded as tentative: the date was prob-ably too early; planning for the task forceof General Patton which was to land at



A Combined land, sea, and air Assaultagainst the Mediterranean Coast of AL-GERIA, with a view to the earliest possibleoccupation of TUNISIA, and the establish-ment in FRENCH MOROCCO of a strikingforce which can insure control of theSTRAITS of GIBRALTAR, by movingrapidly, if necessary, into SPANISH MO-

ROCCO86

of General Patton, which was to land atOran, was not far advanced; too little wasknown to be at all sure of the schedules forUnited States convoys and for building upthe U. S. air force in the American sector.Besides, Eisenhower observed, more thor-ough study of available naval support was

i i g th d ti f th forces


Objective of Torch

During the week that preceded the issu-ance of this second outline plan, no one in

Washington had had an exact idea whatform the plan was taking. 88 GeneralHandy had therefore been sent to Londonwhen the second plan was nearly ready,and there represented the views of GeneralMarshall and his staff in the discussionsthat followed.89 On 22 August he sent afull report to Washington. Handy, likeEisenhower, emphasized the weakness of theoperation and the threat to its flank. Heconcluded that the 21 August outline planwas too risky, and that TORCH should eitherbe given up or be replanned with modest,limited ends. He continued that with con-

Mediterranean. The next best would beto send General Patton's task force to theMiddle East. This course of action wouldformally satisfy the President's conditionthat American troops go into action againstthe Germans. Should neither of thesecourses of action be feasible, there was stilla third: to limit the purpose of TORCH.

If the operation were replanned with lim-ited ends, Handy observed, TORCH wouldstill provide for landings inside and outsidethe Mediterranean, though not in enoughforce to give much chance of occupying thenorth coast of Africa and finally of openingthe Mediterranean. Plans should still bebased on the date of 7 November ratherthan of 15 October, mainly so that theUnited States could furnish more of the



limited ends. He continued that with continental or Pacific operations out of thequestion, there were still three courses ofaction preferable to the plans as they stood.The best, if naval forces could somehow befound, would be to carry out TORCH, asEisenhower had recommended, with simul-taneous landings inside and outside the

United States could furnish more of thetroops to be used, and those troops bettertrained. Even such an operation was to bepreferred to that currently proposed in Lon-don and set forth in the second outline plan:such an operation did not run the risk ofa "major debacle." Handy's final sentence

d th i f th W D t


The American staff officers in Washing-ton were not part of the combined staffcharged with TORCH planning, and there-fore were not inhibited by the existing di-rective issued to Eisenhower from taking aposition of their own. The directive hadprovided for a decisive move against theGerman and Italian forces in North Africa.The opening sentence read:

The President and the Prime Minister haveagreed that combined military operations bedirected against Africa, as early as practicable,with a view to gaining, in conjunction withAllied Forces in the Middle East, completecontrol of North Africa from the Atlantic tothe Red Sea.The directive provided for the initial es-tablishment

taking it—that less was available than hadbeen assumed at first—required that theobjective itself be redefined. The chanceof reaching the objective originally set wasaltered quite as much by eliminating onephase as by eliminating the other. The WarDepartment staff therefore proposed limit-ing the objective to "the early and completemilitary domination of Northwest Africafrom Rio de Oro, exclusive, to Oran, in-clusive." Within these limits, the operationwould initially establish firm and mutuallysupporting lodgements in the Agidir [sic]-Marrakech-Casablanca-Rabat-Fez areain French Morocco and in the Oran-Mos-taganem-Mascara area in Algeria." 93 On25 August the JCS proposed such a direc-tive which became the starting point for a



... of firm and mutually supported lodge-ments in the Oran-Algiers-Tunis area on thenorth coast, and in the Casablanca area onthe northwest coast, in order that appropriatebases for continued and intensified air, groundand sea operations will be readily available. 91

The operational plans being made in terms

f il bl l i

tive, which became the starting point for anew series of discussions. 94 As Handypointed o u t , this was in effect the thirdcourse of action that he had proposed. 95

mer, who as a member of OPD had been directlyinvolved in TORCH planning, concluded that thisdifference was decisive. (Lt r, Col Baumer to Gen

Ward 17 Apr 51 OCMH Files ) But it is do bth h h W D l fl


The British Chiefs of Staff now declaredthemselves willing to put off the operationtill November so as to be able to land inthree places, with additional naval escort,as Eisenhower had recommended on 23August to the CCS and as Handy had rec-ommended on 22 August to Marshall.Eisenhower reported that he had not en-couraged them to expect that the additionalnaval escort could be obtained. 96 Marshallreplied that it could not be provided. 97

The British staffs in London and Wash-ington were as strongly opposed to the modi-fied directive of the JCS as they had been toth e first outline plan (of 9 August) and asthe War Department had been to the secondoutline plan (of 21 Au gu st). The Britishposition was that the limited operation, even

At this point the President and the PrimeMinister intervened and within a weekagreed on a definite version of the opera-tion. On 30 August, replying to a messagefrom th e Prime Minister, th e Presidentconfirmed the demand for a landing on theAtlantic coast, and recognized that cur-rently only one other initial landing seemedpossible. The President proposed, how-ever, that the two governments reconsidereconomies in use of naval escort so as toprovide for a third landing. If it still couldnot be made, the President expected to beable to arrange for an unopposed landingat Algiers within a week after the otherlandings. The President was still hopingfor an early date."

The Prime Minister and his staff re-



p p ,though it at first risked less, ran in the endth e same risks, without any prospect of gain.The JCS reiterated that it did not run thetwo risks that must not be run—prolongedattrition at a high rate to shipping and escortvessels, and a disaster involving Americanarms, which would have the most serious

ll h ld 98

mained full of misgivings and very reluc-tant to abandon the landings at Algiers. 100

In view of this response the President, onthe recommendation of the JCS, proposeda reduction in the Oran force in order to

vide, as the second outline plan did, for a "worthwhile strategic p rpose " (Msg Eisenhower to


provide one regimental combat team aspart of a force to land at Algiers. 101 ThePrime Minister and his staff finding thisstill inadequate, the JCS on 3 Septemberrecommended, and the President on 4 Sep-tember proposed, a similar reduction in theforce for Casablanca. 102 On 5 September

the Prime Minister agreed, and on the sameday Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ)in London issued a third outline plan in-corporating these modifications. 103 Thefifth of September marked the end of thedebating phase of TORCH planning.

101 Msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 2 Sep 42, CM-OUT 0679 (R) .

102 See msg, Prime Minister to President, 3 Sep 42(replying to 182), quoted in msg, Eisenhower toMarshall, 3 Sep 42, CM-IN 1095.

(1 ) See msg, Marshall to Eisenhower, 3 Sep 42,CM-OUT 1354 (9/4/42) ( R ) , for the Americanproposal as drafted. (2) See msg , President toPrime Minister, 4 Sep 42 (183), WDCSA TORCH,1, for the message as sent, different only in phrasing.The definite fixing of the size of the Algiers force

remained in the text as sent only as a result of thelast minute intervention of the Chief of Staff, whowanted the message sent as soon as possible, so thatEisenhower or Clark would not have to come toWashington, as the British were then suggesting, togo over the whole matter. (Memo, CofS for Leahy,4 Sep 42, Tab 42, Item 1, Exec 5.)

103 (1) Msg, Prime Minister to President, 5 Sep42 (144, replying to 183), Tab 46, Item 1, Exec 5.(2 ) AFHQ ( G - 3 ) Outline Plan C Provisional)for Opn TORCH, 5 Sep 42, ABC 381 (7-25-42),4-A.



CHAPTER XIII

The Interpretation of CCS 94

August 1942

The disagreement during August over thetime and place of the landings in NorthAfrica was at the center of a vast confusionand uncertainty. The President, by se-renely ignoring the terms of the agreement

staff that as he understood CCS 94, theresponsibilities would not be separated''until the positive order for the Torch op-eration was given," that is, until the momentcame "when the troops were actually com-



(CCS 94) reached in July, ended in thequickest possible way the attempt of GeneralMarshall, with the acquiescence of hisAmerican colleagues and the British Chiefs,to delay th e "decision" on TORCH. ButGeneral Marshall and his staff did not in-tend that CCS 94 should lapse, and theP id ' i did h f

mitted to movements to base ports, etc.That moment, he went on, had not yetarrived. General Eisenhower and theBritish Chiefs apparently believed that "afinal decision" on TORCH had been made.General Marshall disagreed:

Th d i i t t th ti h

THE INTERPRETATION OF CCS 94 295

merely facilitated the execution of thestrategy they had hoped to supersede. 2

Sir John Dill, whose chief duty was tounderstand General Marshall and keep ongood terms with him, was sufficiently per-turbed to write a note of gentle protest tohim about the attitude displayed by mem-bers of his planning staff. Dill began:

I am just a little disturbed about TORCH.For good or for ill it has been accepted andtherefore I feel that we should go at it withall possible enthusiasm and give it absolutepriority. If we don't, it won't succeed.

From what our Planners tell me, there aresome of your people who feel that TORCH isnot a good operation. That, of course, mus tbe a matter of opinion but those who areplaying a part in mounting the operation mustbe entirely whole-hearted about it, or they

pressed with Dill's final plea that they should"all think alike—and enthusiastically."The answer ended with the statement:"You may feel sure that U. S. Planners will

enthusiastically and effectively support de-cisions made by the Commander-in-Chief." 4

CCS 94 and the Arcadia Statementof Grand Strategy

How closely the attitude of the War De-partment was connected with War Depart-ment views on grand strategy was shownin the main part of Sir John Dill's letter toMarshall. He drew attention to the factthat the American planners in Washingtonin their discussion of grand strategy were



cannot give it all the help it should have andovercome all the difficulties that will arise.

Sir John closed by declaring: "All I aimat is to ensure that we all think alike—andenthusiastically." 3

General Marshall replied that he agreedthat the

ffi charged with executing the

appealing to CCS 94, while the Britishplanners appealed to the statement that theBritish Chiefs of Staff had proposed, andthe American Chiefs had accepted, in De-cember 1941 at the beginning of the AR-CADIA Conference. This statement (inABC-4/CS-1) prescribed for 1942, and

h 1943 f h

296 STRATEGIC PLANNING FO R COALITION WA R FA R E

should be quite clear on this matter. At pres-ent our Chiefs of Staff quote ABCM/CS.las the Bible whereas some of your people, Ithink, look upon C. C. S. 94 as the revisedversion 5

It was expecting a great deal to ask Gen-eral Marshall to disavow CCS 94. He hadsilently concurred in the version of strategypresented by the British Chiefs during theARCADIA Conference, and he could not butconcede that it covered th e TORCH opera-

tion. But he had long since made quiteplain his belief that the course of actionpropounded in the ARCADIA paper, begin-ning with "closing and tightening the ring"around Germany, would not bring aboutthe defeat of Germany, and would not,therefore, justify leaving the Japanese to

resistance by ever-increasing air bombard-ment by British an d American forces", is ofnecessity modified by the provisions in CCS94, one of which contemplates the wi th-drawal of 15 groups of aircraft projected fo rth e United Kingdom for the fu r the rance ofoffensive operations in the Pacif ic; the othermakes available for transfer f rom the UnitedKingdom to the Af r i can Theater such heavyand medium bomber units as may be re-quired.

To this contention the British could prop-

erly have replied that the principle of bom-barding the Continent at the expense ofother strategic aims was not a principlethey had advanced at ARCADIA but a prin-ciple the War Department itself had ad-vanced subsequently, and that CCS 94modified the subsequent proposal ( BOLERO )



hold the strategic initiative in the Pacific.CCS 94 came close to meeting his views, inproviding that a decision to undertake theTORCH operation would amount to accept-ing a "defensive" strategy of encirclement(so far as ground operations were con-cerned) an d would justify a diversion of

l i f h P ifi Th

and not the ARCADIA agreement.General Marshall also read into the AR-CADIA agreement th e peculiarly Americanidea that operations in the Mediterraneanwere not operations against Germany, andthat offensive operations in the Mediter-ranean were not, fo r purposes of grand

ff i ll


After pointing to these two "inconsist-encies," General Marshall shifted his groundto make the more telling point that it wasafter all in the common interest to take intoaccount events that had happened andundertakings that had been made since theARCADIA Conference:

ABC-4/CS-1 contemplates also such actionin the Pacific as will deny to Japan access toraw materials. If we were to implement thatprovision rigidly, you can readily appreciate

the full implications with reference to otherprojected operations. Therefore, while con-stituting a guide for our overall strategy, ABC-4/CS-1, it seems to me, must be consideredin the light of subsequent agreements, par-ticularly if those agreements serve to modifyour concept of strategy as required by develop-ments in the situation. 6

of deciding to go ahead with TORCH, thePresident granted an interview to ColonelFellers. Fellers' outspoken criticism of theBritish command in Egypt and his recom-mendation fo r full American interventionhad led to his being recalled from Cairoto Washington. 8 In presenting his case tothe President, Fellers again recommendedan intense effort to reinforce the British,urging that during the next few weeksAmerican bombers be sent to Egypt at therate of ten a day. His views had notchanged since his return. The substanceof them, according to the President's briefsummary, was as follows:

Colonel Fellers was very pessimistic as tothe ability of the British to hold the NileDelta and the Suez Canal. He had esti-



Marshall thus confirmed Sir John's ob-servation that the British planners and theWar Department planners approached theproblem of future plans with quite differentviews. Their disagreement was merely asign of the real difficulty: TORCH, even thecautious American version, fitted easily intoB i i h A i h d

mated that General Rommel would pene-trate the British positions by the last ofAugust. 9

Whatever may have been the President'sreasons for seeing C olonel Fellers in person,there was no question but that the Presi-dent was unready to accept the restrictiveff f TORCH h j h f


tion. Characteristically, the Presidentcombined the announcement of his deci-sion on TORCH with the question whetherthe United States might not be able tosend more planes to the Middle East (andperhaps a convoy to the Soviet arctic portsas well) ,10 In reply Marshall submitted areport telling what was being done, withonly the remark that additional reinforce-ments for the Middle East would be at theexpense of TORCH or BOLERO.

11

Marshall's policy had been to co-operatewith the British Chiefs of Staff in the Mid-dle East in the hope of "preserving theBOLERO plan." 12 His staff, vexed by thedisappointment of this hope, went so faras to urge on General Marshall the viewthat

This last protest was a measure of how farthe War Department planners were frommeeting the British planners on the basisof thinking "alike" and "enthusiastically"about the problems of combined strategy inth e Mediterranean. Even after reconcilingthemselves to the decision to mount TORCH,they were sure to disagree with the Britishover the exploitation of TORCH and thecomplementary offensive (LIGHTFOOT) thatthe British were planning to launch west-ward from El Alamein. 14

The Pacific

The reluctance of the War Departmentplanners to adjust their aims to the prospectof a North African operation appeared like-

i i h i illi i A



The Middle East should be held if possible,but its loss might prove to be a blessing indisguise. The British, once free of the tre-mendous drain upon their resources repre-sented by Middle East requirements, mightthen be in a position to launch an effectiveoffensive based on the British Isles, and di-rected against the enemy's citadel on theC i 13

wise in their unwillingness to increase Armycommitments in the Pacific. The only no-table concessions that the Army had madesince the Battle of Midway on the alloca-tion of forces to the Pacific were the pro-vision of two infantry regiments (from the40th Division) and a few supporting units


and Southwest Pacific. The considerationof this question, raised on 8 July by GeneralMacArthur and Admiral Ghormley, hadbeen suspended during the brief interludeof rapprochement between King and Mar-shall over the "Pacific alternative" (10-14July). It was opened on 14 July by Ad-miral King, who then passed on to GeneralMarshall with his concurrence the recom-mendation of Admiral Nimitz that theArmy should send three additional anti-aircraft regiments to the South Pacific. 16

On 15 July Admiral King urged GeneralMarshall to act on the proposal. 17

M a r-shall, on the recommendation of his staff,gave way to the extent of agreeing to sendone regiment—the 76th Coast Artillery(AA)—from the west coast as a partial re-l f h i d b

craft until more Army units arrived. There-upon, the Navy Department again re-quested that three regiments should be sentat once, and the War Department again re-fused to do so.

20

The Navy pressed its objections not onlyto the provision for antiaircraft defense butalso to the Army's approach in general.Admiral Nimitz urged the provision of anadequate, continuous flow of land and airreplacements and reinforcements to con-

solidate the forward positions to be seized.The Navy Department agreed that theArmy should provide them, calling atten-tion to Japanese capabilities and recent re-ports of increased Japanese activity in thesouthwestern Pacific. 21 The War Depart-ment reiterated that forces to garrison for-

d i i h ld b b h f



placement for the regiments due to bemoved into the Solomons from Boraboraand Tongatabu. 18 Admiral King was will-ing to accept this solution, on the assump-tion that in the near future the Army wouldsend additional units to complete the re-

l f d f d f

ward positions should be brought up fromth e rear. They would come from NewCaledonia, and would be replaced in NewCaledonia from Tongatabu and Borabora.The forces taken from Borabora and Tonga-tabu would not be replaced; nor would re-

l b d l


against the Continent was the withdrawalof forces from BOLERO for use in the Pa-cific. In that contingency, the CCSagreed that. . . over and above the U. S. forces requiredfrom BOLERO fo r operations in North andNorth West Africa, the following readjust-ments of present U. S. commitments to BO-LERO will be made for the purpose of fur-thering offensive operations in the Pacific:

(1) Withdrawal of the following air

forces:3 groups heavy bombers2 groups medium bombers2 groups light bombers2 groups fighter planes2 groups observation planes4 groups transport planes

(2) Probably shipping to move one infan-

t M i di i i from U S W t C t23

the light of the recent decisions reached inLondon to reenforce with air the PacificOcean Areas," the Army's decision of 27July not to reinforce the South Pacific. 24

The operations staff was not ready tomake concessions, as it indicated in a mes-sage to General Emmons, who (as on pre-vious occasions) had sent word of his heartyagreement with Admiral Nimitz' recom-mendations. 25 The staff (with General Mc-Narney's concurrence) advised Marshall toanswer Admiral King to the same effect.The staff advised standing pat on the de-cision to commit no additional ground forcesand making no specific commitment of ad-ditional air forces, since there were noneavailable for immediate deployment andsince the result of the London conferences

i 26 G l M h ll



try or Marine division from U. S. West Coastto South West Pacific. 23

Admiral King took this provision to meanthat he could expect the Army to commit atleast the additional bombers to the lineHawaii-Australia for which he and the Pa-cific commanders had so long been asking.

was as yet uncertain. 26 General Marshallwithheld action, and explained himself toGeneral Handy with the question: "In viewof the present So. Pacific situation is this thetime (or the manner) for replying to theNavy's paper?" 27




bomber group must go into the Pacific inAugust. Additional withdrawals will dependon the development of the situation there. 34

On 13 August Admiral King called Gen-

eral Marshall's attention to the two appeals,as yet unanswered, for reinforcements andagain stressed the need for additional airunits in Hawaii and the South Pacific. 35

The situation in the South Pacific had mean-while become extremely precarious, as aresult of naval losses (four cruisers) incurred

in a surprise engagement on 8 and 9 Augustoff Savo Island and the withdrawal ofAmerican naval support from the Solomonsarea. Marshall finally authorized the com-mitment of one heavy bomber group toHawaii, which was to be used to replace themobile air force in Hawaii and not to beused in the South Pacific General Arnold

Pacific from the Southwest Pacific, the staffonce again proposed that Marshall shouldhold fast to the policy of sending no addi-tional ground forces. Once again Marshall

withheld action.37

Meanwhile, during the two weeks ofMarshall's silence on the policy to beadopted with reference to deployment inthe Pacific, the War Department hadopened negotiations on the second phase(Task Two) of the projected offensive inthe South and Southwest Pacific, the phaseof operations against the east coast of NewGuinea, under the command of GeneralMacArthur. Following the Japanese land-ings in late July in the Buna-Gona region,Admiral King had asked the War Depart-ment to find out what MacArthur plannedto do in response 38 MacArthur replied to



used in the South Pacific. General Arnolddesignated for this purpose the 90th Bom-bardment Group (H). 36

In submitting an answer for AdmiralKing, to inform him of the commitment ofthe 90th Group to Hawaii and the authori-zation given to divert planes to the South

to do in response. MacArthur replied tothe War Department in a long message de-scribing the disposition of Japanese forces,assessing Japanese capabilities, and givinga detailed plan for countermoves and anultimate offensive against Rabaul. Herecommended the opening of this phase of


and Three he was building air bases on NewGuinea. One at Milne Bay was alreadyoccupied by fighter planes and defended bya garrison of about 5,000 men. He was

concentrating two American divisions (the41st and 32d ) at Rockhampton and Bris-bane to be trained and prepared for action.As a step toward initiating offensive opera-tions, he was sending the 7th AustralianDivision to New Guinea; a few troops wereto be sent as reinforcements to secure the

crest of the Owen Stanley Range. Thefactors limiting operations in New Guineawould be shipping and naval support tokeep open the lines of communication. 39

On 14 August General Marshall re-minded Admiral King of the original agree-ment to execute the three-phase plan ofoperations "without interruption" if the

went to MacArthur and Ghormley the fol-lowing day. 41

On 20 August Admiral King informedGeneral Marshall that the development

of the Solomons campaign would preventAdm iral Ghormley from releasing any forcesto participate in Task Two in the nearfuture, and he inclosed a request fromGhormley for reinforcements in the SouthPacific and a list of the forces that Harmon,with Ghormley's approval, had recom-

mended. He stated that it would be neces-sary to send both air and ground forces, asprovided in CCS 94.42

By that time it was no longer the un-certainty of future plans across the Atlanticbut the urgency of providing for the invasionof North Africa that limited the commit-ment of additional Army forces to the



operations without interruption if themeans were available, and suggested, on thebasis of MacArthur's message, that thereappeared to be means fo r beginning oper-ations against Lae, Salamaua, and thenortheast coast of New Guinea. Marshalltook note of the fact that Admiral Nimitz

ment of additional Army forces to thePacific. On 21 August General Arnoldstruck the new note by urging the needs ofTORCH as a reason fo r refusing to commitan y more air forces to the Pacific.43 Ad-miral Leahy concurred, advising Marshall:


ly [sic ] and MacArthur for additional groundtroops, partially trained if none better areavailable. 44

General Marshall acted on this advice.

He answered the request for more planes, asthe staff had earlier advised him to do,simply by transmitting to Admiral King astatement of the steps already taken—thecommitment of one additional group toHawaii and the authorization given for re-distributing planes in the South and South-

west Pacific.45

General Marshall at the same time askedGeneral Somervell to tell him what troop-ships would be leaving for the Pacific in thenear future, and the operations staff to seewhat changes might be made in shipments

in order to meet the requests of the Pacificd 46 I h li h f S ll'

aircraft regiment, the 43d Division, andsupporting troops—could be sent to theSouth Pacific in the latter part of Septem-ber and early October, on two conditions:(a ) that the Navy would release ships witha troop lift of about 13,000 (of a total trooplift for the period of about 20,000), an d(b ) that the War Department would post-pone scheduled shipments to MacArthurduring the period, except for headquarterstroops for I Corps, which the staff thoughtto be essential. Pending the arrival of thereinforcements, General Harmon wouldhave to go ahead on the presently pre-scribed basis of moving forward garrisonforces from the rear areas to consolidatenewly acquired positions and relieve Mar

rine units for future landing operations47



in order to meet the requests of the Pacificcommanders. 46 In the light of Somervell'sfindings and consultation with ArmyGround Forces, the operations staff con-cluded that about 20,000 men—an anti-

rine units for future landing operations.During the next week the War Departmentwent ahead on this basis to prepare for theshipment of the antiaircraft regiment, the43d Division, and supporting units. 48

Even the value of this concession, as Ad-miral Leahy had anticipated, was limited

44 Note, WDL [Leahy] to Marshall [22 Aug 42],

THE INTERPRETATION OF CGS 94 305

ferred to the east coast for use in the NorthAfrican landings. 49 There was nothing todo but send a division that had not beenfully trained, leaving the South Pacific com-

manders—and the division itself—to makethe best of the situation. 50

The Navy Department quickly fell inwith the proposed changes, accepting theconcession for what it was worth. 51 TheWar Department then informed GeneralMacArthur of the postponement of sched-uled shipments to his command. 52 At theend of August the Navy indicated thatthe overseas destination of the reinforce-

ments would be Auckland. 53 Early in Sep-tember, on receiving confirmation fromGeneral Harmon, the War Department is-sued the movement orders. 54

The concessions made by the War De-partment in August did not end the dis-agreement with the Navy Department andthe Pacific commands over the demandsthey advanced under CCS 94. Instead,the disagreement became more intense.The landings in the Solomons, as AdmiralKing had from the first expected, produceda strong Japanese reaction and a corre-spondingly urgent need fo r more Americanforces, particularly air forces. The reac-tion had already begun. By 21 Augustthe marines had eliminated the first eche-lon of a Japanese combat force (about900 men) that had landed on 18 August

49 For the substitution, see: (1) memo, Streettfor McNarney, 17 Aug 42, no sub, OPD 381 PTO,85; (2) memo, King for CofS, 18 Aug 42, sub:Third Army Div—Relief for, Item 67a, Exec 10;



900 men) that had landed on 18 August.A few days later (23-25 August) a navaltask force had turned back a second Japa-nese convoy (Battle of the Eastern Solo-

y , , ;and (3) memo, CofS for King, 21 Aug 42, sub:Relief of Third Div, OPD 370.5 WDC, 105.

50 The Army did undertake to give what trainingit could to the 43d Division. (1) Memo, CofSfor King, 24 Aug 42, sub cited n. 40, OPD 370.5PTO, 9. (2) Memos, OPD for AGF and SOS,10 and 14 Sep 42, sub: Change in Directive forTr Mvmts, OPD 370.5 PTO, 14.

53 (1) Msg (originator OPD), Marshall to Har-mon, 30 Aug 42, CM-OUT 9541 (R ). (2) On 4


mons) at the cost of damaging the Enter-prise, the one American carrier then inoperation in the Pacific. 55 Further andstronger Japanese action was a virtual cer-

tainty in the near future, posing demandsthat were sure to conflict with the demandsof TORCH, which had been enlarged bythe final agreement of the President and

the Prime Minister on 5 September to landforces in North Africa simultaneously atCasablanca, Oran, and Algiers.

55 For an account of the operations at Guadal-canal, see: (1) Miller, Guadalcanal, and (2) Mori-son, Struggle for Guadalcanal.



CHAPTER XIV

Counting the Costs of TORCHAugust-November 1942

The plan for Operation TORCH, as itfinally took shape after the compromise ofearly September 1942, left London someroom to hope for a quick victory in NorthAfrica, while providing Washington withsome assurance against the fear of a de-moralizing defeat. 1 The most likely resultof the compromise was a long, expensive

the three simultaneous landings. These in-creases did not, of course, measure the in-crease in the total cost of the operation,which the staffs could not even estimateuntil after the landings, when they could atlast decide what to expect, for the pur-poses of planning, from French authoritiesin North Africa, the German High Com-



of the compromise was a long, expensiveoperation. The plan adopted was unfa-vorable to the prospect not only of a short,cheap campaign in North Africa but alsoof a campaign of any kind in Europe in1943. A long campaign in North Africa

in Africa, gmand, and the Spanish Government. Ifthere should be serious initial opposition onthe part of the French forces in NorthAfrica, if there should be a strong Germanreaction in Tunisia followed by the move-



COUNTING THE COSTS OF TORCH 309

amended and approved by the CCS on 13August, the new order of priority read:

1. TORCH—(To take precedence over othershipping in the Atlantic while being

mounted) .Middle EastPacific OceanRussian supplies shipped by way of thesouthern route.

2. U. S. Army Air Forces to the U. K. andto China.

3. Relief of Iceland.

4. BOLERO5. India and ChinaNOTE.—If supplies are to be sent to Rus-

sia via the northern route, priority 6 is recom-mended. 6

The fulfilment of the requirements ofTORCH had a direct bearing on the execu-

tion of the rest of the program of shippingU S Air Forces units and missions person-

later turned ou t , the schedule as then ap-proved for Middle East shipments left toolittle leeway fo r TORCH requirements. 8

However, as King pointed out at the time

of the decision, the CCS must then reserveships for sending units to the Middle Eastin order to retain the option of sendingthem.9

The withdrawal of shipping and navalescort from the sea lanes in time to mountTORCH was certain to call into question

other important commitments of the UnitedStates and United Kingdom. A strikingexample was the interruption of the convoysthat went by the northern route to the SovietUnion. How long to continue sending theseconvoys depended on what date would beset for TORCH. On 12 September, whenthe mid-September convoy had sailed and



p g pp gU. S. Air Forces units and missions personnel to the Middle East and India. Takinginto account the primary needs of TORCH,the CCS on 13 August approved the recom-mendation of a committee o f British-Ameri-can transportation experts that the rest of

pthe next was half loaded, the question asformulated in London was how likely it wasthat TORCH might be postponed beyond 8November 1942. If that were likely, itmight be desirable to run at least one convoy,accepting the postponement of TORCH until


twelve ships had been lost.11 When themid-September convoy was run, thirteen outof forty ships had been sunk, even thoughthere had been an escorting group of

seventy-seven ships of various types protect-ing the convoy. The Prime Minister at-tached so much importance to the continua-tion of the northern route convoys that eventhen he considered proposing that TORCHbe put off long enough to allow for onemore convoy. 12 The Prime Minister ended

by proposing instead to inform Stalin that,though large-scale convoys like that of mid-September would be impossible for the restof the year, he and the President were look-ing for some way to keep on sending suppliesby the northern route on a smaller scale.At the same time he brought up again thepossibility of operations in northern Nor-

Th f i ld b

for the time being, about operations innorthern Norway. Shipments were reducedto the movement of unescorted merchant-men, one at a time, from Reykjavik, to the

Russian White Sea ports. In mid-Decem-ber, convoying began again on a smallerscale.15

Pacific requirements were not so read-ily reduced. To the continued heavy de-mands of the Pacific bases were added,during the TORCH period, the requirements

for sustaining the Solomons operation inthe South Pacific. 16 The Solomons opera-tion was in direct competition with TORCHfor combat loaders. 17 And the needs fo rnaval support of TORCH, as finally planned,were so great that it was out of the ques-tion to transfer from the Atlantic to thePacific any U. S. Navy units to help meeth l i h l Th



way. The chief strategic purpose would beto secure the northern route to Archangeland Murmansk. And to open staff conver-sations with the Soviet military staff on thoseoperations, he believed, might in the mean-time help offset the effect on the Soviet

the critical situation in the Solomons. Thesituation was so tight that it was not untilearly September, when the President and

Leahy's memorandum. (Papers 56 and 58, ABC381 (7-25-42), 4-B.)

15


the Prime Minister were about to agree ona compromise version of TORCH, that theNavy finally furnished a definite list ofU. S. naval vessels available fo r TORCH.18

According to that list, the most that theNavy could spare for the North Africanventure was one modern battleship, twoold battleships, one aircraft carrier, two con-verted aircraft carriers, two 8-inch cruisers,three large 6-inch cruisers, forty destroyers,and six fast minesweepers.

The most dangerous weakness in bothoceans, as Admiral Turner had feared, wasthe want of aircraft carriers. By October1942 four of the seven carriers with whichthe United States had entered the war hadbeen sunk in the Pacific—the Lexington,the Yorktown, the Wasp, and the Hornet.

19

The latter two carriers were lost duringthe contest for Guadalcanal 20 In addition

The new urgent demands for shippingand escort affected other claims on shippingand escort, lower on the list of strategicpriorities, until the success of operations in

North Africa and the Solomons was assured.It was necessary once more to put off thelong-planned relief of the British troops thatremained in Iceland. 21 The movement ofservice troops to Iran had also to wait ondevelopments in North Africa, in spite ofthe desire of the President and the Prime

Minister to accelerate the movement ofSoviet lend-lease traffic through the con-gested Persian Gulf ports to northern Iran. 22

The want of ships and naval escort fur-nished the War Department strong groundsfor pleading once again that the UnitedStates could not give substantial military

support to China, much less satisfy ChiangKai shek's "three demands" of 28 June



the contest for Guadalcanal. In addition,the Saratoga and Enterprise had been dam-aged by the Japanese during the navalbattles for Guadalcanal. In November thePacific Fleet was down to its last activeaircraft carrier, the Enterprise, and even that

Kai-shek s three demands of 28 June1942. These three demands representedChiang's summary of requirements in termsof ground and air forces, and lend-lease ton-nage for the maintenance of the Chinatheater—three American divisions, 500


fronts and demands for men and particularlymaterials and ship tonnage are now beyondour present capacity. 24

Similar restrictions also had a direct bear-

ing on postponing operations for ejectingthe Japanese from the Aleutians. At a timewhen all available means were being usedeither to mount TORCH or to bolster the pre-carious position in the southwestern Pacific,the United States could not afford to beginoperations in what was, by common con-

sent, an indecisive theater. During Octo-ber and November 1942, General Marshallrepeatedly refused General DeWitt permis-sion to assemble forces for an operation inthe Aleutians. The Army and Navy agreedthat neither the shipping nor the troopscould be made available. 25

The search for escorts for TORCH focusedthe attention of U S Army planners and

for producing landing craft under the BO-LERO plan had delayed the completion ofaircraft carriers and superseded the con-struction of escort vessels. It seemed clear

that U. S. naval construction should beshifted back from landing craft to escortvessels. 27 In early October the CCS ap-proved allocations of American productionof landing craft to cover the revised opera-tional needs for the rest of 1942.28 Beforethe close of 1942 the JCS took measures

to secure a review of the whole Allied ship-building program, and an increase in theproduction of escort vessels and merchantshipping. 29

These actions at the end of 1942 consti-tuted an acknowledgment that the effectsof TORCH on the Allied shipping situation

would be prolonged far into 1943. Alliedoperations in North Africa at first severely



the attention of U. S. Army planners andthe military chiefs on Allied programs ofshipbuilding and ship allocation, whichneeded to be reviewed in the light of thenew plans and the heavy toll of Allied ship-ping still being taken by German sub-

26

operations in North Africa, at first severelylimited by existing port and overland trans-port capacity, and still limited by the sizeand frequency of the convoys that the Brit-ish and American naval commands wouldrun with the available escorts, could not


as yet be sustained on a big enough scale toovercome the large forces the Germans weremoving into Tunisia. In North Africa, as inthe Solomons, the issue became a test of the

willingness and ability of both sides to meetthe demands of air operations fo r whichneither side was well prepared—to maintainthe flow of their own supplies and reinforce-ments and to interdict the flow of enemysupplies and reinforcements to the front.The effects of haste and waste, the rate of

attrition, and the scale and duration of theeffort in North Africa depended largely onthe willingness of the German High Com-mand to invest in the continued defense ofa position that must sooner or later be aban-doned. It was, therefore, impossible tocalculate with any certainty just how seriousthe limiting effect of TORCH on Allied ship-ping schedules might be But it was evi-

be the precise composition of assault andfollow-up forces. The original decisionthat only American troops should be used inthe assaults soon had to be changed. Only

ten regimental combat teams, two armoredcombat commands, and a Ranger battalionwere available. 31 Few of these troops,moreover, had received the necessary am-phibious training. In setting aside groundforces in the United States for TORCH andin allocating the necessary priorities, Army

planners in the United States calculated inthe summer of 1942 on a basis of seven di-visions from the United States. 32 In onecombination or another, these almost al-ways included the 3d, 9th, 36th, and 45thInfantry Divisions, 2d and 3d Armored Di-visions, and the 4th Motorized Division, inaddition to the 1st and 34th Infantry and1st U S Armored Divisions in the United



ping schedules might be. But it was evi-dent that the demands of TORCH and thelosses incurred would bear heavily on Alliedshipping schedules. The War Departmentplanners concluded that in any event, unlesscurrent commitments were altered or can-

1st U. S. Armored Divisions in the UnitedKingdom. Accepted political strategy andlogistical considerations required that theUnited States furnish as large a part as pos-sible of the total expeditionary force. Amore definitive determination of the total


from the United States and United King-dom continued to plague the planners al-most to the eve of the actual launchingof the operation. Combat-loading troop

transports were to be available in time forthe operation—at the immediate expenseof troop shipments to the United King-dom—but there was all too little time totrain and rehearse crews to handle the de-barkation of men and equipment and theassault troops themselves. 34 The need for

such training affected not only the dateof launching the operation but also thechoice of troops, for it required the usein TORCH of all available Army troopsthat had had any training in landingoperations. 35

Informal agreement had been reachedon 18 July between War and Navy De-partment representatives on "amphibious"

prospective time available. 38 After theshift to TORCH, the need for training am -phibian brigades continued to exist—andwith time pressing more heavily on Army

authorities than ever. Though the Army-Navy understanding of 18 July was neverformally approved by the JCS, it continuedto serve as if it had been, so far as prepara-tions for TORCH were concerned. 39

Even before the terms of the agreementwere presented formally to the JCS in early

August, three amphibian brigades had beenactivated and were in training. One ofthese brigades, with a strength of about7,000, was set up to load, man, and unloadassault craft for an entire division. As aresult of the TORCH decision, however, theArmy postponed the organization of two

additional brigades that it had scheduledfor activation in August 40



partment representatives on amphibioustraining and organization. 36 This arrange-ment provided for training three Army engi-neer amphibian brigades and an amphib-ious corps of two or more Army divisions. 37

The original reason for the Army's under-

for activation in August.

38 Memo, King for Marshall, 5 Feb 43, sub: ArmyEngr Amph Boat Crews, with JCS 81/1 in ABC320.2 Amph Forces (3-13-42), 1.

39 The agreement of 18 July 1942 had been signedby General Handy and Admiral Cooke, with the


The training of Army divisions for assaultlandings—which was also subject to disputewith the Navy—was thrown into evengreater confusion by TORCH, confusion ag-

gravated by the uncertainty that existedduring August over the composition ofTORCH forces, and especially over the com-position of the assault forces that were to sailfrom the United States. As Handy observedon 7 August, the assault force from theUnited States must consist either of two in-

fantry divisions or of one infantry divisionand one armored division. 41 These pos-sibilities affecting the disposition of the 3dand 9th Infantry Divisions raised a numberof corollary questions for the Army planners.If only one of these divisions were used inthe assault landings, which one would be

chosen? Should the other be used in thefollow-up for TORCH or be dispatched to

certainty of the composition of the assaultforce from the United States, militaryauthorities moved quickly to set up the At-lantic Amphibious Corps (Maj . Gen. Jona-

than W. Anderson, commanding) with the3d and 9th Divisions and the 2d ArmoredDivision. 44

There was no unity of command inTORCH until the expedition set sail fromthe United States. For training, the At-lantic Amphibious Corps, designed as

part of Patton's task force fo r TORCH, cameunder the general supervision of AdmiralHewitt, Commander Amphibious ForceAtlantic Fleet. Army and Navy author-ities tried in the summer of 1942 tostraighten out the lines of command forthat corps—a test case in joint Army-Navy

planning and training.45

The temporaryarrangements adopted for amphibious



follow up for TORCH or be dispatched tomeet commitments to the Pacific? 42 Facedwith the necessity of speeding amphibioustraining for the assault forces for TORCH,the Army planners in early August dis-regarded, for the moment at least, possible

arrangements adopted for amphibioustraining and organization in preparationfor TORCH by no means settled, but ratherdrew attention to, the jurisdictional prob-lems that would have to be resolved iftraining for assault landings was to keep


Kingdom. It was better trained than the34th Division, stationed in Northern Ire-land, and was, therefore, th e choice fo rleading the assault force. In mid-August,

however, a ship carrying nearly all its medi-um and about a third of its light artilleryweapons together with other equipmentwent aground off Halifax on the voyagefrom the United States to the United King-dom. Eisenhower was at that time plan-ning on an early or mid-October date for

launching TORCH. This mishap requiredhim to train assault troops from the 34thDivision instead of from the 1st.46 InWashington the Army planners speedily setin motion War Department machinery tosend to the New York Port of Embarkationweapons to replace those carried in the shipwhich had run aground. 47 Even so, theschedule left so little leeway that Eisenhower

upon the agreement of the President andthe Prime Minister on 5 September. 49

Equipping and training armored forcesintroduced further problems of urgency and

difficulty for the Army planners. In earlyAugust planning for TORCH generally beganto assume that the assault force for Casa-blanca would probably be one armored di-vision and one infantry division instead oftwo infantry divisions, even though thischange would require additional combat-

loading vessels.50

Besides the probable useof the armored division for the assault, allplans called for another armored divisionfrom the United States. In order to pro-vide another trained armored division be-sides the 2d then receiving amphibious train-ing, the 3d Armored Division was trans-ferred from Camp Polk, Louisiana, to theDesert Training Center, California, for



schedule left so little leeway that Eisenhowerwas unwilling to commit himself to using the1st Division though he ordered it held readyto be trained in the event the invasion wasput off until November. 48 Late in August,when it became clear that the operation

Desert Training Center, California, fortraining and maneuvers. On 2 Septemberit was designated for General Patton's TaskForce "A." After completing maneuversin mid-October 1942, it was transferred on24 October to Camp Pickett, Virginia, for


movements to which the Chief of Staff inthe fall of 1942 called the attention of hisstaff. Though he conceded that suddendemands, state of training, and deficiencies

in equipment had forced such moves in thepast, he believed that there were more ofthem than necessary. 52 The Army plannersexplained the shuttling of the 3d ArmoredDivision on the grounds that no similar unitnear the east coast had had desert training. 53

The two other large-scale transcontinental

movements noted by the Chief of Staff werealso related by the Army planners to the un-certainty over TORCH. Both the 43d andthe 29th Divisions, involved in these shifts,had been moved to new stations in the un-certain period before the final determinationof requirements for TORCH. The tentative

allocation of seven divisions to TORCH leftvery few divisions available in the United

ficiency. 55 Efforts to meet Eisenhower'sneeds for service troops, he added, had re-sulted "almost in the emasculation" of re-maining American units. 56 The reserves of

the Army were drained for TORCH. To thedemands of TORCH on units in the UnitedStates were added the heavy demands onAmerican strength in the British Isles—the1st and 34th Infantry Divisions, the 1stArmored Division, and the 1st Ranger Bat-talion, with supporting troops transferred to

North Africa in the fall of 1942 for servicewith II Corps. 57

Of course, with the heavy demands fortroops went correspondingly heavy demandsfor equipment. According to the calcula-tions by Army planners on 2 August, twoinfantry and two armored divisions in the

United States would be equipped on orabout 10 October, and three additional divi-



yStates for other uses.54

The build-up for TORCH drew heavilyon U. S. ground and supporting units in theUnited States and in the United Kingdom.As Marshall pointed out at the close of

,sions (one motorized) could be equippedlater in the fall. 58 In effect, the only divi-sions in the United States that would befully equipped before the close of 1942 weredivisions that had to be ready for TORCH.


States and available for shipment to othertheaters were stripped of equipment. 59 Theextent of that depletion led Marshall to ob-serve in the fall of 1942 that in mounting

TORCH the War Department had "scalped"units in the United States for equipment. 60

The demands of TORCH also cut deeply intothe American supplies and equipment thathad been accumulated in the British Isles,and were due to limit accumulation duringth e next few months. 61

Provision of Air Units

It was evident from the beginning thatmost of the American air units for opera-tions in North Africa, like most of theground and service troops, would have tocome from resources previously allotted forh j d j Ch l

out on any other basis. 62 The rest of theTORCH air force would come from th eUnited States, from units scheduled to goto the United Kingdom and to the Middle

East.In early August Army planners estimatedthat withdrawals fo r TORCH would leavevery little air strength in the United Statesfor other uses in 1942. 63 Activation of newunits in the United States would have to bedeferred to provide replacements for losses

in TORCH.64

All that could be shipped toEngland during the rest of 1942, over andabove TORCH requirements, would be fivebomber groups in September and six troopcarrier groups from August through Octo-ber. Of the fifteen groups to be divertedfrom BOLERO to the Pacific (under CCS

94), the first would not become availabletill December.



the projected major cross-Channel opera-tion. CCS 94 expressly provided that allAmerican heavy and medium air units inthe United Kingdom would be availablefor TORCH. It had soon thereafter been

The TORCH air force, as projected in mid-August, was to consist of two heavy bombergroups, three medium bomber groups, onelight bomber group, four fighter (two P-38and two Spitfire) groups, and one troop


bombing, held the main AAF resources aswell as the most highly trained men avail-able for service in Africa.66 The Eighth A irForce was charged with the organization,

planning, and training of the new air forcefor North Africa. The Eighth was also tocontribute its heavy bombers, and on anorder from Eisenhower on 8 September ithad to discontinue operations from the Brit-ish Isles, notwithstanding the protests of theArmy Air Forces. 67 Except fo r heavy

bomber units, most of the commands of theTORCH air force (the Twelfth) were acti-vated in the United States from units previ-ously designated for the Middle East. 68

These had to be hurriedly prepared andsent to England in time to be indoctrinatedand assimilated, a task hard in itself and

made harder by bad weather in the NorthAtlantic, which played havoc with the69

lotted to Torch and the number is believedto be insufficient. No other fighter planescan make the long initial flights requiredacross the Atlantic or from U. K. to CasaBlanca [sic ] and Oran but the P-38 type.

If we withdraw these planes we, in effect,impose a drastic change, if not the abandon-ment of Torch. 70

The shortage of fighter planes was so seriousthat it could not be met by using all Ameri-can units in the United Kingdom togetherwith those in the United States available

for BOLERO. American planning for aTORCH air force—pushed by Patton an dDoolittle—proposed, therefore, using P-39'sin England in transit to the Soviet Unionand the 33d Pursuit Group (P-40's) whichwas in the United States and awaiting ship-ment to the Middle East. 71 The release to

TORCH of the P-39's en route to the SovietUnion was arranged by Eisenhower with



ferrying of medium and light bombers. 69

The most pressing and serious problemin allocation of air units for TORCH was ashortage of fighters and observation planes,particularly long-range models. General

the Prime Minister. The United Statesundertook to replace them via Alaska assoon as practicable. 72

The release to TORCH of the 33d PursuitGroup was less readily arranged. On 8


was mixed, because of a rather general be-lief that Allied air superiority in the MiddleEast would help assure the success ofTORCH.74 But the JCS agreed to recom-

mend the War Department proposal to theCCS and at the same time authorized Gen-eral Arnold to seek the informal concur-rence of the British Chiefs of Staff.75 Ar-nold thereupon wrote to Air MarshalDouglas C. S. Evill of the British Joint StaffMission for his concurrence. Evill did not

concur, in view of the need for fighterplanes for the Middle East. 76 In order toresolve the problem the CCS agreed on 18September to refer it to Eisenhower for hisviews. 77 Following a discussion with Doo-little, commander of the Twelfth Air Forcefor North Africa, Eisenhower agreed that

the 33d Pursuit Group should be divertedto TORCH as proposed, but he also recog-d d l

East had been given a priority in shippingsecond only to TORCH itself, the limited Al-lied resources available in the summer andfall of 1942 left little leeway beyond the ful-

filment of requirements of the number onepriority, TORCH.In meeting the claims of TORCH the Army

also left unsatisfied the Navy's continueddemands for substantial air reinforcementsfor the Pacific. In August 1942 th e prob-lems of immediate and eventual air rein-

forcements for the Pacific were merged withthe question of TORCH requirements. SinceAugust General Marshall had concededthat one group of heavy bombers should goto Hawaii and had relaxed restrictions onthe use in the South Pacific of bombersassigned both to Hawaii and to Australia. 79

But there remained as a source of disagree-ment between the services the broader ques-



nized the need for sending fighter planes asreinforcements to the Middle East and thebearing on TORCH of air superiority in theMiddle East. The British Chiefs of Staff,concurring, called attention to Ei senhower's

78

tion of priorities to govern the assignmentof the remainder of the fifteen groups sched-uled for withdrawal from BOLERO as theybecame available in succeeding months.Army planners—in accord with AAF


TORCH and the Middle East should hold toppriorities, countered that diversions to thePacific should precede further deploymentto the United Kingdom (BOLERO).

The decision to invade North Africa wasnot at all hard to reconcile with the greataim of the Army Air Forces—strategicbombing against Germany. Through theuse of alternate air bases in the Mediter-ranean to complement long-range strikesfrom the United Kingdom, the Air staff

hoped to minimize the effects of the changein plans. A difference of opinion arosewith the Navy over the relations of thestrategic air offensive to ground operationsin Europe. The Navy held that the pro-jected bomber offensive from the UnitedKingdom could not be considered apartfrom a European invasion and that TORCHhad postponed the one as well as the other,

i i l

of Eisenhower, Patton, Clark, and Spaatzto support his argument. King continuedto maintain, as in August, that the CCS hadreleased the fifteen groups fo r deployment

to the Pacific, and that the situation theredemanded they be sent. 83 Arnold repliedthat the decision to launch TORCH had notaltered the Allied strategy of concentratingagainst Germany, and that TORCH—in con-junction with the development of strategicbomber offensive—promised the most de-

cisive results of any pending Allied opera-tion. He held that the withdrawal of anyof the fifteen groups would preclude thesuccess of the operation. 84 Marshall andLeahy held to a middle-of-the-road policy:TORCH and the Middle East were to takeprecedence, and the allocation of new units

would be decided as they became avail-able.85 Marshall added (as he had earlierld Ei h ) h h d d h i



thereby permitting the release of aircraftfor use in the Pacific and elsewhere. TheAir staff argued strongly that strategic bom-bardment, as originally conceived and as itmust still be conceived, was a separate of-

told Eisenhower) that he regarded the mainpurpose for the American proposal to with-draw the fifteen groups from BOLERO as thetransfer of jurisdiction over their final as-signment back to the JCS.88 Further dis-


an agreement reached by the end of Octo-ber 1942 that the uncommitted balance ofthe fifteen groups withdrawn from BOLEROwas to form a part of a general United

States strategic air reserve precisely as Mar-shall had intended. 87 Claims on air unitsfor operations against Japan would, as be-fore, be weighed against claims for opera-tions across the Atlantic. In effect, GeneralMarshall had regained some of the freedomof action he had lost in the spring by pro-

posing to give absolute priority to the con-centration of American forces in the BritishIsles.

Effects on Plans for a Cross-ChannelOperation

The War Department Thesis

Th great i iti l ithd l f BOLERO

staff restated this view. They believed itprobable that TORCH would not merely de-lay ROUNDUP but would be, in effect, a sub-stitution for that undertaking in 1943.88

They were quite certain that in any eventthe movement of troops to the British Isleswould be considerably reduced for at leastfour months after the assembly of shippingand escorts for the assault landings forTORCH began. And, in Marshall's opinion,the invasion of French North Africa, under-

taken with due allowance for the uncertain-ties involved and with a determination tosee it through to a successful conclusion,would preclude the "offensive" operations"directly" against Germany contemplatedin the original document on "American-British Grand Strategy," dating from the

ARCADIA Conference.89



The great initial withdrawals of BOLEROunits for TORCH, the related withdrawal ofBOLERO a ir units for future disposal, the im-probability that the American version ofTORCH would allow of a quick victory and

Slowdown of Bolero

By the late summer of 1942 the War De-partment had a fairly well-defined idea whatrevisions must be made in the BOLERO troop


gency action on the Continent. Toward theclose of the summer the Chief of Staff ac-cepted the Army planners' proposal for abalanced ground force of 150,000 U. S.troops in the United Kingdom. 90 They hadpointed out to him, on 27 August, that thechange in strategic policy from BOLERO toTORCH had by that time resulted in stoppingthe movement of major ground force ele-ments to the United Kingdom. 91 A greatnumber of supporting combat and service

troops had been prepared for movement tothe United Kingdom on the basis of theBOLERO requirement of an over-all force ofabout one million men by April 1943. Thecontinuation of shipments of these troopswould not only result, his staff planners ob-served, in stripping the United States of such

troops but would also lead to an unbalancedground force in the European theater. Theyh f ll d f b l d d f

United States a total force of about 305,000in the United Kingdom by 1 April 1943.By 30 September 1942 the Army wouldhave 160,000 troops in the United King-dom or en route, over and above the forcesrequired for TORCH. In order to bring theforce in the United Kingdom up to the totalstrength of 305,000 by 1 April 1943, itwould be necessary to ship 145,000 troopsthere. The use of the fast-sailing and un-escorted Queens on the North Atlantic run

appeared to be the most practicable meansof expediting these shipments without inter-fering with TORCH.

In early November 1942 the War De-partment tentatively approved, for plan-ning purposes, a new reduced strength forAmerican forces in the United Kingdom set

at approximately 427,000.93

This figurerepresented an increase of over 100,000b th igi l ti t f th l t



therefore called for a balanced ground force,similar to the one envisaged early in thewar—for the purpose of relief or defense—under th e MAGNET (Northern Ireland)plan.

above the original estimates of the latesummer. Shortly thereafter— on 12 No-vember—in submitting his revised estimatesfor the European theater to General Mar-shall, Maj. Gen. Russell P. Hartle, Deputy


force troops would be needed to reach anestimated total of approximately 159,000.In an accompanying note General Spaatz,the commanding general of the Eighth Air

Force, stated

that combat

units of the

Eighth Air Force that would remain in theUnited Kingdom after the departure ofthe Twelfth Air Force would be seven heavybomber groups, one single-engine fightergroup, and one observation group. Addi-tional combat units scheduled for the United

Kingdom in November and December in-cluded one medium bomber group, onetwin-engine fighter group, and one troopcarrier group. General Spaatz pointed outthat the Twelfth Air Force had priority inthe European theater. The .only readysource from which replacements for the

Twelfth could be drawn was the EighthAir Force, which was also actively en-gaged The process of withdrawing air

their advisers that air operations againstGermany should be resumed and intensi-fied during the North African campaign.

Even on this reduced scale, the schedulesfor the BOLERO movements could not bemet with the trained and equipped groundcombat units and cargo shipping thenavailable. In the latter part of OctoberArmy planners estimated that the troop liftof the four remaining convoys to the UnitedKingdom for the balance of 1942 would

be only 4,000, 3,300, 8,000, and 8,000,hese figures representing the maximumwhich cargo shipping could support. 95 Inearly December the Chief of Staff calledthe attention of the President to the factthat the monthly flow of United Statestroops to the United Kingdom was then

only 8,500.96

Troops were moving evenmore slowly than the Army had wished orexpected



gaged. The process of withdrawing air-craft and combat crews from the operat-ing organization of the Eighth Air Force,he observed, had already begun. Unlesssteps were taken to counteract this trend,

expected.The Army planners had not given up the

idea that the United States and Great Brit-ain must save their strength to engage anddefeat the German Army in northwestern

97


thetical break in German military powerappeared neither possible nor desirable, par-ticularly in the light of other and more im-mediate demands. If the British remained

unwilling to agree to a cross-Channel of-fensive until German military power wasbroken, there remained the "Pacific Alter-native," and the Army planners once againargued for its adoption in that event.Clarification of the subsequent lines ofstrategic action in the European theater for

1943 for the ultimate defeat of Germanywould have to await the outcome of currentoperations and basic decisions of top Alliedpolitical leaders. Meanwhile, the War De-partment staff strove to keep alive the ideathat it would finally prove necessary toundertake a very large cross-Channel oper-

ation against a still formidable GermanArmy, while the Air staff further exploredthe idea that in any event a great air of

The arguments and considerations that youadvanced time and again between last Janu-ary and July 24th apparently made little im-pression upon the Former Naval Person atthat time, since he expresses himself now as

very much astonished to find out that TORCHpractically eliminates any opportunity for a1943 Roundup.The Prime Minister could no longer simplyassume, Eisenhower pointed out, thatTORCH could be reconciled with Sovietexpectations of a second front and of ma-

terial aid:Although the memorandum prepared by

the Combined Chiefs of Staff, when you werehere, and later approved by both govern-ments, definitely states that the mounting ofTORCH would in all probability have to be asubstitute for 1943 ROUNDUP., while the sev-eral memoranda you presented called atten-tion to the effects of TORCH upon the pos-sibilities of convoying materials to Russia andelsewhere, these matters have now to be met



the idea that in any event a great air of-fensive over the European Continent—from bases both in the British Isles and inthe Mediterranean—should have the firstclaim on American air forces.

elsewhere, these matters have now to be metface to face, and with an obviously disturbingeffect upon the Former Naval Person.The Prime Minister was still quite unwillingto acknowledge that TORCH would strain


an d other American officers had left himmuch troubled on that score, saying "Igained the impression at the conference thatRoundup was not only delayed or impingedupon by Torch but was to be regarded asdefinitely off for 1943. This will be anothertremendous blow for Stalin. Already Mai-sky [Soviet ambassador to Great Britain] isasking questions about the spring offensive."The Prime Minister ended his message bysaying, "To sum up, my persisting anxiety

is Russia, and I do not see how we can recon-cile it with our consciences or with our inter-ests to have no more P Q's [northern routeconvoys to Russia] till 1943, no offer tomake joint plans for Jupiter, and no signsof a spring, summer, or even autumn of-fensive in Europe." 100

The Prime Minister's discomfort overthe probable elimination of ROUNDUP as apossibility—not necessarily to be realized—

Isles by 1 April 1943. He took the reduc-tion to indicate that the United States hadgiven up planning for an invasion in 1943.To abandon ROUNDUP, he declared, wouldbe "a most grievous decision." He pointedout that TORCH was no substitute forROUNDUP and only employed thirteendivisions against the forty-eight projectedfor ROUNDUP.102 He reported that althoughhis previous talks with Stalin had been basedon a postponed ROUNDUP he had never sug-

gested that a second front should not beattempted in 1943 or 1944. One of thearguments he himself had used againstSLEDGEHAMMER, the Prime Minister added,was that it would eat up in 1942 the "seedcorn" needed for a much larger operationin 1943. Only by building up a ROUNDUP

force in the United Kingdom as rapidly asother urgent demands on shipping permit-ted could the troops and means be gathered



possibility not necessarily to be realizedfor 1943 was all the greater when helearned, in the fall of 1942, of the WarDepartment's definite plans for scaling downthe BOLERO preparations in the United

ted could the troops and means be gatheredto come to grips with the main strength ofthe European enemy nations. The PrimeMinister conceded that, despite all efforts,the combined British-American strength


dom in line with the revised estimates in theanticipated troop build-up. 103 He pointedout that, as had been agreed during the Julyconference in London, TORCH commit-ments made ROUNDUP improbable in 1943and necessitated revision of BOLERO esti-mates based on the temporarily reducedtroop lift. Other operations that the PrimeMinister was urging could only be mountedat the expense of TORCH and would havethe same effect. He reassured the Prime

Minister that none of these considerations,however, implied any change in the Ameri-can conception of the BOLERO-ROUNDUPplan.

This was not the kind of assurance thePrime Minister needed. The Prime Minis-ter wanted to continue operations in the

Mediterranean, after gaining control of thecoast of North Africa, with an operationagainst Sardinia (BRIMSTONE) 10 4 Ameri-

Such a reassurance he soon received fromthe President. 105 The President remindedhim that the mounting of TORCH postponednecessarily the assembling of forces in theBritish Isles. The North African operationsmust continue to take precedence, againstthe possibility of adverse situations develop-ing in Spanish Morocco or in Tunisia. TheUnited States, the President added, wasmuch more heavily engaged in the South-west Pacific than he had anticipated a few

months previously; nevertheless, a strikingforce should be built up in the United King-dom as rapidly as possible for immediateaction in the event of German collapse. Alarger force for later use should be built upin the event that Germany remained intactand assumed the defensive. Determination

of the strength to be applied to BOLERO in1944 was a problem, the President observed,requiring "our joint strategic considera-



against Sardinia (BRIMSTONE). American officers had therefore some reason to goon discounting the Prime Minister's asser-tions about ROUNDUP. They knew that hewas anxious lest American forces be com-

requiring our joint strategic considerations." The Prime Minister accepted theAmerican explanations and wired the Presi-dent that he was completely reassured. 106

The idea of a cross-Channel operation in

CHAPTER XV

British and American Plans andSoviet Expectations

The American and the British Govern-ments had been aware in the early summerof 1942 that a decision to invade NorthAfrica might complicate relations with theSoviet Union. As the British Chiefs ofStaff had noted on 2 July, in recommendingthat S L E D G E H A MME R should not be mount-ed, the Soviet Government would soon be-

come aware that preparations were notproceeding according to the tentative dec-laration given to Mr. Molotov in May.1

quite probably would have an adverse effecton Russian decisions. 3

Churchill undertook to go to Moscow tobreak the news to Stalin—"a somewhat rawjob," as he expressed it to President Roose-velt.4 Churchill has since recorded that,though he felt his mission was "like carryinga large lump of ice to the North Pole," still

it was better "to have it all out face to facewith Stalin, rather than trust to telegramsand intermediaries." 5 Churchill arrived in



Pending the result of further Anglo-Ameri-can negotiations, there was nothing definiteto tell the Soviet Government. On 8 Julythe Prime Minister, in notifying Sir John

Moscow in mid-August—at a critical mo-ment in the Battle of Stalingrad. TheUnited States was represented at the con-ference by Mr. W. Averell Harriman, and,

PLANS AND SOVIET EXPECTATIONS 329

front." 7 Stalin of course drew attentionto the failure of the United States and GreatBritain to deliver the supplies that had beenpromised to the Soviet Union and to con-tinue the preparations for a second f ront asdescribed to Molotov in May and as antici-pated in the Anglo-Soviet communique of12 June 1942. He spoke of the great sac-rifices being made by the USSR to hold280 German divisions on the Eastern Front.It did not seem to him too difficult for the

British and Americans to land six or eightdivisions on the Cotentin peninsula in 1942.Stalin made the same point that Molotovhad made in May—nobody could be surewhether conditions would be as favorablefor opening a second f ront in Europe in1943 as they were in 1942. In the discus-

sions on TORCH Stalin wavered betweenexpressions of interest and lack of interest.At the conclusion of the conference, he

During his recent visit to an Allied Capitalhe [the Prime Minister] explained the rea-sons for his rejection of Sledgehammer, butapparently without completely convincing hishearer of the military soundness of his views.He then outlined Torch to his hearer as itwas understood when you were here andawakened great interest in this proposition.Before the former Naval person terminatedhis visit to that Capital he was told "MayGod prosper that operation." 8

On 30 August the War Department alsoreceived from General Bradley a delayed

account of the staff conversations that hadaccompanied the conference. 9 Bradley re-ported on a meeting of 15 August, whichhe and Maxwell had attended, betweenBritish Field Marshals Brooke and Wavelland Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur W. Ted-der and Soviet Marshals Kliment E. Voro-shilov and Boris M. Shaposhnikov. TheAmericans had taken little part in the dis-cussionsat this meeting The Sovietofficers



seemed reconciled to the operation.Late in the month of August abbreviated

accounts of the conference were sent directlyto the War Department from Army repre-

cussions at this meeting. The Soviet officershad urged opening the second front in Eu-rope at once, if only with the available sixBritish divisions and using the Channel Is-lands as a base. After two hours argument,


efforts of all three nations to do so. Onemeans of doing so would be to establishdirect military relations with the SovietUnion in the field, in an area in which theSoviet forces were adjacent—the MiddleEast—by committing small British andAmerican forces to the direct support ofSoviet forces in the Caucasus.

A proposal to send a British-Americanair force to the Caucasus was introduced bythe Prime Minister into his conversations

with Stalin of mid-August.10

He suggestedtransferring air forces from Egypt to theBaku-Batumi area. His offer was contin-gent on the success of operations in theLibyan Desert. Stalin did not reject thisproposal, but nothing was settled at thetime, beyond an agreement in principle that

once a definite offer had been made andaccepted, British air representatives shouldgo at once to Moscow and thence to the

well prove to be greater than the need forthem in the Caucasus. Weather conditions,moreover, would seriously interfere withCaucasus operations up to 1 April. Thestaff pointed out also that to support oper-ations in the Caucasus would reduce thevolume of lend-lease aid sent to the SovietUnion via the Persian Gulf. The staff,therefore, concluded that no American airforce should be sent to the Caucasus in 1942,but that the possibility suggested by the

President should be kept under study duringthe rest of the year, on the assumption thatBritish participation would be essential.Marshall forwarded these conclusions to thePresident on 26 August 1942. 12

On 30 August the War Departmentlearned something about the British pro-

posal from General Bradley's delayed re-port of the staff conversations that accom-panied the mid-August conference in Mos-



Caucasus to make plans and preparations.When the President learned of the Soviet

reaction to the Prime Minister's tentativeoffer, he wrote to General Marshall:

cow. 13 According to Bradley's report theBritish were considering the inclusion ofperhaps one American heavy bomber groupin the projected Caucasus air force, but


planes, which would have to come fromthe United States. The Americans wouldfight together with the British componentsunder an RAF officer, who would be un-der Soviet strategic command. The PrimeMinister reasoned that the project wouldemploy British and American air forces ata critical point, reinforcing the Red AirForce and serving as "the advance shield ofall our interests" in Iran. This proposal,like his earlier suggestion to Stalin, wascontingent on a favorable issue of the battlefo r Egypt. 14

General Marshall continued to opposethe project. On 18 September, with theconcurrence of General Arnold, he rec-ommended to the President that the Cauca-su s air force should not include American

units, except for an air transport groupwhich the British could not furnish.15 TheArmy staff pointed out that the U.S. Gov-

the extremely difficult command decision totransfer units from Egypt would, in anyevent, devolve upon the British since theywere responsible fo r operations in theMiddle East, and that it could be bettermade and carried out by the British ontheir own responsibility.

The President did not adopt the policyrecommended by the War Department nordid he accept the Prime Minister's proposal.Instead, he came to the conclusion thatAmerican units should take part in the op-erations, as proposed by the Prime Minister,but that the "definite" offer for which theSoviet Government supposedly was waitingshould not depend on the course of otheroperations. 17 His conviction was strength-ened early in October when he was con-

sidering the draft of a message the PrimeMinister intended to send to Stalin to an-nounce the suspension of the convoys to

18



ern ment, having already demonstrated itswillingness to support Soviet military opera-tions, need not concern itself with whatthe Prime Minister had called the "moral

16

Murmansk. 18 The President reasoned that,having made the unwelcome decision toinvade North Africa and being forced as aresult to take the even more unwelcome


ing supplies." He therefore advised thatthe Prime Minister's message to PremierStalin should mention without qualificationthe British-American determination to sendproposed air forces to the Caucasus. 19

On 8 October the President agreed thatthe force should be made up as originallyproposed by the Prime Minister—includingone American heavy bomber group and onetransport group—and should be transferredto the Caucasus early in 1943. 20 The Prime

Minister so informed Stalin, and the Presi-dent independently sent confirmation on 9October. 21

Up to this point the Soviet Governmenthad continued to show interest in the proj-ect. On 6 October Stalin inquired of Gen-eral Bradley, who had been waiting since

early August 1942 to ask about a proposedAmerican survey of air installations inSiberia, whether he could find out how

Bradley then recommended to the WarDepartment that the United States shouldoffer to send at once at least a token force,and that he be authorized to make a pre-liminary survey in the Caucasus. 28 Uponbeing informed that a specific proposal hadbeen made to send a British-American forceto the Caucasus early in 1943, he stronglyrecommended that the force should be com-posed entirely of American air units andthat the first of them, at least, should be

sent at once and not in 1943. He explainedthat his recommendations reflected his ob-servation that Soviet officials distrusted theBritish and heavily discounted future com-mitments. He proposed that he should beauthorized to carry out negotiations andmake plans to execute his recommenda-

tions.24

The War Department replied that theproject must be carried out as the President

h dl



many units were to be sent to the Caucasus,and when. Stalin was willing that Bradleyshould undertake a survey in the Caucasusas well as in Siberia, stating that he con-

had proposed. Granted that Bradley'sreasoning was sound, the War Departmentexplained, the United States did not haveavailable the units to act as he recom-


Soviet Government should have acceptedthe offer of the President and Prime Minis-ter. 26 The mission the British Chiefs ofStaff proposed would work out such prob-lems as the "operational role," the facilitiesrequired for airfields and road reconnais-sance, and the tonnage needed to maintainthe British-American force. The missionwould be sent by the British Middle EastCommand, with American representativesto come from USAFIME. The proposedforce, the British stated in response to fur-ther questions, was to be under a Britishcommander with the rank of air marshal.On the diplomatic level, the British Govern-ment would conduct the necessary negotia-tions with the Soviet Government. 27

The British proposals raised no objections

except on the subject of command. TheWar Department operations staff recom-mended that an Air Corps officer should be

d "i h

On 20 October the JCS accepted theBritish proposals in so far as they concernedthe method of carrying on negotiations. 30

The British named Air Marshal P. H.Drummond to head the mission. The JCSdesignated as the senior American repre-sentative the commanding general of theIX Air Force Service Command, Brig. Gen.Elmer E. Adler, who was suggested for theposition by the War Department. 31 On 25October the War Department sent Adlerhis instructions. 32

The AAF had already instructed Gen-eral Brereton, the Ninth Air Force com-mander, to organize a new heavy bombergroup (to be equipped with B-24's) frompersonnel and planes already in the MiddleEast, to be ready for operations in Trans-

caucasia at the beginning of January 1943.In so doing he was to redistribute personnelso that the new group (the 376th) wouldb b l h h



put in command, "inasmuch as the heavyportion of the striking force (Heavy Bomb-ers ) is American, and the key logistical sup-port comprising the Air Transport Group

28

be about equal in experience to the othergroups in the Ninth and Tenth Air Forces.He was also to tell Washington what elsehe would need from th e United States, and

334 STRATEGIC P L A N N I N G FO R COALITION WA R FA R E

mein Line (23 October, Operation LIGHT-FOOT) and the British-American landingsin French Morocco and Algeria (8 Novem-ber, Operation TORCH). Finally, as theWar Department learned on 13 November1942, the British, still ignorant of Sovietintentions, arranged for the Drummond-Adler mission to go to Moscow. 34

On 22 November, the day after its ar-rival in Moscow, the mission held its firstmeeting with Soviet representatives, Lt.Gen. Fedor Y. Falalaeyev, Chief of Staff,Red Air Force, presiding. It quickly be-came evident that the Soviet Governmenthad no intention of accepting the offer ofan air force in the Caucasus. Soviet repre-sentatives proposed instead that in place ofan air force, Great Britain and the United

States should send planes to the SovietUnion—in addition to those already sched-uled to be sent. They gave several rea-

L d l li h S i t

deleterious political effect" and the presenceof Allied forces in the Caucasus "mightgive a fu ture hold on or near their oil re-sources." 35

The mission, while agreeing to reportSoviet objections and the Soviet counter-proposal, took the position that the counter-proposal should come from Premier Stalinto the Prime Minister and the President,since the mission was not authorized to dis-cuss it.36 Three weeks passed while themission and the British and American Gov-ernments waited for Stalin to make a formalproposal. The Soviet Government finallyconceded a point—that the crews could besent with the planes to fight in Soviet airunits. 37 In spite of this concession, the WarDepartment staff and the JCS in turn took

the position that the mission ought to beinstructed that the Soviet counterproposalwas unacceptable so that the mission could

i h h d h b i f h i i l



sons. Lend-lease supplies to the SovietUnion would be decreased by the amountit would take to support a British-Americanforce in the Caucasus. Soviet air units,

either go ahead on the basis of the originalproposal or return to the Middle East. TheWar Department was especially interestedin making it clear that it was as undesirable


organized. 38 Moreover, as War Depart-ment planners recognized, the importantdifferences in the British and Sovietpositions were essentially political. The po-litical aspect of the project—the "comrade-ship in arms" in a strategically importantarea—which made it desirable from thepoint of view of the Prime Minister, madeit undesirable from the Soviet point ofview. 39

The mission continued to mark time inDecember awaiting the outcome of theimpasse in negotiations. The Soviet Gov-ernment continued to show no dispositionto deal with the question on a political level.On 13 December Molotov informed AirMarshal Drummond that, since the UnitedStates and Great Britain were apparently

not going to accept the Soviet views as abasis for discussions, the Soviet Governmentwas unwilling to proceed. 40 ThereuponS i t t ti k d h th i

The JCS were still of the opinion that theAmerican and British Governments shouldmake it clear that they were prepared tonegotiate only on the basis of the originalBritish-American proposal. The JCS ad-vised the President that the mission shouldbe so instructed. Passing over the politicalconsiderations, the JCS took the positionthat, as Marshall said, "it would be a greatmistake" to provide heavy bombers insteadof the heavy bomber group which theUnited States was committed to send, sinceit would take Soviet forces about six monthsto train units and construct facilities forheavy bomber operations. 42

The President remained unwilling to dropthe project until he knew for certain thatStalin would not accept it. 43 On 16 De-

cember he sent a message asking Stalin'sviews and offered the concession that theforce need not operate as a whole under ai l B iti h ( A i ) d



Soviet representatives asked when the mis-sion was planning to leave, explaining thatflying conditions would soon become verybad. 41

single British (or American) commander,but only under British and American com-manders by units. 44 He thereby matchedthe Soviet concession to accept planes with


and crews. 45 The President replied that hewas glad to know there was no longer anyneed of British and American help in theCaucasus and that he meant to do every-thing within his power to keep deliveries ofplanes up to schedule. He concluded bypointing out that the United States, like theSoviet Union, lacked planes, not men to flythem, and could not add to its commit-ments except by leaving trained unitswithout planes. 46

On this note the negotiations ended. 47

On 25 December 1942 the mission left Mos-co w for the Middle East.

The Persian Gulf Service Command

The other means of closer collaboration

with the Soviet Union in the Middle Eastwas the development of an alternative routefor lend-lease a i d . Even before the an-nouncement of the TORCH decision to the

facing heavy shipping and naval escort de-mands throughout the world and continuedheavy losses in the Atlantic, were increasing-ly concerned over the prospect of subsequentlosses in the Murmansk convoys. 48 The con-voy en route to Murmansk in early July(PQ 17) had suffered unprecedented losses.American officials could not avoid the con-clusion that the suspension of convoys viathe North Cape was inevitable. So long asJapan and the USSR remained at peace,traffic in nonmilitary supplies might beshifted to the Pacific for transport in vesselsunder Soviet registry. 49 If technical diffi-culties could be solved, lend-lease planesmight in time be shifted to the projectedAlaska-Siberia ferry route. But for thedelivery of other military equipment—in

bulk mainly military vehicles and tanks—the only alternative to the North Cape routewas the Persian Gulf route. The PersianGulf ports and overland transportation in



nouncement of the TORCH decision to theUSSR, American and British authoritieshad been considering ways and means ofincreasing th e volume of traffic via the

Gulf ports and overland transportation inIran had by the early summer of 1942 beendeveloped by the British to the point wherethey could handle about 40,000 tons a

50


Before the close of July 1942, Brig. Gen.Sidney P. Spalding (Assistant Executive,Munitions Assignments Board) was desig-nated as a representative of Mr. Hopkinsand the War Department to visit Iran andinvestigate ways and means of increasingthe volume of lend-lease traffic via thePersian Gulf.51 The War Department hadunder consideration at the same time theproposal by Mr. Harriman, forwarded fromLondon to Washington in early July, that

th e United States should offer to take overthe operation of the Iranian railroad. 52 Thispolicy had been recommended by Maj. Gen.Raymond A. Wheeler a short time earlierand had been suggested by the Prime Min-ister the year before. Harriman estimatedthat only three or four more convoys could

be sent via the northern route before winterset in. He pointed out that there was notime to lose if the Persian Gulf were to beready to handle additional t ffi by winter

sent in July were to be sent via Iran andall of the bombers sent to the Soviet Unionafter July were to be flight delivered. 53

The increasing concern of the Presidentand Prime Minister over the restrictiveeffects of TORCH on northern convoys tothe USSR intensified their interest in fur-ther development of the Persian Gulf route.Upon his return from the Moscow con-ference of mid-August 1942, Harrimanstopped off at Tehran and Cairo to study

the problems of the supply route from thePersian Gulf ports over the Iranian railroadinto the Soviet Union. In Cairo he rejoinedChurchill. As a result of discussions inCairo, the Prime Minister requested theUnited States to take over the developmentand operation of the British-controlled sec-

tion of the Iranian railroad and of the portsserving it.54 On 22 August 1942, in accordwith the Prime Minister's request, Harri-man submitted a series of d fi it proposals



ready to handle additional traffic by winter.Marshall and King agreed, in accord withHarriman's proposals, that all trucks to be

man submitted a series of definite proposals.Generals Maxwell and Spalding, who hadtaken part in accompanying staff talkswith British officials in the Middle East,


While the CCS were resolving the diffi-cult question of the division of authoritybetween British military authorities andU. S. Army Forces in the Middle East inthe control of the new project in the PersianGulf area, the War Department proceededwith arrangements for a new Americancommand. 56 On 1 October the War De-partment issued a directive designatingBrig. Gen . Donald H. Connolly as Com-manding General, Persian Gulf ServiceCommand (PGSC). 57 Connolly ( w h owas shortly thereafter promoted to majorgeneral) was given the primary mission to insure the uninterrupted flow of an ex-panded volume of supplies to Russia." Al-though he was subject to the administrativesupervision of the Commanding General,

USAFIME, he was to have "wide latitude,"

with authority to deal directly with British,Iranian, and Soviet authorities in all mat-ters which did not require diplomatic chan-nels. On other than administrative ma t -ters Connolly was instructed to report di-rectly to Washington. Therefore, in so faras the conduct of its major task was con-cerned, the PGSC was from th e outsetlargely autonomous in fact. 58

Although these arrangements fo r controlof the Persian Gulf ports and southern Iran-ian rail and road transport left Connollyto a large extent independent in carryingout his primary mission, his responsibilitiesin Iran were otherwise limited. The newarrangements for the Persian Gulf area didnot alter the basis of Anglo-Iranian-Sovietrelations as established in August 1941.

The British remained responsible for policyin southern Iran and almost entirely re-sponsible for the defense of southern Iran. 59

Connolly at best could expedite delivery of

Memo, Somervell for Lutes, 29 Aug 42, no sub,Opns SOS 1942-43 in Hq ASF file, Sp CollectionsSubsec DRB AGO (6) Tab A with CPS 46/2



Connolly at best could expedite delivery oflend-lease aid only as far as Tehran. 60

The modifications that the War Depart-ment had been compelled to adopt for the

Subsec, DRB AGO. (6) Tab A with CPS 46/2 ,10 Sep 42, title: Development of Persian Trans-portation Facilities.

56 For the compromise on British-American com-mand prerogatives in the Middle East, see espe-


officers responsible for Army plans thatAmerican policy was best served by mini-mizing military commitments in the MiddleEast, for whatever purposes. 61

During September and October, whilethe main questions of command were be-ing settled, SOS went ahead setting up atroop list for the PGSC, and made tenta-tive schedules for the shipment of unitsand of the heavy equipment they wouldneed in carrying ou t their mission. As fi-nally revised, the troop list called fo r unitswith a total strength of about 24,000.Most of the units had originally been des-ignated fo r BOLERO; a few of them—about4,000 troops—were in excess of the 1942Troop Basis. By the end of Septemberthe War Department had cleared orders

to activate these additional units.62

Dur-in g October th e operations staff cleared withArmy Ground Forces the requests of SOSfor ground units to be included in the force

Toward the end of October 1942, Con-nolly arrived to set up the new command.Not until early in 1943 did an appreciablenumber of the allocated American forcesbegin to arrive in the Persian Gulf area.The full effect of these added commitmentsdid not begin to be felt until late in thespring of 1943. 64 The establishment of thePGSC in October 1942 was to have littleimmediate effect on the delivery of lend-lease materiel to the USSR, but laid thebasis for increased deliveries in the later waryears. 65

Air Collaboration in Alaska and Siberia

Like the Middle East, the North Pacificwas an area in which supporting operations

of the United States and the USSR mightbecome closely related and in which analternative route for lend-lease might be de-veloped One course of action which did



for g ou d units to be included in the forceand issued movement orders for the force,which was to be shipped in several eche-lons. The first echelon was due to be

veloped. One course of action, which didnot present any great problems of strategyand policy, was to increase the ocean-goingtraffic in "nonmilitary" supplies from Port-




matter to divert lend-lease planes for de-livery by way of the North Pacific, or tocarry out any other project fo r joint Soviet-American air action in the Far East, al-though the United States persisted in tryingto make at least a beginning. In May 1942General Arnold had reopened the question,undaunted by the earlier failures to get anyinformation from the Soviet Government onair facilities in Siberia or by the scepticismand objections of the War Department Gen-eral Staff.67 Since the discussions of early1942, which had ended inconclusively, onechannel had opened that he could use di-rectly and independently—the Soviet Pur-chasing Commission. General Arnold hadoften to deal with Maj. Gen. Alexander I.Belyaev, the head of this mission, in connec-tion

with the allocation

and delivery of air-planes under the First (Moscow) Protocol.In his dealings with Belyaev, Arnold couldat least juxtapose the questions of lend-lease

War Department should again impress onAdmiral Standley the importance of gettinginformation on air installations in Siberia. 69

He subm itted to the General Staff a messageto this effect fo r transmission to Standley ;

and Eisenhower co-operated to the extentof sending the message, redrafted and ad-dressed to the military attache, who, as amember of Admiral Standley's staff, couldproperly convey to him the War Depart-ment view.70

In mid-May the military attaché re-ported that the Soviet Government, thoughunwilling as before to permit Americanferrying operations in Soviet-controlled ter-ritory, did appear willing to consider takingdelivery of American planes in Alaska. 71

Although Arnold's idea was, of course, thatAmerican pilots should deliver the planesin Siberia, thus familiarizing themselves withflying conditions and facilities there, AAFinformed Admiral Standley that the Soviet



j p qand his plans in the North Pacific, eventhough it was contrary to American policyto make such a connection in formal official

yproposal—which, of course, would meanthat Soviet pilots would familiarize them-selves with flying conditions and facilities in


In Washington there was no room left todoubt that the subject would have to betaken up through political channels. AnArmy intelligence officer reported in mid-June that while arranging for a call byGeneral Belyaev on General Strong, head ofG-2, he had talked with Belyaev's aide,who had told him "substantially as follows."

Only last week Major General James H.Burns [Executive, Munitions AssignmentsBoard] talked with General Belyaev on thattime worn old topic of our releasing air in-formation on Eastern Siberia. As militarymen, our lips have been sealed on that subjectfo r over a year.

General Burns said "Why don't you let usdeliver those planes that can fly by BeringStraits—then we can use what shipping wehave to send you more material instead offilling our ships with those pit iful , knocked

clown and crated planes?"General Belyaev answered "That is a mat-ter entirely out of the hands of the militaryand in the hands of the politicians. The onlyhi d i h li i i i

end of May—and a conclusive demonstra-tion of American naval strength in thePacific all indicated that American effortsmight prove to be of rapidly growing im-portance , and of rapidly growing interestto the Soviet Union. Furthermore, theJapanese naval offensive in the North Pacif-ic in late May and early June gave somereason to believe that Japan might turn itsattention away from the Southwest Pacific.In mid-June, on the basis of recommenda-tions drawn up by the War Departmentand accepted by the Navy, the Presidentproposed to Stalin a meeting of the Amer-ican and Soviet representatives. 74 He point-ed out the immediate advantages of estab-lishing a ferry route via Alaska and Siberia,and the subsequent advantage—in case ofJapanese a t tack—of its being operated byAmerican crews, who would be ready tooperate against Japanese forces and instal-lations from Siberian bases.75 To facilitate



thing to do is to have your politicians get intouch with Litvinov." 73

In late May and June the conditions fordiscussion on the political level appeared

preparations he proposed that the SovietGovernment should authorize a preliminarysurvey by one American crew.


that either of these proposals would serve, asthe President had suggested, to facilitateAmerican air operations based on Siberia.The Soviet Government simply repeated itsearlier declaration of willingness to acceptplane deliveries in Alaska, as had been urgedby General Arnold in March 1942 andproposed by Admiral Standley in Moscowtoward the end of April. 77 The Presidentsoon decided to go ahead on the basis of thispartial acceptance of his proposals. On6 July 1942 he informed the Soviet Govern-ment that he had designated as his repre-sentative to go to Moscow, M a j . G e n .Follet Bradley, who would be assisted bythe U. S. military and naval attachesthere. 78

General Bradley left Washington at theend of July. Before leaving, he wasbriefed in detail by the War Departmentstrategic planners on the background andobjectives of his mission. 79 In stating his

sued to him on 20 July. 81 Before his de-parture fo r Moscow, Bradley also went overwith Arnold and with General Belyaev ofthe Soviet Purchasing Commission a p ro-visional schedule of plane deliveries viaAlaska and the arrangements for a smallAmerican party to survey Siberian air fa-cilities. 82 Finally, Bradley saw the Presi-dent, who advised him to bear in mind thevarious circumstances favoring Soviet-American military collaboration—the prob-ability of an early Japanese attack on Si-beria, the disadvantages of sending planes byany route other than the North Pacific, andthe willingness of the U. S. Governmentto furnish whatever the Soviet Union neededif a way could be found to deliver it.83

General Bradley arrived in Moscow inearly August 1942—a

few days before

th eTORCH announcement was made. 84 Fortwo months it remained uncertain whetherthe Alaska-Siberia ferry route would go into



ow n conception of it, he differentiatedthree phases. 80 The first was to arrangefor the delivery of planes to Soviet crews

operation. During the second half of Au-gust a small survey party under Col. Alva L.

81 dl l f


Harvey flew in a Soviet bomber over theferry route, by Seimchan, Yakutsk, andKrasnoyarsk west to Moscow. ColonelHarvey reported that the route was prac-ticable. 85 The principal difficulty, as it hadmeanwhile become evident from the dis-cussions being held at Moscow, was that theSoviet representatives considered that theUnited States would have to furnish forty-three transport planes to ferry Soviet crewsto Alaska. This figure was based on theassumption that the twelve medium bomb-ers, one hundred light bombers, and onehundred fighters due to be received eachmonth would all be flown over this route.The War Department replied that theUnited States could furnish only ten trans-port planes for use over that route. The

Soviet Government at length agreed to be-gin ferrying operations on a reduced scale. 86

Planes had begun to arrive at Fairbanks,which had been chosen as the delivery point

the Soviet Government decided to go onwith ferrying operations after all, but theWar Department had meanwhile decidedthat the route was closed, except for deliveryof planes already at Fairbanks. 89 Bradleystrongly protested the War Department ac-tion. After a conference with Soviet repre-sentatives in Washington held on 6 October1942, the War Department agreed to re-open the route. 90

While progress was being made slowlyand haltingly in opening the ferry route,Bradley was still awaiting an interview withStalin and a chance to raise the question ofa m ore extensive survey o f Siberian air facil-ities. On 6 October 1942 he was finallygranted an audience. He then brought upthe question of a further survey of Siberian

air installations to follow the earlier cursorysurvey made by Colonel Harvey in August.Stalin stated that the Soviet Governmentwas well aware that its neutrality pact with



which had been chosen as the delivery point,when General Belyaev in Washington an-nounced, on 19 September 1942, that onlyth l th t F i b k ld b

well awa e ts neutrality pact w tJapan would not prevent a Japanese attack,and that the attack might come at any time.Although he was primarily interested in the


ities in Siberia in the vicinity of Manchuria. 91

General Bradley advised the War De-partment to postpone the survey until theUnited States could make a specific proposalfor using the bases in case of war betweenJapan and the Soviet Union. He believedthat the United States should first offersomething more definite in justification ofthe survey than the information furnishedhim before leaving Washington—the WarDepartment had designated two squadronsof bombers for use in such a contingency. 92

The War Department replied that he shouldundertake only to survey facilities for airsupply into China—as the President had di-rected—returning to Washington for fur-ther instructions before starting to surveyfacilities for possible air operations againstJapan. 93

Bradley returned to Washington early inDecember 1942 and made his detailed re-port.94 Since he had reason to believe that

come of increasing interest in the fall of1942 following the occupation of Adak.The Army strategic planners recommendedthat Bradley be sent back to make the sur-vey already authorized, on the basis of a newproposal by the United States to committhree heavy bomber groups to Siberia im-mediately in the event of hostilities betweenJapan and the Soviet Union. The provisowas that the Soviet Union could makeavailable adequate facilities and furnish themain items of bulk supply. 96 The Chief ofStaff presented this proposal to the JCS witha message to that effect fo r transmission toStalin. 97 Following JCS approval of thedraft message, the President sent it on 30December to Stalin. 98

In answer, Stalin made it very clear thathe wanted

planes at once in the Caucasus

and not air units at some later date in Si-beria. 99 The President replied that theunits in question were not available and



the Soviet Government might be willing toconsider U. S. air operations based in Si-beria, Army planning officers collected the

would become available only if Japanshould attack the Soviet Union, as a resultof redisposing United States forces in the


that were not assigned to units and that theUnited States did not intend to make unitsinoperative by withdrawing aircraft fromthem. 100 On this note the correspondenceended. The War Department thereuponreached an agreement with JCS to take nofurther action on the matter. 101

The Alaska-Siberia ferry route hadmeanwhile continued in operation with re-sults that were disappointing, even afterallowance was made for the lack of trans-ports. The delivery of aircraft had beenslowed down not only by Soviet indecisionbut also by the need for special winterizationof planes and installation of radio com-passes. 102 Upon Bradley's return fromMoscow Marshall had proposed, and theJCS had agreed, to develop the route so that

by the spring of 1943 it could handle allplanes assigned to the Soviet Union. 103 Butby the end of the year only eighty-fiveplanes had been delivered in Alaska for

Soviet Plane Requirements

In the end, the United States had to ac-cept the fact that the Soviet Governmentwanted, not closer collaboration, but more

planes. The Second Protocol offered tothe Soviet Government in June 1942 hadfixed commitments for only three months inadvance. It had provided that in October1942 commitments were to be made "forthe balance of the year on the basis of de-velopments incident to the progress of thewar." 105 In October there were pendingbefore the Munitions Assignments Board,Soviet requests for an increase that wouldnearly double the rate of factory deliveriesfor transfer to the Soviet Government. 106

The Soviet requests amounted to an aver-age of slightly over 400 planes monthly forthe last three months of 1942.

While the Munitions Assignments Boardwas considering these requests, the President



transfer, and experience with the difficultiesof the route led the AAF planners to rely forthe time being on air and water deliveries

table: Aircraf t Delivered to USSR . . . , in[State Dept] Rpt on War Aid Furnished by U. S.to USSR, p. 18.

105




to the one common interest—the early de-feat of Germany. 116 In other words, thequestion of the "second front" remainedcritical. The Prime Minister was anxiousto reach an understanding. He told thePresident in early December 1942, with ref-erence to proposed staff conferences in Mos-

cow, that "what we are going to do aboutROUNDUP," would be "almost the sole thingthey will want to know." 117 In the absenceof specific manifestations of a definite Brit-ish-American understanding on this issue,the fact that the War Department had longbeen pressing for the early establishment ofa second f ront had proved of little assist-ance in American dealings with the SovietGovernment.

116 (1) Draft memo [Gen Arnold for JCS], n.d.,sub: Mil Policy Toward Russia. (2) Memo, Wede-meyer for Handy, 10 Dec 42, same sub. (3) Memo,Handy for Arnold, 13 Dec 42, no sub. All in OPD

381 Russia, 13.

117 Msg, Prime Minister to President, 2 Dec 42,

No. 216, Item 63a, Exec 10.



CHAPTER XVI

Strategic Inventory

December 1942

By December 1942, a year after the Jap-anese attack on Pearl Harbor, the tide ofwar was beginning to turn in favor of theAllies. The strategic initiative was slippingaway from both Germany and Japan. TheRed Army had not only held the invadingGerman armies but also inflicted mortal

losses on them. In North Africa, Guadal-canal, and New Guinea the offensive powerof the western Allies was beginning to makeitself felt. After a year of crises, the danger

ing 37 active divisions and 67 air combatgroups) on 31 December 1941, the Armyhad grown to 5,397,674 (including 73 ac-tive divisions and 167 air combat groups)by the close of 1942. 1 This expansion intotal strength exceeded original War De-partment estimates of strengths for 31 De-

cember 1942, those in the Victory ProgramTroop Basis of late 1941, and those in theWar Department Troop Basis of January1942. 2 The Victory Program Troop Basis,

l b h d



of losing the war had become remote, butthe prospect of winning it was also remote.The specific problem of applying the grow

circulated in late December 1941, had pro-jected total Army strength as 3,973,205commissioned officers and enlisted men (to

STRATEGIC INVENTORY 351

804,439) by 31 December 1942. 3 Theapproved War Department Troop Basis ofJanuary 1942 had projected total Armystrength as 3,600,000 enlisted men (to in-clude 73 divisions and an air force of 998,-000) by the same date. 4 These early blue-prints for building, equipping, and supply-ing the wartime Army had been drawn be-fore the defensive strength of the SovietUnion, the influence of British strategy, andthe extent of American commitments in thePacific had become fully evident.

Additions to the total strength in theTroop Basis for 1942 had been made mainlyto meet modifications in British-Americanwar plans and changing operational re-quirements of that year. One importantrevision of the 1942 goal of 3,600,000 menhad been made in May 1942, when thePresident authorized an increase of 750,000men, chiefly to support the new plan for thebuild-up of strength in the United Kingdom(BOLERO) Another important addition

th e authorized enlisted strength of the Armyby the end of 1942 to 5,000,000. 5 Theseadditions were necessary to cover overdraftson the 1942 Troop Basis already made orplanned.

Distribution of strength within the Armyshifted greatly in 1942. Both the air forcesand service forces grew more rapidly thanestimated in the January 1942 Troop Basis.During 1942 the ground arms more thandoubled, but the service branches and theAir Corps increased over fourfold.6 Amongthe ground forces themselves, moreover, inthe early defensive phase of the war, anti-aircraft units were authorized over andabove the numbers at first planned, andthe Coast Artillery Corps (mainly antiair-craft) actually expanded more rapidly in1942 than the other ground arms. Antiair-craft units were sent to the defense com-mands and to the several overseas theaters.Finally, the dispersion of Army forces ondefensive and supply missions and the re-



(BOLERO). Another important additionhad been made in September 1942, whenth e armed forces were faced with expand-

defensive a d supply missions a d t e equirements of the first offensive operationsraised the proportion of service and air


mon use in the War Department throughoutmost of 1942 had been that it would ulti-mately be necessary to support at least twohundred divisions. The official estimates inthe Victory Program Troop Basis of late1941 had projected an Army at peakstrength of approximately 215 divisions. Inkeeping with the assumption that the RedArmy might collapse and the United Statesand Great Britain might have to defeat Ger-many unaided (and in accordance with theWar Department determination to ignorethe possibility of a dispersion of effort re-quiring large service forces), this initial Vic-tory Program projected an Army consistingprimarily of air, armored, and motorizedforces capable of defeating the huge armiesof Germany and its allies. 7 The projectednumber of divisions grew in 1942, partly be-cause estimated requirements for defeatingJapan were superimposed on the originalestimates o f requirements for defeating Ger-many. In September G-3 reached its peak

the planners were beginning to take accountof experience and to recalculate long-rangerequirements to fit the expectation thatlarge service forces and air forces wouldoften precede and always accompany themovement of ground forces. The ap-proved goal for air groups which had beenset in January 1942 at 115 and changed inJuly to 224, was raised in September to273. 10 Given the anticipated limitations inshipping, it was apparent that the projecteddeployment of a huge air and service forceoverseas by the end of 1944 would greatlyrestrict the number of combat divisionswhich could be sent overseas by that time.In late 1942, moreover, procurement plansfor the armed services for 1943, particu-larly for the Army ground program, wererevised downward by the JCS—in con-formity with a War Production Board rec-ommendation. It was clearly undesirableto withdraw men from industry and agricul-ture to o long before they could actually be



y p pestimate of about "350 divisions necessary towin the war." 8

ture to o g before they could actually beemployed in military operations. Given oneyear to train a division, the mobilization




other commitments had repeatedly beenexceeded, but forces for the British Isles hadnot attained the strength projected in earlyBOLERO planning. Instead of a strength ofabout 500,000 troops planned for December1942, th e actual figures for the UnitedKingdom showed as present and en route,by early December 1942, slightly more than170,000 (including about 123,000 groundand 47,000 air troops.) 19 Only one divi-sion (29th Infantry) and the approximateequivalent of sixteen air combat groups werethen present in the British Isles.

In effect, the American forces that be-came available in 1942 had served as a poolupon which all theaters and operations hadlaid claims since British-American warplans had changed and immediate opera-tional needs and demands in the MiddleEast, North Africa, and the Pacific had re-quired their deployment. The collapse ofthe whole project of preparing a cross-Channel invasion for 1943 and the heavy

1942 the War Department had scaled downthe objective to a balanced ground force of150,000 by the spring of 1943—for support-ing, defensive, and emergency offensive op-erations—and, at an indeterminate date, to

a force which would reach a total of ap-proximately 427,000. 20

Deployment to North Africa

The demands of the North African cam-paign, then in progress, continued to con-

stitute a first claim on American forces andresources. 21 As a result of the failure toforestall the German defense of Tunisia andthe determination of the German HighCommand to reinforce the position there,the British an d American staffs faced th eproblem of building up, over a much longerline of sea communications and a much lessdeveloped line of land communications, adecisive superiority over the forces the Ger-mans chose to commit to Tunisia. The cost

d d h



ywithdrawals already made and projectedfrom BOLERO forces in the United States

of the effort was compounded by haste andwaste. The primary effects were felt in the

t of Great Britain the United States


groups. The ground troops, estimated at128,000, were slightly more numerous thanthose in the United Kingdom. The airtroops were calculated at somewhat under13,000. However, the air forces in the

United Kingdom constituted a reservewhich could be and was heavily drawn uponfor North Africa. The effect of the devi-ation from BOLERO became even more strik-ingly apparent by 21 December 1942 whenthe total U. S. Army forces in French NorthAfrica slightly exceeded those in the BritishIsles. By that time the number of groundcombat troops in French North Africa wasalmost double the total strength of groundcombat troops in the British Isles. Thetrend was also projected, in Army planningestimates at the close of 1942, for troopmovements in the near future. The pro-jected total U. S. troop strength for NorthAfrica was then estimated at 450,000, some-what more than the total projected for theUnited Kingdom.

Deployment to the Middle East

In the Middle East, events of 1942 hadforced successive modifications in theArmy's policy toward that area of British

strategic responsibility. At the beginningof December 1942 about 25,000 Americantroops were present in or en route to theMiddle East—primarily service and airtroops, including seven air combat groups.The enlarged Middle East commitments bythe close of the year reflected, in part, the

increased operational air activities by UnitedStates forces in support of British-Americanoffensive action in the Mediterranean. Inpart, it reflected the greater need for serviceunits required to construct, operate, andmaintain the Persian Gulf supply route forshipments to the Soviet Union.

Besides the troops belonging to U. S.A r m y F o r c e s in the M i d d l e E a s t(USAFIME), there were those of U. S.A r m y F o r c e s i n C e n t r a l A f r i c a(USAFICA) hi h h d b i



Deployment to Iceland

(USAFICA), which had been set up inJune 1942 to control U. S. Army forces

t i l Af i USAFICA


1942 approximately 237,000 U.S. troopswere present in or en route to bases in theWestern Hemisphere, including LatinAmerica, Alaska, and the rest of NorthAmerica. 22 This total included about 185,-000 ground troops and 50,000 air troops(n ine combat groups) actually present.The total U.S. Army strength in theseWestern Hemisphere bases exceeded by asubstantial margin the total U.S. Armystrengths in either the United Kingdom orNorth Africa. It also exceeded—by over100,000—the ceilings, envisaged as part ofthe original BOLERO planning, on strategicdeployment for the area by December 1942.The heavy outlay—in antiaircraft, air, andscattered infantry units—represented in parta carry-over from the early defensive phasesof the war for garrison forces to meet threatsof invasion, naval bombardment, and sabo-tage in the North American and LatinAmerican theaters. Fluctuations in plansfor the European offensive, the long-con-

1942 for the extension, operation, and pro-tection of North and South Atlantic air ferryroutes.

The main operational development inthe Western Hemisphere was the heavy al-locations for Alaska. A year after PearlHarbor there were over 87,000 troops(present or en route) including about 72,-000 ground and 14,000 air troops (2 aircombat groups) actually in the area. Thistotal was more than twice the number en-visaged for the area by the close of 1942.

During 1942, additional troops were alsodispatched for the construction and opera-tion of the Alcan Highway (opened in No-vember 1942) in western Canada. Thisproject, authorized by a joint agreementbetween Canada and the United States,was originally planned and initiated to im-prove transportation links between Canada,United States, and Alaska and thereby toreduce threats to Alaskan installations.

The increase in Army strength in Alaska



tinued threat to the security of the SouthAtlantic area from French West Africa,

reflected the changing situation in andplans for the northern Pacific in the year

h d


tion to providing for defensive-offensiveneeds for Alaska, the increased allocations atthe end of 1942 also included personnel fo rservicing the Alaska—Siberia air ferry routefor delivery of lend-lease aircraft to the

USSR (opened in September 1942). Atthe close of the year, as pressure becamestronger upon the War Department for dis-lodging the Japanese from the Aleutians, afur ther increase to about 100,000 troopswas projected fo r Alaska.

Deployment to the CBI

In the China-Burma-India theater earlylimitations on Army deployment had beenmaintained far more successfully during1942 than either in the Middle East or inthe Western Hemisphere. In the Asiatictheater, as in the Middle East, the circum-stances of world war had plunged theAmerican troops into an area of highly com-plicated jurisdictional, strategic, and logisti-cal problems for the Allies B i strategic

problems had become fa r more difficult—supporting the Chinese, getting their co-operation, and exercising pressure throughChina on Japanese strategic policy. Butfor the U. S. Army the area remained a

secondary air and supply theater. Fromthe summer of 1942 onward, the technicaland tactical instruction of Chinese forcesin India became an increasingly importantactivity. A year after Pearl Harbor about17,000 American troops were present in oren route to the China—Burma—India area.This total included about 10,000 air troops(4 air combat groups) and about 5,000service troops actually in the theater. Thetotal strength was close to early wartimeArmy and joint planning estimates for theend of 1942, only slightly exceeding the totalcommitments for the area projected in theJCS 23 study of mid-March 1942.

Deployment to the Pacific

Th di l A i



cal problems for the Allies. Basic strategicconsiderations, as well as limited Allied re-

f ti g j tt k th

The great divergence from early Ameri-can planning for the war against Japan in

l f h


which offensives might later be undertakenagainst Japan.

The trend in excess of allocations overcommitments for the Pacific during 1942had fallen into two major phases, roughly

divided by the Battle of Midway of June1942. During the early months of the warin the Pacific, the War Department hadtried to keep the forces and means allottedto the minimum consistent with the agreedobjectives of defending Australia, New Zea-land, and the lines of communication fromthe United States to the Southwest Pacific.Strategic deployment planning had not keptabreast of operational planning to meet therequirements of this defensive phase. Thecritical need of reinforcements and read-justments for delaying and containing theJapanese advance led to successive ad hocincreases in allotments of Army troops to thePacific. Adjusting the requirements inground forces was largely a matter of over-coming shipping limitations. Pacific aird l h h bj f

seven of the ten divisions outside the UnitedStates and nearly all the air combat unitsoutside the Western Hemisphere. 24

The rebuff to the Japanese forces in theCoral Sea (May 1942) and Midway bat-

tles (June 1942) by no means slowed downArmy deployment to the Pacific. That de-ployment, in the new phase of the Pacificwar, was no longer calculated in terms ofgarrisoning a "line" of bases to support aharassing naval defensive, but in terms oftactical offensive moves beyond that line.Until August 1942 the actual numbers de-ployed each month in the Pacific continuedto be greater than those deployed in theAtlantic. 25 A series of limited offensive op-erations, beginning with the Marine land-ings on Guadalcanal in August 1942, wasplotted and inaugurated. Emergency rein-forcements were dispatched in the fall of1942 for both the Guadalcanal and Papua

about 46,000 troops en route to destinations outsidethe continental United States. For purposes of this



deployment, however, was the subject of agreat deal of controversy among the Ameri-

. o pu poses ocomputation, Iceland is classified as outside theWestern Hemisphere.

F b kd f 31 b

STRATEGIC INVENTOR Y 359Campaigns, tactically offensive movesagainst advanced enemy positions in theSouth and Southwest Pacific area. Theallocation and movement of service units,filler replacements, and air units to the

Pacific commands remained unsettled prob-lems. The growth of air, ground, and serv-ice forces in the South and Southwest Pa-cific was accompanied by a multiplicationof higher echelons of Army branch andisland commands within these areas—par-ticularly in the South Pacific, where a sep-arate Army command, U. S. Army Forcesin South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), hadbeen established in July 1942. Among theadded activities of the Army in that areawas the assumption in early December 1942of responsibility on Guadalcanal, involvingthe employment of several Army andMarine ground combat forces. 26

The cumulative results of the piecemealprocess by which the Pacific theater hadbeen built up to meet the changing needsduring th e year after Pearl Harbor were in

In each of these sections of the Pacific thelimitations on Army deployment set as partof the original BOLERO planning had beensubstantially exceeded. Though the Cen-tral Pacific then contained the greatest

number of Army troops, events of 1942 hadconsiderably reduced the threat of Japaneseinvasion and capture of island bases in thissector that had appeared so imminent earlyin the war. Before the close of the yearsome of the garrison strength was beingtransferred to aid offensive action in theSouth and Southwest Pacific. 28 No similarslackening off in Army build-up appeared inin prospect for the South and SouthwestPacific Areas. On the contrary, the trendtoward continued increases of Army forcesfor these areas seemed stronger than ever. 29

For the Pacific theater as a whole, thetotal of Army forces deployed a year afterPearl Harbor (about 346,000) was aboutequal to the total Army forces deployed inthe United Kingdom and North Africa(about 347 000) The Pacific build up



during th e year after Pearl Harbor were in -dicated in the division of Army strength

(about 347,000). The Pacific build-upexceeded by about 150,000 the total num-


overseas were deployed in the war againstJapan. All the remaining overseas divi-sions, and slightly over one half of the over-seas air combat groups were deployed in thewar against Germany. The rest of the

overseas air combat groups were distributedamong Latin American and South Atlanticbases. The total U. S. Army forces thendeployed in the war against Japan exceededby about 50,000 the total U. S. Army forcesdeployed in the war against Germany. 30

(See Chart 3.)

Distribution of Aircraft andShipping

The cumulative effects of the successivediversions of 1942 were also shown in therelative distribution of aircraft in the over-seas theaters at the end of the year. Of thetotal Army Air Forces planes (5,626) onhand overseas at the close of December1942, less than half (2,065) were deployedagainst Germany The total number of

exceeded commitments by the end of 1942,particularly in the Pacific and Alaska. 32 Inaddition, a good many planes had been sentto meet the special operational and support-ing needs that had developed during 1942in both of the essentially supply and airtheaters—the Middle East and China-Burma-India. Within the European thea-ter itself, the requirements of the NorthAfrican campaign were draining the UnitedKingdom of U. S. aircraft. Barely onehalf of all the U. S. combat planes envisagedin the Marshall Memorandum of the springof 1942 for the cross-Channel invasion on1 April 1943 (3,250) were on hand in thea-ters across the Atlantic at the end of 1942.Less than one third of these combat planesprojected for 1 April 1943 were actually inthe United Kingdom at the end of 1942.In effect, as the Army planners emphasized,strength and resources originally earmarkedfo r the main effort, BOLERO-ROUNDUP, hadserved in 1942 as a pool from which air-

h d b d d



against Germany. The total number ofplanes deployed against Germany only

d d h l

craft, as well as air units, had been divertedto secondary efforts. 33 The accepted Brit-


The costs of maintaining the widely dis-persed air forces were heavy. To furnishplanes and many items needed on short no-tice to keep the overseas combat units in op-eration, the AAF had had to expand its airferry and transportation service. GeneralArnold described the problem as one ofmaking "too little go twice as far as wouldbe necessary under normal operating condi-tions." He went on to explain:

Dispersed as they are in seven active thea-ters totalling thirteen operational areas, ourair forces require many more planes on thespot as reserve and in transit to replace attri-tion losses than if we had the same numberconcentrated in one theater.

The distances between the United Statesand the theaters of operations were so greatthat it was necessary to maintain in each

theater from 20 to 50 percent reserve, andto begin delivery of planes to make up op-erational losses as much as three monthsbefore they would actually be placed incombat service. As a result, American pro-

ber 1941) to 3,940,791 dead-weight tons(31 December 1942)—an increase of over350 percent. 36 The distribution of ship-ping between the Atlantic and the Pacificduring 1942 showed how great an effort itwas to move, establish, and support forcesin the South and Southwest Pacific—thevoyage was long, the unloading was oftenslow, and the forces were dependent formany of their supplies upon the UnitedStates. Since turnaround time in the At-lantic was much shorter, the shift in thedistribution of tonnage in favor of the At-lantic in the latter part of the year was farless pronounced than the shift in the ratioof troops and munitions moved. Throughmid-1942 the total troop and cargo ton-nage under Army control engaged in thePacific area ( including Alaska) had eachmonth actually exceeded total troop andcargo tonnage for the Atlantic (includingthe Caribbean). Beginning with July,monthly dead-weight cargo tonnage en-gaged in the Atlantic exceeded that engaged



, pduction capacities were being strained tothe utmost and American training units

gaged in the Atlantic exceeded that engagedin the Pacific, reversing the trend of the


reflected largely the increase in shippingactivity in the Atlantic-Mediterranean areaattendant on and resulting from the NorthAfrican campaign.

Shipping limitations continued to affect

planning for future overseas deployment ofUnited States troops. In December 1942,SOS planners calculated that, on the basisof prospective increases in American ship-ping capabilities, a total of almost one mil-lion U.S. Army troops might be movedand maintained overseas in 1943, in addi-

tion to the one million already overseas atthe end of 1942. 37 Current commitmentsto move troops during 1943, including re-placements and reinforcements fo r troopsalready overseas, were expected by the SOSplanners to absorb the larger part (a totalof 628,000) of the approximately one mil-lion troops that might be moved overseasin 1943. The shipping capacity left fo roverseas deployment and maintenance ofUnited States troops might be further re-duced if additional commitments for the

deployed overseas. 38 War Departmentplanners estimated that a total of thirty-seven additional American-equipped com-bat divisions would become available fortask forces by the end of 1943—seven at

the end of the first quarter, twelve at theend of the second, eight at the end of thethird, and ten at the end of the fourth.39

Supporting combat and service units, airand ground, they expected, would be avail-able for such task forces as might be or-ganized, given the availability of divisions

and shipping. By shifting air strength,they concluded, the United States and itsassociates could support any ground opera-tion that they were capable of undertaking.Available shipping—including escorts, com-bat loaders, and landing craft—stood out,in their calculations, as "the controllingfactor" in American planning for 1943. 40

38 (1) JPS 57/4, 23 Sep 42, title: Availability ofU. N. Shipping for Mil Transport. (2) Paper,Shipping Info Re P. M.'s Msg [to President, 22Sep 42 No 154] furnished by Maj Rush B Lincoln



duced if additional commitments for theUnited Kingdom economy or the RussianP t l d I d i h

Sep 42, No. 154] furnished by Maj Rush B. Lincoln,Jr., SOS. Atchd are informal papers by Col Bau-mer, OPD, and Tab A, Availability of Shipping,

CHAPTER XVII

After TORCH

What to do after completing the conquestof North Africa was the crucial question ofAllied strategy at the end of 1942. Sinceoperations in North Africa were almost cer-tain to continue for several months and sinceit was uncertain how many months theywould last, it was too early for a final deci-sion to be made. But the British and Ameri-can staffs, still much preoccupied with theprogress of the first big combined operation,began to feel out each other's positions onfuture Allied strategy.

The War Against Germany

On 18 November the Prime Minister ca-bled the President that the "paramount

areas and including the possibility of ob-taining Turkish support for an attackthrough the Black Sea against Germany'sflank." 2 In accord with these desires ofthe President and the Prime Minister, theCCS on 19 November had directed the com-bined planners to examine the situation inthe Mediterranean and recommend a policyfor subsequent action in the area. 3

At a White House meeting on 10 Decem-ber 1942, the President took up with theJCS the question of the next move after theclose of the campaign in North Africa.

General Marshall gave reasons for notundertaking any new operations in theMediterranean. The first thing to be done,he observed was to clear enemy forces from



bled the President that the paramounttask" before the United States and the

he observed, was to clear enemy forces fromTunisia in order to hold the area without


Strait of Gibraltar. He once again calledattention to the logistic difficulties of opera-tions in the Mediterranean and repeated hisopposition to "dabbling" wastefully in thatarea. Before any new operations were

undertaken there, he wanted to make surethat they would be worth the cost. M a r -shall wanted to settle the North Africancampaign quickly in order to increase therate of troop movements to the UnitedKingdom—then about 8,500 men a month.He declared it to be important to build up abalanced force to strengthen the defensesof the British Isles and to take advantage ofpossible German disintegration on the Con-tinent. He specifically argued that it wasimportant for the United States and theUnited Kingdom to be ready in March orApril 1943 to launch emergency operationsagainst the Brest peninsula or Boulogne, orboth, if there were signs that the Germanair force was becoming weaker or if Ger-man forces started to move through Spain.

h

operate. 5 But the President did not com-mit himself to any course of action. So faras the War Department planners could tell,it was still an open question whether hewould commit the United States to further

operations in the Mediterranean. Plan-ning for such eventualities had, of course, tobe continued. 6

Role of Air Power

In the closing weeks of the year, while the

Army planners were studying possible fu-ture operations in the Mediterranean, theywere also examining plans for air bombard-ment in the European theater. The ArmyAir Forces remained as eager as ever to con-centrate air power against Germany. G e n -eral Arnold held that bombing was the onlymeans of maintaining pressure against Ger-many, and that an integrated air offensivefrom the United Kingdom and North Af-rica would offset the dispersion of Alliedforces caused by the North African opera-



The President was of the opinion thatthere then was no need for an immediate

y ption. The main force would be based in

AFTER TORCH 365the United Kingdom. Arnold declaredthat a minimum force of 2,225 U. S. heavyand medium bombers based in the UnitedKingdom and utilizing American "precisionmethods" would in six months have a great

enough effect to make a land offensiveagainst Germany possible. 7

Commenting on these views, the Armyplanners had pointed to the limitations ofweather upon a sustained "all-out" bomberoffensive, as well as to the reservations ofthe British about any kind of cross-Channel

offensive before the complete collapse ofGermany. If the British would not agreeto exploit a favorable situation created bythe proposed bombing operations, they ob-served, then the operations would in largepart be wasted. 8

Recognizing that air power was a strate-gic weapon of great importance, the Armyplanners cast about for a proper role for itin the changed circumstances of the Euro-pean war. They were favorably inclinedto that part of the recommendations of the

ommended a more extensive air offensivethroughout the European theater from thesebases and intensive Allied pressure regard-less of the specific line of land action eventu-ally adopted in the theater. The Army

planners did not accept the more extremeclaims being advanced by exponents of vic-tory through air power. 10 They still sawa need for a tactically oriented air offensivebefore and during a combined land offensiveacross the Channel; they were not willingto rely solely on "strategic bombing" to pre-

pare the way for the defeat of Germany.

Summary of Main Alternatives

Examination of the possible courses ofaction in 1943 and thereafter led the Armyplanners to the conclusion that there were

three main alternatives—victory throughstrategic bombing, cross-Channel invasion,and continued pressure in the Me d iterra-nean region. 11

They rejected the first alternative—vic-



AAF—with which General Eisenhower wasi d f d l i U i d Ki

tory through strategic bombing—believingh h d f i d l d


sible, as a matter of logistics, before mid-1944. It would mean accepting the sacri-fice of many of the psychological and t a n -gible advantages promised by TORCH. Itwould also be to disregard the fact that large

ground forces would be required to safe-guard North Africa and the Middle East.In addition, the Army planners were verymuch impressed by the heavy cost in casu-alties of the Allied raid on Dieppe in August1942.12 They thus accepted once more theindefinite postponement of ROUNDUP.

The third alternative—continued pres-sure in the Mediterranean region—was theline of least resistance. The strategic ob-jectives for 1943 would be to open the Medi-terranean to Allied shipping, and to knockItaly out of the war. The proponents of

this alternative pointed out that the UnitedStates and the United Kingdom could notdecide, perhaps before mid-1943, when andwhere the decisive blow against Germanywould be struck. In the meantime, limited

i i h M di ld b

able misgivings toward the third alternativefor 1943. 13

The study of the War Department plan-ners had thus brought them by the turn ofthe year to no conclusion on which they

could heartily agree regarding the course tobe followed in the European—Mediter-ranean area after TORCH. But they werebeginning to face up to the need for somenew way of going about the defeat of Ger-many. Air bombardment as a strategicweapon suggested a combination of possi-bilities consistent with the view of strategyto which the American military chiefs ad-hered. Although the relations among thepossible elements—cross-Channel, air bom-bardment, and Mediterranean—were stillconfusing to the War Department planners,

they were beginning to think in terms ofpossible permutations and combinations ofoperations. They were still speaking—asa carry-over from earlier 1942 planning—largely in terms of this operation or that.



operations in the Mediterranean would bef h l t th S i t U i b ki g

But by the very circumstances of their in-

AFTER TORCH 367The War Against Japan

As long as plans for operations across theAtlantic in 1943 remained indeterminate,it was impossible to resolve the uncertainties

and disagreements of the American plannersover fu ture operations in the Pacific. Butsince a large-scale continuation of opera-tions in the Mediterranean was highly prob-able, they began to project a parallel de-velopment of operations in the Pacific.The Army planners continued to work on

the principle—which was never stated in somany words—that further "diversions" tooperations in the Mediterranean, as re-quired to maintain the momentum of the"diversionary" operations initiated there in1942, justified parallel "diversions" to op-erations in the Pacific, as required for the

same reasons. This equation remained thebasis of War Department dealings not onlywith Admiral King and General MacArthurbut also with the British, since the effectivecheck on British proposals involving in-

d h

joined in bottling up the Japanese in theBuna—Gona area. From the middle ofNovember 1942 until the middle of January1943, the Allied troops engaged in bitterfighting to eliminate the Japanese from their

strongly defended positions.14

In October 1942 the President had toldGeneral Marshall that he believed the north-east coast of New Guinea should be securedas soon as possible. Then operations couldbe undertaken against the New Britain-NewIreland area and from there against Truk,

the important Japanese base in the Caro-lines. The President's view was entirely inaccord with that of the Army strategicplanners who had long been maintainingthat Rabaul was the key to the Japaneseposition in the Southwest Pacific, and thebest way to approach Rabaul was from NewGuinea.

Although the immediate objective was theelimination of the threat to Port Moresby,the Papua Campaign was actually thefirst step in securing the northeast coast of



creased U. S. Army commitments in theM di l th t th t

New Guinea. This move was essentially



AFTER TORCH 369cision could be made only after prolongedconsideration, because of the "political,international and organizational implica-tions." The War Department also re-minded the Navy that provision must be

made for shifting air forces as well as navalforces in the Pacific from one sector to an-other. The action proposed by the Army,besides solving the problem at hand, wouldbe "a positive step toward eventual unifica-tion of command of all forces in thePacific." 19

By early January 1943, when the Chiefsof Staff left for the Casablanca Conference,the Army and Navy had reached no agree-ment on the details of the strategy and com-mand arrangements for continuing opera-tions against Rabaul. 20 Nor had the JCSas yet received MacArthur's detailed plansfor the employment of forces in those opera-tions. 21 In anticipation of these meetings,the War Department planners had them-selves drawn up for the Army representa-tives an outline strategic plan for an Allied

ff d R b l A

single commander.22 The reason for thiscondition was to make sure that the twojaws of the pincers would come together onRabaul. Among the advantages of the op-eration, the War Department planners ob-

served, were bringing the key Japanesenaval base at Truk within range of Alliedbombers, extending the area of Allied airreconnaissance, and removing the existingthreat to the Hawaii-Australia supply route.This operation, moreover, would continuethe offensive against Rabaul already

opened. Seven U. S. Army and Marinedivisions, five Australian and New Zealanddivisions, three Marine raider battalions,and one U. S. parachute regiment—alltold, about 187,000 combat troops—wouldbe required to execute the proposed plan.All these Allied forces were allocated to the

area but not all of them, had been sent.There were, moreover, deficiencies in cer-tain kinds of shipping—especially smallships for coastwise use—and some of thedivisions within the area lacked equipment

d t i i f j l d hibi



offensive to seize and occupy Rabaul. Ad f h l

and training for jungle and amphibiousi


with a unit to assemble and repair landingcraft. Such steps were in line with the re-laxation of War Department restrictions onPacific deployment following the combinedagreement on TORCH. In addition, the JCS

had approved, at the end of November1942, the diversion of the 25th Division—tentatively scheduled for Australia—to th eSouth Pacific, on the condition that the 1stMarine Division would be released to Gen-eral MacArthur. 23 Contingents of theMarine unit began to arrive in the South-

west Pacific in December, the vanguard ofa first-class division experienced in landingoperations. 24

Limited Operations in the Aleutians

During October and November 1942 thethreat of further Japanese penetration inthe Aleutian area remained of secondaryimportance so far as the Army planners wereconcerned. Since all available means werebeing used to bolster the precarious Alliedposition in the South and So th est Pa

semble forces to eject the Japanese fromthe Aleutians.

In the closing weeks of 1942 the Wash-ington staffs reconsidered the question ofoperations in the Aleutians. Late in No-

vember reports had come in that the Jap-anese had landed a reconnaissance party onAmchitka, an island just to the east of Kiska.Admiral Nimitz at once recommended toAdmiral King that Amchitka be occupiedas soon as possible by an Army garrison.He pointed to the possibility that the Jap-

anese might construct an airfield there—they had been unable to complete one oneither Kiska or Attu. 25

In mid-December 1942 General Mar-shall and Admiral King reached an agree-ment on a joint directive to Admiral Nimitzand General DeWitt for the preparation ofplans to occupy both Amchitka and Kiska.Amchitka was to be occupied as soon as pos-sible and an amphibious force was to betrained for the Kiska operation. But Mar-shall thought that for tactical and logistical

h h ld b d



position in the South and Southwest Pa- reasons the operation should not be under-

AFTER TORCH 371Chief of Staff expressed dismay that somany troops were being committed to Alas-ka for an essentially defensive role:

The present strength in Alaska I am in-formed is about 85,000 men and approved

commitments will raise this figure to over98,000. Considering the desperate fightingin which we are involved in the Solomons,New Guinea and Tunisia, and Stilwell's pre-dicament in Burma, we cannot afford thiscontinual increase in Alaska. 27

On 20 December the War Departmentspecifically told DeWitt that the forces forthe occupation of Amchitka would have tobe taken from those currently available tohim. 28

While detailed operational plans for theAmchitka and Kiska operations were beingprepared in the theater, the War Depart-ment strategic planners, in anticipation ofthe Casablanca discussions, drew up an out-line plan for the occupation of Kiska. 29 Onthe assumption that the impending land-ings on Amchitka would be successful, theproposed target date for the undertaking

anese aggression in the Aleutians and Alas-ka, remove a Japanese observation post inthe North Pacific, and deny the use ofKiska Harbor to the Japanese. 30 Theplanners were not at all sure that it would

be worth the expense in American lives,shipping, and equipment to remove a posi-tion that was then costly to the Japanesebecause of American air attacks. Evenafter the Japanese were driven from Kiska,furthermore, they would still have a listen-ing post in the Aleutian area on Attu, and toremove this would take a further investmentof American forces and resources. The op-eration would not, the planners maintained,result in the reduction of the American airand ground garrisons in Alaska. On thecontrary, it would increase the Alaskan gar-rison by the number of

forces required to oc-

cupy Kiska. Though acknowledging theadvantages of removing the Japanese threatin the northern Pacific, the Army plannerswere still wary of the further scattering ofAmerican strength



against Kiska was set for early May 1943.American strength.

At the same time that the planners were


mittee of the JPS reported at the end ofNovember 1942, listing what would haveto be done to prepare against this contin-gency. This included recapturing thewestern Aleutians—to ensure the safety of

the lines of communication—and obtainingSoviet co-operation in plans and prepara-tions for a campaign against Japan via thenorthern route. 33 On 5 January 1943 theJCS approved these recommendations, withslight modifications, for planning purposes. 34

Consideration of the northern route, how-

ever, was to be temporarily abandoned bythe Army staff planners following the SovietGovernment's refusal early in January 1943to allow a survey of facilities in easternSiberia. 35 The cancellation of the surveyproject ( B A Z A A R ) seriously curtailed th eplanning that could be done for a campaignagainst Japan by way of the northern route.But the unopposed landings by an Americantask force on Amchitka, begun on 12 Janu-ary 1943, just before the opening of theCasablanca Conference, raised the question

further dispersion of American forces in anindecisive area.

Plans for Burma Operations

The strategic location and manpower ofChina had continued to figure throughout1942 as essential—if somewhat abstract—factors in planning the war against Japan.Large Japanese ground forces were still inChina. 37 To make more use of bases inChina and of the huge reserves of Chinese

manpower would threaten Japanese posi-tions on the Asiatic mainland and allow airoperations both against Japanese coastwisetraffic and against the Japanese homeislands. It might well force the Japaneseto divert strength from other areas, specifi-cally from the South and Southwest Pacific.

To realize these possibilities, China's troopswould have to be armed and its basesequipped with supplies from the UnitedStates and Great Britain on a much greaterscale than in 1942, when only a trickle ofsupplies had reached China carried by a



Casablanca Conference, raised the questionf f th operations i th Aleutians 36

supplies had reached China, carried by al I di

AFTER TORCH 373essential for eventual offensive operationsagainst Japan proper. 38

Various proposals and plans—American,British, and Chinese—for an offensive inBurma had been under consideration in

Washington since the summer of 1942.39

It had soon become apparent to the com-bined planners that, fo r lack of necessarymeans, a major land offensive to retake allof Burma could not be launched before late1943, if then. 40 The combined chiefs di-rected, in early November 1942, that plan-

ning for this offensive continue. At thesame time they decided to explore the pos-sibilities of a limited operation earlier in1943. 41 By early December 1942 GeneralMarshall had ready for the JCS the WarDepartment's proposal for a limited offen-sive operation to be launched by the Gen-

eralissimo and General Stilwell in March1943. 42 It was to follow a British operation

to seize Akyab, which was already underway, and a British thrust toward the Chind-win River that was to begin in February1943. The War Department proposed thata limited spring offensive, to be launched by

forces converging f rom India and China, beaimed at opening a land supply route intoChina connecting Ledo with Myitkyina andBhamo thence to Wanting on the BurmaRoad. General Marshall stated to the JCSthat he considered the proposed Burma op-eration to be of the "utmost importance."

To reopen a land route from Burma to sup-ply the interior of China would make pos-sible the use of greater American ai r powerin China, since the required base facilitiescould be supplied overland rather than byair. There was even a good possibility, inMarshall's opinion, of using bases in China

to carry out the long-cherished project ofbombing Japan proper. The bombing ofJapan would influence opinion in India andChina and among the Soviet forces on theSiberian f ront and would "seriously com-plicate" the Japanese position in the South

38 Memo by JCS circulated as CCS 135, 26 Dec42, title: Bsc Strategic Concept for 1943.

For an example of CPS agreement on importanceof reopening the Burma Road and recapturing



plicate the Japanese position in the Southd S h f

of reopening the Burma Road and recapturingB i 31 t t 4 S 42

374 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFAREnese troops, armed with American weapons,were being trained in India at Ramgarh.Chinese forces in Yunnan Province, more-over, were being reorganized and consoli-dated by the Generalissimo. But Stilwell

still lacked the necessary road-building ma-chinery and engineers, medical service, andcommunication troops. To make up thedeficiencies would require the shipmentfrom the United States of 63,000 measuredcargo tons and 5,000-6,000 men duringJanuary and February 1943. The prob-

lem was to secure the necessary shipping.The JCS agreed, on 8 December, to directfurther study of the logistical and strategicimplications of the projected operation, andto acquaint the President with the plan. 43

Meanwhile, the projected operationagainst northern Burma for March 1943was being studied in the theater. Thelimited offensive, as conceived in GeneralMarshall's proposal of early December 1942(JCS 162) , had the approval of ChiangKai-shek, at least in principle. 44 But com-plex and delicate issues in connection with

Stilwell were apparently in agreement alsothat the command of all forces operatingfrom India would be under the British.Stilwell recommended to Chiang that heaccept British supreme command when the

British and Chinese efforts converged inBurma. But no decision had been reachedon this score by the end of the year. 45

The question of mutual support alsothreatened to affect a spring operation. InNovember 1942 Chiang had agreed to acombined operation for the spring of 1943—

as then proposed by Field Marshal Wavell—provided he was reasonably assured ofAllied air superiority and naval control ofthe Bay of Bengal. On these conditions hepromised to have fifteen divisions ready fo rthe operation by mid-February. 46 But itwas far from certain that these conditions

would be fulfilled. In the early part of De-cember one of the War Department plan-ners went so far as to declare flatly, "Itshould be clear enough by now that theBritish do not want the Chinese to go intoBurma " He went on to predict:



plex and delicate issues in connection with Burma. He went on to predict:



AFTER TORCH 377JCS recommended the eventual transfer ofexcess forces from North Africa to theUnited Kingdom in anticipation of the in-vasion of Western Europe in 1943. Theyproposed that Turkey should be maintained

in a state of benevolent neutrality until suchtime as help, in the form of supplies andminimum specialized forces, would insurethe security of Turkish territory and makeit available for Allied use.

Turning to the Pacific, the JCS recom-mended offensive and defensive operations

to secure Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand,Australia, and the lines of communicationthereto, and to keep the initiative in the"Solomon - Bismarck - East N ew GuineaArea." As for the Far East, the JCS urgedoffensive operations in Burma, with the im-mediate aim of reopening the supply routes

to China.The British Chiefs of Staff replied on 2

January 1943 that on most issues they werein agreement with their American col-leagues. 57 The British Chiefs stated thatthe main point of difference was that

and amphibious assaults (as against Sar-dinia, Sicily, and finally the mainland ofItaly). Along with the American Chiefsof Staff, they urged the increased bombingof Germany. They also proposed the

gathering of forces in the British Isles—butonly to the extent that the other operationsproposed by them would permit. TheBritish estimated that about twenty-oddBritish-American divisions would be readyto re-enter the Continent in August or Sep-tember 1943, if conditions at that time ap-

peared favorable for success. In theiropinion, this course of action would givegreater relief to the USSR than would con-centration on BOLERO at the expense of allother operations; nor would it render im-probable the main Burma operation(ANAKIM) in the winter of 1943-44.

The British Chiefs contended that thestrongest force that could be assembled byAugust 1943 for an attack upon northernFrance would be at most thirteen British andtwelve American divisions. Of these divi-sions, six (four British and two American)



p ( )

378 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFAREtwenty-five divisions would be only slightlyover one half the force originally planned forROUNDUP; for seven months, while the forcewas being built up, the USSR would begetting no relief and the Germans would

have time to recuperate.The British Chiefs therefore recom-mended "limited offensive operations in thePacific on a scale sufficient only to containthe bulk of Japanese forces in that area." 58

They also proposed that operations to re-open the Burma Road be undertaken as

soon as resources permitted. The Britishestimated that the Japanese were engagedalmost to the limit of their resources andthat their capabilities would not increase solong as "communications with Germany arekept severed."

The unsatisfactory exchange between the

American and British Chiefs before Casa-blanca was accompanied by the failure ofthe planning subcommittee of the CCS toagree on a course of action subsequent toTORCH. The planners reported that theywere helpless because of the lack of agree-

that the British were evidently "adamant inrelation to establishing a f ront in France."On the other hand, he was "adamantagainst operations which would result inunwarranted loss of shipping." Admiral

King was especially anxious to counteractwhat he believed to be the British under-estimation of Japanese capabilities. In hisopinion, unless constant pressure were main-tained to prevent Japanese consolidation oftheir conquests, the Allied cause would bejeopardized. He went so far as to suggest

the desirability of the Allies' deciding on apercentage basis what part of the over-alleffort should henceforth be directed againstJapan. General Marshall questioned thefeasibility of this approach. 60 On the basisof detailed findings of the joint planningcommittees, the Joint Chiefs were prepared

to reargue, at the conference, the case forimmediate concentration of forces in theBritish Isles. 61

The choice for 1943 appeared to be eitherto continue operations in the Mediterraneanand in the Pacific on a large scale, while



and in the Pacific on a large scale, while

AFTER TORCH 379of the Continent and a campaign in Burma.There was every reason to expect the Presi-dent and the Prime Minister to choose thefirst course, although General Marshallwould do his best to dissuade them.

Staff Planning and the President'sPosition

General Marshall's intention to do justthat became very evident in the discussionof the JCS with the President at the White

House on 7 January 1943—the only suchmeeting held in direct preparation for theforthcoming conference. 62 At this meetingthe President inquired of the JCS whetherall were in agreement that the Americandelegation should meet the British "unitedin advocating a cross-Channel operation."

General Marshall told the President thatthere was a difference of opinion, particu-larly among the planners, although theAmerican Chiefs themselves regarded across-Channel operation more favorablythan an operation in the Mediterranean.

Channel operation against the Brest penin-sula sometime after July 1943. The lossesin that operation would be in troops. Thecurrent shipping situation was so criticalthat "to state it cruelly, we could replace

troops whereas a heavy loss in shipping,which would result from the Brimstone[Sardinia] Operation, might completely de-stroy any opportunity for successful opera-tions against the enemy in the near future."

Marshall concluded that in view of cur-rent differences in American and British

military opinion on the critical issue ofcross-Channel versus Mediterranean opera-tions, "the question had resolved itself intoone thing or the other with no alternativein sight." The President, seeking to post-pone a final decision, renewed the requesthe had made in early December 1942 that

the JCS consider the possibility of an inter-mediate, compromise position. He sug-gested the possibility of gathering Americanforces in England and making plans fo roperations in northwestern Europe as wellas in the Mediterranean, leaving the actual



F M h ll h " l f d i i i b f h


sideration in Washington, how much morelend-lease aid to promise the USSR, thePresident left the JCS uncertain how farhe was willing to go. He did not define hisviews on the conflict—which had longtroubled Generals Marshall and Arnold andtheir staffs—between increased air aid tothe USSR and American air training pro-grams and plans and operations. He simplyproposed not to answer Soviet requests fo rmore aircraft and to send General Marshallto discuss the matter with Stalin after theCasablanca Conference.

The most striking illustration of the wantof understanding between the White Houseand the military staffs was the President'sannouncement, at the 7 January meeting,of his intention to support the "uncondi-

tional surrender" concept as the basic Alliedaim in the war. 63 The President simplytold the JCS that he would talk to the PrimeMinister about assuring Stalin that theUnited States and Great Britain would con-tinue on until they reached Berlin and

The Casablanca Conference

On 14 January 1943 the President andthe Prime Minister met, in company withtheir leading political and military advisers,

at Casablanca. They spent ten days re-viewing the questions at issue in global strat-egy and considering the next move afterTORCH. There were practical reasons forthe choice of Casablanca as a meeting place.Any plans fo r subsequent action were di-rectly related to the course of the North

African campaign, and it was desirable tocanvass the possibilities with the command-ers on the spot. The hopes for a quicktermination of that campaign had been dis-appointed, and uncertainty when it wouldend complicated and unsettled all British-American planning for the future.

As the exchange of opinion before theCasablanca Conference indicated, GeneralMarshall had felt neither obliged nor en-couraged to try at once to unite the Ameri-can representatives, from the Presidentdown on a revised version of the plan to



AFTER TORCH 381

MAJ. GEN. T. T. HANDY, Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, and otherplanners of the division. Seated left to right: Col. C. A. Russell, Col. J. E. Upston,Brig. Gen. P. H. Tansey, General Handy, Brig. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, Col. E. E.Partridge, and Col. R. E. Starr; standing left to right: Col. R. C. Lindsay, Col. V. H.Connor, Col. F. L. Fair, Col. J. C. Blizzard, Jr., Col. C. W. Stewart, Jr., Col. W. L.




ing the scope of operations against Japanand in the President's announcement of theunconditional surrender concept. But theimportant thing for the immediate futurewas that the advances already begun in the

Mediterranean and in the Pacific would becarried on in the two areas in which U. S.deployment had been especially heavy in1942.65

The Future of Planning

The indecisiveness of the CasablancaConference on basic strategic issues—whichappeared to the American staff to be a vic-tory for the British Chiefs—brought hometo the Army strategic planners the need toadjust themselves to a new phase of coali-tion warfare. The effect of General Mar-shall's rear guard action at the conferencewas to give them the time they badly neededto regroup for a "counteroffensive" in theirdealings with the British in 1943. Theproblem of limiting operations in "subsidi-ary" theaters, which the War Department

that General Eisenhower had submitted, thesense of conviction and urgency that hadappeared in the oral and written presenta-tions of the War Department case—by Stim-son and Robert A. Lovett, Marshall, Arnold,

and Wedemeyer—had had their effect,though not the effect intended. But theirarguments were most evidently not strongenough in themselves to overcome the gravi-tational pull on the President of the diverseclaims urged by the British Prime Minister,Admiral King, and General MacArthur.

What was needed was a far more elaborateand extensive analysis of the "American po-sition" than could be developed in the mindsof a few War Department officials who hadstrong preconceptions and enormous oper-ating responsibilities. To this task of analy-sis, similar to that that the British staff had

long since made for the "British position,"the American planners would have to ad-dress themselves.

The strategic planners had to face up toth e problems of preparing fo r maximumoffensive effort in the global conflict. The



Appendix B

WAR DEPARTMENT DRAFT OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR LONDON CONFERENCE-JULY 1942*

JULY 15, 1942.MEMORANDUM TO GENERAL MARSHALL

ADMIRAL KINGSubject: Instructions for London Conference—

July, 1942.

1. You will proceed immediately to London as my personalrepresentatives for the purpose of consultation with appropriateBritish authorities on the conduct of the war.

2. You will carefully investigate the possibility ofexecuting SLEDGEHAMMER, bearing in mind th e vital urgency ofsustaining Russia this year. This is of such great importancethat grave risks are justified in order to accomplish it. Ifyou consider that, with the most complete and wholeheartedeffort on the part of the British, SLEDGEHAMMER is possibleof execution, you should strongly urge that preparations for itbe pushed with the u tmost vigor and that it be executed in caseRussian collapse becomes imminent. The geographical objectiveof a cross-channel operation in 1942 is not of vital importance,providing the great purpose of the operation can be achieved,



APPENDIX B 385contain appreciable German forces. Material aid to Russia shouldcontinue with the bulk delivered through Basra, the northernconvoys to Russia to be suspended.

4. You will, with the British au thorities, investigate thecourses of action open to us in the event of a Russian collapse.

In this investigation, and in the recommendations you make as tothe course to be pursued, you will be guided by the followingprinciples:

a. Our aim must continue to be the complete defeat ofthe Axis powers. There can be no compromise on this point.

b. We should concentrate our efforts and avoid dispersion.c. Effective coordinated use of British and American

forces should be sought.d. Available U.S. and British forces should be brought

into action as quickly as they can be profitably used. Itis very important that U.S. ground troops are brought intoaction against the enemy in 1942.

e. Any course of action adopted should include supportof an air offensive from the British Isles by strong U.S. airforces and the assurance of the security of that base for

operations against Germany by U.S. ground reinforcements.5. The subjects listed below are considered as appropriate

for discussion with the British in arriving at our course of actionin case of Russian collapse. Your discussion will not necessarilybe restricted to these subjects. The United States will not becommitted to a course of action to be followed in the event ofR i ll i th t ifi appro al



Appendix CTIMING OF TORCH

The records consulted for the month ofAugust, the time of the debate over the datefo r launching TORCH, contain no indicationthat the British spoke of wanting the opera-tion to follow promptly after the plannedoffensive in the Libyan Desert ( LIGHTFOOT,for which a target date had not yet been set),

or that the President alluded to the desir-ability of having it come well before the con-gressional elections of 4 November. It isclear, however, that Churchill consideredthe relation of LIGHTFOOT to TORCH. In amessage to the War Cabinet on 6 August, hestated his view that "a victory over Rommel

in August or September may have a decisiveeffect upon the attitude of the French inNorth Africa when 'Torch' begins." 1 Fol-lowing an understanding between Church-ill and General Alexander, the Prime Min-ister advised the President on 26 August that

"General Alexander will attack in sufficienttime to influence Torch favourably should

he be successful." 4

It appears from the silence of the recordthat the President did not introduce theNovember elections into the discussion ofthe timing of TORCH. Unwillingness tohave imputed to him, in case the operationshould fail, that partisan reasons had over-

ruled military judgment, may even have in-fluenced him to acquiesce in the later date,once he understood what the reasons were.The postponement of TORCH (from theOctober date which the President hadhoped for ) may have been a disappoint-ment to the President, but Robert E. Sher-wood states that Roosevelt said at the time,"this was a decision that rested with theresponsible officer, Eisenhower, and notwith the Democratic National Commit-tee." 5 Another reference to the mattercame during the Casablanca Conference in



Appendix DMONTHLY DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL ARMY STRENGTH IN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

AND OVERSEAS, FROM NOVEMBER 1941 T H R O U G H DECEMBER 1942 (IN THOUSANDS)

The total strength of the United States Army, as of 31 December 1942, was esti-

mated at 5,398,000. Of this total number, approximately 1,065,000 officers and enlistedmen were stationed outside of the continental United States. The month-by-monthnumber is shown in the following table and chart, together with the percentage ratio ofoverseas troops at monthly intervals, for the period from November 1941 throughDecember 1942.

Strength and Deployment of U. S. Army *



Appendix E

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF ARMY

STRENGTH IN OVERSEAS THEATERS—EARLY DECEMBER 1942

Statistical summaries for Army overseasstrength a year after Pearl Harbor are foundin a number of diverse sources, publishedand unpublished. There are certain dis-

crepancies in strength figures and even inidentity and number of units cited in thevarious sources used as a result partly ofdifferences in time of reporting—varyingfrom a few days to a few weeks—and partlyof varying statistical bases of counting and

reporting. Wherever possible,

these datahave been checked against one another andreconciled.

The strength figures in each of the follow-ing tables are taken from the OPD WeeklyStatus Map of 3 December 1942. Figures

troops and air service with air troops. The

OPD Weekly Status Maps do not necessarilycorrespond with other statistical records keptin the field or in Washington during the war,but they did provide the War Departmentwith its most reliable detailed contemporarysummary of over-all Army deployment fo rplanning purposes. Rough as their statis-

tics are, they still represent one of the mostvaluable sources available on total deploy-ment, area by area, of personnel present, enroute, and projected. The post-1945 re-ports of the Strength of the Army, issued byOffice, TAG, Strength Accounting Branch,as part of its STM-30 series, contain revisedand official monthly summaries on actualArmy strength and deployment in theatersof operations and major commands duringthe war years.

The number and identity of divisions aretaken f rom: (1 ) Directory of the Army of




ARMY STRENGTH IN OVERSEAS THEATERS

Present En Route Projected

TOTAL 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 ,640Ground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 760,960 (17 Divs) 2 1,560,190 (30 Divs)Air. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202,100 (66 Groups) 2 420,610 (73 Groups)

EUROPEAN THEATER:British Isles and Iceland: 3

Ground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156,970 (2 Divs) 4 912,160 (21 Divs)A i r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,190 (16 Groups) 214,500 (30 Groups)Total. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 8 0

French North Africa 5 (Moroc-co, Algeria, Tunisia):

G r o u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127,980 (6 Divs) 6

A i r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,600 (1 1 Groups)MIDDLE EAST-AFRICA:

Egypt-Levant States-Eritrea-Aden, Iran-Iraq, Palestine:

Ground. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6,590 36,560A i r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,150 (7 Groups) 23,190 (9 Groups)T o t a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 , 090

Central Africa (Liberia, GoldCoast, Belgian Congo-French Equatorial Africa,Kenya):

G r o u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,760 4,030A i r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 , 1 2 0 2,050

CENTRAL PACIFIC AREA:Hawaii, Fanning Island, Christ-

mas, Canton, Midway,



Appendix F

SHIPMENT OF DIVISIONS—1942

There is a vast amount of detailed infor-mation on the shipment of divisions overseasin World War II, but a simple table withprecise dates and brief explanatory notes forthe main phases in the movement of divi-sions overseas in 1942 has not been found in

Department of the Army files. The sourcesof information on which this table and theaccompanying notes were based are scat-tered in diverse Army files and publications.A compilation of the assembled detaileddata from which the table and notes weredrawn is contained in Strategic Plans UnitStudy 4. Further detailed information canbe secured by consulting official divisionrecords now located at the Field RecordsDivision, Kansas City Records Center, Kan-sas City, Missouri.

The most useful sources consulted were:

and (6) division histories published by divi-sion associations. It was necessary to relyheavily on the history data cards maintainedby the Organization and Directory Section,Operations Branch, Adjutant General'sOffice. These history data cards were com-piled during the war from whatever sourceswere available—water transportation re-ports, strength reports, station lists, postalreports, and AG letters—and are thereforenot entirely accurate. Discrepancies werealso found in the combat operations reportsfor departure and arrival dates of divisions.

There are a number of explanations forthese discrepancies. Scheduled departuresmight be changed or delayed; availability ofshipping might send units of the division indifferent convoys; time of arrival of a shipmight be reported as a different day fromthat of debarkation of troops; and shipsarriving at one harbor might be diverted to



APPENDIX F 393

at a later date by the division headquartersand the main body of troops, and frequentlyby a rear echelon movement of units held inport-of-embarkation backlog, depending onthe availability of shipping. If the destina-tion was in a combat area, a regimentalcombat team would often comprise the firstechelon of a divisional movement. In thelight of piecemeal movements of the ele-

ments o f a division, it was found most usefulin establishing dates to chart the movementof the division headquarters. Unless other-wise indicated, the dates used in the tablefor sailing, arrival, and reshipment refer tothe division headquarters. These dates donot necessarily coincide with those for themovement of the advance echelon or therest of the division.



Appendix GDEAD-WEIGHT TONNAGE OF VESSELS UNDER ARMY CONTROL IN PACIFIC AND ATLANTIC

AREAS FROM NOVEMBER 1941 THROUGH DECEMBER 1942*During the year 1942, shipping in the service of the Army grew from a total of 871,-

368 dead-weight tons to a total of 3,940,791 dead-weight tons—an increase of 352 percent.



Bibliographical Note and Guideto Footnotes

This volume was written from severalgroups of records kept by the War Depart-ment before and during World War II, in-terpreted with the help of a number of othersources, principally service histories and

published memoirs. From these sourcesmay be established long and fairly completeseries of official transactions in 1942 deal-ing with strategic planning. For 1941 andearlier years, when strategic planning wasonly loosely related to the development ofnational policy and to current operations,the sequence o f official transactions was veryoften broken, and much of the evidence willbe found, if at all, in other sources thanthose used by the authors.

Official Records

of government). Each of the several setsof records in which these documents werefound and consulted will be kept intact andin due course will be transferred to The Na-tional Archives of the United States.

These records are described in Federal Rec-ords of World War II, Volume II , MilitaryAgencies, prepared by the General ServicesAdministration, Archives and Records Serv-ice, The National Archives (Washington,Government Printing Office, 1951).(Hereafter cited as Federal Rcds. )

The principal record groups used in pre-paring this volume are those kept by the fol-lowing offices: (1 ) Office of the Chief ofStaff and the divisions of the War De-partment General Staff (Federal Rcds, pp.92-151); (2) Headquarters, Army Air




Policy Group records contain a virtuallycomplete set of papers issued by the Jointand Combined Chiefs of Staff and their sub-committees, with OPD drafts, comments,and related papers, and constitute one ofthe most important collections of World WarII records on matters of joint and combinedstrategic planning and policy. The Execu-tive Office files, informally arranged, con-tain documents on policy and planning thatwere of particular interest to the AssistantChief of Staff, O P D . Many of them are

to be found nowhere else in War Depart-ment files. All these files, with the exceptionof the Executive Office files (still in the cus-tody of the G-3 Division of the GeneralStaff) were located at the time o f writing inthe Departmental Records Branch, Adju-tant General's Office (DRB AGO). F o r -

mal strategic plans are Registered Docu-ments (Regd Docs) of the G-3 Division.Such plans are held by G-3 unless they havebeen declared obsolete, in which case theyare located in a special collection of theClassified Files, Adjutant General's Office.

In the annotation of these sources, thetype of communication is always indicated.Normally four other kinds of descriptive in-formation are presented—originator, ad-dressee, date, and subject. A file refer-ence is not given for all documentation thatmay be readily located and positively identi-fied without one—AG letters, messages inthe Classified Message Center series, andminutes an d papers of the JCS and CCSand their subordinate committees. AG let-ters can best be located by the Adjutant Gen-eral's Office by the numbers of the letters;the classified messages can be located by dateand classified message number in any of sev-eral file series; the JCS and CCS papersand minutes can be found by the numbersassigned to them by the JCS and CCS; andJoint Board papers and minutes can be lo-

cated by the Joint Board subject numberand serial number. The official file of theJCS and the CCS is under the control ofthe JCS, as is the official set of Joint Boardpapers and minutes. (Federal Rcds, pp.2-14.)



BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE AND GUIDE TO FOOTNOTES 399

operations of the Army Air Forces, the in-dispensable secondary source is the seriespublished by the Air Force, THE ARMYAIR FORCES IN WORLD WAR II,edited by Wesley Frank Craven and JamesLea Cate. These volumes also contain con-cise summaries of the strategic planningback of the operations described.

Finally, the authors have repeatedlyused, often in manuscript form, the workof their colleagues writing the history ofthe UNITED STATES ARMY INWORLD WAR II, especially the manu-script, The Logistics of Global Warfare, byRichard M. Leighton and Robert W. Coak-ley and the volume, Stillwell's Mission toChina, by Charles F. Romanus and RileySunderland (Washington, GovernmentPrinting Office, 1952).

This volume could hardly have beenwritten without the help of published worksdrawing on the recollections of prominentparticipants and official records to which theauthors did not have access, notably:

Churchill, Winston S., The Second WorldWar: Their Finest Hour (Boston, Hough-to n Mifflin Company, 1949).

Churchill, Winston S., The Second World

War: The Grand Alliance (Boston, Hough-

ton Mifflin Company, 1950).Churchill, Winston S., The Second WorldWar: The Hinge of Fate (Boston, Hough-ton Mifflin Company, 1950).

Sherwood, Robert E., Roosevelt andHopkins, An Intimate History (re v. ed.,New York, Harper & Brothers, 1950).

Stimson, Henry L. and McGeorge Bundy,On Active Service in Peace and War (NewYork, Harper & Brothers, 1948).

A typescript copy of the original manu-script of the present volume, bearing thetitle, "Strategic Planning for Coalition War-fare, 1939-42," and containing unabridgedfootnotes, has been deposited in OCMHFiles where it may be consulted by studentsof the subject.



Glossary of Abbreviations

AA AntiaircraftA&N Army and Navy

AAC Army Air CorpsAAF Army Air ForcesABC American-British Conversations (Jan-Mar 41)ABDA (COM) Australian-British-Dutch-American (Command)ACofS Assistant Chief of StaffActg ActingADB American-Dutch-BritishADC Alaska Defense CommandAdd AdditionalAdmin AdministrationAdv AdvanceAEF Allied Expeditionary ForceAFHQ Allied Force HeadquartersAG Adjutant GeneralAGF Army Ground Forces

AGO Adjutant General's OfficeAlt AlternateALUSNA U. S. naval attacheAm AmmunitionAmer AmericanAMMISCA American Military Mission to ChinaAmph Amphibious (i )



GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 401

Chem ChemicalChm ChairmanCIGS Chief Imperial General StaffCINC Commander in ChiefCINCAF Commander in Chief, U. S. Asiatic FleetCINCPAC Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

CM-IN Cable message, incomingCM-OUT Cable message, outgoingCMTC Combined Military Transport CommitteeCNO Chief of Naval OperationsCofAAC Chief of Army Air CorpsCoAC Chief of Air CorpsCofAS Chief of Air StaffCofS Chief of StaffCsofS Chiefs of StaffCollab CollaborationCom CommitteeCOMALSEC Commander Alaskan SectorComd(s) Command(s)Comdg CommandingComdr Commander

Comdt CommandantCOMGENSOPAC Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces in the South PacificComm CommissionCOMINCH Commander in Chief, U. S. FleetCOMNAVEU Commander U. S. Naval Forces, EuropeCOMSOPAC Commander, South PacificC f( ) C f ( )



40 2 STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

Equip EquipmentEst EstimateEstab Establish(ment)ETO European Theater of OperationsETOUSA European Theater of Operations, U. S. ArmyExch Exchange

G-1 Personnel section of divisional or higher staffG-2 Intelligence sectionG-3 Operations sectionG-4 Supply sectionGHQ General HeadquartersGp GroupGS General StaffGt Brit Great BritainHist History, historicalHv HeavyIB Intelligence BulletinIncl Inclosed, inclosing, inclosure, includingInd Indorsed, indorsementIndef IndefiniteInfo Information

Instn(s) Instruction (s)Intel IntelligenceJB Joint BoardJCS Joint Chiefs of StaffJIC Joint Intelligence CommitteeJPC Joint (Army and Navy) Planning CommitteeJ Pl C J i (A i B i i h) Pl i C i



GLOSSARY OF ABBREVIATIONS 403

N Af North AfricaNatl NationalNav NavalNYPE New York Port of EmbarkationObsn(s) Observation(s)Obsr(s) Observer(s)

OCAAC Office of the Chief of the A rmy Air CorpsOCofS Office of the Chief of StaffOCT Office of the Chief of TransportationOff ( s ) Off i ce ( s ) , officer(s)OPD Operations DivisionOpNav Office of the Chief of Naval OperationsOpn(s) Operation(s)Orgn OrganizationOSW Office of the Secretary of WarPdn ProductionPers Personal, personnelPGSC Persian Gulf Service CommandPhil PhilippinesP.I. Philippine IslandsPL Public Law

Plng PlanningPOA Pacific Ocean AreaPOE Port of EmbarkationPTO Pacific Theater of OperationsRAF Royal Air ForceRAAF Royal Australian Air ForceRcd Record




Sit SituationSJB Secretary of the Joint BoardSN Secretary of the NavySOS Services of SupplySPA South Pacific AreaSp SpecialS& P Strategy and PolicySPENAVO Special Naval Observer, LondonSPOBS Special Army Observer Group in LondonStf StaffSum(s) Summary(ies)SW Secretary of WarSWPA Southwest Pacific AreaT Theater

TAG The Adjutant GeneralTDUN Tentative Deployment of United Nations, 1942Tech TechnicalTEDA Tentative Deployment of U. S. Forces, 1942Tel TelephoneTng TrainingTransf TransferTr(s) Troop(s)U.K. United KingdomU.N. United NationsUSAFBI United States Army Forces in the British IslesUSAFFE United States Army Forces in the Far EastUSAFIA United States Army Forces in AustraliaUSAFICA United States Army Forces in Central Africa



UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II

The following volumes have been published or are in press:

The War DepartmentChief of Staff: Prewar Plans and PreparationsWashington Command Post: The Operations Division

Strategic Planning fo r Coalition Warfare: 1941-1942Strategic Planning fo r Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944Global Logistics an d Strategy: 1940-1943Global Logistics an d Strategy: 1943-1945The Army and Economic MobilizationThe Army and Industrial Manpower

The Army Ground Forces

The Organization of Ground Combat TroopsThe Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops

The Army Service ForcesThe Organization and Role of the Army Service Forces

The Western HemisphereThe Framework of Hemisphere DefenseGuarding the United States and Its Outposts

The War in the PacificThe Fall of the PhilippinesGuadalcanal: The First OffensiveVictory in PapuaCARTWHEEL: The Reduction of RabaulS i f th Gilb t d M h ll



The Supreme CommandLogistical Support of the Armies, Volume ILogistical Support of the Armies, Volume II

The Middle East TheaterThe Persian Corridor and Aid to Russia

The China-Burma-India TheaterStilwell's Mission to ChinaStilwell's Command ProblemsTime Runs Out in CBI

The Technical ServicesThe Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for WarThe Chemical Warfare Service: From Laboratory to FieldThe Chemical Warfare Service: Chemicals in CombatThe Corps of Engineers: Troops and EquipmentThe Corps of Engineers: The War Against Japan

The Corps of Engineers: The War Against GermanyThe Corps of Engineers: Military Construction in the United StatesThe Medical Department: Hospitalization and Evacuation; Zone of InteriorThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the Med iterranean an d Minor

TheatersThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the European Theater of OperationsThe Medical Department: Medical Service in the War Against JapanThe Ordnance Department: Planning Munitions for War

The Ordnance Department: Procurement and SupplyThe Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and BattlefrontThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IThe Quartermaster Corps: Organization, Supply, and Services, Volume IIThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against JapanThe Quartermaster Corps: Operations in the War Against Germany



410STRATEGIC PLANNING FOR COALITION WARFARE

Aircraft carriersconstruction of, 193, 312conversion of transports to, 72Curtin requests British for SWPA, 212-13delivery of planes to Philippines by, 84-85Enterprise damaged, 306for G Y M N A S T, 112-13, 268

Hermes sunk in Indian Ocean, 202Japanese superiority in, 120, 223, 256, 258loss in Coral Sea, 223 , 311MacArthur requests for SWPA, 213 , 215, 259in Pacific, 223, 306, 311for Pacific-operations, 259-60, 265Ranger ferries planes for use in India, 203Ranger loaned to move aircraft to Middle East, 248,

251for TORCH, 287-88, 290n, 311, 320Wavell requests for ABDA, 133-35

Air-to-surface-vessel radar, 258Akyab, 13 7

British operations against, 373, 375Alaska, 154, 155, 270-71, 361, 3 7 1 n , 3 7 7 . See also

Aleutian Islands; North Pacific.ai r route to Siberia, 121, 142-43, 145, 319, 336,

339-46, 357aircraft on hand in, December 1942, 360, 360nAlcan Highway, 356B-17's for defense of, 69, 225Eleventh Air Force reinforcement, 225 , 258establishment of bases in, 61n54th Fighter Group diverted to, 258Japanese threat to , 224-25, 257, 356, 371and Pacific alternative, 271

d l i f i i Al i 370 71

Amchitka. S ee also Aleutian Islands.American landings on, 372Japanese landings on, 370plan for capture of, 370-72

American Military Mission to China, 57American Volunteer Group, 136-37, 138

reinforcement of, 74-75, 203

American-British Conversations, 32-43, 63, 65, 157.See also ABC-1.conference delegates, British, 33conference delegates, U.S., 32-33Dominion advisers at, 33n

American-Dutch-British conversations, 65-67. See alsoADB-1; ADB-2.

Ammunition, 186for Bri t ish, 20fo r China, 73fo r Middle East, 253for Philippines, 67-68, 84shortage of , 17n , 48-49, 71 , 2 2 4 , 318nfo r troop training, 194, 195n

Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet, 315Amphibious operations, planning for, 112 , 194, 261-

62in Aleutians, 258, 370-72in French North Africa, 315n. See also GYMNAST;

TORCH.in Mediterranean after TORCH, 377in South Pacific, 258-63, 265. See also Task One.in Southwest Pacific, 158, 258-63, 265, 367-70. See

also Task Two; Task Three.Amphibious training, 109, 148, 158, 182, 187, 259,

265, 2 6 7 , 2 7 1 , 370. See also Atlantic AmphibiousC



INDEX411

Antiaircraft artilliery units—Continuedfor South Pacific, 299, 30 4in Southwest Pacific, 150

Anti-Comintern Pact, 35Antigua, 44, 49nAntilles, 61nAntisubmarine operations, 270 , 312n , 356

Antisubmarine ship construction, 193. See also Ship-ping, construction.Antwerp, 186Anzac area, 160, 263nANZAC Task Force, B-17 squadron diverted to sup-

port of 153, 263Aquitania, 151, 309nARCADIA Conference, 87, 96, 97-126, 128, 132, 139n,

140n, 143, 1 4 7 , 152, 166, 175, 201 , 205, 217n ,221, 27 0

agenda for, 97American preparation for, 97-98British strategy statement, 99-101, 295-97, 322. See

also ABC-4/CS-1.Declaration of the United Nations, 98meetings held, 98-99

Archangel, 101, 142, 229, 230, 231 , 336Areas o f strategic responsibility, 40n, 170, 176. S ee also

Command.

American, 30, 40, 165-68British, 166-67, 189, 200-201, 331, 35 5division of world into, 165-68

Argentia. See Atlantic Conference.Armored Divisions

1st, 48n, 109n, 191, 250, 313, 317, 354, 358n2d, 48n, 249-50 , 2 4 9 n , 285 313, 315, 316, 3543d 48 109 313 316 17 316

Army, U.S.—Continuedstrength, December 1941, 350strength, December 1942, 350strength authorized in 1940, 21nstrength authorized in 1942, 195, 350-51. See also

Troop Basis, 1942; Victory Program Troop Basis,strength authorized in 1943, 352-53

strength overseas, December 1941, 353strength overseas, December 1942, 353. See also De-ployment of U.S. forces,

strength in World War II, 61n, 353nultimate size and composition, 58-59, 61n, 351-53.

See also Victory Program.Army Air Corps, 250, 351. See also Army Air Forces,

doctrine on employment of air power, 132expansion under ABC-2 agreement, 38-40plan for airway via Takoradi to Cairo, 40. See also

Air ferry routes, Afr ican,plan for ferry route to South Pacific, 70-71. See also

Air fe rry routes, South Pacific,planning for operations against Germany, 39-40planning for use of air forces in Egypt and Turkey,

40representation on committees and boards, 41ntraining program, 38-40

Army Air Forces, 81n, 147, 198, 2 4 2 . See also ArmyAir Corps; Arnold, General Henry H.

ABDA area as air theater, 128aircraft overseas, December 1942, 360-61Alaska-Siberia fe rry route, 1 2 1 , 142-43, 145, 319,

336, 339-46allocation of units to Far East, 70Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 330-36,

344




Army Air Forces—Continueddiversion of 15 groups from BOLERO, 281, 296,

300-302, 308, 318, 320-22doctrine of daylight bombing, 318-19. See also

Strategic bombing.doctrine on employment of air power, 132, 321,

358, 365Doolittle mission, 139Drummond-Adler mission, 332-36Eighth Air Force discontinues operations, 319, 321nexpansion of, 38-40, 201-02, 207, 227 , 334, 336,

345-46, 347-48. See also Aircraft, policy on allo-cations; Arnold-Slessor-Towers agreement.

ferry route to South Pacific, 70-71. See also Air ferryroutes, South Pacific.

ferry route to USSR via Basra, 341nferry route to USSR via polar icecap, 342n

and GYMNAST forces, 106, 108, 236Halverson Project, 139, 141land-based air cover for Navy, 154-56, 223 , 256,

26 0Middle East as air theater, 255, 360and Midway battle, 256, 256nmobile forces for use in South Pacific, 211-12,

218-19, 223-24, 264, 299, 301n, 320obsolescent planes for China, 141-42and Pacific alternative, 271plan for air support o f BOLERO, 18 3reaction to Japanese landings in Aleutians, 257,

257n, 371Siberia project, 121, 142-46, 270, 27 1, 328, 332,

341-46strategic bombing of Germany, 321 , 322, 324, 325,

358, 364-66

Arnold, General Henry H.—Continuedon air forces for North African operation, 112, 303,

32 1on air representation on mission to London, 41non aircraft allocations to British, 201, 202n, 207. See

also Arnold-Slessor-Towers agreement,on aircraft allocations to USSR, 207-08, 347and Alaska-Siberia air route, 342n, 343on American air operations in Siberia, 341-42on Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 331,

333at ARCADIA Conference, 99at Atlantic Conference, 53non bombing Germany, 321 , 321n, 324, 364-65,

365non bombing Japan, 139non deployment of air forces to Pacific, 162, 223n,

303, 32 1on discontinuance of Eighth Air Force operations,321n

on dispersion of aircraft in overseas theaters, 361on establishment of Tenth Air Force in India, 140inspection of Pacific bases, 321-22on Maxwell-Brereton command dispute, 255and mobile air forces for use in South Pacific, 224orders bombers to Philippines, 85orders 90th Group to Hawaii, 302responsibility for orders af ter Pearl Harbor, 81and 33d Pursuit Group fo r TORCH, 320on transport planes for USSR, 207-08trip to London, 1941, 39n, 41ntrip t o London, M ay 1942, 196, 227 , 233-34, 24 8

Arnold-Portal agreement, 201 , 201nArnold-Portal-Towers agreement. See Arnold-Slessor-



INDEX 413

Atlantic—Continuedleased bases, 21 , 21n, 41, 44, 49n, 147n, 148, 353n,

356nmajor military effort in, 17, 26-27, 29-30, 38, 60,

67-68, 156-59, 161, 182, 217 , 2 2 1 - 2 2 , 238-39,243-44, 267-68. See also BOLERO; Offensive op-erations, Europe versus Pacific; Plan Dog; RAIN-BO W 5.

naval strength in, 270, 310-11, 310nshipping in Army service, December 1942, 361-62shipping losses in, 51, 53, 229-30, 238, 265 , 312,

312n, 336Atlantic, Battle of, 308Atlantic Amphibious Corps, 314, 315. See also Am-

phibious training.Atlantic Conference, 53-56, 68, 76, 99n, 103Atlantic Fleet, U.S., 50, 311

ATL's, 193, 194Attrition, rate of, 231, 313, 361Attu , 356, 370, 37 1

Japanese landing on, 257Auchinleck, General Sir Claude, 175, 176, 252Auckland, 305Augusta, 53Aurand, Brig. Gen. Henry S ., 144n, 199Australia, 9, 36, 45n, 151, 153, 194, 205 259 377

and ABDA Command, 123-26advisers at ABC-1 conference, 33nair base construction in, 96, 302on air ferry route, 114air forces transferred to Burma from, 137-38,

140-41air units allocated to, 1 4 9 , 152-54, 158-59, 172,

211, 21 7 219 301 358n

Australia—Continuedestablishment of base in, 87-96, 98in Far Eastern strategy, 1224 1 s t Division ordered to, 128-30, 131, 149-50, 158,

162-63, 17241st Division training in, 303Japanese threat to, 114 , 115, 120, 130-31, 133, 155,

158, 172, 2 1 2 -1 5 , 217 219 219n,

MacArthur commands SWPA, 165, 169-73MacArthur ordered to, 165MacArthur's relations with Curtin, 213-15mobile air forces for use in South Pacific, 211-12,

219, 2 2 3 -2 4 , 264 299 320and New Guinea campaign, 36719th Group designated Australian Mobile Air

Force, 264n147th Field Artillery Regiment assigned to, 129,

129n, 150and Pacific advisory council, 166. See also PacificWar Council.

and Pacific alternative, 271and Pacific War Council, 217nPensacola convoy ordered to, 83-84, 88planes and ammunition ordered to, 85reinforcement of, 115-17, 118, 128-30, 131, 147,

148-50, 152-54 , 157 158 162-64 , 1217 , 219, 358n. See also Deployment of U.S.forces

return of divisions from Middle East, 127-28, 130,152, 162-63, 198, 2 1 2 - 1 3 , 214

Roosevelt directs reinforcement of, 2 1 7 , 218-19security of line of communications to, 158, 160-61,

163-64, 185, 189, 211-12, 214 226 2

7th Australian Division, proposal to divert to




Azores, 6, 44-45, 52, 102, 108Roosevelt directs operations in, 50

B-17's, 137, 141. See also Bombardment aircraft.British request for, 19 nin defense of Alaska, 69, 225in defense of Hawaii, 18, 19n, 69, 259in defense of Panama Canal, 19n, 69in defense of Philippines, 69-70, 81n , 85n, 95production of, 69, 70n, 71squadron assigned to ANZAC Task Force, 153, 263

B-18's, 70, 85nB-24's, 85 , 139, 141, 246, 254n, 258, 33 3B-25's, 139, 153, 231-32Babbitt, Lt. Col. Theodore, 342nBahamas, 49n, 356nBa k u , 33 0

Bali, 133Balikpapan, 82nBalkans

British defeat in, 54, 285British plans for operations in, 100, 101planning for operations in, 363

Balmer, Col. Jesmond D., 181nBandoeng, 81Bangkok, 136Barber, Col. Henry A., Jr., 370nBarnes, Maj. Gen. Julian F., 83-84, 88, 132n

commands USAFIA, 171, 171nBarrage balloon battalions, 2 2 4 nBARRISTER, 103n. See also Dakar.Bases-for-destroyers transaction, 20-21, 21nBasra, 142, 253, 253n, 273, 338n, 34 1Bataan, 95, 165

Berne, 278nBessell, Col. William W., Jr., 378nBhamo, 373Bilin River, 130BIRCH, 151. Se e also Christmas Island.Bismarck Archipelago, 261, 270, 369, 377Bissell, Brig. Gen. Clayton L., 56n, 139n, 142

on Chinese operations against Japanese, 228B LAC K, 103. See also Dakar.Black Sea, 101, 203n, 363Blamey, General Sir Thomas, 171nB LEA C H ER , 155. See also Tongatabu.Bliss, 72, 73nBlizzard, Col. John C ., Jr., 364nBlockade

of Germany, 44 , 61 , 296of Germany, British plans for, 23, 55, 100, 280, 295

of Germany, Stark on, 26of Japan, economic, 26, 66of Philippines by Japanese, 84

Bloemfontein, 132nBoat crews, 284, 314. See also Engineer amphibian

brigades.BOBCAT, 151. See also Borabora.BOLERO, 183-88, 183n, 185n, 190-97, 221-22 ,

233-35, 236-44, 255n , 2 7 3 -7 7 , 2 7 6 n , 314 , 339,351, 355, 356, 359, 360, 376-79. Se e also Mar-shall Memorandum; ROUNDUP; S LED G EH A M M ER .

British attitude toward, 266-69, 325-27cargo shipping limiting factor in, 272construction program for, 326diversion of 15 air groups f rom, 281, 296, 300-302,

308, 318 320-22est imate of forces for, 182-83, 185-86, 239, 270-71,



INDEX 415

Bombardment aircraft—Continuedfor air offensive against Germany, 364-65, 365n. See

also Air offensive, against Germany,fo r Alaska , 69 , 225, 25 8B-17 squadron assigned to ANZAC Task Force,

153, 26 3for British-American air force in Caucasus, 330,

332 , 333, 335for build-up in British Isles, 212 , 318-19, 324for Burma and India, 136-38, 202-04for China, 66, 75diversion of groups from BOLERO to Pacific, 2 11 ,

296, 300-302, 318-19, 320-22.for GYMNAST, 106for Hawaii, 18 , 19n, 69, 81, 153-54, 211 , 259, 300,

302, 320, 322nfor Java, 134-35

King requests bomber group for South Pacific, 211,2 19land-based air cover for Navy, 154-56, 160, 256for Middle East, 246, 251, 253-54, 297-98, 298nin Midway battle, 256, 256nmobile forces for use in South Pacific, 2 1 1 - 1 2 ,

218-19, 2 2 3 - 2 4 , 2 6 4 , 299for Panama Canal, 19n, 69for Philippines, 66, 69-70plan for operations with British Bomber Command,

39-40for Siberia, 121, 143-46, 345for S LEDGEHAM M ER , 241fo r South Pacific, 153-54, 2 11 - 1 2 , 2 1 2 n , 219, 226,

263, 301-02, 322nfor Southwest Pacific, 95, 149, 152-54, 2 11 -1 2 , 214,

215, 226, 298, 3 01

Bradley, Maj. Gen. Follett—Continuedon Soviet reaction to TORCH, 329

Brady, Col. Francis M., 136, 137, 138nBrazil, 18, 52, 98, 108

marines ordered to guard air bases in, 148Brereton, Maj. Gen. Lewis H., 137-38

and Anglo-Am erican air force in Caucasus, 333on beginning of hostilities with Japan, 7 In

command relationship with Maxwell, 255commands B-17's moved south from Philippines,

95ncommands Ninth Air Force, 333commands Tenth Air Force, 140-41, 164, 190, 246commands U.S. Army Ai r Forces in Middle East,

247, 250, 255on release of A-20's at Basra to Brit ish, 253n

Brest, 239, 364, 37 9

Brett, Lt. Gen. George H., 24n, 116, 169on air operations in India and Burma, 136, 137-38,140

Allied air commander, SWPA, 171 , 171narranges for reception of AVG in Burma, 138at Chungking conference, 86commands USAFIA, 135, 164, 170ordered to Australia, 87-88, 95, 135orders bombers to Java, 135on pursuit planes for Java, 135-36and unified command in Southwest Pacific, 168

BRIMSTONE, 327, 379. See also Sardinia.Brink, Lt. Col. Francis G., 65n, 86n

at Singapore conference, 86, 87Brisbane, 83, 132-33, 303British Admiralt y Missions in North America, 43nBritish Air Training Plan, 43n




British Chiefs of Staff—Continuedon concept of TORCH operation, 285, 285n, 287-88,

29 2decision to mount TORCH, 280-83, 294defeat of Germany as ultimate aim, 23-24, 100-101on defense of Middle East, 249 , 279 , 281non Drummond-Adler mission, 332-33on eliminating Italy from war, 23, 34, 37, 101, 377on forces required in Far East, 121on French invitation to invade North Africa, 175on importance of Middle East and India, 53,

189-90, 203non invasion of North Africa, 35, 1 7 5 , 238-39,

280-81, 286. See also G Y M N A S T; TORCH.on invasion of northwestern Europe in 1942, 101,

188, 2 3 7 - 4 0 , 243-44, 266-67, 2 78, 328. See alsoBOLERO; S L E D G EH A M M E R .

on invasion of northwestern Europe in 1943,100-101, 179-80, 188, 238, 243-44, 280-81,377-78. See also BOLERO; ROUNDUP.

jurisdiction over Indian Ocean and Middle East,166

on land offensive against Germany, 24, 100on limited offensive on Continent, 101on limited o ffensives in Mediterranean, 55,

100-101, 174-75 , 377-78on limited offensives in Pacific, 378at London conference, April 1942, 187-90at London conference, July 1942, 278, 280-81on operations in 1943, 377-78on release of 15 air groups from BOLERO, 28 1on release of shipping from BOLERO, 281 , 308on relief of U.S. marines in Iceland, 111request U.S. assistance in Indian Ocean area,

British Guiana, 44, 49n , 61nBritish Home Waters Area, 45British Isles. See Great Britain.British Joint Planners, 281Brit ish Joint Staff Mission, 42-43, 67, 2 6 7 , 286n, 320

plan fo r organization of, 42, 43nBritish military mission in Washington. See British

Joint Staff Mission.British Ministry of War Transport, 266, 31 OnBritish naval staff, 7, 7nBritish Navy. See Navy, British.British Purchasing Commission, 28, 33British units. S ee also Eighth Army, British.

7th Armoured Brigade, 127 , 13718th Division, 127

British War Cabinet, 266-68, 328British War Cabinet Defence Committee, 188

Brittany, 241Brooke, Field Marshal Sir Alan, 236n, 238n, 243,280, 32 9

Brown, Lt. Col. R. J., 335nBryden, Maj. Gen. William B., 33n, 81nBuckner, Maj. Gen. Simon Bolivar, Jr., 257nBulgaria, 43Buna, 302, 367Bundy, Col. Charles W., 83n

at Atlantic Conference, 53n,

55non British plans for North Africa, 101on entering the war, 53member of 1941 mission to Moscow, 57non plan for offensive against Germany, 45

Burma, 78, 80n, 114, 135, 155, 17 1, 178, 194, 371in ABDA Command, 123-24air operations from bases in, 136-38, 139 140 142



INDEX 4 7

Burrough, Capt. Edmund W., 108nButler, Brig. Gen. William O., 225

Cairo, 85, 141, 245, 247, 248, 250, 251n, 252, 253,253n, 255 297, 337

Calais, 178Calcutta, 137-38, 203Camp Pickett, Virginia, 316Camp Polk, Louisiana, 316Camranh Bay. See Kamranh Bay.Canada, 166, 214. See also Permanent Joint Board on

Defense, Canada-U.S.at ABC-1 conference, 33nAlcan Highway, 356and British Joint Staff Mission, 42deployment of U.S. forces to, 356, 356nand First Special Service Force, 244n

and Pacific War Council, 2 1 7 nCanary Islands, 108Canton Island, 9-10, 228, 263

Army garrison for, 115, 151pursuit squadron for, 149n, 154

Cape of Good Hope, 10Cape Verde Islands, 6, 44-45, 50, 52, 98, 102, 108Caraway, Lt. Col. Paul W., 3 7 2 nCargo shipping. S ee Shipping, cargo.Caribbean, 147n, 148, 155, 156 , 158Caribbean Defense Command, 169nCaroline Islands, 2, 26, 45, 367Carriers. See Aircraft carriers.Carter, Lt. Col. Marshall S., 352nCasablanca, 320

plan for landings at, 106, 113n , 235-36, 285-91,293, 306 , 316, 319. See also GYMNAST; TORCH.

CCS 61, 202nCCS 61/1, 248nCCS 65, 208nCCS 78, 194nCCS 83 , 239nCCS 83/1, 239n, 244nCCS 84, 249nCCS 87 , 309nCCS 87/3, 309nCCS 87/4, 309nCCS 91 , 265nCCS 94, 279-82, 281n, 283, 294, 295-97, 297n , 299,

301, 302n, 303, 3 0 5 , 3 0 8 , 318, 325. See alsoTORCH.

CCS 100, 308nCCS 100/1, 309nCCS 103, 289n

CCS 103/1, 287n, 291nCCS 103/3, 313nCCS 104, 373nCCS 104/1, 373nCCS 104/2, 373nCCS 104/3, 373nCCS 109, 338nCCS 109/1, 338nCCS 112 , 320nCCS 112/1, 320nCCS 122, 33InCCS 124, 363nCCS 124/1, 378nCCS 135, 373n, 3 7 6 n , 377nCCS 135/1, 377nCCS 135/2, 373n , 378nCelebes, 120



INDEX 419

Churchill, Winston S.—Continuedan d ARCADIA shipping schedule, 117on area of TORCH landings, 292-93on areas of strategic responsibility, 165-68at Atlantic Conference, 53-55on BOLERO, 188-89, 325-27at Casablanca Conference, 380on continuing planning fo r GYMNAST, 113controversies w i th Curtin, 212-15conversations with Molotov, 234, 267conversations wi th Stalin, 326, 328-30, 329non cutting lend-lease to USSR, 119on defense of Indian Ocean, 190and defense of Middle East, 190, 250on destroyers and munitions exchange, 20on diversion of Australian divisions to Burma, 130,

130n

on emergency operation in 1942, 189, 234-35, 239-40, 242-43, 255, 266, 273-76, 2 7 6 n , 326and fall of Tobruk, 245non fraternization with Soviet troops, 331, 335on Iranian railroad, 337on limited offensives in Mediterranean, 307, 363on MacArthur's evacuation from Philippines, 165non MacArthur's role in Curtin's requests, 213on Mediterranean operations af ter TORCH, 327,

363on northern convoys to Soviet Union, 309-10, 331,

337 , 348on no t i fy ing USSR of decision not to mount

SL E DGE HAM M E R, 328-29on n o t i f y i n g USSR of decision to mount TORCH,

328-29on operation in French North Africa 102-03 234-

Churchill, Winston S.—Continuedon troop movements in World W ar I, 11 1on troop shipments to Ireland an d Iceland, 111 ,

113, 148on Turkey's ent ry into the war, 363, 364non U.S. deterrent action in Pacific against Japanese,

20on U.S. divisions for Southwest Pacific, 152, 162-63on U.S. naval visit to Eire, 20and USSR release of A-20's to British, 253, 253n

Civil airline transports, 209-10Clagett, Brig. Gen. He nry B., 88Clark, Col. Frank S., 6nClark, Maj. Gen. Mark W., 293n, 321 , 325n

commands II Corps, 197on TORCH plan, 288-89, 29 0trip to London, May 1942, 196

Clarke, Capt, A. W., 33, 43nClay, Brig. Gen. Lucius D., 253nCoast Artillery Corps, 351Coast Artillery units, 351, 355

70th (AA), 150n76th ( A A ) , 299198th ( A A ) , 151203d (AA ), 258n244th, 150n

Cold Bay, Alaska, 224Coleridge, Comdr. R. D., 43nColor plans, 6 . See also BLACK; ORANGE plan; RAIN-

BOW plans.Combat loading vessels, 117-18, 148, 283-84 , 362

shortage o f, 316nfo r Solomons operation, 310fo r TORCH, 310, 314, 314n, 316, 316n



INDEX 421

Crawford, Brig. Gen. Robert W., 56n, 116n, 259nCrenshaw, Capt. Russell S., 6nCrete, British defeat in, 54, 285Cross-Channel attack. See Northwestern Europe.Cruisers

loss of British, o ff Ceylon, 2 0 1 n , 20 2loss of, off Savo Island, 302

Curaçao, 44Currie, Lauchlin, 63, 73Curtin, Prime Minister John, 122n, 131

on Australian dependence on American aid, 114n-15n

on British aid tor Australia, 212-13, 215, 217on diversion of 7th Australian Division to Burma,

130and MacArthur as commander of SWPA, 170MacArthur's relations with, 213-15

on return of Australian divisions from Middle East,130, 212-13Cyprus, 252Czechoslovakia, 4-5

Dakar. S ee also West Africa, French.British attempt to seize, 54plan fo r operations against, 103-04, 108, 112, 285n

Daladier, Premier Édouard, 4Daley, Maj. Gen. Edmund L., 109nDankwerts. Rear Adm. V. H., 33Darwin. See Port Darwin.Davis, Col. Thomas D., 182nDawson, Lt. Col. Leo H., 141Dawson mission, 14 1Deane Maj Gen John R 80n 182n 237 253 271 n

Deployment of U.S. forces—Continuedto Philippines, 49n, 69-70, 72-73 , 81n, 82-85, 219-

21p la n n in g for, 41, 146, 195-96, 354. Se e also JCS 23.projected fo r 1943, 362to South Pac if ic , 114-15 , 1 4 7 , 150-56, 175, 179,

210-12, 218-21 , 222-26 , 264-65, 299-305, 304n,320, 322n , 358-59

to Southwest Pacific, 114-17, 147, 148-50, 153-54,158-59, 162-64, 167, 172-73, 175, 176, 179, 198,2 1 0 - 1 2 , 2 1 7 - 1 9 , 265, 298-99, 301, 304, 304n,369-70

strength overseas, December 1941, 35 3strength overseas, December 1 9 4 2 , 353

Desert Training Center, California , 316Destroyer escorts. See also Naval escort vessels.

construction of , 194, 31 2

Destroyers-for-bases transaction, 20-21, 21nDeWitt, Lt. Gen. John L.

on air operations in Aleutians, 225plan fo r operations in Aleutians, 258, 312, 370-71

Dieppe Raid, 366Dill, Field Marshal Sir John, 238n, 253n, 328

on American attitude toward strategy, 295-97on American attitude toward TORCH, 295-97on Australian divisions in Middle East, 13 0

on British naval support for Burma offensive, 375on decision to mount TORCH, 282, 29 5on invasion of Europe in 1943, 180non return of Burma to command of India, 164non shipping fo r GYMNAST, 110, 308on shipping for Iceland and Ireland, 110on shipping priorities, 308on shortage of ammunition in Egypt 253




Divisions—Continuedoverseas, December 1942, 353. See also Deployment

of U.S. forces.overseas, June 1942, 358nfor Pacific, 215, 308, 358, 353n, 359, 359nfo r Pacific alternative, 270-71fo r Philippines, 72nprojected fo r 1942, 351. Se e also Troop Basis, 1942;

Victory Program Troop Basis.projected for 1943, 352-53for relief of British troops in Iceland, 308for ROUNDUP, 180, 182-83, 185-86, 325-26, 377-78for S LED G EH A M M ER , 239, 241, 32 9for TORCH, 285, 289, 304-05, 313-18, 354, 35 9ultimate requirement estimate, 59, 352-53. See also

Victory Program; Victory Program Troop Basis.Don River, 308

Doolittle, Brig. Gen. James H., 139, 225and 33d Pursuit Group for TORCH, 320and Twelfth Air Force, 318n, 319

Doolittle mission, 139, 141, 190, 204, 22 5Dorsetshire, 2 02Draft, 21Drummond, Air Marshal P. H., 333Drummond-Adler mission, 330, 332-36Duke of York, 97Dunkerque, 12 , 177, 23 4Dutch East Indies, 9-10, 35n, 43, 70, 88, 122, 158,

171. Se e also Netherlands.in ABDA Command, 123ability of U.S. to reinforce, 102air combat groups allocated to, 95Australian troops diverted to, 127authorization for aircraft delivery to 71

Eden, Sir Anthony, 121nEdwards, Vice Adm. Richard S., 324n, 353nEfate, 224

Army garrison for, 151, 154-56Egypt, 34, 40, 100, 226. See also Middle East.

A-20's released at Basra for use in, 253air forces for Caucasus from, 330-31armored task force for, 249-50, 249n-50n

Auchinleck assumes command in, 252British command in , 199-200, 253, 29 7command problems in, 255, 279crisis in, 250-55, 297-98, 331defense of, 23, 175, 189, 198-202, 244-55establishment of USAFIME, 245-46HALPRO group detained in , 246, 250-51international corps for, 253loss of ship carrying tanks and guns to, 251

79th Fighter Group ordered to, 251nshipment of ammu nition to, 253tanks and guns for, 250, 255Tenth Air Force bombers diverted to, 246-47, 25033d Pursuit Group diverted to TORCH, 319-2033d Pursuit Group ordered to, 251nU.S. air units for, 189-90, 200-202, 245-49,

250-51, 2 5 3 - 5 4 , 255, 273, 297-98, 297nU.S. ground forces for, 249-50, 251, 277, 27 9

Eichelberger, Maj. Gen. Robert L., 305nEighth Air Force, 236

and daylight bombing, 318-19discontinues operations, 319and organization of Twelfth Air Force, 318Spaatz commands, 324strength after withdrawals fo r TORCH, 32 4units fo r TORCH, 318-19



INDEX 425

Freseman, Comdr. W. L., 332nFuller, Maj. Gen. Horace H., 129Fulton, Comdr. James R., 184n

G-2, 57 , 177, 182, 183, 251-52, 253, 291n, 34 2G-3, 182, 183, 314n, 350n, 352G-4, 17, 99, 118, 182, 199Gailey, Col. Charles K., Jr., 56n, 165n

Gallant, Lt. Col. Edward B., 314nGandhi, 205General Council. See War Department General

Council.General Headquarters, U.S. Army, 47George, Col. Harold L., 141nGeorge Washington, 117nGerman Air Force, 159, 177, 234, 321n, 36 4German Army, 61-62, 159, 278, 324-25

Germany, 1, 8, 11-12, 57, 64, 197n, 244n, 281air offensive against, 23-24, 26, 39, 41, 44-45, 47,55, 69, 100, 155, 156, 160, 163, 178-79, 186-87,194, 231, 234, 242, 269 , 280, 295-96, 318-19,321, 322 , 324, 325, 347, 358, 364-66, 376, 377,379, 38 1

air superiority over, 38, 40, 61, 160, 178, 181,185-86, 221, 23 4

alliance with Italy and Japan, 4, 11annexation of Czechoslovakia, 5and approach to Berlin, 380attack on Soviet Union, 53blockade of, 23, 26, 44, 55, 61, 100, 280, 295, 296British strategy for defeating, 23-24, 34, 55,

100-101, 1 7 4 , 36 3British view on land offensive against, 24, 100-101,

179-80, 231, 233-35, 237-40, 243-44, 266-69,

Germany—Continuedland offensive against, planning for—Continued

214, 2 1 5 , 230-32, 233-35, 236-44, 266-68,273-76, 277-78, 279-81, 282-83, 290, 296, 314,322-27, 3 2 9 , 353-54, 360 , 364 , 365-66, 3 7 3 ,376-77, 380-82. See also BOLERO; MarshallMemorandum; ROUNDUP.

occupation of Denmark, 11

occupation of Poland, 8offensive in North Africa against, plans for, 102-06,234-44, 278-93, 296-97. Se e also GYMNAST;S U P ER-G Y M N A S T; TORCH.

operations against, after TORCH, 363-64operations against, through Turkey, 363, 364Pershing's World War I experience with, 24RAINBOW 5 plan fo r offensive against, 45-46in RAINBOW plans, 6-8. See also RAINBOW plans.

reinforcement of North Africa, 54, 104, 105, 117,246, 282, 3 0 7 , 313 354Roosevelt on German troops killed by Red Army,

214, 2 2 1 , 222nand Stalingrad battle, 308strategy of encirclement of, 55, 61, 100-101, 102,

105, 279-80, 295-97, 299-300, 307strength of divisions on Eastern Front, 329strength offerees in France, 235submarine operations, 51, 53, 194, 229-30, 312support of Soviet Union in war against. See Soviet

Union, support of, in operations against G er-many.

threat of attack on U.S., 28-29threat to French North Africa, 287-88threat to Western Hemisphere, 5-6, 13, 15, 279and unconditional surrender policy 380




Glantzberg, Col. Frederic E., 257nGold Coast, 40, 137, 245, 248Gona, 302, 367Gorell-Barnes, W. L., 43nGrant, 15 1GRAY war plan, 50n. See also Azores.Great Britain, 1, 4, 10, 87, 155, 160, 175, 244, 298,

352, 356, 363, 366, 367. See also British Chiefs of

Staff; Churchill, Winston S.and ABC-1 agreement, 46nand ABDA Command, 123-26ability to withstand invasion, 13-14, 23-24, 39aid to USSR, 57-58, 229-32, 277, 325-27 , 328-29,

334, 336-39aim to defeat Germany, 23-24air bases in, 61, 177, 18 1air forces transferred to North Africa f r o m , 296,

300Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 329-36,344, 345 348

antiaircraft defense,.40, 42, 46areas of strategic responsibility, 165-67, 189,

200-201, 331 355assistance requirement in Far East, 26bomber offensive against Germany f rom, 39-40,

218, 238, 321-25, 365-66, 376. Se e also Air offen-sive, against Germany.

British C ommonwealth, policy on security, 44, 243build-up of American forces in, 161, 174, 176,

1 7 7 - 7 9 , 181, 183, 186, 188, 190, 191, 198, 204,205, 210-11, 217-19, 228, 235 237-38, 265 267,269-71, 271n, 27 3, 27 9, 294, 296, 308, 314n,317-19, 321-27, 351, 353-55, 364, 377-79. Se ealso BOLERO

Great Britain—Continueddeployment of U.S. air forces to, 43, 191 , 194, 195,

200, 212 217-18, 270-71 , 273 308-09354-55

deployment of U.S. forces to , 102, 117, 147-48, 156,195, 2 1 7 -1 8 , 2 7 0 - 7 1 , 2 7 3 308 322359, 36 4

deployment of U.S. forces to, under ABC-1, 40-43,

47-48deployment of U.S. forces to, under RAINBOW 5,47-48

destroyers-for-bases transaction, 20-21Drummond-Adler mission, 333-36Eighth Air Force discontinues operations from, 319entry into war against Japan considered, 66essential supplies for, 156, 362ETOUSA established in, 196-97

Far Eastern policy, 23, 34-38, 120-23, 14 2, 143,372, 3741st Armored Division instructors and equipment

offered to, 250, 250nforces for cross-Channel attack, 182, 185-86, 233,

239, 242, 260, 329, 377-78forces for TORCH, 281, 313and fraternization with Soviet troops, 331, 334, 335and French Fleet at Alexandria, 252nand German attack on USSR, 53German threat to British Navy, 1940, 12, 13-14German threat of invasion, 12, 13-14, 24-25, 39,

53, 109 283Ghormley-Emmons-Strong visit to London, 22-24Indian Ocean area policy, 187, 189-90Iran occupied by British and Soviet troops, 58and Iranian railroad operations 336-38



INDEX 4 7

Great Britain—Continuedoffensive in Europe, willingness to launch in 1943,

268-69, 272-73 , 325-27, 365-66, 378. Se e alsoROUNDUP.

offensive in Europe, willingness to launch in 1944,326, 365. See also ROUNDUP.

opposition to German aggression, 5-6, 8and Pacific advisory council, 125

and Pacific War Council, 217nPershing's World War I experience with, 24plan fo r operations in China, 66, 73and plan for operations in Far East, 76in RAINBOW plans, 6-8, 43-44reliance on American aid, 21-24and a second f ront , 231-32 , 233-35, 237-44,

325-27, 328-29and security of Austral ia and New Zealand, 114,

120, 122, 211-16security of British Isles, 109, 283, 322, 364shipping allocated to BOLERO, 186, 270-71, 309shipping losses, 51, 53, 230shipping for North African operation, 176shipping for U.S. troop movements to Pacific, 151and Singapore, 34-38, 121-22, 122nstaff conversations requested, 28. See also American-

British Conversations.strategy of encirclement of Germany, 55, 61,

100-101, 102, 105, 280, 295-97, 299-300, 30 7strategy in 1940, 21-2 4strategy statement at ABC-1 conference, 34-37strategy s tatement at A R C A D I A Conference, 99-101,

295-97, 322strategy statement at Atlantic Conference, 53-55strength of U S forces in December 1942 354

Gross, Maj. Gen. Charles P., 107, 107n, 362nGroups, ai r combat, 333. See also Army Air Corps;

A r m y Air Forces.for Alaska, 258, 356for BOLERO, 195, 217-18, 241, 324, 354, 360for Caucasus, 330-32, 335for CBI, 137, 138-39, 141, 357diversion from BOLERO to Pacific, 300, 301-02, 318,

320, 322for GYMNAST, 106for Middle East, 202, 248, 250-51, 355overseas, December 1942, 353. See also Deployment

of U.S. forces.for Pacific, 70, 72, 115 , 149, 153, 158-59, 211, 300,

302, 304, 320, 358-60fo r Pacific alternative, 27 1for Siberia, 345strength, August 1941, 48strength, December 1941, 350strength, December 1942, 35 0for TORCH, 318-20, 354-55, 36 0ultimate requirement estimate, 352. See also Victory

Program; AWPD/1 ; 54-Group Program; 100-Group Program; 273-Group Program.

for Western Hemisphere, 356, 356n, 360Groups, aviation

1st Ferrying, 14 13d Air Depot, 1413d Bombardment, 149n7th Bombardment, 72 , 137, 149n8th Pursuit, 149n11th Bombardment, 264n12th Bombardment, 24819th Bombardment, 70 , 70n, 137, 149n, 264n




Guam—ContinuedJapanese threat to, 5, 9-10line of advance through, 270

Guerrilla forces, 119. Se e also Resistance groups; Sub-versive activities.

British plan for operation in China, 66Guns, 194

3-inch antiaircraft, for China, 75

75-mm. for British, 17, 17n75-mm. for Philippines, 68, 7390-mm., 7 5105-mm. for British in Middle East, 250-51, 255fo r British, 20shortage of, 48

GYMNAST, 111-19, 156, 249, 271-73 , 276n , 282, 283,285. See also North Africa, French; SUPER-GYM-NAST; TORCH.

as code name, 112, 113n, 280estimate of forces for, 105-07, 111-14, 235-36revival of, 234-44, 256, 267-68, 278-81shipping for, 107-08, 110-11, 113, 176, 236 268

Halifax, Lord, 33, 35n, 46nHALPRO. See Halverson Project.Halsey, Vice Adm. William F., 368Halverson, Col. Harry A., 139, 246

Halverson Project, 139, 141, 246-47, 250Hammondsport, 132n, 148, 149nHandy, Maj. Gen. Thomas T., 78n, 83n, 212n , 244,

259n, 271n, 287n, 290n, 300on aid to USSR in a Soviet-Japanese war, 145and amphibious training agreement, 314non composition of Western Task Force, 315

Hawaii-Australia line, 147, 160-61, 185, 189, 198,211, 258, 300, 358-59, 369, 377. See also SouthPacific.

allocation of U.S. forces to, 163-64shortage of troops for, 151 -54

Hawaiian Air Force, 70, 153Hawaiian Coastal Frontier, 263Hawaiian Islands, 26 , 118, 155, 157, 158, 160-61, 194,

21 2, 224, 377. See also Central Pacific; CentralPacific Area; Pearl Har bor; Pearl Harbor attack.on air ferry route, 10, 96, 114air units, mobile reserve in, 159, 211-12, 218-19,

223-24 , 263n, 264 299-300, 302, 320alert ordered, 19allocation of air forces to, 153-54, 21 1, 300, 302,

304, 320, 3 2 2 n , 358nantiaircraft artillery regiment in, 224nB-17 squadron diverted to ANZAC Force from,

153, 263B-17's ferried by 19th Bombardment Group to, 70bomber units held to meet Japanese threat, 225,

259defense of, 82, 102, 121, 161-62, 225n, 256-57, 263,

263n11th Bombardment Group designated Hawaiian

Mobile Air Force, 264nEmmons commands Army forces in, 263

Fleet attack west of, advocated by MacArthur, 8690th Bombardment Group assigned to, 302, 304nand Pacific alternative, 271planning for offensive operations west of, 3and RAINBOW 1, 6and RAINBOW 5, 46reinforcement of, 4 9 n , 81, 98, 11 7, 147, 152-54,



INDEX 429

Hopkins, Harry—Continuedat London conference, April 1942, 184, 188, 202,

211at London conference, July 1942, 27 1n, 272,

278-82, 285non North African operation, 279, 282and Pacific War Council, 217non plan for cross-Channel attack, 182

on President's need of military advice, 51and a second f ront , 182 , 184, 184n, 188, 221, 235,236, 240, 242-43

on shipping to move 41st Division to Australia, 129and shipping for Soviet lend-lease, 119on target date for TORCH, 282, 284and transport planes for USSR, 208, 210on Wavell's appointment to ABDA Command,

124, 124nHome, Vice Adm. Frederick J., 193Hornet, 223, 311, 311nHouston, 82n, 129nHsiung Shih-fei, Lt. Gen., 227Hughes-Hallett, Capt., 192nHull, Cordell

and British proposals on Singapore, 35ncommitment in 1938 for naval aid to British in Far

East, 36conference with President on military policy, 28and Japanese threat to Kunming, 74non Plan Dog, 28weekly meeting with Secretaries of War and Navy,

28nHull, Brig. Gen. John E., 183n, 290n, 323n

and BOLERO Combined Committee, 193and Marshall Memorandum, 183

Iceland—Continuedtroop shipments to, 49n, 51, 11 7 , 147-48, 156, 163,

176, 188 270, 355, 353nand USAFBI, 111U.S. Army garrison in, plans for, 41, 47-49, 61n

Imphal, 228India, 23, 35, 36, 86, 124, 128, 172 , 178, 185, 194,

205, 214, 228, 245, 308, 311, 355, 372, 373, 375.See also China-Burma-India theater,air operations from bases in, 136-38, 139-42

in area of British strategic responsibility, 165-67Australian and New Zealand troops i n, 114, 131,

163boundary between Indian and Pacific theaters,

169nBritish request for U.S. assistance in, 190, 202-04in British strategy, 120, 122, 187, 18 9Burma returned to operational command of, 164nand command for Burma offensive, 374Curtin proposes diversion of two British divisions to

Australia f rom, 212-13instruction of Chinese Army forces in, 357, 373-74Japanese threat to, 157-58, 202-04, 213, 215, 271movement of British divisions to, 163, 179and Pacific alternative, 271and Pacific War Council, 217nstrategic aim to hold, 156-58, 202-04Tenth Air Force bombers diverted f rom, 250Tenth Air Force established in, 140-42, 164, 246Tenth Air Force reinforcement, 190, 203troop movements to, 147n, 308-09

India Command, British, 190Indian Infantry Brigade, 44th, 127Indian Ocean, 10 130 211 215




Infantry—ContinuedBritish theories on employment of, 55

Infantry Brigade, 51st, 150nInfantry Divisions. S ee also Divisions.

1st, 48n, 313, 315-16, 316n, 317, 3 542d, 48n, 318n3d, 4 8 n , 285 304 313, 315 , 315n, 3544th (Motorized), 48n, 3135th, 48n 355, 358n6th, 48n7th , 4 8n8 t h , 4 8 n9th, 48n, 285 , 313 315, 315n, 35424th (Hawaiian), 48n, 358n, 359n25th , 48, 358n, 359n, 37026th , 48n27th , 48 n , 151, 152, 163 164n, 257 358n, 359n28th , 48n29th, 4 8 n , 317, 317n, 318n, 323, 35430th , 48 n31st, 48n32d, 48n, 109, 164n, 172, 303 , 358n , 359n33d, 48n34th, 48n, 109, 147 , 191, 313, 316, 3 16n , 317 , 354,

358n35th , 48n36th,

4 8 n , 31 3

3 7 t h , 48n , 109, 155n, 164n, 222-23, 2 2 2 n , 358n,359n

38th, 48n, 318n40th, 48n, 257, 298, 359n41st, 48n, 129-31, 149-52, 158, 162-63, 172 , 303,

358n, 35943d 48 3 0 4 305n 317 317 359

Intelligence estimates—Continuedprediction of attack on Midway and Unalaska,

224, 256prediction of raid on west coast, 225, 225nof Soviet ability to resist German invasion, 53

Intelligence reportson Far East, 78n, 79, 80, 223on North Africa, 113, 278n

Intercepted messages, Japanese, 79, 223, 226Intervention in w ar, U.S., 51-53

advocated by British at Atlantic Conference, 55,103

and approval of ABC-1 and RAINBOW 5, 46assumption in planning, 14, 22, 25-26, 30, 33, 38-

39, 4 1 -4 2 , 47, 59, 66declaration of war on Japan considered, 74-75recommendations against, 12-13, 15, 29, 31

Iran, 214, 231, 278. See also U.S. Military IranianMission.British control of railroad in, 336-37British interest in, 331British responsibilities in, 338Connolly's authority in, 338deployment o f U.S. forces to , 311 , 3 39Iran-Iraq Service Command redesignated PGSC,

338nSoviet control of railroad in, 336n, 338Spalding's trip to, 337strength of U.S. troops in, 339nsupply route to USSR through, 336-39. Se e also

Persian Gulf; Persian Gulf Service Command.U.S. operatio n of railroad in, 337, 338n

Iran-Iraq Service Command, 338n. See also PersianG lf S i C d



INDEX 431

Italy—Continuedthreat to Western Hemisphere, 5-6, 13, 25

Jamaica, 44, 49nJapan, 1, 13-14, 43 , 102, 136, 185, 352 357-58, 360

and ADB report, 65-66air operations against, planning for, 121, 138-46,

322, 341-46, 372-73air superiority over, 123, 132, 154aircraft carriers, superiority in , 120, 223, 256, 258in area of American strategic responsibility, 165-67Army and Navy objection to ultimatum to, 75assets frozen by U.S., Dutch, and British, 65and British strategy, 1940, 22-23British strategy to defeat, after Germany, 34coalition with Germany and Italy, 11, 35command of operations against, 260-63construction of naval vessels, 2declaration of war on, considered, 74-75Doolittle raid on, 139, 190, 204, 225economic blockade of, 26, 65-66embargo on exports to, 16n, 21, 21n, 25, 64-65, 68Embick proposes understanding with, 16entry into war predicted, 14, 71nand Halverson Project, 139junction offerees with Germany, 189-90, 200

landings in Buna-Gona region, 302landings in Sarawak and Jolo, 88limited war with, study of, 26lines o f advance to, 2, 9-10, 261 , 270, 371-72loss of Singapore in a war with, 37and mandated islands, 2messages intercepted from, 79 , 223, 22 6

h f h

Japan—Continuedsettlement in Far East proposed by, 68Soviet neutrality in war with, 86, 86n, 121, 142-44,

157, 336 342, 343n, 344-45, 371and Soviet supply route in North Pacific, 229Stimson's view of foreign policy on, 82strategic defensive in operations against, 159-62,

174-75, 187-88, 211 212 215-16, 97, 376, 378

strategy to defeat first, 182, 267-69. Se e also Pacificalternative.

successes in Burma, 130-31, 227-28, 357threat to Alaska, 224-25, 257 , 370-72threat of attack on U.S., 28-29, 225threat to Australia, 115, 212-16, 219, 219n, 25 8threat to Central Pacific, 224-25, 300, 359threat to Far East, 5-6, 20, 25, 36, 71, 78-79

threat to India, 157-58, 202-04, 213, 271threat to Indochina, 15threat to New Caledonia, 115-16, 155-56threat to New Zealand, 115, 219threat to North Pacific, 224-25threat to Panama Canal, 19threat to Pearl Harbor, 18-19threat to Solomon Islands, 292nthreat to South Pacific, 155-56, 211-12, 223-24

threat to Soviet Union, 121 , 269, 270-71 , 342, 343-45 , 343nthreat to Yunnan Province, 74-75U.S. action to deter agression, 15-16, 23, 56, 62, 74and U.S. reinforcement of Southwest Pacific, 118and Victory Program, 60-61warnin g message to, August 1941, 68-69

i hd l L N i




JCS 19, 166nJCS 19/1, 166nJCS 23, 161n, 163, 163n, 164n, 175n, 179n, 180, 180n,

182n, 211 212n, 353n, 354n, 357, 360nJCS 30, 194nJCS 42, 209nJCS 48, 2 12n, 219n, 353n, 360nJCS 81 , 3 1 4 n

JCS 81/1, 314nJCS 97/1, 319n, 321nJCS 97/2, 321nJCS 97/5, 322nJCS 101, 319nJCS 112, 265nJCS 123, 346n, 347nJCS 123/1, 348nJCS 131/1, 333nJCS 152, 365nJCS 153, 363nJCS 154, 352nJCS 162, 373n, 374JCS 167/1, 376nJCS 167/2, 376nJCS 167/3, 378nJCS 167/5, 378nJCS 180, 345n, 346nJCS 180/1, 336n, 345n, 346nJCS 180/2, 345nJCS 182, 346n, 372nJohnston Island, 45Johpre Province, 127Joint, definition of, 99nJoint Army and Navy Basic War P lan—RAINBOW 5.

See RAINBOW 5.

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continuedon air offensive against Germany, 321, 376on air operations against Italy, 376and aircraft allocations, 207-10and aircraft allocations to USSR, 348and amphibious training agreement, 314and Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 332-35at ARCADIA Conference, 98, 295

on armored division for Middle East, 281n, 292nArmy Chief of Staff agent for, in SWPA, 172and Army control of operations against Germany,

26 2and bombers for Siberia, 345-46on build-up in United Kingdom, 161, 376on command for Anglo-American air force in

Caucasus, 333conference with Mountbatten, 196on deployment of forces in Pacific, 161-62, 179,

211-12deployment priorities study, 159-62, 211-12directive to commanders of SWPA and POA, 171-

72on directive for TORCH, 291-92and Drummond-Adler mission, 332-351st Marine Division released to MacArthur by, 370invasion of Continent, plan for, 179-80, 182, 280-

81, 376 378-80

on invasion of Continent in 1942, 161, 180-81, 240jurisdiction over operational strategy in SWPA,

172, 213jurisdiction over Pacific area and operations, 166King proposes Ghormley execute operation in

South Pacific under, 262Leahy appointed liaison officer for, 282n



INDEX 433

Joint Chiefs of Staff—Continuedand strength of Army, December 1942, 351on 33d Pursuit Group for TORCH, 319-20on timing of TORCH, 281on transport planes for USSR, 208on Turkey's role in the war, 37725th Division ordered to South Pacific by, 370an d ultimate size of Army, 35 2

and U.S. fighter unit s for Middle East, 189-90, 227Joint Planning Committeeagenda for American-British Conversations, 29an d RAINBOW 5, 43and RAINBOW plans, 5-10studies military situation, June 1940, 14-15

Joint Staff Planners, 249nand ABC-4/CS-1, 295-97and aid to USSR in a Soviet-Japanese war, 143-45attitude toward TORCH, 295-97and CCS 94, 295-97deployment priorities study, 159-62and grand strategy, 295-97and northern route of approach to Japan, 372on target date fo r TORCH, 283non transfer offerees from North Africa to U.K., 377and ultimate size of Army, 352-53

Joint United States-Canada War Plan 2, 43Joint U.S. Strategic Committee, 212n, 286n

and aid to USSR in a Soviet-Japanese war, 144-45deployment priorities study, 159-62on land offensive against Germany, 177-79, 187

JUPITER, 235, 2 4 4 n , 267n , 265, 27 8, 326. See alsoNorway, British plans f or invasion of .

Kamchatka Peninsula 371n

King, Admiral Ernest J.—Continuedon concentration offerees in British Isles, 211 , 212 ,

216on cross-Channel attack, 268-69, 280, 283on decision to mount TORCH, 283on deployment of air forces in Pacific, 211, 218-19,

223-24, 225-26 , 300-303, 321on diversion of air groups from BOLERO, 300, 303,

32 1on heavy bomber group for South Pacific, 2 11 ,218-19

and instructions for London conference, July 1942,273, 276

on Japanese threat to Centra l and North Pacific,224-25, 225n

on Japanese threat to lines of communication toAustralia, 223-24, 258

on Japanese threat to Port Moresby, 223on land-based air cover for Navy, 223on lend-lease for USSR, 230-32, 337at London conference, July 1942, 27 2, 278-82on mobile air forces for defense of South Pacific,

211, 2 1 9 , 2 2 3 - 2 4 , 264on North African operation, 238, 268-69, 279-83,

287non northern route of advance to Japan, 371on Pacific advisory committee, 125on Pacific alternative, 268-70on Pacific operations in 1943, 378and plan for capture of Amchitka and Kiska, 370on plan for offensive operations in South Pacific,

260-63, 265on plan for o ffensive operations in Southwest

Pacific, 260-63, 302-03




Knox, Frank—Continuedapproves statement for American-British Conversa-

tions, 30at ARCADIA Conference, 98conference with President on military policy, 28-29and North African operation, 113and Plan Dog, 25and Victory Program, 60nweekly meetings with Secretaries of State and War,

28nKodiak, 2 24Kra Isthmus, 80nKrueger, Col. Walter, 2nKuala Lumpur, 120, 126Kungsholm, 117Kunming, Japanese threat of attack on, 74-75Kupang, 129, 132

Kuril Islands, 371nKuter, Brig. Gen. Laurence S., 78n, 257n

Lae, planning for operations against, 262, 303. See alsoTask Two.

Land, Rear Adm. Emory S., 129, 193n, 206Land offensive

against Germany, 7, 8, 46, 58, 61, 100, 156-61, 162,163, 174-75, 177-87, 194, 202 206 295-97, 298,365-66, 373, 376-77, 380-82

against Germany, British view on, 24, 55, 100, 179-80, 326-27

against Germany, Stark's view on, 26-27in North Afr ica , 8, 27, 103, 175-76, 234-44, 267-

70 , 271 , 272-73, 277-327 . Se e also GYMNAST;SUPER-GYMNAST; TORCH.

h 1942 l f

Latin America—Continueddeployment of U.S. forces to, 356, 356n, 360an d RAINBOW 5, 43U.S. support in defense of, 44

League o f Nations, 2Leahy, Admiral William D., 284n, 304, 310n, 324n,

335n, 363n, 379non air forces for TORCH, 303-04, 321appointed chief of staff to President, 282ndiscussions with British naval staff, 1939, 8non diversion of air groups from BOLERO, 321on ground forces for Pacific, 303-04on target date for TORCH, 282-83

Leary, Vice Adm. Herbert F., 170, 171nLeased bases. See Atlantic, leased bases.Ledo, 37 3Lee, Brig. Gen. Raymond E., 33, 33n, 34, 34n, 42n

Le Havre, 180, 185-86Lembang, Java, 126nLend-lease, 62, 78, 139 , 1 4 2 , 156, 163, 179, 201,

205-10, 226, 228, 229-32, 273 , 311 325-26, 329334, 336-48, 357 , 3 6 2 , 380. Se e also individualcountries.

Act of 11 March 1941, 33, 56, 63Army responsibilities in, 56military missions, 56-58, 245 . See also American

Military Mission to China; Military mission toNorth Africa; Military mission to USSR; U.S.Military Iranian Mission.

Lend-Lease Administration, 63, 143Leningrad, 240Lewis, Lt. Col. John T., 107nLexington, 223, 311

b 226 286 h f



INDEX 435

MacArthur, General Douglas—Continuedarrives in Australia, 169-71and campaign in New Guinea, 367and command of offensive operations in South-

Southwest Pacific, 258-63, 302-03, 368-70commands SWPA, 169-73, 215commands USAFFE, 67conferences with British, Dutch, and U.S. Navy,

76-78on cross-Channel attack, 215-16on Curtin's request for British aid for SWPA,

213-14on delivery of planes to Philippines by aircraft car-

rier, 84, 88directive to, as Supreme Commander, SWPA,

171-721st Marine Division released to, 370

Fleet counterattack west of Hawaii requested by, 86Military Advisor to Commonwealth Government ofthe Philippines, 67

on Navy control of operations in Pacific, 262on offensive operations against New Britain-New

Ireland area, 259-60, 261, 251n, 302on offensive operations against New Guinea, 261,

302-03on offensive operations against Solomon Islands,

259, 26 1ordered to Australia, 165orders bombers to East Indies and Australia, 95on Pensacola convoy, 84, 88Philippine command attacked by Japanese, 81-83Philippine command transferred to Dutch, 164and Philippine defenses, 67-68, 72-73, 84-85

f T k O 265

McNarney, Lt. Gen. Joseph T.—Continuedon BOLERO, 268on decision to mount TORCH, 28 2on deployment of air forces under ABC-1 and

ABC-2, 39-40on entering the war, 52on fighter aircraft fo r TORCH, 31 9

McNaughton, General, 186nMaddocks, Col. Ray T., 352nMaginot Line, 11MAGNET, 109, 109n, 148, 156, 191, 323. See also

Northern Ireland.Magruder, Brig. Gen. John, 86

heads AMMISCA, 57on Yunna n war scare, 74-75

Maisky, M., 326Makassar Strait, 82n

Malay Archipelago, 26, 34, 74Malay Barrier, 45, 121, 122, 136defense of, 26, 78definition of, 45nline of advance through, 270

Malaya, 36, 80n, 114in ABDA Command, 12 3and American area of strategic responsibility, 166British plans for holding, 23Japanese invasion of, 80Japanese threat to, 22-23, 65-66, 79loss of , 120, 126-28, 130, 131, 158

Malaysia. See Malay Archipelago.Malony, Brig. Gen. Harry J., 207nMalta, 238Manchuria, 2, 228, 345M d t d i l d J 2 9 lO




Marine Regiment, 8th, 359nMariposa, 132nMaritime provinces, USSR, 79, 121, 371nMarquesas Islands, 7Marrakech, 291Marshall, General George C., 10, 28, 57, 143, 144,

147, 1 81 , 190, 196, 201-02, 216, 217 , 233, 237,238, 240, 242 , 244, 259n, 263n , 264-65, 267, 290,

291n, 300, 314n, 325, 328, 329, 345, 353n, 367,374, 375 38 0at ABC-1 conference, 33and ABC-1 report, 43on ABDA Command, 123-25and ADB conversations, 65, 67on adequate training of troops, 50, 208-09, 285agent for JCS in SWPA, 172and air offensive against Germany, 324on Alaska-Siberia ferry route, 346on allocation of aircraft to USSR, 207, 231-32,

347-48on American planners' attitude toward TORCH,

295-97and ammunition for Middle East, 253on Anglo-American air force for Caucasus, 330-31,

335appointed Chief of Staff, 12non appointment of Eisenhower as TORCH com-

mander, 286, 286non appointment of liaison officer between President

and JCS, 282nat ARCADIA Conference, 99and areas of strategic responsibility, 166at Atlantic Conference, 53nauthority to release equipment to foreign govern-

Marshall, General George C.—Continuedon deployment to Alaska, 371deployment policy for Hawaii, 162, 218, 256-57,

257nand deployment of Tenth Air Force, 203, 228and diversion of air groups from BOLERO, 281, 296,

301-02, 302n, 321-22on diversion of 37th Division to Fiji Islands, 222on emergency operation in 1942, 188, 218-19, 232,

243, 255non emergency operation in 1943, 364on establishment of base in Australia, 87on establishment of ETO, 196-97on establishment of Special Army Observer Group,

London, 4 2on establishment of SWPA, 168-69on expeditionary forces in 1941, 50on fate of British and French Fleets, 18instructions to Bundy on trip to Moscow, 101on Japanese threat to Kunming, 75on Japanese threat to west coast, 225on landing craft, 192, 193on lend-lease to USSR, 231-32, 337at London conference, April 1942, 181n, 184,

187-90, 211, 21 8at London conference, July 1942, 271 n, 272-82,

2 7 2 n , 28 6

on loss of shipping and of troops, 379and MacArthur's relations with Curtin, 214and Maxwell-Brereton command dispute, 255on movement of troops to Iceland, 110-11, 148, 188on movement of troops to Northern Ireland,

110-11, 188on munitions for Britain, 15, 19



INDEX 437

Marshall, General George C.—Continuedon Pacific deployment, 115, 154-55, 218-19, 224,

225-26 , 257, 299 -304 , 3 2 0on participation of British troops in TORCH, 281on peace or war status, April 1941, 51-52on Pensacola convoy, 82-83on reinforcement of Alaska, 218, 258nrelationship to President as Chief of Staff, 32

on relief of British troops in Iceland, 50on relief of marines in Iceland, 51, 111on Roosevelt's failure to approve RAINBOW 5, 47and Roosevelt's instructions for London conference,

July 1942, 273-78on security of British Isles, 283seeks time in negotiations with Japan, 79on service troops for TORCH, 3 17on shortage of equipment for TORCH, 317-18and show of strength in Pacific, 15on slow down of BOLERO, 218-19on strategic policy, June 1940, 17-20on strategic policy, May 1940, 13on strategy in war with Japan, 30, 217-19, 268-72on support of China, 228on tanks and guns for Middle East, 250, 255on target date fo r TORCH, 283, 28 4on transport planes for USSR, 208-10trip to west coast, 225and Troop Basis, 1942, 195on troop movements, 316-17on unity of command, 123-24, 263on U.S. air forces for Middle East, 188, 200-201,

248, 255on U.S. ground forces for Middle East, 200, 239,

249 50 254

Mediterranean—Continuedaircraft on hand in, December 1942, 360nan d American naval effort, 27, 30, 38, 41, 45, 53American view of offensive operations in, 294-97,

298, 376-77area of British strategic responsibility, 166bombing of Germany from bases in, 321, 325, 364bombing of Italian Fleet units in, 246

British plans for landings in, 285-86, 285nBritish plans for limited offensives in, 100-101, 104,174, 294, 295 -97 , 327, 363, 377-78

German intervention in, 54offensive operations in , 113 , 254, 270, 272 , 276, 355,

363planning for operations after TORCH in, 363-67,

376-79Tenth Air Force bombers diverted to operations in,

246-47TORCH plan fo r landings in , 281, 286 , 287-88,

287n, 289-91. See also Algiers; Bone; Oran.Melbourne, 135, 137, 150, 168, 213 , 214Mers-el-Kebir, 54Mesopotamia. See Iraq.Mexico, 12 , 6 4 n , 214Michela, Col. Joseph A., 329n, 341nMiddle East, 40, 41, 102, 109, 185, 194, 204, 211,

256, 2 72 , 291 , 328, 353n, 354, 366, 376. Se e also

Egypt; Libya; North Africa; Syria,air forces for Caucasus f rom, 330-31, 333air operations complementary to TORCH in, 321air superiority in, 320as air theater for combat operations, 255, 360Andrews commands USAFIME, 255narea of British strategic responsibility 165-67 200




Middle East—ContinuedMaxwell-Brereton command dispute in, 255movement of Bri t i sh divisions to, by U.S. shipping,

163, 179, 198movement of Br i t i sh troops to, 167, 176, 186, 238,

24 9PGSC redesignated Persian Gulf Command, 338nPolish Army forces in, 237

retention of Australian and New Zealand divisionsin, 152, 162-63return of Australian divisions f rom, 127-28, 130-31,

152, 212, 21 4shipment of ammunition to, 253Soviet release of A-20's at Basra for use in, 253strategic aim to hold, 53-55, 156, 158, 181, 187-88,

189-90strength of U.S. air forces in, June-July 1942, 250nstrength of U.S. forces in, December 1942, 355subsidiary theater in American planning, 101, 201,

254supply route to USSR, 336-39. See also Persian

Gulf; Persian Gulf Service Comman d,tanks and guns for, 250Tenth Air Force reinforcements held in, 247-48Tenth Air Force squadron diverted to, 246-4733d Pursuit Group diverted to TORCH f ro m, 251n,

319-20376th Bombardment Group organized in, 333U.S. air forces for, 188, 189-90, 200-202, 227,

245-49, 250-51, 253-54, 273, 297-98, 298n,308-09, 318-19, 320-21, 320n, 3 2 2 n , 355

U.S. Military Iranian Mission redesignated, 338nuse of American troops in, 55, 98, 198-200, 226,

235 239 245-46 2 4 9 - 5 0 251 254 273 277-79

Mobilization—Continuedmateriel required for, 1 7required by surrender of British or French Fleet,

17 nMobilization Day, 45n, 46, 61Molotov, Foreign Commissar Vyacheslav M., 121n

conversations in London, 2 31, 233-34, 267 , 328-29conversations in Washington, 231-32, 233-34, 329,

34 2and Drummond-Adler mission, 335signs First (Moscow) Protocol, 57and situation in Caucasus, 332

Molucca Sea, 10Monroe Doctrine, 5, 7, 13, 60Monterey, 149Moore, Capt. C. J., 14nMoore, Maj. Gen. Richard C., 68nMorgenthau, Henry L., Jr., 16, 19nMormacsun, 132nMorocco, French, 14 . See also GYMNAST; North Africa,

French; TORCH.air defenses in, 278nFrench sentiment in, 278ninvasion of, 334plan for landings in, 100, 102, 106, 109, 236,

2 7 7 - 7 8 , 285, 285n, 289, 291, 311. See also Casa-blanca.

Morocco, Spanish, 105, 105n, 307, 327force for control of, 289

Morris, Maj. Gen. E. L., 33Moscow, 240, 328, 329n, 330, 332, 334, 336, 342-44,

346, 349, 364nMoscow conference, August 1942, 328-29, 330, 330n,

33 7



INDEX 439

Napier, Brigadier Vernon M. C., 117Nash, Walter, 259nNatal, Brazil, 102, 15 8National Guard, 19-20, 48, 68

Joint Resolution of 1940 authorizing call of, 21, 21nrestriction on use outside Western Hemisphere, 49retention in service, 1941, 51

Naval bases

for British Isles, 41, 45, 46for Iceland, 39Naval escort vessels, 180, 238, 260, 268, 279, 281, 310,

361, 362. See also Destroyer escorts.shortage of, 96, 105, 236 311 33 6for TORCH, 286, 292 , 307, 309, 311-13, 322

Naval limitation agreements, 2Navy, British, 8n, 10, 27, 180, 238

action at Mers-el-Kebir, 54reinforcement in Far East, 10nsafety of, 12, 14, 17n, 18, 25

Navy, French, 12, 14, 17-18, 17 5action at Mers-el-Kebir, 54at Alexandria, 252n

Navy, Italian, 246Navy, U.S., 1, 14, 42, 52, 103n, 147 , 158, 230, 272,

294, 301, 342 . See also King, Admiral Ernest J.;Stark, Admiral Harold R.

and ADB report, 67ai r defense for Efate, 156Allied naval forces in SWPA commanded by of-

ficer of , 171namphibious training agreement, 314, 314n, 315nantisubmarine operations, 312nArmy transports transferred to, 72and basing U S Fleet in Pacific 18

Navy, U.S.—Continuedand f ighter aircraft for South Pacific, 319inability to furnish naval forces fo r support of

Philippines, 69-70, 82n, 85, 88intelligence reports from broken Japanese code,

223 , 224on Japanese threat to Central Pacific, 225nand Japanese threat to Hawaii, 83

and Japanese threat to Kunming, 74-75and defenses of Singapore, 38nland-based air cover for, 154-56, 160, 22 3, 256,

259-60and landing craft, 192, 193-94MacArthur reports arrangements with, 78N imi t z directed to name commander in South Pa-

cific, 26 4and North African operation, 270 , 286n, 292n,

310-11. See also GYMNAST; TORCH.North Pacific area to be commanded by officer of ,

169and offensive operations in South Pac if ic , 259-63,

368and offensive operations in Southwest Pacific, 131,

155, 259-63, 368-70and operations in Aleutians, 312and operations in Mediterranean, 27, 30, 38, 41on Pacific deployment, 161, 210-12, 218, 225-26,

267, 299-301, 305 320-21and Pacific island defenses, 45and Pacific Ocean Area, 169and Pensacola convoy, 88planning with Britis h, 7, 7n, 10, 27plans for garrisoning Palmyra and American

Samoa 115



440 STRATEGIC P LANNI NG FOR COALITION WARFARE

Netherlands, 122. See also Dutch East Indies,and ABDA Command, 123and ADB conference at Singapore, 65anticipation of Japanese attack in Far East, 15, 80British plan for invasion of, 100and command in Far East, 87and conferences in Far East, 76, 85-86and defense of Philippines, 69-70freezes Japanese assets, 65German victory in, 11and Pacific advisory committee, 125and Pacific War Council, 217nand plan for operations in Far East, 76planning for invasion of, 221, 243U.S. assistance to, in Far East, 26and U.S. o il embargo on Japan, 64and warning to Japan, 68-69

Netherlands Air Force, 131Netherlands Indies. See Dutch East Indies.Nevins, Col. Arthur S., 183nNew Britain, planning for operations against, 259-63,

367-70. S ee also Task Three.New Caledonia, 10, 155-56, 160, 222-24, 263

Americal Division in, 358nartillery battalions ordered to, 129nbomber squadron for, 154controlled by Free French, 114forces for forward areas from, 299and Pacific alternative, 271pursuit squadron for, 149n, 150, 15472d Field Artillery Regiment ordered to, 150in South Pacific Area, 168-69task force for defense of, 115-17, 129, 148-50, 158,

211

New Zealand—Continued43d Division ordered to, 305Japanese threat to, 114-15and Pacific War Council, 217nin South Pacific Area, 168-6937th Division diverted to Fiji Islands from, 222-23on unified command in South-Southwest Pacific,

168, 170

Newall, Air Chief Marshal Sir Cyril L., 22-24Newfoundland, 44, 49n, 53, 61n, 68, 148, 356nNile delta, 252, 29 7Nimitz, Admiral Chester W.

and allocation offerees to Hawaii, 256, 300on allocation offerees to South Pacific, 299, 301and authority over Army forces in Hawaii, 263,

2 6 3 n , 304non bombers for South Pacific, 224n

on capture of Amchitka, 370and command of offensive operations in South-Southwest Pacific, 261, 368

commands Pacific Fleet, 263, 264commands Pacific Ocean Area, 169directive to, as Commander in Chief, POA, 171intelligence estimate o f Japanese intentions, 224,

225nnames Ghormley commander in South Pacific, 264on offensive operations in South Pacific, 258-59,

303and plan for operations in Aleutians, 370

Ninth Air ForceBrereton commands, 333and 376th Bombardment Group for operations in

Transcaucasia, 333



INDEX 44

North Africa, French—ContinuedBritish advocacy of operations in, 55, 102-03, 189,

197, 235, 238-40, 242, 2 4 4 , 250, 255, 267, 276n,280-81, 294 -97 , 307, 327

British plans f or operations in , 101-03, 106, 112,238-40, 284-85, 287-88, 291-93. Se e also GYM-NAST.

Casablanca port in operations in, 113-14, 235-36,

285command of operations in, 175, 279, 281, 286-87and decision to mount TORCH, 281-84, 33 1deployment offerees to, 354-55, 359, 364discontinuance of planning for invasion of, 175-77Eisenhower commands TORCH operation in,

286-87estimate of enemy intentions in , 291nestimate o ffe rees fo r operat ions in, 105-07, 236,

278n, 285, 287, 288-89, 290n, 313-22French resistance to Axis in, 14French sentiment in, 102-03, 112-13, 117 , 175-76,

236, 2 7 7 , 278n, 289, 307German threat to, 23, 104-05, 282intelligence reports on, 113, 278ninvasion of, 251n , 334, 363-64, 376invitation to invade, 102-03, 175-76postponement to May 1942 of operation in, 118,

119, 148, 163, 167, 175revival of planning for operation in, 234-44, 256,

267, 268, 278-81security of lines of communication in, 104, 105n,

363-64shipping for operations in, 107-08, 111, 114, 118,

148, 283-85, 308-13t th f S f i D b 9 2 354 55

Northern Ireland—Continued34th Division training in, 316troop movements to, 11 7 , 147-48, 156, 163, 176,

186, 188, 358nan d USAFBI, 11 1

Northwestern Europe, 8, 290, 298, 300, 308, 358American plans for operations in, 101-02, 156-57,

159, 174-75 , 177-79 , 181-87, 206, 208-09,215-16, 218, 2 3 0 - 3 2 , 2 3 3 -3 4 , 235, 364, 365-66, 373, 3 7 6 -7 7 , 380-82. Se e alsoBOLERO; ROUNDUP ; S L E D G E H A M M E R .

area of joint British-American responsibility,165-67

British plans for operations in, 99-101, 179-80,233-35, 237-40, 243-44, 327-65

invasion of in 1942, plan for, 177-79, 180-81, 185,186-87, 188-89, 190-92, 193, 196, 209, 210,

2 2 1 - 2 2 , 230-32, 233-35, 2 3 6 - 4 4 , 255, 266-273-76, 27 7, 278, 280, 314, 322, 326, 328-29. Seealso BOLERO; S L E D G E H A M M E R.

invasion of in 1943, plan f o r , 179-82, 187-88,190-97, 221, 232, 235, 236, 238-39, 243, 267,268-70, 273-76, 2 7 7 , 279-81, 282, 283,314, 318, 322 - 27 , 329, 353-54, 360, 364, 373,376-77, 380-82. See also BOLERO; ROUNDUP.

invasion of in 1944, planning for, 326-27, 365-66.See also ROUNDUP.

Norway, 197nBritish plans for invasion of, 100 , 189, 235, 239,

244, 244n, 267n, 269, 278, 310, 326German invasion of, 11, 234, 285, 285n

Noumea, New Caledonia, 150, 301, 305n




Offensive operations—Continuedagainst Germany, planning for, 26-27, 44, 61-62,

101, 144, 156-57, 159-62, 174-75, 177 , 181-82,194, 196, 202, 206, 218, 294-97, 298, 322, 363-66, 376-80. See also BOLERO; ROUNDUP; SLEDGE-H A M M E R .

against Japan, planning for, 123, 163, 172, 371-73McNair's views on, 48nin North Pacific, planning for, 258, 370-72in northwestern Europe in 1942, plan for, 177-79,

180-81, 182-89, 190-92, 193, 196, 208-09, 210,218-19, 221-22, 230-32, 233-35, 236-44, 255,266-68, 273-76, 27 7, 278, 280, 314, 322, 326,328-29. Se e also BOLERO; S L E D G E H A M M E R .

in northwestern Europe in 1943, British plan for,101-02, 179-80

in northwestern Europe in 1943, plan for, 179-81,182-89, 190-97, 232, 235, 236, 238-39, 243, 267,268-70, 273-76, 277 , 279-81, 282, 283, 314, 318,3 2 2 -2 7 , 329, 353-54, 360, 364, 376-77, 380-82.See also BOLERO; ROUNDUP.

in northwestern Europe in 1944, planning for,326-27 , 365-66

preparation of U.S. troops for, 61, 178, 313-18,350-53

an d RAINBOW 5, 46in South Pacific, planning for, 258-63, 265, 299-

301, 302-03, 358-59, 367-70in Southwest Pacific, planning for, 171-73, 258-63,265, 301, 302-03, 327, 358-59, 367-70, 377

Oil, 23, 37, 158at Abadan, 203nbombing of fields at Ploesti, 246, 246nin Caucasus, 334

Pacific, 1, 187, 188, 190, 215-16, 22 7, 238, 256, 264,290, 310n, 336, 345, 351, 353, 354, 360, 38 2

advisory council f o r , 125-26, 166 , 2 1 7 . See alsoPacific War Council.

area of American strategic responsibility, 165-67Army strength in , July 1942, 353nArnold-Streett inspection trip to , 321-22boundary between Indian and Pacific theaters,

169ndeployment policy in, 159-62, 211-12, 298-306,

304n , 320-21, 356-58, 370deployment of U.S. forces in, 49, 49n, 69-70, 72-

73 , 81n, 82 -85 , 114-17, 147, 148-56, 158-59,162-64, 167, 172, 175, 176, 179, 198, 2 1 0 - 1 2 ,217-21 , 222-26, 256-57, 265, 270-71, 298-306,304n, 3 1 5 n , 320-21, 322n, 357-60, 369-70

diversion of 15 air groups from BOLERO to, 281, 296,300-302, 308, 318, 320-22

island bases, 61n, 194, 223, 270, 310, 358-59lines of advance in, 2, 9-10, 260-61, 270, 371-72naval forces in, 223, 305-06, 310-11, 342offensive operations in , planning for, 1-3, 8-10, 161,

258-63, 265, 2 6 7 - 6 9 , 315 327, 3378, 379. See also Offensive operations, Europeversus Pacific; O R A N G E plan; RA IN BO W 2; RAIN-BOW 3; Task O n e ; Task Two; Task Three.

shipping in Army service in, Decmber 1942, 361

shipping losses in, 302strategic defensive in, 2 -3 , 12-13, 17, 19, 26-27,29-30, 34-35, 60 , 155, 157-62, 172, 174-75, 177,178, 189, 211 , 212 , 222, 223, 226, 267-68, 296-97, 3 7 6 - 7 7 , 378

unified command for 168-69, 260, 263-65, 368-69.See also ABDA Command; Pacific Ocean Area;



INDEX 443

Panama Canal Zone—ContinuedB-17's in defense of , 19n, 69defense of, 82, 102reinforcement of, 46, 81vulnerability to Japanese attack, 80war warning message to, 79

Papua Campaign, 358-59, 367Parachute troops, 186, 208-09, 241, 271, 369Paris, 178Partridge, Brig. Gen. Earle E., 360nPas-de-Calais, 24 1Pasteur, 248, 251Patch, Maj. Gen. Alexander M.

artillery regiment for, 129ncommands task force for New Caledonia, 11 6 - 1 7 ,

129, 150proposed as Army commander in South Pacific,

264

and units at Guadalcanal, 359nPatterson, Robert P., 199nPatton, Maj. Gen. George S., 3 11 , 315, 3 1 6 , 321

commands Task Force "A," 289ncommands task force for Middle East, 249, 249n,

290, 292ncommands Western Task Force, 289, 289non TORCH plan, 288-89trip to London, August 1942, 288-89, 290n

and Twelfth Air Force, 318n, 319Pearl Harbor. See also Hawaiian Islands.as base for U.S. Fleet, 8n, 15, 20, 29, 35attack on, predicted, 18-19B-17's for defense of, 18, 19n, 69

Pearl Harbor attack, 73n , 82, 97, 120, 138, 158, 199,205, 359

Philippine Islands—Continuedand air ferry route, 70-71air reinforcements for, 70-71, 84-85, 95, 132B-17's for defense of, 69-71British view on loss of, 37command placed under Dutch, 164and conference at Manila, 76-78date of first effective reinforcement, 75defense of, and aid to China, 73-75defense of, under RAINBOW 5, 45defense of Luzon, 65-67difficulties of reinforcing, 71-73fall of Manila, 120Japanese attack on, 81-82, 88Japanese proposal to guarantee neutrality of, 68Japanese threat to, 5, 9, 79, 80line of advance through, 270loss of , predicted, 2

MacArthur evacuated from, 170MacArthur ordered to Australia f rom, 165mission to hold Manila Bay, 319th Bombardment Group ordered to, 70and Pacific War Council, 217nand Pensacola convoy, 72-73, 82-84, 88, 129policy to defend, 67-73, 76-78, 82-85, 87-96, 121-

23, 172policy not to reinforce, 3, 45, 66-67

reinforcement of, 49n, 67-73, 74, 78-79, 82, 102,219-21reinforcement of, under ORANGE plan, 3nschedule of troop shipments to, 72-73, 82in Southwest Pacific Area, 168-70surrender of U.S. Army Forces in Far East, 17321st and 34th Pursuit Squadrons transferred from,



444 STRATEGIC P LANNI NG FOR COALITION WARFARE

Ports of Embarkation. See also New York Port of Em-barkation; San Francisco Port of Embarkation.

Boston, 149Charleston, 151

Pound, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley, 23, 55n,102n, 126, 238

on conference in Far East, 76on North African operation, 280

PQ. 17, 335-36. See also Convoys, Arctic.Pratt, Lt. Col. R. S., 18nPresident. See Roosevelt, Franklin D.President Garfield, 72, 73nPresident Johnson, 72, 73n, 151President Taylor, 151Prime Minister, British. See Churchill, Winston S.Prince of Wales, 53 , 55n, 103Priorities. S ee Industrial production, priorities.Production. See Industrial production.

Propaganda, against Germany, 55, 61Protocols, Soviet. See First (Moscow) Protocol; Second

(Washington) Protocol.Public opinion, 5, 26, 27, 31, 52, 104, 215Puerto Rico, 49nPurnell, Capt. W. R., 65nPursuit aircraft

for Anglo-American air force in Caucasus, 330, 333for AVG, 203

for British Isles, 39-40, 218, 32 4for cross-Channel attack, 2 41diversion of groups from BOLERO to Pacific, 300for Guadalcanal, 30 1for Hawaii, 153for Iceland, 51, 355for India and Burma, 136-38

Radar, 258shortage of, for use in Philippines, 71

Raids, coastal, 219 . See also Commando operations;Dieppe Raid.

on European Continent, 184, 187, 2 2 1 , 238, 242,266, 273

prediction of Janpanese, on west coast, 225in South Pacific, 259

RAINBOW 1, 6, 7-8, 8n, 47nRAINBOW 2, 6, 7, 8-10, 13, 47n, 260RAINBOW 3, 6, 8, 13, 47nRAINBOW 4, 6, 8, 12, 13, 14, 47nRAINBOW 5, 8, 13, 25, 43-48, 60n, 61, 353

effective, 7 December 1941, 80, 81nRAINBOW plans, 5-10, 13, 29

cancellation of, 47nRamgarh, 374Ramsey, Capt. DeWitt C., 33n, 39nRanger, 203, 248, 251, 31 1Ranger Battalion, 1st, 31 7Ranger battalions, 313Rangoon, 120, 121, 130, 131, 136, 137

loss of, 139Red Air Force, 331, 334Red Army, 174 , 178, 181 , 185, 187, 209, 238, 240,

243, 277, 330, 350, 35 2Red Sea 14, 40, 291

area of British strategic responsibility, 166reduction of lend-lease sailings for, 163, 176, 179Regimental Combat Team, 172d, 305nRegimental combat teams, 313, 316nRegular Army, 20, 48. See also Army, U.S.Republic, 72, 152Reserve officers, 51



INDEX 445

Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continuedaid to China policy, 63-64, 204-05, 229on aid to USSR, 1 6 7 n , 205-06, 214, 226, 229-S2,

273, 2 7 7 , 298, 331-32, 336, 346-48, 379-80on air force for Chennault, 376non air route to China via Siberia, 343n, 345on air support of USSR in Caucasus, 330-32, 330non aircraft allocations, 201-02, 2 2 7 , 334-35, 336,

345-48and aircraft delivery to Netherlands East Indies

an d Australia, 7 1on Alaska-Siberia air route, 342-43and Anglo-American air force for Caucasus,

329-32, 334, 335-36, 335n, 345at ARCADIA Conference, 97-119on ARCADIA shipping schedule, 11 7 , 205-06on area of TORCH landings, 285n, 292-93on areas of strategic responsibility, 165-67, 176on Army Air Forces expansion, 347at Atlantic Conference, 53, 103authority to call ou t National Guard and Organ-

ized Reserves, 21authority to control exports, 21on an auton omous air force, 201non Azores operation, 49-50and base in Australia, 87, 88on bombing Japan, 139n, 190

and bombing of Ploesti oil fields, 246non Burma offensive, 375at Casablanca Conference, 380and CCS 94, 282-83, 294and Churchill-Curtin controversy, 212-15on civil airline transports, 210commitment in 1938 to British for naval aid in Far

Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continuedon fraternization with Soviet troops, 330freezes Japanese assets, 65and German attack on USSR, 53on German troops killed by Red Army, 214,

221-22, 222nand Ghormley-Emmons-Strong trip to London, 22on hemisphere defense, 1938, 5instructions for London conference, July 1942,

273-78, 28 0and Iranian railroad, 337on JCS and CCS control of strategy and operations,

167non juncture of German and Japanese forces, 190on landing craft , 193Leahy appointed liaison officer between JCS and,

282nlend-lease policy, 56-57, 63-64on lend-lease shipments to USSR, 119, 205-06,

231-32, 292n.on loss of British cruisers off Ceylon, 201non MacArthur as Supreme Commander, SWPA,

170on MacArthur's relations with Curtin, 213-15and MacArthur's views on Pacific strategy, 215-16and military conversations in Moscow, 342military policy in 1940, 20-21

and naval aid to British at Singapore, 36need of professional military advice, 51-52on North African operation, 1 0 2 , 1 0 4 , 105-07,

107n, 110-11, 117-18, 119, 17 5, 176, 235, 236,273-76 , 2 7 7 , 278-79, 282, 285n, 2 9 2 n , 327

on northern convoys to USSR, 310, 310n, 337and notification to USSR of decision to mount




Roosevelt, Franklin D.—Continuedan d RAINBOW 4, 13and RAINBOW 5 , 46-47, 81non reaching Berlin, 380re-election, 1940, 25on re inforcement of Austra l ia , 13 1 , 214, 2 1 7 , 219and reinforcement of Hawaii, 162on reinforcement of Iran, 278

relationship w i th A r m y Chief of Staff, 32on relief of troops in Northern Ireland and Iceland,98, 109-11, 113 148

on return of Australian divisions f rom Middle East,213, 21 4

on ROUNDUP in 1944, 32 7on a second f r on t in 1942, 166-67, 183-84, 214,

221-22, 231-32 , 233-34 , 23 5 , 2 4 0 , 273-78and shipping for movement of British troops to

Middle East, 163, 176, 198and shipping fo r Southwest Pacific deployment,

163, 176, 205-06show of strength policy in Pacific, 15, 78, 82on slow down of BOLERO, 219-21, 223, 273, 276,

276n , 282, 283, 327on Soviet-American m i l i t a r y collaboration in

Siberia, 343, 345and Soviet neutrality in Japanese war, 86n, 121,

143, 14 5and Soviet release of A-20's at Basra to British, 253,

253non strategy, Janu ary 1941, 28-30on strategy in the Far East, 86non support of Philippines after Japanese attack, 82,

83, 85, 95d SWPA d 169 70

ROUNDUP—Continuedt iming of, 180-81, 182-83, 185-86, 280-81, 296,

325-27Royal Air Force, 38, 39, 41, 45, 180, 201n, 234, 242,

268, 331Royal Austra l ian A ir Force, 132Royal Navy. S ee Navy, British.Rubber, loss of, 19, 37, 158

Ruhr, 180Rumania, 43, 246Russia. S ee Soviet Union.Russian mari t ime provinces. S ee Mari time provinces,

USSR.

Saigon, 136St. Lucia, 44, 49nSt. Quentin, 178Saipan, line of advance through, 270Salamaua, planning for operations against, 262, 303.

See also Task Two.Salween River, 130Samoa, 6-7, 26, 45, 74, 115, 151, 155, 169, 222San Francisco Port of Embarkation, 148-49, 151, 223,

224nSanta Cruz Islands, planning for operations against,

262, 265. Se e also Task One.Saratoga, 311Sarawak, 88Sardinia

estimate of shipping losses in operation against,378n

plan for operations against, 327, 363, 373, 377, 379th t f i tt k f 287



INDEX 447

Service forces—Continuedfor Middle East, 199, 226, 245, 35 5fo r Pacific alternative, 271projected fo r 1942, 351. See also Troop Basis 1942;

Victory Program Troop Basis.for South Pacific, 150n, 152, 224, 357, 359for Southwest Pacific, 150, 152, 357, 359for TORCH, 3 1 7 , 318

for U.K., 191, 27 0, 2 7 1 n , 323-24ultimate requirements, 352in Victory Program, 60

Services of Supply, 183, 245, 271, 314n, 317 n, 323,337, 339, 36 2

Services of Supply, USAFIME, 255nShaposhnikov, Marshal Boris M., 329Sherman, Comdr. Forrest P., 53nSherrill, Col. Stephen H., 2 5 7 nShipping, 59, 99, 15 7, 159, 16 2, 166, 194, 21 9, 239,

248-49, 25 1, 259, 268, 270-71 , 279 , 289, 303,307, 333 366 369 371

in Army service, December 1941, 361in Army service, December 1942, 361for BRIMSTONE, 373, 378n, 379fo r Burma operation, 374construction, 1, 49, 193-94, 230n, 312controlled by four agencies, 310nCurtin requests additional British, 213limiting factor in 1943, 362loaned by British, 151losses, 51, 53, 229-30, 238 , 265, 2 8 6 , 292, 302,

309-10, 312, 312n, 313, 336, 361, 378priorities for, 156, 308-13, 320fo r ROUNDUP, 3 77h t g f 96 147 48 160 17 2 176 185 186

Shipping, cargo—Continuedwithdrawal of, f rom lend-lease service, 119 , 163,

179, 206 309-10Shipping, troop, 361-62

ARCADIA Conference report on , 107-08fo r BOLERO, 183, 186, 191, 27 0, 2 7 2 , 281, 308-09,

323, 324, 3 2 7combat loading vessels, 117-18, 148, 314, 316, 316n

construction of, 49conversion for combat loading, 283, 314nl imi t ing factor, 1942, 163, 179, 180, 284 36 1fo r movement to British Isles, 17 8, 17 9, 183,

186-87, 308-09, 31 4fo r movement of British troops to Middle East and

India, 163, 167, 176 , 179, 198fo r movement to Iceland and Northern Ireland,

109-11, 147-48, 191, 308-09, 31 1for movement of U.S. troops to India, 308-09for movement of U .S . troops to Middle East,

308-09, 339for Pacific alternative, 270-72fo r Philippine reinforcement, 72-73in RAINBOW 5, 46for ROUNDUP, 180, 183, 186, 191, 323, 324shortage of, 49, 102, 104, 105, 107-08, 116-17, 199,

308-13for SLEDGEHAMMER, 183, 186, 191, 239, 266for South Pacific reinforcement, 152, 155, 179, 304,

308fo r Southwest Pacific reinforcement, 114-18,

129-30, 152, 155, 167, 17 6, 179, 21 8, 281 , 300,304

for TORCH, 281, 283, 284, 308-13, 322in Victory Program 60




Singapore—Continuedfall of, 127-28, 130, 1 31, 1 37, 138, 139, 1 57, 160,

164, 168Japanese bombing of, 80state of defenses of, 38n, 122n

Singapore ADB conference. See American-Dutch-British conversations.

Singapore conference, 85-86

Sitka, 258Sittang Bridge, Battle of, 130-31, 138S LED G EH A M M ER , 1 8 5 n , 186-87, 189, 190-92, 209,

218-19, 2 2 1 - 2 2 , 232 , 233-35, 236-44 , 249, 2 6 0 ,272, 277, 2 7 7 n , 281, 294, 314, 322

British att i tude toward, 196, 233-35, 237-40,243-44 , 266-69, 273-76, 2 7 6 n , 280, 326, 328-29

British commander for, 196as code name, 19ndecision not to execute, 267, 278, 280, 328-29estimate of forces for, 182-83, 186, 239, 241landing craft for, 186, 192, 193 , 235, 23 9, 2 4 1 , 266planning in London for, 190, 240shipping for, 183, 191, 230-32, 239, 266timing of, 182-83, 186-87, 233, 239, 243, 26 6

Slessor, Air Vice Marshal J. C., 33n, 39n, 248-49Smeallie, Capt. J. M., 2nSmith, Col. George A., Jr., 286nSmith, Col. Joseph, 257nSmith, Brig. Gen. Walter Bedell, 17, 19n, 162n, 210,

244, 2 8 4 n , 325non BOLERO-ROUNDUP, 326-27on construction in U.K., 326-27on crisis in Egypt, 251-52

Smuts, General Jan Christian, 102nS i I l d 7 151

South America—Continueddeployment of U.S. forces to, 356nprotection of key ports in, 18-19troops for, under RAINBOW 5, 46

South Atlantic, 1 7, 25, 96, 98, 137, 27 9, 360. See alsoAzores; Cape Verde Islands; Dakar,

air ferry route, 248, 356expeditionary force for use in, 103

South China Sea, 36, 64, 79, 120, 228, 261South Pacific, 9, 347, 361, 37 2air combat groups for, 153-54, 211-12, 218-19,

223-24, 225-26, 2 2 5 n , 263-64 , 300, 301-02, 30319, 320, 3 2 2 n , 358-59

air operations in, as aid to Russia, 144antiaircraft regiments for, 299B-17 squadron diverted to support of ANZAC

force in, 153, 263command of offensive operations in, 260-63, 368command problem in, 263-64defense of bases in , 114-16, 118, 299-300, 30 1deployment of U.S. forces to, 114-16, 150-56, 185,

211-12, 2 2 2 - 2 3 , 265, 299-305, 308divisions available for movement to, 318ndivisions in, 359n43d Division ordered to, 304, 317 , 317 nGhormley appointed naval commander of, 262Harmon commands Army forces in, 264-65Japanese carriers in, 223King requests heavy bomber group for, 211landings in Solomon Islands, 301, 358-59line o f advance from, 27 0mobile air forces from Hawaii and Australia for use

in , 211-12, 218-19 , 223-24, 299, 301-02, 301n,



INDEX 449

Southwest Pacific—Continued139, 166 2 2 5 n , 312 3 2 7 , 342, 361, 372, 381

and ABDA Command, 123-26, 164advisory council on, 125-26air combat groups for, 95, 152-53, 273, 298, 358air operations in, 152-53amphibious forces for, 158anticipation of Japanese attack in, 8 0 n , 212-13,

215, 299Churchill requests two U . S . divisions for, 152,162-63, 198

command of offensive operations in, 260-63,368-70

Curtin requests British reinforcement of, 212-15,217

diversion of bombers to Burma from, 140divisions in, 359nengineer amphibian brigades for use in, 314nI Corps headquarters ordered to, 3041st Marine Division ordered to, 370line of advance from, 270MacArthur requests reinforcements for, 213, 215MacArthur's view of strategy in, 215-16mobile a ir forces for use in South Pacific, 211-12,

219 , 223-24, 264, 299, 301-02, 304Navy estimate of air forces required in, 226offensive operations in, planning for, 258-63, 299,

302-03, 367-70. See also Task Two; Task Three,operations in New Guinea, 358-59postponement of shipments to, 304-05reinforcement of, 122, 128-31, 148-50, 151-54,

156, 167, 172, 175, 176, 179, 185, 188, 200,2 1 7 - 2 1 , 281, 298, 299-300, 304, 358, 369-70. See

Phili i I l d i f f

Soviet Union—Continuedaircraft allocations to, 206-10, 231-32, 334-36,

341, 345-48, 380Alaska-Siberia air route, 121, 142-43, 145, 319,

336, 339-46, 357alliance with France and Czechoslovakia, 4and American air operations from Siberia, 121,

142-46, 328, 332, 341-46, 371-72

American estimate of ability to resist Germans, 53and American survey in Caucasus, 332American survey in Siberia, 332, 342-46, 372and an American withdrawal in Southwest Pacific,

88and Anglo-American air force for Caucasus,

329-36, 344, 345, 348and ARCADIA Conference, 98Bradley mission to, 342-46

British plans for sustaining, 101and command of an Anglo-American a ir force inCaucasus, 331

and conference at Chungking, 85-86Connolly authorized to deal wi th , 338and decision to mount TORCH, 328-29, 336Drummond-Adler mission to, 330, 332-36fraternization with British and U.S. troops, 330,

331, 334, 33 5German attack on, 53, 112Greely mission to, 58, 198Iran occupied by British and Soviet troops, 58and Iranian lend-lease mission, 58, 198Japanese threat to, 121, 269, 279-71, 342, 343,

343n, 344-45, 37 1Japanese threat to southern supply route to, 203nl d l id 56 62 74 75 142 43



INDEX 451

State Department, 117influence on President, 52and Japanese threat to Kunming, China, 74-75negotiations with Soviet Union, 143, 14 5policy in Far East, 2, 16

Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., 57nStilwell, Maj. Gen. Joseph W., 175, 264, 371

assigned to Dakar operation, 104

assigned to North African operation, 105chief of staff to Chiang Kai-shek, 139-40and command for Burma offensive, 374commands U.S. Army forces in China, Burma, and

India, 139-40on ground combat units for China, 228mission to China, 139-40, 357and offensive in Burma, 373-76retreat in Burma, 228Tenth Air Force assigned to, 140-41, 228, 246-47Tenth Air Force diverted from, 203, 247, 247nand training of Chinese troops at Ramgarh, 373-74

Stimson, Henry L ., 47, 206, 221, 272, 282, 382and air reinforcement of Philippines, 70on aircraft allocations to British, 201-02, 207on aircraft allocations to USSR, 207at ARCADIA Conference, 98authorized to deliver aircraft to Australia and

Netherlands East Indies, 71conference with President, January 1941, 28on cross-Channel attack, 182, 183, 236, 269non defense of Middle East, 200-201, 254and establishment of base in Australia, 87on expeditionary forces, 1941, 50on isolationism, 31

N h Af i i 113 236 236 295

Strong, Maj. Gen. George V.—Continuedon Japanese threat to Pearl Harbor, 18on mobilization of National Guard, 19on strategic defensive in Pacific, 18, 19on strategy, June 1940, 16n, 19-20trip to London, 1940, 22-24on troops for South America, 18

Sturdee, Lt . Gen. V. A. H., 129n

Styer, Brig. Gen. Wilhelm D., 337nSubmarine campaign, German, 312Subversive activities, 43. See also Guerrilla forces; Re-

sistance groups.against Germany, 55, 61, 100

Sudan, 247, 252Suez Canal, 57, 189

German threat to, 252, 297Sumatra, 45n, 131, 164, 166SUPER-GYMNAST, 113, 235-36, 281n, 285-86. S ee also

G Y M N A S T; TORCH.cancellation of, 175-77as code name, 113nmodified plan, 176n

Surabaja, 10, 133Surinam, 49nSuva, 10, 82, 115

70th Pursuit Squadron arrives in, 151Sweden, 197n

Syria, 40, 200, 226, 277, 279German threat to, 252Halverson Project planes forced down in, 246n

Takoradi, 40 , 137, 138, 24 8Tank Battalion, 192d, 68nT k B tt li 754 h (L) 150




Tenth Air Force, 149, 333bombing of Andaman Islands, 202diversion to British for operations in Indian Ocean,

190, 202, 203, 227, 247-48diversion of 9th Bombardment Squadron to Egypt,

246-47diversion of reinforcements for, to Egypt, 247establishment in India, 140-42, 164

Fellers' recommendation on, 254nreinforcement of, 190, 202for use in China and bombing of Japan, 140, 228

ter Poorten, Lt. Gen. H., 135nThailand, 43, 66, 79, 80n, 128, 228

Japanese attack on, 80Theobald, Rear Adm. Robert A., 225Thomas, Capt. F. P., 286nTimberman, Lt. Col. Thomas S., 139nTimor, 132

defense of, 129148th Field Artillery Regiment ordered to , 129,

129nTobruk, fall of, 238, 245, 245n, 246, 252, 254, 255,

255nTokyo, 139, 225Tonga Islands, 151, 155Tongatabu, 224

Army garrison for, 151, 155, 299forces for forward areas from, 29968th Pursuit Squadron ordered to, 149n, 155

TORCH, 251n, 2 7 9 n , 297, 299, 307-08, 343, 363-64,366, 370, 376-77, 378, 380, 382

and aid to China, 311-12and aid to Middle East, 297-98, 319-20i f f 318 22 318 347 48 l T lf h

TORCH—Co n t i n u edand operations in Aleutians, 312operations in French North Africa, 333P-39's en route to USSR released to, 319and Pacific requirements, 299-300, 303-04, 305-06,

320-22plan of 9 August 1942, 286-88, 292plan of 21 August 1942, 288-90, 292

plan of 5 September 1942, 293, 306, 316plan of 20 September 1942, 313planning in London for, 281 , 285, 286-93planning in Washington for , 284-86, 288, 290, 291-

93and relief of British troops in Iceland, 3112d Armored Division assigned to, 285shipping for, 281, 283, 284-85, 289, 290, 290n, 292,

308-13, 314, 314n , 316, 316n, 320, 322and shipping priorities, 308-13and shipping for Solomons operation, 310-11and Soviet lend-lease, 309-10, 311, 319, 3 48Soviet reaction to, 328-293d Division assigned to, 285 , 304-0533d Pursuit Group assigned to, 319-20timing of, 281, 282-85, 284n, 28 7, 288, 289, 290,

292, 294, 309, 310training for, 281, 2 8 8 , 2 9 0 , 313-19. See also Am-

phibious training.versus ROUNDUP, 279-84, 294-97, 322-27

Torres Strait, 88Towers, Rear Adm. John H.

and air forces for Middle East, 227, 248-49and allocation of U.S. aircraft, 227and mobile air forces for defense of South Pacific,



INDEX 453

Transport aircraft—Continuedfor China, 139, 141-42, 37 2diversion from BOLERO to Pacific, 30 0for Middle East, 322nproduction, 207-08, 209for South Pacific, 322nfor Southwest Pacific, 369for TORCH, 318fo r training parachute and airborne troops, 208-09

Trickle movement, 310n. See also Convoys, Arctic.Trinidad, 44, 49nTripoli, 117, 3 73Troop Basis, 1942, 194, 195-96, 245, 270, 339, 350-52,

350nTroop Basis, 1943, 352-53Troop carrier groups. See Transport aircraft.Troop movements, 48-51, 81, 1 8 7 , 191, 316-17,

3 1 7 n , 355, 364. See also Deployment of U.S.forces; Shipping, troop.Troop training. See Training.Troop transports. See Shipping, troop.Troops, restriction on use outside Western Hemi-

sphere, 21, 49, 50Truk, 259, 270, 367, 36 9Tulagi, 368. See also Solomon Islands.

Ghormley commands operations against, 262planning fo r operations against, 259-63, 265. See

also Task One.Tully, Col. James K., 372nTunis, 285n, 291Tunisia, 278n, 327, 371, 373

German reinforcement of, 307, 312-13, 354planning for advance into, 102, 175, 285-89, 285n,

Umnak, 225Unalaska, 13, 224Unconditional surrender policy, 380, 382Underground activities. See Resistance groups.United Kingdom. S ee Great Britain.Unity of command. See Command, unity of.Upston, Col. John E., 200nU.S. Army Air Forces in the Middle East, 247

U.S. Army Forces in Australia, 170-71U.S. Army Forces in the British Isles, 48, 111U.S. Army Forces in Central Africa, 245

strength of U.S. troops in, December 1942, 355U.S. Army Forces in China, Burma, India, 140U.S. Army Forces in the Far East, 69, 88, 173

establishment of, 67U.S. Army Forces in the Middle East

Andrews commands, 255n

authority over PGSC, 338and Drummond-Adler mission, 333-36establishment of, 245-46Maxwell commands, 245-46, 255, 255nstrength of U.S. troops in, December 1942, 355

U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, 264,359

U.S. Asiatic Fleet. See Asiatic Fleet, U.S.U.S. Atlantic Fleet. See Atlantic Fleet, U.S.U.S. chiefs of staff. See Joint Chiefs of Staff.U.S. Fleet, 26. See also Navy, U.S.; Pacific Fleet, U.S.

base at Pearl Harbor, 15-16, 15n, 18, 20, 27, 29,35

and base at Singapore, 8n, 10ndanger of attack on, at Pearl Harbor, 18in Pacific as deterrent to Japanese, 23, 36




War Department Concentration Plan RAINBOW 5,47n

War Department General Council, 329n, 345nWar Department General Staff, 341War Department Operations Plan RAINBOW 5, 47nWar Department Troop Basis, 350n. See also Troop

Basis, 1942; Troop Basis, 1943; Victory ProgramTroop Basis.

W ar plans, 6 - 7 , 25-28, 50 . Se e also BLACK; BOLERO;Color plans; G Y M N A S T; O R A N G E plan; RAINBOWplans; ROUNDUP; SL E DGE HAM M E R; TORCH.

W ar Plans Division, 17, 42, 45, 52, 59 , 81n, 99, 157,183, 267. See also Operations Division.

War Production Board, 193, 194, 206, 352War Shipping Administration, 206, 310nWard, Maj. G en . Orlando, 80n, 286nWashington conference, January-March 1941. S ee

American-British Conversations.Washington conference, December 1941-January

1942. Se e ARCADIA Conference.Washington conference, June 1942, 236-44, 249-50,

32 6Washington naval treaty of 1922, 2Wasp, 311, 311nWatson, Maj. Gen. Edwin M., 17, 19n, 46Wavell, Field Marshal Sir Archibald, 129, 132, 17 1

on aircraft carrier to move planes to Java, 133assigns 147th Field Artillery Regiment to PortDarwin, 129n, 15 0

an d British carrier Indomitable, 133, 134n, 13 5and Burma offensive, 374-75CCS instructions to, on withdrawal from Java,

134 164

Wedemeyer, Brig. G e n . Albert C.—Continuedon maintaining Red Army as effective force, 187on strategic defensive in war against Japan, 187-88an d TORCH plan, 287nand Victory Program, 59

Welles, Sumner, 13, 19, 107nWemyss, Lt. Gen. H. C. B., 43West Africa, British, 245West Africa, French, 23, 26, 98, 103, 158, 356. See

also Dakar.West coast, U.S., 79, 81, 82, 151, 225, 259, 268, 299-

300West Point, 72Western Defense Command, 224n, 225, 258, 370Western Hemisphere, 14, 95, 164, 339n, 358

air forces for defense of, 39, 40Army strength overseas in, December 1942, 355-

57Army strength overseas in, July 1942, 353nAxis threat to, 5, 12, 15, 25Azores in defense of, 50British bases in, 21. S ee also Atlantic, leased bases.defense of, 5n, 7 -8 , 12-13, 16, 17-20, 29, 34, 52,

60-61, 61n, 10 3defense of , under RAINBOW 1, 6, 7, 47ndefense of , under RAINBOW 4, 8, 12, 13, 47n

defense of, under RAINBOW 5, 43-45deployment of U.S. forces in, 355-57military program for, 20restriction on use of troops outside, 21, 49, 51

Western Task Forceamphibious training, 315forces for 315 316 17

cmh pub 1-3 - strategic planning for coalition warfare- 1941-1942

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