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CMCFinlandYEARBOOK2008onCivilianCrisisManagementStudies

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEARBOOK 2008

CivilianCrisisManagementStudies

CMCFinlandCivilianCrisisManagementStudies

Volume1:Number6/2008

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEARBOOK 2008

onCivilianCrisisManagementStudies

Kirsi Henriksson (editor)

CMCFinlandCivilianCrisisManagementStudies

Publication Editor

KirsiHenriksson,HeadofResearchandDevelopment,CMCFinland

Editorial Board

AriKerkkänen,Director,CMCFinlandHannuRantanen,ResearchDirector,EmergencyServicesCollegeJariMustonen,SeniorResearcher,CMCFinlandSenjaKorhonen/OliviaŠetkić,ResearchCoordinator,CMCFinland

Advisory Board

ResearcherCedricdeCoening,Accord,South-AfricaEmeritusProfessorReijoE.Heinonen,FacultyofTheology,UniversityofJoensuu,FinlandGeneralSecretaryKristiinaKumpula,FinnishRedCrossProfessorLiisaLaakso,DepartmentofPoliticalScience,UniversityofHelsinki,FinlandSeniorResearcherKariLaitinen,ThePoliceCollegeofFinlandProfessor,DirectorTuomoMelasuo,TamperePeaceResearchInstitute,FinlandDocent,LecturerPerttiMultanen,InstituteofDevelopmentStudies,UniversityofHelsinki,FinlandDocentArtoNokkala,NationalDefenceUniversity,FinlandProgrammeDirectorHannaOjanen,TheFinnishInstituteofInternationalAffairsSeniorAdvisorChristerPursiainen,CounciloftheBalticSeaStatesProgrammeDirectorKristiinaRintakoski,CrisisManagementInitiativeStateSecretary(Political)TeijaTiilikainen,MinistryforForeignAffairsofFinlandProfessorJarmoToiskallio,NationalDefenceUniversity,FinlandDocentPekkaVisuri,NationalDefenceUniversity,FinlandAcademyResearchFellowTarjaVäyrynen,InstituteforSocialResearch,UniversityofTampere,Finland

©CMCFinlandCoverdesign:CommaGroupOyLayout:TarmoMajasaari,CrealabOy

ISSN1797-2140ISBN978-952-67127-0-3

CMCFinlandPOBox1325FIN-70821Kuopio,Finlandwww.cmcfinland.fi

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEArBook 20088

Abbreviations.............................................................. 10

Acknowledgements.................................................... 12kirsi Henriksson

Prologue........................................................................ 14Alexander Stubb

Introduction................................................................. 16Ari kerkkänen – kirsi Henriksson

Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels: Studying EU-ESDP Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina............... 18Jari Mustonen

1Introduction2Civil-MilitaryCoordinationinEUCrisis

Management:ConceptsandStructures 2.1Civil-MilitaryCooperationvs.Civil-

MilitaryCoordination 2.2Developmentandstructuresforcivil-

militarycoordinationintheEU 2.3Frameworkforcoordinationbetweenthe

EU–ESDPactorsinBosniaandHerzegovina3TheESDPmissionsinBosniaandHerzegovina:mandates

andmodalitiesforcooperationandcoordination 3.1TheEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentative 3.2EuropeanUnionPoliceMission 3.3EUFORAlthea4Experiencesofcoordinationandcooperation 4.1ThedifficultdebutofESDPinBosnia 4.2Fightingorganisedcrime:thebottleneck 4.3Fieldlevelinterface 4.4FromSevenPrinciplestoCommon

OperationalGuidelines 4.5Cooperationandcoordinationatthepresenttime5Conclusion

Recruitment and Training in Civilian Crisis Management: Learning from the ECMM/EUMM Experiences....................... 42olivia Šetkić

1Introduction2TheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission 2.1ThedevelopmentfromECMMtoEUMM 2.2TheEUMMmandate 2.3TheEUMMmethodology 2.4TheEUMMListofQualifications3Therecruitmentofmonitors4Thetrainingofmonitors 4.1Pre-missiontraining 4.2TheEUMMinductiontraining 4.3Learningonthejob 4.4Remedialtraining5Identifyinggapsweakeningthefieldperformance 5.1KnowledgeofEnglish 5.2Interpersonalskillsandculturalsensitivity 5.3Politicalacumen 5.4KnowledgeandunderstandingoftheBalkans 5.5Analyticalskills 5.6Agelimit 5.7Stressmanagement6Recommendations 6.1Recruitingrecommendations 6.1.1Detailedqualificationcriteria

andjobdescription 6.1.2Encouragingself-evaluation 6.1.3Adjustingprofiletochangedcircumstances 6.1.4Dialogueandmeasures 6.1.5Addingtransparencyandvisibility 6.1.6Thetimingofrecruitment 6.1.7Testingqualities 6.2Trainingrecommendations 6.2.1Sharingresponsibilityfortraining 6.2.2Additionstotrainingcurricula •Interviewingtechniques •Workingwithinterpretersversus

workingwithinternationalstaff

Contents

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYEArBook 2008 9

•Whobenefitsfromthemonitoring,howandwhy?

•Morespecificsonthetargetareaandtargetissues

•Trainingoftrainersandstressmanagement

6.2.3Individualisingtraining 6.2.4Developingnewe-learningtools7Concludingremarks

Building Capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police: EUPOL COPPS and Communications Project................................... 64Ari kerkkänen – Hannu rantanen – Jari Sundqvist

1Introduction2SettingthestageforthePalestinianPolice 2.1PolicingbeforetheOsloAccords 2.2PolicingfollowingtheOsloAccordsin

1993andinternationalassistance 2.3TheSecondIntifadaanditsaftermath3EUPOLCOPPS 3.1TheInitialCommunicationsProjectanditsrationale 3.2Frombi-lateralprojecttofully-fledgedESDP

mission-EstablishingEUPOLCOPPS 3.3EUPOLCOPPSCommunicationsProjectdescription 3.4Stakeholdersandbeneficiaries 3.5Projectimplementation 3.6Projectresults4Conclusions 4.1Thechallengeofthepoliticalcontext 4.2Operationalprospectsandbarriers 4.3HumanSecurityprinciplesastheProjectframework

Human Security in Post-Status Kosovo: a Shared European Responsibility.......................... 88Tanja Tamminen

1Introduction2Humansecurity–fromaconcepttotheESDPreality 2.1HumanSecurityDoctrineforEurope 2.2Lobbyingforcertainprioritiesofaction 2.3HumansecuritytrainingtoinfluencetheEUactivities3Limitsandchallengesofthehumansecuritythinking 3.1HumanSecurityinKosovounderstatusnegotiations 3.2ESDPdevelopmentinparallelto

humansecuritydebate4KosovofocusedHumanSecuritytraining 4.1FutureESDPoperationinKosovo 4.2AddedvalueofKosovospecific

humansecuritytraining5Conclusion

PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil-Military Integration................................... 104oskari Eronen

1Introduction2ShorthistoryofPRTs3PRTmissionandtasks4PresentvarietyofPRTs 4.1ListingPRTs 4.2Institutionalframeworkonthehomefront 4.3Localconditions 4.4Presenceofothertroops5GenericPRTmodels 5.1American 5.2German 5.3British(-Nordic) 5.4Turkish6PRTsunderscrutiny 6.1ResearchonPRTs 6.2Incoherenceofmodels 6.3Capacityinreconstructionanddevelopment 6.4Whole-of-governmentapproach 6.5Blurringofcivilianandmilitaryroles 6.6PRTasasecurityprovider? 6.7Integrationofcapacities7Thewayforward 7.1Coherence 7.2Afghanisation 7.3Civilianisation 7.4Futureoftheintegratedconcept8Futureresearch

Authors........................................................................ 140


Abbreviations

ACBAR AgencyCoordinatingBodyforAfghanReliefAIA AfghanInterimAdministrationAMIS AfricanMissioninSudanANA AfghanNationalArmyANP AfghanNationalPoliceAU AfricanUnionBCI PalestiniantelecommunicationsoperatorBiH BosnaiHercegovina,(Bosnia

andHerzegovina)CA CivilAffairsCERP Commander’sEmergencyResponseProgramCFC-A CoalitionForceCommand–AfghanistanCFSP CommonForeignandSecurityPolicyCHG CivilianHeadlineGoalCIMIC Civil-MilitaryCooperationCIVCOM CommitteeofCivilianAspects

ofCrisisManagementCIVMILCELL Civilian-MilitaryCellCJCMOTF CoalitionJointCivil-Military

OperationsTaskForceCMC CrisisManagementCentreFinlandCMCO Civil-MilitaryCoordinationCMCOORD UNHumanitarianCivil-MilitaryCo-ordinationCML Civil-MilitaryLiaisonComNet TelecommunicationsnetworkCONOPS ConceptofOperationsCOPP Co-ordinationCommitteeofInternational

AssistancetothePalestinianPoliceForceCOREPER CouncilofPermanentRepresentativesCORDS CivilOperationsandRural

DevelopmentSupportCOTER EUcounterterrorismprogram(codename)CPCC CivilianPlanningandConductCapabilityCSTC-A CombinedSecurityTransition

Command–AfghanistanDDK DanishkroneDDR Disarmament,Demobilisation

andReintegrationDfID DepartmentforInternationalDevelopmentDGE DirectorateGeneralECivilian

CrisisManagement

DIAG DisbandmentofIllegalArmedGroupsDoP DeclarationofPrinciplesEAR EuropeanReconstructionAgencyEC EuropeanCommissionECMM EuropeanCommunityMonitorMissionECU EuropeanCurrencyUnitEGT EuropeanGrouponTrainingENP EuropeanUnionNeighbourhoodPolicyEOD ExplosiveOrdnanceDisposalESDP EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicyESDC EuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollegeESDP EuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicyESF EconomicSupportFundsESS EuropeanSecurityStrategyEU EuropeanUnionEUBAM EuropeanUnionBorderAssistanceMissionEUCOPPS EUCo-ordinationOfficefor

PalestinianPoliceSupportEUFOR EuropeanUnionForceEULEX EuropeanUnionRuleofLaw

MissioninKosovoEUMC EuropeanUnionMilitaryCommitteeEUMM EuropeanUnionMonitoringMissionEUMS EuropeanUnionMilitaryStaffEUPM EuropeanUnionPoliceMissionEUPOLCOPPS EUPoliceMissioninthePalestinianTerritoriesEUPT EuropeanUnionPlanningTeamEUSR EuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeEU EuropeanUnionFCO ForeignandCommonwealthOfficeFSB ForwardSupportBaseGAERC GeneralAffairsandExternalRelationsCouncilGCPP GlobalConflictPreventionPoolGOA GovernmentofAfghanistanHART HART-securitycompanyHF Highfrequency

HQ HeadquartersHR HighRepresentativeICG InternationalCrisisGroupICO InternationalCivilianOfficeICT Informationandcommunicationtechnology


ICTY InternationalCriminalTribunefortheFormerYugoslavia

IDF IsraelDefenceForceIDP InternallydisplacedpersonsIFOR ImplementationForceILO InternationalLabourOrganizationIMF InternationalMonetaryFundINFOOPS InformationOperationsIO InternationalOrganisationIPTF InternationalPoliceTaskForceIPU IntegratedPoliceUnitISAF InternationalSecurityAssistanceForceKFOR KosovoForceLGCD LocalGovernanceand

CommunityDevelopmentLOT LiaisonandObservationTeamLWB LongWheelBaseLSE LondonSchoolofEconomicsMFA MinistryofForeignAffairsMIP MissionImplementationPlanMoD MinistryofDefenceMoI MinistryofInteriorMONUC UNMissionintheDemocratic

RepublicoftheCongoMOT MobileObservationTeamMSF MédecinssansFrontièresMSU MultinationalSpecialisedUnitNATO NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganisationNGO Non-GovernmentalOrganisationNOK NorwegiankroneNSF NationalSecurityForceOEF OperationEnduringFreedomOHDACA OverseasHumanitarianDisasterandCivicAidOHR OfficeoftheHighRepresentativeOPLAN OperationPlanOSCE OrganizationforSecurityand

Co-operationinEuropePA PalestinianAuthorityPASC PalestinianArmedStruggleCommandPCP PalestinianCivilPolicePCPDP PalestinianCivilPolice

DevelopmentProgrammePHS PeaceandHumanSecurityPIC PeaceImplementationCouncilPISG ProvisionalInterimGovernmentofKosovoPLO PalestinianLiberationOrganizationPMC ProjectMonitoringCommitteePMG Politico-MilitaryWorkingGroupPMT ProjectManagementTeamPNA PalestinianNationalAuthorityPPPM PalestinianPoliceProjectMemorandumPRT ProvincialReconstructionTeamPRTESC PRTExecutiveSteeringCommitteePSC PoliticalandSecurityCommitteePSR PolicySurveyandResearchQIP QuickImpactProjectRC RegionalCommand

RCC RegionalCoordinationCentreRO RegionalandMissionOfficesSAS SectionsAdministrativesSpecialiséesSCR SeniorCivilianRepresentative(NATO)SFOR StabilisationForceSG/HR Secretary-General/HighRepresentativeSOP StandardOperatingProcedureSRSG SpecialRepresentativeof

SecretaryGeneral(UN)SSR SecuritySectorReformSU StabilisationUnitTETRA TerrestrialTrunkedRadioTIPH TemporaryInternationalPresenceinHebronToR TermsofReferenceUCK KosovoLiberationArmyUK UnitedKingdomUN UnitedNationsUNAMA UnitedNationsAssistance

MissioninAfghanistanUNC UnifiedNationalCommandoftheUprisingUNDPKO UNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperationsUNDP UNDevelopmentProgrammeUNIFIL UNInterimForceinLebanonUNOCHA UNOfficefortheCoordination

ofHumanitarianAffairsUNMIK UNMissioninKosovoUNMIS UNMissioninSudanUNOSEK OfficeoftheSpecialEnvoyofthe

Secretary-GeneraloftheUNUNSC UNSecurityCouncilUS UnitedStatesUSACE UnitedStatesArmyCorpsofEngineersUSAID UnitedStatesAgencyfor

InternationalDevelopmentUSD UnitedStatesDollarVHF/UHF Veryhighfrequency/Ultrahighfrequency


Acknowledgements

In themiddleof thedarkest periodof Finnish autumn, it iscomfortingtofinallyseelightinaformofthisYearbook.Ioweaspecialdebtofgratitudetomanypeople.

Firstofall,Iwouldliketoexpressmydeepestgratitudetotheauthorswhohavebeenpatientlyrevisingtheirtexts.

Toalltherefereeswhohaveparticipatedinthepeerreviewprocess,youalsodeservemywarmestregards.Ihaveenjoyedthe cooperation with Director Arno Truger from AustrianStudy Center for Peace and Conflict Resolution (ASPR), Dr.Pilvi Torsti from theDepartmentof Social ScienceHistoryattheUniversityofHelsinki,Dr.Johanna ValeniusfromtheUnitforPolicyPlanningandResearchattheMinistryforAffairsofFinland, Research Fellow Cedric de Coning with the AfricanCenterfortheConstructiveResolutionofDisputes(ACCORD)and the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI),as well as with Dr. Gordon Peake from the Department forInternational Development UK (DfID). Also, the input ofResearcher Tanja Viikki from the Tampere Peace ResearchInstitutewas invaluable, and it still is,while she is currentlyworkingintheEULEXMissioninKosovo.

Afewotherindividualsmadepracticalcontributionstothisbook. Without the valuable proofreading work of Mr. John Mills,Ms.Joan LöfgrenandMs.Meghan riley,thequalityofthelanguagewouldnothavereachedthelevelitisnow.Also,thepatienceofJuniorADTarmo MajasaarifromCrealabwashelpfulinrealisingthelayoutofthisYearbook.

Finally, I would like to dedicate this Yearbook to theprofessionalpersonnelofCMCFinland.Itisalwaysapleasuretobegintheworkingdayinsuchaninspiringandmotivatedatmosphere.

Kuopio,Finland,4November2008

KirsiHenriksson,Editor

STATE PROVINCIALOFFICE OFEASTERN FINLAND


Foreword

TheEU’sroleasasecuritypolicyactorhasgrownsignificantlysincethecreationoftheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP).ThishastakenplaceintandemwiththeevolutionoftheESDPitself.TheESDPhasbeenoneofthemostdynamicsectors of European integration. The objectives set in theEuropeanSecurityStrategy(ESS)guidethefurtherelaborationoftheESDP.CurrentlytheESSisbeingre-examinedtoreflectchangesinthesecurityenvironment.Newsecuritychallengeskeep emerging, which is why the ESDP has to be subjectto regular development. On the other hand, security policychallengesofamoretraditionaltypekeepemergingandposesignificant demands for the response capacity of the Unionandofotherinternationalorganizations.

Enhancing the Union’s crisis management capabilitiesis one of the key elements in strengthening the ESDP. TheaimmustbefortheEUtohaveanabilitytomanageseveralcivilianandmilitaryoperationssimultaneouslyandsetupnewoperationsatshortnotice.MilitaryandCivilianHeadlineGoalsset the framework for the development of capabilities. EUBattleGroups,ontheonehand,andCivilianResponseTeams,ontheother,ensuretheEU’srapidresponsecapacity.Thesemechanismscanandshouldbefurtherelaboratedonthebasisofexperienceaccumulatedsofar.

Nowadays the ESDP comprises a variety of tools thatprovideabasisforcomprehensivecrisismanagementmissions.Coordinationbetweendifferentactorsaswellascoordinationbetweencivilianandmilitaryactivitiesisvital.Cooperationwiththird countries, other international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is essential as well. TheEUhas several tools thatwouldnot traditionallybedefinedas security policy instruments but that are useful and maycomplement the ESDP – such as development cooperation.Ideally,theEUshouldbereadytorespondsimultaneouslytodifferent kinds of demands in different parts of the world,but also to include in each crisis management operationa comprehensive set of tools to address the sources andconsequencesofaconflict.

Finland has actively contributed to the strengthening oftheEU’scapabilitiesincrisismanagement.Ourowncapacityto participate in EU operations is subject to continuingdevelopment–atthemomentFinlandisparticipatinginmostEUoperations, theEuropeanMonitoringMission (EUMM) inGeorgiabeingthemostrecentone.ThefirstNationalStrategyforCivilianCrisisManagementwaspublished in September2008. Its main goal is to enhance national capabilities andcoordination in civilian crisismanagement.Work is ongoingon formulating a national strategy for comprehensive crisis

management.

For a Member State to be able to contribute effectivelytoEUcrisismanagementactivitiesandtotheESDP’s furtherdevelopment, it is of utmost importance that coordinationbetween different national actors functions well. This hasbeenthecase inFinland.CrisisManagementCentreFinland(CMCFinland)undertheMinistryofInteriorhas,since2007,undertaken responsibility for the recruitment and trainingof civilian crisis management experts, and it also conductsresearch in this field. TheworkofCMCFinlandhas furtherenhancedFinland’scapacitytobeanactiveMemberStateinthedevelopmentand implementationof theESDP.ThisfirstYearbookofCMCFinlandisanillustrationofthewiderangeofthemesthattheESDPcoversandwithwhichtheCMCdealswithinpractice.

AlexanderStubbMinisterforForeignAffairsofFinland


Introductionkirsi Henriksson – Ari kerkkänen

Civilian participation in conflict management and conflictresolution is not a new phenomenon. The United Nationspeacekeeping and peace support missions have containeda civilian component, through civil affairs, orpolice supportfordecades.Inrecentyears,UNpeacebuildingmissionshavetypically been civilian in character, endeavouring to supportpost-conflictinstitutionbuilding,especiallyinthefieldofruleof law. There are dimensions within the UN missions thataresimilar toEUcrisismanagementmissions.TheEU’scrisismanagement missions have, from the very inception, beenheavilybuiltonthebroaderconceptoftheruleoflawfield.Civiliancrisismanagement,thetermcoinedbytheEuropeanUnion,isarapidlygrowingcrisismanagementtoolwithintheEUunderitsSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP).ItisnoteworthythatthenumberofEUcivilianmissionsissignificantlyhigherthanEU’smilitarycrisismanagementmissions.

Thisallreflectsanunderstanding,stemminginlargepartfrom the context and consequences of contemporary wars,underlining the importanceofacomprehensiveapproach incrisis management and peacebuilding. It is recognised thatthe complexity and nature of conflicts requires a broaderresponsethanthetraditionalmilitaryapproach.Containmentof conflicts isnot enough; theobjectivemustbe in conflictresolution.Itisnotachievedbywinningthewarbutinsteadbywinningpeace,whichultimatelyrequiresacomprehensiveapproachaswellasasimultaneouspoliticalprocess.Winningpeacerequiresinstitutionbuildingsupportinvariousfieldsofcivilianexpertisesuchastheruleoflaw,police,humanrights,goodgovernanceandmonitoring,forexample.

The shift towards a comprehensive approach andincreased civilian participation in the peacekeeping andpeacebuildingparadigmisalreadytranspiringbuttheresultsarestilltobeseen.However,theycannotbejudgedsuccessfulonly by sharing the commonly acknowledged wisdom ofcomprehensiveness.Theactualandsustainableimpactaswellasend-resultsofcomprehensivenessmustbetested.Toachievethis,theremustbefurtherscrutiny,analysisandresearchonthe current crisis management practises. Lessons learnt andbestpractisesunitsofcrisismanagementmissionscarriedoutbytheEUandotherinternationalorganisationsareonlynow

takingshape;oftenwithintheirownrespectiveorganisations.Thisisagoodpractiseinturninglessonsidentifiedintolessonslearnt on one hand, but on the other, makes it vulnerableforsubjectivity,biasandpartisanship.Independent,objectiveandacademicresearchisofaparamountimportanceinorderto support strategic design of today’s and tomorrow’s crisis

management.All phases of today’s crisis management, whether in EU

orUNorothercontext,mustbescrutinisedby the researchinordertoevaluateagenuine impactfor long-termstabilityand end-results. CMC Finland aspires to integrate researchinto the national operational capacity building of civiliancrisis management alongside the training and recruitment.The research must contribute to the formation of a crisismanagementculturethatisbasedmoreonhumandimensionthantechnologyandpowerorientatedmotives.Keepingtheserequirementsinmind,theResearchProgrammeofCMCFinlandfortheyears2008–2012isbasedonfourthemeswhichprovidea framework for the research. These four research themesare: research on civilian crisis management missions and methodology; research on civilian crisis management training and recruitment; research on coordination between civilian and military crisis management; research on technological and material expertise in civilian crisis management.

Thekey-wordsof theresearchpractisedatCMCFinlandareimpact analysisandhuman security,withaspecificattention to the United Nations Security Council Resolution1325onWomen, Peace and Securityadoptedin2000.Humansecurity provides a new paradigm and framework whicheventually may replace presently predominant perceptionof crisis management. It provides a comprehensive andhumanisticapproachforcrisismanagement,whethercivilianormilitary.Thehumansecuritycultureofcrisismanagementnaturally takes into account development aid withincomprehensiveness. Italsoappreciatesvalues,morals,ethicsandhumanrightsincrisismanagement.Thehumansecurityparadigmofgovernanceincrisismanagementismoreaboutcreating conditions for security in fragile states and regionsthan merely enforcing or producing security by traditionalmeans.


The impact analysis aims to evaluate the ongoing andcompleted civilian crisis management missions as wellas finding better and more efficient methods to improveoperational tasks and develop civilian crisis management.Also,theimpactoftrainingprovidedbyCMCFinlandaswellashumanresourcesandrecruitmentprocessesareallanalysedinorder to transparentlydevelop the tasksofCMCFinland.The research gathers the experiences of those experts whohavebeentrainedandrecruitedbyCMCFinlandandwhoareworkingindifferentmissions.Theirexperiencesareimportantinordertoassesstherelevancy,usefulnessandapplicabilityofthetrainingandrecruitmentvis-à-visthemissionwork.

TheresearchproducedbyCMCFinlandispublishedintheelectronic publication series the CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies which has an editorial board and aninternationaladvisoryboard.ThisYearbook 2008 on Civilian Crisis Management Studies is based on the articles of thispublication series. Civil-military cooperation is analysed byJari Mustonen who focuses on different crisis managementinstrumentsinBosniaandHerzegovina.OliviaŠetkićanalysestheEUMonitoringMissionintheWesternBalkansandgivesrecommendationstotherecruitmentandtraininginrelationto the monitors. The article on EUPOL COPPS touches thepolitical dimension of the operation as well as it gives anexample of the use of Information Technology utilized inthis specific operation. Implementation of human securityprinciples in the ongoing crisis management activities inKosovo is under examination in the article written by TanjaTamminen. Oskari Eronen reflects the challenges associatedwiththedifferentmodelsofProvincialReconstructionTeamsonthecrisismanagementeffortsinAfghanistan.

Theviewsexpressed intheresearcharticlesarethoseoftheauthorsanddonotreflecttheviewsofCMCFinland.


Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels StudyingEU-ESDPCrisisManagementInstrumentsinBosniaandHerzegovina

Jari Mustonen

ThearticleexaminesthecoordinationandcooperationbetweentheEU-ESDPmissionsin

BosniaandHerzegovina.TheEUhas,undertheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP),

deployedinBosniaandHerzegovinaaSpecialRepresentative(EUSR),apolicemission(EUPM)

andamilitarymission(EUFORAlthea).Coordinationbetweenthedifferentmissionsisof

utmostimportance,andexperiencesfromco-existenceofthemissionshaverevealedsome

inconsistenciesinthecomprehensiveapproachoftheEUinBosniaandHerzegovina.However,

inaprocessoflearningbydoing,therelationshipandcoordinationbetweenthedifferent

missions,atleastontheoperationallevel,hassignificantlyimproved.1

1 ThearticlewasfinishedinMarch2008.


1 Introduction

Towards the turn of the century, the demands for crisismanagement and crisis management operations have beenchanging.SincetheendoftheColdWar,mostarmedconflictsorwarshavebeen intra-state,and thus inmanycaseshavebeen more complex and more challenging for internationalcommunity intervention than “traditional” inter-state wars.For this reason, crisis management operations have alsobecomemorecomplexandmultidimensional.Operationsmayinclude different actions and phases, varying from conflictprevention and resolution to post-conflict rehabilitation andreconstructionoperations.

Actions related to rehabilitation more and more oftenencompassaspectsofstate-building.Asaresult,themilitary,traditionallyseenastheprimaryactorincrisissituations,hasinmanyoperationsbeendeployedinparallelwithcivilianactors.Thepresenceofvariousinternationalactorsrepresentingthemilitaryanddifferentcivilianorganisationsandagenciesmeansthatcivil-militaryinteractionisacrucialelementofoperations,and that coordination and coherence between civilian andmilitaryorganisationsisoneofthekeystothesuccessofsuch

operations.The EUhasdeveloped its crisismanagement capabilities

asapartoftheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP),under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). ThePetersbergtasks,incorporatedintotheEUintheAmsterdamTreaty in 1999, included both military and civilian crisismanagement tasks, even though in the beginning the roleofmilitary crisismanagementwasmore visible than thatofcivilian crisis management. Nevertheless, the appropriatestructures for deploying operations according to the ESDPwere established by the end of 2001, and in January 2003theEUlaunchedthefirstESDPoperation,theEuropeanUnionPoliceMissioninBosniaandHerzegovina(EUPM).2

2 Leinonen2006,127–129.

AsBosniaandHerzegovina(hereafterBosnia)“representsakeychallengefortheEuropeanUnion”3,theEUengagementinBosniahassteadilyincreased.TheEUpresenceinBosniadatesbacktotheEuropeanCommunityMonitorMission(ECMM),operationalinformerYugoslaviafrom1991to2000,andtheEuropean Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM), operationalsince22ndDecember2000.PriortolaunchingtheEUPM,theEU appointed Lord Paddy Ashdown as the European UnionHighSpecialRepresentative(EUSR)inBosniainMarch2002.4InDecember2004,theEUdeployeditslargestmilitarymissionsofar,EUFORAlthea, toBosnia.5TheEUhasalsoexpresseditswillingnessandreadinesstoincreaseitspresenceinBosniaafter the closure of the Office of the High Representative(OHR).

BosniabecamethefirsttheatreofoperationsinwhichtheEU was operating, within the framework of the ESDP, botha civilian and a military crisis management mission. In thisrespect, the issue of coordination and coherence betweendifferentEUactorsbecameevident.CurrentlyBosniaisstilltheonlyareawheretheEUhasacivilian,apoliceandamilitarymissiondeployed.AsthefutureengagementofEUinBosniaseemsevenabouttoexpand,theneedforcoordinationamongthedifferentactors,whethercivilianormilitary,iscrucial.Aseloquently set out in the European Security Strategy (ESS)6,combining the different instruments of crisis managementatitsdisposalhasbecomeincreasinglyimportantfortheEU,especially now that it is deploying the largest civilian crisismanagementoperationsofarinKosovo.

3 ESS-BiH2004.4 “CouncilJointAction(2002/211/CFSP)”.5 “CouncilJointAction(2004/570/CFSP)”.6 ESS2003.


Thiscasestudyexaminesthecoordinationandcooperationbetween EU-ESDP actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina: theEUSR, the EUPM and the EUFOR Althea. Even though thecoordination inpracticealsoencompassesrelationsbetweenthe ESDP operations and the Commission delegation, thescopeofthispaperwillbelimitedtotheexaminationofintra-pillar coordinationandcoherencebetween theESDPactors.ConsequentlytheCommissiondelegationwillnotbeincludedinthisstudy.7

This study will examine coordination on the decision-making,operationalandtacticallevels.Themainfocuswillbeontheoperationalandtactical levels,sincethecoordinationon the Brussels level and implementation of comprehensiveconcepts and new institutional arrangements of crisismanagementhavebeenquitewidelyexamined8,ashas theESDPasawhole.Naturally,coordinationonthestrategiclevelmustnotbeignored,butinthisstudythiscoordinationisonlyinvolvedinsofarasitprovidestheframeworkforthestudy.

Theprimaryquestionofthestudyis:howiscooperationand coordination between the ESDP missions operating inBosnia?Keyissuestobeconsideredarehowthecoordinationisregulatedordirectedinthemandatesoftheoperations,andhowthemandateshavebeenalteredasEUengagementhasbeen expanded and prolonged. In respect of the mandatesof the operations and concepts for coordination, the studyexamineswhatkindsofsolutionstheactorshavedevelopedformutualcoordinationandcooperationinthetheatre,andhowthecoordinationandcooperationbetweenthemissionshasdevelopedthroughtheyears.Finally,thecurrentsituationof the cooperation and coordination between the ESDPmissionsisaddressed.

7 The issue of coordination between the different EUorganisations in Bosnia, and especially the role of theCommission,wasbroughtoutinmanyoftheinterviewsconducted within the framework of this study, andthus would constitute a topic for a separate paper.Mostof the intervieweesbelieved that co-locating theEUSRand theECDelegationwouldoffer added valuefortheEUandparticularlyfortheunitedimageoftheEUamongthe localpopulation.Further, inthecaseofEUSRreplacingOHRwithoutBonnPowers(therighttoremovefromofficepublicofficialsandtoimposelaws),closer cooperation with the Commission DelegationwouldincreasethepossibilitiesavailableforEUSRtouse“carrot”insteadofthetraditional“stick”.InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.

8 On this, see Penksa 2006; Khol 2006; Juncos 2006;Juncos2007.

Asinterviewsofpersonneldeployedinthemissionsprovideacrucialsourceofinformationforthisstudy,ashortfieldtripwas conducted in May 2007. In addition, personnel whohave previously been deployed in these missions have beeninterviewedforthestudy.Intotal36personsof8nationalities,fromfield leveltoseniormanagementofthemissions,havebeen interviewed for the report, to all ofwhom theauthorwishestoexpresshisgratitude.Theintervieweeswillbereferredtoanonymously,withonlyamentionoftheorganisationthepersonrepresentsorrepresented.Nevertheless,astherandomsample of the interviews is rather limited and the majorityof the interviewees represent the Northern part of Europe,the results are only indicative, but certain tendencies in thedevelopment of the cooperation and coordination betweenthe ESDP missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina emerge. Theauthorof this studyhimself servedwithEUFORasaLiaisonOfficerbetweenDecember2005andJune2006.


2 Civil-MilitaryCoordinationinEUCrisisManagement:ConceptsandStructures

2.1 Civil-Military Cooperation vs. Civil-Military Coordination

Given the complex nature of crisis management operationsandtherequirementfordifferenttypesofcrisismanagementinstruments within the operations, civil-military interactionsarenowadaysacrucialelementofEUoperations.EventhoughBosniaandHerzegovinaisthefirstand,currently,onlyareaofoperationswheretheEUhasbothcivilianandmilitarymissions,manycivilianESDPoperationstakeplaceinanenvironmentinwhich anongoingmilitarymission exists, under the leadofNATO, the United Nations (UN) or the African Union (AU).9It is imperative todrawacleardistinctionbetween the twoterms, “Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)” and “Civil-MilitaryCoordination(CMCO)”,whichapplytothisareaandoftenbecomeconfused.Bothconceptsalsoexistwithin theframeworkofEUactivitiesincrisismanagementoperations.10

Civil-Military Cooperation or CIMIC has many definitions,depending on the organisation. Civilian, humanitarian andmilitary communities have developed different concepts ofCIMIC,andtheconcepthasbeeninterpretedindifferentwaysatnationalandinternationallevels.11

NATO’s definition of CIMIC – greatly influenced by theorganisation’s experience of the peacekeeping operationsIFORandSFORinBosnia-Herzegovina–isasfollows:

“theco-ordinationandco-operation,insupportofthe mission, between the NATO Commander andcivilactors, includingnationalpopulationandlocalauthorities, as well as international, national andnon-governmentalorganisationsandagencies.”

9 The ongoing military ESDP operations (as of February2008) are EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovinaand EUFOR Chad/RCA in Eastern Chad and NorthEastern Central African Republic. Of the civilian ESDPoperations, EUPT Kosovo (soon EULEX Kosovo) andEUPOL Afghanistan, for instance, are interacting withNATO-ledmilitaryoperations,andtheESDPmissionsinDRCalongsideUN-ledMONUCandEUPOLCOPPSwithUN-ledUNIFIL.

10 Khol2006,123–124.11 Rehse2004,14–27;Kristoffersen2006,9–11.

The NATO CIMIC doctrine also defines the purpose ofCIMIC,andmainlypresentsCIMICasatoolforthecommanderandatacticaldoctrine,notasastrategyforcoordinationassuch.12

TheUNDepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations (DPKO)has developed a UN doctrine for peace operations, Civil-Military Co-ordination Policy13, but nonetheless most UNpeace operations still use the abbreviation CIMIC to avoidthe confusion of adopting a new acronym. Within the UN,theterm“Civil-MilitaryLiaison (CML)”hasbeen introduced,butnotyetapprovedby theDPKO.14TheUNOffice for theCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA)abandonedtheconceptofCIMICandcreatednewguidelines15forcooperationbetweenmilitary and civilian actors, also adopting the term“Civil-MilitaryCoordination(CMCoord)”.16

TheEUdemonstrateditsperceptionofCIMICbyadoptingthe“CIMICConceptforEU-ledCrisisManagementOperations”in2002.TheEUdefinitionofthetermis:

“Co-ordinationandco-operation,insupportofthemission, between military components of EU-ledCrisisManagementOperationsandcivilrole-players(external to theEU), includingnationalpopulationand local authorities, as well as international,national and non-governmental organisations andagencies.”

Even though the EU definition of CIMIC resembles theNATOconcept, theEUperspective iswider,highlighting theselection of civilian and military instruments at its disposalin crisis management operations.17 EU has also declared itsambitiontodevelopbothcivilianandmilitarycrisismanagementcapabilities,and in this respecthasdevelopedaconcept forinternalcoordination–Civil-MilitaryCoordination.18

12 NATO2001.13 UNDPKO2002.14 deConing2007,12.15 UNOCHA2003.16 deConing2006,103.17 CIMIC Concept for EU-led Crisis Management operations,

CouncilDoc.7106/02,18March2002.18 Khol2006,125.


The European Union’s definition of Civil-MilitaryCoordinationisasfollows:

“Civil-MilitaryCo-ordination(CMCO)inthecontextof CFSP/ESDP addresses the need for effectiveco-ordination of the actions of all relevant EUactors involved in the planning and subsequentimplementation of the EU’s response to thecrisis.”19

In general, CIMIC is primarily a support function to the military mission20 and covers the cooperation withexternal actors in the field on the tactical or operationallevel, whereas CMCO was primarily designed for internalcoordination, covering planning, political decision-makingandimplementationofEUactionsincrisismanagement.Thepurpose of this study is neither to limit itself to examiningactionsrelatedtotheconceptCIMIC,norexplicitlyfocusonCMCO as defined by the EU, but rather to investigate thecoordination and cooperation between the EU actors in abroadersense,usingacomprehensiveapproach,andincludinginteractionsbetweenthedifferentciviliancrisismanagementinstruments.Astheterm“CMCO”hasuntilrecentlydescribedtherelationshipandcoordinationbetweencivilianandmilitaryactorswithinEUcrisismanagement,thisacronymwillbeusedinthestudyandsofirstpresentedbriefly.

2.2 Development and structures for civil-military coordination in the EU

The importance of developing instruments and proceduresfor effective civil-military coordination in the ESDP contexthas been emphasized throughout the history of ESDP since1999.AconcretelandmarkindevelopingtheCMCOwastheadoptionoftheAction Plan for further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis managementintheautumnof2002.TheActionPlancontainedbothtoolsandguidelinesfor civil-military coordination, such as an improved CrisisManagementConcept,inclusionofCMCOaspectsintrainingandEUexercisesand improving institutional coordination inBrussels.AlthoughtheActionPlanprovidedadviceoninternalcoordinationindifferentphasesofconflicts,itintroducednomechanismsforenhancingsuchcoordination.21

The Council adopted a document Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO) in November 2003, which, in its ownwords, suggested some fundamental principles to providea framework for civil-military coordination.22 Instead ofemphasizing the structures or procedures of coordination,the document highlighted that “CMCO as a culture of co-ordinationisanessentialelementinensuringoverallcoherencein the EU’s response to crisis.” This culture of coordinationshouldbecreatedattheearliestpossiblestageofanoperation

19 Civil-Military Co-ordination (CMCO), Council Doc.14457/03,Brussels,7November2003,Para1(asquotedinKhol2006,125).

20 Ibid.21 Khol2006,127;Juncos2006,8.22 Civil Military Co-ordination (CMCO), Council Doc.

14457/03,Brussels,7November2003.

andforthewholedurationoftheoperation,andisbasedoncontinuouscooperationandcommonpoliticalobjectives.

In addition to the concept of a culture of coordination,thedocumentalsoprovidessomefundamentalsofCMCOinoperations,bothintheplanningandoperationalphases.Thestatus of the Secretary-General/High Representative as theinitiator of the EU response to crisis is recognised, and thePoliticalandSecurityCommittee(PSC)isgivenacentralroleinensuringthecoherenceoftheEU’sresponsetocrisis.ThecooperationbetweentheCouncilGeneralSecretariatandtheCommissionintheplanningandimplementationphaseofanoperationisalsoemphasized.

Ontheoperationallevel,theEUSR,ifappointed,maintainsoversightofalltheEUactivitieswithinanareaofoperations.The EUSR acts under the direction of SG/HR and receivesstrategic guidance from the PSC. The EUSR’s activities arecloselycoordinatedbothwiththePresidency,CommissionanddiplomaticHeadsofMissionandwiththeForceCommander,thePoliceHeadofMissionandtheHeadsofMissionforothercivilianoperations.AcentraltaskoftheEUSRistochairaCo-ordinationGroupcomprisingalltheEUactorsinthefield.EvenifCMCOprimarilydealswithinternalcoordinationwithinEU,italso servesasaprerequisite forcooperationwithexternalactorsengagedinresolvingthecrisis.23

Despite thefundamentals laiddownbytheCMCOonadocumental level, there are some practical constraints thatcomplicate the coordination and hamper the creation of aculture of coordination within the EU, such as the differentnational cultures of civil-military relations. Even thoughthe military and civilian staffs at the Council SecretariatDirectorate-GeneralEinBrusselssharethesamepremises,thedifferentinstitutionalculturesaggravatecoordinationefforts.Much of the coordination still takes place through informalmeetingsata lower level,as the formalguidelinesdirectingthiscoordinationarelesseffective.TheemphasisofEUcrisismanagementeffortshasforalongtimebeenondevelopingthemilitarycapacity,andthefactoftheimbalanceofresourcesbetweenmilitaryandciviliancomponentsisdemonstratedbyconstantunderstaffingon the civilian side, andespecially inthePoliceUnit.24

To assist in strategic planning and operational tasks inbothcivilianandmilitaryoperations,theEuropeanCouncilinDecember2003decidedtocreateaCivilianMilitaryCell(CivMilCell) within the EU Military Staff (EUMS). The central roledesignedfortheCivMilCellistodevelopacapabilityrapidlyto set up an Operations Centre (OpCen) for any operation.The establishment of the CivMil Cell was postponed as thenegotiations concerning the Operations Centre delayed theprocess.25However,theCivMilCellhasnowbeenestablished,

23 Ibid. Even though the acronym CMCO refers to thecoordination between the civilian and military crisismanagementinstruments,itshouldbeinterpretedmorebroadly to encompass also coordination between allof thedifferentcivilianEUactors, fromBrussels to themissionareas.

24 Khol2006,127–128;Juncos2006,8.25 Khol2006,131.


and the facilities for the Operations Centre have also beenreadysince1stJanuary2007.26

One“structuralhandicap”oftheCivMilCell,eventhoughitconsistsofbothcivilianandmilitary staff,might lie in thefact thataspartof theEUMS, it represents themilitarysideof ESDP, which could once again emphasize the militaryapproachinoperations.Nevertheless,theCivMilCellandtheOpCenhavebeen loadedwithhigh expectations, especiallyinthefieldofstrategicplanningforjointcivilian/militarycrisismanagementoperations.TheCellcanalsocontributetothedevelopment of doctrines and concepts to further enhancecivil-military interaction. Inaddition, theCell canalsoactasaninterlocutorbetweenthecivilianandmilitarycomponents,since it reports to both the Committee of Civilian Aspectsin Crisis Management (CIVCOM) and the European UnionMilitaryCommittee(EUMC),andhasapermanentlinktotheCommission.

The CivMil Cell is also in the position to conduct jointlessonslearntfrombothcivilianandmilitarymissionsongoinginthesameterritory,aswellasfromEUexercises.Civil-MilitaryCoordinationhasbeenincludedintwotrainingprogrammes,one inuseby theCommissionsince2001andtheotherbytheCouncilsince2004.InDecember2004thePSCapprovedtheEUTrainingPolicyintheESDPConcept,inwhichthecivil-militaryareaisconsideredanimportantaspectoftrainingatbothstrategicandoperationallevels.Ingeneral,thetrainingrequirement for CMCO and inter-pillar aspects has beenhighlighted as a result of the experience from OperationAltheainBosnia.27

In June2007 theEuropeanCouncil decided toestablishthe Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), acivilianequivalenttoEUmilitarystaff,responsibleforplanningand conduct of civilian ESDP operations. The CPCC, whichfunctions within the Council Secretariat, is headed by theCivilianOperationsCommander,whoexercisesstrategiclevelcommand and control over civilian ESDP operations.28 Thepurpose of creating the CPCC was to systematize planningandcommandof civiliancrisismanagementoperations,buthowitcancontributetothecoordinationoftheuseofcivilianandmilitaryESDPinstrumentsremainstobeseen.

With regard to the future of CMCO, and furthercoordinationofcivil-militaryinteractionswithinEU,theCivMilCellisatthecentreofexpectationsconcerningtheplanningofjointcivil-militaryoperationsandthedevelopmentofconceptsandprocedures.DeployingajointoperationcontainingallthedifferentinstrumentsofEUcrisismanagementseemstobethenextgreatchallenge.Severallessonsconcerningco-ordinationbetweenthedifferentEUactorshavealreadybeenidentifiedonthebasisoftheexperiencesfromBosniaandHerzegovina,but a thorough follow-up study of coordination betweenoperationsstillneedstobeconducted.

26 Solana2007,4.27 Khol2006,131–134.28 “PresidencyReportonESDP”,10910/07,Councilofthe

EuropeanUnion,Brussels18June2007.

2.3 Framework for coordination between the EU–ESDP actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina

The elements of coordination between the civilian andmilitarycomponentsinthecaseofEUoperationsinBiHwerecrystallised on a conceptual level in the European Security Strategy – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Comprehensive Policy,adopted by the Council in June 2004.29 At the time thedocumentwas adopted, the EUengagement inBosniawasbeing further enlarged with a military component, EUFORAlthea,which tookover fromtheNATO-ledmilitarymissionStabilisationForce(SFOR).SomeexperienceofcooperationandcoordinationbetweenEUactorshadalreadybeenobtained,mainlybetweentheEUSRandEUPMthathadco-existedforayearandahalf.WithrespecttotheEuropeanSecurityStrategyandthedeploymentofEUFOR,theneedforacomprehensiveapproachtoBosniaandHerzegovinawasincreasinglyapparentandembodiedintheadoptionofthedocument.

AccordingtotheComprehensivePolicy,“all EU actors/instruments, whether political,military,police-relatedoreconomic,willcontributeto implementing this overall EU policy towardsBosniaandHerzegovina.”

The overall coherence of EU actions is highlighted,because,

“giventhemagnitudeoftheEUinvolvement,akeychallengewillbetoensurecloseco-ordinationandcoherence of the EU actors/instruments in BosniaandHerzegovina.”

In order to promote this coherence, a number ofarrangements were suggested, both at the Brussels andSarajevolevels.

Inensuringthemaximumcoherenceofthedifferentactorsonthestrategiclevel,theCouncilandtheCouncilofPermanentRepresentatives (Coreper), as its preparatory organ, have astrong role, as has the SG/HR together with the EuropeanCommission. The political control and strategic direction oftheESDPmissionsistheresponsibilityofthePSC,whichwillremainindirectcontactwithEUmissionsinBosnia.

On the Sarajevo level, “the EUSR will promote overallEU political co-ordination in Bosnia and Herzegovina.” TheEUSRwillassisttheSG/HRandthePSCintheirtask,andalsoprovidepoliticaladvicefortheEUForceCommander,withoutprejudicetothechainofcommand.InrelationtotheEUPM,theEUSRbelongstothechainofcommandandisthereforeinapositiontoco-ordinatetheinteractionofthesetwoactors.TheroleoftheEUSRisalsoemphasizedinrespectofinternalEUcoordination,astheEUSRistochairregularmeetingsofEUHeads of Missions (including participation or representationfromtheEUSR,EUMM,EUPMandEUFORHeadsofMission).Further,informalmeetingsbetweentheoperationalactorsinBosnia(EUForceCommander,EUPM,CommissionDelegation,EUMM and EU Presidency) are also to be chaired by the

EUSR.

29 ESS–BiH2004.


IthastoberealizedthattheComprehensivePolicy in itstimeonly setoutcertainpreconditions forcoordinationandcooperation between the EU actors. The mandates of therespectiveorganisationsalsoincludedcoordinationelements,andhavesincebeenamendedtobettermeettherequirementsorsetouttheconditionsforcoordination.


3 TheESDPmissionsinBosniaandHerzegovina–mandatesandmodalitiesforcooperationandcoordination

The EU’s involvement in the country has steadily increased,which has been motivated by many factors. Firstly, theEuropeanCommunity’sinabilitytopreventorstopthefightingin the heart of Europe, in the former Yugoslavia between1991and1995,hasbeenseenbysomecriticsasresultingina“guiltyconscience”whichneedstobeappeased.Secondly,thedevelopmentoftheEUasacrisismanagementactorhascreatedtheneedtostrengthentheESDPcapabilitiesfurther,andforthispurposeBosniaandHerzegovinahasservedasauseful“testingground”.30

Inthefollowing,themissionsandmandatesofthethreeEU-ESDPactorsunderconsiderationinrelationtocoordinationarepresentedintheorderoftheirappearanceinthetheatre.The purpose here, in short, is to present the tasks reservedfortheorganisationsintheirmandatesandalsohighlightthepreconditionsandmodalitiesforcooperationorcoordinationmadepublicinthemandates,ifapplicable.

3.1 The European Union Special representative

The basis of the existence of the European Union SpecialRepresentative EUSR lies significantly in the Office of HighRepresentative (OHR), an ad hoc institution responsiblefor overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of theDaytonPeaceAgreement in1995.Thepositionof theHighRepresentativewascreatedinAnnex10oftheDaytonPeaceAgreement,whichalsodefinedthemandateoftheOHR.31

In order to expand the EU engagement in Bosnia andHerzegovinaandtofurtherfacilitatethecountry’sintegrationintotheEU,theCouncilappointedtheHighRepresentative,LordAshdown,asEUSpecialRepresentativeinMarch2002.When this appointment was made, it was emphasised thatthe role of EUSR should not prejudice the mandate of theHigh Representative, but the EUSR would preserve the roleofcoordinating theactivitiesofall civilianorganisationsandagenciesandperformotheradditionalduties.

Toserve theEU’s intentions, theEUSRwasmandated tomaintainoversightoftheactivitiesrelatedtoRuleofLawand,

30 Juncos2006,5.31 The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia

and Herzegovina,Annex10.

as deemed necessary, provide advice to the SG/HR and theCommission.ThecoordinationroleoftheEUSRalsoincludedaspecificauthoritytogivedirectiontotheHeadofMission/Police Commissioner of the EU Police Mission, which wasintroducedtoreplacetheUnitedNationsInternationalPoliceTaskForce (ITPF) from1st January2003onwards.32Fromthebeginning, the role of the EUSR in relation to EUPM wassignificant,owing to the fact thatEUPMreported toSG/HRthroughtheEUSR.33

TheEUSRoperatedunderthetermsofthemandateoftheOHRuntilJuly2004,whentheCounciladoptedaJointActionon the revised mandate for the EUSR.34 The new mandatereflected both the EU Comprehensive Policy for Bosnia andHerzegovinaandtheCouncildecisiontodeployanEUmilitarymission in BiH, in which the role of the EUSR was furtheremphasised.AsthemilitarymissionincreasedthenumberofCFSP/ESDPinstruments,themandateoftheEUSRneededtobemodifiedaccordingly.

Accordingtothefirstmandate,theEUSR’smaintasksweretooffertheEU’sadviceandfacilitationinthepoliticalprocessand topromoteoverallEUpoliticalcoordination inBiH.TheEUSRwasalsomandatedtocontributetothereinforcementof internal EU coordination and coherence in Bosnia andHerzegovina, to which end he/she would have authority togive direction, as necessary, to the Head of Mission/PoliceCommissioner of the European Union Police Mission andprovidelocalpoliticaladvicetotheEUFORCommander.35

ManyaspectsoftheEUSRmandatereflectedthemandateoftheOHR,andalsotherelationsbetweentheOHRandtheNATO-led military missions, which meant that the mandatewastoacertainextentoutofdatefromthebeginning.Themain amendment in the mandate referred to the increasedneedforinternalcoordinationandcoherenceofEUactivitiesintheregion,butgavenospecificdirectiononimplementationontheoperationalorfieldlevel.Themandatemadeclearthepositionof the PSCas theprimary point of contact for the

32 “CouncilJointAction2002/211/CFSP”.33 “CouncilJointAction2002/210/CFSP”.34 “CouncilJointAction2004/569/CFSP”.35 “CouncilJointAction2004/569/CFSP”,Article4.


EUSRwiththeCouncil.TheEUSRwastoreportinpersontotheSG/HRandtothePSC,andalsotootherrelevantworkinggroups and to the Council, on the recommendation of theSG/HRorthePSC.

ThemandatealsoregulatedtheissueoftheprovisionofanEUdedicatedstaffwithintheofficeofEUSR/OHR.WhenLordAshdownwasgiventhedouble-hatasEUSR/OHRin2002forthefirsttime,noEUstaffwasappointedtohisoffice,whichobviously hampered his performance of his duties as EUSR.According to the new mandate, staff projecting EU identityshould be assigned to assist the EUSR and to contribute tothe coherence and effectiveness of the EU action in BiH. Inpractice,theEUSRstaffwasappointedwellafterthemandatecameintoforce.

Regardingthecoordinationinthefield,thecentralroleoftheEUSRwasreinforcedinthemandate.AccordingtothefirstEUPMmandate,theEUSRbelongstothechainofcommandof theEUPMandactsasa linkbetweentheEUPMandtheSG/HR.Ontheotherhand,directionfromSG/HRtoEUPMalsopassesthroughtheEUSR.36

InrelationtoEUFOR,theEUSRwasmandatedtoprovidepolitical advice to the Force Commander, without prejudice to the chain of command.EventhoughtheEUSR isoutsidethechainofcommandofEUFOR,militaryoperationsshouldbe co-ordinated with the EUSR to ensure consistency in EUactionsinthefield.

The mandate of the EUSR was amended in November2005,mainlywiththeadditionandreviewoftasksrelatedtocoordinationwith theother EUactors.37 In particular, issuesrelated to the localpoliceand tacklingorganisedcrimehadcreated problems in cooperation and coordination betweenEUPMandEUFOR,whichisreflectedintherevisedmandate.The EUSR was thus given the additional task of promotingoverallEUcoordinationofthefightagainstorganisedcrime,even though the leading role in policing activities remainedwiththeEUPM.

InhisroleinthechainofcommandofEUPM,theEUSRwasalsorequiredtoprovidetheEUPMHeadofMissionwithlocalpoliticalguidance.Thepolicingaspectwasemphasisedoverallintherevisedmandate,astheEUSRwastoprovidesupportforreinforcingtheBosniancriminaljustice/policeinterfaceandrestructuringthelocalpoliceforce.TheEUSR’sroleinEUFORand involvement in matters related to the Integrated PoliceUnit(IPU)wasnowmandatedtobecarriedoutinagreementwiththe(EUFOR)ForceCommander,whichagainreflectstheobviousneedforcooperationbetweenalltheactors.

ThemissionofLordAshdownastheHighRepresentativeandEUSRcametoanendinJanuary2006,andMr.ChristianSchwarz-SchillingwasappointedOHR/EUSRwitheffectfrom

1stFebruary2006.38InanticipationoftheclosureoftheOHRoffice,themandateoftheEUSRwasamendedinJuly2006.As the preparations to reinforce the EUSR office needed tobemadeinparallelwiththeclosingdownoftheOHRoffice,

36 “CouncilJointAction2002/210/CFSP”,Article7.37 “CouncilJointAction2005/825/CFSP”.38 “CouncilJointAction2006/49/CFSP”.

theEUSRwasmandatedtosupportplanningrelated to thisclosure.39Themandateof theOHRwas,however,extendeduntil 30th June2008by the Peace ImplementationCouncil’s(PIC)SteeringBoard.40

The mandate of the EUSR was amended again at thebeginning of February 2007. The mandate of Mr. Schwarz-Schilling was also extended until 30th June 2007. Theseamendments to an extent reflect the recent politicaldevelopment,asthedutiesoftheEUSRnowincludeprovidingpolitical advice on the process of constitution reform, andengagingwithlocalauthoritiesontheirfullcooperationwiththe InternationalCriminalTribune for theFormerYugoslavia(ICTY). Co-ordination between the EU actors was againhighlightedintherevisedmandate,as

“insupportoftheEUcrisismanagementoperations,theEUSR,withotherEUactorspresentinthefield,shall improve the dissemination and sharing ofinformation by EU actors in theatre with a viewto achieving a high degree of common situationawarenessandassessment.”41

AsthemandateofMr.Schwarz-Schillingcametoanendon30thJune,Mr.MiroslavLajčákwasappointedthenewHighRepresentativeandEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativefortheperioduntil29thFebruary2008.42ThemandateofthenewEUSRremainedatfirstthesameasthatofhispredecessor,butwassignificantlyexpandedinNovember2007.43Thebiggestchanges in themandate concern the EUSR’s role in relationtoEUFOR,ashe/sheisnowmandatedtooffertheEUForceCommanderpoliticalguidance,andnotonlypoliticaladvice.TheEUSRis inthepositiontogiveEUFORpoliticalguidanceonmilitaryissueswithalocalpoliticaldimension,particularlyconcerningsensitiveoperations,relationswithlocalauthoritiesand the local media. In return, the EUSR is to consult withboththeCommanderofEUFORandtheHeadoftheEUPMbefore takingpolitical actionswhichmayaffect the securitysituation.

Settingthemandatesaside,theactualfunctionsoftheEUSRhavedepended toa largeextenton thestaffand resources

39 “CouncilJointAction2006/523/CFSP”.40 Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board, February 27,

2007.41 “Council Joint Action 2007/87/CFSP”. Improving

situationalawarenessinEUcrisismanagementoperationswas visibly promoted during the Finnish Presidency inthelatterhalfof2006.TheFinnishPresidencyorganisedaseminar“ImprovingSituationalAwarenessinEUCrisisManagement Operations” in Brussels in September2006,atwhichtheemphasiswaslaidonthelessonsofcooperationinthefield,especiallyfromBosnia,asofthetwocasestudiesavailable,thefirstconcentratedsolelyonBiH.RepresentativesfromEUSR,EUPM,EUFORAltheaandtheCommissiontookpart inthepaneldiscussion,and the results of an Audit to BiH, organised by thePresidency and the Secretariat, were also presented.Amongtheseminarfindings,thesituationalawareness,informationsharingandalsostrengtheningtheroleoftheEUSRwerehighlighted,whichcanbeseenreflectedintherevisedmandateoftheEUSR.

42 “CouncilJointAction2007/427/CFSP”.43 “CouncilJointAction2007/748/CFSP”.


available.Asalreadystated,thefirstEUSRLordAshdownhadno EUSR-dedicated staff until 2005, but only double-hattedOHR/EUSRpersonnel, limitinghisopportunitytoexecutethemandateaseffectivelyasmighthavebeenneeded.By2005there were three officials working exclusively for the EUSR,and in early 2006 there were five EUSR employees.44 ThenumberofpersonnelthenincreasedsothatinOctober2007the number of staff within the EUSR was 28, of whom 22wereEUSR-dedicated.45

TheEUSRstructureisconcentratedinSarajevo.TheEUSRhasnofieldpresenceofitsown,andtheOHR’sfieldpresenceisalsolimitedtoRegionalOfficesinMostarandBanjaLuka,theBrckoFinalAwardOfficeandafieldofficeinBratunac.46ThustheEUSR’sabilitytocoordinatedirectlyEUactivitiesonthefieldlevelisratherrestricted.

Withinthe last twoyears, theresourcesandstaffof theEUSR have steadily been increased, which has enabled theEUSRtofulfilthemandatebetterandtoactasthecoordinatorof EU activities in the country. The future prospects of theEUSR depend greatly on the closure or continuation of theOHRinJune2008.IncaseoftheclosureoftheOHR,theEUSRistotakeoverthefunctionsofOHR,anditsroleislikelytobefurtherstrengthenedandmandatewidened.

3.2 European Union Police Mission

One of the features of the Dayton Peace Agreement wastheprovisionofasafeandsecureenvironmentforthe localpopulation, and in order to assist the local authorities inmeetingtheirobligations,aUnitedNationsInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF)wasestablished.47The IPTFwasoperationalfrom1996untiltheendof2002whenitwasreplacedbytheEuropeanUnionPoliceMissionEUPM.

ThedeploymentofEUPMformedpartoftheEUapproachofaddressingthewholerangeoftheRuleofLaw,inlinewiththegeneralobjectivesofAnnex11oftheDaytonAgreement.The mission was launched with the aim of establishingsustainablepolicing arrangements underBosnianownershipinaccordancewithbestEuropeanandinternationalstandards.TheEUPMwasexpectedtoreachitsgoalsthroughmonitoring,mentoringandinspecting,originallybytheendof2005.48

ThemissionandthestructureoftheEUPMweredefinedbytheCouncil inMarch2002.49AsdescribedintheMissionStatement,thethree-yearEUPMwastoconcentrateon:

44 Penksa2006,13;InterviewswithEUSRofficials,15May2007,18May2007,22May2007.

45 EUSr organisation Chart,October2007.46 http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/gen-info/#4, read on the

30thOctober2007.47 Dayton Peace Agreement,Annex11.48 “CouncilconclusionsonInternationalPoliceTaskForce

(IPTF)Follow-on”,18/19.2.2002.Fromthepointofviewof the EUPM, it was supposed to follow, not replace,the IPTF, with a substantially different mandate. SeeCollantesCelador2007,8.

49 “CouncilJointAction2002/210/CFSP”.

•Preserving, through continuity with theachievements of the IPTF mission, the existinglevelsofinstitutionalandpersonalproficiency;

•Enhancing, through monitoring, mentoring andinspecting, police managerial and operationalcapacities;tothisend,tofocusondelegationofpowerandquality-orientedmanagementprinciplesaswellasimprovingoperationalplanningcapacitybasedonanalysis;

•Strengtheningprofessionalismathighlevelwithinthe ministries as well as at senior police officerslevelsthroughadvisoryandinspectionfunctions;

•Monitoring the exercise of appropriate politicalcontroloverthepolice.

As the mandate of the EUPM was in practice createdin parallel with the mandate of the EUSR, the culture andmodalitiesforcoordinationbetweenthesetwoactorsweretosomeextentalreadydefined.Thisalsoenabledtheformationofa jointcommandstructure,whichevidently improvedthecoherence. Nevertheless it was stated in the mandate that“coordination arrangements in Brussels and Sarajevo arerequired”, reflecting theneed for furtherclarificationof theproceduresforcoordination.

When the mandate of the EUPM was nearing its end,theCounciloftheEuropeanUniondecidedinJuly2005thatin order to complete its current mandate, the EUPM wasto continue its action, with adjusted mandate and size.50In the secondphaseof EUPM (so called EUPM-II), itwas toconcentrateonthreepillars51:

•Supporting the local police in the fight againstorganisedcrime;

•Conducting inspectionsandmonitoringofpoliceoperations;

•Supporting the implementation of policerestructuring.

TherevisedmandatereflectedalessonidentifiedfromthefirstphaseoftheEUPM,asitdirectedtheEUPMtotake

“the lead in the coordination of policing aspectsof the ESDP efforts in the fight against organisedcrime, without prejudice to the agreed chains ofcommand”.

The clarification of the roles of the actors refers to theEUPM’sandEUFOR’sdifferinginterpretationsofthemandates,which emerged in relation to tackling organised crime. Thefactthattheactorshaddivergingunderstandingsoftheirownmandateandthemandateoftheotherorganisationcausedconfrontation that needed to be settled. Even though themandateoftheEUPMitselfdidnotsignificantlychange,theactualperceptionofthelimitssetbythemandatealtered,thuswideningtheroleandpossibleactionsoftheEUPMonpolicingmatters.52Furthermore,thefocusofthemissionchangedafterithadconcludeditscontributiontopolicereformbytheend

50 “CouncilJointAction2005/824/CFSP”.51 Penksa2006,15.52 Interview with a former EUPM official, 16 February

2007.


of2006.In2007,themissionconcentratedonsupportingthefightagainstmajorandorganisedcrime.53

Thecontentsof themandate in relation to coordinationremainedsomewhatsimilar.Withregardtocoordination,theCouncilstatedthat“arrangementsalreadyexistintheMissionareaaswellasinBrussels”,whichimpliesthatthemodalitiesforcooperation,whichthreeyearsearlierhadtobedevelopedbothinSarajevoandBrussels,werenowestablishednotonlyinSarajevobutonthefield levelaswell–afairlyoptimisticstatementatthatstage,especiallyfromthepointofviewofthefieldlevel.

EUPMreplacedIPTFwithasignificantlysmallerorganisation.Duringitsfirstmandate,thepersonnelofEUPMencompassedaninternationalstaffofapproximately550persons,bothpoliceofficersandcivilians,workinginthefieldin33co-locations.54As EUPM-II, startingat thebeginningof2006,was to fulfilits mission with a modified mandate and size, the strengthof international police officers and civilians was reduced toapproximately200,whichisalsothecurrentfigure.55

Whenthemandatereacheditsendon31stDecember2007,theCouncilfurtherextendedtheEUPMmandateforanothertwoyears,untiltheendof2009.Thecontentandthemissionstatementofthemandateremainedlargelyunchanged,andthemajorchangeinthemandateisrelatedtomanagementofthemission.TheCounciloftheEuropeanUnionapprovedinJune2007Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian operations in Crisis Management.Theseguidelinesprovide that the Director of the CPCC within the CouncilSecretary will be the Civilian Operation Commander for allciviliancrisismanagementoperations,inter alia,forEUPM.

In general, the Civilian Operation Commander exercisescommand and control of the EUPM on the strategic level,while theHeadofMission retainscommandandcontrolonthetheatre level.Asaresultofthenewstructure,theEUSRno longerbelongs to thechainof command for theEUPM,while remainingable toprovide localpoliticaldirection.TheCivilianOperationCommanderandtheEUSRare,however,toconsulteachotherwhenrequired.AccordingtotheConceptof Operations, there will be no changes in the structure orpersonnelofthemissioninthenearfuture.56

3.3 EUFor Althea

To assist the international community in the territorialand other militarily related provisions of the Dayton PeaceAgreement, a multinational military Implementation Force(IFOR)wasestablishedinDecember1995.TheNATO-ledIFORwith60,000troopscompleted itsmandateof implementing

53 http://www.eupm.org/MissionObjectives.aspx, read 31stOctober2007.

54 reports to the European Parliament by the oHr and EU Special representative for BiH, January-June2003andJuly-December2003;Penksa2005,4.

55 WeeklyestablishmentofEUPMpersonnelbycountries,as of 26th October 2007; report to the European Parliament by the oHr and EU Special representative for BiH,February2006-June2006.

56 EUPM Mission Mag.N:o28,11.10.2007,5.

themilitaryannexesofthePeaceAgreementwithinoneyearandwas replacedbyStabilisationForce (SFOR) inDecember1996.

As the name implies, the overall role of SFOR with itsinitial strengthof32,000 soldierswas to stabilise thepeaceand contribute toa safeand secureenvironment inBosnia.With this robustmilitary force,SFORwas ingeneralable tofulfil its mission of maintaining the peace. Over the years,the improvedsecuritysituationallowedfor restructuringthemissionandreducingthetroopnumbers,firsttosome20,000in2000,thento12,000in2003andfinallytosome7,000in2004.57

To further develop the crisis management “toolbox” ofESDP, the EUheadsof state expressed theirwillingness andreadinesstoleadamilitaryoperationtofollowSFORasearlyas2002.58InDecember2003,theCouncilconfirmedtheEU’sreadiness for a military mission in Bosnia, in anticipation ofNATO’s decision to end the SFOR mission.59 Consequently,NATOannouncedduringitsJune2004summitinIstanbulthatanEU-ledpeacekeepingforcewouldreplaceSFORbeforetheendoftheyear.ThefactthataEuropeanUnionForce(EUFOR)wouldcontinueastheorganisationwithprimaryresponsibilityfor maintaining peace in Bosnia reflected the opinions ofbothEUandNATOabout the improvedsecurity situation inthecountryandthebeliefintheEU’sabilitytoleadamilitaryoperationrobustenoughforthepurpose.60

FollowingtheCouncildecisionon12thJuly2004andUNSecurityCouncilResolution1575,amilitaryoperationnamedEUFORAltheawaslaunchedon2ndDecember2004.Accordingtothemandate,EUFORisto:

•provide deterrence, and continued compliancewith the responsibility to fulfil the role specifiedinAnnexes1.Aand2oftheGeneralFrameworkAgreementforPeaceinBiH;

•contributetoasafeandsecureenvironmentinBiHinlinewithitsmandate,andtoachievecoretasksintheOHR’sMissionImplementationPlanandtheStabilisationandAssociationProcess.

In theEUFORmandate, theotherESDP instrumentshadbeen taken intoaccountwith respect to thecoherenceandcoordination of EU activities on the ground. The EU ForceCommanderwastoreceivelocalpoliticaladvicefromtheEUSR

57 ICG2001;ICG2004.58 Presidency Conclusions,CopenhagenEuropeanCouncil

12and13December2002.59 Summary of the Report by Javier Solana, EU High

RepresentativeforCFSP,onaPossible EU Deployment in BiH,23February2004.

60 ICGJune2004.EventhoughtheSFORmissionendedin2004,NATOstillhasasmallHeadquartersinSarajevo,inco-locationwithEUFORHeadquartersinButmir.TheroleofNATOinBosniaistoassistBiHtomeetrequirementsfor theNATOPartnership forPeace (PfP)programandeventually membership in the NATO alliance. NATOwill alsoundertakecertainoperational tasks, includingcounter-terrorism,supportoftheInternationalCriminalTribunal for the formerYugoslavia,with regard to thedetentionofpersons indictedforwarcrimes (PIFWCs),andintelligencesharingwiththeEU.


andliaise,asappropriate,withtheEUPM.TheCommanderalsoneededtocoordinatecloselywiththeEUSRtheconsistencyofmilitaryoperationsinthecontextofEUoperations.61

Whendeployed,EUFORcomprisedsome6,200troopsfrom22EUmember statesand11othercountries,whichmeansthatitwasroughlythesamesizeasSFOR.EUFORalsoadoptedthestructureofSFOR,withthreeregionalMultinationalTaskForcescovering theentirecountry,andaheadquarters (HQ)andIntegratedPoliceUnit(IPU)situatedinthemaincampinSarajevo. Under the Multinational Task Forces operated theManoeuvre Battalions and Liaison and Observation Teams(LOT) which formed “the eyes and ears” of EUFOR on theground.62

InNovember2005theEUCouncilofMinistersextendedthe EUFOR mandate, leaving its force structure unchangedfor 2006. However, in accordance with the second missionreview,EUFORwas toalign itsoperationsmorecloselywithEUPMandplayalessactiveroleinthefightagainstorganisedcrime.EUFORwastocontinuetopreparetosupportthelocallaw enforcement agencies in operations directed againstorganisedcrime,andalsotoparticipateactivelyintheCrimeStrategyGroup,abodychairedbytheEUSRtomaximisetheESDPeffortsinsupportoftheBosnianauthorities’fightagainstorganisedcrime.63

61 “Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP”. The EUFORoperation is carried out with recourse to NATO assetsandcapabilities,underthe“BerlinPlus”arrangements.

62 report to the European Parliament by the oHr and EU Special representative for BiH,January–June2005.

63 report to the European Parliament by the oHr and EU Special representative for BiH,June–December2005.

As the security situation in the country remained calm,itwasdecided thatEUFORshould furtheralter its role fromdeterrencetoreassurance.Inpractise,thismeantreorganisationoftheforceandtroopreductionsinspring2007.TheTaskForcestructure,datingbacktoIFOR,wasdismantledandthefieldpresenceofEUFORoperationalforcesdecreasedrespectively.

RestructuredEUFORreachedfulloperationalcapabilityattheendofApril,andisnowdeployedwithsome2,500troopsontheground.ThenewstructureisbasedonaHeadquarters,IntegratedPoliceUnitandmanoeuvreelement(MultinationalManoeuvre Battalion) in Sarajevo, and a revised situationalawareness matrix with 45 Liaison and Observation Teams,under five Regional Coordination Centres (RCC), coveringthe entire country. Under the new structure, the operationcontinuesitsorganisedcrime.64

64 “OperationALTHEA”,2007; In caseof adeterioratingsecurity situation, the Manoeuvre Battalion can bedeployed throughout the country. In relation to thedecreasednumberoftroops,thereadinessfortheuseofOver-the-HorizonForceshasbeenimproved.InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.


4 Experiencesofcoordinationandcooperation

4.1 The difficult debut of ESDP in Bosnia

In Bosnia, the coexistence and simultaneous use of ESDPinstrumentsbeganinpracticewhentheEUpolicemissionwasdeployedatthebeginningof2003.Asdescribedearlier,LordAshdownhadbeenappointedEUSR inMarch2002and, inaccordance with his mandate, now belonged to the EUPMchainofcommand.Atthatpoint,theneedforcoherenceinthe“EUfamily” referred to the relationsbetween theEUSRandEUPM,asEUMMhadbeendeployed inthecountryforoveradecadeandwasfollowingitsspecificmission,onwhichthedeploymentofthenewEUactorshadnoeffect.65

EUPM, as the first ESDP operation, had a difficultbeginning.Neithertheorganisationalstructure itselfnortheinfrastructurewerecompletelyorganisedatthebeginningofthemission.EUPMencounteredseveredelaysinprocurementand personnel which initially reduced the efficiency of themission.Moreover,thehandoverfromIPTFwasnotseamless,asnotallthenecessarydocumentationwasreceived.66

Thebiggestchallengefor themission,however,wastheinterpretation of the mandate, “to monitor, mentor andinspect”. It was not completely clear what this meant inpracticeevenatHQ,andtherewerevoicesdemandingthatEUPM should have a more operational, executive mandate,ratherthantheintendedadvisoryrole.Inaddition,problemswerecausedbytheso-calledprogramdesign,throughwhichtheobjectivesof themissionweresupposedtobepursued,as few of the personnel were acquainted with longer-termprogrammatic thinking.Manyof thefirstpoliceofficershadan IPTF background, and in practice did not always act in

65 InterviewwithaformerEUPMofficial,16February2007.Relations between EUPM and EUMM were close andpracticalfromthedeploymentoftheplanningteamforEUPM, towhichEUMMoffered logistical andmaterialsupport.ManyoftheEUMMpersonnelalsojoinedEUPMlateron.Astherewerenopressingissuesbetweenthetwomissions,inmanyinterviewstherelationsbetweenEUPM and EUMM were described as informal and“friendlyexchangeofinformation”.

66 Penksa 2006, 4–5, 10; Interviews with former EUPMofficials,30March2007&18April2007.

accordancewiththeadvisorymandate,butcontinuedastheyhadbeenusedto.67

ThefactthattherewasconfusionattheEUPMHQaboutimplementing the mandate meant that there were no clearoperatingprocedures or guidelines for thepersonnel at theregional and field levels to follow. At worst, this created asituationinwhichthepoliceofficersinthefieldhadnoideawhat they were supposed to do, and so “developed theirownprivatemissions”,according to theirbestknowledge.68Inshort, themostcrucial internal failingsat thestartof themission were inadequate implementation of the mandate,inadequate instructions to the field and non-functionalcommunication and reporting structures. For the coherenceofEUactions inBosnia, thebeginningofthepolicemissionwasnoteasy,“becauseeven thecoordinationwithinEUPMdidnotexist.”69

In addition to internal confusion, the status of thedouble-hatted OHR/EUSR was sometimes unclear. The basicproblemwasthatthemandateofEUSRwasbroadandquitecomprehensive,but“ironically,youturnedLordAshdownintoaEUSRbutyougavehimnostafftoexecutethatmandate.”70From theEUPMpointof view, theHighRepresentativewasoccupied with many functions of the OHR, and withoutdedicatedEUSRstaff,itwasfeltthat“hewastherightpersonfor the job…but he never really was the EUSR”.71 Also thereportingfromEUPMtoBrusselsvaried:onsomeoccasions,the reports went directly from the Commissioner to thePolice Unit, and sometimes the EUSR was in the middle ofthe reporting chain. So from the point of view of EUPM,double-hattingtheOHRsometimescreatedthesituationthattheHighRepresentativeusedhisstatusasEUSRonlywhenitsuitedhispurposes, rather thancomprehensively.Asoneof

67 Ibid;CollantesCelador2007,10.TheamountofpoliceofficersthatmovedfromtheIPTFtotheEUPMwas119accordingtoMichaelMerlingenandRasaOstrauskaite(ascitedbyCollantesCelador2007,9).

68 InterviewwithaformerEUPMofficial,18April2007.69 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,30March2007&

18April2007;Penksa2005,11.70 InterviewwithanEUSRofficial,15May2007.71 InterviewwithaformerEUPMofficial,18April2007.


the informantsbluntlyput it, in thefirstyearofEUPM“theEUSRpositionwasessentiallyirrelevant.”72

The role of EUSR within the chain of command andproviding political advice for EUPM became more relevantduring 2004 and 2005. One of the issues that provokeddiscussions between EUPM and EUSR/OHR was the statusof legalandpoliticalelements inEUPM.TheEUSRproposedthatEUPM IIwouldno longerhavepolitical,mediaor legalfunctionsof itsown,but that theseshouldbemergedwiththeofficeoftheEUSR.73

From the viewpoint of coordination between theorganisationsandsendingaunifiedEuropeanUnionmessageto the field and the local population, combining theseactivities might have been a useful solution. However, fromthepointofviewofthepolicemission, itwas imperativetohaveso-called“in-houseadvisors”tobeabletoprovidemoretechnical knowledge and guidance concerning the politicaland legal aspects of policing. The fear was that withoutlegal and political elements, EUPM would become merely a‘hammer’ for the EUSR and over-influenced by the politicalaspirations.Onthis issue,opinionsevenwithinEUPMvariedconsiderably,asabalancewassoughtbetweenfollowingthepoliticalagendaandconductingtheprofessional“monitoring,mentoringandadvising”.74

With thedeploymentof themilitarycomponent,EUFORAlthea, at the end of 2004, the need for coherence andcoordinationofEUactivitiesinBosniabecamemoreevident.As Bosnia now became the first area in which the EU hadits own Special Representative, police mission and militarymission in the field, without having planned or deployedthese missions simultaneously, problems concerning internalcoherencestartedtoemergefromthebeginning.Quitesoonitbecameclearthatneitherthemodalitiesnorstructuresforcoordinationdescribed inthemandatesofthemissions,northeEUSRwereabletopreventtheproblemsencountered.

4.2 Fighting organised crime: the bottleneck

FromthepointofviewofEUFOR,keepingthetakeoverperiodfromSFORasshortaspossiblewasapriority.TothisendEUFORstartedlaunchingoperationsinlinewithitsmandateasearlyas December 2004. Operations that were often conductedtogetherwithlocallawenforcementagenciesincludedactionsagainst organised crime, such as illegal logging, weapons’smugglingandhumantrafficking.

ThemaincauseofdisagreementsandproblemsbetweenEUFORandtheEUPMwasthatbothhadbeenmandatedto

72 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,30March2007,18April2007&6June2007.OnefactorthattheEUPMHQfeltwasaffectingtheperformanceoftheEUSRwasthe American influence in the OHR, as the AmericansdidnotfullysupportthecreationofEUPMwiththenon-executive mandate. On this, see further Penksa 2006,andPotter2005.

73 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,16February2007&6June2007.

74 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,16February2007&6June2007;Penksa2006,13.

have a role in fighting organised crime. As the mandate ofEUPMlimiteditsfunctionstomonitoringandmentoringthelocallawenforcementagencies’activitiesonthisissue,EUFORwithitsexecutivemandatewasabletotakeactualmeasuresandlaunchoperationsaimedatfightingorganisedcrime.Thiswas interpreted by some observers as EUFOR searching fora mission for itself, and EUPM hiding behind its lack of anoperationalmandate.75Inotherwords,thefactthattheEUPM’smandate disallowed direct participation in policing activitieswasseenbyEUFORasanopportunitytogainjustificationforits mission. Some EUPM personnel also considered that the“Programme Design” approach drew attention away fromactualpolicing,suchasfocusingonorganisedcrime,andgaveEUFORthechancetohavearole.76

Theproactive role of EUFOR infightingorganised crimewastoa largeextentdueto interpretationof themandate.The first EUFOR Force Commander, Major-General Leakey,was encouraged by High Representative Javier Solana toemphasize EUFOR’s mission as distinct from that of SFOR.Fightingorganisedcrime,whichwasoriginallyintendedtobeasupporttaskforEUFOR,thusbecamethemilitarymission’sfundamentaltask.FromtheEUPMpointofview,EUFORwasexceeding itsmandate and its actionswere interferingwiththeEUPMmandate.BecauseofthecriticismEUFORfacedinrelation to its operations, Major-General Leakey raised theissuebeforethePSConmanyoccasions,pointingoutthattheactionsofEUFORwere inaccordancewith itsmandateandtakenfortheimprovementoftheoverallsecuritysituation.77

Even though EUFOR was, according to their owninterpretation, executing their task of supporting the fightagainst organised crime, the methods employed raisedconsiderable criticism in the EUPM. The overall principlethat in most Western European countries, organised crimeis not usually fought with military force but by regular lawenforcementagencieswasfrequentlyputforwardbyEUPM.This was also recognised by General Leakey, who regardedthe antipathy to military engagement as originating “fromthe leadership downwards”78. The other major cause forcomplaintwasthateventhoughitwasEUPM’stasktomonitortheperformanceofthelocalpolice,thiswasimpossibleowingtothefactthattheywerenotinformedaboutthelocalpolice’soperations with EUFOR. On many occasions EUPM receivedinformationaboutEUFOR’soperations fromthe localpolice,notdirectlyfromthemilitary.79

75 Penksa 2006, 20. As Hansen (2002) points out, “thedivision of labour between the military and the policehasbeenasourceofdebatethroughoutthehistoryofcivilian police contributions to peacekeeping.” Furtheronthemilitary-policecooperation,seeHansen2002.

76 InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.77 Juncos 2007, 59; Kupferschmidt 2006, 18. Major-

GeneralLeakeyalsourgedthattheinitiativehadtocomefromBrusselsandthatthemandateshadtobechangedtoadjusttherolesofEUPMandEUFOR.InterviewofaCIVCOMofficial,12March2007.

78 Leakey2006,144.79 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,16February2007

&22May2007.


EUFOR’s active participation in disrupting organisedcrimewasalsoproblematicwithregardtotheresultsoftheoperations. Even though EUFOR was in some cases able toapprehend persons suspected of criminal activity, the factthattheoperationswerenotexecutedincompliancewiththeproceduresrequiredbylocallawingeneralnullifiedtheresults,astheevidenceEUFORhadfoundcouldnotbeusedincourt.Relatingtothis,someEUPMpersonnelaccusedEUFORofanexcessivelyrobustandvisibleappearanceinthecourseoftheseoperations, which aimed at promoting their publicity abouttaking action against the problems encountered. AnotherconcernwiththeEUPMwasthatEUFORwasinfactdoingthejobofthelocals,andthuscrushingtheideaofenhancinglocalownership,promotedbytheEUPM.80

EUFOR conducted its operations throughout themissionarea,inalltheTaskForcesandwithalmostalltheoperationalassets in its possession. However, one specified asset ofEUFOR, the Integrated Police Unit (IPU), was often used inthisconnectionandthusbecameasourceofdiscordbetweenEUFORandtheEUPM.IPUisaGendarmerietypeofmilitarypolice force, with a strength of approximately 500 troops,which functions under the Commander EUFOR and can beused throughout the country. The task of IPU is to providesupporttomaintainingasafeandsecureenvironment,anditcanalsobeusedincivildisturbanceoperationsandpolice-likeoperations,includinginvestigations.81

Most of the criticism of IPU actions touched upon themannerinwhichIPUexecuteditsactionsaimedatorganisedcrime. From the perspective of EUPM, IPU often conducteditsoperationswithoutanypriornoticetoEUPMorthe localauthorities,andfrequentlyemployedanexcessiveamountofforce.82Rather surprisingly, suchopinionswereechoedevenwithinEUFOR.Fromthemilitarypointofview,thesignificanceofIPUwasandisrecognised,takingintoaccountitscapabilitiesand the task of EUFOR. However, in early 2005, some IPUoperations took place without the Task Force commandersofbeingawareofthem,whichcreatedproblemswithintheorganisationitself.83

80 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,16February2007,30March2007&22May2007.

81 IPU took over from its predecessor in SFOR, theMultinationalSpecializedUnit,MSU,whichwasseenausefultypeofassetalsoforEUFOR.However,deployingtheIPUunderEUFORandcreatingaconstabularyforce–withexecutivepowers–undermilitarycommandraisedconsiderable opposition among some of the memberstates. See further Juncos2005,5, andHansen2002,70–73.

82 InterviewsofformerEUPMofficials,22May2007&1August2007.

83 Interviews of former EUFOR officers, 19 April 2007 &25April2007; InterviewsofformerEUPMofficials,16February 2007 & 18 April 2007. Another point thatthe interviewees, representing both former EUPM andformer EUFOR personnel, brought out concerning thecoordinationof EUFORactivities in relation to tacklingorganisedcrimewasthat,especiallyin2004and2005,someof the troopsbelonging to theTaskForceswerenotoperatingcompletelyinlinewiththeguidancefromHQEUFOR,butfollowingtheirownagendas.

4.3 Field level interface

ExaminingcooperationandcoordinationbetweenEUandESDPactorsatthetacticalorfieldlevelmeansinpracticeexaminingrelationsbetweenEUPMandEUFOR, theorganisations thatactuallyhaveafieldpresence.84Eventhoughcoordinationandcoherenceatthetop–inthiscaseSarajevo–level iscrucialforthesuccessofsuchmissions, it isequally importanthowtheactors inthefieldimplementandinterprettheguidancereceived from above. The severe difficulties faced by theorganisationsattheoperationallevelmusthavebeenreflectedat lower levels.Ontheotherhand,actions inthefieldwerea manifestation of the mission’s policy and mandate, bothtowardstheHQlevelandalsotowardsthelocalsociety,andconsequentlyitwasimportantfortheoperationalleveltobeincontroloftheseactions.

Fromthefieldlevelperspective,thechangefromSFORtoEUFORwasnottoogreat,asEUFORinheriteditsfieldstructurefromSFORlargelyunchanged.Alsomostofthetheirshoulderbadge.85

Havingbeenoperationalforalmosttwoyearsbeforethedeployment of EUFOR, EUPM had been able to create itsconnectionsandliaisontowardsSFORandotheractorsontheground. The EUPMheadquarters had liaison officers postedto each of the Task Forces to guarantee close cooperation.However,immediatelypriortoEUFORdeployment,theEUPMHead of Mission at that time, Commissioner Kevin Carty,decidedtowithdrawtheliaisonofficersfromtheTaskForces,leavingtheliaisonresponsibilitytotheregionalheadquarters.The lack of organic liaison officers became apparent whenEUFORreplacedSFOR,and inmanycasestheconnectiontoEUPMregionalandfieldofficeswascut.AsonememberofaregionalcentreofEUPMstated,insomeareastherelationshipbetween EUPM and SFOR had been much better than thatbetweenEUPMandEUFOR,at leastduring thefirst yearoftheircoexistence.86

The lack of organic liaison between EUPM and EUFORsloweddownthecreationofrelationshipsinthefield.WhentheresponsibilitytoactasthefocalpointforEUFORwasleftto the EUPM regional offices, which lacked direct guidanceor instructionsabouthowtoperformthis, itbecamepurelya matter of each person’s judgement how important thisrelationshipwas.Inpractice,thiswasinterpretedasmeaningthattherewasnodirectobligationtoliaisewithEUFOR,whichwas thenusedasanexcusenot tocontact themilitaryand

84 Attheregionallevel,EUPMisrepresentedbytheregionalheadquarters and SIPA regional offices. At EUFORregionallevel,untilspring2007therewereTaskForcesandlaterontheRegionalCoordinationCentres(RCCs).At the field level, EUPM has local police co-locationoffices and Border Police field offices, while EUFOR ismainlyrepresentedbytheLiaisonandObservationTeamsand, prior to the restructuring, also the ManoeuvreBattalions. In this context, both the regional and fieldlevels are includedwhen referring tofieldpresenceorcoordinationinthefield.

85 Kupferschmidt2006,18.86 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,26March2007&

1August2007.


createaliaisonstructure.Astherewerenoprocedures,inmanycasestherelationshipbetweenEUPMandEUFORstartedonanationalbasis.Forthisreason,relationsbetweenEUPMandEUFOR in the field varied greatly. In some areas the actors,despiteorevenbecauseofthelackofguidance,wereabletocreategoodcontactsandrelationshipswiththeircounterpartsandfindlocalsolutionstotheproblems.87

Ingeneral,theEUPMwasinitiallynotveryactivetowardsEUFOR, as EUPM was engaged in various projects which innowayincludedEUFORparticipation.Moreover,thefactthattheorganisationslackedamatchingregionalorfieldstructuremade itdifficult tofind the rightcounterpart.However, theneedforcoordinationtoextendtothefieldlevelbecameanissuewhenthesamecooperationproblemsfacedinSarajevoalsobecameapparentontheground,asEUFORpursuedanactive roleagainstorganisedcrime.TheTaskForcesand IPUwereconductingtheiroperationswithoutinformingtheEUPM,who were mainly learning about these operations from thelocalpolice.IPUdidtaketheinitiativeandcontacttheEUPMattheregionallevel,butonlyinordertogaininformationfortheiroperations,nottoprovideinformationaboutthem.88

The LOTs are the primary EUFOR actors responsible forliaisonwithEUPMatthefield level. Inadditiontoobservingandmaintainingsituationalawareness,thetasksoftheLOTsinclude contacting the local authorities, inter alia, the localpolice, customs officials and Border Police. After EUFORdeployment,LOTsweredirectlycontactingthelocalpoliceandotherlocalauthorities,whichinsomeareasirritatedthelocalEUPMoffice,astheysawcontactwiththelocalauthoritiesasexclusivelytheirresponsibility. Inordertosolvethisproblem,differentlocalsolutionswereimplemented.Insomecases,LOTswereabletocontactlocalpolicefreely,informingEUPMonlyaboutpossibleoperationswhichincludedthelocalpolice.89

WhatcreatedconfusionamongthelocalpoliceandEUPMwasthefactthattheLOTswerenottheonlyrepresentativesofEUFORwhoweredirectlycontactingthelocalauthorities.EventhoughitwastheresponsibilityoftheLOTstomaintainliaisonand in this way coordinate EUFOR actions in the field, theManoeuvreBattalionand IPUwerealsoactive in contactinglocalauthorities.Afrequentoccurrence,forexample,wasthatafteranincident,thelocalChiefofPolicewouldreceivevisitorsfromtheLOT,theManoeuvreBattalionandpossiblytheIPU,allwearingthesameEUflagbutaskingoneafteranotherthesamequestions.90

From the point of view of EU coherence in Bosnia andHerzegovina, almost the entire first year of coexistence ofEUFORandEUPMwascharacterizedby thecontroversies inrelationtothemandatesandtasksofthemissions.Inadditiontotheconflictingmandates,thereweresomepersonalclashes

87 InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007;InterviewswithformerEUFORofficers,19April2007&5June2007;InterviewwithformerEUPMofficial,1August2007.

88 InterviewwithformerEUPMofficial,1August2007.89 InterviewswithformerEUPMofficials,26March2007,

1August2007;InterviewwithformerEUFORofficer,7June2007.

90 InterviewwithaformerEUFORofficer,7June2007.

atthetoplevelwhichwerealsoreflectedinthecooperation.Even though the actors were operating under the sameflag,therewasnoactualplannedcoordinationbetweenthemissions.TheroleoftheEUSRinmediatingthedisputeswasrelatively small in theearlyphase,but increased in thefinalmonthsof2005.91InthisrespectitcanbesaidthattheEUSRwasunable toactaccording to themandate to“contributeto reinforcementof internalEUcoordinationandcoherenceinBiH.”

4.4 From Seven Principles to Common operational Guidelines

Asthedifficultiesinthecooperationanddelineationoftaskswith regard to fighting organised crime became ever moreapparent,andappropriatemechanismsfromtheBrusselsendwere still lacking, the actors themselves took the initiativeto improve thesituation.The leadingmission in this respectwasEUPM,forwhomthesituationatthattimewastheleastsatisfactory. In September 2005 EUPM, EUFOR and EUSRagreedonthedocumentsSeven PrinciplesandGuidelines for Increasing Co-operation between EUPM-EUFor and EUSr.92

Accordingtothesedocuments, theorganisationsagreedonstrengtheningtheircomplementaryandcoordinativerolesin tackling organised crime, and that the EUSR would takeresponsibility for the overall coordination. To this end, theEUSRestablishedanewbodyunderEUSRchairmanship,theCrime Strategy Working Group, to ensure the coordinationof EU-ESDP actors in support of the local authorities’ fightagainst organised crime and corruption. EUPM and EUFORwerealsotoparticipateintheWorkingGroup.TheagreementgaveEUPMtheleadingroleincoordinatingpolicingactivitiesinthecountrybymonitoringandmentoringtheplanningofcounter-organised-crime operations. EUFOR was to changeits role from a proactive to a clearly support role and alignits operations with EUPM. The aim was to enhance localauthorities’ initiative intacklingorganisedcrimeandrequestoperationalsupportfromEUFORifnecessary,butwithEUPMassessingtheneedforassistance.93

Agreement on the Seven Principles was the first officialstep towards delineation of the tasks of the organisations.Theseprincipleswerereaffirmedintherevisedmandatesforboth EUSR and EUPM in November 2005, thus confirmingtheroles.94Eventhoughtherevisedmandatesnowincludedmodalities and defined tasks for EUPM and EUFOR at theoperational level, implementing the new practices at bothoperationalandfieldlevelsdemandedtimeandeffort,andinpracticethechangedidnothappenovernight.EUPMwasalsobusyfinalisingtheirprogrammesandprojectsasthemandatewasendingbytheendof2005,whichmeantthattheSevenPrinciplesbecameeffectiveat thefield levelonlyduring the

91 InterviewwithaformerEUFORofficer,5June2007.92 Juncos2007,60;InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.93 Juncos 2007, 61; Penksa 2006, 20–21; Interviews in

Sarajevo,May2007.94 Council Joint Action 2005/824/CFSP; Council Joint

Action2005/825/CFSP.


next mandate, starting in 2006. The principles created noclearstructuresforliaisonandcoordinationassuch,andthecooperation between EUPM and EUFOR at the field levelcontinuedtodependgreatlyonpersonalities.95

TheimplementationoftheSevenPrinciplesandtherevisedEUPMmandateinthefieldagainvariedindifferentregionalandfieldoffices. In certainareas, EUFORLOTswereable tomaintain their liaison and continue their activities with thelocalauthorities inthesamewayasbefore,astheguidancefromEUPMdidnotactuallychange.Someproblemsoccurred,however, concerning the instructions the local police hadreceived fromEUPM.These instructionswere in somecasesinterpretedasmeaningthatthelocalpolicewerenotpermittedtodealwithEUFORwithoutfirstconsultingwithEUPM.Asaresult,thelocalpoliceonthebasisoftheseinstructionsrefusedtomeetrepresentativesofEUFORandurgedthemtocontactEUPMforpermission.ThesesituationswerecorrectedthroughcoordinationwithEUPMattheregionalleveland,atleastintheareainquestion,theprocedurethatwasfollowedconcerningtherelationshipbetweenEUFORandlocalauthoritiesbeforetheSevenPrinciplesremainedthesame.96

Reflecting the need to further clarify and even detailcooperationandcoordination, EUFORandEUPMagreedonCommon operational guidelines for EUPM – EUFor support to the fight against organised crimeinMay2006.TheguidelinesspecifiedtheproceduresandmethodstobeusedincasesofEUFOR support to local law enforcement agencies. In ordertopromotelocalownershipandatthesametimereducetheneed for EUFOR engagement, the support from EUFOR tolocal policewas restricted to those cases inwhich the localpolicelackthecapacity,ortheconfidencetousetheexistingcapacity,andtheneedforEUFORassetsisdeterminedtobeessentialbyEUPM.97

A significant change in comparison with the earlierSevenPrincipleswas the inclusionof cooperationat tacticallevel under the Guidelines, a solution that was more thannecessary to ensure that the improved coordination andcooperation between the missions on the HQ level wouldalso reach the actors on the field level, that is, EUPM andEUFOR. Implementing the Guidelines naturally caused someproblems,especiallywithinEUFOR,butasconfirmation thattheGuidelineswerefoundtobemutuallybeneficial,whentheagreementwasjointlyreviewedbytheactorsinOctober2006and again during autumn 2007, only slight changes to theagreedpracticesresulted.TheGuidelineswillbeupdatedagaininspring2008,followingtherenewedmissionofEUPM.98

95 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interview with aformerEUPMofficial,1August2007.

96 Reflecting the author’s own experience between1.12.2005–1.6.2006.

97 The Council of the European Union 8900/07; Juncos2007,61;Penksa2006,20–21; Interviews inSarajevo,May2007.

98 EmailinterviewwithEUPMofficial,28November2007.

4.5 Cooperation and coordination at the present time

All the actors involved in the creation of the CommonOperational Guidelines emphasize the current goodcoordinationandcooperationbetweentheEUSR,EUPMandEUFOR, three years after the beginning of the coexistenceof themissions. It is similarlyemphasised that the improvedcoherenceislargelyduetotheGuidelinesthatnowregulatetherelationships.EspeciallyfromthepointofviewofEUPM,theirrelationwithEUFORhasbeencontinuallyimprovingsincespring2006,aftertheGuidelineswerefirstsigned.99

ApracticalexampleofimprovedcoordinationistheuseofEUFORassets insupportofthelocalauthorities,whichusedtobeoneofthecriticalpoints.EUPMassessestheneedforsupportandmakestherequesttoEUFOR,whichthendecideswhether it will provide the support or not. The supportingunitthencoordinatesitsactionsdirectlywithEUPMandlocalpolice. The Integrated Police Unit, IPU, is often used in thiscontextasitpossesses,forexample,technicalresourcesthatlocalpoliceforceslack.100

The use of IPU, which previously caused problems,especiallybetweenEUPMandEUFOR,hasalsobeenregulatedunder the Guidelines and is now quite widely accepted asfunctional.WhenoperatingundertheEUflag,IPUactionsarecoordinatedandinlinewiththeguidancefromEUPM.Ontheotherhand, IPUhasalsoperformedoperationsunderNATOcommand; in thesecases IPU isnotboundby theCommonOperational Guidelines. Nevertheless, IPU operations are nolongeranissue.101

Moreover,thecoordinationstructuresbetweenthemissionshaveevolvedandarenowregardedasquitecomprehensive.AttheHeadsofMissionslevel,theBoardofPrincipals,aweeklycoordinationmeetingchairedbytheOHR,bringstogetherthemostsignificantinternationalorganisationsinBosnia.ForEUoperations,theEUHeadsofMissionsweeklymeetingshouldcoordinatetheactionsofthemissionsandoftheEUPresidency,whichgenerallychairsthemeeting.TheEUSRusuallyholdsanadditionalEUHeadsofMissionsmeetingonceamonthforabriefingonprevailingkeyissues.102

Onthelowerlevel,thereareseveralregularmeetings.TheweeklyESDPmeetinggatherstogethertheseniorpoliticalandmediaadvisersoftheentire“EUfamily”.TheESDPmeetingischairedbytheHeadofEUSR’sPoliticalDepartmentandcoverskey political events and developments, common policies,policeandmediaissues.ThesameorganisationsmeetagainintheINFOOPSWorkingGroup,which,undertheEUSR’sHeadofCommunications,convenestodiscussthepressandmediafunctions. In the fight against organised crime, the mostimportant meeting is the bi-weekly EU Coordination Board(the former EU Targeting Board), at which EUPM, EUFOR,EUSR,andtheStateProsecutor’sOfficedefineconcretetargets

99 InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.100 Interviews in Sarajevo, May 2007; Interview with a

formerEUPMofficial,15May2007.101 InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.102 Ibid.


intacklingorganisedcrime.Differentsectionsofthemissionsalsoconveneonachocbasis,whenevertheneedrequires.

The liaison arrangements between the missions havebecome closer over the past year. Both EUPM and EUFORhave their representation at the EUSR morning meetings.Respectively, the Politico-Military Officer from EUSR attendstheweekly EUFORChief of Staff andCommander’sUpdatemeetings,andoneofthepoliticaladvisersparticipatesinthetwoweeklyexecutivemeetingsatEUPM.TheEUPMLiaisonOfficeralsoattendsEUFORChiefofStaffmeetings,whiletheEUFOR Liaison Officer is present at appropriate meetings atEUPM.

With the above mentioned coordination and liaisonstructures in place, it was stated by interviewees of all themissions that the regular contacts between EUPM, EUFORandEUSRareonagood level. Itwasalsocommonlynotedthatwithmorestructuredcoordination,theendresultmightactually deteriorate, because merely sitting in a meeting orhavingaliaisonofficerfromanothermissiondoesnotequalcoordination. It is also noticeable that cooperation makessenseonlyuptoacertainpoint:alloftheexistingproceduresneedtohaveapurpose,andtheaimofthecooperationandcoordinationispractical,derivingfromtheactualneed.103

Even though the relations between the missions in theheadquarters level have significantly improved during thethree years of coexistence, the level of cooperation andcooperationinthefieldstillvariesconsiderably.TheCommonOperationalGuidelineshaveinmanyareasbeensuccessfullypassedondowntotheregionalandfieldlevelsofEUFOR104,inpracticetheRegionalCoordinationCentresandtheLOTs,atleastconcerningthepresentdelineationoftasks.ThismeansthatEUFORLOTpersonnelinthefieldhaveacceptedthefactthat EUPM has the leading role with respect to organisedcrime. ImplementingtheGuidelineshas,ontheotherhand,caused some misunderstanding between the missions, asthe instructions for EUFOR LOTs on how to deal with localauthoritieshavevaried.For instance, insomeareasalldirectLOT contacts with local police must first be approved byEUPM.105

103 InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.104 WhenreferringtopresentfieldpresenceofEUFOR,the

random sample of the study only covers the area ofoperationsRegionalCoordinationCentre4,theNorth-Eastcornerofthecountry.

105 InterviewswithEUFORofficers,May2007.

The EUPM policy towards coordination and cooperationonthefieldlevelverymuchdependsontheirowninterests.TheaimoftheEUPMistoactaccordingtoitsmandateand,bycoordinationwiththeotheractorsinthefield,toseektopreventothers from interferingwith itsmissionandmandate.Someinterviewees actually give their opinion that “EUPM officersshouldfocusonotherthingsinthefieldthancooperationwiththeLOTHouses”.106AlsofromthepointofviewofEUFOR,thefocusofEUPMonthefieldlevelhasshiftedalmostexclusivelytowards tacklingorganisedcrime,which leaves fewer issuestobecoordinatedbetweenEUPMandEUFORonthatlevel.Inmanycases,thecoordinationandcooperationbetweenEUPMandEUFORislimitedtooccasionalsharingofinformationandsocialcalls,asEUPMpersonnelareunabletoshareinformationonmostof theiractivities. Inareaswhere there isnoEUPMpresence,therelationshipisevenmoredistant.107

ThestatusoftheEUSRincoordinatingtheactivitiesofbothEUPM and EUFOR has become more significant, especiallywith the revised mandate and the ability to provide EUFORwithpoliticalguidance.However,thefactoftheEUSRgivingpoliticalguidancetoEUFORdoesnotactuallychangethestatusquo because of the existing close relations, and in practicethesearrangementshavealreadyexistedforsometime.Themandate confirmed the position of the EUSR as ‘convener’forcoordinationarrangementsthatarealreadyinplace.AlsotheroleoftheEUSR inrelationtothecriminal justice/policeinterfaceandtodevelopingandmonitoringtheprosecutorialsystemwasaffirmed,towhichendthecooperationwiththeEUPMhasalsobecomecloser.108

Regarding the future prospects of the coordination andcooperationbetweenthedifferentEUactorsinBosnia,manyoftheinformantsstatedthatthechallengenolongerconcernsinter-ESDPrelations,buttherelationsbetweenESDPmissionsand the Commission Delegation. Combining or co-locatingtheEUSRandECDelegationofficesseemstobethenaturalstepforward,whichthestructuresandpersonnelinSarajevoaremorereadyandwillingtotakethanBrussels.ThedecisionsconcerningtheOHRalsoaffectthecoordinationbetweentheEUactorsinthefuture,as“thelongerOHRcontinues,thelesstheEUSRdevelops”.109

106 InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.107 InterviewswithEUFORofficers,May2007.108 “Council Joint Action 2007/748/CFSP”; Interviews in

Sarajevo,May2007.109 InterviewsinSarajevo,May2007.


5 Conclusion

The improvementof cooperationandcoordinationbetweentheEU-ESDPmissionsinBosniaandHerzegovinahasbeenaprocessoflearningbydoing.Inthefirstphase,thedifferencesbetween the missions were mainly related to differinginterpretations of the mission mandates, both within EUPMand EUFOR. The mandates were broad and overlapping,giving both organisations a role in fighting the organisedcrime thatemergedas thecritical issuebetweenEUPMandEUFOR.Inaddition,someconflictingpersonalitieswithinthemissionscreatedasituationinwhichtherewasverylittleornocoordinationofoperations.

Onelessonwhichhasbeenidentifiedisthatthemissionmandates need to be sufficiently clear and precise to beabletoprovideanundisputeddelineationoftasks.Howeverit hasbeenobserved, especially by thepolitical elementsofthemissions,thatthemandatesshouldbebroadenoughtoleavesomeroomforactionbytheHeadsofMissionsontheoperationallevel.HavingclearmandateswouldinthisrespectalsoenabletheHeadsofMissionstoconcentrateonleadingtheirownorganisations,insteadofhavingtocreatetheirown

mission.Another factor that has been identified is that initially

the mandates took insufficiently into account the need forstructuresandmodalitiesforcoordination.Thereweresomerather general directions concerning how to coordinate theEU-ESDP activities, but in practice there were neither clearstructures nor guidelines for coordination and liaison, norcleardelineationoftasksbetweenthemissions. Itverysoonbecame evident that when left solely up to the will of theactorstoliaiseandcoordinatetheiractivities,thecooperationandcoordinationwereinadequateandhighlydependentonpersonalitiesandpersonalcontacts.Thiswas themain issueontheregionalandfieldlevels.

Clear structures for coordination of the activities andcooperation between the missions are required. If suchstructuresarenotincludedatthemandatelevel,thenmutuallyapprovedprocedures,forinstance,wouldreducethechancesofoverlappingorconflictingactions.Theneedforsuchstructuresisfirstencounteredandrespondedtobytheactorsinthefield,butthecreationofstructuresandmodalitiesforcooperationshouldalreadyhavebeentakenintoaccountatthestrategic

levelbeforemissiondeployment.Theimplementationofclearstructures would also mean clearly defined responsibilitiesfor theactors in thefield to liaisewithotherorganisations.Naturallyitiseverymissionmember’stasktocooperatewiththe other actors when required, but having clearly definedresponsibilitieswouldensurebetter fulfilmentof the taskofliaisonandcooperation.

AccordingtothemandatesoftheESDPmissionsinBosniaandHerzegovina, it istheEUSR’sresponsibilitytocoordinatetheESDPactivitiesinthetheatre.Inthebeginning,theEUSRwasinnopositiontoexecutehismandate,mainlyduetothelackof capacityorwillingness todo so.As themandateoftheEUSRwasquiteextensivefromthebeginning,thereweremanyexpectationsfortheEUSRtoimplementthecoordinationfunctionwhentheproblemsinthefieldbecameobvious.ThefunctionsoftheOHRwere,however,clearlytheprimarytaskfortheEUSR/OHR,andinthissensedouble-hattingtheOHRhas not been a successful solution. The EUSR clearly needsfulloperationalcapabilitytobeabletoactinaccordancewiththeroleofthecoordinatorofESDPmissions,andtothisendthe EUSR’s positionneeds to be strengthened.OHR, and inthissensedouble-hattingtheOHRhasnotbeenasuccessfulsolution.TheEUSRclearlyneedsfulloperationalcapabilitytobeabletoactinaccordancewiththeroleofthecoordinatorofESDPmissions,andtothisendtheEUSR’spositionneedstobestrengthened.

One of the factors that have been identified as havinghinderedcooperationwaspoorknowledgeoftheotheractorsandtheirmission,especiallyatthefieldlevelinterface.Asthemandateandmissionofthecounterpartswereunclear,itwashardtofindcommongroundforcooperation.Themissionshavestep-by-step increased the traininggiven to their personnel,one of the aims of which is to enhance the knowledge ofother actors in the field. In this respect, the situation hasalreadyimprovedsincethebeginning.Onesolutiontofurthersystematize the training would be to introduce commoninductiontrainingforkeyESDPpersonnel,inwhichtheEUSRcould take the leading role. In connection with improvingpreparedness to liaiseand interactwithotherorganisations,theneed to increase trainingof civil-military relations in thepre-missiontraininghasalsobeenacknowledged.


The creation of the Seven Principles and later on theCommonOperationalGuidelines isagoodexampleofhowbuilding up the cooperation and coordination is a never-endingprocess.ThecaseofBosnia,wheretheactors in thefieldwerecompelledtoinitiatesuchaprocess,alsorevealedtheinabilityoftheEUstructuresatthattimetoreactpromptlyto the problems. This inability also becomes evident whenthechanges in themandatesof themissionsareexamined;everytime,thesechangesseemtoreflecttheproceduresandstructures that the missions have already adopted or thatalready exist in the field, which means that the practice isguidingthemandates,ratherthantheotherwayaround.

With the Common Operational Guidelines, the missionshave mutually agreed on the delineation of tasks andcoordination structures that now regulate their interactions.Becauseoftheseproceduresandstructures,coordinationandcooperation between the EUSR, EUPM and EUFOR on theoperationallevelinSarajevohasimprovedoverthepastyearandahalf.At the regionalandfield level, the tactical level,thecooperationandcoordinationhavealsoimprovedowingto the guidance the field presence receives from above. Aseachmission’stasksdiffersignificantly,theneedtocooperateintheirfieldactivitiesisnotasimperativeasattheoperationallevel.FromthepointofviewofspeakingwithoneEUvoice,however,acertainamountofcoordinationandcooperationisrequired.

Even though the relationsandcooperationbetween themissionshave improvedandare consideredgood, thisdoesnotimplythatthereisnoroomforfurtherimprovement.Eventhough the missions operate under the same EU flag andsamepolicy,neverthelesscertainhandicaps,suchasnationalagendas, conflicting personalities, language problems,different nationalities and cultural background, are factorsthathavetobetakenintoconsiderationinthecooperation,aswithanyotherinternationalorganisationormission.However,theEUisinauniquepositiontodevelopitscapacitiesincrisismanagement, as many of these handicaps seem to be lessapparentowing to the relativelyunitedapproachof theEU

missions.BosniaandHerzegovinahassometimesbeenreferred to

asa‘testingground’fortheESDP,fromthepointofviewofplanningandcoordinatingthedifferentEUcrisismanagementinstruments.Afterarockystart,numerouslessonshavebeenidentified, and some even learnt, in developing EU crisismanagement in general.With regard to the coherence andcoordination of civilian and military crisis management, thenext great challenge for the EU lies in Kosovo, where thecooperationbetween the future EULEXKosovomissionandNATO-ledKFOR isoneof thekey issues. This challengehasbeen taken seriously, and the actors involved have alreadyagreed on the guiding principles for their cooperation andmutualinteractions.Itremainstobeseenhoweffectivelytheseguidelineswillbe implementedontheground.As the tasksof themissionsaresignificantlydifferent, the issuethis timeshouldnotbe thecoordinationofactivities in thefield,butratherreinforcingacredibleandunitedinternationalpresenceinKosovo.


Interviews

InterviewofaformerEUPMofficial,16February2007,recorded.

InterviewofaCIVCOMofficial,12March2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUMMandEUPMofficial,26March2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUPMofficial,30March2007,notes.

InterviewofaformerEUPMofficial,18April2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUFORofficer,19April2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUFORofficer,25April2007,recorded.

InterviewofaEUSRofficial,15May2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUPMofficial,15May2007,recorded.




InterviewofaEUPMofficial,17May2007,recorded.



InterviewofaEUPMofficial,17May2007,emailinterview28November2007,recorded.




InterviewofaEUFORofficer,19May2007,notes.






InterviewofaEUFORofficial,22May2007,recorded.

References



InterviewofaEUMMofficial,22May2007,notes.

InterviewofaformerEUPMandEUSRofficial,22May2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUFORofficer,5June2007.

InterviewofaformerEUFORofficial,5June2007.

TelephoneinterviewofaformerEUPMofficial,6June2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUFORofficer,7June2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUPMofficial,19June2007,recorded.

InterviewofaformerEUPMofficial,1August2007,recorded.

EmailinterviewofaformerEUFORofficial,28November2007.

AllthenotesandrecordingsareinthepossessionoftheauthorattheCMCFinland.

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Council of the European Union

“CouncilconclusionsonInternationalPoliceTaskForce(IPTF)Follow-on”,18/19.2.2002.

TheCounciloftheEuropeanUnion8900/07:European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina six-monthly review report,Brussels3May2007.

“CouncilJointAction2000/811/CFSPof22December2000ontheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission”.official Journal of the European Communities,L328,23December,53–54.

“CouncilJointAction2002/210/CFSPof11March2002ontheEuropeanUnionPoliceMission”.official Journal of the European Communities,L70,13March,1–6.

“CouncilJointAction2002/211/CFSPof11March2002ontheappointmentoftheEUSpecialRepresentativeinBosniaandHerzegovina”.official Journal of the European Communities,L70,13March,7.

“CouncilJointAction2002/569/CFSPof12July2004onthemandateoftheEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeinBosniaandHerzegovinaandrepealingCouncilJointAction2002/211/CFSP”,official Journal of the European Communities,L252,28July,p.7–9.

“CouncilJointAction2004/570/CFSPof12July2004ontheEuropeanUnionmilitaryoperationinBosniaandHerzegovina”.official Journal of the European Communities,L252,28July,10–14.

“CouncilJointAction2006/49/CFSPof30January2006appointingtheEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeinBosniaandHerzegovina”.official Journal of the European Communities,L26,31January,21–23.

“CouncilJointAction2006/523/CFSPof25July2006amendingthemandateoftheEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeinBosniaandHerzegovina”.official Journal of the European Communities,L205,27July,30.

“CouncilJointAction2006/867/CFSPof30November2006extendingandamendingthemandateoftheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission(EUMM)”.official Journal of the European Communities,L335,1December,48–49.

“CouncilJointAction2007/87/CFSPof7February2007amendingandextendingthemandateoftheEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeinBiH”.official Journal of the European Communities,L35,8February,35–38.

“CouncilJointAction2007/748/CFSPof19November2007amendingJointAction2007/87/CFSPamendingandextendingthemandateoftheEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeinBosniaandHerzegovina”.official


Journal of the European Communities,L303,21November,38–39.

“CouncilJointAction2007/749/CFSPof19November2007ontheEuropeanUnionPoliceMission(EUPM)inBosniaandHerzegovina(BiH)”.official Journal of the European Communities,L303,21November,40–44.

“CouncilDecision2007/427/CFSPof18June2007appointingtheEuropeanUnionSpecialRepresentativeinBosniaandHerzegovina”.official Journal of the European Communities,L159,20June,63–64.

“OperationALTHEA”,Quarterly report to the United Nations, Council of the European Union,Brussels,3July2007.

Presidency Conclusions,CopenhagenEuropeanCouncil12and13December2002,CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,Brussels29January2003.

Presidency report on ESDP,10910/07,Brussels18June2007.

other Documents

Communiqué by the PIC Steering Board,February27,2007.http://www.ohr.int/pic/default.asp?content_id=39236,readonMarch6,2007.

ESS(2003):European Security Strategy,Brussels,12December2003.

ESS–BiH(2004):European Security Strategy – Bosnia and Herzegovina/Comprehensive Policy,18June2004.

EUPM Mission Mag.No28,11.10.2007,Sarajevo.

EUSROrganisationChart,October2007,Sarajevo.

General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

ICG(2001):“NoEarlyExit:NATO’sContinuingChallengeinBosnia”.International Crisis Group (ICG) Europe report,No,110,22May2001.

ICG(2004):“EUFOR-IA:ChangingBosnia’sSecurityArrangements”.ICG Europe Briefing,29June2004.

NATO(2001):MC411/1.NATo Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation.MilitaryCouncil,Brussels.

report to the European Parliament by the oHr and EU Special representative for BiH,January-June2003.

report to the European Parliament by the oHr and EU Special representative for BiH,February2006-June2006,publishedonSeptember11,2006.

SummaryoftheReportbyJavierSolana,EUHighRepresentativeforCFSP,onaPossible EU Deployment in BiH,23February2004.

UNDPKO(2002):Civil-Military Co-ordination Policy.UNDepartmentforPeacekeepingOperations,NewYork,September2002.

UNOCHA(2003):Guidelines on the use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.UNOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs(OCHA),Geneva,March2004.

UNSecurityCouncil(2007):resolution 1785.AdoptedbytheSecurityCouncilatits5782ndmeeting,on21November2007.


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Recruitment and Training in Civilian Crisis ManagementLearningfromtheECMM/EUMMExperiences

Olivia Šetkić

MonitoringisoneoftheEuropeanUnion’sciviliancrisismanagementpriorityareas.Thisarticle

contributestothediscussionofthequalityofinternationalmissionpersonnelbyexaminingthe

personnelservingtheEuropeanCommunityMonitorMission(ECMM)anditssuccessor,the

EuropeanUnionMonitoringMission(EUMM).Researchresultsaremainlybasedoninterviews

ofmonitorsandtheyhighlightthelessonslearnedoftheECMM/EUMMexperience.Ingeneral,

thetrainingandrecruitmentrecommendationsgiveninthisarticleprovidevaluabletoolsto

allthoseengagedinplanningandassessingEuropeanUnionSecurityandDefencePolicy’s

monitoringmissions.1

1 ThisarticlewasfinishedinFebruary2008.


1 Introduction

ThefallofYugoslaviawiththesubsequentwarsintheheartofEuropehaveactedasacatalystfortheEuropeanUniontodevelopandstrengthenitsroleasanactoranditsinvolvementincrisismanagement.2FollowingtheEU’sidentificationofitsfourinitialpriorityareas3withinciviliancrisismanagementatthe European Council of Feira in 2000, an agreement wasreached to make available a certain number of experts foreachofthesepriorityareas.Thislistofprioritieswasprolongedwithtwoadditionsin2004,namelymonitoringandsupportfortheEUSpecialRepresentative.4AddingmonitoringasanEUpriorityareahasbeenclaimedtobeaconsequenceofthesuccessoftheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission(EUMM).5

As the quantity of available experts was achieved, andevenexceededalreadyin20026,thediscussioncametofocusincreasingly on the quality of experts. The training centresthathavebeensetup in severalEuropeanstates toprovideexpertswithciviliancrisismanagementtrainingisanattempttoimprovethequalityofstaffsecondedtomissions.

Thisarticlecontributestothediscussionofthequalityofinternational mission personnel by examining the personnelserving the European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM)and its successor, the European Union Monitoring Mission(EUMM). After introducing the mission in section two, thearticlecontinuesbydescribingtherecruitments(chapterthree)madebysomesecondingnations, followedbyadescriptionofwhatevertraininghasbeenavailableforthefuturemissionmembers by their seconding nations on the one hand, andby the mission itself on the other hand (section four). Bothsectionsthreeandfourhighlightsomefactorschallengingtherecruitmentandmakingthetraininglessthancomprehensive.Sectionfive isbasedon the interviewees’ reflectionson theperformance in the field, whereas section six gives a list of

2 See,forexample,Langinvainio2006.3 The initial four EU priority areas within civilian crisis

management were Police, Rule of Law, CivilianAdministrationandCivilProtection,as identifiedintheSantaMariadaFeiraEuropeanCouncil,19and20June2000,Presidencyconclusions.

4 ActionPlanforCivilianAspectsofESDP2004,4&6.5 BriefguidetotheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy

2005,37.6 Solana2002.

recommendations based on identified shortcomings in therecruitment, training and performance of ECMM/EUMMmonitors.

The article is based on facts, views and opinions asexpressed by 50 informants, who can be divided into thefollowingthreecategories:

•recruitmentand/ortrainingofficers(11),•missionpersonnel(31)consistingof

-sixHeadsofECMM/EUMM,-24 active and former (at the time of the

collection of data) ECMM/EUMM monitors,oneformerECMMinterpreter,

•representativesoftherecipientoftheECMMandtheEUMMreports(8)including

-Western Balkans Desk officers at theirrespectiveministriesforforeignaffairs,

-embassiesintheEUMMareaofresponsibility,-one representative to the EU Committee

for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management,CivCom.

The same informant may represent two differentcategories,inwhichcasehe/shehasbeenlistedaccordingtowheremostemphasisoftheinterviewhasbeenplaced.Activemonitorswere interviewedintheEUMMheadquarters,withtheexceptionofonetelephoneinterview.Inallcasesbutonehadtheypreviouslybeenassignedtoteamsasfieldmonitors.SeveraloftheinterviewedmonitorshadservedtheECMMortheEUMMonmorethanoneoccasion.

Whenever possible, respondents were interviewed inperson, in which case the interview was recorded on tape(withoneexception),andlatertranscribedintowrittentextforanalysis.Ifthiswasnotfeasible,theinterviewwasconductedbytelephone,withduenotestaken.Inothercasesresponseswere collected by a questionnaire via email, with possiblefollow-up questions made when applicable. Informants willnotbeidentifiedasmostchosetoremainanonymous,andinafewcasesduetothefrequentrotationofrecruitingpersonnel,the actual informant has in fact relied only on forwarded

CrisisManagementCentreFinlandYearbook 200844

informationastohowthingshavebeendonepreviously,butnotdoneanyrecruitingforECMMorEUMMinperson.7

All the interviews were conducted and questionnairescollected between February and December 2007. Therespondents represent eleven different participating nationsof the ECMM/EUMM, with emphasis given to countriessecondingciviliansandoneinterpreterlocallyemployedinthemissionarea.

The writer’s own experience of serving the ECMM hasbeenstatedtotheinformants,andthisinsightintothemissionisalsoreflectedinthisarticle.

ArestrictionintheresearchhasbeenthatwiththeEUMMreports being classified material, they have not been madeavailable for review for this article.Neitherhave theECMMpresidency reports nor the EUMM annual reports from thepastyearsbeenavailableassourcematerial.

7 All source material collected is archived at the CrisisManagementCentreFinland,Kuopio.


2 TheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission

2.1 The development from ECMM to EUMM

TheEuropeanCommunityMonitorMissionwasinauguratedinSloveniain1991inaccordancewiththeBrioniDeclaration.8Thefirstconcreteobjectivewastomonitorthewithdrawalofthe Yugoslav Peoples’ Army from Slovenia through Croatiato Serbia. The mission was set up to give the EuropeanCommunity speedy and unaltered information about thedevelopmentsintheregionfromareliablesource,somethingwhich theembassiesbeing located inBelgradewereunabletodo.

After the commencing of activities, the mission activelymonitored the developments of the 1990s, which led inter alia to the declaration of independence of five ex-Yugoslavrepublics,tothewarsinCroatiaandBosniaandHerzegovinawhicheventuallyledtothesigningoftheDaytonPeaceAccordsinDecember1995,aswellasthemassexodusfromKosovoin1999,theNATObombingsinSerbiaandMontenegro,andthe post-conflict rebuilding of society up to late 2000. Themonitoringcontinuedforanothersevenyears,butasaresultoftheCouncilJointAction,andtoemphasisehowthemissionwasperceivedaspartof theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy,themissionchangeditsnametotheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission9.After16.5yearsofoperation,theEUMMwasfinallydissolvedattheendof2007,ontheveryeveoftheKosovoStatusdecision.10

As the circumstancesunderwhich themissionoperatedchanged significantly, the mission had to change its raison d’être. The focusof themission shiftedover the years, andthegeographicalcoveragedecreasedanumberoftimes.Thenumberofinternationalstaffdeployedvariedfromaninitial30toamaximumof420monitorsin1996–1997,andnearingtheclosureofthemissionin2007downtolessthan60monitors.Withthenumberofmonitorsonthefieldshiftingaccordingto the degree of relative stability, the level of monitoringcoverage focusedeitheron local politicsoronhigher levelsofpolitics.Bysodoing,themissionmanagedtorespondto

8 Brijunskadeklaracija1991.9 CouncilJointAction2000/811/CFSP.10 CouncilJointAction2006/867/CFSP.

thechangingneedsoftheEUandthestatesparticipatinginthemission11,andtheoperationgotnewextensionsannually.These extensions were not, however, automatic, as pointedoutbyoneinformant,butrathertheresultoflongandheateddiscussions.

2.2 The EUMM mandate

The last Council Joint Action regarding the EUMM of 30November2006,whichextendedandamendedthemandateoftheEUMM,statedthatthemissionshall:

• monitor political and security developments in the area of its responsibility, with a particular focus on kosovo and Serbia, and neighbouring regions that might be affected by any adverse developments in kosovo;

• give particular attention to border monitoring, inter-ethnic issues and refugee return;

• provide analytical reports on the basis of tasking received;

• contribute to the early warning of the Council and the confidence building, in the context of the policy of stabilization conducted by the Union in the region.

The Council may also initiate specific tasking in co-ordination with the Secretary General/High representative and in consultation with the Commission.12

Successfullyimplementingthesetasksbygivingbackgroundinformation and up-to-date information and analysis abouttrends in the region, he EUMM was to contribute to theformulationofacommonEUpolicytowardstheregion.ThereportswentsimultaneouslytoBrusselsandtothecapitalsofallparticipatingnations.

AlthoughnotexplicitlywrittenintheEUMMmandate,onefeatureofanymonitoringmissionisseentobetoshowtheEUflagintheregion13.Moreimportantly,itisstatedhowthe

11 Except for the Member States of EU, Slovakia (beforebecominganEUmember)andNorway.

12 CouncilJointAction2006/867/CFSP,1.13 ConceptforEUMonitoringMissions2003,6.


merepresencetendstolowertensions,aspeopledonotfeelneglected or forgotten.14 The importance of these featureshave,nevertheless,decreasedontheonehandastheregionhasachievedrelativestability,andontheotherhandas theEU has increased its representation and presence by othermeans.

2.3 The EUMM methodology

ThemethodwhichEUMMutilisedwastodeployfieldteamsof at least two internationalmonitors representingdifferentnationalitiestocoveragivengeographicalareaofresponsibility.Theteamsalsoconsistedofalocal,EUMM-affiliatedinterpreter.Theteamshadsignificantfreedominplanningtheiractivitiesandinchoosingtheirinterlocutorsthemselves,aslongastheyoperatedwithinthemissionmandate.

The recommendations were for a team to conduct twomeetings a day.15 These meetings were the principal wayinformation was collected. Due to the form in which thesemeetingswereconducted,andtheiranticipatedoutcome, itwould be more appropriate to refer to them as interviews.The team would have prepared questions for the meeting,focusingonsomeparticularareaof interest thatwas in linewith the team’s short-termand strategic long-termplan formonitoring.

Afterthemeetings,theteamreturnedtotheirteamsiteto analyse the gathered material and to write a short dailyreport about the most significant findings. The accuracyof controversial, if not all, material, should ideally havebeen verified fromdifferent sources. Itwouldbe fair to saythat the coreof thedaily tasks thus resembled investigativejournalism.

Once the report was finalised by the team, it wasforwarded to the mission headquarters in Sarajevo. Theheadquarters used the reports of the mission’s entire areaof responsibility as the bulk of information that it analysedandfromwhich itcompiledanassessment,whichwasthenforwardedtoBrusselsandtothecapitalsoftheparticipatingstatesonaweekly(previouslydaily)basis.Thereportsonthelocallevelwerealsoforwardedtootherinternationalplayerson thegroundaswellas to theembassies representing theparticipatingstates.Inadditiontothedailyreports,theteamsalsoproducedspeedyincidentreports,moreanalyticalspecialreportsandweeklyassessments.

The teams not only finalised their reports at the teamsite, a rented house among the local population, but mostoftenalsouseditforaccommodation.ThisfeaturemeantthatbeinganEUMMmonitordidnotonlyequalhavingadayjobinapost-conflictregion,butbeingattractedtosuchawayoflivingwouldcallforcertainlifevalues.AlthoughcircumstancesduringtheEUMMtimewerenotharsh,theywouldbeunusualanddifferentfromwhatthemonitorwasusedtoinhisorherrespectivehomecountry.

14 Ibid.15 EUMMintroductionCD.

Formostof themission, themonitorswouldhavewornawhiteuniformwithvisibleEUinsignia,withsomeregionalexceptions to this practice. All monitors were unarmedthroughoutthemission.

Although EUMM officially was a civilian mission, it isinteresting to note that mission personnel with a civilianbackground,HeadsofMissionincluded,tendedtodescribethemissionasmostlyamilitaryone,withsomecivilianelements.Missionstaffwithamilitarybackground,however,describedthemissionascivilian,unmilitary,orevenantimilitary.

2.4 The EUMM List of Qualifications

Atthebeginningof themission,allfieldstaffwasrecruitedfromthemilitary.Thecircumstancesatthetimemeantopenwar and the monitored issues were such that a militarybackgroundwasneededatthattime.

However,afteracertainlevelofstabilityhadbeenachieved,thefocusshiftedfrommonitoringactivitiesrelatedtowarfare,tohumanitarianissuesandthoseofhumanrightsaswellasto monitoring the building up of a civil society. During theEUMMtimes,thefocusshiftedonceagaintofittheneedsofthereport reader,meaningthat littleattentionwasgiventomunicipal levelmattersandallthemoretomiddleandhighlevelpolitics.TheEUMMreportsincludedmoreanalysesofthemeaningand significanceof themonitored issues, than theECMMreportseverdid.

EUMMlistedsomebasicqualificationsandrequirements16,whichithasforwardedtotheparticipatingstatesandBrussels,asanaidetohelpidentifysuitablemonitorstobesecondedtothemission.Thisdocumentliststhefollowing:

1.Personalrequirements •citizen of EU member state (after 01 May 2004

onlyexception:Norway) •graduated from university/equivalent (major

in international politics, political history, law,economics etc.) or graduated from militaryacademy (minimum rank of a captain – major/equivalent or higher ranking) – exceptions forsome specified EUMM HQ administrative andtechnical/personnelfunctions

•secondedforaminimumperiodofoneyear •previous working experience for a minimum of

twoyears •proper physical condition (national medical

check) •fluencyinEnglish(writtenandoral) •computerliterate •driverlicense2.Practicalskillsortrainingin: •firstaid •mineawareness •radiovoiceproceduresand •drivingoffourwheeldrivevehicles

16 EUMMSOPAnnex4H/2.


AstheECMMwasrenamedtheEUMM,themostvisiblechangewasthedecreaseinthenumberofpersonnel,droppingfrom239to110inayear’stime.17Despitethisreductionofpersonnel, the job description and the area of coveragebasicallydidnotundergoacorrespondingmodification.Withsuchasignificantreductioninthenumberofpersonnel,thequality of the existing personnel naturally took on a newdegree of importance; as a reflection of this, some of theparticipatingmemberstatesdid,indeed,takeacloserlookattherecruitmentstheymade.

OnecouldquestionifthenumberofpersonnelaftertheCouncil Joint Action of 2000 was sufficient for successfullyimplementing the mandate. However, this article does nottakeastanceonthenumberofmonitors,butratherexaminesthequalityofpersonnel reflected in the jobdescriptionandthecircumstancesinwhichthejobwasbeingdone.

17 ECMM/EUMMPersonnelStrength2006.


3 Therecruitmentofmonitors

Currently nine out of ten mission members in EU civilianoperations are seconded by their national governments.18In the EUMM, all internationals but three19 were seconded.Contrary to the practice of recruiting to the ESDP missions,where the seconding nations nominate candidates to beselected centrally, for the EUMM the seconding states hadthe full right to choose and deploy anyone of their liking.The above-mentioned EUMM List of Qualifications servedasaguideline for recruitment. TheEUMMemphasisedhowtherewasalsobilateraldialoguebetweenthemissionandthesending states, in order topoint out the importanceof thelistedqualificationsbeingmet.

TherecruitingofmonitorstotheECMM/EUMMfellunderdifferent authorities in different participating states, thispartlyreflectingonwhohasbeeneligiblefortheassignment.In many cases the recruiting responsibility underwent somechange,meaningtwoorthreedifferentbodiesmayhavebeeninvolvedovertheyears.

In most of the participating states, the recruiting wastypicallydoneeitherbytheMinistryofDefence,theDefenceForces, or the Ministry for Foreign Affairs or through acombinationofsomeoftheabove.Insomecaseswheretherecruitingfellundersomeotherministryorwasoutsourcedtoanotherbody,arepresentativefromtheMinistryforForeignAffairsmighthave interviewedsomeshort-listedcandidates,been present at the interviews, or at least given their finalblessingonthenomination.ThispracticeservedasameansofensuringthesecondedmonitorswereofthecalibreexpectedbytheMinistryforForeignAffairs.20

Despite the fact that the EUMM List of Qualificationsallowed for very broad recruiting, openly advertising posts

18 TheroleoftheEUinCivilianCrisisManagement2006,5.

19 Head of Mission, Chief of Personnel and Chief ofProcurement.

20 Anoftenstatedopinionamongmonitorsinterviewedforthisarticlewasthatmoreoftenthannot,therecruitingpersonnelhadpoorknowledgeofwhatcircumstancesand what duties the recruited monitors faced in thefield.Anotherperceptionthatwasraisedwasthefailureof the recruiters topay attention to theneedof their“realcustomers”,thoserelyingonthegoodqualityofEUMMreportstofacilitatethemintheirrespectivejobs.

in newspapers or other fora was rare.21 Most participatingstatesrestrictedtheirrecruitmenttoa“pre-selected”groupofpeople.Thus,iftheMinistryofDefenceortheDefenceForceswasrecruiting,thepostswouldtypicallyonlybeavailabletomilitary personnel. Even in the case of seconding civilians,most countries restricted their secondments to a group ofindividualssomehowknowntotherecruiters22,orinthelastyearsthecandidateswouldbesoughtfromarosterofexperts.SuchrostershavebeensetupinmanyEUcountries,tocatertotheever-growingneedofsendingcrisismanagementexpertsonmissionsabroad.23

Therosterscameinhandy,astheturnoverofrecruiterswasquitehighinmanycases,andontheotherhandtherecruitmentprocessoftenhadtobefinalisedinamatterofdaystofilla

21 Only in the case of one nation was there an annuallyrepeated announcement of vacancies in the dailynewspapers and on the internet, meaning that therecruiting personnel annually went through some 200applications to fill six EUMM posts. Some states paidspecialattentiontotherecruitmentatthetimeoftheirrespective EU presidency, but lessened their efforts atothertimes.

22 Withparticipatingstatesnominatingtheirownmonitors,a fairly frequently stated criticism was that it allowedthoseinchargeofappointingtherecruitstofavourtheirownpreferredcandidates.Assomeinformantsbroughtup,this“buddy-buddysystem”wasalsofeltwithinthemission, where senior management staff was able tofavour theirownnationalcolleagues in turn,and littleornoattentionwaspaidtothemotivationandskillsoftheappointedperson,meetingtheneedsforaparticularfunction.AtthetimebeforetheJointAction,thissystemwastheprevailingone,wherethestateholdingtheEUpresidency,hadtheoverallresponsibilityforthemission,andwaseagertopromoteitsownnationalstoasmanykeypostsaspossible.SometimeaftertheCouncilJointAction,thispracticepracticallyceasedtoexistwithinthemission.

23 Forthoroughcoverageofrosters,seeGourlay2006.Alsoworthnoting ishowGlazebrook (2006,56–58)pointsouthowexpertdatabaseshavebeenviewednegatively.Firstly, without constant management, they are notfunctional,secondlywiththelikelihoodofgettingajobthrougharosterbeingperceivedassmall,applicantslackconfidence in these, which could reflect the fact thatoften thesedatabases lack valuable informationaboutthequalitiesofcandidates.


postthatunexpectedlybecamevacant,notleavingtoomuchtimeforacomparisonofcandidates.Althoughtherewasnoparticularhurry, itseemsthatnottoomuchtime,moneyoreffort,wastogointotherecruitmentprocess.24

Thenumberofpeopleontherosterandtheinclusioncriteriavarieshighlybetween rosters, fromhaving toattendspecialtrainingbeforebeingadmittedtotheroster,tosimplyfillinginanelectronicformwithpersonaldataandemploymenthistoryandtherebybeing included.Despite theexistenceof rosterswithpre-trainedcandidates,therehasbeenanexperienceofrostersbeingtoolimitedandbeingunabletopresentanysuchcandidatesthatwouldbeconsideredsuitablefortheEUMMaccordingtothestandardssetnationally.Insuchacasebettercandidates were actively sought, found outside the registerandconsequentlynominatedasEUMMmonitors.

Mostoftheinterviewedmonitorshadbeenselected1–2monthsbeforedeployment,aperiodoftimeperceivedbythemonitors as short, not allowing for other preparation thantaking care of practical issues. Only one seconding nationcompletedtheirselectionprocessuptoorevenexceedingoneyearbeforedeployment.Atbestthismeantthatamotivatedmonitorhadcoveredagivenlistofreadingmaterialandwasthuswellprepared.Atworstthemotivationofthesecondeehadgonethroughasignificantchange in that time, leavingsome intended monitors withdrawing their commitment onshortnoticeandothersperformingpoorlyinthefield.

Although elaborated recruitment strategies were notdisplayed, different participating states demonstrated quitea varied attitude towards their recruitment. This resulted insecondments varying from sending more senior and wellexperienced staff to sending very young people on theirfirst-everassignmentabroadtogainexperienceandtogrowprofessionally. One approach was to send people capableenoughtogetseniorpositions.Somestatedhistoricallyandgeographically close relations to the Balkans, others thepromotion of the national image as a reason to send thebestpossiblecandidatestothemission.Onevoiceraisedthemoralisticissueoftheamountofmoneybeingspentonthemission being a reason not to fall back on lethargy, but topaycloseattentionthattherightpeoplearesenttotherightmissioninordertodoatopqualityjob.Ontheotherhand,one stated reason for disinterest in the recruitments to theEUMMwasthefactthatfortheseveralyearsthemissionhadbeenexpectednottogetfurtherextension,andthusdirectingresourcestherewasnotseenasworthwhile.

When asked to identify what factors had led to beingrecruited to serve in the EUMM, the lion’s share of thoseinterviewedwithamilitarybackgroundstatedonlytwothings:havingthenecessaryminimumrankandhavingthenecessaryknowledgeofEnglish–asidentifiedbytherecruitingbody.25

24 Glazebrook(2006,54)pointsouttwooccasionswherecrisismanagementpersonnelwassought,andhowsomeapplicationswasseenasa“flood”,soopenadvertisingwasseenasbeingmoreworkthanitwasworth.

25 Theperceptionofthenecessary levelofEnglishforanEUMM monitor varied greatly, with some secondingstatesrequiringonlyabasiclevel.Differenceswerealsoapparentintheratingoftheknowledge,attimesgiving

When asking monitors from civilian walks of life, amongthemostcommonlycited factorswerecommunication skillsand previous international experience, quite often from theBalkans,andtheabilitytowriteareport.

The decision to extend the contract of monitors was asolelynationalissue,andmostofthetimeswasdonewithoutconsultingthemission.

Itisworthnotingthatatnopointwasthereanymechanismfor quality control of the seconded monitors at the end ofthe ECMM or EUMM.26 The mission did not want to beselectivewhenthesecondingstateswerepayingthesalariesofthemonitors,whichledtothefactthatanysecondeewaswelcomed,eventhoughhe/shedidnotfulfiltherequirementslistedbyEUMM27.

Althoughthereweredifferingopinions,generallyspeaking,theheterogeneityofthestaffwasseenasanassetmakingthemissionstronger28.Thepracticeofmixingmilitaryandcivilianmonitorshasthus,accordingtooneinterviewee,beengivenasarecommendationfortheAcehMonitorMission.

quiteamisleadingpictureof theability touseEnglishprofessionally.

26 Withouta system forquality controlof thepersonnel,attheveryworst,themissiononoccasionsfounditselfreceiving a monitor who had in fact admittedly beensentawaytosortouthisorherfamily-ordrug-abuse-relatedproblems.

27 Although participating states did agree to the criterialisted in chapter two, in reality they often failed todeliver.Therequirementtobesecondedforaminimumofoneyearwasnotmetbyanumberofparticipatingstatesthatsecondmilitarypersonnelonly.Intheclosingyear,approximately30%ofthemonitorsservedonlyforaperiodofsixmonths.

28 In the final years of operation, the balance betweenmilitary and civilianpersonnelhad comeclose tohalf-and-half,withsomeemphasisalwaysremainingonthemilitaryside.


4 Thetrainingofmonitors

Thischapterdemonstrateshowmostofthetrainingprovidedwas limited to general crisis environment, leaving out bothmission-specificandfunction-specifictrainings.

4.1 Pre-mission training

Generallyspeaking,thepracticeofnationallyprovidedtrainingformonitorstothemissionwasinadequate,andinthecaseofquiteanumberofinterviewedmonitors,theyhadhadnotrainingwhatsoeverprior todeployment.Mostof the timesthe lack of training would be due to the shortage of timebetweenrecruitinganddeploymentand/orthefactthateveniftherewasmoretime,notrainingsessionswouldbesetupforpossiblyjustonesecondeeatatime.

In the cases in which training was provided prior todeployment, it was ordinarily 1–2 weeks in length. Thetraining for the ECMM/EUMM was in most cases identicalorverysimilartothatofUNmilitaryobservers.Muchofthetrainingfocuswasgiventomanaginginthepotentiallyhostileordangerousenvironmentandcircumstancesinwhichthejobisdone, thus focusingon issues related topersonal securityand safety, theuseof hand radios, driving four-wheel drivevehicles,andfirstaid.ThesefourissuesarewhattheEUMM,in fact, expected monitors to have already been trained in,accordingtotheStandardOperatingProcedures.

In very few cases, the training included mission-specificknowledge, typically restricted to a brief overview of theBalkans. Function-specific trainingwasevenmore rare, thusthe following issueswerehardlyevercovered: topical issuestobemonitored in lightofthecurrentstateoftheBalkans,theinterrelationshipbetweendifferentissues,howtoaddressparliamentarians,interviewingtechniques,whatsortofdatatocollect,howtoanalysethedatainawiderformerYugoslaviancontext, identifying trends and being able to give an earlywarningofsomeundesireddevelopments,andsummarisingthemostimportantissuesinareportwritteningoodEnglish.Hardly any emphasis was put on the larger EU context inwhichthemissionoperated,orontheimpactsorresultsthemonitoringwasanticipatedtohave.

AlthoughbasiccoursesinciviliancrisismanagementwereorganisedduringthelastyearsoftheEUMMinanumberof

trainingcentres,29onlyonemonitorhadlearnedaboutsuchacourseintimetoattendpriortodeployment.

One informant said how the official training stood for30%ofhis training,whereas the self-initiatedmeetingofacoupleofpreviousmonitorsrepresentedtheremaining70%ofusefulinformation.

TheEUMMproducedaTrainingCDwhichwasenvisagedto be handed over to future monitors prior to their arrivalto the mission. The training CD included some PowerPointpresentationswithmonitoringandreport-writingguidelines,some textsaboutBalkanhistoryanda listof recommendedreading.30 Only in the most exceptional cases was this CDhandedovertothemonitorbeforehis/herarrival.Instead,themonitorsreceiveditintheirinductiontraining.

4.2 The EUMM induction training

When a new monitor arrived at the headquarters of themission in Sarajevo, he or she underwent EUMM inductiontrainingbeforegoingtohisorherfinaldestination.Althoughit was known that not all monitors were trained nationally,the induction training of one or at most two days was notenvisagedtobetrainingperse,butasthebrevity indicates,ratheratooltorefreshknowledgeandskillsthatthemonitorhadpreviouslybeentrainedin.

The monitors interviewed for this article rated theusefulness of the induction training from very poor togood.Not surprisingly,monitorswith amilitary backgroundappreciateddifferentpartsofthetrainingthanthosewithacivilianbackground.However,asaresultoflistingthetrainingissues that were perceived as the most useful, the trainingcurriculumwasactuallyrebuiltalmostinitsentirety.Togiveanexample,forsomeitwasmostusefultolearnoftheEUMMorganisation,forothers itwastolearnhowtoputonsnowchains,whilequiteafewconsideredtheroleplay“Attending

29 TheEuropeanCommissionlaunchedaprojectonTrainingforCivilianAspectsofCrisisManagement,withtheaimofcreatingnationalpoolsofpre-trainedexperts.Oneofthe training programmes developed is a concept corecoursecoveringamultitudeofissuesrelevantforeveryfieldworker.Seemoreonwww.eutraininggroup.net

30 EUMMIntroductionCD.


ameeting”mostuseful.Thelast-mentionedtopicdividedtheopinionsgreatly,assomeoftheinterviewedmonitorsfounditridiculousandevenmisleadingtouseaset-upofnegotiatingtoexchangeprisonersofwar,sayingitgaveanarchaicpictureofwhatthemonitorsdoandthereforewascompletelyunhelpful.ManyamonitorfeltthatmeetingthepeoplefromtheAnalysisSectionandhearingaboutone’sownareaofresponsibilitywasthemostusefulpartoftheinductiontraining.Forsome,thisexchangeofinformationwas,however,amatterofminutes.

Although the EUMM relied heavily on people learningon the job, and no one was expected to be completelyoperationalregardlessofhowmuchtraininghe/shehadhadbeforedeployment, itbecameevident thatmoreandbettertrainingwasneeded inorder toachieveahigherdegreeofunderstandingofone’stasksandspecificfeaturesoftheareaof responsibility, aswell as in order formonitors to achieveahigher levelofconfidence.Somemonitors suggested thateventhesameamountof informationshouldbespreadoutoverthreedays,asdigestingthelotfeltlikeatasktoodifficulttodoinjusttwodays.

4.3 Learning on the job

Oncethemonitorhadreachedhisorhergeographicalareaofresponsibility,he/shewasbeinthehandsoftheteamleader,whowasexpectedtoguidethenewcomerandhavehim/herfollowtheworkforsometime,before“imitating”it.TheEUMMreliedheavilyonallitsmonitorstoundergoasimilar“learningonthejob”processandtobefittotakeuponthemselvestheroleofthenewteamleaderafewmonthsafterarrival.Aslongastheteamproduceditsdailyreports,therewashardlyanymicromanagementoftheteamsfromtheRegionalorMissionOfficeorthemissionheadquarters.Despiteanimprovementinthefinalyears,thelacksupportinstructionsandfeedbackfrom the senior levels in the organisation was still a majordisappointingfactorformostinterviewedmonitors.

When asked when the monitors felt comfortable aboutunderstanding their task and fulfilling it in accordance withexpectations,theanswerwouldwithoutexceptionsreflectthelengthofthemonitor’sexpectedtourofduty.Thus,monitorswho served the EUMM for a total of six months, wouldordinarily state that they were fully operational after twomonths.Monitorsservingfortwoyearsormorewould,ontheotherhand,considertheentirefirstyearaperiodoflearning,stating how the importance of understanding nuances onlycomeswithtimeandexperience,andstatedthedisbeliefthatanyone could really grasp the whole picture in a matter ofweeksorevenmonths.

4.4 remedial training

TheRegionalandMissionOffices(RO)oftheEUMMarrangedmonthlymeetingsofallteamswithintheirareaofresponsibility,inordertoprovideremedialtraining.Theinterviewedmonitorsdidnot,however,onasingleoccasionraisethisasasupportingmeanstoimproveone’sperformance.Infact,somesuggestedthereshouldbesomefurthertrainingalongtheway,butthe

samepersonsdidnotconnectoridentifytheROmeetingsasbeingsuch,orasmeetingtheneedshe/shehadinmind.

Monitors willing to make the most significant possiblecontribution to the mission were keen on getting furthertrainingaboutthedesiredcontentsofreportingratherthantheformatofit.Afewthematictrainingneedsthathadnotbeencoveredorcoveredinsufficientlyweretrainingininterviewingtechniques,traininginthespecificstagesoftheprocessfromthecollectionofdatatothesendingofthereportstoBrusselsandthecapitals,includinghowthereportsweremodifiedinheadquarters,andgenerallarge-scaleBalkandevelopments.Itwassuggestedthatamongthemissionmembersthereoughttobecompetenceenoughtotraininmostofthesubjects.


5 Identifyinggapsweakeningthefieldperformance

This chapter analyses the major gaps identified by eitherfield monitors working on the grass roots level, analysts inheadquarters, Heads of Mission or representatives of therecipientofthereports.Anumberofintervieweeswereoftheopinion that educational background and previous workingexperiencewereofnorealsignificance.Ifamonitorwasonlyflexibleenough,knewEnglishandhadtherightsocialskills,heorshewouldswiftlylearnallothernecessaryskills,anddoa good enough job. Report readers, however, desired morespecificqualities,resultinginalistwhichincidentallyexhibitsgreatresemblancetothosequalitiesidentifiedintheConceptforEUMonitoringmissionsofMay2003.31

5.1 knowledge of English

The one shortcoming almost unanimously identified by allthoseinterviewedwasinsufficientknowledgeofEnglish.Theunderstanding of how advanced knowledge was requiredfor the mission varied between the seconding nations. ApoorcommandofEnglishaffectedthemissionnegatively inmany ways. Firstly, when conducting meetings about issuesthatwerenotparticularlyfamiliartothenewmonitor,therewas great risk for misunderstanding the message the localinterlocutorswantedtoconvey,orthemainpointsbeinglost.Second,withoutthenecessaryfluencyinEnglish,thereportsforwardedupthechainwereofsuchpoorliteralquality,thatanunintendedlargeamountofresourceshadtobedirectedintopolishingthelanguage.Withdifficultiesinunderstandingthecontentsofameetingandinsummarisingthemostessentialissuesinareadablereport,themonitorwithoutprofessionalfluency in English failed to fulfil his/her two central duties.Third,withonemonitornotpullinghis/herweight,itresultedin

31 The Concept for EU Monitoring missions lists thefollowing qualities (notably similar to the list ofEUMM identified shortcomings): familiarity with thecountry/region of operation; interpersonal/negotiating/diplomaticskills; skills in themission language,aswellas,wherepossible,inlocallanguage;reportwritingskillsand,appropriatepoliticalanalyticalskills;formonitoringmissions with thematic or sector focus, staff shouldpossessthenecessaryspecialistskillsorexperience,e.g.onrefugeeissues,humanrights,inmilitaryaffairs,civil-militaryrelationsetc.

his/herpeershavingtocarryanunfairlyheavyworkload.Timeandtimeagainthisledtofrustrationanddissatisfactionwithintheteam,affectingboththeteamspiritandthequalityoftheworknegatively.Monitorslackingthenecessarylanguageskillswerenotabletorealisetheirfullpotentialregardlessofhowskilledtheywereinallotheraspects.Itisdifficulttoimaginethatamonitorinsuchapositionwouldfindhis/herpositionrewarding and feel professional contentment in serving themission.

5.2 Interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity

In addition to professional competence, paying attentionto personality was seen as equally important for successfulrecruiting.32Theimportanceofthisisdemonstratedbythefactthatthesecond-moststatedshortcomingamongtheservingmonitors,mentionedinalmosteveryinterview,includedpoorinterpersonalskillsanda lackofculturalsensitivity.MostEUcountrieswererepresentedamongtheEUMMmonitors,witha big variation in age, working experience and professionalbackground.AmongthesecondedmonitorswerepeoplewithvastinternationalexperienceandpeopletowhomservingtheEUMMequaledbeingabroadfortheveryfirsttime.Allthesedifferences in life experience were evident also in differentpreferencesabouthowtogoaboutdoing the job.Withoutsolidinterpersonalskills,teamssufferedfromaninflammatoryatmosphere, which in turn affected the quality of and themotivationforthework.Withouttheskillstogetalongwithpeersrepresentingdifferentvaluesthanoneself,onoccasionthemissionhadtoshiftmonitorsbetweenteams.Intheworstcases, skilledmonitors left themissionearlier thanoriginally

intended.Interpersonalskillsandculturalsensitivitywereessentialnot

onlywithintheteam,butalsowhenaddressingrepresentativesofthelocalpopulation.Asuccessfulteammanagedtobuildconfidence between the team and the local interlocutors,making the informants feel confident to share relevantinformationwiththem.Inthebestcasescenario,themeetingwould look like an informal or semi-formal and pleasant

32 Markkanen1999,17.


dialoguebetweenequals,notlikeaninterrogation,evenifthemonitorwastheoneposingquestionsandnotgivinganswersorsharingviewsofhis/herownoroftheEU.Monitorswholackedtheskillstoaddressthelocalsfromallwalksoflifewithduerespectandunderstandingforthereigningcircumstances,and monitors who treated their informants like instrumentsor objects rather than subjects, ended up causing irritationandprovedlesssuccessful incollectingrelevant information.MonitorswithoutthenecessaryculturalsensitivityalsocausedembarrassmentamongtheirpeersastheywereseentoconveyapoorimageoftheEU.

Among the national recruiters, none but one identifiedinterviewingskillsassomethingmandatoryforthesecondedmonitortohave,despitethefactthatitwastheoneprincipalthing the monitor was doing during his/her assignment.Successful interviewing is a skill that does not necessarilydevelop automatically just by conducting a number ofinterviews. Successful interviewing includes: keeping calmeven when meeting interlocutors that one has nothing incommon with; understanding the fact that even catchingsomeone telling blatant lies about one thing, does notnecessarilymeanthathe/sheisuntruthfulwhentalkingaboutanother topic; and paying attention to and being able tointerpretnon-verbalcommunication.AnEUMMmonitorwaslikelytomeetalotofpeopleinfunctionsthathe/shewouldordinarilynothaveanycontactwithinhis/herhomecountry.Adaptingone’stonetosuiteachaddressed interlocutorwasparamountforthesuccessfulimplementationofthemandate.Developed interpersonal skills and cultural sensitivity wereneeded when EUMM monitors met with interlocutors thatother internationalactorson thefieldhaddeclaredpersona non grataanddecidednottohaveanydialoguewith.

5.3 Political acumen

AstheprincipaltaskofECMM/EUMMmonitorsshiftedfrommonitoring the political discourse at the municipal level, tothatofmiddleorstatelevel,itmeantthatallthemorepoliticalacumenwasneededtofulfilthetask.Withthemajorityoftherecruitedmonitorsstillbeingmilitaryofficersandnottrainedforthetasktheywereemployedfor,acommon–althoughnotunanimous–viewwasthatthemissionfounditselfstrugglingtomaintainqualityofthereporting.

Some countries reacted by bringing in academics withtheoretical knowledge of state-building or internationalpolitics. Having an academic education in political sciencebecametheprerequisitetobesecondedbysomeparticipatingstates,whereasothersusedacademicsfromabroaderrangeoffields.

Inordertoavoidmisunderstanding,itisimportanttonotethattheEUMMreportingwasnotofatheoreticalbutratherofapracticalcharacter,i.e.theEUMMdeliveredassessmentswhich could be translated into enhancing the EU’s politicaldecision-making.Nevertheless,thenecessarylevelofpoliticalacumen within the mission staff was still mentioned as asignificantshortcoming.

Itwas alsonoted that very fewof themonitors had anunderstandingoftheEU’sforeignpolicyandstrategy,orwereabletoidentifythelinkbetweentheEUMMandtheEUHighRepresentative for theCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy,ortheCommission.HavingatleastabasicunderstandingofthelargerpoliticalframeworkinwhichtheEUMMoperatedisbelievedtoaffectthereportingpositively,makingiteasierforthemonitortodistinguishwhichofallthecollectedinformationwasworthwhiletoforwardupthechainandrelevanttothefinalrecipientsofthereports.

5.4 knowledge and understanding of the Balkans

Due to the complexity of the Balkans, no single trainingwith one or more modules reserved for Balkan history and/orBalkanpoliticshasbeenable toachieveanythinggreaterthangivingapoliteintroductiontotheregion.Thehistorical,politicalandculturalcomplexityoftheBalkanshasalsomeantthatrelyingon“learningon-the-job”wouldnotautomaticallylead tomonitors being able tounderstandhowevents anddevelopments in theirgivenareaof responsibility interlinkedorrelatedtoagreaterpicture.Simplygettingapictureofwhatpolitical parties are central in a given area,who thepeoplebehind these parties are, and what their discourse is withotherlocalparties,wouldtakesometimetounderstand,letalonehowthepoliticsofthelocallevelarelinkedwiththatofthestatelevel.

The lackofunderstandingofthetargetareaamongthemonitors resulted in the Analysis Section being left with agreaterburdenthannecessary.ParticularlythefinalrecipientsoftheEUMMreportsidentifiedtheneedtorecruitmonitorswithproperunderstandingofthetargetareaasparamount,inorder toachieveanendproduct thatwasof valueasanadditional tool in the policy formulation among all otheravailablesources.

Althoughinfrequent,oneviewthatwaspresentedwasthatpreviousknowledgeoftheBalkansmaycompromisemonitors’neutrality.Curiously enough,only academicknowledgewaspresented as a significant risk to compromised neutrality,whereaspreviousworkingexperienceintheBalkanswasonlyseenasanasset.

5.5 Analytical skills

TheEUMMwasenvisagedtoprovidebackgroundinformationandanalysisaboutdevelopment intheBalkans.Theanalysiswasideallytobeginintheteams,withadditionalvaluegiventoitinheadquarters.However,teamreportsweremostoftenseenasaword-for-word repetitionofwhat the interviewedinterlocutor had said, lacking comments or an analysisthat would put the statements in a context and give themsignificance.MonitorswhoprovedtobemostsuccessfulwereoftentransferredtotheAnalysisSectionintheheadquarters,given that their time or service was long enough. As theanalysis fromtheteamswerefromnon-existenttoscarce, itwastheanalysissectionwhichwasthenfacedwithfulfilling


the task, something which was said to be possible only asreportingtoBrusselschangedfromdailytoweekly(in2003),freeingthenecessaryresourcesforanalysing.

Final recipients who have read the ECMM and EUMMreportsforanumberofyearshavestatedthatonlysometimeafter the first Council Joint Action, did the EUMM reportsbecomeanalytical.Yetmostreportreadersstilldescribedthereportsasmostlydescriptive,rarelyorhardlyincludinganalysis.Whereassomeinformantsvaluedthereportsespeciallywhenthey were perceived as being analytical, others felt quitesatisfiedwiththereportsastheywere,someevenstatingthatthe final analysis and significance ought to be left to eachindividualreader.

The report readers recognised that the higher up thechainthereportscamefrom,themoreanalysistheyincluded.Nevertheless, the most useful reports were often said tocome from the local levels, when interviewing less knowninterlocutors, noting that the information in the reports ofhigher levels would typically be available from a number ofothersourcesaswell.

Whenemphasis isputonproducinganalyticalreports, itwouldrequirerecruitingmonitorswhocouldstayinamissionlonger,evenuptothreeyears.

5.6 Age limit

Thejuniorityofmonitorswasmentionedanumberoftimesasafactorthreateningthecredibilityofthemissionorweakeningitsperformance.Manymonitorswouldputaminimumagelimitofapproximatelythirtyyearsformonitors,amongthemmonitors who themselves felt their youth and inexperiencemayhavehinderedthemfrommakingaparticularlyvaluablecontribution.

5.7 Stress management

Being away from home without one’s customary social life,working in a foreign language and being in a potentiallydangerousareaareoftenstatedasfactors thatmightcausestresswhenbeingonamission.Inthatcontextitisworthwhileto note that the monitors expressing the most stress werethosealsoexpressingthestrongestkeennesstoexcelintheirjobandtoseekwaystoconstantlyimprovetheirperformance.Forthemthelackofinstructionsandguidancecombinedwithworkingwithpoorlyqualifiedormediocrecolleaguesprovedtobethemoststressfulfactorsintheirmonitoringfunctions.


6 Recommendations

Itneedstobeemphasisedthatnotwomissionsarealike,andatailor-madeapproachtobothrecruitmentandtrainingshouldbe adopted for each separate mission, be it a monitoringmissionoranyother typeofmission.The recommendationsbelow derive from the analysis undertaken above, meaningthey are based on the ECMM/EUMM experience. However,most recommendations given here are of a fairly generalcharacter and would be applicable even for missions thatdiffer from the EUMM, possibly with slight mission-specificmodifications.

6.1 recruiting recommendations

6.1.1 Detailed qualification criteria and job description

Contrary to the OSCE, the EU lacks detailed standards thattheEUciviliancrisismanagementexpertsinthevariousfieldsofexpertiseshouldmeet;inotherwords,whatsortofprofiletheyshouldhave.33 Intheabsenceofsuch, it isessentialforeachmissiontobeabletoprovidethesecondingstateswithalistofqualificationsthatisfarmoredetailedthanthatusedbytheEUMM.

Itisimportanttoexplicitlystatebothcorporatecompetenciesandpersonalcharacteristics thathavebeen identified in themission as mandatory for the successful implementation ofduties.AccordingtotheMonitorEfficiencyFormintheEUMMStandard Operating Procedures, the monitors are rated intermsof tenqualities: integrity, interpersonal skills,personalbehaviour, physical fitness, sense of duty and discipline,initiative, planning and organisation skills, judgement skills,decisiveness/self-confidence and finally communication/

33 OSCE has a 12-point description of the profile for amissionmemberworking in thefieldofGeneral staff/monitoring functions. TheEUMM list of qualifications,in fact, resembles the general minimum requirementsexpectedofanyOSCEcandidateforanyfieldoperation,rather than qualities identified for a particular knownfunction in a given mission; see www.osce.org/employment for a comparison with the EU-identifiedqualitiesmentionedonpage14.

reportingskills.Onlyoneof the listedqualitiesconcurswiththelistofbasicrequirements,andthatisphysicalfitness.

Taking into consideration the frequently changingrecruitment personnel in charge of selecting nationalcandidates,nothingshouldbeleftimplicit.Itishighlyunlikelythatanyrecruitingofficernotexceptionallyfamiliarwiththespecial featuresofamissionwillbeabletounderstandthat“properphysicalcondition”translatesintointerpersonalskills,cultural sensitivity and ability to work in a team and othersocialskills,ashasbeensuggestedtobeincludedin“properphysicalcondition”intheEUMMListofqualifications.

In order for no future mission members to be taken bysurprisewhenrealisingtowhatsortofmissionhe/shehasbeenseconded, it is essential to articulate both the environmentandthecontextinwhichthemissionoperates,theactualjobdescriptionandadetailedlistofqualitiesneededtofulfilone’sduties.Thelistofqualitiesshouldbeextendedtoincludeallsuchareasofexpertise,skillsandpersonalcharacteristicsthathavebeenidentifiedasbeneficialinamonitor(knowingthatnochosenmonitorwouldnecessarilyfittheentiredescription),ratherthantheabsoluteminimumrequirements.

6.1.2 Encouraging self-evaluation

Identifying qualifications including not only educationalbackgroundandyearsofworkingexperience,butalsodesiredattitudesandmotivation,shouldbefollowedbydetailingtheactual jobdescriptionandarticulatingallofthis inawrittendocument. This document should be made available for allcandidates seeking secondment to support self-selection. Inotherwords,itisnotenoughforrecruiterstobeawareofthesequalities.Self-evaluationshouldbeanautomaticstepofeachrecruitingprocess,regardlessofwhethercandidatesarefoundona rosterorbyothermeans. If apotential candidate failstoseehim-/herselffulfillingaparticularjobasitisdescribed,anddecidesnottocompeteforthepost,thefirststepofself-regulatedquality controlhasbeenachieved.Whereas rosterinclusion is passive, active application is not effortless. Thusanynumberofapplicationsshouldbeseenasmorevaluablethanscreeningthesamenumberofrosterentries,forwhom


motivation,timing,familysituationandotherrapidlychangingfactorsareunlikelytoshowintheroster.

Following self-selection, mission- or function-specificchallenges need to be dealt with again when interviewingcandidates and thirdly in training, all in order to reinforcetheimageofpossiblechallengesawaitingthefuturemissionmember,andminimisesurprises.

6.1.3 Adjusting profile to changed circumstances

Many participating states have clung to the idea of “one-size-fits-all” and consequently not modified the profile ofthe seconded monitors from the beginning of the ECMMtotheendoftheEUMM,despitethecircumstancesandthemonitoredissueshavingundergonequiteasignificantchangeduringthe16.5yearsofoperation.34Inordertoensuregettingtherightkindofpeoplefortherightmission,itisofutmostimportancetoupdatethelistofcriteriaandthejobdescriptionon a regular basis to fit the current needs and the currentvacancies.

It shouldbe recognised that recruiting systemsdesignedtocaterforavarietyofcircumstancesareunlikelytobethebestchoiceforanyparticularmission,butinorderformissionstobeeffectiveandefficient,secondingstatesoughttoadoptamoretailor-madeapproachintheirrecruitments.This istobeemphasisedinareaswithalong-lastingmissionpresence,whichisthecaseintheBalkans.AsaconsequenceofthefallofYugoslavia,memberstates,particularlytheiruniversities,cameto produce numerous new experts, for whom secondmenthasnotbeenpossibleduetothememberstates’stickingtoaonceadoptedsystemofrecruitment.Thesmallerthemission,themorecrucialitisthateachsecondee’scontributioncanbecountedon,asthereis littletonoroomtohidemisfits. It isessentialtorecognisethattherearetasksforwhichavaluablecontribution requires secondments exceeding six months oreven a year, a limitation which is frequent among military

recruitments.

6.1.4 Dialogue and measures

Incasethesecondingbodyitselfisunlikelytoinitiatethenecessarychangeintheirmethodofrecruiting,itisrecommendedthattherespectiveforeignministryinconjunctionwiththemissionandapossiblenationalcontingentwithinthemissiontakeajointpositionandmakeastrongrecommendationtoallowformission-specificexceptions.

For diplomatic reasons, the national contingents andseconding statesought tobe thedriving forcebehind suchchange. Nevertheless, when seconding states clearly fail todeliverinaccordancewithagreementsandexpectations,themission must have a mechanism for quality control, whichallows it to refuse or send back staff who clearly lack thenecessarycompetence,andtodosowithouthavingto fear

34 SeecomparisonswiththeOSCEbyGourlay(2006,22)andEUPMasdescribedintheInternationalCrisisGroupreport:Bosnia’sStalledPoliceReform(2005,13)andinFutureofESDP:LessonsfromBosnia(2006,1).

thatnewandbettercandidateswillnotbeputforward.ThepassingofanEnglishtestviatelephonepriortodeploymentshouldbeaneasymatterifthereisnotamassiverecruitmenttaking place at one time. No mission members ought tobe seconded without any sort of competition, testing andcomparison of candidates. If a certain number of seats arereservedforaparticularnationality,itshouldbeadvisedthataminimumoftwoorthreecandidatesperseatbepresentedtotheHeadofMissiontochoosefrom.Allcandidatesmustnaturallymeetatleasttheminimumrequirementsforsuchapracticetohavemeaning.

6.1.5 Adding transparency and visibility

Theuseofrostershascreatedanimageofsecrecyratherthantransparencyintherecruitingprocess.Somechosencandidateshavestatedhowaluckypersonalcontacttotherightpersonat the right time has been the reason for secondment. Asthis may favour returning mission members, it may reflectpositively on the quality of secondments. Nevertheless, asrostersneedtobemanagedinordertobefunctional,italsocallsforsomeactivestrategytoensuretherighttargetgroupsenrol in the rosters. One particular country’s monitors gotmuchpraiseforbeingthemostqualifiedones.Thishappenedafterintroducingthepracticeofgoingtheextramiletolookfor expertson the targetareaoutside theexisting roster. InlightofthefactthattherehasrepeatedlybeenBalkanexpertswhohavenot registered themselvesonto rostersas seekingcrisismanagementpositions,butbysomeactoffateheardofandendedupintheEUMM,havingblindfaithintheroster’somnipotence may mean that the greatest experts foundnationallynevergetseconded.Activelyattractingnewtargetgroupsinordertobroadenthepooloftalentshouldbepartofthestrategytomanagerosters.

Equallyessentialistorecognisethatwithrostersgrowing,it becomes more likely that recruiters stop searching forcandidateswhentheyfindsomeone“goodenough”,ratherthan screening all potential candidates in order to ensurefinding the most qualified one. One means to addressthis is to develop the rosters into an interactive channel ofinformation.Makingallpostspublictothoseregisteredwouldallowforcandidatestodoself-evaluationasthefirststepintherecruitingprocess.Interactiverosterswouldfurtherworkasameanstoinformaboutrelatedtrainingevents,seminarsorpublicationswhichcouldbeofinteresttothoseregisteredandaddtotheircompetence.

6.1.6 The timing of recruiting

If the time between recruitment and deployment is to beseenasanopportunitytobecomefamiliarisedwiththearea,the taskand thebackground, then the recruitingmust takeplace more than 1-2 months ahead of deployment. As arecommendation,itwouldbeusefultoaimfortheselectiontobemade3-4months aheadof time,whichwould allowtheselectedpersonstofamiliarisethemselvessomewhatwith


whatliesahead,somethingmanyinterviewedmonitorsstatedtheyhavehadtheinterestindoing,butlackedthetime.

6.1.7 Testing qualities

Qualitiesandskillswhichcannotbetrainedinamatterofoneortwoweeks,andwhichshouldbeuptoacertainstandardwhenenteringamission,ratherthantobedevelopedorimprovedduring it, should be tested nationally. The command of themissionlanguageissomethingwhichshouldunquestionablycorrespond to the identified level of Englishneeded for themission or the task. However, one must recognise that testresults that are years old tend to give a more flatteringpicturethanwhatthecurrentcommandofEnglish inrealityis. Therefore, language testing should be made part of theselectionprocess.

Thegeneralfluency in Englishought tobe testedwheninterviewing short-listed candidates. In order to get the fullpicture, it is highly recommended to also include a task inwritingEnglish,inwhichthecandidatewouldbefacedwithamission-typicaltextandwouldneedtoproduceasummaryorresponseto it,asappropriate. It isessentialthatthe levelof English isup toaprofessional level, including specialised

vocabulary.In case the recruiters are not equipped to assess the

sufficiencyofknowledgeinthewrittenEnglishtest,itwouldbeadvisorytodevelopasystemwherethereceivingmissionhasstafftoevaluatetheperformanceassufficientorinsufficient.Insuchacase,itwouldbeworthwhiletoinclude,forexample,thetestingofanalyticalskillsoroftheknowledgeofthetargetarea if applicable, in the same task aswhen testingEnglishskills.Asanalternative,competentreturningmissionmemberscouldbetrainedtobeusedasjudgesofsuchskills.

Standardised language testing on the candidates’ owninitiativecouldbeusedasanalternative,but isnot seenasthe best solution, as test results do not age well, and thuscandidatesmaynoteventhemselvesbeawareofapossibledeteriorationof their language skills over the years. It is, ofcourse, natural that the knowledge of English will improveaccordingtomissionspecificsduringthetimeofservice.Thenecessary language knowledge should, however, be gainedonrefreshedbeforedeploymenttoavoidlosingvaluabletimeinthemission.

6.2 Training recommendations

6.2.1 Sharing responsibility for training

Whenfacedwiththe lackofguidance,especially rightafterdeployment, interviewed monitors tended to blame themissionforpoortraining.Fewinformantsrecognisedthatthesending nations could or should have had a greater role inprovidingorextendingthepre-missiontraining.

Wheneveramissionlastsforseveralyearsandtherotationofstaffcanbecharacterisedashigh,agoodpracticewouldbeforthemissionandthesecondingstatestoagreeonthe

sharingoftrainingresponsibility.Asmanyinterviewedmonitorssaidtheamountofinformationgiveninashortperiodoftimeistoooverwhelmingtoabsorb,duplicationoftrainingshouldnot necessarily be seen as a problem in any other respectthanthatitusesresources.Ifthemissionisstretchedandonlyallowsverylittletimefortraining,itbecomesessentialtofocuson mission-specific and function-specific issues, and entrustmember states to cover other basic and generic trainingneedsliketheunchangingorslowlychangingissues,suchastheuseof radios, how toworkwith interpreters and stress

management.Givingthesecondingnationstheresponsibilitytoprovide

minimumtrainingequallingthetimeofthemissiontraining,would be a good rule of thumb to use, at the same timerecognisingthattwodaysofin-missiontrainingisnotenough.Pre-mission and in-mission curricula would be developed intight cooperation between the mission and the secondingstates,or ideally theEUwoulddevelopa commonlyagreedpaper with recommendations for standardised pre-missiontraining.Thisisnottosaythateverysecondingnationhastodeveloptheirowntrainingsessions,especiallyifonlyoneorafewpeoplearesecondedatatime.Abetteralternativewhenthenumberofrecruits issmall istoconcentratethetrainingin one or more seconding nations at a time, and for othersecondingnationstobuytheirtrainingservices,whenunabletoprovidetrainingthemselves.

6.2.2 Additions to training curricula

Depending on who is asked, the most central additions orimprovements to the training curricula vary. Monitors inthe field recognise particular needs, whereas their superiorsrecognisedifferentones;monitorswithamilitarybackgroundseekreassuranceinothermattersthandocivilians.Onecoulddrawparallelstotheanecdoteoftherepliesgivenbytwomenaskedwhattheyweredoing,astheywereseenworking:onestatedhewascarryingbricksfromonesideoftherivertotheother,whereastheotherrepliedbysayinghewasbuildinga

church.The issues below have been mentioned in numerous

interviewsasdesiredtrainingadditions.

Interviewing techniques

Asinterviewinginterlocutorsisthemaintoolformonitors,themostoften statedadditional trainingneedwas tohavenotonly the team leaderbuta trueprofessional to teachaboutinterviewing techniques. Things that monitors felt wouldbe useful to know particularly included how to read thingsbetween the lines, things that are not explicitly said, butthingsthatmaybeconveyedbynotstatingsomethingorbynon-verbal communication. How to recognise if a source isreliable? How to know what topics to avoid with particularinterlocutors?Howtointerpretwhatisbeingsaidthroughthecorresponding“culturallens”?

Equally important is to realise that each monitor’s ownbehaviourandcommunicationwill affect the successof the


interview.Monitorsoughttounderstandhowawellpreparedset of questionsmay lead to different outcomesdependingon the use of encouragement, interruption and/or silence,aswell as the formandorder inwhichquestionsarebeingposed.35 Interviewees may feel obliged to state things theyfeelthe interviewerwantstohear,sociallyacceptablethingsthat may differ from the actual state of facts.36 Assessingwhattheintervieweeisstatingtohis/herpositionisonewayto try to determine the trustworthiness of the interviewedinterlocutor.37

Asmanymissionmembersother than justmonitorswillbeusinginterviewingasatoolintheirjob,itisrecommendedthatinterviewingtechniquesbeaddedtothecurriculaforcorecoursesinciviliancrisismanagement.Althoughbothmilitaryandciviliansrecognisedtheneedfortrainingininterviewingskills, civilians often emphasised the need for theoreticalknowledge, whereas military emphasised the necessity ofpracticaltraininginface-to-faceinterviewingsituations.

Working with interpreters versus working with international staff

Almost as often mentioned, but invariably by differentinformants, typically senior staff not using interpreters on adailybasis themselves,was theneed to increaseor improvetrainingonhowtobestworkwithinterpreters.

Inadditiontotraininginternationalstaff inhowtoworkwithinterpreters(oftenincludingawarningthatespeciallyinanewlysetupmission,thequalityofinterpretersmayleavemuch tobedesired), it is recommended todevelop trainingfor the interpreters on how to work with internationalstaff. It is known that local interpreters may find it difficulttobeunbiased.Nevertheless,usingtheir localknow-how inconveyingimpressionsreceivedattheinterviewisstillseenasasaferbetthantryingtotraininternationalspossiblywithoutpreviousexperience in thetargetarea’sculturetoreadnon-verbalsignals.

ThefactofthematteristhattheonlyguidancegivenbytheECMMandtheEUMMtothelocalinterpretershasbeentohandoveraCodeofConductinconjunctionwiththecontractof employment. Thereafter the new monitors inform theinterpretersoftheirownpreferredwayofworking,whichhasat timesmeantanadjustmentof thestyleofworkingeveryfew months. In order to avoid such a lack of uniformity ofstandards,inordertostreamlineexpectationsandtoimprovethejointteamperformance,itwouldbeworthwhiletoensurethatinternationalstaffandinterpretersaretrainedthesameway.Ratherthanhavingmonitorsdictatepersonalpreferencesregardingthestyleofinterpretation,interpreterscouldbeusedto train internationals on how to achieve the best possible

result.

35 Hakkarainen&Hyvärinen1999,99–108.36 Kuutti2002,118.37 Kuutti2002,134–135.

Who benefits from the monitoring, how and why?

Questionsneedingclarificationincludeputtingthedailyworkin a larger context. Several monitors stated that they weretheretohelpthelocalpeople,butwerenotabletoelaboratehowthemonitoringbenefitedthepopulation.Thequestionsneeding answers included: Who reads the reports? Whatinformation are they interested in? How are they going touse the information that themissionprovides?Whomdoesthe EUMM work for? What is the framework in which themissionoperates?Notonlyfieldmonitorsfeltaneedtogetthesequestionsclarified,butalsomissionmembersworkingintheAnalysisSectionnotedthatmonitors’perceptionofwhatBrusselsisexpectingoftendifferssignificantlyfromtheirs.

Wheneverpossible,itwouldbeadvisableforthemonitorsto meet a representative to personalise “Brussels and thecapitals”. In the fairly rare caseswhere amonitormetwithsomeonewithin their respectiveMinistry for ForeignAffairs,who in fact received the reports, ithasbeensaid tohaveamotivating effect, especially if theministryofficial explainedwhatsortofreportinghe/sheanticipated.Strivingforthistobecome common practice in the sending nations is highlyrecommended. The mission should not count on a briefoverviewatinductiontrainingtomakemonitorsknowledgeableenoughaboutthecontextinwhichtheywork.Suchtrainingshouldbeextendedandreinforced.

More specifics on the target area and target issues

Even if a monitor had significant background knowledgeabout the Balkans, the likelihood on him/her knowing theupdated specifics of the actual given area of responsibilitywere slim. Leaving mission members have on a number ofoccasions proved to be unable or unwilling to give newlyarrivingmonitorsacomprehensivepictureofthebackgroundandof issuesrelevanttomonitor.Monitorshavestatedthatthe lackofessentialdocuments toget familiarisedwithhassloweddowntheirunderstandingoftheirtargetarea.

Surprisingly,themonitorsintervieweddidnotmentiontheneedtobetrainedinspecificmonitoringissues,suchaswarcrimes,exhumations,issuesconcerningrefugeesandinternallydisplacedpeople,parallelinstitutions,theprivatisationprocess,property legislation, education, or election implementation,justtomentionafewissuesmanyafieldmonitorwouldlikelyhavedealtwithontheirtourofdutybutlesslikelytohavedealtwithintheirordinarydayjobs.Thereisreasontoquestionhowvalidthecontributioncanbe,whenaddressingsuchavarietyofissues,withoutrelatedbackgroundeducationortrainingintheseissuesfromaBalkanperspective.

TheECMM/EUMMwasanatypicalmonitoringmissioninthat itdidnothavestrictlyasingle focus, likehumanrightsmonitoring, media monitoring or border monitoring, butcovered a wide variety of issues. The spectrum narrowed,however, during the EUMM times. Although the variety ofmonitoring issues meant great challenges for any training,it is recommended for future training to increase the focuson what is being monitored, in order to increase monitors’


understanding about the field they are monitoring and onwhichtheyareexpectedtoreport.

Training of trainers and stress management

Astheroleofguidingnewcomersisanessentialpartofanymonitor’sduties,itshouldbeincludedinthejobdescriptionanddulysupportedinordertoensurenewcomersgetthedesiredsystematic and effective reception. The levels above fieldteamswereexpectedtogivefarmoreguidance,instructionsandfeedbackthanwhatwasthecase.Asamethodtosupportnewmonitors,asawaytocomparenotesaboutthepoliticsdrivenandothermonitoredissuesinagivenareaanditslinksandrelationstohigherlevelpoliticsorneighbouringareas,itwouldbeusefulforsuperiorsfromheadquarterstovisitandtalktofieldstaffmore.Theneedhadbeenacknowledgedforanumberofyears,buthadnotbeenaddressedduetoalackofresources.Asmostpeoplearenotnaturalborntrainersorleaders, it is recommended to include a training of trainerssystemfocusingnotonlyontrainingskillsandfacts,butalsoonthemotivationandreassuringofunconfidentmonitors.

Althoughstressmanagementwascoveredinmosttraining,itwasevident inanumberof the interviewshow themostqualifiedandmotivatedmonitorshadtakenuponthemselvestobearsuchaheavyburden,thatitwasaffectingtheirhealth.Frustrationandexhaustionwerementionedespeciallywhenreferring to the heavy workload leaving monitors short ofachieving theirownambitionsabout theirwork.Somethingespecially disappointing was the amount of time and efforthavingtobedirectedtomotivateandreassure incompetentor unconfident monitors, something which was perceivedas anunintendedandunwelcomeaddition to the job load.Therefore it is suggested to add to the job description theassessing of newcomers’ competence and their coachingintotheirnewrole.Stressmanagementtraining,particularlyrelatedtocopingwithworkingwithpoorlyperformingstaff,needstobeimproved.

6.2.3 Individualising training

Withmissionmembersbeingrecruitedindividuallymoreoftenthaninagroup,tendingtotheirtrainingneedsnationallypriortodeploymentrequiresanewwaythinking.Althoughtrainingwould ideally include practical exercises with peers, certaintrainingcanbearrangedwithouttheuseofmultipletrainers,anditdoesnotnecessarilyhavetobeboundtoagiventimeandplace.

Arecommendationtotrainrepatriatedmissionmembersto give an individual briefing to future mission members inaccordancewithanagreedcurricula,isonewaytoensurethatnooneisdeployedwithoutanygeneraltrainingatall.

Continuingthedevelopmentanduseofamission-specifictraining CD, as the EUMM did, is strongly recommended.However, thedistributionneedstobe improved inorder forselectedmissionmemberstofamiliarisethemselveswiththecontentontheirownpriortodeployment.

6.2.4 Developing new e-learning tools

In order to carry out more effective quality control, it isrecommended to develop e-learning modules, which wouldwork especially well in case the time between recruitmentanddeploymentisshort.38E-learninghasthebenefitofbeingrerunatany time themissionmemberneeds to refreshhis/her knowledge and in the long-run e-learning is also cost-effective.

Ifforlogisticalreasonsitisdifficulttogatheralargenumberofmissionmembersinoneplace,thematice-learningmodulescouldwellbedevelopedtobeusedasasupportivemeansforremedialtrainingduringthemission.E-learningcouldbeusedparticularlyfor long-termmissionmembers,asexistingface-to-facetrainingtendstocaterprimarilytothesuperficialneedsof fast-rotating staffmembers. To achieve this,missions arerecommended tocooperatecloselywith training institutionswiththecapabilitytodevelopnewe-basedtrainingmaterial.

38 One good example of an e-learning module is theintroduction toESDPdevelopedby theGenevaCentreofSecurityPolicy, availableathttp://www.esdp-course.ethz.ch/access/start/index.cfm.


7 Concludingremarks

Withoutquestioningtheusefulnessoftraining,itissafetosaythatnoamountofpre-missionor in-mission trainingaffectsmission success to the same extent as a proper recruitingprocessdoes.Neithercoreciviliancrisismanagementtraining,which is first and foremost designed to provide a generalintroductiontoawidevarietyofissues,norfunction-specifictrainingofafewdays,cancompetewithrelevantknowledgeandexperiencegainedoveramatterofyears.Thus,inensuringmissionsuccess,onemuststartbyputtingrecruitmentunderthe spotlight. For the best possible results, the requiredqualifications must be set far higher than what the EUMMdid.Achieving,oratleastgettingclosertoexcellence,requiressetting the bar at the highest possible level which will stillmakeitpossibletofindthenecessarynumberofcandidates.

On the other hand, as working with civilian crisismanagementmeansdealingwithcross-disciplinaryissues,nosingleeducationalbackgroundorworkingexperiencewill initselfguaranteehavingaproperunderstandingofthespecificsawaitingmissionmembers inthefield.Simplycopyingone’sordinary working methodology to a mission environment,without paying due attention to the local circumstances, isboundtoleadtofailure.Therefore,theutmosteffortshouldbe made to ensure no one is deployed without due pre-mission training. Furthermore, trainingprovides anexcellentopportunity to assess certain essential skills, like how thepotential future mission member acts as a member of agroup.

Comparing a few national training curricula with whatmonitorshaveclaimedtobeabletotake in, rememberandusewhenapplicable,thereseemstobequiteagap.Althoughmosttrainingwill logicallytakeplacepriortodeployment, itis advisable to see training as a systematic approach to theincreasing of competence and as a continuum, rather thana singleevent, limited toa timeandplace. Pre-missionandmission induction trainingshould thereforebesupportedbyremedial training. In trying to achieve the greatest possibleimpactoftheworkingeffortsofmissionmembers,acertainamountofinvestmentneedstobemade.

AlotoffocusisbeingputontrainingfortheBroaderRuleofLawmissioninKosovo.Themissionisdesignedtocontributeto an improvement in the local society, not just to report

aboutchangesaswasthecasewiththeEUMM.Inadditiontomonitoring,selectedmissionmemberswillhaveamentoringandadvisingroleaswell(andinsomecaseexecutivepowers).Thisaddsnewhumanrequirementstotheprofileoftheidealmissionmemberandequallyaddsnewchallengesfortrainingtocover.


Interviews

Interviews and questionnaires: recruiting and training officers

Interviewwithrecruitingofficer24.5.2007,Helsinki(recorded).

Telephoneinterviewwithrecruitingofficer29.6.2007(notes).

Telephoneinterviewwithrecruitingofficer17.7.2007(notes).

Telephoneconversationwithformerrecruitingofficer14.9.2007(notes).

Questionnairescompletedbyseven(7)recruitingofficers.

Interviews and questionnaires: Mission members (monitors, heads of mission, and interpreter)

Interviewwithformermissionmember26.2and2.3.2007,Helsinki(recorded).

Interviewwithformermissionmember8.3,Helsinki(recorded).

Interviewwithformermissionmember19.4.2007,Kuopio(recorded).

Interviewwithmissionmember24.4.2007,Sarajevo(recorded).

Interviewwithmissionmember25.4.2007and2.5,Sarajevo(recorded).













References




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Telephonewithmissionmember15.6.2007(notes).

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Interview and questionnaires: EUMM report readers

InterviewwithEUMMreportreader12.3.2007,Kuopio(recorded).

Questionnairesfilledinbyseven(7)reportreaders.

AllthenotesandrecordingsareinthepossessionoftheauthorattheCMCFinland.

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Concept for EU Monitoring Missions(2003).CounciloftheEuropeanUnion.FromSecretariattoDelegations14536/03.DGEIX.

“CouncilJointAction2000/811/CFSPof22December2000ontheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission”.official Journal of the European Union,L328,23/12/2000,pp.53-54.

“CouncilJointAction2006/867/CFSPof30November2006onExtendingandamendingthemandateoftheEuropeanUnionMonitoringMission(EUMM)”.official Journal of the European Union,L335,pp.47-48.

ECMM/EUMM Personnel Strength(2006),January2006.


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Brief guide to the European Security and Defence policy(2005).PermanentRepresentationofFrancetoEuropeanUnion

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EUMM Introduction CD.EditedbyChiefofOperations,Effective01March2007.Format:CD.

FutureofESDP:LessonsfromBosnia(2006):European Security review,number29,June2006.InternationalSecurityInformationService.Europe.

Glazebrook,John(2006):An investigation into the Factors Affecting recruitment Success in the International Peacebuilding Industry.DissertationsubmittedinpartialfulfilmentoftherequirementsforadegreeofMasterofBusinessAdministration,HenleyManagementCollege.

Gourlay,Catriona(2006):Lessons Learned Study: rosters for the Deployment of Civilian Experts in Peace operations.UnitedNationsPeacekeepingintheserviceofpeace.PeacekeepingBestpractices(PBPU).

Hakkarainen,Tuula&Hyvärinen,Marja-Leena(1999):Puheviestintää oppimaan.Jyväskylänyliopisto.

InternationalCrisisGroup(2005):“Bosnia’sStalledPoliceReform.Noprogress,noEU.”Europe report,Number164,6September2005

Kuutti,Heikki(2002):Tutkittu juttu. Johdatus tutkivaan journalismiin.Jyväskylä:AtenaKustannus.

Langinvainio,Mikaeli(2006):”Siviilikriisinhallinta-käsitteenmonettulkinnat”.InKorhonen,Senja&Sumuvuori,Senja(eds)konflikteista kehitykseen. Johdatus Euroopan unionin siviilikriisinhallintaan,pp.34–61.Kansalaisjärjestöjenkonfliktinehkäisyverkosto&Committeeof100inFinland.

Markkanen,Mikko(1999):Etsi arvioi valitse. onnistunut rekrytointi.Porvoo:WSOY.

The role of EU in Civilian Crisis Management(2006).InternationalWorkshopinVienna12-13January2006.

Solana,Javier(2002).SpeakingpointsofJavierSolana,EUHighRepresentativeforCFSPattheCivilian Crisis Capability Conference,atministeriallevel(GeneralAffairsandExternalRelationsCouncil),Brussels19November2002.


Building Capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police TheEUPOLCOPPSandCommunicationsProject

Ari Kerkkänen – Hannu Rantanen – Jari Sundqvist

ThisarticlereviewsEUPOLCOPPS,andthedevelopmentsleadingtoitsestablishmentasan

EUsecurityanddefencepolicyefforttocontributetothestabilityintheregion.Theprimary

aimistoanalyseandevaluatetheCommunicationsProjectimplementedbyEUPOLCOPPS

intermsofcapacitybuildingwithintheframeworkoftheSecuritySectorReform(SSR).The

questionofadherencebythemissiontohumansecurityprinciplesisalsorevisitedonthebasis

oftheprinciplesoftheMadridReportoftheHumanSecurityStudyGroup.LaunchinganESDP

missioninthePalestinianterritorieswasnouncomplicatedmatter,buttheestablishmentofthe

ESDPmissionitselfinthePalestinianterritoriescanberegardedasasignificantdevelopmentfor

EUsecurityanddefencepolicy.Operationally,themostsignificanttaskofEUPOLCOPPSwas

toenhanceradiocommunicationofthePalestinianCivilPoliceduringtheinitialphaseofthe

mission.TheprojectapproachutilisedinEUPOLCOPPSprovedtobeausefulcrisismanagement

approach,easilytailoredtomeetaparticularneed,manageable,transparentandeconomic.

Moreover,itprovidedausefulanddeployablelinkbetweenciviliancrisismanagement

missionsanddevelopmentaid.Linkingofbi-lateralprojectsinsupportofESDPciviliancrisis

managementshouldbeencouraged.1

1 ThisarticlewasfinishedinAugust2008.


1 Introduction

TheEuropeanUnionCoordinatingOfficeforPalestinianPoliceSupport(henceforthEUPOLCOPPS)isthefirstmissionwithinthe frameworkof theEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP) in the context of the protracted Israeli-Palestinianconflict.Themissionwasofficiallylaunchedatthebeginningof 20062, almost simultaneously with the second ESDPmissioninthesamepoliticalandgeographicalsetting,namelytheEuropeanUnionBorderAssistanceMission (EUBAM) inRafah.3

TheOsloProcess,beginningin1993,andsomeyearslatertheRoadmaptoPeace,launchedin2003,laidthefoundationfor the feasibility of EU crisis management operations inthe Occupied Territories of Palestine. There is abundantjustificationforEUparticipation inthecrisismanagementofthe Israeli-Palestinianconflict. TheEUCommissionhasbeenthe largest donor to the Palestinian territories (€550millionin assistance in 2007).4 The EU is an active member of theRoadmapQuartet–theothermembersbeingU.S.,RussiaandtheUN–andhasparticipatedinseveralcoordinationforums,inparticularinthefieldofjudiciaryandsecurityreform.IsraelandthePalestinianterritories,within thewiderMiddleEast,fallundertheEuropeanUnionNeighbourhoodPolicy(ENP).5The EU has a Strategic Partnership with the Southern andEastern Mediterranean countries6, the objective of which isto promote the development of a common zone of peace,

2 CouncilJointAction2005/797/CFSP.3 On 15 November 2005, Israel and the Palestinian

Authority concluded an Agreement on Movement and Access, including agreed principles for the Rafahcrossing(Gaza).TheCouncilJointAction2005/889/CFSPwasagreedon12December2005.http://www.eubam-rafah.eu/portal.

4 TheEUi.e.theCommissionandmemberstatesis,withan annual contribution of US 400 million, the largestdonor. For example, the Commission co-chaired thePalestinianDonorsConference inDecember2007andannouncedthesumof€440million($650millionUSD)for the Palestinians for 2008 (European CommissionPressRelease17December2007).

5 CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities2003,3.6 Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Palestinian

Authority,Israel,Lebanon,Syria,Jordan.

prosperity and progress.7 Stability in the Middle East is ofparamountimportanceforEurope.

ThisarticlereviewsEUPOLCOPPS,asmallmissionofsome30internationalstaffmembers,andthedevelopmentsleadingtoitsestablishmentasanEUsecurityanddefencepolicyeffortto contribute to the stability in the region. TheprimaryaimofthisarticleistoanalyseandevaluatetheCommunicationsProject implemented by EUPOL COPPS in terms of capacitybuildingwithintheframeworkoftheSecuritySectorReform(SSR).8 Thequestionofadherenceby themission tohumansecurityprinciplesisalsorevisitedonthebasisoftheprinciplesof the Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group,led by Professor Mary Kaldor.9 The SSR itself, including itslegislativereforms,liesoutsidethescopeofthisstudy.

TheCommunicationsProject,as statedabove,willbeatthecoreofthisstudy.Thepurposeisnotonlytoevaluatethecontent and scopeof the Project, but also the approach assuch,whichreflectsanewdevelopmentwithinESDPmissions.10EUPOLCOPPSisreviewedontwolevels:

1)on the political and strategic level, as the firstESDPcrisismanagementmissionintheveryheartoftheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict,

2)and on the practical and operational level, asameans tobuilding the capacity of the rule oflawwithinthePalestinianterritoriesthroughtheCommunicationsProject.

OneofthecentralfunctionsoftheProjectwascoordinationbetweendonorsandthePalestinianNationalAuthority(PNA)in delivering an enhanced communication network for thePalestinian Civil Police (PCP). The core objective, however,concerns not the technical details of the Communications

7 CommissionoftheEuropeanCommunities2003,3.8 SSRinthePalestinianTerritorieshasbeendealtwithby

RolandFriedrich(2004).9 The Madrid Report (2007, 9–10) outlines the main

principlesoftheHumanSecurityConcept,consistingoftheprimacyofhumanrights,legitimatepoliticalauthority,a bottom-up approach, effective multilateralism, anintegratedregionalapproachandclearandtransparentstrategicdirection.

10 Aproject-basedapproach is alsoplanned for thenewEULEXKosovo;ESDPruleoflawmissioninKosovo.


Project, but the lessons learned from the Project. The latestdevelopments in the Palestinian territories following theHamastakeoveroftheGazastripinJune2007,resultinginade factodivisionbetweentheFatah-leadWestBankandtheHamascontrolledGazaStrip,willbetakenintoaccountwithintheanalysis.

Afunctioningsystemofcommunicationisoftheutmostimportanceforeachandeveryorganisation;formodernpoliceand security structures, which are the cornerstones of theruleoflawineverystateandsociety,suchasystemiscrucial.Effectivecommandandcontrolcannotbeachievedwithoutaproperly established and maintained communication systemoperated by trained staff. It is impossible to secure eitherpolitical or operational control of forces in charge of day-to-day securityandpublicorder in thePalestinian territorieswithoutoperationalcommunications.Theveryspecificsettingofasocietyinaprocessofstateformation,whichisevidentinthePalestinianterritories,presentsanadditionalchallengetomaintenanceoftheruleoflaw.

EUPOLCOPPSisalsoanexampleoftheprocesswherebya bilateral project turns into a fully fledged ESDP mission.11The Communications Project was initiated and initiallyfinancedbytheUnitedKingdomDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment (DfID). The initial report drafted by the DfID,basedonthePalestinianPoliceProjectMemorandum(PPPM),statesthatassistingthePCPtorealisetheirfullpotentialandbuildaneffective,accountableandmodernpoliceserviceisanimmensetask.12

11 There is a more recent example of a bilateral missionturning into an ESDP mission in Afghanistan, whereEUPOLAfghanistanhasbeen launched in the summerof 2007 on the basis of a German-led bilateral policeproject.

12 McIvor 2004, 4. The PPPM draft of 18 September2003wasproducedfortheDfIDbyateamofspecialistconsultants.

In fact, EUPOL COPPS already represents the secondgeneration of international assistance to the PCP since theOsloAccordsof1993.ExtensiveinternationalassistancewaschannelledtothePalestinianpoliceprior totheoutbreakoftheSecond Intifada in 2000. Theonset of theOslo Processwitnessed a multitude of international donor programmesdeliveringequipmentandtrainingtothePCP,evenpayingtheirsalaries.13Thisassistancewasprovidedbothonthebasisofbi-lateralagreementsandalsobyinternationalorganisationsliketheUN.14TheEuropeanUnionbecame increasingly involvedin this assistance during this period. The Second Intifadaderailed theprocessofdeveloping thePCPand led,amongother things, to thepartialdestructionof the infrastructure,includingbuildingsandcomplexes,ofthePCP.15

Thesourcematerialforthisstudyconsistsofunclassifieddocuments stored at the EUPOL COPPS office in RamallahalongwithinterviewsofthekeypersonnelofthemissionandthePCPduringafield visit to thePalestinian territories andRamallahinApril2007.

ThemainlimitationofthestudyistherestrictednumberofinterviewsoftheProject’send-usersabouttheirexperienceswiththeimprovedcommunicationsystem.Thiskindofanalysis,however,shouldonlybecarriedoutafteralongertime-spansincethe inceptionof theproject.All resultsconcerningtheProject’simpactremainindicativeonlyatthisstage.

13 Acomprehensiveaccountofinternationalassistanceinthe1990sisgivenbyBrynjarLiainhisnewlypublishedbook from 2007: Building Arafat’s Police. The Politics of International Assistance in the Palestinian Territories after the oslo Agreement.IthacaPress.

14 Regarding the coordination and implementation oftrainingassistance,theUNplayedanimportantrolebyseconding successive UN police training coordinatorsfromthebeginninginSeptember1994.TheyconstitutedtheUN’sresponsetothePLO’srequestforpolicetrainingassistance, addressed to the UN Secretary-General atthe timeof theDeclarationof Principles (DoP) signingceremony in Washington, DC. The response to thisrequestsubsequentlycrystallizedintoaninformaldonorgroupthatformedthebasisofthefirstUN-coordinatedpolice aid efforts for the Palestinian police. Beginninginmid-1994,theUNgroupimplementedawiderangeofpolicetrainingprogrammes,reflectingtheprevalentview among the donors that more training was theirmain vehicle for police reform and the promotion ofdemocratic policing. As Lia (2007, 322323) observes,thepoliticalandinstitutionalframeworkforpolicereformwasnotidealasthedonorswerelacking,forexample,monitoringteamsonthegroundwhichcouldhavegivenadviceandfollow-uponadailybasis.

15 McIvor2004.


2 SettingthestageforthePalestinianPolice

2.1 Policing before the oslo Accords

The establishment of a policing operation and a credible,accountable and functioning police force in a non-statesetting, amid territorial fragmentation, within an extremelycomplicated and vulnerable political context and politicaltransformation,presentsahugechallenge.ThiswasandstillistherealityfacingthePCP.

The process of establishing a recognised police forcecommencedwiththesigningoftheDeclarationofPrinciples(DoP) inSeptember1993between IsraelandthePalestinianLiberation Organisation (PLO). The DoP stipulates theestablishmentofastrongpoliceforce inordertoguaranteepublicorderand internal security for thePalestiniansof theWestBankandtheGazaStrip.16Annex IIoftheDeclarationstates, in relation to the agreement on the withdrawal ofIsraeli military forces from the Gaza Strip and Jericho area,thatarrangementsfortheassumptionofinternalsecurityandpublicorderwillberesponsibilityofthePalestinianpoliceforce,consistingofpoliceofficersrecruitedlocallyandfromabroad(holdingJordanianpassportsandPalestiniandocumentsissuedbyEgypt).17

PolicingofthePalestiniansisnotanewphenomenonbyanymeans,althoughitshistoryislimitedandsporadic.PalestinianArabswereserving inthePalestinePoliceduringMandatoryPalestine, togetherwith Jewish inhabitantsaswellasBritishcitizens.18TheconceptofaPalestinianpoliceforcehasbeenon the agenda as part of an Arab-Israeli agreement on the

16 DoP 1993, Article VIII: Public order and security. ThestrongPalestinianpoliceforcewasalsosupportedbytheIsraeli authoritiesasanearlyempowerment (Lia2006,99–100).

17 DoP 1993, Annex II: Protocol on Withdrawal of IsraeliForcesfromtheGazaStripandJerichoArea.Thisannexalso stipulates concerning training that those whoparticipate in thePalestinianpolice force coming fromabroadshouldbetrainedaspoliceofficers.

18 Shepherd 2000, 66. For example, the Palestine PoliceForce, which was set up in 1926, had the followingcomposition in 1930: British 692; Muslim 1396; non-BritishChristian301;andJewish327.

Occupied Territories since the occupation of the PalestinianterritoriesbyIsraelin1967.19

PalestinianArabsgainedconsiderablepolicingexperiencein the Occupied Territories within the Israeli Police. AlmosthalfoftheIsraelipoliceforceintheOccupiedTerritorieswasPalestinians.Nearlyallof themquitat thebeginningof theFirst Intifada,followingthecalltoresignissuedbytheUnifiedNationalCommandof theUprising (UNC) inMarch1988.20Theseprofessionallytrainedpoliceofficersformedthecoreofthe new Palestinian police. However, the role of Palestinianpolice officers trained formerly by the Israeli Police wasmarginalisedandminimisedfollowingtheOsloAccords.21

2.2 Policing following the oslo Accords in 1993 and international assistance

The history of the Palestinian police since the Oslo Processhas been analysed in detail by Brynjar Lia.22 In his research,Lia concludes that the many flaws of the Palestinian policein terms of organisational structure, chain of command,internal discipline and coordination, and mechanism ofaccountability have been the result of the PNA’s non-staterealityandconsequentpolicingdilemmas.23LiastatesthatthePalestinianpolicehaveseenthemselvesmoreasavehicleforachievingnational independence thanasanon-political lawandorderagency.24Fromalegalandpoliticalstandpoint,the

19 Lia2006,93.20 Ibid.,41.21 Ibid.,141–142.22 Lia2006;Lia2007.DuringtheBritishMandate,Palestinian

ArabsservedinthePalestinePoliceandhadcertainself-policingfunctionsduringtheArabRevoltin1936–1939,aswellasduringtheinsurgencyinGazain1969–1971,in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan in 1968–1970andinthePalestinianguerrillastateinLebanonin1969–1982.ThePalestinianArmedStruggleCommand(PASC)served as a local police force in the refugee camps.TheFirst Intifada in theOccupiedTerritoriesstarting in1987was thenext chapter in Palestinian self-policing,nowtransferredfromtherefugeecampsofLebanontoPalestineitself(Lia2006).

23 Lia2006,309.24 Ibid.,429–430.


Palestinianpolicewasfarfrombeinganationalpoliceforceinanindependentstate.Thegreatestanomalywasthefactthatitwasnotestablishedtoprovidesecurityandrenderservicesfor the people among whom its members were recruited,and on whose territory it exercised control, but to ensureimprovedsecurityforaforeignstate(Israel)anditscitizens.25Thisdimensionasaproviderofextra-PalestiniansecuritywasonlyemphasisedintheformulationoftheRoadmapforPeacein2003.26

Asearlyas1978,theCampDavidFrameworkforesawtheestablishmentofalocalpoliceforceaspartofanautonomyagreement for the West Bank and Gaza Strip.27 In August1992,PalestinianandJordanianpoliceexpertsmettodiscusspreparationsforafuturePalestinianpoliceforce,envisagedatastrengthofsome20,000Palestinians,assumingresponsibilityafteran Israeliwithdrawal.28APolicecommitteewassetupat Orient House, which conducted feasibility studies andplanning.29

OnordersfromthePLOleadership,twopolicecommitteeswere set up in the Occupied Territories, one for the WestBank and another for the Gaza Strip, to supervise policepreparations.30 On 21 September 1993 the PLO begancalling forpolice recruits in theOccupiedTerritories,and14recruitment offices in nine Palestinian towns were openedforthispurpose.31Morethan2,000Palestinianrecruitswereaccepted into the Palestinian police. They were formallyinductedintothepoliceonlyaftertheexile-basedpoliceforcearrivedinMay1994.32ThePLO’semphasiswasonamilitaryaspect of national security, asNational Security Forcesweretobemuchstrongerthanthemodestnumberofpoliceunits(3,000intheGazaStrip,650inJerichoand3,000intheWestBank).33

The Civil Police34, also known as the “Blue Police”, wasinauguratedinMay1994,andgrewintooneofthelargestandmostimportantbranchesofthePalestiniansecuritystructures.Itsstrengthwasanestimated10,500menin1997,with6,500in theWest Bank and4,000 in theGaza Strip. TheCivilianPolicehadalsoaspecialFemalePoliceDepartmentwithabout350policewomen in1997.35 TheCivilianPoliceexperienced

25 Ibid.,269.26 U.S.DepartmentofState2003.27 Lia2006,119.28 Ibid.,98.29 Ibid.,118–119.30 Ibid.,133.31 Ibid.,134–135.32 Ibid.,144–145.33 “Palestinian document on the police (in Arabic)”, al-

Quds,8November1993,7,quotedinLia2006,183.34 InadditiontoCivilPolice,otherofficialsecurityagencies

under the PA are the Preventive Security, the CivilDefence,theNationalSecurity,thePresidentialSecurity,the Military Intelligence, the Naval Police, and theGeneralIntelligence.Inadditiontotheofficialagencies,anumberofsemi-officialagenciesoperatesuchastheSpecialSecurity,theMilitaryPolice,theBorderPoliceandtheSpecialForces(Friedrich2004,36–41).

35 Lia2006,318–319.

thefastestgrowthinallbranchesafterdeployment,becomingthesecond-largestbranchofthePalestinianpolicein1997,theNationalSecurityForcesremainingthelargest.In1996–1997,theCivilianPolicestaffed18policestationsinthemaincitiesand25stationsinWestBankvillages.Itemployedfrom8,000to11,000personnel,withanofficercoreofmorethan1,000.Bytheyear2000,itstotalstrengthhadincreasedto14,000,and23specialiseddepartmentshadbeenformed.36

International aid played a fundamental role in theestablishment of the Palestinian police. The PLO’s financialcrisistogetherwiththehighcostofcreatinganentirelynewpolice force from the very beginning meant that the PNAquickly became heavily dependent on donor assistance fordevelopingandmaintaining itspolice force.37Consequently,internationalassistanceanddonorssteppedinfollowingtheOsloAccords.Arafat,forexample,calledontheUNtosupervisethetrainingofthePalestinianpoliceintheOccupiedTerritoriesin September 1994, an idea that was strongly opposed byIsrael.38AstheoccupyingandcolonialpowerintheWestBankandGaza Strip, Israel viewed the Palestinianpolice throughtheprismofitsterritorialinterestsintheOccupiedTerritoriesand theomnipresent threatof terrorism. ThedominanceofIsraeloverthePNAhinderedtheabilityofforeigndonorstoofferthePalestinianpolicerelevantassistance.39

In any case, donor pledges were numerous but theslow pace of disbursement and delivery emerged as thefundamentalproblemduringthefirstwaveofdeploymentinthesummerandautumnof1994.Tocoordinatethemultitudeof donor pledges and programmes, the multilateral bodyCo-ordination Committee of International Assistance to thePalestinianPolice Force (COPP)was establishedat theCairodonormeetingon24March1994.40ThiscanalsoberegardedasapreludeforthefutureEUPOLCOPPS,andtheselectionofthisparticularacronymfortheEUmissionreflectedinpartanattempt tohighlightwhathadworkedat theCOPPandbuildontheCOPPconcept.41COPPhadrepresentativesfromtheUnitedStates,Russia,theEU,Norway,Japan,Egypt,thePLOandIsrael,anditssimplemissionwas“tospeedupthemobilisationofinternationalassistance.”42

Inclusion in COPP was important for the EU, as the EUwished tosubstantiatepolitical returns forbeing the largestaid provider in the territories. In addition, it considered itsregionalinvolvementanimportanttestinggroundforthenew

36 Lia2007,246–247.37 Lia2007,25.38 Lia2006,145.39 Lia2007,2.40 Ibid.,42.41 McIvor,emailtoAriKerkkänenon28May2008.42 Lia 2007, 44. The Oslo Police donor conference had

previously taken place on 20 December 1993. At thisconferencethePLO’srepresentativeDrNabilSha’athandIsrael’s representative General David Agmon stressedthatthePLOandIsraelwereinbroadagreementonthebasic principles concerning thepolice force and calledupondonorstostarttheiraideffortsimmediatelywithregardtotrainingandequipment(Lia2007,34)


CommonForeignandSecurityPolicy(CFSP).43 InApril1994,the EU foreign ministers’ meeting supported a resolutionto spend ECU 10 million ($11.3 million USD) “in order tocontributeactivelyandurgentlytothecreationofaPalestinianPoliceforce.”Infact,thepolicefundingresolutionwashailedas “one of the first actions taken by the Union under theMaastrichttreaty’ssecondpillarCommonForeignandSecurityPolicy.”44

Withinthedonorcommunity,Norwaygraduallyadopteda leading role in the mobilisation and coordination of thepolice aid, primarily responding to PLO wishes rather thanactivelyseekingsucharoleforitself.45ButitwastheUnitedKingdomwhichplayedthemostcrucialdonorrolefromtheEuropeanUnion.AccordingtotheArabandIsraelipress,theUKhadpromisedtocontributeby“providingspecialelectronicequipment”andalsoassistanceintheareasof“restructuring,communications,training,andplanning”inthisearlystageofdonorsupport.TheBritishpoliceaidpackage,however,fellfarshortofPalestinianexpectations.46Assistance in thefieldofcommunicationremained,asseeninthelaterprojectinitiatedbytheDfID,theprimary interestandexpertiseoftheBritishcontributiontotheassistanceprogrammes.

It appears that theUnitedKingdomwas theonlymajorEU country with a strong interest in the police sector andpossessingboththenecessaryresourcesandalsothepoliticalstrengthandwill.AsastrongindicationofitsinterestinthePalestinianpolice,theUKspentsome£5millionBritishpoundsinaidduring1994andcommittedanddispersednewgrantsforpolice aidpurposesnearly every year for the restof the1990s.TheUKalsoprovidedone-sixthofthetotalEUaidtothePNA,whichincludedsizeablecontributionstothePalestinianpolice.TheUKalsoofferedawiderangeoftrainingcoursesin,forexample, seniormanagement training, riot control,drugcontrol and counter-narcotics, community policing, forensictechniques,Englishlanguageandcounter-terrorism.47

Donoractivitiesdidnot raiseconcernsonly in Israel; thedonorcommunityitselfwaswaryofprovidingthePalestinianpolicewithcertaintypesofexpertise.Oneexampleofatrainingcourse,thatcausedhesitation,concernedexpertiseinexposingdocumentforgery.Donorsfearedthatsuchexpertisemightfall

43 Ibid.,28.44 Ibid.,64–65.LatertheEUinvolvementwasfollowedby

adopting JointAction97/289/CFSPon an EU counter-terrorismprogrammeforthePNAon29April1997.ThenewEUcounter-terrorismprogrammewascode-namedCOTER and was supposed to use existing facilities inGaza and Jericho and not aim to build new trainingcentres.OneimportantfocusofCOTERwastohelpthePalestinianintelligenceservicesbuildanorganisationwithboth intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities.Also a bilateral PNA-EU security understanding wasconcluded, providing for a joint security committeethatwastomeetregularlyinordertoassessPalestiniancounter-terrorism efforts and review cooperation. Theagreement was concluded in April 1998 during PrimeMinisterTonyBlair’s visit to theMiddleEast (Lia2007,301,304–305).

45 Ibid.,28–29.46 Ibid.,41.47 Ibid.,257.

intothehandsofinternationalsmugglerleagues,whichforgeddocumentsforillegalrefugees,ormightbeusedbymilitantstosmugglesuicidebombersintoIsrael.TheproblemofwhatkindofexpertisethedonorsshouldtransfertothePalestinianswasalsoraisedinregardstocommunicationequipment,andin this area Israel intervened to ensure that the PalestinianpolicewereunabletogettheirhandsonadvancedequipmentthatIsraelwouldbeunabletomonitor.48ThisattitudeoftheIsraeliauthoritiesonlyintensifiedfollowing9/11.

In the light of the communication equipment crisis,COPPmadeefforts tomitigatethesituationwithtemporarymeasures.AtCOPP’ssuggestion,theMotorolacommunicationsystem used by the Temporary International Presence inHebron (TIPH), an international observer mission in Hebronwhosemandateexpiredon8August1994,wastransferredtothePalestinianpoliceandbecameitsfirstfieldcommunicationsystem.Thissystemincludedtworepeatersandsome95radiosets.Aftersomeconsultations,theNorwegianMFAagreedtoallocateabout$11,500USDtoupgradethesystemwiththreemore base stations in order to enhance its efficiency in theGaza Strip.49 On 4 January 1996, during a visit to Gaza byJeremy Hanley, the British Minister of State for Foreign andCommonwealth Affairs, a donor agreement was signed forestablishingacommunicationnetworkfortheCivilPolice intheWestBankatanestimatedcostof$2millionUSD.TheequipmentwassuccessfullydeliveredandinstalledjustaheadoftheforthcomingPalestinianelections.50

Manyconclusionsdrawnconcerning theproblems facedby the donor community in assisting the Palestinian policeresembledthosechallengesfacedfirstbythebi-lateralpoliceassistance programme by the DfID, and after its mergerinto the ESDP mission, by EUPOL COPPS itself. The mainchallenges,especiallyintermsofdelivery,canbesummarisedas follows: donors were slow in their decision-making; theIsraelis were intentionally delaying delivery by bureaucratichold-ups or at border crossings; and the PLO was slow toproducetheinformationrequiredtoreleasedonorassistance.AideffortswerealsohamperedbyPalestinian-Israelidisputesover radio frequencies and other security-related matters.51TheconclusionofDrJohnJenkins,theBritishConsulGeneral,about the impact of the international donor assistance wasthatbothmultilateralandbilateralaidchannelledintosecurityassistance had produced very limited results. He furtherstressedtheimportanceofchannellinginternationalassistancethroughaclearmechanism.52

48 Lia2007,271.49 Ibid.,92.50 Ibid.,93.51 Ibid.,109.52 Jenkins in Palestinian Security Sector Governance.

Challenges and Prospects2006,26.


2.3 The Second Intifada and its aftermath

The outbreak of the Second Intifada in September 2000constituted a major setback for the Palestinian police andeverything thathad so far beenestablishedanddeveloped,especiallywithintheCivilPolice.Policeinfrastructuresufferedheavily due to Israeli attacks. Some 45 police buildings andcomplexesacrosstheWestBankandGazaStripweredestroyed,including the Forensic Laboratory at Police Headquarters inGazaCityandthepolicecomplexatRamallah.Communicationsystemswere also targeted. Therewere few if any repeaterstations left intact, resulting in radio coverage limited to aradius of a few kilometres from base stations. These basestationsweregenerallyvehicleradiosetsmountedoncontrolroomdesks.53 Inevitably, theruleof lawcapacityof thePCPwasseriouslyhampered.

The Roadmap had envisaged accountability for the CivilPolice, Civil Defence and Preventive Security lying with theMinister of the Interior. Presidential Decree No.12 of 2002stipulatedthatthePolice,thePreventiveSecurityandtheCivilDefenceareunderthecommandoftheMinistryofInterior.54TheimplementationoftheseprovisionscollapsedwiththeAbuMazengovernment in2003andtheywerenevereffectivelyimplemented, resulting in a situation in which the CivilPolice,CivilDefenceandPreventiveSecuritywerenominallyaccountable to the Minister of Interior, but their respectiveheadssatontheNationalSecurityCouncilchairedbyPresidentArafat.DrKhalilShikaki,DirectorofthePalestinianCentreforPolicySurveyandResearch(PSR),madetheassessmentin2006thattheongoingsecurityreformprocess,therestructuringofforcesandthereorganisationofallsecurityforcesintothreeagencieswerenotbeingseriouslyimplemented.55

53 McIvor 2004, 10. Also the Public Order, Traffic andCriminal Investigations Department complex at Der ElBalah,rebuiltsince2001,wasdestroyedforthesecondtime.

54 Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects2006,45.

55 Shikaki in Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects2006,20.

ThisstateofaffairswasobservedalsobyJonathanMcIvor,Police Adviser in the DfID (UK Department for InternationalDevelopment) lead capacity building project for thePalestinianCivilPoliceand later thefirstHeadofMissionoftheEUPOLCOPPS,whoobservedthatovertpoliticalcontrolandtheabsenceofamechanismtoholdtheChiefofPoliceaccountable for the conduct andperformanceof thepolicemilitatedagainsteffectivepolicing.56

The rationale of international donor assistance to thePalestinian police had to be reassessed as a result of theSecond Intifada. The political and security fragility had leftmanyeffortsduringthepost-Osloperiodinruins,anddonorsmusthaveperceivedthatinvestinginthePalestinianTerritoriesin general, and in the Police in particular, was like sewingwind.57

56 McIvor2004,8.57 The Second Intifada and its consequences also led to

a re-evaluationof theEU’s role inPNAsecurityaffairs.A degree of scepticism was expressed in EU capitalswithregardtoassistingthePalestinianpolicewhenthelatter appeared to be directly involved in the fighting.Counter-terrorismaidwas replacedby EUattempts tointroduce unofficial security monitors on the ground.AnEUmonitoringunitwithmultinationalparticipationwassetupinthePNA-ruledterritoriestoreportonandassistineffortstoconcludeaceasefire.However,Israelstronglyresistedthemove,seeingitasacovertattemptto introduce international observers or peacekeepers.Relations between the EU and Israel also deterioratedasaresultofIsrael’sdestructionoftheEUdonationstothePNAandthePalestinianPolice,notablysurveillanceequipment, communication systems and an expensiveforensics laboratory. In late 2002, the EU was stillmaintaining its special adviser’soffice,but its rolewasreduced tomaintaining contactswith the Palestinians,gauging the possibilities for restarting police trainingandupdatingEUmemberstatesonthesituationontheground.(Lia2007,306)


3 EUPOLCOPPS

The Roadmap published in mid-2003 formed a newframeworkforthepost-Osloera.TheRoadmap,presentedtoPalestinianandIsraelileadersbyQuartetmediators,envisagesconsolidationofallPalestiniansecurityorganisationsintothreeserviceswhichshouldreporttoanempoweredMinisteroftheInterior.ThefocusofthesecurityparagraphintheRoadmapisthat,insteadofenforcingtheruleoflawinthePalestinianterritories,thePalestinianSecurityapparatusconfrontsallthosewhoareengagedinterroranddismantlesterroristcapabilitiesand infrastructure. Furthermore, it is declared that the PNAmust“undertakevisibleeffortsonthegroundtoarrest,disrupt,andrestrainindividualsandgroupsconductingandplanningviolent attacks on Israelis anywhere.”58 There has been anacknowledgementthatarestructured,properlyequippedandtrainedPalestinianCivilPoliceserviceandPublicOrder forcearecrucialtothisprocess. ItwaswithinthisframeworkthattheEUPOLCOPPSwasconceivedanddeliveredbythebilateralDfIDprojectandfinanced,toalargeextent,byDenmarkandNorway.

3.1 The Initial Communications Project and its rationale

The DfID deployed a team of consultants following thepublication of the Roadmap in mid-2003. The purpose wasto assess what assistance might be given both to help thePalestinians meet their obligations under the Roadmap foreffective and restructured Palestinian Security Services” andto develop the PCP as an element of good governance.59ProjectplanningwasfurthertriggeredbyIsraeliPrimeMinisterArielSharon’sannouncementinDecember2003ofunilateraldisengagementfromGazaandpartsoftheWestBank.Thiswould mean an urgent need for capacity building withinthePCP.60Asafirststep,aPoliceAdvisorwasappointedona six-month contract in mid-April 2004 to plan a possibledevelopmentproject.61TheDfID led theUKcommitment to

58 U.S.DepartmentofState2003.59 McIvor2004,5.60 Ibid.,6,14.61 Ibid.,6.

thePCPand,as the initialassessmentstates, theUKwas inturn seen by the European Union as the leading nation insecuritysectorissues.62

TheProjectfact-findingwascarriedoutin2004byinitialvisits to police establishments and police commanders fromJenintoHebronintheWestBankandGazaCitytoRafahintheGazaStrip.63AnAdviser’sOfficewasestablishedatPoliceHeadquarters in Gaza City. The Project started as the auditandinspectionofvehiclesprocuredbytheMinistryofInteriorfortheCivilPoliceasaresultofanassistancegrantbyDfIDof $1 million USD agreed in June 2003, and a task relatedtoExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal(EOD)teamsasaproposaltoprovidethemwithfourfullyequippedLongWheelBase(LWB)Land Rovers and Helmets/Visors/Protective Vests.64 The UKhadalsosupportedtheestablishmentofaCentralOperationsRoominRamallah,responsibleforco-ordinatingtheactionsofanumberofPalestiniansecurityagencies.65

TheteamproducedaPalestinePoliceProjectMemorandum(PPPM)outliningproposalsforathreeyear,£5millionsterlingprojectprogrammeofsupporttothePCPinPhase one,withconsiderationoflongertermsupportinPhase Two.66TheaimofthissupportwastoaddressboththesecurityconcernsofIsrael, particularly in combating the threat posed by terrororganisations,aswellastheneedsofthePalestinianpeopleforimprovedsafetyandsecurity.AfinalProjectdocumentwasnotproducedorofficiallyadoptedowingtotheramificationsofthecollapseoftheAbuMazengovernmentinSeptember2003.67Thedraftremained,however,animportantdocument68and theDfID focusedon the latter objective, seeing reformofthecivilianpoliceasacriticalcomponentofstrengtheningoverallgovernanceinPalestine.69

62 Ibid.,4.63 Ibid.,6.64 Ibid.,6–7.65 PPPM2004,15.66 Ibid.,3.67 McIvor, Jonathan (2004): Assistance to the Palestinian

CivilPolice.InitialReportMay2004,5.68 Ibid.,5.69 PPPM2004,11.


The Project Memorandum states that support for thePalestinian police was widely recognised as having thepotential to contribute to the improvement of the lives ofthePalestinianpeople,byreducingcrimeand insecurityandhelping create the conditions for economic recovery.70 Thisalready demonstrates a good understanding of the humansecurity approach in theplanningphaseof the Project. TheProjectMemorandumfurtherstatesthatthepoliceandothersecurityservicessufferfromacrisisoflegitimacyandcredibilityintheeyesofPalestinianpeople.ThisisnotonlyduetotheirinabilitytocountertheIsraelithreat,butisequallyrelatedtothelackofinternalaccountabilityandthefailuretoprovideforthesafetyandsecurityofthepopulation.71AsurveyconductedbytheGenevaCentreforDemocraticControlofArmedForcesrevealsthatPalestinianrespondentsweremostunhappywiththe performance of the security forces in fighting againstcorruption, in preventing violence against women, and inpreventingdamagetoproperty.72

The initial report proposed a twin track approach toproviding assistance whereby an Operational Plan (mediumterm)wouldrunalongsideaTransformationalPlan(longterm)over a period of three years. The Operational Plan woulddeliver on a day-to-day basis, whilst the TransformationalPlan would be concerned with organisational change andlongtermeffectiveness.73TheinitialreportalreadypredictsapossiblerolefortheEuropeanCommissioninacoordinationmechanism.74 Jonathan McIvor, appointed as Police Adviser,concludesinhisassessmentthataneffectiveandcompetentCivil Police servicewill contribute in largemeasure to Israelisecurityinthelongterm.75

Indigenous efforts were also undertaken following thepublication of the Roadmap. The Abu Mazen governmentproduced two strategy plans in July 2003. These were The Action Plan of the Ministry of Interior on the Managerial and organisational Level, focusing on creating an independentpolicing structure under the Ministry of the Interior andrebuildingtrainingandoperationalfacilities,andThe Ministry’s Plan to Control and organise the Palestinian Street,focusingoncooperationandcoordinationbetweenthevarioussecurityagencies.76 Unfortunately for this development, the AbuMazen government collapsed on 6 September 2003 andwithitanumberofreformsuponwhichtheProjecthadbeenpredicated.77

The PCP, built in the post-Oslo period, consists of some18,000PCPpersonnel:12,000ofthemweredeployedinGaza,ofwhomsome3,100werePublicOrderPolice.Some6,000weredeployedintheWestBank,1,000ofwhomwerePublicOrderPolice.TheorganisationalstructurerevealedgapsintheCommandandControlstructures.CommandandControlisa

70 Ibid.,3.71 Ibid.,3.72 Boccoetal.2006,35.73 McIvor2004,4,15.74 Ibid.,15.75 Ibid.,4.76 Ibid.,9.77 Ibid.,5.

keyissuefortheCivilPolice,notonlyintermsoforganisationalstructure,butalsointermsofinternalcommunication,takinginto account the paucity of radio systems and informationtechnologyandtheinabilityoftheseniorcommandertomovefreelywithinandbetweentheWestBankandGazaStrip.78

In terms of public order capacity, of the 4,100 PublicOrderPolice,3,100weredeployedintheGazaStripandtheremainderat various locations in theWestBank.Theywerefound to be lacking appropriate accommodation, vehicles,communicationsequipment,personalprotectionequipment,longhandledbatonsandriotshields.79Trainingfacilitieswereassessedaspoor,whereassomepotentialwasfoundatmiddlemanagement level.80 The PCP had a functional commandstructurewithveryfewwrittendocuments,guidelinesandrules.Policeofficersintheirmissionsareledwithvocalcommandsand instructionsgivenby their superiors.81Moreover, itwasdiscoveredthatpoliceofficersarenottrainedorinstructedtomakeindependentdecisionsinthefield.82Onlyabout5%ofcrimesendupbeinginvestigated,andcourtaswellaspolicetraining does not include crime investigation. Investigationsare carried out only by order and guidance of higher leveljusticeofficials.83

McIvor’sobservationsinundertakingtheinitialassessmentwere that little attention had been paid to the safety andsecurityneedsofthePalestiniancitizenry,whichshouldbetheprimary concernof theCivil Police.Capacitybuilding in thepast had been skewed towards Israeli security needs.84 ThePCP seemed to lack legitimacy; it seemed to many citizensthat therewasa senseofpurposelessnesswithin thepoliceactivities,whichdidnotcreateconfidence.85Thisconclusionwas spelled out in a Project Memorandum drafted a fewmonthslateronthebasisofMcIvor’sassessment.TherewasadegreeoflackoflegitimacyandcredibilityofthePalestinianpoliceandothersecurityservices,notonlyduetoinabilitytocounter the Israeli threat, but equally related to the lack ofinternalaccountabilityandafailuretoprovideforthesafetyandsecurityof thepopulation.86 In fact, thefearof internalinsecurity due to the activities of local armed groups hasgraduallyincreasedinGaza.87

Communicationequipmenthadalreadybeenpinpointedby donors as the weakest point in the equipment of thePalestinian police during the first wave of internationalassistance in the 1990s.88 At that time, for example, Spain,

78 Ibid.,9.79 Ibid.,11.80 Ibid.,11.81 Interview of Suleiman Khatib, ICT officer, 28 March

2007,Ramallah.82 PresentationatJerichoPoliceSchool,29March2007.83 InterviewofFrankKirby,ProjectCoordinator,27March

2007,Ramallah.84 McIvor2004,9.85 Ibid.,10.86 PPPM2004,3.87 Boccoetal.2006,14,29.88 Lia2007,90.AttheCOPPmeetingon6April1994,ajoint

communicationsystem,tobeusedbyjointPalestinian-


the United Kingdom and Germany had come forward withpromises of communication equipment, but the failure toreachagreementonthefrequencyissuepresentedthemostsignificant obstacle, causing the British government to shipanumberofpreviouslypledgedpolicepatrolvehiclestothePalestinian police without radio communications systems.IsraeliauthoritiesalsophysicallyremovedpoliceradiosfromanumberofSpanishpolicecarsdonatedin1995.89

As immediate priorities, the initial report drafted byJonathan McIvor proposed the following action plans:ExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal (EOD), Support to PublicOrderand Counter Terrorist Units and refurbishment of trainingfacilitiesatJericho.90Thusthisproposalwasmainlymadeupof technical,materialandtrainingassistance.McIvor furtherconcluded that if the goal for civil policing is to create aneffectiveandaccountablepoliceservicecapableofdeliveringonsecurityandsafetyforbothPalestiniansandIsraelis,whichalso secures and maintains public confidence in the rule oflaw, then a comprehensive and strategic development planwillberequired.91Thisledtotheformationofthetwintrackapproach with emphasis on shorter term operational needsandlongertermtransformationalobjectives.

ThePalestinianPoliceProjectMemorandumofNovember2004 contained a risk assessment according to whichthe probability of having no political counterpart on thePalestinianside,andPNAaccountabilityaswellasoversightremaining unclear, was assessed as medium, also resultingpotentially in medium impact on the project.92 The impactof Israeliwithdrawal fromGazaresulting inabreakdownoflawandorderwasassessedashighlyprobable,withahighimpactontheProject.93Theriskassessmentfurtherstateswithhigh probability that rejectionist groups would gain groundasa resultofaheavy-handed Israeli response. Likewise, theprobabilityofinternalconflictwithinthePNAwasassessedas

Israeli patrols, was agreed upon. Spain provided a$130,000USDgranttofinancetheequipment,whichwasputinplaceinmid-July1994.AninternalPalestiniancommunication system was not forthcoming withthe samepromptness. Thiswasoneof thePalestinianpolice’s greatest handicaps as they moved into theGazaStripandJericho.Severedelaysinthedeliveryofcommunicationequipmentwerecausedbyanumberoffactors. The most important obstacle was Palestinian-Israeli disagreement on radio frequencies to be usedbythePalestinianPolice.The Israeliauthorities insistedon their ‘right’ tomonitor all radio communicationbythePalestinianPolice,andrefusedtogranta rangeoffrequencies, which would complicate surveillance. ThePNAwishedtosetupaclosedradiosysteminordertoevade Israeli eavesdropping. Attempting to arrange acompromise, COPP recommended that the PalestinianPolice accept anopen radio system for traditional lawenforcement operations, in which communication isless sensitive,andpostponed the issueof closed radiosystems,buttolittleavail.(Lia2007,9091)

89 Lia2007,92.90 McIvor2004,19.91 Ibid.,14.92 PPPM2004,24.93 Ibid.,25.

high.94Since laterdevelopmentsfollowingHamas’ascenttopowercausedpoliticalturmoilwithintheterritories,theProjectriskassessmentwasaprofessionalandrealisticone,predictingquite correctly the possible future path of development. Asamitigatingfactor,thememorandumstatesthatirrespectiveofthehighprobabilityofinternalconflicts,withouteffectivepolicing the outcomes were likely to be even worse.95 TheProjectMemorandum’sfinal assessmentwas that therewasahighprobabilitythattheProjectwouldnotfullyachieveitspurposeandobjectives.96

3.2 From bi-lateral project to fully-fledged ESDP mission – Establishing EUPoL CoPPS

The EU Coordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support(EUCOPPS)servedasabridgingphasebetweenthebilateralUK-Palestinian Police Support project and EUPOL COPPS,launched at the beginning of 2006. On the basis of thebilateralprogramme,EUCOPPSwasestablishedinApril2005within the office of the EU Special Representative for theMiddleEastPeaceProcess,MarcOtte.97TheestablishmentoftheEUmissionwasfurtherpromptedbytheunilateralIsraeliwithdrawalfromGazaandpartsoftheWestBankinAugust2005,anditsestablishmenthadalreadybeenenvisagedinthePPPMdraftedinNovember2004.98

SeveralrecognisedfactorscontributedtotheestablishmentofEUCOPPS.The Israeliwithdrawal strengthened theneedformoreeffectivecivilpolicingintheareasfallingunderthesphere of the PNA. Supporting the PCP was perceived as acontribution to improving the livesof thePalestinianpeoplebyreducingcrimeand insecurity.TheEUhadalready, inthedeclaration of the European Council on 17–18 June 2004,stateditsreadinesstosupportthePNAintakingresponsibilityforlawandorder,especiallyacknowledgingtherequirementtosupport improvementofcivilpoliceand lawenforcementcapacity.99 The conclusions of the Council of the EuropeanUnion on 3 October 2005 emphasised the importance ofPalestinian security sector reform and the co-ordination ofinternationaleffort inthisregard.TheyfurtherunderlinetheEU’scommitmenttocontinuedandenhancedsupportforthePCPthroughEUPOLCOPPS.100

EUCOPPSconsistedoffourEUPoliceexpertsheadedbyChief Superintendent Jonathan McIvor, and its office wasbasedinthebuildingofthePalestinianMinistryoftheInteriorinRamallah,withasatelliteoffice inGazaCity.TheOffice’srolewas toprovide support forboth immediateoperational

94 Ibid.,26.95 Ibid.,27.96 Ibid.,28.97 EUCOPPS&PCPDPFactsheet.98 PPPM 2004, 4, 12. Endorsed by the GAERC (the EU

GeneralAffairsandExternalRelationsCouncil).99 EU Council Secretariat Factsheet 2005; EU Presidency

Conclusions,Brussels,17–18June2004.100 EUCouncilPressRelease3October2005.


priorities, and longer-term transformational changemanagement.101

During this bridging phase, the Palestinian Civil PoliceDevelopmentProgramme2005–2008(PCPDP)wasproducedjointlybyEUCOPPSandthePCPwithinputfromthePNA.ItscontentwasmainlytheresultofplanningworkshopsheldinJericho inApril 2005.102 ThePCPDP setsout itsobjectiveasthe establishment of a “transparent and accountable policeorganisation with a clearly identified role, operating withina sound legal framework, capableof delivering an effectiveand robust policing service, responsive to the needs of thesocietyandabletomanageeffectivelyitshumanandphysicalresources.”103 The PCPDP came to serve as a blueprint forbuildingamodern,democraticandaccountablepoliceserviceandasaframeworkfordonorassistance.104

The PCPDP, and also the objectives of EU COPPS,were clearly founded on the initial assessment carried outby Jonathan McIvor. The Transformational Plan aimed atfundamentalorganisationalchange,whiletheOperationalPlanenvisagedraisingoperationalcapacityandperformanceintheshorterterm.105TheDfIDapproachofprovidingsupporttothePalestinian police through a co-ordinated donor mechanismwasstronglywelcomedbytheEU,andeventuallyculminatedinendorsementoftheideatoestablishEUCOPPSundertheauspicesoftheEUSR.106

Atthisstagefinancialassistanceandpolicetrainingwereprovided by Spain, the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark.Norway was co-funding the Police Communications ProjectwithDenmarktoenhancecommunicationscapacity inGazaand to build new infrastructure in the West Bank.107AnagreementbetweenDenmark,PNAandEUCOPPSconcerningcommunicationequipmentforthePCPwassignedon2July2005.ThisagreementstipulatesEUCOPPSasanimplementingagency,whichshallmanagetheimplementationoftheProject,including proactive engagement with the Israeli authoritiesfor the release of equipment from customs, and ensurethat procurement, including delivery, installation, warrantymaintenanceandtraining,isundertakeninatimelyway.108

EUCOPPSwastransformedintotheEUPOLCOPPSbytheEUCouncilJointActionofNovember2005.109Thisestablishedan EU PoliceMission in the Palestinian Territories under theESDP,statingthattheMissionwouldhavealongtermreformfocusandprovideenhancedsupporttothePNAinestablishingsustainableandeffectivepolicingarrangements.110The JointActionwasbasedonadraftConceptofOperationdated7October2005,andpreparationsforlaunchingthemissionwerefollowedbythedraftingofanOperationPlanon30November

101 EUCouncilSecretariatFactsheet2005.102 EUCOPPS&PCPDPFactsheet.103 QuotedinEUCOPPS&PCPDPFactsheet.104 EUCouncilSecretariatFactsheet2005.105 EUCOPPS&PCPDPFactsheet.106 PPPM2004,12.107 EUCouncilSecretariatFactsheet2005.108 Agreement2005a.109 CouncilJointAction2005/797/CFSP.110 EUCouncilPressRelease14November2005.

2005.TheJointActionstipulatedthattheoperationalphaseof the Mission would start not later than 1 January 2006.The mission would have a three-year mandate, and wouldassistintheimplementationofthePCPDP,adviseandmentorseniormembers of the PCP and criminal justice systemandalso co-ordinate EUand international assistance to the PCP.Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CommonForeign and Security Policy, appointed Jonathan McIvor asHeadofEUPOLCOPPS111forthePalestinianTerritorieson16November2005.112

The Mission Statement sets objectives for the ESDPPolice Mission. The main objective was to contribute tothe establishment of sustainable and effective policingarrangements under Palestinian ownership in accordancewith best international practice, in co-operation with theEuropean Commission’s institution building efforts as wellasotherinternationaleffortsinthewidercontextofSecuritySector and Criminal Justice Reform. To meet this objective,EUPOL COPPS was to advise and closely mentor the PCP,and specifically senior officials at District, Headquarters andMinisterial level, assist the PCP in implementation of thePCPDP,co-ordinateandfacilitateEUMemberStateassistance,and–whererequested–internationalassistancetothePCP,andadviseonpolice-relatedCriminalJusticeelements.113TheMissionStatementreiteratesobjectivesalreadysetforthintheinitialassessmentoftheDfIDcarriedoutbyJonathanMcIvorin2004.Thedesiredendstateforthemissionwastheexistenceofapoliceorganisationwithsufficientcapacity,whichisbothtransparentandaccountablewithaclearlydefinedrole,whichoperateswithinasoundlegalframeworkandwhichiscapableofdeliveringaneffectiveandrobustpolicingserviceresponsivetotheneedsofsocietyandofeffectivelymanagingitshumanandphysicalresources.

Elements included in the EUPOL COPPS structure were:PoliceHeadofMission (assistedbyaPoliticalAdviserandaSecurityOfficer),AdvisorySection,ProgrammeCo-ordinationSection and Administration Section. The Programme Co-ordinationSectionwasgiventhecrucialtaskofcoordinatingand facilitating EU donor assistance, and, where requested,international donor assistance, to the PCP within theframeworkof thePCPDP,andofdesigningand formulatingprojectsasrequired.114

Incidentally, the official establishment of EUPOL COPPScoincidedwiththePalestinian legislativeelections inJanuary2006, which brought victory for Hamas and led to theformation of the Hamas-led government. This new politicalsetting complicated the objectives set for the new mission

111 The EU Council Secretariat Factsheet dated November2005 spellsout theaimsand scopeofEUPOLCOPPS.The mission would have approximately 33 unarmedpersonnel seconded mainly from EU Member States,and the financial reference amount intended to coverexpenditurerelatedtotheMissionuntiltheendof2006wouldbe€6.1millioneurosascommoncosts.

112 Statement of Cristina Gallach, Spokesperson of JavierSolana,16November2005.

113 CouncilJointAction2005/797/CFSP.114 Ibid.


in supporting the Palestinian police, as the Hamas-ledgovernmentwasboycottedbytheQuartetandtheinternationalcommunitybecauseofitsrefusaltomeetQuartetconditions.Hamas consequently took over control of the Ministry ofInterior,thepoliceforcesofwhichtheESDPMissionhadbeencommissioned to support. Funding of the PNA would haveautomatically been taken as support for Hamas, which wasplacedunderinternationalsanction.ThefreshlylaunchedESDPmission was not, however, called off. The difficulty createdby Hamas control of the MoI was circumvented as follows:thePresident’sOffice,belongingtoFatahandnotsubjecttosanctions,became theownerof the communication systemandthePalestiniantelecommunicationsoperatorBCIEUPOLCOPPSsystemproviderpartnerwascommittedtoavoidlinkingthe system with any fraction not under the control of thePresident’sOffice.Thisarrangementguaranteedcontinuationofthedonorsupport.115

HamasitselfestablishedthenewSpecialExecutiveForce,which periodically raided the police headquarters for publicorder equipment and eventually succeeded in replacing thePCPasthedefactopoliceinGaza.116

The Quartet in its statement on 20 September 2006encouragedgreaterdonorsupporttomeettheneedsofthePalestinian people, with a particular emphasis on securitysectorreform.117

3.3 EUPoL CoPPS Communications Project description

Atthebeginningof2000,thePCPhadmediumtogoodqualityinformationandcommunicationtechnology(ICT)equipmentin some districts (Gaza and Ramallah), which was howeverinsufficienttocoveralldepartments.Someotherdistrictswereparticularlypoorlyequipped(Bethlehem,Jenin),andinotherdistricts(Jericho,Hebron)noequipmentwasavailable.118

ThePalestiniansecurityagencies,includingthePCP,wereallsufferingatthattimefromashortageofcommunicationsequipment(radio,telephone,computersystems).TheshortfallappearedgeographicallytobemuchworseintheWestBankthaninGaza.Theagencieswereequippedwithdifferentradiosystemswhichwereoftenincompatiblewitheachother.Manyofthedeviceswerefoundtobeold,neglectedordamaged.Inmanyareaspolicereliedontheirownmobilephones.119

The PNA made efforts to remedy this situation and inSeptember 2000 imported through Ben Gurion Airportthreenewradiotrunkingsystemswhichweretobeinstalledin the police districts of Hebron, Nablus and Jenin. Owing

115 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Headof Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007,Stockholm.

116 Kaldor&Faber2007,9.117 QuartetStatementonMiddleEastPeace,20September

2006.118 Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police

2005,1–2.119 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head

of Mission and Project Coordinator, 7 February 2007,Stockholm.

to the Second Intifada, Israeli authorities refused release ofthisequipment,whichhassincethenremainedstoredattheairport.120

The armed conflict between Israel and the Palestinians,including several Israeli attacks on the infrastructure of thePCP,especiallyduring2001–2003,damagednotonlybuildingsbutalsoallkindsofcommunicationequipmentandantennamasts.GeographicallytheconditionsinPalestinianterritoriesareverydifferent:theWestBankisverymountainousorhilly,andthereforeneedsmoreantennasthanGaza,whichisflat.Accordingly,adamagedantennaintheWestBankhadmoreimpactoncommunicationcapacitythanadamagedantennainGaza.121

TheequipmentleftundamagedbytheIsraeliattackswaspartly functional. It was mainly very old radio equipmentof different brands, which led to incompatibility ofcommunication equipment. Some radios were inoperativebecause of a shortage of batteries or spare parts. In someWestBankdistricts, thepolicemighthavehadsomeradios,butcommunicationwithpatrollingpoliceofficerswasnearlyimpossible due to the limited antenna coverage from basestations,whichweregenerallyvehicleradiosetsmountedoncontrolroomdesks.122

Within the Palestinian police, the administration ofcommunicationswasdelegatedtoaverysmallunitofpeoplewith technological backgrounds. There seemed tobeagapbetweenthepoliceofficersandengineers.Thepoliceofficerswouldhavelikedtohavemoreequipmentandtheengineersmore elaborate technical tools. Nobody seemed to be inchargeoftheactualneedsassessment.123

The difficult operating environment also made itproblematicproperly todiscussandagreeuponthecontentof the Project Memorandum with the main Palestiniancounterparts–althoughthecloseworkingrelationshipwhichhadbeenestablishedearlierbetweenthePCPleadershipandthe Police Adviser meant that many of the ideas presentedwerealreadyfamiliar.Theviewwastakenthatalthoughtherewereclearlyrisksassociatedwithnothavinggonethroughafully consultativeprojectdesignprocess, theurgencyof thesituationdemandedamore“fit-for-purpose”approach.124

TheCommunicationsProjectwaspartofalargerassistanceprogramme, and its purpose was mostly technical capacitybuilding,althoughtherewerethestatedobjectivesofbuildingpublicconfidenceandoverallcredibilityofthePCPandothersecurityforces.125Tostartwith,EUPOLCOPPSdecidedtocarryout an overall audit of the communication infrastructure,covering not only the PCP but all security forces, in orderto conduct a detailed audit of the current state of the PCP

120 Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police2005,1.

121 Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police2005,1.

122 Ibid.,1.123 InterviewofFrankKirby,ProjectCoordinator,27March

2007,Ramallah.124 PPPM2004,13.125 EUCouncilSecretariatFactsheetJuly2005.


communication infrastructure, to assess the communicationcapacity in the other agencies, to identify the current andfuturecommunicationneedsof thePCPandtorecommendan appropriate communication strategy to meet the needsof the PCP as part of a security agency’s broad integratedcommunicationnetwork.126

The audit was carried out by a German expert in April2005, and a report was submitted to EU COPPS on 21May2005.127 Themainweaknessof theauditwas that theoperational analysis was not carried out, which made theneedsassessmentlessaccurate.128Onthebasisofthisexpert’sfindings, EUPOL COPPS made decisions on activities to beundertaken on short-, mid- and long-term objectives. Theshort-termplanwastobuildaradionetworkbasedonHFlongrangeradiosincombinationwithVHF/UHFshortrangeradiosandrepeaterstomakethesecurityforces,especiallythePCPandNationalSecurity,operationalassoonaspossible.Inthemid-term(1–3years)theexistingtrunkradiosolutionsshouldbe linked to more sophisticated technology. A nation-wideanalogueradionetworkcouldbebuilttocoverthegrowingoralreadyexistingneedsofthesecurityagencies.Thelong-termplanwouldbecreatedbydevelopingacommonInformationandCommunicationTechnology(ICT)Strategytoensurethatall activities and needs of all Palestinian security agencieswouldbeharmonized.129

The PCP was using Motorola, but other systems werealso inuse.Noneof thesesystems functionedperfectlyandtheircoveragewasinadequate.EUPOLCOPPSwasconvincedthattheMotorolaanaloguesystemwasgoodandworthup-grading,andthedecisionwasmadetoimplementthis.130

To sum up, the objective set by EUPOL COPPS was toincreasethecapacityoftheexistinganaloguesysteminordertomeet the requirementsof100%coveragecoverofGazaandtheWestBankandtoupgradethenumberofradiousersatdistrictlevels.131

TheProjectobjectiveswereoutlined in thedevelopmentplanasfollows:afullcommunicationnetworkforthePCPinGaza,afullcommunicationnetworkinsixofninedistrictsintheWestBankwithalimitedlocalcommunicationnetworkintheremainingthreedistricts,technicalcapabilityforthePCPto linkupwithcommunicationnetworkofNationalSecurityForces,morethan100%increaseinhandheldradiocapacityand60%increaseinbasestationradiocapacity,upgradingofalreadyexistingradioequipmentthroughvariousaccessoriesand, finally, an enhanced capacity to operate equipment

126 Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police 2005,2

127 Ibid.,2.128 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head


129 Ibid.130 Ibid.131 Ibid.

deliveredundertheProjectthroughdevelopingeducationandtraining.132

The Project was put together with a Project MonitoringCommittee (PMC) and a Project Management Team (PMT).The functions of the PMC were to be responsible for theachievement of the project result and to channel resourcesneededforimplementationoftheProjecttothePMT.ThePMCwasthedecision-makingbodyandaccountabletothepartnerorganisations.Allpartnerswererepresentedonthecommittee.The PMC had 5 members consisting of representatives ofthePCP,DanishRepresentativeOffice,a representative fromUK Global Conflict Prevention Pool GCPP/UK Departmentfor International Development DfID and EUPOL COPPS. ThePCP Head of Planning and Technical Department chairedthemeetings.Decisionsweretakenbyconsensusofthefivemembers.ThePMCdecidedthecompositionandsizeofthePMT.BothPMCandPMTwereplannedtomeetasnecessaryandallowedtoinviteconsultantsandotherstoparticipateinmeetingsasrequired.ThefunctionofthePMTwasthepracticalimplementation of the project. Its responsibilities includedensuring that activities were implemented as described inthe Project document and in accordance with the scheduleasdecidedbythePMC.TheheadofPMTteamwasaProjectManagerfromthePCP.HisresponsibilitywastoreporttothePMC. The EUPOL COPPS Police Adviser would mentor andsupportthePMTinitsroleintheproject.133

3.4 Stakeholders and beneficiaries

SeveralstakeholdersandbeneficiariescanbeidentifiedintheCommunicationsProjectwithvaryingrolesandactivitylevels.Inthefollowingthesegroupsaredividedintofourcategories:Actorsarethegroupswhohavehadaleadingandcoordinatingroleatsometimeorduringsomepartoftheprocess;Donorsare the groups within the international community whohavebeenfundingdifferentpartsoftheassistanceactivities;Beneficiaries are the actual end-users and their customerswithinthePalestiniancommunity;External actorsaregroupswhohavenottakenpartintheactualassistance,buthavehadsignificantrolesinthebackground.

The main actors were the United Kingdom, EUPOLCOPPS, the EU Special Representative and the PalestiniantelecommunicationsoperatorBCI.TheUKhasplayedaveryactive role in assisting the Palestinians through the years,enjoying a good position within the security sector owingto thehigh levelof trust ithasgained frombothparties tothe conflict, as well as from important external actors suchas U.S. and Egypt. Israel explicitly accepted the UK’s role instrengtheningthePalestiniansecurityapparatusintheformalDisengagementPlan134adoptedbythe16thKnessetattheendof2005.TheUKhada leading role in theestablishmentofEUPOLCOPPS,producinginitialsurveysandcoordinatingthe

132 Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police 2005,4.

133 Ibid.,4–5.134 Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon

– revised,28May2004.


assistanceeffortswhichfollowed.Theleadingagencywithinthe UK was the Department for International Development(DfID).135

ThePalestiniantelecommunicationsoperatorBCI,ownedbySaidBaransi,canalsobeseenasanexternalactororevenas a beneficiary. The BCI was chosen on 14 July 2005 byEUPOLCOPPStobethecontractorsupplyingcommunicationsequipmenttothePCP.136Itsrolehasbeenquitecomprehensive,and without BCI’s commitment and active participation inplanning and problem-solving, the Project would not havebeensuccessful.137

TheUK,DenmarkandNorwaywerethemaindonorsoftheCommunicationsProjectwiththeirexplicitwishtocontributetotheoverallaimtoestablishatransparentandaccountablepoliceorganisation.138

The direct beneficiary of the Communications ProjectwasthePCP.139WithinthePCPthefollowinggroupscanbeidentified:leadership,end-users,technicalstaffandthetrainingcentre. All of these brought slightly different approachesandemphases to theproject,butnotcontradictory ideas.140Indirectly,thewholePalestinianpopulationmustberegardedasthebeneficiary,becausetheProjectProposalfromtheveryinceptionoftheProjectclearlystatesthatoneofitsobjectivesistocontributetoimprovingthelivesofthePalestinianpeopleby reducing crime and insecurity. The direct objective oftheProjectwas tobuild the communication capacityof thePCP inorderto improvecommandandcontrolforallpoliceoperationsassuch,butwiththeshorttermfocusbeingontheIsraelidisengagement.141

ExternalactorstotheProject includedtheU.S.,withtheU.S.SecurityCoordinatorplayinganimportantandvitalrolein obtaining the release of stranded equipment from Israelicustody142. Israel as the occupying power of the PalestinehadandstillhasasignificantroleineverythingthathappenswithinPalestine,andtheirinterestsalsohadtobetakenintoconsiderationsinthisProject.IsraelwasnotactivelytryingtohalttheProject,butalsoneversawanybenefitcomingfromit.143IsraelhascontinuedtoseethePCPasathreat,andthus

135 PPPM2004,15.136 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head


137 LetterfromSaidBaransitoHenrikStiernbladonthePARadioCommunicationNetwork,1March2006.

138 Agreement2005b.Denmark’ssharewastoprovideuptoDKK5million(approx.$800000USD)andNorway’suptoNOK3million(approx.$450000USD).

139 There are also other Palestinian security organisationswhich have had the opportunity to exploit thetelecommunications system but the effects of this aresomewhatvague,andthustheyarenotconsideredasbeneficiariesinthisstudy.

140 Interviews27and28March2007,Ramallah.141 Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police

2005,3.142 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head


143 Interviewof JonathanMcIvor,Chief Superintendent,8March,London.

the freedomofmovementof thePCP isnotguaranteed; infact,theoppositeismostlythecase.PCPrepresentativesaregivennopriorityinpassingthroughroadblockseveniftheyareonanurgentpolicemission.144

OtherexternalactorsincludeEgyptandJordan,whichareimportantplayersondifferentlevelsofthePalestiniansociety.Egypt,inparticular,wasinitiallyseenasakeyplayerconcerningissues relevant toGaza, andhas thus been considered as apotentialactorinprovidingsupporttothePalestiniansecurityservices.GiventheabsenceofassurancesfromtheIsraelisideabout the safety of Egyptian personnel to be deployed todeliverassistanceontheground,theroleoftheEgyptians(aswellasJordanians)hasremainedquitesmall.145

3.5 Project implementation

TheCommunicationsProjectcanbedividedintofourphases.Phase One concentrated on the building of communicationcapacity. Thework started inmid-June2005, and themainpart was accomplished by October 2005. The contractwith the BCI included maintenance for six months, deliveryof equipment and the following installations on the sites:erection of a new and higher antenna mast in Khan Yonis,Gaza,andinstallation,optimizationandtestingofaSmartnettrunking system.This Smartnet trunking systemhadalreadybeenpaidforbyPNA,andhadspentsome34yearsinstorageinGazaundercontrolofthePCP.Thecontractalsoincludederectionofantennamasts inHebron,Nablusand Jeninandinstallationof fully-equipped siteswith trunking systemandrepeatersineachlocationwithaone-yearwarrantyalthoughthe equipment had been bought and paid for by PNA inSeptember2000andsincethenstoredatBenGurionAirport.Inaddition,thecontractincludedtheerectionofpipetowerantennasandinstallationofnewfixedrepeaterstationsinthetowns of Jericho, Tulkarem and Qualkilia to relieve pressureonthemaintrunkingsystemandtoprovideflexibility,andthepurchaseanddistributionof600GP240radiohandsets,50GP280radiohandsetsand90basestations.Also,thepurchaseof accessories, including batteries, antennas and chargers,theeducationandtrainingofpersonnelinthecorrectuseofthe purchased equipment, as well as the training in correctprocedures for radio communications, were stated in the

contract.146

FollowingPhase one,theBCIarrangedasix-daytrainingcourse atBCI facilities inRamallahat theendofNovember2005. The coursewas tailored tomeet the requirementsofthePCPandtheobjectivessetbytheEUPOLCOPPSmissiontoenhancetheradiocommunicationscapabilitiesofthePCPofficers,andtogivethemtheneededskillstotrainpoliceusersandtocarryoutfirstaidmaintenance.Traineeswerefromtheradio communication department of the PCP, and all were

144 Interview of PCP representatives, 27 March 2007,Ramallah.

145 PPPM2004.146 Interview of engineer Mohammed Tamimi, PCP, and

officerSuleimanKhatib,ICT,28March2007,Ramallah.


engineers.Theparticipantsweregenerally satisfiedwith theoutcomeofthecourse.147

Phase Two was a follow-up to improve the existingcommunication infrastructure in Gaza, and the work waslaunchedinlateOctober2005.148IthadbecomeapparentthatinGazaCityarea, theexisting14channelswere insufficientforeffectivecommunication.Thiswasprimarilybecauseothersecurityorganisationsthanthecivilpolicewereusingthesamecommunicationsystem.Thesystemwasoverloadedwiththeresultthatdelayswerecreatedandeffectivecommunicationhampered.Forthisreason,EUPOLCOPPSdecidedtopreparea project proposal, in collaboration with the PCP, on radiochannel capacity expansion in Gaza City Smartnet TrunkingRadioSystem.Theprojectwasintendedtoresultinimprovedcommunication infrastructure in Gaza City with reducedqueuing when using the system. There was an agreementthat that BCI would order, deliver and install the necessaryupgradeequipmentat theSmartnetTrunkingSystemsite inGazaCity.149

Ithadalreadybeenanticipatedduringtheplanningphasethat the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) would perhaps preventcommunication equipment entering PNA territories. Thisactually happened, the equipment was not released by theIsraelis, and therefore some equipment was moved fromBethlehemtoGaza.150

Phase Threeoftheprojectwaseffectivelyamaintenancecontract of the system after the expiry of the maintenancepartoftheinitialphase.Aftersomewhatlengthynegotiations,thecontractwiththeBCIcameintoeffectatthebeginningofDecember2006foraperiodofoneyear.151

Phase Four was a continuation of activities without anyadditionalformalagreements.ThemainconcernsoftheProjectManagementCommitteeweretheoptimisationofthesystem,trainingissuesand,aboveall,sparepartsandbatteries.152

Maintenanceconstitutesacontinualproblem.Maintenanceoftheradionetworkismeantsimplytokeeptheequipmentfunctional. Themost recent purchasewasmade two yearsago, which also indicates that all the batteries are at leasttwo years old. Their working time is about 10 minutes.153From May 2006 until December 2006, no resources wereavailable for maintenance of the network. Simultaneously,the U.S. supported financially the Presidential Guard, whichnowhasnewradiohandsetsandbasestationswithfunctionalmaintenance.154 To remedy this worsening situation, the

147 BCITrainingCourseReport,3January2006.148 Communication infrastructure improvement phase 2

2005.149 Interview of Said Baransi, managing director of BCI

communicationscompany,28March2007,Ramallah.150 Interviewof JonathanMcIvor,Chief Superintendent,8

March2007,London.151 Maintenance of Palestinian Civil Police Communications

Infrastructure2006.152 Project Management Committee minutes, 7 March

2007.153 InterviewofFrankKirby,ProjectCoordinator,27March

2007,Ramallah.154 Ibid.

maintenance contract for the period from 1 December2006 until 30 November 2007 between EUPOL COPPS andthe BCI was signed in November 2006.155 The objective ofthis contractwas to ensure that the PCP continues tohaveradiocommunicationcapacitytoexertcommandandcontrolover police operations. This was to be achieved by the BCIproviding technical service and maintenance of the existingradionetworkandallportable,mobileandbaseradiosinusebythePCP.156

TheHamasvictoryinthePalestinianlegislativeelectionsinJanuary2006alsohadanegativeimpactonthefutureplansoftheCommunicationsProject,butsmallscaleimprovementshavebeenongoingsincethetransferofpower.157AstheBCIcontractwascomingto itsend inspring2006, thedecisionwasmadetocarryoutapost-procurementauditoftheProject.EUPOLCOPPScontractedHartSecurityUKLimitedtoprovidean independentcommunicationexpert toconduct thepost-procurementauditfortheCommunicationsProject.Theauditwas carried out during two weeks in March 2006, and theresultpraisedtheBCIforitscompetenceandleveloftechnicalexpertise.158TheexpertvisitedalltheTrunkedsystemsintheGazaStripandWestBankandhadmeetingswithSaidBaransi.EUPOLCOPPSwasrecommendedtocontinueusingtheBCIasthecontractorforthecommunicationnetwork.159

EUPOLCOPPS recordsof thecontractwere found tobesatisfactory, and the documentation was present, correct,and up-to-date, with files in systematic order. The expertrecommendedtheagreementtobeamendedtoincludetheprovisionbytheBCIofamonthlyStatusReportatthesamefixeddateeverymonthtoEUPOLCOPPS.160

Thereportalsofoundsatisfactionofdonorrepresentativesto be excellent. As in the previous audit, the importanceof maintenance was emphasised. If the equipment is notmaintainedproperly,itdoesnotfunctionproperly.ItappearedthattheattitudeofthePCPreflectedafailuretounderstandtheimportanceofmaintenance.161

3.6 Project results

Said Baransi as the system provider lists the EUPOL COPPSshort term Communications Project results as follows: theProjectprovidedthePalestiniansecurityagencieswithmuchbetter voice communication, 100% coverage in the GazaStrip,and60–70%coverageontheWestBank,anincremental

155 MaintenanceofPalestinianCivilPoliceCommunicationsInfrastructure2006.

156 Interview of Said Baransi, Managing Director of BCIcommunicationscompany,28March2007,Ramallah

157 InterviewofFrankKirby,ProjectCoordinator,27March2007,Ramallah.


159 HARTSecurityUKLtd2006b;2006a.160 HARTSecurityUKLtd2006b.161 Interview of Henrik Stiernblad, former Deputy Head



improvementinboththePCPandNSFcommandandcontrolcapabilities,supportoftheinteroperabilitybetweenthePNASecurityForces,improvedmotivationofthePCPandincreasedcredibilityofthePNASecurityForces.162

The PCP has 8 radio networks built with Motorolaequipment: Jericho, Jenin, Ramallah, Bethlehem, Hebron,NablusandtwointheGazaStrip.Thenetworksarepositionedwithoutgeneralplanning.Theircoverageareaisexcellentandhasalotofoverlap.Theresultmighthavebeenmoreefficientbyconcentratingresourcesontwoorthreenetworks.163

Databasessuchascriminal,weaponandvehicleregistersconstitutethebackboneofefficientpolicework.ThePCPhasconnectedthecompilationoftheseregisterswithdigitalisingthe radio networks.164 At the moment, the present level ofregisters, bywhich eachpolice stationhas its own registersbased only on knowledge from its own area, is more anadministrativethanatechnicalproblem.165

Many handicaps were identified during theCommunicationsProjectthatcanberemediedbyproperandprofessional training. The manner of communicating withradios is ineffective. Point topoint discussions are longandinformal,whichstrainsthecapacityofbatteriesandengageslimited channel capacity. The coverage of main masts andrepeatersisnotutilisedincooperation.Policeofficersarenottrainedtoshiftfromtheirownchannelstochannelsoftheirneighbouringpolicestation;mostoftheofficersdonotevenknowthatthis ispossible.Theoneswhoknowarenot inapositiontomakechangesinpolicy.Radiosareusedlikemobilephonesforbilateralcommunication.166

The technology delivered is quite appropriate, althoughtowards the end of its life span in some respects. The PCPtechnology staff would be eager to utilise more moderndigital,forexample,TETRAtechnology,althoughtherearenoclearneeds to justify thisdemand, taking intoconsiderationthatthelevelofdigitalrepositoriesisverylowwithinthePCP.

162 LetterfromSaidBaransitoHenrikStiernbladonthePARadioCommunicationNetwork,1March2006.


164 Interview of engineer Mohammed Tamimi, PCP, andofficerSuleimanKhatib,ICT,28March2007,Ramallah.



The HART audit states that the ComNet is currenttechnology,TETRAcapableandlikelytoremainthiswayforatleastthenext5years,andprobablyforlonger,upto10years.The ComNet is scaleable and may be enhanced to includedual analogue/digital and digital equipment enabling digitalencryptionandthetransferofdata/video,forexample.167

TheAuditemphasisestheimportanceofthePNAensuringthatadequateandappropriatesecurityexistsattheMotorolatrunkedsystemsitestopreventtheftorlossofinfrastructure.Similarly,theauditrecommendsthatthePNAneedstobecomeinvolvedand take responsibility toensure the trainingof allusers of radios and/or equipment, especially in appropriatevoiceprocedures.168

Many training courses have been delivered by donorcountries. Training continues to be seen as a priority andis being delivered by the PCP and NGOs on a daily basis.Facilities,however,arepoor.Thereisalackofteachingspaceand instructionalequipment.TheTrainingCentreat Jericho,although the completion of buildings is still taking place,couldpotentiallybeanimportantandvaluabletrainingasset.Themajorityoftrainingneedsarelikelytobemetbyinternaltrainers,manyofwhomareexceptionallywellqualifiedandexperienced. In principle, any additional training shouldbe delivered “in country”, as this is the most cost effectivemethodandmorelikelytotargettherightpeople.

It is obvious that PCP ambitions for the communicationnetworkarehigherthanthoseachievedandenhancedthroughtheCommunicationsProjectandcurrentlyinusebythePCPandothersecurityfactionswithinthePNA.Digitalisingisthenextstepinradionetworkdevelopment.Inaddition,thePCPwantstoacquireend-to-endencryptedcommunications.169

167 HARTSecurityUKLtd2006a.168 HARTSecurityUKLtd2006a.169 Interviews of PCP representatives, 27 and 28 March

2007,Ramallah.


4 Conclusions

4.1 The challenge of the political context

Owing to the extremely complicated political setting withina protracted Israeli-Palestinian conflict, launching an ESDPmission in the Palestinian territories was no uncomplicatedmatter.Themissionwastobelaunchedinanareathatlackedrecognisedsovereigntywhilesimultaneouslygoingthroughatransitionandinstitutionbuildingprocess.TheHamasascenttopowerinGazafurthercomplicatedmattersbyputtingthesecondESDPmissionattheRafahbordercrossingintolimbo.Asthesecuritysectorbecamede factodividedbetweentheWestBankandGaza,theESDPmissiondealingwithsecuritysectorissueswasdoomedtobecomepartiallyandtemporarilyineffective.EUPOLCOPPScontinuedtooperateontheWestBankontheunderstandingandassumptionthatinternationalsanctionsimposedonHamasandministriesunderitscontroldidnot affect the legalityof theESDPmissionas longas itoperatedundertheauspicesofthePresident’sOffice.

OneofthecoresuccessesofEUPOLCOPPShasbeenthefact that theEUhassucceeded inestablishingabridgeheadforaninternationalEU-ledcrisismanagementmissionintheoccupiedterritories.ESDPmissionsrepresentEUpolicyandamissionintheMiddleEast,volatilebutgeographicallyincloseproximitytotheEU,isofparamountimportance,andnotonlyintermsofEUsecurityanddefence.AnEUcrisismanagementmission increases EU credibility and political weight, andreinforcesitspositionasthebiggestdonorforthePalestinian

territories.Consequently,theestablishmentoftheESDPmissionitself

in thePalestinian territoriescanbe regardedasasignificantdevelopmentforEUsecurityanddefencepolicy.Ithascertainlyalsobeenwelcomedby theFatah-ledPalestinianauthoritiesas strengthening, albeit indirectly, political recognition forPalestiniansandtheiraspirationsofsovereignty.Israelhasnevergiventhemissionfullaccreditationinlinewiththeirtraditionalresistance and suspicion about international peacekeepingand crisis management involvement, not only in Palestinebut in the surrounding areas as well. Lack of accreditationhasnodoubthampered theoperational activities of EUPOLCOPPS.Politically,itwasalsoanintelligentandwell-conceiveddecisiontoconcentrateonimprovingthePCP,thusfocusing

onthesecurityofordinaryPalestinians,insteadofgoingwiththeflowandsupportingmainlyU.S.-financedPalestinepolicetrainingprogrammeswithinanoverallframeworkofthefightagainst terror.170 EUpolicy and the Project itself hada clearagenda from the very beginning which showed a healthygrass-rootsandbottom-upapproach.

4.2 operational prospects and barriers

Operationally,themostsignificanttaskofEUPOLCOPPSwasto enhance radio communication of the PCP. Based initiallyon a bi-lateral UK–Palestinian project, the CommunicationsProject demonstrated from its inception a very professionalproject planning capability taking into accountmanyof theuncertaintiesprevailing inthisextremelychallengingpoliticalcontext.Alreadyduringtheplanningphase itwaspredictedthat eventually there would be a different political order inGaza, and its impact was quite correctly assessed. Missionplanning,atleastwhenanalysedonthebasisofdocumentaryevidence,seemsgood intermsofquality.TheProject targetwasjustifiablychosentobeapoliceorganisationinchargeofeveryday security for Palestinians. It was logically concludedthat increasedeffectivenessof the PCPwould contribute toincreasedsecurityof Israeland Israelisalike. ImprovingradiocommunicationsforthePCPdidnotrequireinstallingsecurecommunications, which would only have complicated thewhole undertaking unnecessarily and made it even moresuspiciousfromtheIsraelipointofview.

Capacity building was not only perceived in termsof improving technical capability, but also coupled withappropriate training for the police personnel using andmaintaining communication systems. Although the lack of

170 At the beginning of 2007, the U.S.A. SecurityCoordinatorappointedtoassistthePalestinianPresidentandstrengthenhiscontroloversecurityforceshasathisdisposalsome$59millionUSD,whichisplannedtobespentonstrengtheningthePresidentialGuard.Therisk,accordingtooneobserver,isthattheseotherforceslikethe Presidential Guard or the Special Executive Forcewill lead to the establishment of more “quasi-militarybrigades” while weakening the PCP. (Kaldor & Faber2007,13)


communication equipment and capability among the PCPwasclearlydemonstrated,themainobstacletoeffectiveandoperational communication seemed to lie in the inefficientmanner of using communication. The ultimate aim of theproject,risingaboveimprovingmeansandtools,wasthereforethe transformationof theoperatingandworking cultureofthePCP.Itappearsthatanevenmorerobustapproachinthefieldofcommunicationtrainingwouldhavebeenrequiredinordertoachievethestatedobjectives.

The changed political reality brought the Project to astandstillinGaza,wherethebuildingsoftheMinistryofInteriorwerealsotakenoverbyHamas,whiletheProjectcontinueditsactivitiesintheWestBank.Whilethereisacredibleevidenceofincreasedcommunicationcapacity,itismoredifficulttopointto clear evidence of transformed working and operationalculture.Thiswillcertainlytakeamuchlongertime,adecadeatleast,toachieve,andthereforethisparticularmissioncannotbe judged on the basis of apparently slow transformational

change.AdifferentviewpointonEUPOLCOPPS,outsideitsregional

andpoliticalcontext,issuppliedbyitspositionwithintheEUbureaucracy.Itappearsthatthedifficultiesinestablishingthemission were aggravated by the slow and complicated EUbureaucracy.ItisunacceptablethatimportantpolicytoolssuchasESDPmissionsareindangeroflosingtheircredibilitybecauseadministrative and logistical support is not provided quicklyandeasilyenough.Transparencyisneededinallphasesofthemissionplanningandexecution,butthiscannotbeanexcuseforendangeringoverallobjectivesofamissionthathasbeenapprovedbyallEUmemberstates.Bureaucracyandmodalitiesat EU level must be revised on the basis of this and otherESDPmission experiences inorder toguaranteeunhinderedoperational capability from theverybeginning. Inparticular,theprocurementprocessmustbemade,whilecertainlynolesstransparentthanbefore,smootherandfaster.171

Procurement in ESDP missions constitutes an issue thatcan impede taking action in a timely and speedy manner.Commission rules require competition in the procurementprocess,whichintermsofaccountabilityandtransparencyiscertainlylegitimateandnecessary.Acrisisandconflictsituationmay,however,demandaveryquickresponseinprocurement,too, in order to execute decisions made on the EU politicallevelandbythememberstates.Thereforeagapmayappearbetween the need and will to act quickly and the practicalcapacitytoexecutethepoliticalwillbecauseofthedecision-making bureaucracy of ESDP missions. Jonathan McIvorwitnesseddifficult and slowEUbureaucracy inactionwhenthe time was ripe for decision-making, and this hampered

171 LessonsfromthisandotherESDPmissionshaveinfactled to re-structuring of DGE IX which is in charge ofciviliancrisismanagementattheBrussels level.CivilianPlanning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) within theCouncilSecretariathasbeenoperationalasofautumn2007 with the specific task of improving missionplanning,administrationandlogistics.Thecomingyearswillshowwhetherthisre-structuringwillleadtoalongawaitedimprovementwithintheCouncilSecretariat.

actual operational activity.172Clear and transparent strategicdirection, one of the Human Security principles, and in thiscaseonthepartofEUinstitutions,wasunsatisfactoryinthisparticularsituation.

Thesamerigidityinselectingstaffforthemissionmadeaskill-basedapproachdifficult. The skills andcompetencesoftheProjectparticipantsintheEUPOLCOPPSwerenotineveryrespect appropriate to this type of project. The participantswereexperiencedpoliceofficersexperiencedinlegalmatters,but not specialists in third world development work ortelecommunications. The assumption of EU Member Stateswas that the required mission personnel for an ESDP PoliceMission like EUPOLCOPPS canbe foundwithin the variousmemberstates’policeservices.Thisassumptionprovedtobeincorrect,andthepossibilityofhiringspecificcivilianexpertisein technology or project management, for example, fromoutside the various police services should be guaranteed.173AmoresystematictrainingofESDPmissionmemberswouldpartlyremedyinefficiencycausedbyunawarenessoftheESDPculture,decision-makingsystemandbureaucracyinBrussels.

TheprojectapproachutilisedinEUPOLCOPPSprovedtobeausefulcrisismanagementapproach,easilytailoredtomeeta particular need, manageable, transparent and economic.Moreover, it providedauseful anddeployable linkbetweencivilian crisis management missions and development aid.Linkingofbi-lateralprojects insupportofESDPciviliancrisismanagementshouldbeencouraged.

4.3 Human Security principles as the Project framework

ProfessorMaryKaldor,withherHumanSecurityStudyGroupat the London School of Economics and Political Sciences,hasalso reviewedESDPmissionsdeployed in thePalestinianterritoriesagainstsixprinciplesofHumanSecurity.ThereisnodistinctionbetweenthePoliceandtheBorder(EUBAMRafah)missioninhersummaryfindings,butaccordingtoherstudythere are problems especially in the principles concerninglegitimatepoliticalauthority,clearandtransparentmandate,effectivemultilateralismandintegratedregionalapproach.174

IncontemplatingtheseprinciplesstrictlyfromtheMissionpointofview,thepictureissomewhatbrighter.MissionandProject planning documents bear witness especially to theprimacy of human rights, and to the Mission having beenplannedwithclearobjectivestoenhancethecapabilityofthePCP,whichisprimarilyinchargeofsecurityissuesconcerningordinaryPalestiniancitizens.

LegitimatepoliticalauthorityisperhapsthegreatestconcerninrespectofthisMission,aswhileinvitedandwelcomedbythe Palestinian authorities and approved as a mission by allEUmemberstates,theMissionneverreceivedrecognitionandaccreditationfromIsrael.Itwasclearfromtheoutsetthatthislackoffulllegitimatepoliticalauthoritywouldcomplicatethe

172 Interviewof JonathanMcIvor,Chief Superintendent,8March2007,London.

173 McIvor’se-mailtoAriKerkkänenon28May2008.174 TheMadridReport2007,20.


Mission itself. Moreover, the predicted but still unexpectedpoliticaloutcomefromthePalestinian legislativeelectionsatthebeginningof2006dividedPalestinianterritoriesintotwohalves,wherebycontinuationoftheProjectinGazaprovedtobeextremelydifficult.

While theMissionhada clear and transparentmandateforitself,itlackedthesignificancetoconnectitproperlywithotherEUactors’andagencies’operations inPalestine/Israel,aswellaswithEUinvolvementintheQuartet.Mandatesmusttake into consideration better other EU and internationalactors in the theatre in order to cooperate and coordinatemoreeffectively;suchscrutinyalsoassistsindefiningthelimitsofmandatesandspheresofcooperation.

ThefactthatthePCPwasthemainrecipientoftheProjectand the Mission itself, with its already stated objectives,demonstratesagoodunderstandingofabottom-upapproach.Thereisevidenceeverynowandthenthatcivilsocietyanditsviewsarebeingconsideredandtakenintoaccount,butforamoreprofoundengagement,agenuinebottom-upapproachwould require a wider engagement of the Palestinian civilsocietyindifferentphasesoftheProject.

Effectivemultilateralism is to someextentevident in theMission and its Project, especially close coordination withU.S. SecurityCoordinatorsandvariousdonor countries. TheU.S. consultation has been necessary in spite of the risk ofbeingdrawn into security sectordevelopment aimednot atincreasing grass-roots level security but at implementing amore“politicised”securityagenda.Manymatters relatedtoeffectivemultilateralismandanintegratedregionalapproachshouldbetakenintoaccountasearlyasthemissionplanningandmandatedraftingphase,assumingallthetimeappropriateEUpoliticalsupportfromBrussels.

Analysis of operationalisation of the Human SecurityprinciplesbyusingEUandESDPmissionsasatestcaserevealssome shortcomings in understanding the operationabilityof Human Security. It appears that the way in which theseprinciplesareoperationalisedandmadeusablebypractitionersdependstoalargeextentonthelevelatwhichtheseprinciplesarebeingoperationalised.Usingtheseprinciplesasbenchmarkson a planning and strategic decisionmaking level seems tobeeasierthanputtingthemintopracticeonthegrass-rootslevel.Thesameprinciplesdonotnecessarilyresonateamongthose who are carrying out day-to-day crisis managementactivitiesinthefield.Takingasexampleprinciplesofeffectivemultilateralism and integrated regional approach and thenimagining how these would be implemented by a middle-level practitioner whose area of responsibility both in termsofmandateandregionare limited.Therefore,whenlookingat EUPOL COPPS through the prism of the Human Securityprinciples on the very strategic and EU decision makinglevel, there seemtobegaps ineffectivemultilateralismandintegrated approach. These would of course be key factorsfor the overall success of the mission, but at the sametime, they arenot crucial for an individual practitionerwhodesirestoabidebytheHumanSecurityprinciplesbyputtingforwardtheagendatoprotectpeople.Thisistosuggestthatoperationalisation of the Human Security principles requires

avariedapproachdependingonthelevelatwhichtheywillbeoperationalised.Havingsaidthis,theoperationalisationwillonlysucceediftheseprinciplesarecomprehensivelytakenintoaccountonthestrategiclevel.Thereforeatop-downapproachtooperationalisationisnecessaryinordertocreateconditionsfor thebottom-upapproach,oneof thebasic tenetsof theHumanSecurityprinciples.

EUPOL COPPS complies to a large extent with manyHumanSecurity priorities. Retrospective analysis strengthensthe view that these major principles, some of them evenfurther modified and revised, would serve as a tangiblebenchmarks from the planning phase of any ESDP missiononwards,continuingasameanstoevaluateamissionduringitslifetime,andestablishingcriteriatoevaluatemissionshortandlongtermobjectivesaftertheendofthemission.Makingthese principles operational requires however a differentapproachontheplanningandstrategylevelfromthegrass-rootpractitionerlevel.

EUPOLCOPPSisanongoingmissionandwillbeevaluatedmany times in the future.Theseconclusions suggest that inthis small ESDP mission with its high political significance,operationalgoalshavepartlybeenachieved,butachievementhasbeenhamperedbythepoliticaldevelopmentaswellasbytheneedformoretime-consumingtransformationalchange.Human security principles are quite well followed by themissionitself,provingthatprinciplesproposedbytheMadridReportcouldbeevenmoresystematicallyfollowedbyallESDPmissions, thus ensuring a more systematic and structuredattachmenttoHumanSecurity,andmakingHumanSecuritystandardpractise,andverypracticalinamissionenvironment.Compliancewiththeseprinciplesonthestrategicandpolicymakinglevelthatledtotheestablishmentofthismissionwaslesstangibleandmorevague.

Control over the security sector lies at the veryheart ofthe internalpowerstrugglebetweenFatahandHamasover

Palestine.175 It is noteworthy that the trust in the PCP hadfallenbetweenJuly2005andMay2006despitethefactthatit had undergone an internationally assisted reform processduringtheprevious12months.ThereducedtrustinthePCPindicates that, in the eyes of the public, recent reform andrehabilitation efforts had not been successful. In the searchfor an explanation, three assumptions must be considered:the reform process failed to produce tangible outcomes, itproducedoutcomesbutnotthosevaluedbythepublic,andlastly, it produced the expectedoutcomes, but thepublic isunaware of them, because these had not been properlycommunicated.176 It is also to be noted that any impact onthesecurity sector in thePNA isdifficult toachievewithoutsimultaneous progress in the field of judiciary. Increasingefficiency of the police has no sustainable effect on overallsecurityandfeelingsofsecurityaslongasahugebacklogofpendingcourtcasesexists.177

175 CrisisGroupMiddleEastReport2007,5,7.176 Boccoetal.2006,33–34.177 AccordingtooneestimatebyaEuropeandiplomatthere

isabacklogofabout50000casesinGazaalone.CrisisGroupMiddleEastReport2007b,9,footnote77.


Thedesiredend state for theMissionwas theexistenceof a police organisation with sufficient capacity, which isboth transparent and accountable with a clearly definedrole,operateswithinasoundlegalframework, iscapableofdeliveringaneffectiveandrobustpolicingserviceresponsivetotheneedsofsocietyandisabletomanageitshumanandphysicalresourceseffectively.GoodplanningandestablishmentoftheMissionproducedapromisingstart,whichwasmainlyhamperedbythenewpoliticalsetting.TheMissionendstateisstillfaraway,butthisdoesnotmitigatetheusefulnesssofarof thisparticularmission, itsoverall significanceandwhat ithasalreadyachieved.


Interviews and other field trip material

InterviewsofPCPrepresentatives,27and28March2007,inRamallahbyHannuRantanenandJariSundqvist.

InterviewofSaidBaransi,ManagingDirectorofBCICommunicationsCompany,28March2007,inRamallahbyHannuRantanenandJariSundqvist.

InterviewofMohammedTamimi,engineer,PCP,28March2007inRamallahbyHannuRantanenandJariSundqvist.

InterviewofSuleimanKhatib,ICTofficer,28March2007inRamallahbyHannuRantanenandJariSundqvist.

InterviewofFrankKirby,ProjectCoordinator,UnitedKingdom,27March2007inRamallahbyHannuRantanenandJariSundqvist.

InterviewofJonathanMcIvor,ChiefSuperintendent,UnitedKingdom,8March2007inLondonbyAriKerkkänen.

InterviewofHenrikStiernblad,formerDeputyHeadofMissionandProjectCoordinator,7February2007inStockholmbyAriKerkkänenandHannuRantanen.

LetterfromSaidBaransitoHenrikStiernblad,1March2006.Subject:ThePARadioCommunicationNetwork.

PresentationandvisittotheJerichoPoliceSchool29March2007ofHannuRantanenandJariSundqvist.

official documents and project related documents

Agreement(2005a).AgreementbetweenDenmarkandPalestinianAuthorityandCoordinatingOfficeforPalestinianPoliceSupportconcerningCommunicationEquipmentforPalestinianCivilPolice(104.PAL.21-7),signedon2July2005.

Agreement(2005b).AgreementbetweentheGovernmentoftheKingdomofNorway,thePalestinianAuthorityandEUCoordinationOfficeforPalestinianPoliceSupportregardingCommunicationEquipmentforPalestinianCivilPolice,signedon4August2005.

BCITrainingCourseReport,3January2006.

Communication Equipment for Palestinian Civil Police(2005):ProjectrelatedtotheimprovementofabetterinformationandcommunicationsystemsbetweenPalestinianCivilPolice,UKGlobalConflictPreventionPool,DenmarkandEUCOPPS.ProjectDocument,DevelopmentPlan,12June2005,Projectcode03C1/02/2005.

References


Communication infrastructure improvement phase 2(2005):ProjecttoimproveexistingcommunicationinfrastructureforPalestinianCivilPoliceinGazacity(upgradefrom14channelsto28channels).ProjectDocument,DevelopmentPlan,24October2005,Projectcode03C1/04/2005.

Disengagement Plan of Prime Minister Ariel Sharon – revised(2004).AddendumA–28/02/2004.http://www.knesset.gov.il/allsite/QGenTxt_eng.asp.

EuropeanUnionCoordinatingOfficeforPalestinianPoliceSupport(EUPOLCOPPS)&PalestinianCivilPoliceDevelopmentProgramme2005–2008,Factsheet.

HARTSecurityUKLtd(2006a):Post Procurement Audit report. Communication Network for Palestinian Civil Police,31March2006.

HARTSecurityUKLtd(2006b):EUPoL CoPPS – Independent Communications Infrastructure Audit.ProjectSummarySheet,4April2006.

Maintenance of Palestinian Civil Police Communications Infrastructure(2006).ContractbetweenJonathanMcIvor,HeadofMission/PoliceCommissioneroftheEUPOLCOPPSandBCIforCommunication&AdvancedTechnology,Ramallah,representedbySaidBaransi,11November2006.

McIvor,Jonathan(2004):Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police. Initial report May 2004 (Update July 2004).DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment.

ProjectManagementCommitteeminutes,7March2007.

U.S.DepartmentofState(2003):A Performance-Based roadmap to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.PressStatement,OfficeoftheSpokesman,Washington,DC,April30,2003.http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2003/20062.htm.

European Council

CouncilJointAction2005/797/CFSPof14November2005ontheEuropeanUnionPoliceMissionforthePalestinianTerritories.

CounciloftheEuropeanUnion:PressReleaseofthe2679thCouncilMeetingon3October2005(12515/1/05REV1,Presse242).

CounciloftheEuropeanUnionPressRelease14402/05(Presse295)on14November2005.

EUCouncilSecretariatFactsheetJuly2005:EU Assistance to the Palestinian Civil Police.PAL/02(update2),8July2005.http://www.consilium.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/050708_EU_Coord_Office_Palestinian_Police.pdf

EUCouncilSecretariatFactsheet,EUPOLCOPPS/01,November2005

European Commission

Commission of the European Communities. Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours.COM(2003)104.11March2003,p3.

http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf(accessed19February2008).

DeclarationofPrinciples,ArticleVIII:Publicorderandsecurity.

EuropeanCommissionPressRelease.17December2007.http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/07/1938&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en#fn1(accessed19February2008)

EUPresidencyConclusions,Brussels,17and18June2004.

StatementofCristinaGallach,SpokespersonofHRSolana,on16November2005(S368/05).

QuartetStatementonMiddleEastPeace,20September2006.S261/06.http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/91035.pdf.


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Friedrich,Roland(2004):Security Sector reform in the occupied Palestinian Territories.Jerusalem:Passia.

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Palestinian Security Sector Governance. Challenges and Prospects(2006).Jerusalem:PalestinianAcademicSocietyfortheStudyofInternationalAffairs,PASSIA&Geneva:GenevaCentrefortheDemocraticControlofArmedForces(DCAF).http://www.dcaf.ch/_docs/bm_palestinian_ssg.pdf.

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Human Security in Post-Status KosovoaSharedEuropeanResponsibility

Tanja Tamminen

The Human Security Doctrine for EuropeistheworkofaStudyGroupledbyProfessorMary

Kaldor.Thisarticlewillanalyseif,how,and,towhatextenttheconcreteimplementationofthe

HumanSecurityDoctrineproposalsareusefulinthepost-statussituationinKosovo;especially

inregardstothelaunchingoftheEUciviliancrisismanagementoperation.Itisarguedinthis

articlethatthehumansecurityconceptisimportantinparticularwhenimprovingtheEU’s

performanceandeffectivenessonthegroundincrisisareas.Thiscanbeachieved,forexample,

byintroducingthehumansecurityapproachintotheEU’scrisismanagementpre-deployment

training.1

1 ThemanuscriptwasfinishedforthefirstApplying Human Security in Crisis Management TrainingattheCMCFinlandinJanuary2008.


1 Introduction

TheKosovostatusnegotiationsareover,andKosovoparliamentwas elected in free2 and fair electionson the17November2007;nowtheworldprepares for the independenceof thisdebatedregion3.ThemajorityoftheinhabitantsbeingKosovoAlbanians,thepositionofKosovointheformerYugoslaviawasmarginal;itwasapoorandunderdevelopedregionproducingagriculturalgoodsandrawmineralsforexporttootherareasof the federation. During the Ottoman period Kosovo wasalreadyconsideredaspartofthemarginalborderregionsofthestate.Asaborderregionbetweenthepastandthefuture,between shattering Ottoman Empire and the strengtheningnation-statesintheBalkans,KosovowasannexedbySerbiain1912.4Furthermore,whenYugoslaviacollapsedinthe1990sKosovoseemedtobethelastunresolvedterritorialquestion.Today Kosovo’s position appears to have shifted from “themarginofthemargins”tothecentralfocusofworldpolitics.Kosovo’syearnforindependencehasnotleftmanyindifferentontheworldscene.Eventhoughthesocalled“West”moreor less unanimously supports Kosovo Albanians’ wish forsovereignty from Belgrade, Serbia, backed by its strong allyRussia,refusestorecogniseanindependentKosovo.

In this tense situation theEuropeanUnion (EU)preparestotakeoverciviliancrisismanagementtasksinKosovofromtheUnitedNations(UN).SincetheKosovoWarof1999,theUNprovisionaladministration,UNMIK(UnitedNationsMissioninKosovo),hasruledovertheregion.AstheUNpreparestoleave, the EU is planning the largest Rule of Law operationin the history of the European Security and Defence Policy(ESDP)forthepost-statusKosovo.Theoperationwillincludeover1700civilianexpertsfromdifferentfieldsofruleoflaw:policemen, judges,prosecutors,customsofficialsandsoon.Theseexpertsarepreparedtoassist,monitorandstrengthenlocal institutions. As the international debate concentrates

2 Free, if Belgrade’s pressure on the Kosovo Serbianpopulationtoboycotttheelectionsisnotcounted.

3 ItisusefultonotethatKosovo’sbordershavenotbeenclearly defined in the past. During the late Ottomanperiod the so called Kosovo vilayet, administrativeregion, comprised also Novi Pazar in today’s Serbia aswellasSkopjeintoday’sMacedonia.KosovobordersasweknowthemtodaydatefromtheSecondWorldWar.

4 Malcolm1998,250–256.

on the status of Kosovo and the judicial basis of the ESDPoperation, the main aim of the international assistance,however,seemstofade.Whichisthepriority–thesuccessfullaunching of an ESDP operation or the effectiveness of thisESDPoperationinachievingitsgoals?Outsideinterventionandciviliancrisismanagement,theoperationsshouldbebasedonthe reality.TheHumanSecurityDoctrine isanexcellent toolto underline the need of an approach that focuses on thelivingconditionsofthecivilianpopulationinthecrisisareas;afactoftenoverlookedinthepoliticaldebatesaboutthecrisismanagement.

ProfessorMaryKaldor,world renownforherconceptof“newwars”5,isleadingaHumanSecurityStudyGroup6attheLondonSchoolofEconomicsandPoliticalScience(LSE).Thisarticlewillanalyseif,how,and,towhatextenttheconcreteimplementation of some of the Human Security Doctrineproposalsareuseful in thepost-statussituation inKosovo–especiallyinregardstothefuturelaunchingoftheEUciviliancrisismanagementoperation.Theideaisnottodescribethelarge debate around the concept of human security itself,but to concentrate on the functional recommendations ofMaryKaldorandherStudyGroupaswellastoconsidertheirusefulness and limits in the Kosovo context. I will argue inthisarticlethatthehumansecurityconceptasdefinedbytheHumanSecurityStudyGroup,issignificant,inparticularwhenplanning pre-deployment trainings for the EU experts beingsenttocrisismanagementoperations.

5 Kaldor1999.6 Group includes Ulrich Albrecht, Christine Chinkin,

Gemma Collantes Celador, Stefanie Flechtner, MarliesGlasius,MaryKaldor (Convenor),KimmoKiljunen, JanKlabbers, Jenny Kuper, Sonja Licht, Flavio Lotti, KlausReinhardt, Genevieve Schmeder, Pavel Seifter, NarcisSerra,GertWeisskirchen.


2 Humansecurity–fromaconcepttotheESDPreality

2.1 Human Security Doctrine for Europe

The Human Security Study Group’s report “Human SecurityDoctrine for Europe” was received by High RepresentativeJavier Solanaon15 September2004and is nowknownasthe Barcelona report. A new report7 from the group waspublished in the presence of Solana on 8 November 2007inMadrid(the Madrid report8).ThephilosophyoftheStudyGrouphasevolvedovertheyears,butthemainapproachhasremained the same: theESDP shouldbebasedonacertainset of principles, the so called Human Security DoctrinethattheStudyGrouphopestobeadaptedasanofficialEUdocument.9

TheHumanSecurityStudyGrouphasbeendevelopingandrefining the concept of human security since the BarcelonaReport2004.Acertainnumberofcasestudiesoncrisisareasbased on this concept have been published. Macedonia,Great Lakes region, Sierra Leone, South Caucasus and theMiddleEastwereanalysedinabookeditedbyMarliesGlasiusandMaryKaldor, and some recent case studies onKosovo,Lebanon,DRCongo,AcehandPalestine formapartof theMadridreport.10

AccordingtoKaldorandherStudyGrouphumansecurityisabout the securityof individualsandcommunitiesaswellas about the “interrelationship of ‘freedom from fear’ and‘freedomfromwant’”.11Intolerablethreatstohumansecurityrangefromgenocideandslaverytonaturaldisasterssuchashurricanesorfloodstomassiveviolationsoftherighttofood,healthandhousing.12Kaldorandothergroupmembersargue

7 In 2006 before the Finnish EU Presidency, the PolicyPlanningUnitoftheFinnishMinistryforForeignAffairsaskedtheCentrefortheStudyofGlobalGovernancetoreconvenetheStudyGroupandlookatwaysoftakingforwardaHumanSecurityagendawithintheEuropeanUnion.

8 Madridreport2007.9 Ibid.,2–4:entitled“CFSPandESDP:PromotingHuman

Security:AProposalforaDeclarationorProtocol”.10 Glasius&Kaldor2006;MadridReport2007.11 MadridReport2007,8.12 BarcelonaReport2004,9.

that theadoptionofaHumanSecurityDoctrinewouldgivenewdynamismtotheESDPpractices.

“– – human security can be seen as a proactivestrategicnarrativewith thepotential to furtherEUforeignpolicyintegration.”13

InstatingthisKaldorandtheStudyGrouppresenthumansecurity as a discursive change which involves a learningprocess amongEUdecisionmakers andactors. This changein attitudes towards crisis management operations movesthefocusfromstabilisationofaconflictareatoasustainablehumansecurity.

2.2 Lobbying for certain priorities of action

TheHumanSecurityStudyGrouphasanumberofhighlevelcontactsinthemaincapitalsoftheEUandhasbeenlobbyingfortheadoptionofthehumansecurityconceptaspartoftheEU’sESDPlanguage.Thedoctrinein2004wasbasedonsevenmainprinciples,andinthenewMadridReporttwoofthemhavebeenmerged and thenewdoctrine relies on sixmainprinciples.

First,“the primacy of human rightsiswhatdistinguishesthe human security approach from traditional state-basedapproaches”.14 In the Madrid Report Mary Kaldor and herStudyGroupunderlinethat“respectforhumanrights”shouldbe the main challenge of an international operation – notmilitaryvictoryorthetemporarysuppressionofviolence.Since2004 the concept has evolved to embrace United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) definition understanding“protection” as referring to “both physical and materialprotection, that is economic and social as well as civil andpolitical rights”.15 According to the Barcelona Report, “theprimacyofhumanrightsalsoimpliesthatthosewhocommitgrosshumanrightsviolationsaretreatedasindividualcriminalsratherthancollectiveenemies”.16Thus,Kaldorcriticisesdirectly

13 Kaldoretal.2007.14 BarcelonaReport2004,14.15 MadridReport2007,4.16 BarcelonaReport2004,15.


forexamplethe“axesofevil”thinkingoftheUnitedStates’foreignpolicy.

Second, the Human Security Doctrine underlines thatanyoutsideintervention“muststrivetocreatea legitimate political authority”intheconflictareabyprovidingnecessaryconditionsfordemocraticinstitutionbuildingthroughpoliticalprocesses. Similarly, the “intervention must be viewed aslegitimate locally and within the international communityas a whole”.17 Legitimate political authority is seen as thepreconditionforhumansecurity.

Third, Kaldor appeals for close consultation of localpopulations by promoting the so called Bottom-up Approach”Thismeans involvingnotonly the localpoliticalleadersbutalsocivilsocietyandvulnerableormarginalgroupsindialoguewith the international actors.“This isnot just amoral issue”, is noted in theBarcelonaReport, “it is also amatterofeffectiveness.Peoplewholive intheaffectedareaarethebestsourceofintelligence.”18

Fourth, Kaldor’s Study Group underlines need foreffective multilateralism–betterdivisionoftasksbetweendifferentinternationalandlocalactors.Indeed,incrisisarea,commitmenttoworktogetherisneeded,butalsocommitmenttowork in the frameworkof agreed rules andnorms in anatmosphere of cooperation and coordination to preventunnecessaryduplicationandrivalry.19

Fifth, the Human Security Doctrine is based on an integrated regional approach. According to the MadridReport, “regional dialogues and action in neighbouringcountriesshouldbesystematicallyintegratedintopoliciesforcrisis”.AsalreadynotedintheBarcelonaReport,

“[T]ime and again, foreign policy analysts havebeen taken by surprise when, after considerableattention had been given to one conflict, anotherconflictwouldseeminglyspringupoutoftheblueinaneighbouringstate.Thus,thefailuretoincludeKosovo in the Dayton negotiations over BosniaHerzegovinawasonefactorthatledtotheoutbreakofthewarinKosovoin1999.”20

Sixth, the Madrid Report also appeals for clear and transparent strategic direction when it comes to the EUoperationsunderliningtheneedofcloselinkbetweenpolicy-makersandthoseontheground.21AlreadyintheBarcelonaReportthiswasunderlinedbynotingthattheformershouldhavethe

“– – ultimate control over operations. Humansecurity missions should be led by a civilian. Thisshouldtypicallybeapolitician,orsomeonewithasenseforthepoliticsbothofthesendingstatesandthehostsociety,witheasyaccesstopolicy-makersaswellasreceptivetolocalpoliticalactors.”22

17 MadridReport,9.18 BarcelonaReport2004,17.19 MadridReport2007,18.20 BarcelonaReport2004,18.21 MadridReport2007,10.22 BarcelonaReport2004,16.

2.3 Human security training to influence the EU activities

TheabovementionedconceptsarethuspromotedbyHumanSecurity Study Group on the European scene. Dr. MaryMartinhasbeenleadingtheplanningofthehumansecuritytraining.23Adraftconceptofthetraining24waspresentedtotheEuropeanGrouponTraining (EGT)partners25 inBrusselson26September2007.ApilottrainingbasedontheseplanswasheldattheCrisisManagementCentreFinlandinFebruary2008.The ideawastotrainafirstgroupofhumansecurity“evangelists”(inMaryMartin’swords)topromotethehumansecurity thinking both on the operational as well as on thepolicyplanninglevel.

Martinalsopreparedacasestudyonthetrainingconceptfor the Madrid Report in which she underlines the current“mosaic of different national and professional cultures andcapabilities” when it comes to civilian crisis managementtraining.26 It is indeed agreed among member states of theEUthattheoperationalpre-deploymenttrainingforsecondedpersonneltoESDPoperationlies inthefieldofresponsibilityof the member states. Thus, there are no clear instructionson how the training should be conducted and by whom.Certain steps have been taken towards developing a morecoherent training regime including a general agreement onacommonTraining Needs AssessmentwhenitcomestotheESDPoperations. It includesaspecific listofcapabilitiesthatareexpectedfrompersonneldeployedonthefieldmissions.However,thediscussiononthequestionofwhoshoulddesignthe trainings is still seen as responsibility of the memberstates. In this respect the EU is still far from Martin’s wishof “generating a new operational culture surrounding crisismanagementandpost-conflictstabilisation”.27

Martin’sproposaltoovercometheincoherenceoftheEU’sexternal operations is to create integrated human securitytrainingforbothmilitaryandcivilianpersonneldeployedontheground,aswellastargettheplanningoftheoperationsinBrussels.Martinnotesinhercasestudythatonthestrategiclevel“European training”hasalreadybeenconducted since2005 intheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollege (ESDC).Martin sees the development of strategic training as animportant step towards the right direction. Other initiativesexist to offer strategic ESDP training for middle and seniorrankingdiplomaticpersonnel.28ThecriticismMartindoesnotaddress inherpaper isthatfewofthesediplomatsorotherhigh levelofficials trained intheESDPandotherclasseswill

23 Mary Martin, Denisa Kostuvicova and Tanja TamminenconductedinterviewstogetherinKosovoinSeptember2007topreparethepilottraining.

24 Martin2007b.25 ToimplementaEuropeanCommissionfinancedproject

on“TrainingforCivilianAspectsofCrisisManagement”an informal European Group on Training was formedof different training institutes. The project has beenfinalized,butthenetworkremains.

26 Martin2007a,2.27 Martin2007a,3.28 Ibid.,5–6.


eventuallybedeployedinfieldmissions.Itisstillquiterarethatthe newly appointed EUSR or Head of Mission would havethetimeortheopportunitytoattendspecificESDPcourses.It is thus a legitimate question how cost-effective theseexpensive trainingsfinallyare fromthepointof viewof theEU field operations. In general, the percentage of all thosewhohavebeentrainedbytheEUorthememberstateforanESDP operation, to actually be seconded to an operation issurprisinglylow.

The Directorate General E Civilian Crisis Management(DGE IX) in the Council General Secretariat conducted asurvey on the EU’s on-going operations noting that a largenumberofpersonneldeployedonthefieldwishedformorepre-deployment training. A substantial number (36%) ofpersonnelhadnotattendedanyESDPtrainingwhatsoeverpriortodeployment.29TheEUPlanningTeaminKosovo(EUPT)hastakenthetraining issueseriouslyandorganisedthefirstESDPtrainingconferenceinPristinainOctober2007.TheEUPTinvitedtheEUmemberstatetraininginstitutestoattendandplan together solutions to address the acute training needsof the future EU operation in Kosovo.30 Today most of thesolutionsarefoundonanadhocbasis,buttheESDPtrainingsphereisdevelopingconstantlytowardsnew“bestpractices”thatwillhelpfutureoperations.

MaryMartinsuggestsinherstudythatacommonhumansecurity training for thosedeployedon thefieldcould solveacertainsetofproblemswhenitcomestotheEU’strainingagenda.ThehumansecuritytrainingasaconceptitselfwouldofferEUpersonnelaworkabletoolkit:asecuritydoctrinethatcouldbeimplementedonthegroundthuscreatingtheneeded“operationalculture”andanagreed“setofnorms”.Martinsuggests that the training should always be region specific,takingthelocalsocietyasastartingpointpromoting“bottom-upparticipation”andincludingtrainersfromthespecificcrisisareaitself.31ThefocusofthetrainingshouldnotonlybetheEUstructures,butalsotheconditionsontheground.Itshouldbenotedhowever,thatMartin’sproposaldoesnotincludeaproblemthatisrarelyhighlighted:incrisissituationorinapost-conflictsocietytheinternationalcommunitystandsinfrontofadifficultdilemma:whotolistento;whoseinterpretationoftheconflicttobelieveortosubscribetoorhowtolearnthesituationwhilestillstayingimpartial;whichNGOsorpoliticalleaderstosupportandforwhichtowatchout.Whilepreparingtrainingonconflictsituationsthesequestionsmustbekeptinmind–eveniftheycannoteverbeansweredexhaustively.

To reinforce the legitimacy of EU’s action, Martinsuggests that the training should be based on the specificoperationalmandateofwhichthetraineeswillbedeployed.32This is difficult in such cases when the mandates and rulesof engagement, including CONOPS and OPLAN33, are stillrestricted documents. Martin underlines that “the Human

29 DGEIX2006.30 Seehttp://www.eupt-kosovo.eu/training/.31 Martin2007a,12–13.32 Ibid.,12.33 CONOPS, Concept of Operations; OPLAN, Operation

Plan.

Security approach requires a commitmentby those involvedwithEUmissiontointernationalinstitutions,andtoworkingthrough agreed rules and norms, particularly internationallaw”.Asagreeableas it sounds theEUworks incrisisareasalsoinsuchapoliticalcontextwheretheEUasapoliticalunionhaspoliticalprioritiesandpreferences.Thecrisismanagementoperationscannotworkinapurevacuumbuthavetofollowthe political guidance of member states: thus, for exampleanswers topreviouslymentionedquestions,“whichpoliticalleaderstosupportorwhichlocalinstitutionstoprotect”,mayalso have political meaning. The EU is a political union anditspolicygoalsaredeterminedinapoliticaldebatebetweenmemberstates,oftenasacompromiseoftheirinternalpolicieswhichhasrepercussionsalsoonthefieldmissionlevel.

Despite these practical difficulties of Martin’s proposals,shemanagestobringupasetofweaknessesthatthecurrentESDP training is facingand toproposepertinent argumentsas to how the human security training could respond tothese weaknesses. Following the six principles of HumanSecurity Doctrine, Martin notes that current training oftenlacksmainstreamingofhumanrightsproposingonlyahumanrightsmoduleoralectureasifprotectinghumanrightswouldnot be as cross-cutting issue as gender for example. TheHumanSecurityDoctrineemphasises theprimacyofhumanrights protection in all crisis management activities. Martinunderlinesthatoftenthepersonalsafetyofmissionpersonnelisaccordedmoretrainingthantheobjectiveoftheoperationtoprotectlocalpopulations.Thehumansecuritytrainingwouldproposeadifferentperspective.Martinalsoappealsformoreintegratedcivil-militarytrainingtoaddressthecurrent“gap”betweendifferentkindsofmethodscombatingoldandnewsecuritythreats.Moreover,Martinremindsusthat“effectivemultilateralism”,coordinationbetweendifferentinternationalactorsinthecrisisareas,shouldbetrainedinviewof“divisionof labour” and not as just understanding different workmethodsofcrisismanagement.34AccordingtoMartin

“[T]he multilateralism principle would includeinstructionandenactmentscenariosbasedonhowthelocalsituationrelatestointernationallaw,howto co-ordinate action with other international andlocalinstitutionsandwhatkindofdivisionoflabourisneededontheground.”35

Martin’s criticism towards current situations is pertinent.For example, in Kosovo the EU was represented by overhalf a dozen different actors in 2007: the economic pillaroftheUNMIKadministration is ledbytheEU,theEuropeanCommissionhasa liaisonoffice inKosovo, the technicalaidiscoordinatedbytheEuropeanReconstructionAgency(EAR),theEUPT is deployed in the region toplan the future ESDPoperation,atthesametimetheICOPreparationTeamistheretoplantheofficeofthefutureEUSpecialRepresentative(EUSR)office,nottomentiontheEUPresidencyandothermemberstates’ liaison offices, the visits of the High RepresentativeSolana or the EU Status Envoy Stefan Lehne during the

34 Martin2007a,13–14.35 Ibid.,17.


AhtisaariperiodorWolfgang Ischingerduring the troika lednegotiations.Indeed,thecoherenceoftheEUactivitiesneedstobeimprovediftheEUplanstoconductasuccessfulESDPoperationintheregion.


3 Limitsandchallengesofthehumansecuritythinking

3.1 Human Security in kosovo under status negotiations

Aspreviouslymentioned,certainideasinthehumansecuritytraining concept are confronted to some practical problemssuchastherestrictedEUdocumentsthatcannotbeusedasbasisfortrainingorthenotsoblackandwhitesituationsonthegroundthatcannotalwaysbeeasilyexplainedinlecturesduring the training despite inviting local trainers and civilsociety representatives. Also the human security concept assuchhasfacedanumberofcriticismssince its launch. Iwillvery rapidly go through certain criticisms that the HumanSecurity Study Group has dealt with on a conceptual level.However,Iwillanalysemorein-depththelimitsoftheconceptintheconcretecaseofKosovo.Anothersetofcriticismwillbeanalysed intheframeworkof thedevelopmentofEuropeanUnion’scrisismanagementpoliciesingeneral.

Theconceptofhumansecurity isnotonlyusedbyMaryKaldorandherStudyGroupbutalsobyotherresearchersaswellaspoliticalactors36.Theconcept itselfhasbeen judgedintheacademiccirclesastoovastandtoovaguetobeclearlydefinedandeffectivelyused inpractise.37 Indeed, thebroaddefinitionoftheconceptforexampleusedbytheUNDPcanbeseentoincludeallsortsoffactorsofinsecurity.Infact,thewidedefinitionhasbeencriticisedas toobroadto focusonpractical ways of dealing with security threats and it is notconsideredusefulinacademictheoriesorforpolicyplanning.This is why the Human Security Study Group has adopteda much narrower definition of the concept based on theearliermentionedsixprinciplesandfocusingontheEU’scrisismanagementactivities.38

36 UNDP has used the concept in Human DevelopmentReports since2004withabroaderdefinition than theone used by Mary Kaldor, a Human Security refereejournal is published in Paris by Center for Peace andHumanSecurity(PHS),etc.

37 Excellentsynthesisofcriticismsandcounter-argumentsonhumansecurityconceptcanbefoundinTadjbakhsh&Chenoy2007,59–68.

38 As this article is based on the Human Security StudyGroupdefinitionofHumanSecurity,Iwillnotelaborateextensivelyonthebroaderdebateon“humansecurity”concept. A wide range of sources exist to study the

Main criticismsonhuman security theorisingaredirectlylinked with the current debate on the excessive use of theconceptofsecurity in internationalrelations;only ifanissueis defined as a security issue in today’s politics it can getoverwhelming attention. Barry Buzan argues that “[O]ver-securitizationrisksdestroyingtheintellectualcoherenceofthefield,overcomplicatingsolutionfinding”.39Indeed,inspeakingabout human security, some see a risk of giving space toincreasinginterventionismbytheinternationalcommunityinthenameofsharedresponsibility:“Humansecuritychallengestheroleofthesovereignstateasthesoleproviderofsecurity”and “provides justification for continued surveillance andengagement, used by dominant powers to legitimize self-interested interventionism”.40 Buzan however reminds us,that “[h]uman security remains state-centric despite thesupranationaldimensionsoftheconcept”.Itcanbeseenas“anewtoolforexistinggoverningagenciestoshapeandcontrolcivilpopulations”.41

AstheMadridReportputsit,“[S]omecriticsworrythat[HumanSecurity]isanewlabelforneo-imperialismandawaytojustifyliberalinterventionism and a new European militarism.Others argue that far from being hawkish, theconceptlacksteethandistoo‘warmandfuzzy’or‘soft’.”42

Madrid Report answers a number of criticisms but hasdifficultiesindefendingtheconceptagainsttheargumentthathumansecurity“simplyre-labelsexistingissuesandtools”.43TheMadridReporttriestoprovideaspecific“discursiveandoperationalframework”44forthesemultipleEUactivities.

Kosovo represents an interesting test case for humansecurityconcept.Kosovohasbeenatestinggroundformany

differentusesofthisconcept.SeeforexampleHumanSecurityReport(2005).

39 BuzaninTadjbakhsh&Chenoy2007,63.40 BuzaninTadjbakhsh&Chenoy2007,64.41 Buzan inTadjbakhsh&Chenoy2007,63–64;Seealso

Buzan2004.42 MadridReport2007,10.43 Tadjbakhsh&Chenoy2007,68.44 MadridReport2007,10.


European or Euro-Atlantic foreign and security policy ideasever since the 1999 NATO bombings. That event marked ahistoricalchangeintheNATOpolicylinesasforthefirsttimethememberstatesdecidedtostrikeagainstasovereignstatetocometotheaidofapersecutedminority.ScholarlydebateonthenormativelegitimacyoftheNATObombingswasfierceduringandafter thebombings.45 Somepeaceorganisationsandactivistsofpolitical leftorganisedpublicdemonstrationsagainst the bombings in defence of Milosevic’s Serbia inEuropeaswellas forexample inCanada.46However, ithadbeen thepresident of Serbia SlobodanMilosevic backedupby most of the political elite and population that removedthe autonomous status from the mainly Albanian inhabitedprovince of Kosovo. Albanians were pushed to leave publicpostsforcingtheareatoastrangeparallelsystemfor10yearsinwhichAlbanianshadtoorganisethepublicservicessuchasschoolsandgeneralhealthservicesforthemselves inprivatehomes. Clandestine elections were held and the province’sAlbanianpopulationwasledbyacommonlyelectedPresidentIbrahimRugova,whochoseapeaceful resistancepolicy linetoavoidthemassacresthatweretakingplaceinBosniaintheearly1990s.Onlyinthelate1990syoungAlbanianstookuparmsandbuilttheKosovoLiberationArmy(UÇK)whichstruckagainst Serbian police stations and provoked the SerbiansecurityservicestotakeupethniccleansingmeasuresagainsttheAlbaniancivilpopulation.Finally,theseeventsledtoNATOinterventioninthespring1999.

Kosovo came under the UN Security Council resolution1244aUNprotectorateadministeredbyUNMIK.Thissolutionin the aftermath of the NATO bombings was perceived asprovisional.TheissueofKosovostatuswastobedeterminedlater. However, the years passed under slow and ineffectiveinternationaladministration.UNMIKwasbuiltonfourpillarswhichwere:1)PoliceandJustice,underthedirectleadershipoftheUnitedNations2)CivilAdministration,alsounderthedirect leadership of the United Nations 3) DemocratizationandInstitutionBuilding, ledbytheOrganizationforSecurityand Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and 4) Reconstructionand Economic Development, led by the European Union.Today before the status solution only two of the pillarsremain:theOSCEledinstitutionsbuildingpillarandtheEUledreconstructionpillar.Mostofthetasks inthefieldofpolice,justice and civil administrationhavebeen transferred to thelocal institutions including the creation of the Ministries ofJusticeandInteriorinearly2005.

Despitehugeinternationalaidforreconstruction,Kosovo’seconomywasnotabletorecoverinthislimbosituationwherepotential private investorsdidnot knowwhether theywereinvesting in a province of Serbia or a future independentKosovo.WithoutindependenceKosovowasandisstillnotabletoapplyforloansfromtheinternationalfinancialinstitutionssuchasWorldBankorIMF.TheextremelyyoungpopulationofKosovo,ofwhichamongtheAlbaniansover50percentare

45 SeeforexampleLutz1999/2000;Krause2000;orBooth2001.

46 Manifestations in Canada, see for example Leblanc1999.

under25yearsold,felttrappedinasituationwithnoprospects.MostofthemwerenotallowedvisastomoveasGastarbeitertotheWesterncountriesbuttherewasnoworkavailableinKosovo. In this situation the threat of social instability wasimminentanditburstintoviolenceagainsttheSerbminorityduringoneweekend inspring2004 intheaftermathofthedeathofthreeAlbanianchildrenintheIbarriver.

Only this sudden violence woke up the internationalcommunityandforcedthequestionofKosovostatustobepushedintotheforefrontoftheEUagenda.The“standardsbeforestatus”logichadprovedtobeineffectiveasoneofthemajorstandards;whereasthereturnoftheSerbiandisplacedpersons (IDP) to their homes became a very useful tool inthehandsoftheBelgradepoliticians.AslongastheSerbianpopulation felt insecure inKosovo itwas impossible for theKosovoauthoritiestogetherwiththeinternationalcommunityto convinceSerbian IDPs to return.As longas the situationremainedso,Belgradewassurethattheuncomfortablestatusissue would not be discussed. However, the UN SecretaryGeneralKofiAnnanaskedaNorwegiandiplomatKaiEidetowriteareportonthecausesofthe2004incident,thereportconcludedthattheviolenceagainsttheSerbianminoritywasdirectlycausedbythefrustrationoftheAlbanianpopulation.Inthesummerof2005inareporttotheUN,KaiEideurgedthe international community to start the Kosovo statusnegotiationsassoonaspossible.47

FormerFinnishPresidentMarttiAhtisaariwasnominatedbySecretaryGeneralAnnantoheadthesestatusnegotiationsinNovember2005.AnatmosphereofhopearoseinKosovoasthenegotiationswerenotexpectedtobelong.InparallelwiththestatusnegotiationstheEUwantedtoredefineitsroleinKosovo.TheUNwastoleaveKosovopermanentlydespitethe stateofaffairsand theEUstarted toplan for theESDPoperation: a Kosovo Rule of Law Operation. An EUPT wassenttoKosovotomakespecificplansfortheEUactioninthepost-statusKosovoinlatespring2006.MeanwhileAhtisaari’sstatusproposalwasbeingdrafted through thenegotiationsbetween Kosovo and Belgrade representatives on specificissuessuchasdecentralisation,culturalheritageandminorityrights.TheinternationalcommunityacceptedtheideaofusingtheBosnianmodelofinstitution:aHighRepresentativewhowouldhaveasmall internationalstaff toover-seethestatusimplementation. In Kosovo this would be called the ICO,InternationalCivilianOffice.Theplanswerehoweverseverelyslowed by the Serbian elections in January 2007 and lateronby theRussianopposition toanewUNSecurityCouncilresolutionbasedonAhtisaariplaninsummer2007.

InthissituationAhtisaaribackedofffromthenegotiationsand the Contact Group on Kosovo took over. WolfgangIschingerwasnominatedtorepresenttheEUinnegotiationsbutmanyobserversnotedthatthismovefromthehandsoftheUNOSEK48tothehandsoftheoldgreatnations(UnitedStates, United Kingdom, Russia, France, Germany and Italy)

47 Eide2005.48 UNOSEK,Officeof theSpecialEnvoyof theSecretary-

General of the United Nations for the future statusprocessforKosovo.


marked a clear failure of the EU’s authority on the subject.However, the Ahtisaari plan of supervised sovereignty wasnevertakenoffthetableandwaskeptasabasisofallEUandWesternplanningforfutureinternationalpresenceinKosovo,apresencethatissupposedtobeclosertothelocalpopulationthanthedistantUNMIKadministrationhadbeen.

Different studies and surveys have been conducted inKosovo to analyse the human security situation and publicperceptionsofsecurity.49Someofthesestudies/surveysdonotusethehumansecurityconceptbuttouchuponthehumansecurityissues.SomeoftheseusetheconceptbutmaybewithslightlydifferentdefinitionsthanMaryKaldor’sStudyGroup.50Despite different approaches, clearly themain security issueidentifiedbyAlbanian,Serbianandotherminoritypopulationsin Kosovo is economic uncertainty and unemployment(around45%).Almost70%ofKosovarsstillliveinthecountryside,mainly livingon smallone family farms.Theextremelyyoungpopulationlackseducation.Schoolsareovercrowdedand working in triple shifts if not even with 4 shifts a dayassuringeachchildat least fewhoursof teaching.Teachersareunderpaidandunmotivated.Anumberofwomenlivinginruralareasarestill illiterate.51Kaldor’s theoretical frameworkwouldindeedbeusefulinraisingsomemajorissuesinKosovo’scurrentsituation.52

Human Security Study Group work on Kosovo hasconcentrated on the case of Serbian minority, a group thatis keenly observed by the world. During UNMIK time theywere a tool of Belgrade, asked to boycott all elections andall cooperation with the UN or local authorities in Kosovo.Despiteanumberofefforts fromthe international sideandthesignificantdropofinterethniccrime,theintegrationoftheSerbianenclaveshasfailed.Anumberofothercommunitiessuffer a similar fate in the current situation: Roma, Ashkali,Goraniandothersmallerethnicminoritiesrequireintegrationpoliciesandspecialattention.

Human security doctrine is not only about protectingvulnerable groups, but about listening to local knowledge,respectinglocalownershipandaboutlegitimateaction.Thesearepertinentquestionswhendecidingupon theamountofexecutivepowersofthefutureESDPoperationandtherightsofintervention(“thecorrectivepowers”)oftheInternationalCivilian Representative. How to strengthen local ownership,accountability of the local leaders as well as the legitimacyofinternationalpresence?Theseareallbasichumansecurityquestions.Theycanbeanalysedon thebasisof the lessonslearntinBosniaandHerzegovinaoreveninUNMIK.Howwillthe futureEUoperationmanage toovercome theproblems

49 Eide2005;ICG2007;Saferworld2007a;2007b;UNDP2006a;UNDPEarlyWarningReport2007.

50 ForumforCivicInitiativesandSaferworld2007.51 IlliteracyinKosovoisamongthehighestinEurope,see

UNDP2006a,12–13.“Inruralareas,forexample,about9.5percentoffemalesaged16to19areestimatedtobe illiterate; moreover, one in four young women inthoseareashasverylimitedknowledgeofreadingandwriting.”(UNDP2006b,41)

52 Šaboviæ(2007)usestheframeworkandbringsuptheeconomicdimensionofHumanSecurity.

of UNMIK: sounding superior, lacking coordination andcoherence with other international actors on the field? Thehuman security concept is a useful tool in analysing thesekindsofissues.

Tryingtoimplementanacademicconceptintoacrisisareareality or EU’s ESDP bureaucracy is not an easy task. In theKosovocase,itisinfactapitythattheHumanSecurityStudyGrouphasnotconcentratedontheabovementionedquestionstocontributeindevelopingthefutureEUoperationinKosovo.TheStudyGrouphasonthecontraryshownstrongcriticismtowards the Ahtisaari plan that has been widely acceptedas the “best plan possible” to solve the Kosovo stalemate.TheAhtisaariplanseesawiderangeofspecialrightstotheminority communities in the post-status Kosovo – a set ofrights that even highly esteemed democratic countries suchasFinlandarenotabletoimplementintheirminorityareas53.ThecriticismoftheHumanSecurityStudyGroupfocusesonthe non-involvement of the local inhabitants in the statusnegotiations. The Kosovo status negotiations were howeverled by the Kosovo Albanian side, the so called Unity Team,includingrepresentativesofallmajorpartiesaswellasanNGOrepresentative.ThedecentralisationplanhasnotbeendebatedatthemunicipallevelwhichaccordingtoDenisaKostuvicova,forexample,isamajorshortcomingoftheplan.54Thecriticismdoes not take into account however the extremely difficultcontextofthenegotiations,forexampleBelgraderepresentingKosovoSerbs.MoreusefulfromthepracticalEUperspectivewouldbeaHumanSecurityapproachthatdoesnotproposeanewacademicstatusproposalbutfocusesonthebest(humansecurity)practicesoftheEUpersonneltoimplementthestatusproposalachievedunderpressureofworldpolitics.

3.2 ESDP development in parallel to human security debate

OnthepoliticalEUfieldtheattemptofKaldor’sStudyGrouptolobbyfortheHumanSecurityDoctrineconcepthasoftenbeenconfrontedwiththeargument:“Wearealreadydoingthis,wejustdon’tcallitHumanSecurity”.Indeed,aselaboratedmorepreciselylaterinthisarticle,thehumansecurityprinciplesareoftenincludedintheEUpolicymakingandit isalegitimatequestion to ask, what would be the added value of a newconcept in theEUsecuritypolicydiscourse if thecontentofhuman security principles are already existing. As such theMadridReportgivesveryfewconcreteproposalsfordecisionmakersonoperationalchangesinEUactivities–ifnotcountingthetrainingproposals.

Civilian crisis management aims at strengthening thedemocratisation, respect for human rights and rule of law,goodgovernanceandfunctioningcivilsocietyinpost-conflictareas.Itisclearthatmilitarymeansarenotenoughtoresolveaconflict–theycanmerelystoptheviolence,protecthumanlives and provide more stable environment for the civilian

53 Cf.SámipeopleintheFinnishLapland.Finlandhasnotratified the ILO-Convention No. 169 on IndigenousPeoples.(SeeforexampleCCPR2004)

54 SeeforinstanceKostuvicovaetal.2007.


actorstotakeupotherresponsibilitiesinthefieldofconflictmanagement and peace building. As Mary Kaldor and theHuman Security Study Group underlines, the functioningcoordinationandcooperationbetweencivilandmilitaryactorsisanabsolutenecessity.

ThisisanissuethathasbeenunderlinedontheEUagendaaswell.AssuchtheESDPfieldofactivitiesisstilldeveloping.If the military side was first thought of in the EuropeanCouncilofDecember1999inHelsinkitheEUmemberstatesunderlined,intheaftermathoftheearlierKosovoWar,thatEUneedstocoordinateanddevelopitsnon-militarycapabilities.Since1999EUciviliancrisismanagementhasbecomeoneofthemostusefultoolsoftheEUinthefieldofESDP.TheEUhaslaunchedoperationintheBalkans,theCaucasusaswellasinAfricaandthefieldsofactivitiesaremultiple:includingpoliceand justice sector reform, border management, monitoringpeaceagreements,training,andsoon.CurrentlytheEUhas12operationson-goingorbeingplanned.

TheEU’sSecurityStrategyfromDecember2003definedacertainsetofEU’sglobalchallengeswhichwereinmanycasesechoingtheUnitedStates’securitydoctrinedraftedinthepost9/11.Toanswersomeofthesethreats,EU’scrisismanagementcapabilitieswerefurtherdeveloped.InDecember2004worktopreparetheCivilianHeadlineGoal2008waslaunched.ThegoalwastocreatesuchciviliancapabilitiesthattheEUwouldbe able to conduct multiple and different kinds of civilianoperationsatthesametime.Thiscouldeitherbeindependentoperations or parts of other military operations. This wouldintegrate the expertise of different EU focus areas such aspolicing,ruleoflawandcivilianadministration.Accordingtotheplans, operations shouldbe able tobe launched in lessthanamonthfromthemomentthatthepoliticalagreementisreached.TheEUactivitiesshouldbecoherentandcoordinatedwith the EU Commission activities. Indeed, one of themajorpracticalflawsof theEU’s rapidaction is that theEUCommissionisinchargeofthemoney.Whenpoliticaldecisionsonthelaunchofanoperationcanbereachedquitefast,theprocurementandmoneyrelatedissuesoftenlagbehind.

FollowingthemilitaryHeadlineGoalexampletheCivilianHeadline Goal 2008 process developed scenarios of futureciviliancrisismanagementchallengesandtheneedsforciviliancapabilities.Astherearemanyactorsinvolvedinciviliancrisismanagement, coordinationbetween theEU institutionsanddifferentinternationalorganisationswasstronglyunderlined.Inaddition,CivilianHeadlineGoal ledtothecreationoftherapidreactionactivities,thesocalledCivilianResponseTeams,whicharereadytobedeployedin3to5daysandcanworkfor example to make first assessments in the conflict areas,supportinestablishinganewoperationorbringinexpertiseinacrucialphaseofanearlierlaunchedoperation.Justrecently,intheNovember2007GeneralAffairsandExternalRelationsCouncil(GAERC)agreedonthereportoftheCivilianHeadlineGoal 2008 and launched a new process called CivilianHeadlineGoal2010tofurtherstrengthentheEU’scapabilitiestoconductfieldoperations.

Thus, thedebates inside the EU followa certain agreedpattern. The ambassadorial level (PSC) has the political

leadership over ESDP operations. “New best practices” areinvented both in the field missions and during meetings inBrussels (including the CHG process). The Barcelona Reporthasmostcertainlycontributedtothethinkingoftheciviliancrisismanagementcapabilities.TheproposalsoftheBarcelonaReportwerenotseenaspossibletoimplementandtheEUdidnotendorsethereport.Howevertheconceptofhumansecuritydid stay in the debate inside the EU and impacts initiativessuchas theplanning.TheHumanSecurityStudyGroup stillhopesthattheMadridReportwhichhasbeenstripedofftheimpracticalproposalswillbeendorsedbytheEU.Theproblemis that theEUhas comea longway since2004.Anumberofhumansecurity issuesarecurrentlydiscussedondifferentlevels of the EU decision making process (CIVCOM, PMG,PSC,etc.55).IntheEUthediscussionsarefocused(includingintheearliermentionedCivilianHeadlineGoalprocess)on:theneed to strengthen civil-military cooperation, to implementtheUNSecurityCouncilResolution1325onwomeninarmedconflicts, to focus on DDR and SSR activities56, to improvecrisis management training, to strengthen cooperation withcivil society actors and other international actors as well asonlinkingandsynchronisingsecurityanddevelopmentissues.Indeed,alltheseissuescanbefoundinthelastyearGAERGconclusions for example. Moreover, in November 2007 theEUMinisters ofDefence andDevelopmentAidheld for thefirst time a meeting together to collectively discuss securityand development issues and to agree on common Councilconclusion.

Even though it is not discussed in the conceptualframeworkofhumansecurity,manyofKaldor’sandherStudyGroups’ ideasare thuson the table in theEU.Theworkofthe EUPT inKosovo is an excellent exampleof how the EUis improving its crisis management activities in the spirit of“HumanSecurity”evenifitisnotlabelledassuch.Consultingthe localpopulation, taking intoaccount regional impactofEUactivities,planningbettertrainingandevaluationpoliciesfor the operation, the EUPT is creating “best practices” forESDPoperations.EventhoughtheEUisimprovingitsactivities,and this is also noted in the new Madrid Report, there arestillplentyofissuesthatneedtobetackled.Forexample,theeffectivemultilateralismemphasisedbothintheMadridReportasinthepoliticaldebatesinsidetheEUstillneedsimproving.NotonlyaretheEUactorsonthefieldoftenunawareoftheiractivities;Commission’stechnicalaidprojectscanbeplannedwithno link toESDPoperationplanning forexample.ClosedialogueandcoordinationbetweentheEU,NATO,theOSCEandtheUNinthecaseofKosovoisanabsoluterequirementforthesuccessofthefutureESDPoperation.However,ifitisconsideredonthepoliticalfieldasamatterofhumansecurityisanotherquestion.

55 CIVCOM, Committee for Civilian Aspects of CrisisManagement; PMG, Politico-Military Working Group;andPSC,PoliticalandSecurityCommittee.Theyareallinchargeofciviliancrisismanagementplanning.

56 DDR, Disarmament Demobilisation Reintegration; SSR,SecuritySectorReform.


4 KosovofocusedHumanSecuritytraining

4.1 Future ESDP operation in kosovo

InthislastchapterIwillarguethatamajortestcaseforthehumansecurityconcept–controversialornot–willbethepost-statusKosovo.IwillconcludethischapterbyunderliningtheusefulnessofthehumansecurityphilosophywhenpreparingtrainingsfortheEUexpertstobedeployedinKosovo.

Asalreadydiscussed,inJune1999theUNSecurityCounciladapted the famous resolution 1244 that established theprovisional UN administration, UNMIK57, to Kosovo. UNMIKhasbeen inchargeof thecivilianadministration,promotingautonomy and self-government in Kosovo by graduallytransferring its responsibilities into thehandsof theKosovoauthorities, the Provisional Interim Government of Kosovo(PISG).Theresolution1244alsocalledonUNMIKtofacilitateapoliticalprocesstodetermineKosovo’sfuturestatus.

BasedontheUNSCresolution1244inNovember2005theSecretaryGenerallaunchedtheprocesstodetermineKosovo’sfuturestatus.HisSpecialEnvoyMarttiAhtisaarimadeastatusproposal in early 2007 on “supervised independence”. Theproposal calls for the abolishment of the remaining UNMIKfactions and the creation of a much smaller and lighterInternationalCivilianOffice.Theideaistofollowtheexampleof Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia andHerzegovinaandtonameaHighRepresentative (HR)oftheInternationalcommunity tosupervise the implementationofthe status agreement. The HR would also be nominated astheEUSpecialRepresentative.ThisnewinternationalpresenceinKosovowouldpromotelocalownershipandaccountability.TheEUisconsideredtohaveaspecialroleinthepost-statusKosovoastheEUSR(doublehattedastheInternationalCivilianRepresentative,andmaybeifneededeventriplehattedasthe

SRSG58)willsupervisethestatusimplementation.Moreover,theEUissendingtoKosovothelargestciviliancrisismanagementoperationoftheESDP’shistory.

57 http://www.unmikonline.org/intro.htm,accessed27/11/2008.

58 Special Representative of the UN Secretary Generalincase theUNSecurityCouncil resolution1244 isnotchanged.

TheideawasnottocreateanewUNMIKthatwasalreadyperceived as distant and unfair by the local population.There are several court cases pending against internationalorganisations – no one has dealt with them during UNMIKadministration. Some Kosovo citizens have felt mistreatedbyUNMIKbuthavehadnoforumtodiscussgrievances.TheEUPT in Kosovo has underlined the willingness of the EUto be more close to Kosovo’s local institutions and people.International judges are planned to sit together with localjudges inthesamebuildingsandnot insomedistant“ivorytowers”behindheavilyarmedmilitarypersonnel.Atleastonthe surface the relations between international civilian crisismanagementpersonnelandthelocalpopulationareplannedtochange.DoesthisalsomeanachangeintheperceptionsoftheinternationalroleincontributingtothesecurityofKosovo?Whatwillbethesecuritydoctrineofthefuturemission?

Despiteordueto(thenotsosurprising)thefailureofthenegotiationsbetweenPristinaandBelgrade,theAhtisaariplanisstillexpectedtobethebasisofthefuturestatusofKosovo.TheEUPThasbeeninplacesincethespring2006toplanthefuture ESDPoperation to thepost-statusKosovo. The Teamhasproducedextensivesetofoptions,needsassessmentsandfinancial blueprints for the future operation. However, theConcept of Operations can be decided upon only after thestatussolution,whethertheUNSecurityCouncilresolutionor,more likely, Kosovo’s coordinated independence declarationandtherecognitionoftheUnitedStatesandtheEUmemberstates.Forexample,thepossibleexecutivepowersoftheEUoperationandotherspecificpartsof itsmandatecannotbedecidedbeforetheactualstatusofKosovoisknown.Accordingtotheprimaryplans,thefutureESDPoperationwouldincludearound1700internationalexperts.Theirmaintaskswouldliein thefieldofmentoring,monitoringandassistingKosovo’sown authorities, including police, justice and customs. Aspecific transitionperiodbetween theactualdeploymentoftheESDPoperationandtheclosingdownofUNMIK(120days)isforeseenintheAhtisaariplan,butcanalsodependonthepoliticaldecisionswhenKosovogovernmentactuallydeclaresindependence; theUNSC resolution 1244mayne extendedand thus a mini-UNMIK maybe needed. All these questionsremaintobeansweredatthetimeofwritingofthisarticle.


Closecooperationbetweentheinternationalactorsis,inanycase,anabsolutenecessity. Theseplansalso requirequiteamassivetrainingefforttogivethepersonnelofthefutureEUmissionthespecificESDPandKosovoknowledgeneeded inordertoimplementtheoperationefficiently.

4.2 Added value of kosovo specific human security training

Indeed, the member states have been asked to organiseKosovospecificESDPtrainingforthoseexpertsthattheycounttoproposeforthesecondedpositionsinthefutureoperation.59Crisis Management Centre Finland prepared in cooperationwithMaryKaldor,MaryMartinandtheHumanSecurityStudyGroup,aKosovospecificHumanSecuritytrainingwhichtookplaceinFebruary2008.60TheseeffortsareaclearanswertotheEUPTappealforbettermemberstateaccountabilityinthefieldofESDPtraining.

KosovofocusedhumansecuritytrainingcanatthesametimecontributetothetrainingoffutureESDPpersonnel,butwillalsohavealargerscopetryingtoinfluencenotonlythosedeployedonthefieldbutalsothosetheyneedtocooperatewithwhetherinBrussels(CommissionorCouncilSecretariat)or on the military side in Kosovo (Kfor) for example. Eventhoughonepilottrainingcannotreachalargeaudience,thefirst step is significant. In Kosovo case, the human securityapproachcanbringupsomeessentialissuesthatarenotoftenconsidered in the civilian crisismanagement efforts inplacetoday.

Thesupremacyofhumanrightsprincipleunderlinesthatalllocalsareequalcitizens.Oftencrisismanagementoperationstendtotakeforgrantedthatinternationalstafftreatsminorityandmajoritypopulationsequally.Minorityandmajoritydivideis not however always an ethnic question. As underlinedin Human Security Doctrine’s “bottom-up” principle,internationalactorsdeployedonthegroundshouldtakeintoaccountandconsultnotonlyobviousminoritygroupssuchasethnicminorities,butalsoothervulnerablegroupsthatcanbechildren,handicap,orevenmajoritygroupsasinKosovocasewomenoryouth.

It isobvious thatgender issues shouldbemainstreamedall through the international activities whether crisismanagement,reconstructionorhumanitarianaidincrisisareas.Women are the best source of information when it comestoplanningeffectivewaysofhelping their livingconditions.There isadebate ifwomenshouldbemore involved in thepeace negotiations because of their equal rights of beingrepresentedorbecauseoftheircapabilitiesofreconciliation.Eitherway,theirparticipationisseenassomethingthatshouldbe promoted. The Kosovo Women’s network is in constantdialoguewithmutualvisitswiththeWomeninBlackofSerbia

59 Forexample,inFinland,theCrisisManagementCentreFinland,locatedinKuopio,hasalreadyorganisedthreeIntegratedRuleofLawcoursesthatfocusedonKosovo.

60 Applying Human Security in Crisis Management,11.–15.2.2008, Kuopio, Finland. See more at www.cmcfinland.fi.

–adialogue thatcouldnotbe imaginedamong themen.61Thesekindsofexamplesarenumerousbutnotsomanytimeslistenedto;womendohaveavoiceinKosovo.

Butwho talksabout theyouth?62Are theyoungpeopleequal citizens in the eyes of the international actors or aretheyperceivedmoreasa security threat inKosovo? Indeed,whentalkingabouttheyouthinKosovo,toooftenattentionisdrawntothatweekendinthespring2004whenthemobsof young men stormed on the streets and burnt orthodoxchurchesinrevengeofthedeathof3Albanianchildren,ortothe spring2007whenyoungstersmanifestedagainst statusnegotiationsandtwoofthemgotkilledbytherubberbulletsoftheinternationalpolice.ThepopulationofKosovoisextremelyyoungandgrowing;someestimatescountabout70%ofthepopulationunder30years.Atthesametime,thispopulationlacks employment prospects, education opportunities orpossibilitiestoimmigrate.Howtoconsultyoungpeople?Howtointegratetheminthedialoguebetweeninternationalsandlocals? These are important challenges for the future ESDPoperation. For example, in the situation where the politicalelitehaslostlegitimacyintheeyesofthepopulation,itisthepopulationitselfthatsuffersfromthelackofeducationinasituationwherethegovernmentmakesfutureplansmainlyonprospectsofminingandelectricityproduction.ThereisindeednoclearplanonreformingtheeducationsectorinKosovo.

Thisyoungpopulationexpectsalotfromthepost-statustimes–abetterfuture.Adeepdisappointmentcouldbefatal.Inthissense,alsothehumansecurityprincipleof legitimatepolitical leadership shouldbeclosely studied in the training.Howtogain legitimacy in theeyesof the localpopulation?How to support local institutions, local ownership and localaccountability?ThecoordinatoroftheInternalSecuritySectorReviewofKosovo63,AnthonyWelch,underlines that theEU“needstoallowthenewKosovo––tofinditsownway,makeitsownmistakesandgrowasasocietyandpoliticalentity”.64Toooften,internationaladvisorsfinditeasiertodraftthelawsby themselves or make the project proposals on their ownas they realise their counterparts in local institutions wouldnot know how to do. How to avoid this again, as the EUsendsahugenumberofexperts in thefield?Andhownotto give promises that EU actors cannot keep? For example,theESDPoperationwillnothavesuchfinancialinstrumentsinitshandsastheCommissionhas.Asmoothcooperationandcoordination–asKaldorsays“effectivemultilateralism”–isavirtuethattheEUactorsinthefieldneedtoacquire.

61 The Kosova Women’s Network and Women in BlackNetworkSerbiaformedtheWomen’sPeaceCoalitionon7May2006(KosovarWomen’sVoice2006,1)

62 Kuper2007.63 UNDP2006a.64 Welch2006,234.


5 Conclusion

It is evident that the European Union is facing a majorchallengewhenlaunchinganESDPoperationinKosovo.First,it is a challenge for the EU’s internal unity. Some countriesseemmorereluctanttorecognisetheindependenceofKosovothanotherswhichcreatesaproblemforthecommonlyagreedjudicialbasisoftheoperationinasituationwhereSerbiaisnotready to accept the internationally imposed status solution.AsthecredibilityoftheESDPdependsonhowtheEUisableto deal with such a sensitive political issue, it is howeverhighlyprobablethattheEUmanagestogetoveritsinternalhesitationsandlaunchtheoperation.

Second, theoperationchallenges theEU’s credibilitynotonlyontheinternationalscenebutalsointhefieldinKosovo.Is EU able to deliver its promises, assist the institutions totake up more responsibility and ownership and contributetoKosovo’ssustainabledevelopment?IsEUabletoconvincethe local population as well as the local leadership of thenecessity and legitimacy of reforms and the signification oftheEUperspective?OntheSerbiansidetheEUperspective,eventhoughitisoftenunderlinedinpoliticaldiscourse,ithasnot brought the same pace of reforms as in the candidatecountries.On the contrary, manyobservers often wonder ifSerbiaevenwantstojointheEUinthefuture.TheEU’sESDPoperationinKosovowillbecloselylinkedtoEU’senlargementpoliciesandtheEUassistanceisbasedontheEUmembership

perspective.

As the European Union develops its common foreignand securitypolicy,Kosovo, is a veryuseful test case foranintegrated rule of law operation and the development ofciviliancrisismanagementoperation.TheEUpartnersdiscusstheEU’scredibility,theEU’scapabilities,andtheEU’spositionontheworldscene.ThethirdchallengeIwouldliketopointout inthespiritoftheHumanSecurityDoctrine, ishoweverthemostimportant:theeffectivenessoftheEUactivities,theaddedvalueoftheEUoperation,theactualbenefitsthattheEU’sciviliancrisismanagementoperationbringsonthegroundtothelivesoflocalpopulations.

This article has made an effort to underline the specificvalue but also the limits of the Human Security theorisingin the concrete civilian crisis management planning of theEU using the Kosovo case as an example. How the humansecurity approach canbeuseful is to find concreteways toenhancetheEU’sperformanceonthegroundincrisisareas.Byemphasisingtheprimacyofhumanrightsandtheneedofeffective cooperationbetweendifferent internationalactors,the Human Security Doctrine reveals relevant areas wheretheEUshouldimprovethecarryingoutofcrisismanagementactivities.Tounderlineinpre-missionhumansecuritytrainingstheEU’saccountabilitytowardsthelocalpopulationsisalreadyagoalinitself.


Primary documents

BarcelonaReport(2004):A Human Security Doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona report of the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities presented to EU High representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana in Barcelona on 15 September 2004.http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchhumansecurity.htm.

CCPR(InternationalCovenantofCivilandPoliticalRights,UnitedNations)(2004):Concluding observations of the Human rights Committee:Finland.02/12/2004.http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CCPR.CO.82.FIN.En?Opendocument,accessedon3/1/2008.

DGEIX2006:EU/ESDP Training Survey 2006.

Eide,Kai(2005):“AcomprehensivereviewofthesituationinKosovo”.http://www.unosek.org/docref/KaiEidereport.pdf

ForumforCivicInitiativesandSaferworld(2007):Human security in kosovo: A survey of perceptions,May2007.http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/Human_Security_in_Kosovo_English.pdf.

Human Security report(2005):HumanSecurityCentre,LiuInstituteforGlobalIssues,UniversityofBritishColumbia.http://www.humansecurityreport.info/content/view/28/63/.

HumanSecurityStudyGroup,LondonSchoolofEconomics.http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchhumansecurity.htm

InternationalCrisisGroup(2007a):“BreakingtheKosovoStalemate:Europe’sResponsibility”Europe report,No.185,21August2007.http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5018&l=1.

InternationalCrisisGroup(2007b):“KosovoCountdown:ABlueprintforTransition”.Europe report,No.188,6December2007.http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5201&l=1.

MadridReport(2007):A European Way of Security: The Madrid report of the Human Security Study Group comprising a Proposal and Background report by Human Security Study Group (LSE), launched in Madrid 8th November.http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/PDFs/Madrid%20Report%20Final%20for%20distribution.pdf.

Saferworld(2007):“Kosovoatthecrossroads:Perceptionsofconflict,accesstojusticeandopportunitiesforpeaceinKosovo”,December2007.http://www.saferworld.org.uk/images/pubdocs/SafePlace%20Conflict%20Analysis%202%20Report%2020071202%20English.pdf.

UNDP kosovo Internal Security Sector review(2006a).http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/ISSR_report_eng_ver2.pdf.

UNDP kosovo Human Development report(2006b):“Youth–AnewgenerationforanewKosovo”.http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/hdr_eng.pdf.

UNDP kosovo Early Warning report(2007).http://www.kosovo.undp.org/repository/docs/EWR17_eng.pdf.

References


UNoSEk kosovo Comprehensive status proposal.http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/statusproposal.html.

UN Security Council resolution 1244.http://www.nato.int/Kosovo/docu/u990610a.htm.

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PRT models in Afghanistan Approachestocivil-militaryintegration

Oskari Eronen

The26ProvincialReconstructionTeams(PRT)inAfghanistancombinemilitaryandcivilian

capacitiesincrisismanagement.Thisarticlegivesanoverviewofthemissionandhistoryof

theteams,presentingmorecloselyfourgenericPRTmodels.Theflexibilityoftheconcept

hasdevelopedintoanincoherentnetworkoflead-nation-drivenunitswhichcouldrun

counterproductivetoAfghanownershipandthecomprehensivenessofinternationalefforts.

Whileinneedofreform,thePRTsingeneralprovideaninterestingandunprecedentedmodel

forcivil-militaryintegrationatthefieldlevel.1

1 ThisarticlewasfinishedinAugust2008.


1 Introduction

ANATO-ledInternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)hasbeen operating in Afghanistan since January 2002. Startingfromasmalltaskforcetosecurethecapital,Kabul,ithasgrowntocovertheentirecountry.NATO’sprimeoperationcommands52,000soldiersandhasassumedabroadrangeofdutiesfromcounterinsurgencytostabilisationandreconstruction.

The latter tasks are crystallised in 26 ProvincialReconstructionTeams(PRT)thatISAFhasacrossthecountry.ISAF describes PRT as a joint civil-military unit operating attheprovinciallevelandledbyanISAFmembernation2.PRTsare intendedtomonitortheirareasofresponsibility,supportsecurity sector reform and better governance, and enablereconstruction and development. PRT lead nations total 14,which has resulted in a variety of organisations in terms ofthe functionsand resourcesavailable.EachPRThas itsownrecognisablenationalfeatures,resultinginavibrantbutvexingrealityofdiverseunits.Fashioningnovelapproaches tocivil-military integration, PRTs have become a topic of constantdebate.

ItcouldbeaskedwhetherPRTsremainintheframeworkofmilitarycrisismanagementorendeavourtoestablishawiderform of post-conflict stabilisation. Answers to the questionvary between different stakeholders: ISAF, PRT lead nationgovernmentsandbranchesofthese,theAfghanpeopleandgovernment, NGOs, the United Nations, and independentacademia. In numbers, PRTs evidently appear to be militaryunits: on average, civilians make up only some 5% of thetotal personnel. However, the PRT mission statement goesfarbeyondthemilitarydomainandrequiresalsocompetentcivilianactivities.

Thispaper looksatPRTs fromawidecrisismanagementangle.ThemainobjectiveistoexaminethecurrentPRTconceptand various approaches to integrating civilian and militarycrisismanagementwithinaPRTframework.Inbroaderterms,a “PRT model” also includes the ways participating nationsorganisetheirdevelopmentandreconstructioneffortsintheirPRTgeographicareasofresponsibility.FourgenericPRTmodelsare outlined: American, German, British-Nordic and Turkish.Thepaperalsosurveys thefieldof international researchon

2 ISAF2007,3.

PRTsandintroducesafewtopicalpointsofcriticismtowardsPRTsinAfghanistan.

ThestudyaimstobroadentheunderstandingofPRTsandtointroduceabriefandup-to-dateconceptualhistoryoftheteamsatlarge.ThisarticleattemptstoprovidecomprehensiveinformationespeciallyfortheFinnishaudience,whichsofarhashadtorelyonpublicinformationproducedbytheFinnishDefenceForcesandsporadicnews items.Hopefully the textwill feed the national discussion on Afghanistan and theFinnishmissionthere.Atthiswriting,FinlandhasdispatchedfourciviliancrisismanagementexpertstoPRTMazar-eSharifinnorthernAfghanistan.

The scope of the paper is limited to only cover PRTs inAfghanistan.TheunitsundertheCoalitioninIraqshouldbestudiedseparately.Althoughcivil-militaryrelationsareasourceoftimelyandcontinuouslydebatedtopics,suchasthePRTs’interactionwiththelocalpopulace,thispaperwillnotaddresssuchissuesindetail.ThefocusisonhowthePRTsareorganisedinternally with regards to the civil-military integration andhowthePRTleadnationsapplytheirintegratedapproachinprovinces.ToimplementISAF’smissioninacertainareadoesnotonlyincluderunningaPRT;ithasgraduallyturnedintothebuildingupofamultifacetedsupportpackagefortheprovinceintermsofdevelopmentaid,governancesupportandpoliticallobbyinginKabul.

ThisstudyofselectedPRTmodelsinAfghanistanislargelybased on publicly available research papers, studies, articlesanddocumentsfrommultiplesourceswritteninthelastfewyears. In addition, the author’s personal experiences as apolitical advisor in PRT Meymaneh3 and PRT Mazar-e Sharifduring2006–2007laythefoundationsforthestudy.Theactualeffectivenessofdifferentmodelscannotbeanalysedonthesegroundsasitwouldnecessitatemuchmoredetailedresearchandinterviewsinthefield.Theapproachhereisconsequentlymore conceptual, looking at how PRTs are designed anddepicted. Assessments of the quality of their functions aredrawnfromotherstudies.

3 The great variety of transliterations of Afghan namesmustbeacknowledged.Forthesakeofclarity,thetextwillhereafterfollowversionsusedbyNATOintheISAFPRTHandbook.


2 ShorthistoryofPRTs

Afghanistanmadeasuddencomeback into thespotlightofinternational politics in September 2001. Terrorist attacks intheUnitedStateswere soon trackeddowntoAl-Qaeda,aninternationalnetworkwhosetopleadersandtrainingcentreshad been operating in Afghanistan for several years. TheTalibanregime’shorrifyinghumanrightsviolationshadalreadybrokenthenews,butitwas9/11thatliftedAfghanistanbackto world attention. The Taliban hosted enemies of the onlysuperpowerintheworld.

ToseizetheleadingAl-QaedaterroristsandtodismantletheTalibanregime,aUS-ledcoalitioncalledOperationEnduringFreedom(OEF)startedamilitarycampaigninAfghanistanon7October2001.Talibanfightersrapidlylostcontrolovervastparts of the land, the main ground force being US-backedNorthern Afghan militias. Enjoying a UN Security Councilmandate,OEFcontinuedfightingremnantsoftheTalibanandAl-Qaeda,especiallypursuingOsamabinLaden.

Simultaneously with military success, the political futureof Afghanistan remained to be settled. The internationalcommunity prepared a conference in Bonn, Germany,assembling most of the political and ethnic groups inAfghanistan.Asaresult,theBonnAgreementestablishedtheAfghan InterimAuthority (AIA) and cleared theway for theconstitutionalprocessinthenextthreeyears.HamidKarzai,anethnicPashtunfromKandahar,wasinauguratedasChairmanoftheAIA.

AsrequestedintheBonnAgreementandrecognisingtheneed to support the fragile political compromise built, theUnited Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1386 on20December2001.UnderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter, itauthorisedtheestablishment

“ofanInternationalSecurityAssistanceForcetoassistthe Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenanceof security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, sothat the Afghan Interim Authority as well as thepersonnel of the United Nations can operate in asecureenvironment.”4

Foralmost twoyears ISAF remaineda rather small forceof just 5,000 located in Kabul. OEF continued operating

4 UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil2001.

throughoutthecountry,thoughitspermanentpresencewaslimited to the Kabul region and a few bigger cities in theeastandsoutheastofthecountry.BoththeUNandtheAIAChairmanKarzaiproposedanextensionofISAFtocovertheentirecountry.TheUSAdisagreed,arguingthatnotenoughinternationaltroopswouldbeavailable.UnwillingitselftodirectmoresubstantialresourcestoAfghanistanandsufferingfromthefeeblesuccessofthecombatoperationsofOEF,theUSAstartedtodevelopalternatives5.Inbroadterms,theAmericanthinkingwasinlinewiththeUNapproach,craftedundertheterm“lightfootprint”bytheSpecialRepresentativeoftheUNSecretaryGeneral(SRSG)atthattime,LakhdarBrahimi.PRTsemergedfromthesediscussionsofhow“tospreadthe‘ISAFeffect’withoutexpandingISAFitself.”6

PRTs presented a light version of a presence deemed tobetter suit the Afghan context that was not permissive torobustpeace-enforcementinanywideprojection.TherefusaltoacceptanenduringforeigninfluencehasbeenrecurrentinAfghanhistory.]

EvenifPRTsappeartobequiteanovelremedytobroadproblemsof instability andacutely immaturegovernment ina war-torn country, they are sometimes said to have earlyancestors. RobertM.Cassidyhas studied counterinsurgencystrategies and the use of indigenous forces in a number ofpost-World War II cases. He asserts that PRTs may haveforerunners in Algeria and Vietnam. The French-createdSections Administratives Specialisées (SAS) and the US CivilOperations and Rural Development Support (CORDS) arein some respects similar to PRTs inAfghanistan. These earlyprecursors were trained to intervene and support locals ingovernance, justice, infrastructure and agriculture. CORDS,forexample, includedUSAIDexperts, just like theAmericanPRTstoday.Theyweretosomeextentabletowinheartsandmindsorto“holdthecountrysidebypacifyingandsecuringthepopulation.”7

5 Gauster2007,19.6 McNerney2005,32.7 Cassidy2006,53–54,56.


In somewhat the same fashion, the ISAFPRTHandbookdescribesaPRTas:

“acivil-military institutionthat isabletopenetratethe more unstable and insecure areas because ofitsmilitarycomponentandisabletostabilizetheseareas because of the combined capabilities of itsdiplomacy,military,andeconomiccomponents.”8

ThesameHandbooktells thatanearlyPRTconceptwasborneoutoftheCoalitionHumanitarianLiaisonCells(CHLCs)established already in 2002. CHLCs operated under OEF’sJointCivil-MilitaryOperationsTaskForce(CJCMOTF).Staffedwith only 10–12 persons, these military teams providedinformation on humanitarian needs, coordinated aid withmilitaryoperationsandimplementedsmallprojects.9Lateron,theteamswerejoinedbyUSDepartmentofStateandUSAIDrepresentatives.

Thefirstconceptofa“JointRegionalTeam”wasdevelopedin November 2002 into “Provisional Reconstruction Teams”whichbeganworking inGardez,KunduzandBamian.Afterafewmonthsinapilotphase,thenamewasfinallychangedtoProvincialReconstructionTeams10,derivingreportedlyfromPresidentKarzai,whosaid:“Warlordsruleregions,governorsrule provinces.” The main emphasis was on reconstruction,whichKarzaiwantedtoseePRTschieflyengagingin.11Maybeheevenforesawanopportunityforgovernorstodemandmorereconstruction money for their provinces and play the PRTsagainsteachother–asishappeningattheverymoment12.

The first teams were established under US-led OEF inearly 2003. As the PRT Handbook remarks, the first fourlocationswerechosenstrategically:Gardez(ethnicallyPashtundominated southeast), Kunduz (northern Tajiks), Bamian(central Hazaras) and Mazar-e Sharif (northern Uzbeks)13.ThelatterwaslaunchedbytheUKinJuly2003.TheUSPRToutreach continued with four other strategically importantspots:Bagram,Herat,JalalabadandKandahar.

NATOtookcommandofISAFinAugust2003.Twomonthslater, at the request of theAIA andNATO, theUNSecurityCouncil issued Resolution 1510 authorising ISAF expansionoutsideKabul.BackedupbytheResolution,NATOcommencedplanning for expansion first to the north. This was to takeplacethroughPRTs,aconceptOEFhadjustproveduseful.InDecember2003oneof thefirst threepioneeringunits,PRTKunduz,wastransferredtoISAFcommandandtakenoverbyGermany.Thatwas,however,notthefirstPRThandoversincetheUShadturnedPRTBamianovertoNewZealandalreadyinSeptember2003.

The first PRT to be established as part of ISAF was theGerman-led PRT Feyzabad in the remote and mountainousBadakhshan province. At the same time, UK-led Mazar-e Sharif was absorbed into ISAF command and a new PRT

8 ISAF2007,5.9 ISAF2007,D-2-1.10 reliefweb2003.11 McNerney2005,36.12 IWPR2007;Irinnews2007a.13 ISAF2007,D-2-2.

Meymanehwascarvedoutfromitsareaofresponsibility.Theyear 2004 saw altogether 11 new PRTs being established.14Afghan presidential elections in autumn 2004 on their partconsolidatedPRTs’statusasausefultoolinstate-building15.

ISAFwasfurtherexpandedtothewestinsummer2005.Theprocessputnew leadnationsonto the ISAFmapwhenItaly, Spain and Lithuania organised their own PRTs. At thesame time, thePRTextensionwascontinuedwith twonewOEFunitsestablishedintheeast.16

NATO’splanwastospreadtheISAFpresencetocoverallofAfghanistan.Reachingouttothesouthstartedalreadyinlate2005andcontinuedin2006astheUKhandedover itstwo units in the north and prepared to concentrate on thesouthern Helmand province, where it assumed commandof an originally US-established PRT in May 2006. Also theNetherlands relocated from the north and Canada fromKabultotakeoverPRTsundertheRegionalCommandSouth.The northern PRTs were assumed by Norway, Sweden andHungary.Finally, ISAFtookoverresponsibilityforallthePRTsinAfghanistaninOctober2006.PreviouslyOEF-ownedPRTsintheeastwereshiftedtotheNATO-ledoperation.17

Afterthethree-yearprocesstotransformtheinternationalmilitary presence in Afghanistan, the majority of operationsare now, in autumn 2008, commanded by NATO/ISAF,coveringalsomostofthosedirectedagainsttheTaliban.OEFin Afghanistan has been reduced in numbers and scope ofoperations,butstilloperateswithaforceofthousands.OEFis represented by Coalition Force Command – Afghanistan(CFC-A),whichincludes,forexample,theCombinedSecurityTransition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), a strong taskforce to support the reconstitution of the Afghan NationalArmy(ANA)andPolice(ANP).

In November 2006, the PRT community was expandedbya Turkishnewcomerwhena civilianPRTwasestablishedin the Vardak province. The Czech Republic assumed PRTresponsibilities in Lowgar, south of Kabul, in March 2008.Subsequently, two provinces have remained uncovered bya PRT: Daykondi in central Afghanistan and Nimruz in the

southwest.AllPRTsare,atthiswriting,undertheISAFmilitarychain

of command. It should be noted, though, that this militarychain of command only applies to the military units – nottheciviliansembeddedintothePRTstructures.Itcanalsobequestionedhowmuchofthecentral(ISAF)militarycommandstructureisactuallyeffectiveoverthenationallycommandedtroops supporting and stationed in the PRTs. In addition tothe Kabul-based military command structure headed by theCommander of ISAF, the echelons closest to PRTs are fourRegionalCommands(RC)establishedin2006:RCNorth,RCWest,RCSouthandRCEast.ThefifthRCistheCapital(RCC),buttherearenoPRTsformedinKabul.TheRCsareanswerabletoISAFHeadquartersinKabul.Theregionalechelonscommand

14 ISAF2007,D-2-3,D-3-2.15 Stapleton2007,24.16 ISAF2007,D-2-3.17 ISAF2007,D-2-3/4.


notonlythePRTsbutalsovariousotherunitslikemanoeuvrebattalions,logisticalunitsandothersupportelements.Someoftheseassets,togetherwiththerespectivePRTs,mayformnation-driventaskforcesundertheRCs,suchastheCanadianTaskForceinKandahar.

ThePRTconceptbecametrulyinternationalinNovember2005 when it was adopted in Iraq by the US-led coalition.Since the introduction of the “New Way Forward” planin Iraq, there currently are 31 PRTs covering all the18 Iraqiprovinces.ManningofthePRTsdifferssomewhatfromthoseinAfghanistan,unitsinIraqbeingmuchsmaller(26personsinaverage)andcontainingmorecivilianstaff.Altogether13PRTsinIraqareembeddedintocombattroops(ePRTs),whiletherestare ledbycivilians.ThesedualfeaturespresentasubstantialalterationfromthemodelsusedinAfghanistan.18

18 USDepartmentofState2007a;Perito2007,1–6;Perito2008.


3 PRTmissionandtasks

TheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilamendedandexpandedISAF’s mandate to cover regions outside the Afghan capitalKabulinOctober2003.Bythattime,thefirstPRTshadbeenoperatingundertheUS-ledCoalition’sOEFformorethanhalfa year. Although Resolution 1510 did not mention PRTs, itpreparedthewayfortheestablishmentofthefirstISAFPRTsand set ISAF’s mission for the next years. Security CouncilResolution1510stated:

“StressingalsotheimportanceofextendingcentralgovernmentauthoritytoallpartsofAfghanistan,ofcomprehensive disarmament, demobilization andreintegrationofallarmedfactions,andofsecuritysector reform including reconstitution of the newAfghanNationalArmyandPolice,––[The Council authorizes the] expansion of themandate of the International Security AssistanceForcetoallowit,asresourcespermit,tosupporttheAfghanTransitionalAuthorityand its successors inthemaintenanceofsecurityinareasofAfghanistanoutside of Kabul and its environs, so that theAfghan Authorities as well as the personnel oftheUnitedNations andother international civilianpersonnel engaged, in particular, in reconstructionand humanitarian efforts, can operate in a secureenvironment,andtoprovidesecurityassistanceforthe performance of other tasks in support of theBonnAgreement.”19

Inshort,theCouncilgaveISAFamissiontoexpandoutsideofKabulinordertocreatesecurityconditionsforaidandtosupporttheslowspreadingoutofAfghangovernmentauthoritytoprovinces thatwere controlledbywarlords armed to theteeth.Thelatter,initsessence,isapoliticalmission.FollowingtheUN-preferredlightfootprintapproachtoAfghanistan20,itrequiresnotonlymilitarycapabilitiesbutskilfullocaldiplomacyandsponsoringof theAfghangovernment.PRT isa toolof“robust military diplomacy,” Peter Viggo Jakobsen argues21.

19 UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil2003.20 Jakobsen2005,8.21 Jakobsen2005,12.

It thus deviates from the neutrality principle of traditionalpeacekeeping.

Who, then, opposed this mandate? Writing ofcounterinsurgencystrategies,DavidJ.ClarkandRaymondA.MillenobservethatthecreationofPRTwebsinAfghanistanandIraqfollowsan“oilspotstrategy.”

“Thistechnique––employspocketsofcivil-militaryteamsincludingpolice,administrators,andsoldiersinclustersthroughoutthecountry.Theobjectistograduallyexpandfromtheselocationsbyconductingpacificationoperationsinthesurroundingareas.Intheory, theclusterswillbecomecontiguousas theinsurgencymeltsaway.”22

Theoilspotschemecorrespondsinitsformwithrealitiesin Afghanistan, but it might miss the real target of such astrategy.For theUNandtheenlarging ISAF, theenemywasnotinsurgency,butpotentiallyoldwarlordsandcriminalsthatthreatened the rule of the Afghan central government andtheoutreachof its authority to theprovinces. ISAF’smasterplanfrom2003onwardswastobalanceandgraduallyshrinkwarlords’powerbasesinorderfortheAfghansecurityforcesand administration to evolve. The PRT concept essentiallycarries a political mission. Warlords were the opponents (or“spoilers” in military language) to ISAF’s mandate and thepost-Bonn regime symbolised by Hamid Karzai. Insurgentsemerged a bit later – both in the streets and at the topofISAF’slistofconcerns.23

Ironically the same powerbrokers that ISAF tried to playdownhadbeenkeypartners inOEF’s campaignagainst thehardcoreofTalibanandAl-Qaeda.Eveniftheoilspottheoryseems tobeweakonexplaining theexpansionof ISAF, it islikely that the counterinsurgency spur was a strong factorbehindsomeoftheOEFPRTs,atleastintheeastandsouth.

TheUN’sbroadmissionfor ISAFwaslaterrefinedbythePRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC), a high-level bodyco-chaired by the Afghan Minister of the Interior and theCommanderofISAFandconsistingofotherAfghanministers,NATO, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

22 Clark&Millen2006,20.23 Anastutearticleontheartofdealingwithwarlordsand

state-buildinginAfghanistanisOrsini2007.


(UNAMA) and EU representatives and ambassadors of thePRT troop-contributing nations. The ESC was established inDecember2004toprovideguidanceandoversightofPRTs.Itapprovedadocumenttitled“PRTTermsofReference(ToR)”inJanuary2005andgavePRTsamissionto

“assistTheIslamicRepublicofAfghanistantoextenditsauthority,inordertofacilitatethedevelopmentofastableandsecureenvironmentintheidentifiedareaof operations, and enable SSR and reconstructionefforts.”24

ThemissionwasstillrathergeneralindispositionalthoughtheToRfurtherlistedPRTresponsibilitieswithregardtootheractors, security, reconstruction and information activities. Inall relations the PRTs should aim to extend “the reach andlegitimacyofnationalgovernment.”Besidesmonitoring theoverallsituationinassignedareas,themostprecisemandatePRTs are given is in supporting the build-up of the AfghanNationalPolice(ANP).Regardingreconstructionactivities,thePRTsaresteeredtoprimarilycreateconditionsforotheractorssuchas theUNandNGOs.But thePRTsmayalso run theirownprojectsfollowingtheideaoffillingthevoidthatothersleave.PRTeffortsneedtobeinlinewithAfghangovernmentactivities. To this end, the PRTs are to support the localadministration’s development planning in their responsibleprovinces.25

ISAFHeadquarterslaterrefinedthePRTToRintoadoctrineofthree“linesofoperations”includingsecurity,governanceandreconstruction&development.Sometimesalsoafourth,cross-cutting dimension of coordination is mentioned.Some activities like the Disarmament, Demobilisation andReintegration(DDR)processoftheAfghanMilitiaForceshaveended,butthelistofsupportingactivitiesforPRTshasmostlyremainedthesame.FocusingonSecuritySectorReform(SSR),governanceanddevelopmentPRTsareexpectedto“provide”,“observe,assessandreport.”26Itmaybesaid,however,thatmanyunitshavegraduallyoverplayedtheirroleinreconstructionanddevelopmentandaretakingresponsibilitiesingovernancesupportthatwouldmorenaturallyfallwithinthemandateofUNAMA.

Inaddition to theUNmandateand theToRguiding thePRTs,theirtasksarefrequentlyreviewedbyboththeESCandISAFHeadquarters.ESCissuedthreePolicyNotesinDecember2006andFebruary2007definingthePRTroleindevelopment,humanitarianaidanddisarmament27.Thesedocumentsarede factobindingasthedecisionshavebeenmadebyambassadorsofthePRTtroop-contributingnations.

ISAFHeadquarters,throughthemilitarychainofcommand,frequentlytasksPRTswithnewduties.In2007PRTsweregivenorders to startmonitoringandassessingdevelopment levelsin districts, including mapping existing infrastructure, newprojects, and evaluating the basic conditions and needs inthe judicial sector. The latter task came as the international

24 ISAF2007,B-1-1/2,B-2-1/2.25 ISAF2007,B-2-1/2.26 ISAF2007,B-2-1/2.27 ISAF2007,B-4-1/2,B-5-1/2.

community was preparing for the Afghanistan rule of lawconference in Rome in July 2007. It seems the PRTs areconceived as a handy tool available when the internationalcommunity needs to get something done fast and broadlyacrossAfghanistan.ThePRTsarepresentalmosteverywhere,theyarefairlymobileandarecapableofsecuringthemselves.Freedomofmovementiscombinedwithcivilianexpertiseabletoguidesimplefact-findingactivitiesrunbythemilitary.


4 PresentvarietyofPRTs

4.1 Listing PrTs

Therearecurrently26PRTsacrossAfghanistan,allsomehowdifferent fromeachother.Thesamemissionand taskshavelent themselves to a variety of implementation in divergingcircumstances.Unitsmaybecomparedagainstseveralcriteria,forexampleinlightofthetenfollowingfactors:

1. Nationscontributing;2. SizeofthePRTinnumbers;3. Balancebetweenthemilitaryandcivilian

componentsinnumbers;4. LeadershipofthePRTandintegrationofthe

militaryandciviliancomponents;5. SecurityactivitiesandcapabilitiesthePRThas

(bothmilitaryprofileandcivilianassetssuchaspolicetrainers);

6. ActivitiesingovernancebythePRTitselforitsleadnation;

7. ReconstructionanddevelopmentactivitiesthePRToritsleadnationruns;

8. Fundingmechanismsandmodalitiesforreconstructionanddevelopment;patternindistributionoffundingviathePRTversusoutsideofit;

9. Totalamountoffundsflowingtotheareaofresponsibilityinrelativeandabsoluteterms;

10.ExternalenvironmentforthePRTtooperatein:securitysituation,qualityofgovernanceanddevelopment,presenceoftheUNandNGOs,modusoperandiofothertroopspresent.

The list lays heavy emphasis on civilian assets and theirintegrationintothewholeframework.IntheForewordtothePRTHandbookfromFebruary2007,theISAFCommander,UNSRSGandNATOSeniorCivilianRepresentativemaintainthat

“all effective, well-functioning PRTs have onecharacteristic in common: they operate as fullyintegrated civil-military structures, and, as such,bring a comprehensive rangeof resources tobearin assisting GOA [Government of Afghanistan] to

extend its authorityand to increase its capacity to

govern.”28

NATO considers PRT to be a holistic civil-military unit,the achievements of which are dependent on successfulcooperation between the civilian and military components.It may well be argued that the tight integration of civilianandmilitarycapabilitiesisthemostfruitfulinnovationoftheentire concept. Summarising Anglo-American research onPRTs,HannahGodsaveobserves that this integrativecoreoftheorganisationhasnotraisedcriticism,unlikesomanyothertraitsofthePRTs29.

The questions above make an extensive list and wouldnecessitatethoroughfieldresearchinordertocomeupwithawide-rangingstudyofthenatureofall26PRTsinAfghanistan.Althoughtheinformationbaseinthisresearchsetting(publicsources, limited field exposure) remains incomplete, it iscertainlypossibletodrawsomegeneralconclusionsonhowandwhyPRTsdiffersomuch.

4.2 Institutional framework on the home front

Themostapparentobservation is thateveryPRT isoneofakind. It isoftennoted that thisdivergencederives from thecapitals and thusoccursnotbetween thePRTsas such,butthe14 leadnations.Havinga lookat thetwoGermanPRTsin the north and especially those 12 led by the USA acrossAfghanistan, it becomes clear that domestic reasoning isa major force behind modelling a PRT. The American PRTshaveastandardizedstructure–eventhoughtheycoversuchdifferentprovincesasParwannorthofKabulandGhazni inthesoutheastofAfghanistan.

ThePRTsareasomewhatnovelinnovationininternationalcrisismanagementintheirwayofbringingtogetherdifferentbranchesofhomegovernments.Assets sent toAfghanistanaredependentontheresourcesthenationhasonthewhole.Inaddition,experts,ofcourse,donotarriveinAfghanistanfromanyvacuum,butcarryalongattitudes,bureaucratictraditions

28 ISAF2007,ii.29 Godsave2007,33.


and the legal restrictions of their employers back home30.Jakobsen argues that both operational approaches and theway cooperation between civilian and military componentsis arranged are predominantly reflections of domesticinheritance31. Putting together the military, police advisors,development experts anddiplomats carries seriouspotentialforexplosion.Luckily,theoutcomeofthe interplaybetweenthese living organisational memories and policies written inPRT planning documents guide, but do not determine, thenatureofaPRT.Nationalpolicyrigiditiesonreconstructionanddevelopmentortheshowingofforcearerepeatedlyloosenedontheground.

The widest disparities emerge from national policiestowardsreconstructionandthePRTroleinit.ItwasoriginallythoughtthatPRTswouldrunonlysmallandshort-termprojectsto rapidly build up their role in provinces and to meet theimmediateneedsofthelocalpopulation.Thiswassupposedtotakeplacewhereandwhenotherdevelopmentactorswouldnotbeavailableorcapable.ManyPRTshaveovertimeboostedtheirreconstructionactivities;someduetothenon-permissivesecuritysituationforNGOs,someformorepoliticalreasons.

From the ISAF perspective, these restrictions, or caveatsastheyaresometimesmisleadingly32called,arecomplicatingthenormal business. Leading amilitary operation infiltratedsoheavily by variousnational policies and civilian expertisesprovesdifficult.Forexample,CIMIC(Civil-MilitaryCooperation)branches inhigherechelonshavebeensurprisedtofindoutthatthetwoNordicPRTsinMeymanehandMazar-eSharifdonothaveanydedicatedCIMICon-the-groundassetsavailableduetonationalAfghanistanpolicies–whereassuchactivitiesformthemilitarybackboneoftheAmericanPRTmodel.

Ontheotherhand,itcouldbenotedthatbizarreprioritiesandconstraintsfavouringonesector,activityormodalityoversomeothersmayserveapoint.Oftenthesearrangementsareneededtomotivaterigiddomesticbureaucraciesandinduceagencies to any meaningful cooperation. Positively, recentexperiences in Afghanistan have set in motion processes ofinterdepartmentaladjustmentsinmanycountries.

One more complicating factor in the field is the variouspartneringnationsbehindthePRTs.Theytoohavetheirowninstitutional rigidities and favoured policies. But adding tothoseoftheleadnation,partners’prioritiescouldwellprovideneededsupplementaryassetsandflexibilitytothePRT.There

30 InsightfultextintothesedynamicsiswrittenbyPiiparinen2007.

31 Jakobsen2005,28; Perito (2005,3)makes apointofhomeland legal requirements hindering comparisons,evaluations and learning processes between leadnations.

32 Limitations to PRT functions described above shouldnotbemixedupwith the largerscale issueofmilitarycaveats and other serious operational restrictions thatsomeISAFparticipatingnationshavenotified.Thelatter,liketheGermanor Italianpolicynottosendtroopstothesouth,havesparkedafiercedebateinNATOoveritsmembers’participation in ISAF.Partlybecausebuildingonoutdated information,Godsave (2007,11–13) fallsintoatrapofmuddlingthesetwomatters.

are altogether 16 PRT partnering nations in ISAF, includingFinland33.

4.3 Local conditions

Establishing a unit solely according to bureaucraticcircumstances would soon prove to be a futile effort. Thereal environment certainly has had an impact on how PRTshave been modelled. The PRT concept has been notoriousfor itsflexibility inadjustingtovaryingandchangingneeds,challengesandopportunities.Thelackofdirectguidancefromabovehasresultedintheexcessivecapacitytobendthemodelandactivities.Manyregardthisincoherenceasamajorerrorofthewholeenterprise34.

Afghanistan for sure is plagued with bad and weakgovernance,poorcapacitiesinprovincestoplanandadminister,loweducation,alackofinfrastructure,afeeblejudicialsystemandcorruptionpermeatingthegovernmentatalllevels.Thesevexing problems are common across the country. Howevercircumstances in provinces differ when it comes to theproductionofnarcotics,narco-trade,activitiesofillegalarmedgroupsandthepowerofoldwarlords,orinsurgentactivities.Helmandprovinceinthesouthwestproducesalonemoreillicitdrugsthananyothercountryintheworld,whereasmorethanhalfofAfghanprovincesarepoppy-free35.

ThesecuritysituationinthesouthernandeasternpartsofthecountryhasremainedvolatileandhasaffectedPRTactivitiesaswell.MostclearlyitisreflectedinthelownumbersofNGOspresentinmostoftheprovincesthatseeregularfightingandstrikesby insurgentgroups.Michael J.DziedzicandMichaelK.SeidlnotethattheUSPRTbeltwasbuiltinhotspotareas“where therewas virtually no IOorNGOpresence”36.OnlythebiggestcitieslikeKandaharandJalalabadandafewoftheprovincialcentresattractsubstantialnumbersofaidworkers.

Similarly poor security is equivalent of incapable andsometimeseventotallycollapsedlocaladministration,leavingthe people without public services. This kind of securitysituationandlevelofdevelopmentchallengesleadPRTsinthesouthandeasttotakealargerrole.Theyhaverobustmilitaryelements (CIMIC or Civil Affairs37 type) for reconstructionand their lead nations provide provinces with high sums ofdevelopmentaid.38

33 ISAF2007,D-3-2.34 E.g.Save the Children2007;Perito2005;Godsave2007;

Stapleton2007;Gauster2007.35 UNODC2008,vii.36 Dziedzic&Seidl2005,4.37 AmericanequivalenttoCIMIC.38 Evenifgeneraltrendsmaybetracked,itshouldbenoted

that there are no comprehensive statistics availablecoveringeveryPRTandshowingthefundsflowingfromPRTcontributingnationstotheirresponsibleprovinces.Comparisons from easy-access sources are difficult tomake as some governments publicise exact figures,some nothing. Some aggregate estimations of donorcontributionstotheAfghanprovincescanbefoundinWaldman2008,14.


The security environments for PRTs vary from the ratherpeacefulnorthernandcentral regions tohigh-riskprovinceslike Helmand, Kandahar or lately Kunar. This warrants aprincipalquestionofwhetherthePRTconceptisatallviablefor high-threat-level areas. PRTs were originally establishedin potentially unstable provinces where low-level conflictsbetween local militias could be ignited or areas in whichPRTs servedaspartofOEF’spost-combat counterinsurgencyapproach. Godsave terms these territories as “quasi non-permissiveareas”39,whileRobertM.Peritofavours“reasonablypermissiveenvironments.”40AtthemomentsomeofthePRTsareoperating incombatzones.Aretheyable toaccomplishtheir political mission at all in environments that seriouslypreclude freedom of movement of units other than thoseheavilyarmed?

4.4 Presence of other troops

Variationsinthesecuritysituationcorrelatewithcombattrooppresence. InnumerousAfghanprovinces ISAForOEF forcesotherthanasolitaryPRT.Theseincludedifferentsortsoftaskforcesorheadquartersequippedwithmanoeuvrebattalions,engineering battalions and special forces. Moreover, somePRTsthemselveshostnon-ISAFelementslikePoliceMentoringTeamsofCSTC-AordetachmentsfromtheUSArmyCorpsofEngineersintheircamps.

SuchpartnersprovidePRTswithasetofexternalresourcesandassetsinforceprotection,intelligence,reconstructionandsecuritysectorreform.AnassortmentofthesecapacitiesaroundaPRTobviouslyshapesitsownnature.Militarilyrequirementsthat PRTs face in Afghanistan vary at least as much as thedevelopmentlevelsacrossprovinces.ThesefactorsseemtogounrecognisedinmostofthestudiesonPRTs.ItisbyessenceadifferenttasktorunaunitinnorthorwestAfghanistanortheremotecentralpartsthaninthesouthandeastwherethereareplentyofotherISAFandOEFforcesoperating.

39 Godsave2007,26.40 Perito2005,15.

In the absence of other forces nearby, the PRT is solelyresponsibleforcoveringitsprovinceintermsoftheshowofpresence, intelligencecollectionand ifneeded,useofforce.TheLithuanianPRTintheextremelyremoteGhowrmonitorsa vast central highlands province on its own. Whereas thesouthern neighbours, the Dutch in the PRT Tarin Kowt, aresurroundedbyafulltaskforceofmorethan1500soldiers41.The Dutch PRT is able to concentrate on cooperation withlocal administration, reconstruction efforts and coordinationwithotheractors.Paradoxically,militaryrequirementsforPRTsarethehighestinareasofrelativepeace.Ontheotherhand,this iswell in linewith the limitedmilitarymuscle theunitshaveandtheiroriginaldesignfora“limitedrangeofsecuritychallenges.”42

AsapartofISAFdoctrine,allPRTsrelyultimatelyonForwardSupportBases(FSB)collocatedwiththeRegionalCommands.FSBshostavarietyoftroopsdeployableacrosstheresponsibleregion.Fortheirprotectioninextremis,thePRTsmay“reach-back”totheseassetsorISAFjointairpower.

The ways in which the PRTs interpret their military rolediffer. The size of the territory to be covered, the presenceof other troops and the security situation lead the units tocompose varying military capabilities. PRTs in areas wherethereareclosetonoexternalforcestendtobebiggerintermsof both mobile troops and staff. These comparisons shouldnotbetakenascriticism.Theyonlyhighlightthe immenselyvarying nature of the PRTs and the contexts in which theyoperateinAfghanistan.

41 DutchMinistryofDefence2007.42 USInteragency2006,6,11.


5 GenericPRTmodels

Already the first year of PRTs in Afghanistan saw theemergenceofdistinctivemodels.PRTGardez,PRTKunduzandPRTMazar-eSharifstartedwithoutanyuniformguidanceorstrict regulationsof their tasksandorganisation.SoontherecouldbeobservedrecognisableAmerican,GermanandBritishmodels. These generic models are often referred to in thePRTdiscourse.WhethernewerPRTsunder the leadershipofnationslikeSpain,theNetherlands,LithuaniaorHungaryfallwithin the old categorisation remains an almost untouchedfieldofresearch.Nevertheless,itisreasonabletoaddatleastonenewmodel:theTurkishcivilianPRTinVardakopensanewchapterintheshorthistoryofthePRTs.AsummarisingtableofthesemodelsisprovidedinAnnexB.

5.1 American

ItwastheUS-establishedPRTGardezthatbeganthebuild-upofthePRTweb. InFebruary2003,theUSEmbassy inKabuldecided on “Principles Guiding PRT Working Relations withUNAMA, NGOs and Local Government.” The paper listedthreekeyobjectives forPRTs: toextendtheauthorityof theAfghan central government, improve security, and promotereconstruction. These principles gave initial guidance to allPRTactivitiesinAfghanistan,alsosettingmilestonesforlaterdevelopmentsunderISAF.43

The US PRTs developed under the OEF umbrella untilrecently. The United States has launched 18 units inAfghanistanaltogether,running11atthemoment.Thesearemostlylocatedintheeastandsoutheast,alongthePakistanborder.Thosehandedoverhavemainlybeensituatedinthesouthandwestofthecountry.TheUSAhasalsotransferredthePRTconcepttoIraq,whereitleads22units.

AdistinctivefeatureoftheAmericanmodel isthatthereare nearly no partnering nations involved in the PRTs. Theonly exceptions have been PRT Qalat in the southern ZabulprovinceandPRTBagram,supportedbyRomaniaandSouthKorearespectively.

USPRTsarefairlysmallinsize,includingonaveragelessthan100military.TheoriginalOEFdraftmodelconsistedof

43 Perito2005,2.

83militaryandcivilianpersonnel.ComparedtotheGermanandBritishPRTmodels,themilitaryorganisationisbuiltlight:planningandintelligencestaffisthinandoperationalassetsaredirectedtoCivilAffairsandforceprotection.Peritoalsoremindsofdifficulties infindingenoughqualifiedmilitarypersonnel,resulting in frequent understaffing. On the civilian side, theAmericanPRTscompriseonlytwoorthreeindividuals.Allunitsinclude US Department of State and USAID representatives.SomealsobenefitfromtheexpertiseofadvisorssentbytheUSDepartmentofAgriculture.44

TheAmericanunitsare ledbymilitarycommanders.Themain organisational vehicle for coordinating between thecivilianandmilitarycomponentsisthePRTCommandSection,whichcombinescivilianrepresentativeswiththecommanderandhis/herclosestlieutenants.Thisarrangementis,however,alaterimprovementreplicatingthesuccessfuljointCommandGroupmodelcreatedbytheBritishinthenorth.ItsAmericanprecursors were the civil-military boards that guidedreconstructionefforts45.

CommandSections aredesigned to feature a forum forthe synchronisation of efforts in security, governance anddevelopment lines of operation. Civilian experts are alsoexpectedtoworkcloselywithCivilAffairsteams.Despitethisappearanceofequalintegration,theAmericanmodelseemsto have been plagued with overriding military leadership.Jakobsen portrays civilian representatives as “embedded inmilitaryteams”and“alloperatingundermilitarycommand.”46Perito’s report on PRT lessons learned is basedon extensiveinterviewswithUSandNGOrepresentativeswhohaveservedinAfghanistan.Henotesthatuncleartermsofreferenceforcivil-military interaction inside the organisation have led tovaryingoperationalsuccess.SomeoftheAmericanPRTshavebeentornby internal rowswhereas themosteffectiveoneshavebeenabletofusemilitaryandciviliancomponents“intoaclose-knitandmutuallysupportiveteam.”47EvenaslateasJune 2006, the US Interagency assessment demanded that

44 ISAF2007,D-2-2;Perito2005,45.45 USInteragency2006,14.46 Jakobsen2005,28,17.47 Perito2005,11.


allPRTs startapplying the jointCommandSectionapproach– recognised to be a best practise already earlier48. On theotherhand,itmustbenotedthattheUSmodelistheonlyoneon which there are collected substantial and public lessonslearned.

Asanexceptiontotherule,theUnitedStatesestablisheda civilian-led PRT in Panjshir in October 2005. This smalland historically exceptional area was carved out from thethree provinces covered by PRT Bagram. A small militarycomponent (approximately 40) is ordered by a commander,whoworksundertheciviliandirectorofthePRT.Thedirectorrepresents the US Department of State and is joined byadvisors from USAID and the Department of Agriculture. A“smallfootprint”approachwaschosendeliberatelytofittheuniquecircumstancesofPanjshir–anethnicallyhomogenousvalleywhichhassuccessfullyresistedall intrudersinthepast30years.Oneofthekeycharacteristicsofthisexercise istoengage the PRT in daily interaction with local governmentanditsprocesses.49Evenifitwascalledaprototypein2005,the USA has not adopted the same approach elsewhere inAfghanistan.

In the security line of operation, standard US PRTs carryoutsomemobilemilitarypatrolsthoughtheirdirectroleasasecurityforceismainlylimitedto“forceprotection.”50JakobsenreducesthisfeaturebothtoUSoperationaltraditionsandthedemanding security environments in the south and east ofAfghanistan51.Peritoremarksthatthisnarrowedmissionhascaused disappointments with NGOs and UNAMA52. On theotherhand,therehaveonmostoccasionsbeenothercoalitionmanoeuvre forces in close vicinity of the PRTs. Interestinglyenough, fierce verbal collisions have sometimes occurredbetween commanders of these two types of Americanunits sodifferent innatureandtasks53.Alsomilitary-militarycoordinationprovestobeachallengeinconflictzones.

In linewith the longer-termmissionof capacity-buildingamongst the Afghan security forces, US PRTs work on thedevelopment of local police forces through Military Policeteams54. They work together with OEF’s CSTC-A and itspolice mentors contracted from the DynCorp company.These external resources, often collocated with US PRTs,are used for conducting police training and as a source ofdonatedequipment.CSTC-APoliceMentoringTeamsandaninfrastructure element implemented by US Army Engineerswerenotavailableoutsidethesouthernandeasternregionsuntil spring 2007. Since then, they have come into closecooperationandsupportalsonon-AmericanPRTeffortsinSSRacrossAfghanistan.

48 USInteragency2006,14.49 USDepartmentofDefence2005.50 Itisinterestingthatthesamekindsofrestrictionsinthe

earlyGermanmodelhavegainedsomuchmorenegativeattention(seeSection5.2).

51 Jakobsen2005,19.52 Perito2005,7.53 Perito2005,8.54 Perito2005,9.

The American support package for governance andreconstructioninaprovinceisbuiltontwolegs:PRTprojectsand USAID activities. Aimed to win “hearts and minds”,CIMIC-type projects are mapped, proposed and supervisedbyCivilAffairsteams.Thefirstfundingsourceavailablewasthe Defence Department’s Overseas Humanitarian DisasterandCivicAid(OHDACA).55Intheearlyyears2002–2003,theaverage project cost in these programmes was $45,00056.Another funding modality is called CERP, Commander’sEmergency Response Program. CERP is flexibly utilised inprojects implemented by local constructors. Funds providedfor different PRTs vary considerably, since they are basedon applications and compared to the needs of other units–becomingsometimesdifficult to reach.Thisnewmodalitywas introduced in 2004 and it granted commanders up to$100,000permonth57.Inthefiscalyear2007,CERPprovidedAmericanPRTswithUSD231millionanditsnewersupplementEconomicSupportFunds(ESF)totallingUSD216million58.

Especially in the early years, rapid spending on projects(schools, clinics,wells) greatly irritatedNGOs,who felt theirexpertise in long-term development and capacity-buildingwas threatened by the reckless and untrained military.59ConfrontationeasedupabitwhenallUSPRTsfinallyreceivedUSAIDrepresentativesduring2004.Theyprovidethesecondpillar of the American reconstruction effort in PRT areas ofresponsibility.Inconjunctionwithexpertise,USAIDoffersPRTsQuickImpactProject(QIP)fundsthatcanbeusedinprojectsin line with provincial development plans, implemented bycontracted NGOs or foreign commercial firms60. A groupconsistingof seniormilitaryandcivilianofficers identifyandsuggestprojects that support thewholemissionof theunitinitsspecificarea.TheseprojectreviewcommitteesreflectanimportantlessonlearnedintheAmericanmodel:expertvettingneedstobearrangedforallprojects,alsothosefulfillingthecommander’sgoalofwinning“hearts andminds,” inordernottoharmworkdonebyNGOsandhumanitarianagencies.Committeeswere for a long time theonly formal executivebodyintegratingmilitaryandciviliancomponentsinUSPRTs,highlightingtheheavyreconstructionfocusoftheAmericanmodel.

USAIDfundsprojectsandprogrammesalsoindependently.TheAgency’sprovincialrepresentativesembeddedinthePRTsdo not decide on these projects but provide informationandmonitor them– thusgiving thePRTsanopportunity tocomment on USAID activities in provinces. USAID typicallychannels funds to projects in infrastructure (roads, localgovernment premises), water resources and irrigation, localgovernance training and agriculture. Sums allocated todifferentPRTareaspresumablyvaryaswithCERP.USAIDdoesnotpubliciseprovincialfigures.

55 Perito2005,10.56 Jakobsen2005,19.57 Stapleton2007,21.58 Abbaszadehetal.2008,49.59 Perito2005,10;Dziedzic&Seidl2005,910.60 Perito2005,10.


It should be noted that most US PRTs operate in rathersmallprovinces.ManyofthemarelocatednearthePakistanborder and are essentially those territories where mostinsurgentattacksandfightingbetweentheTalibanandISAF-OEFtakeplace.Consequently,thereareusuallyveryfewNGOsactive in theUS-observedprovinces–with theexceptionofthesignificantregionalcentreJalalabadintheeast.Thishasprobably led thePRTs,andtheUSAoverall, to takea largerroleinreconstructionanddevelopmentthanmighthavebeenthecaseinmorepeacefulareas.

Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the Americanmodel has from the beginning focused heavily on a quickimpactand reconstruction.Theunderlyingobjectiveof suchamodusoperandihasbeentowin thesupportof the localpopulation, in other words counter-insurgency motivation61.This mirrors the suitability of the choice for Americanstrategistsinneedoftools,butalsotheenvironmentswhereUSforceshaveoperatedinthesouthandeastofAfghanistan.Theabundanceofreconstructionprojectsandanunconcealedcounterinsurgency association have rendered the US modelthemostcriticisedonebynon-governmentalactors62.

Resources to implement reconstruction in provinceshave been funnelled to the military, having its echoes inPRT activities. A group of researchers from the Universityof Princeton –NimaAbbaszadeh,MarkCrow,Marianne El-Khoury, Jonathan Gandomi, David Kuwayama, ChristopherMacPherson,MeghanNutting,NealinParkerandTayaWeiss– remind that “the agency that controls funding heavilyinfluences PRT priorities.”63 A slow turn in the Americanrationalemightbeexpected,however,asQIPsfundedthroughCERPandthenewerESFaregraduallyscaleddownandconfertotheLocalGovernanceandCommunityDevelopment(LGCD)programme.ThelattermechanisminsupportoftheUSPRTsin Afghanistan focuses on long-term governance capacity-building and has since September 2007 enjoyed an annualfundingofUSD249million64.

5.2 German

Kunduzisfrequentlymentionedasoneoftheexemplarycasesof a PRT. After only nine months of American leadership,the organisation was adopted by the Germans. Half a yearlater,GermanyestablisheditssecondPRTinthenortheasternBadakhshanprovince.

GermanydoesnotworkaloneinitstwoPRTs,butworkswithalonglistofpartneringnations:Belgium,Croatia,CzechRepublic,Denmark,France,Hungary,Romania,andtheUnitedStates.MultinationalityhasbeenfirmlybuiltintotheGermanmodel.

ThesmallAmericanPRTinKunduzgrewagreatdealafterbeingtakenoverbytheGermans.Alreadyin2003itcontaineda military force of 300 soldiers. Despite high numbers, the

61 Abbaszadehetal.2008,7.62 Gauster2007,2223.63 Abbaszadehetal.2008,9.64 Abbaszadehetal.2008,49.

operationalapproachwaslimitedbydomesticpolicypressureto mere, and exceptionally robust, force protection. During2003–2005theGermanPRTsinKunduzandFeyzabadlackedmobility and presence in outer districts of their provinces.ConsequentlysomeoftheolderstudiesdrawheavyattentiontotheserestrictionsandtheovercautiousapproachandhenceslandertheentireGermanPRTmodel65.

The German units today demonstrate mightier militarymuscle. Consisting of 400–450 soldiers, the militarycomponentsaredesigned tomaintainnotonly robust forceprotection but also patrolling in districts and relatively wideCIMICactivities.Afterthecommencingoflong-rangepatrols– though unnecessarily heavy in size – the German modelhasmilitarilymovedslightly towards theBritishone.Aclearstrongpoint of the German military component has fromthe beginning been that information operation capabilitiesplayapioneeringroleforall ISAF66.AclearweaknessofthePRTsisposedbytheextremelyshortrotationcycleofmilitarycontingents(regularlyfourmonths).

Civilian components in Kunduz and Feyzabad are wellstaffed, including some 10–20 experts. Germany providesmostofthem,butsomeoftheothercontributingnationssendtheirpolitical,developmentandpoliceadvisorsaswell.Somecriticsacknowledgetheextensivepre-deploymenttrainingofalso the civilian component, while reminding of the lack ofintegrationacrossthecivil-militaryboundary67.

AtruespecialityoftheGermanmodelisdualleadership.Theunithastwochiefs:amilitarycommanderandacivilianhead, both running their own, independent halves of theorganisation. Military components are led by colonels andcivilianpartsbyrepresentativesoftheGermanForeignMinistrytotheprovinces.TheydecidemattersconcerningthewholePRTcollegiallyandrepresenttheunitonequalbasestowardsthe local population andofficials. Initial strict independenceandtensionsbetweenthecomponentshaveovertimeeasedofftosomeextent.

TheGermanPRTtypeisfirmlybuiltonfourpillarsbytheministriesrepresented:

•FederalMinistryofDefence•FederalForeignOffice•FederalMinistryoftheInteriorand•Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and

Development(BMZ)68.

Despitecertainprogressintheinstitutionalframework,thereisstillsomerigidityintheGermansystemofinterdepartmentalcooperation. Problems reflect the developmental foreignpolicy tradition, the high degree of independence given to

65 See Jakobsen 2005; Perito 2005; on the more recentdevelopments, see also the non-updated Godsave2007.

66 ISAF2007,D-2-2.67 Abbaszadehetal.2008,27.68 Jakobsen2005,24.


thedepartments,domesticpoliticalpressuresandthepublicmood69.

Securityisprimarilyadutyofthemilitary,althoughitmustbenotedthatpolicementorssentbytheMinistryoftheInterior(MoI)andastrongGermanMilitaryPoliceplayanimportantroleinsupportingthedevelopmentoflocalpoliceforces.Thishas been well in line with Germany being the internationalleadinbuildinguptheAfghanpolice–takenoverin2007bytheEUPoliceMissioninAfghanistan.

Thecivilianpartistaskedwithgovernance,reconstructionanddevelopment.Withintheciviliancomponent,theheadisresponsible for thegeneral coherenceof thebroadGermanapproach. However, BMZ has preserved wide operationalindependence due to the fact that it maintains budgetaryautonomy70. Representatives of other nations are includedintheciviliancomponent incoordinationwiththeirnationaldirections.

TheGermanapproachtoreconstructionanddevelopmentin the provinces is two-fold. The military CIMIC teams mapneedsandimplementQIPsineducation,watermanagementand other small infrastructure. BMZ-funded longer termdevelopment work is implemented by partners such as theGerman Agency for Technical Cooperation (GTZ). There isalsoa considerablenumberofGerman-fundedNGOsactiveinnorthernAfghanistan. InKunduztheGermancommunityisamongtensofactorssharingacommon”Germanhouse”in thecitycentre71.Sectorsprioritised through thesevariouschannels and modalities are economic reconstruction,education,water,energy,governanceandruleof law72.TheGerman impact on the northeastern provinces has grownsoextensivethatMarkusGausterbelieves theretobea riskof becoming counterproductive to the building up of localcapacities and institutions73. On the other hand, a LocalDevelopmentInitiativehasbeenestablishedineachprovincewhichintegratesGermanmilitaryandcivilianrepresentativeswith the localAfghangovernment inorder toprioritiseanddecideonprojectsfundedbyGermany.

5.3 British(-Nordic)

OfthethreeoriginalPRTmodels,theBritishonehasprobablywitnessedmostadjustment.TheUnitedKingdomestablisheditsfirstPRTinthenortherncentre,Mazar-eSharif,inJuly2003.Thisfirstnon-USPRToriginatedundertheOEFcommand,butwastransferredtoISAFinsummer2004.Atthesametime,theUK launched its secondPRT inMeymaneh,Faryabprovince,detaching it from PRT Mazar’s huge area of five provinces.Meymaneh and Mazar-e Sharif were later handed over toNorway and Sweden respectively as the UK headed south.

69 Abbaszadehetal.2008,26.70 Abbaszadehetal.2008,27.71 RecentcollocationwiththePRTcommander’snewcity

officehasraisedsometensionsintheNGOcommunity.(Abbaszadehetel.2008,28)

72 BMZ 2007; GTZ 2007; more detailed information ofGermanaidbyGauster2007,4547.

73 Gauster2007,42.

There, it tookover thePRT inHelmandfromtheAmericansinMay2006.

Recognisingcertainchangesovertime,thepaperathandadjuststhenameofthethirdgenericmodelfromthetraditionalBritish intoBritish-Nordic.This isduetothefact thatNordiccountries have all along the way been functional partnersto theBritish leadership,providingbothmilitary and civilianresources. The old contributors and currently lead nationsSwedenandNorwayhavecontinuedwiththeBritish-initiatedmodel, developing it further. They have been supported byFinland, Denmark and Latvia, of which group Denmark hasrecentlyoptedforthesouth,beingnowinHelmandwiththeUK and Estonia. Another smaller contributor to the British-NordicPRTsistheUnitedStateswithitscivilianresources.

In size, the early British PRTs were much closer to theAmerican than the German model. With a military forceof 50–150, they put a heavy emphasis on SSR. The PRTHandbookpraises theBritishmitigationof conflict betweentworivalwarlordsinthenorth:GeneralDostumandGeneral

Atta.74 Following the policy of disarmament and mediation,conflict resolution between power brokers via diplomacyand cooperation with local authorities has been typical fortheBritishmodel75.Fromtheverybeginning,theBritishPRTshavemaintainedcapabilitiestooperateinallcornersoftheirprovinces with small and lightly armed Mobile ObservationTeams(MOT)76.Aterritoriallywidepresencehassupplementedthe endeavours of the civilian components to build up thecapacities of the local police force through training andinfrastructureprojects.

The British-Nordic PRTs have been reinforced over timeandarenowthesizeofabout150–200soldiers.PRTMazar-eSharif isnotablybigger (over400),butontheotherhandcovers four provinces – an area five times that of Kosovo.Civilian capacities have been strengthened significantlyfrom the original three representatives including a political,development and police advisor. The PRTs in Lashkar Gah,MeymanehandMazar-eSharifsponsornow,inautumn2008,a number of civilian specialists, whose expertise covers, forinstance, political affairs, governance, development, civilianpolice, thepenitentiary systemandcounter-narcotics.By farthebest resourced is theUKPRT in LashkarGah,Helmand,whichincorporates28civilianexperts,coveringsome15%ofthetotalpersonnelinthatunit77.

IntheoriginalBritishmodel,PRTsareledbyatriumvirateconsistingoftheprincipalsofthreeagencies:theMinistryofDefence (MoD), Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO),and the Department for International Development (DfID).Cooperation of the three resembles the German model onpaper,buthas inpractiseresulted inmuchmoretightlyknit

74 ISAF2007,D-2-2.75 Jakobsen2005,21–22.76 Coveringvastandremoteareas,boththePRTBamianled

byNewZealandand the LithuanianPRTChaghcharanhave adopted somewhat the same mode of mobility.In this respect, they resemble the UK model thoughdeviatingfromitinotherways.

77 Abbaszadehetal.2008,46.


teams.Thetriumviratediscussesplansandactivitiesinallthreelinesofoperationandseekstomakedecisionsunanimously.ThisearlyinnovationoftheBritishinMeymanehandMazar-eSharifwaslateradoptedasanISAFbestpractiseandpromotedtoallPRTsundertheterm“integratedcommandgroup”.ThenewUKPRTinLashkarGahisrepresentedbyajointcommandgroupasinthenorth,butreportsnowtoaKandahar-residentregionalcoordinatorappointedby theFCO78,hencemakingthePRTeffectivelycivilian-supervised.

Michael J.McNerneyappraises theBritishmodeof civil-military integration as the finest example of interagencyjointnessonatactical level inAfghanistan.79Jakobsennotesthat interconnecting military and development resourceson the ground necessitates institutional arrangements backhome.HeattributestheBritishsuccesstoConflictPreventionPools, which are joint mechanisms for bringing togetherassetsinforeignaffairs,defenceanddevelopment.80AnotherkeyarrangementtoinstitutionalisecoordinatedplanningandleadershiponthecapitallevelhasbeentheinterdepartmentalStabilisation Unit (SU), integrating members from the FCO,DfIDandtheMoD.SUisorganicallypresentalsointhefield,havingsixofficersinthePRTLashkarGah.81

TheNordicPRTshavedeviatedfromthetriumviratemodelandhavebecomeostensiblyledbyamilitarycommander.Inanycase,theyhaveupheldclosecooperationbetweenmilitaryandciviliancomponents,integratedintheCommandGroups.ANordicPRTCommandGroupconsistsoftheseniormilitaryofficersandtheciviliancomponent.Evenifinternalconsensusisacommonobjective,thecommanderistheleadingfigureoutsidethePRT.Therehasbeensometendencytopromoteapoliticalrepresentativeoradvisortoaseniorpositionintheciviliancomponentasasortofcounterparttothecommander,butnotasmanifestlyasintheGermanmodel,inwhichaPRTisaduallyheaded, two-pillarorganisation.Moreapparently,the Nordic PRTs seem to depict all civilian representativesas embedded advisors in slightly the same fashion as inthe American model. Despite these relative changes, theCommandGroupmodelstillcontinuestobestrongandfairlyequallyintegrative82.

The transformation has probably more to do withstrengthenedmilitarycapacitiesandtheorganisationalcultureof these PRTs than direct instructions from the respectivecapitals. The divergence between the UK and the Nordiccountriesalso reflects thedifferent stages in integrating thegovernment branches in the capitals. The installation of anintegratedapproachtoplanning,follow-upandleadershipisproceedingatvaryingpaces.

78 Abbaszadehetal.2008,46.79 McNerney2005,45.80 Jakobsen2005,32.81 Abbaszadehetal.2008,43.TheSUwasformerlyknown

asthePost-ConflictReconstructionUnit(PCRU).82 AnupdatedNordicversionofintegratedthinkingonPRT

organisationandactivitiesisofferedbyPRTMeymaneh2007.

The British-Nordic PRTs have not taken as strong a rolein governance and development as they have in security.They have largely been limited to a facilitator role, sharinginformation,advisingandcoordinatingwithUNAMA.TryingtoavoidduplicationwithNGOefforts,directfundingviaPRThasbeenmadeavailableonlyforinfrastructureandcapacity-buildingprojectsinthesecuritysectorandlocaladministration.DfIDprovidedanannual£1millionpoundsoffundingforthePRTsin2003–2006.83

With regards to reconstruction, the British PRT inLashkar Gah has transformed the established model andimplements now QIPs. Also the PRT external troops of theRoyal Engineers have been deployed to upgrade police andwaterinfrastructure.84 Inadditiontopreviouslyusedfundingmodalities, the British Ministry of Defence has introducedwhat Barbara Stapleton calls the “CERP-equivalent” fund.It furnishes the PRT Commander with a maximum £40,000poundsamonthfor“heartsandminds”typesofprojects.85The introduction of QIPs may be seen as a response to theparticularlydemandingsecuritysituationinHelmand.

The Nordic edition of the British model has evolved aswell. Policymakers in Stockholm and Oslo have decided torefrain from allowing any project activities by the militaryandhaveoptedfordirectingaidtotheregionsolelythroughNGOsandmultinationallyfundeddevelopmentprogrammes.Sums funnelled through these arrangements are increasing.Representingapartnernation,theFinnishMinistryforForeignAffairshasfundedSSR-orientedprojectsimplementedbyusinglocalemploymentandsupervisedbytheciviliancomponentofthePRTsinMeymanehandMazar-eSharif.

TheBritish-NordicPRTsinnorthernAfghanistanhavenotrunnotableCIMICprojects,onlyoccasionalandsmallforce-protection ventures. PRT commanders have raised this issuerepeatedlyandaskedforasmall,flexibleandswiftlyobtainabletool for them tobeable to reactata fastpace to changesin their area of operations. From 2008 onwards, Finland isdirecting an annual sum of€100,000 to€150,000 to QIPswatchedoverbyaciviliandevelopmentadvisor.

The original model of a light footprint in reconstructionhas been changing mostly in the same direction. All threelead nations following the British-Nordic model bring moredevelopment to their provinces, but for the most part stillexternally to the PRT. Each lead nation has adopted a jointapproach to their areasof responsibility – thusapproachingthebroadGermanmodelinKunduzandBadakhshan.HomegovernmentsarenotonlylookingtothePRTs,butplanforacomprehensivepresenceinaprovince.

83 Jakobsen2005,22–23.84 HouseofCommons2006,Column367-8W.85 Stapleton2007,21–22.


5.4 Turkish86

VardakprovincewestofKabulgotitsownPRTinNovember2006.Turkeydidnotemulateanyexistingmodel,butwishedto create one of its own. PRT Vardak was launched as acivilian-led organisation, concentrating on governance anddevelopment.

The civilian component of the Turkish organisation isrobust. ThePRT is ledby aCivilianCoordinator, amid-leveldiplomaticofficer.Underhimcivilianexpertsrunthebusiness.Advisors in governance and development mentor andtrain local administration, as well as implement projects ineducation,infrastructure,healthcareandagriculture.Ateamofpoliceadvisorsisworkingtotrainthelocalpoliceforceandtoupgradeitsfacilities.TheTurkishMinistryofForeignAffairsprovidedfundstoPRTprojectstotalling$6.5million inboth2006and2007.

Thereare about70 soldiers in thePRT, all Turkish. Theirrole is merely to provide logistics, communications andprotection.ThePRThasnoregularmilitarypresenceoutsidetheprovincialcentreunlesscivilianexpertswishtovisitsomeoftheouterdistricts.Assuch,thePRTdoesnothaveitsownmilitary operations. Since insurgent activities are spreadingalsotoVardakprovince,otherforcesthanthePRTareneededtocounterthem.

Like theUSPRT inPanjshir, theunit inVardak isa smallorganisation focused on reconstruction and governancecapacitybuilding. It isnot takinga role in thedaily securitybusiness.Inthesecuritylineofoperation,itconcentratesonlonger-term investment in developing police forces. Doingso, it seems to neglect immediate security-related duties ofpatrollingandsupportforthegovernmentoutreachtoterrainsheldbycombinationsoftriballeaders,illegalmilitiasandlocalpowerbrokers/old warlords. This type of PRT undoubtedlynecessitatesthemorerobustpresenceofotherforcesinany“normal”Afghancontext.PRTVardak is thusatrulyspecialventure,seeingthewholePRTmissionandtaskingdifferently.Panjshirprovinceisanexceptional,andeasier,caseof“natural”security in this regard. Vardak resembles more closely thethinkingbehindPRTsinIraqandcouldsetanexampleforcivil-militaryintegrationinlesshostileenvironments.

86 Based mostly on personal communication with theTurkishConsulateGeneralinMazar-eSharif.


6 PRTsunderscrutiny

6.1 research on PrTs

Professionaldebatesonthetransformationofpeacekeeping,a comprehensive approach to conflict management or thehumanitarian-military relationship often bring up the caseofPRTs inAfghanistan.NearlyallobservershaveanopiniononthePRTs.Incontrasttothepopularityofthistheme,PRTsareafairlyunderstudiedconceptinpeacesupport.Nobroadandpublicstudyexiststhatcomparesthecharacteristicsofall26PRTs.ResearchpaperstendtofocusononePRTmodelorsummarilymeasurethethreegenericmodels:US,UK,German.Thispaperisnoexemptiontotherule.

Many of the papers study only models and concepts asportrayedbycontributinggovernments; just fewtruly try toexaminehowPRTsfunctioninreality.Someofthestudiesarebarelymore thandistant comments andmayhavea strongbiastowardsoragainstthePRTsingeneralorcertainnationalmodels.

PRT research has been conducted chiefly by individualresearchersandcommentatorsinvariouscountries.OftentheyhaveprofessionalexperienceinAfghanistan,beitindiplomaticor military service or work with NGOs and internationalorganisations. Military studies of operational and strategicscopemakeupa largeshareofPRT research.TheUSArmyWar College publishes several master’s theses concerningAfghanistaneveryyearinwhichthePRTsarescrutinisedfromcounter-insurgencyandstabilisationoperationperspectives.

ResearchonthePRTsremainsfairlyscattered.Researchersarenotnetworkedtoextendoverprofessionalboundariesofgovernment bureaucracies, military, research institutes, UNagencies,academics,andNGOrepresentatives.PRTconferencesandseminarsarenormallyorganisedbygovernmentalactorsorNATOandtendtoexcludewideparticipation.

Despite a moderate body of research, one single bestmodel of PRTs in Afghanistan cannot be identified. Thereseems tobe,however, somecommonunderstandingacrossthePRTliteraturethattheBritishmodelisprobablytheclosestapproximationofawell-builtprovincialreconstructionteam.

Nevertheless,itismoreimportanttorecognisethedifficultyofPRTbestpractiseidentification.Ifnothingelse,PRTresearchunanimously agrees on the lack of instruments to measure

successandevenanyimpactofthePRTs.Howtoassesswhattheteamsaredoingorhaveachieved?87Lessonslearnedandevaluation processes in ISAF have been weak and seriouslydistracted by the heavy lead-nation drive behind the PRTnetwork.Supportersofeachnationalmodelareconvincedoftheircasewithouttoolstobackuptheirargument,accordingtothecriticsoftheSave the Childrenorganisation88.Judgmentsare too often built on anecdotal evidence and impressions.McNerneywarnsof“smilesonAfghanfaces”methodology89.Another easy solution is to list inputs instead of analysingimpacts. The Americans have tried to quantify their workinwells, schoolsandclinicsbuilt,but thatcanhardlymirrorsuccessinsuchamultidimensionalstate-buildingtaskasthatofthePRTs.Indeed,theverypoliticalnatureofthePRTmissionmayrenderitnearlyimpossibletoassessitsimpactinatimeframeofacoupleofyears.

Recent research raises many critical challenges for theworkingandfuturedevelopmentofthePRTs.Godsavedescribesthediscussionasa“heavilycriticalscholarlydebate.”90Heresomeofthekeytopicsinthisbattleforthe“heartsandminds”oftheinternationalaudiencewillbebrieflyintroduced.

6.2 Incoherence of models

OneofthekeycharacteristicsofthePRTsisflexibility.AdaptationtolocalcircumstancesinAfghanistan’swidecountrysidewaspartoftheoriginalidea91.However,localisedflexibilitywassoonoverriddenbyleadnationpolicies,traditionsandbureaucracies.Thishasresultedinanimbalancednetworkofprovincialunits,whose performance in governance and development is notcontrolled by ISAF. The Headquarters in Kabul has effectivecommandonlyofthecoresecurity (military)activitiesofthePRTs. Altogether 14 nationally designed models determinehow the PRTs execute their mission to support the Afghangovernment.Themost critical incoherenceofPRTmodels is

87 Save the Children(2004,38–39)andMcNerney(2005,39)proposesomeparametersformeasuringeffects.

88 Save the Children2004,37.89 McNerney2005,39,43.90 Godsave2007,43.91 McNerney2005,37.


manifested by the relative weight they give to their role asreconstructionTeams.Asprojectfundsderivefromdomesticbudgets,theISAFoperationmaintainsnocontroloverthem,butcanonlyobservenationalprioritiesbeingpromotedundertheISAFflag.

TheestablishmentofRegionalCommands(RC)tobridgethePRTsandISAFHeadquartersin2006tightenedthemilitarycommand and probably enhanced military coordination.Varioussortsofreportinghaveboomedtocoveralsoawiderange of governance and development-related matters,thus incorporating civilian expertise into the ISAF commandstructuretoahigherextentthanpreviously.Increasedreportingisa resultof thedemandofaggregated informationby theinternationalcommunityinKabul,aswellasNATOCommandsrequiringeverwidersituationalpicture.Real-life PRTs out in the provinces have evolved into manyanddiverseendeavours.TheTermsofReferenceissuedbythePRTExecutive SteeringCommittee (ESC) in2005attemptedtosetsomeguidelinesforreconstructionactivities.ISAFsoonrealisedtheneedtofurtherexplicateandguidetheactivitiesontheground.InordertogetagriponthePRTs,NATOheldaseriesofseminarsonthematterandworkonpublishingaPRTHandbookstarted.ThefirsteditioncameoutinOctober2006aspartofa largerschemetodevelopmissiontrainingand lessons-learned-processes within ISAF. It coincided withISAF’s expansion to cover the whole Afghan territory andabsorbtheremainingOEFPRTs.Sinceautumn2006,PRTpre-deployment training courses have been arranged for bothmilitaryandcivilianofficialsattheNATOSchoolinGermany.ISAFHeadquartershostsquarterly PRT conferences inKabulanddistributesabulletincalled ISAF PrT Weekly,presentingacollectionofnewssentinbyPRTcivilianofficers.TheCIMICbranch at the ISAF Headquarters has been reinforced withadditional military and civilian staff to better engage andsupportthePRTs.Onapoliticallevel,PRTESCanditsWorkingGroupswerereactivatedinlate2006,whichledtotheissuingofthreepolicynotesthatgivedirectguidancetoPRTactivitiesindevelopment,thehumanitariansphereanddisarmament.

Clarifying the tasks is not enough. What is even moretroublesome is thatAfghans are confusedby the seeminglychaoticPRTpresence.PreciselyhowthedifferentPRTsworkisnotwellknowntotheAfghangovernment,whichiswishingtobettercoordinatedevelopmentactivities.AUSinteragencystudy on PRTs warns that flexibility in funding bewildersorganised national development process; PRTs, operating intheirresponsibleprovinces,maychooseprojectprioritiesthatarenotinlinewithAfghanplanning92.

6.3 Capacity in reconstruction and development

PRTTermsofReference(ToR)stipulatethatunits“mayconductQuickImpactProjects[QIP]intheirareastogaintheconsentof the local population to support operational priorities.”93

92 USInteragency2006,9.93 ISAF2007,B-2-2.

ThelooseguidelinesoftheToRhavebeenutilisedinvariousnationally driven models to expand PRT reconstructionactivities.QIPshaveturnedintothebuildingofschools,clinics,roads,wells,andwaterchannels.

AssumingwideractivitiesposesPRTswiththechallengeofdevelopmentcapacity.ArePRTsequippedwiththeknowledgenecessaryforbecomingdevelopmentactors?Criticsclaimthattheunitsdealwithtoomanythings,lackingtheskillsneeded94.DevelopmentshouldbelefttotheAfghangovernment,aidedbyNGOsandtheUN.PRTsarenoteffectiveintheirreconstructionactivities,duetodeficienttraining,skillsandexperience.Therearesystemicdeficienciesinmilitaryorganisationssteppingintothedevelopmentsphere:thetendencytoplanandactintheshort-termandalackoftransparencyandaccountability.

TheselectionofQIPsinthePRTsisnotbasedonthesamekind of criteria as with development agencies and NGOs.Stapletonremindsthatmilitaryandpoliticalobjectivesinfluencetheselectionofprojects.Alsothecapacitytooverseeprojectimplementationhasremainedlow,resultinginpoorquality.95AUS interagency study repeats theemblematicaccountsofhow American PRTs have built local infrastructure in healthandeducationwithoutpayingattentiontorealitiesaroundthewalls.Clinicsandschoolsdonotbringmuchdevelopmentifthelocalgovernmentisnotabletomaintaintheseinstallationsbysecuringthepurchaseofmedicineandbooks,orlacksthefundstoemploycompetentdoctorsandteachers.96

Examiningtherecentcritique,GodsavesuggeststhatPRTsshould turn from QIPs towards longer term infrastructureandthedevelopmentoflocalinstitutions97.McNerneypointsout that PRTs have performed fairly well in security sectorcapacity-building.Hewould liketoseeresourceschannelledalso to governance, where PRTs could have great potential,so far unexercised.98 There seems, however, to be someobscurityastohowtoactuallyoperationalisethevaguePRTmandate in terms of governance. The PRT Handbook doesnot give a clear answer. Roger Lane and Emma Sky list thePRT tasks in governance as being regular engagement withlocalgovernmentandpeople’srepresentatives,thepromotionof Afghan leadership, the bridging of information gapsbetween centre and periphery, and training and mentoringinadministrationand the judicial sector99. Stapleton takesamorecritical stance toward thegeneral ideaof themilitary-mindedPRTs“fillinggaps”ingovernanceandreconstruction.Shemaintainsthatlongertermcapacity-buildingdependsonhow and by whom things are done, not just achieving theimmediate,concretegoal.100

Thevariousreconstructionanddevelopmentactivitiesofthe26PRTsinAfghanistancarrytheriskofseriouslyconfusingotheractorsandfurthercomplicatingthealreadychallengingtaskof

94 Forinstance,Godsave(2007,27–28)collectsthecriticaltones.

95 Stapleton2007,23–24.96 USInteragency2006,9.97 Godsave2007,28–29.98 McNerney2005,42.99 Lane&Sky2006,48–49.100 Stapleton2007,36.


coordination. PRT activities may raise too high expectationsand differing funding modalities put PRTs into competitionwithoneanother101.Amorestructuralchallengeisposedbytheoftentooloosealignmentwiththenationalandprovincialdevelopment planning of the Afghan government102. PRTshavetheirownagendasandplansuncontrollablebyAfghans.Stapletonwarnsofa“paralleldevelopmentstrategy”,whichendsupbeingcounterproductivetoboth localdevelopmentandthedevelopmentofafunctioninggovernment103.

Policy Note 1, issued by the PRT Executive SteeringCommitteeinDecember2006,strivesforbettercoordinationofactivitiesandunderlinesthevitalneedforPRTprojectstobeinlinewithlocalprioritiesandAfghannationalprogrammes.ThepaperrankssupportforprovincialplanningasamajorPRTtaskinthedevelopmentlineofoperation.104

6.4 Whole-of-government approach

PRT lead nations’ support packages for capacity building ingovernancearedirectedthroughtheUNorAfghannationaldevelopmentprogrammes.Similarly,fundingfordevelopmentand reconstruction is channelledviaAfghanprogrammesorcontractedNGOs.Whatisremarkableisthataslargedonorstheleadnationshavemanagedtobendnational-leveleffortsto allocate resources to their responsible provinces. Forexample,programmesutilisedinthe“provincialisation”ofaidbyNorway,Swedenand/ortheUKincludethe:

•National Area-Based Development Programme(NABDP)

•Afghan Sub-National Governance Programme(ASGP)

•NationalSolidarityProgramme(NSP)•Microfinance Investment Support Facility for

Afghanistan(MISFA)•NationalRuralAccessProgramme(NRAP)•Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme

(RUWATSAN)•EducationQualityImprovementProject(EQUIP)105.

Overall investments of lead nations in provinces areincreasing rapidly. The British development agency DfID hasstartedathree-yearprogrammetofundsomeoftheabove-mentionednationaleffortsinHelmand–withatotalcostof£30million106.Consideringall thechannelsused, theBritishassistancetoHelmandtotalsupto£20millionperyear107.Thisisequivalentto$40million.In2007Norwaychannelled82.8millionNorwegiankronetoFaryab,equivalenttonearly$15million108.

101 Irinnews2007a.102 WorldBank2007,27–28.103 Stapleton2007,23–24.104 ISAF2007,B-4-1/2.105 NorwegianMinistryofForeignAffairs2007;DfID2007.106 DfID2007.107 HouseofCommons2006,Column367W.108 NorwegianMinistryofForeignAffairs2007.

It should be noted that the UK, Norway and Germanyare not the only ones in Afghanistan to apply what couldbecalleda (provincial)“whole-of-government”approach topost-conflict stabilisation.After deploying in the south, alsothe Dutch and Canadian governments now follow this lineofheavilysupportingtheirresponsibleprovincesboththroughand outside the PRTs, combining military elements, localdiplomatic efforts, development activities and humanitarianaid. TheDutchMinistry of ForeignAffairs planned todirect€24.5milliontoUruzganin2007,mostlyexternaltothePRT109.Intheirpreviousareaofresponsibility,Baghlanprovinceinthenorth, theDutchhadonly a small budget for humanitarianprojects110.TheCanadiancounterparthaspledgedupto$20milliontoKandahar111.TheUnitedStateshasduringthepastfew years employed a somewhat similar scheme in its PRTprovinces.

Othergovernmentsandleadnationsaremovingtowardsan integrated, interdepartmental approach as well. Whole-of-government thinking–or“3D”as it is sometimes calledafter Diplomacy, Development and Defence – is clearly thepredominant new trend in PRT concept development inAfghanistan. This reflects a wider policy change in majordonor nations’ approaches to fragile states. The whole-of-government idea seeks national policy coherence and hasemergedasananswertonewglobalandlocalrealitiesofthesecurityanddevelopmentenvironment.112InAfghanistan,theapproachisforthefirsttimereachingaprovincialortacticallevel with the co-presence of various tools. Success on theground necessitates institutional integration in the donorcapital. For example, some critics note that poor strategiccoordinationinRomehasseriouslymaimedtheItalianPRTinHerat113.

Theconcentrationofnationaleffortsonsingleprovincestriggers criticism. Stapleton refers to this phenomenon asthe “Balkanisation” of aid, since development becomesgeographically scattered and dependent on the priorities ofeachdonor114.AlsotherecentreportbyACBAR,theAgencyCoordination Body for Afghan Relief, seriously criticises theimmense disparities in the aid different provinces receive115.“Balkanised”Afghanistanisunevenlydividedintodonorareasofresponsibility,resultinginineffectivenessanduncoordinatedfracturesinsectorssuchaspolice,justiceandcounter-narcotics,warned the outgoing NATO Senior Civilian RepresentativeDaanEvertsinaninterviewbyAl JazeerainDecember2007116.The whole-of-government approach is intended to increasepolicy coherence,butbeing so tied to selectedprovinces, italsorunstheriskofbecomingdisalignedfromAfghanpolicy

109 DutchMinistryofForeignAffairs2007b.110 Jakobsen2005,17.111 CanadianMinistryofNationalDefence2007.112 Patrick&Brown2007,1–6.113 Abbaszadehetal.2008,7.114 Stapleton2007,40.115 Waldman2007,12–13.116 Al Jazeera2007.


processesaswellascreatingdisharmonybetweendonors.117Thewhole-of-governmentapproachthroughintegratedunitsmaythusruncounterproductivetothewider“comprehensiveapproach”oftheinternationalcommunity.TworecentreportsonAfghanaidandlocalgovernancebyACBARandtheWorldBank suggest a downscaling of the PRTs and related directactivities in more secure areas and redirecting funds to thegovernmentofAfghanistan118.

PRT-driven whole-of-government approaches are alsoaccusedofpoliticisingdevelopment.Developmentactorsarewary of being perceived as annexed “force multipliers” tothemilitarydue to funding links toPRT leadnations.NGOshavebecomevulnerable toprioritisationsandpressure fromEuropeancapitals119.Ontheotherhand,thepoliticisationofdevelopmentinthecontextofAfghanistanprovesextremelydifficulttodeny.DonorsandtheUNhavepledgedtheirsupportto the legitimate government and state-building projectin Afghanistan. Thus all development aid to Afghanistanis political support in essence. The national developmentprogrammes partly implemented by NGOs carry “distinctpoliticalovertones,”asStapletonrightlyreminds120.

Debate over the political nature of development aidcontinues between donor governments and NGOs. CanadarevieweditscontributioninsouthernAfghanistanandsetupan IndependentPanelonAfghanistan tocollectexperiencesandproposeafuturepolicyplanin2007.Initssubmissiontothe Panel, Canada’s Coalition to End Global Poverty (CCIC)association criticised the Canadian whole-of-governmentapproachofputtingsecurityfirstandsuppressingdevelopmentand diplomatic efforts on the ground. CCIC claimed thatthe Canadian approach has militarised peace-building andhumanitariananddevelopmentassistance.Itaskedforwiderconceptualthinkingandavarietyofindependentnon-militarytools.Otherwise,aserious risk loomsofcivilianandmilitaryactorsbeingdirectlyassociatedinthefield.121

6.5 Blurring of civilian and military roles

Responsibilitiesandactivitiesoftheforeignmilitaryhavebeenasourceoffrequentdebate inAfghanistansincethewinter2001–2002. Mark Sedra argues that few issues are moredivisiveforthe internationalcommunity inAfghanistanthanthePRTsandtheirrelationshipswithcivilianactors122.Criticismarises fromamixtureofademandingsecurityenvironment,especially in the southandeastofAfghanistan,PRTproject

117 Sky(2006)arguesthatalsothefragmentedleadnationapproachtosecuritysectorreforminAfghanistanmaybevastlyunconstructive.Fivemajordonorswereappointedin 2002 to lead the support for the Afghan NationalArmy(USA),AfghanNationalPolice(Germany),judicialreform (Italy), counter-narcotics (UK) and disarmament(Japan).

118 Waldman2007,24;WorldBank2007,46.119 Stapleton2007,40.120 Stapleton2007,24.121 CCIC2007,1–2,9–10.122 Sedra2004,1.

activitiesandwhole-of-governmentapproachesexercisedbymanydonorcountries.

Save the Children accuses the PRTs of geographical andsectoralduplicationwiththeworkofhumanitarianagencies.Themilitarydonot limit their activities to the ideaoffillinggaps,butrunconstantQuickImpactProjectsinfieldsdefinedas humanitarian by specialised agencies. Save the Childrenclaimsthatthemilitarydonothaveexpertiseinhumanitarianwork.123 Agencies call attention to the internationalhumanitarian principles in all aid: humanity, neutrality andimpartiality. Various PRTs with different QIPs hardly observetheseprinciples.

Beinghighlycritical toallPRTprojectactivities,Save the Childrenisafraidofthemilitarisationofaid.PRTinvolvementindevelopment runs the riskofblurringmilitaryandcivilianrolesinaconflictzone.124Projectsconfusethelocalpopulationandthegovernmentoverthedivisionofresponsibilities.Theaid community is preoccupied with the danger of beingperceived as part of a military campaign plan.125 Save the Children warns of reduced differentiation between militaryandcivilianactorsandmaintainsthatthemilitary,duetotheirprojects, are encroaching on the “humanitarian space” ofNGOs.Theblurringofrolesdrawsattacksonaidworkers.126Humanitarian space is a concept coining secure access to aconflict zone, guaranteed by respect and the exercise ofhumanitarian principles. The diminution of humanitarianspaceisofgreatconcerntotheUNandhumanitarianagenciesinAfghanistan127.

The Save the Children report from 2004 still accuratelyreflectsthesentimentsofmanyNGOsandagenciesengagedinhumanitarianworkaswellasdevelopmentinAfghanistan.PRTs are seen as hazardous political efforts that carry moreproblems and risks than benefit. A sad and extreme casein point was the 2004 pullout of Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) fromAfghanistanafterfiveof their aidworkersweremurdered. MSF was exceptionally concerned about thehumanitarian-militaryrelationsinAfghanistanandarguedthatPRTproliferationinfluencedtheirdecisiontowithdraw.128TheMSFcasetriggeredmuchdiscussionofthePRTsandtheirroleinreconstructionandhumanitarianaid.Thisdebatesomewhatsettleddown for a fewyears,but intensifiedagain in2007as ISAFhastakenovermuchoftheOEFrole infightingtheinsurgency.

PresumablyonlyfewNGOsandhumanitarianagenciesarecompletelynegativeaboutthePRTs.MostofthemapparentlywishtolivesidebysidewiththePRTs,butalsotokeepthematadistance.Manyare indifferenttoPRTefforts,whichareperceivedaspotentiallyuseful,butratherlimitedinreality.

Throughout the critical reviews, the British model isconsideredasthemostsuitableoneforNGOsandhumanitarian

123 Save the Children2004,1–3,24,36.124 Save the Children2004,40.125 Dziedzic&Seidl2005,5.126 Save the Children2004,33–34.127 Irinnews2007b.128 Sedra2004,1.


agencies. This isbasedfirstlyon the fact thatUNandNGOrepresentativeswereinterviewedbeforedesigningthemodel,andsecondlyonfollowingtheprincipleofavoidingduplicationwith other actors and concentrating on security sectorreform.129TheotherwisecriticalSave the ChildrenwritesthattheUKmodel“standsoutinhavingamoreprecise‘conceptof operations’.”130 It seems to answer the NGO demand ofPRTswithdrawingfromhumanitarianassistanceandextensiveprojectactivities,especiallyinthehealth,educationandwatersectors.ThemostcriticisedmodelistheAmericanone.USPRTprojects, strong aid conditionality and previously unmarkedvehicles and soldiers have raised strong resentment.131 Onthe other hand, Gauster argues that PRT-NGO relations aresevering more in the north than in the south, where largeareasarealreadyimpenetrabletoNGOs132.

ISAF guidance on PRT tasks in the humanitarian sphereremainedfora longtimethindespitetheincreasingcritiquefrom NGOs. The PRT Terms of Reference do not make adistinctionbetweencivilandmilitarypersonnelandtasks,normentionUNAMA’sleadroleingovernance,developmentandhumanitarianaffairs.TherevitalisationoftheExecutiveSteeringCommittee (ESC) in 2006 has to some extent enhancedguidance.PolicyNote1,adoptedinDecember2006,specifiesPRTs’roleinprovincialdevelopment.Itunderlinestherequisitecoordinationwithandsupporttoprovincialgovernmentsandtheirplans.TheNoteaddstothePRTHandbookstatement:“PRTisalsonotadevelopmentagency.”PolicyNote3fromFebruary 2007 stipulates PRT intervention in humanitarianassistance,drawingafirmlinebetweencivilianactorsbyandlarge in charge and the military giving aid only in extremecircumstances.PRTsmayconducthumanitarianactivitiesonlywhenrequestedbyUNAMAortheAfghangovernment.ESCalsounderlinedthathumanitarianassistancemustnotbeusedforthepurposeof“winningheartsandminds.”133Evenwiththesenewdirectivesinstalled,theproblemhaspersisted;notallPRTnationshavefullyadheredtothem.

SteeringprocessesshouldbestrengthenedbyGuidelinesfortheInteractionandCoordinationofHumanitarianActorsandMilitaryActors inAfghanistan,whichwasdraftedby aCivil-MilitaryWorkingGroupdually chairedbyUNAMAandACBAR, and consisting of other humanitarian actors, majordonors, ISAF, and the Government of Afghanistan. TheGuidelines were published in August 2008 amidst growingfearsthattheconflicthasnotonlyseverelyreducedtheaccessofaidagenciestolocalpopulations,butisturningthemintotargets134.TheagreeddocumentfocusesheavilyonthePRTs.Reinforcing earlier guidelines by the ESC and recognising

129 Stapleton2007,16–17;Jakobsen2005,22;Sedra2004,8.

130 Save the Children2004,20.131 Sedra2004,6–7,9.Although, itshouldbenotedthat

alsotheUK-NordicandGermanPRTshavebeencriticisedforusingunmarked,whitefour-by-fourvehicles.See,forexample,Gauster2007,53.

132 Gauster2007,36.133 ISAF2007,3,B-4-1/2,B-5-1/2.134 Irinnews2008;Asia Times online2008.

theproblemswith theovergrownreconstruction roleof theteams,itunderlinestheprovisionofsecurityastheprimetaskof the military – instead of politically or militarily motivatedassistance.135 But like the earlier guiding principles, theseremainjustasvulnerabletonegligencebythebigplayers.

6.6 PrT as a security provider?

ThePRTsare frequently consideredas securityguarantors inthefashionofatraditionalpeacekeepingorevenactivepeaceenforcement force. Those criticising the PRTs of getting toodeeplyinvolvedinreconstructionanddevelopmentissuestendtoask formore robustuseofmilitary capabilities.Units arerequested more in providing direct security and downsizingother,morecivilian typesofactivities.NGOsdemandsecureenvironmentsforthemtooperatein.136

More precisely, the PRTs should be able to stop clashesbetween warlords and root out local criminal gangs. Save the Children describes the PRTs as the “second-best optionforenhancingsecurity,”unableandtooweakformediationor reducing the propensity for conflicts. Save the Childrenstatesthat“PRTshavenotheldwarlordsaccountableforlocalabusesofauthority.”137All themore, lightlybuiltPRTs inanenvironmentpenetratedbyarmedpolitico-criminalnetworksmaythemselvesneedtorestsomeportionoftheirsecurityontolerancebylocalpowerbrokers,i.e.warlords138.

Expectations for a PRT role in security andmanoeuvringcapabilitiesareambitious.Stapletontracksthesehopestothelaunching phase of the PRT programme when their militarymuscleswereoversold;buffedwithcapabilities thatdidnotmaterialise139. Accusing PRTs of the inability to intervene inlarge-scalefactionalfighting–liketheoneinHerat2004140begsthequestionwhetherPRTseverweredesignedtocarryoutsuchduties.ExpectationsseemtoruntoohighincomparisontothePRTmission,taskingandresources.EvenifenjoyingtheISAFmandateunderChapterVIIoftheUNCharter,PRTswereestablished according to the light footprint doctrine, whichevolvedasacompromisebetweentheexperiencesofAfghanhistoryandlameinterest incontributinginternationaltroopstotheground.

With their mission of a political nature, the PRTs aredevised and tasked to monitor, support, liaise and facilitateplenty of things, but not to run, execute and implement.DziedzicandSeidlremindthat“PRTsweredesignedtospreadapeacekeepingeffectwithoutcreatingalargepeacekeepingforce.Theyarethegrease,notthewheel.”141Whendeemednecessary,thePRTscanreachamorerobustforcefromtheirregionalForwardSupportBasesorISAFaircapabilities.Theseprovide the PRTs with the last resort deterrence they mightneedinrapidlyescalatingsituations.ThePRTswerecreatedin

135 Guidelines2008.136 Dziedzic&Seidl2005,7–8;Stapleton2007,11.137 Save the Children2004,5,28–30.138 Gauster2007,15.139 Stapleton2007,11.140 Save the Children2005,32.141 Dziedziz&Seidl2005,8.


arelativelylowlevelofconflictandarenotbestsuitedforhigh-levelconflictareaswithconstantbattles.JakobsenunderlinesthatothertroopsandmechanismsthanthePRTsareneededto root out such deep problems of the Afghan conflict asinsurgency,thedrugbusinessandorganisedcrime142.

6.7 Integration of capacities

PRTs are welcomed by almost all observers in their capacityto integrate a wide range of civilian and military resources.EvenSave the ChildrenagreesthatthePRTsmaybepositiveinintegratingapproachestosecurityanddevelopmentandinadvancing the conceptofhuman security143.Godsavenotesthat civil-military jointness is the most likely element of thePRTexperimenttobeappliedinfuturestabilityoperations144.In contrast to thesepromisingprospects, actual civil-militaryintegrationwithintheteamshasnotbeenmuchresearchedorcommentedon;ToukoPiiparinenreflectshisownexperiencesinaNorwegian-ledunitinMeymaneh145whilePeritoandtheUSinteragencyreportstudyUSpractisesbasedonquestionnairesandinterviews146.

Integratingcivilianandmilitaryassetsatthefieldlevelorinatacticalunitdefinitelyposesachallenge.TheUSinteragencystudyfoundthatgoodresultsarereachedonlywhen,tailoredto local dynamics, both components work closely togetherandemployallresourcestothefullextentinlinesofsecurity,governanceanddevelopment147.Usingtheterm“integration”begs thequestionwhether civilianandmilitary componentsare considered equal elements of the whole. What is thestrikingforceorspearheadofaPRT?ArethePRTs“essentiallymilitarymechanisms,whichhaveembeddedcivilians togivethem a more holistic approach to their work,” as Godsavemaintains?148Acounterargumentcouldunderlinetheexistenceof civilian-led PRTs in Afghanistan and the evidently civilianorientationthatPRTshaveadoptedinIraq.Ontheotherhand,onecanhardlyavoidtheconclusionthatthebalancebetweencivilianandmilitarycomponentsinaPRTisdecidedchieflyintheleadnationcapitals.Nationaltraditionsandpoliciessteerthetasks,resourcesandmodeofcooperationinaunit.

All three commentators list a lack of guidance on rolesandresponsibilitiesas themainsourceof friction in internalPRT civil-military relations. Piiparinen analyses differences intraditions,mentalmindsetsandconceptsbetweencivilianandmilitaryofficers.Theseaffectthewaysoforganisingaunit’sadministrationaswellasinteractionwiththelocalpopulation.

142 Jakobsen 2005, 29, 34–35. It is interesting that from2007onwardssomePRTshavebeenforcedtoassumea counter-insurgency type of duties in western andnorthernAfghanistan,wherethereareclosetonoOEFforcesandonly limitedcombattroopsof ISAFpresent.PRTmilitarytasksarewidest insuch lowtroopdensityareas,asnotedinSection4.3.

143 Save the Children2004,35.144 Godsave2007,18.145 Piiparinen2007.146 Perito2005;USInteragency2006.147 USInteragency2006,11.148 Godsave2007,19.

Thebulkofthecriticismisdirectedtothemilitary’stendencytoforgettherealitiesoutsideitsowncamp.Withonlylooseexternal and internal guidelines, the PRTs are “left to theirowndevices”toorganise theirmission.Aclashofmindsetsremainspossibleandharmony is“ensuredonlybygoodwillonthepartoftheindividuals,”Piiparinenconcludes.149Muchrelies on personal chemistries. The US interagency paperexpresses concern over the finding that “personality playeda disproportionate role in determining the direction of PRTactivities.”150Successislaidonadhoc,trialanderrorprocessesinsteadofwelldesignedorganisationalprocesses151.

TheroleofthecivilianpersonnelinISAFisratherimpreciseingeneral.WhilenumerousPRTtasksandfrequentreportingroutinesinvolvecivilianactivities,civilianexpertsarenotpartofthecommandstructure.Theyarenationallysentspecialistswholinkupwithmilitarycontingents.Howthisisimplementedtechnically remains within domestic traditions and legalframeworks.Forexample,GermanPRTciviliansbelongtotheirministrystaffsandareofficiallynotpartofISAFatall,whereasFinland seconds its “civilian crisis management” experts toISAF–evenifthereisnocivilianISAFleadershiporcommandstructureineffect.

ReflectingthemixednatureofthePRTs,theUSInteragencyreportwarnsofthemilitarisationofPRTactivities–includinggovernance and development, which should be civilian-led according to US national guidance. In this matter, thecollocationof someof theUSPRTswithcombat troopshasclearlybeenanegativefactordisorientingthePRTmission.152

Recruitment to the demanding, stressful and potentiallydangerousenvironmentinAfghanistanhasprovendifficultformanynations.Livinginamilitarycampunderheavylimitationsonpersonalfreedomisnotaparticularlylucrativechoice.MostoftheUScivilianrepresentativescollocatedwiththePRTshavebeen junior officers or retirees from diplomatic service153.Juniorofficersmayfaceproblemsinaculturethatvaluesageandhierarchy.TheUSinteragencystudyalsoremindsthatsuchinexperiencedpersonnelwillbeworkingwithmid-levelmilitaryofficerswith20yearsofservice154.TheNordiccountriesandnew NATO members tend to send younger representativesaswell.Anotherchallenge is thatAfghansrepeatedlyprefermilitarycommanderstocivilianrepresentativesastheirliaison.Mirroring the militarised past of the Afghan society, manyofficialsinthelocaladministrationandpoliceforceareformersoldiers who may perceive a military commander as havingmoreauthoritythantheyoungerciviliancounterparts.

Warningofpoorareaexpertise,Peritodemandsmorepre-deploymenttrainingforcivilianexperts155.TheUSInteragencypaper suggests joint training for military and civiliancomponents156. Training should cover not only local culture,

149 Piiparinen2007,149–155.150 USInteragency2006,10.151 Perito2005,11.152 USInteragency2006,10,14.153 Perito2005,11–12.154 USInteragency2006,15.155 Perito2005,11–13.156 USInteragency2006,11.


society and the history of the conflict, but also introducethe ISAF operation, PRT mission and model of civil-militaryintegration,domesticpolicies,and the introductionofotheractorsontheground.

A practical factor further complicating civil-militaryintegration in the PRTs is often a mismatch between theresourcesof thecomponents.Civilianexpertsare frequentlysent to the field without any administrative, logistical orsecurity assets. Civilians become dependent on the servicesofthemilitarycomponent,whichmakesthemvulnerabletooverruling military priorities and hinders their opportunitiesto meet local counterparts.157 Also discrepancies in fundingcreateinternalgaps.TheUSinteragencystudydemandsthatallcivilianfunctionsoragenciesrepresentedinaPRTshouldbefurnishedwithdedicatedfundstooperatewith158.

157 Perito2005,11.158 USInteragency2006,16.


7 Thewayforward

The PRT experiment in Afghanistan has been depicted as asuccess by Western governments, while it has met criticismfromnon-governmentalactors.Withrealitylyingsomewhereinbetween,thereexistsacertainconsensusaroundtheneedforathoroughreformationofthescheme.ThePRTsservedwellinsupportingtheDDRprocessandconstructionofthepost-BonnpoliticalsysteminAfghanistan.Bothprojectshavebeentechnicallysuccessfulventuresofstate-building. Inachievingmorequalitativeprogressofgoodandefficientgovernance,thePRTsarelessevidentlycost-effective.

7.1 Coherence

In the near future two major challenges have to be solved.First,ISAFandNATOneedtoworkouttheworstoutcomesoftheincoherenceofthevariousPRTmodels.“Synchronisation”and“coherence”havesurfacedtoPRTseminaragendasbothinAfghanistanandEurope.Findingmore“unityofeffort”wasone of the overarching motivations for the PRT Handbook.EvenifNATOattemptstoovercomediversitybysettingbetterguidelines, it seemsa slimchance that the coreproblemofdifferentleadnationpoliciesinprovincialreconstructionwouldbetackled.Anotherobstaclerarelyobservedbycommentatorsare the wide differences in PRTs’ military tasks due to thevaryingpresenceofcombatforcesasindicatedabove.

One of the recent papers to demand effective PRTcoordinationwastheAfghanistanStudyGroupReport,whichcalledforthenewUNSRSGtooverseethePRTs159.ISAFandUNAMAshould indeedbeperceivedasmissions in tandem.Inaway,ISAFwasestablishedasamilitarycomponentforalargerinternationalmissioninAfghanistan,UNAMAbeingthepolitical and development hub responsible for humanitariancoordination as well. Even if the organisational structureis less apparent, the arrangement bears resemblance tothose practised in UN peace operations. However, the twocomponentshavegrownsomewhatdistantfromeachothersince the early days of the mission limited to Kabul. Thesituation is particularly problematic in the provinces, wherethePRTshavegraduallyself-extendedtheirtasksandactivities.

159 AfghanistanStudyGroupReport2008,20–22.

The teams should provide their support in governance anddevelopment via UNAMA offices, which unfortunately donotexistinthemajorityofprovinces.IftheUNAMAnetworkexpands,PRTscouldandshouldhandoverpartoftheiractivitiestotheUN.ItisevenmoreimportanttoascertainmutualtrustandcooperationbetweenthelocalUNrepresentationandthePRTforthebenefitofcommonlysharedgoals.

Despite the current discussions to find a more coherentcomprehensive approach to Afghanistan, there areirreconcilableunderpinningfactorsthatprolongtheconfusion.Theycanbefoundintheradicallydifferentpolitical-strategicvisionsofthenationscontributing.TheUnitedStates,theUKandagroupofactivesmallermembersoftheAllianceperceivetheentiremissioninAfghanistanasawar,whereastheUN,theEUandsometroopcontributorstotheISAFapproachthesituationusingcrisismanagementand/orpeace-buildingasastartingpoint.Arewetryingtowinawarorbuildpeace?

7.2 Afghanisation

In its second challenge, NATO must decide on how todownscalethePRTseventually;whatisthePRTexitstrategy?NATOisworkingtocreatecriteriaforanISAFphase-out,thefourthstage in theAfghanistancampaignplan. Itwouldbea logical choice to start in the north of the country, wherethe security situation has remained the best and somewhatplentifuldevelopmentactorsenjoyrelativelyrelaxedfreedomofmovement.ThepoliticalmissionofthePRTshasbeenfairlysuccessful in northern and central Afghanistan, althoughpartial victories gained in recent years will wither away if aqualitativechangeofgovernancecontinuestobeimpeded160.Inthesouth,politicalactionconcentratesonnegotiationswithtribalnetworks inorder towin local support for thecentralgovernment and split the insurgency into smaller factions.Any exit strategy for the next few years there seems to beimprobable.Morepessimisticobserverssaydecades.Gausterperceives it as difficult for the PRTs to leave when they are

160 Stapleton2007,1–2.


regarded by the local population “as permanently installedinternationalcharities,i.e.quasi-jobcentres.”161

The first option for the phasing out of the PRTs is togradually substitute the military-based units with moreAfghans.Jakobsennotesthataccordingtotheoriginalplan,thePRThandovertothegovernmentofAfghanistanwastobe started already in 2005 and concluded in 2007162. Thisoptimisticplanwas soonoverriddenby thedifficult realitiesofweakgovernmentandamoredemandingsecuritysituationthanestimatedintheinitialphasesofthe“campaign.”

The establishment of liaisons to link the PRTs and theAfghanstructures,especiallythenationalsecurityforces,hasbeenproposed163. In fact,direct liaison functionshavebeentriedintheUSPRTs,towhichtheAfghanMinistryofInteriorhasembeddedcolonel-levelofficers since2004164.Only fewother PRTs have such representatives collocated. It must,however,berememberedthatthePRTmandate isstrongestinsupportingthepolice,withwhichPRTunits(should)havealreadyestablishedfrequentanddirect liaison.Muchvagueris alignment with the Afghan structures in governance anddevelopment,wherethePRTsshouldhaveafacilitationrole,butoftenruntheirindependentprojects.

In terms of Afghanisation, it is remarkable that Afghanopinions and ideas about the development of the teamshave not been researched at all. Neither the governmentofAfghanistannordomesticNGOshavehadmuchvoice inrecentstudies.ThisunfortunatedisregardtowardtheAfghanvoicewasrecognisedalreadyin2005attheNATOconferenceonPRTsandCIMIC165.DomesticspeakersareusuallyincludedinPRTseminarsandtrainingcourses,butinaminorrole.

7.3 Civilianisation

Another option available for a gradual PRT transformationis civilianisation. It would make a logical step from militaryinterventiontowardslonger-termstabilisation,politybuildinganddevelopment.TheUSInteragencyreportunderlinesthatthePRTexpertiseneededmaychangeovertimeasthemissionandconditionsevolve166.BothPeritoandMcNerneysuggestaugmentingciviliancapacitiesinthePRTsandcomparethesetoCORDSunits inVietnam inwhichmore thanhalf of thestaff were civilian experts in sectors of governance, rule oflaw, reconstructionandagriculture.McNerneywould like toseeawiderpresenceofPRTsacrossthecountry,byforminganetworkofsmaller,district-levelsubunits167.

A further qualitative step towards civilianisation is fullcivilian leadership, so farexercisedonly in twoexperimentalPRTs inAfghanistan. The Princeton studygroupargues thatcivilian control would “balance the long-term development

161 Gauster2007,9.162 Jakobsen2005,14.163 Dziedzic&Seidl2005,13;Stapleton2007,40.164 McNerney2005,42.165 NATO2005.166 USInteragency2006,21.167 Perito2005,14;McNerney2005,4345.

with near-term military imperatives.”168 Civilian leadership,representation and liaison would presumably be warmlygreeted by many international civilian actors, such ashumanitarian agencies169. The Canadian Independent Panelon Canadian involvement in Afghanistan suggested a rapidshifttocivilianleadershipinPRTKandaharinordertoenhancethecoordinationofnationalefforts170.

Toanalysethecivilianconceptonemightneedtohaveacloser look at experiences in Panjshir andVardak aswell asunitsinIraq.ItcouldalsobeenlighteningtocomparethePRTframeworktothatofintegratedUNmissions,whereaForceCommanderworkssubordinatedtoaHeadofMission,whoiscivilian.Suchanarrangementcouldperhapsserveasamodelforsemi-independentprovincial/tacticalunitsaswell.

In the case of Afghanistan, the most drastic version ofsuchcivilianleadershipwouldbetobestowPRTleadershiptolocalUNAMAoffices.UNpoliticaloversightinsteadofvariousnational models should improve the coherence of the PRTnetworkandmaybeseenasaresponsetothecriticismaboutthe lack of a comprehensive approach by the internationalcommunity in large. This could perhaps be tested first innorthernAfghanistan,wherethesecuritysituationallowsformorepioneeringcivilianapproaches.

Advances towards civilianisation challenge the prevalentthinking.TheybegaprincipalquestiononthenatureofPRTs:aretheyafterallnothingbutmilitaryunitsspicedupwithafewembeddedcivilianstogather informationandcommenton operations and plans? It seems reasonable to say thatPRTs started as military installations with just thin guidanceon the use of civilian resources. Since then the PRTs have,however, developed more towards civil-military integrationon a more equal basis. The ISAF lessons-learning processhasplaced integrationhighontheagenda,recognisingthatembeddednessisnotenough.Also,thewhole-of-governmentapproachtoAfghanistanhighlightsjointnessinprovincialunits.TousetheEuropeanUnionterm“civiliancrisismanagement”in depicting the PRTs would be an overstatement, but theysurely include elements that are capable of carrying outactivitiescomparabletothat.

7.4 Future of the integrated concept

CouldthePRTsserveasamodelforfuturemissionsinsimilarcontexts?ThePRTsareratherwidelyconsideredtobeusefulfield-level or tactical tools in coordination of military andcivilianeffortsintheearlystabilisationstagesofapost-conflictenvironment. They provide policymakers with unforeseenflexibilityandcancovervastgeographicalareas,demandingonly a relatively thin troop presence and modest resourcescomparedtoheavierunits. InAfghanistan,themainmilitarytask of the PRTs has been to maintain modest situationalawareness in areas unoccupied by the spearhead forces.Militarily,thePRTsarecheap.

168 Abbaszadehetal.2008,16.169 Sedra2004,10.170 IndependentPanel2008,26.


Onanyscale,theprogressivecoreofthePRTconceptiscivil-militaryjointness.Experiencesfromfield-levelintegrationwillbeuseful,evenifthewiderschemeofprovincialreconstructionteamsarenotintroducedintoanyfuturemissions.Itcouldbearguedthatthemilitary-heavydesignofthePRTsinAfghanistanshouldberevisedforfutureuseinotherarenas.Tothatend,thereare examples tobeanalysedboth inAfghanistanandIraq.However,recognisingtheuniquenessofeachconflict,nofixedmodelsshouldbepredeterminedforfutureuse.

ThePRTexperiment stemswellwithageneral tendencytofindmorecoherencebetweenmilitaryandcivilianassets,methods and efforts in crisis management and peace-building.

PRTexperiencesfromAfghanistanandIraq171areenteringintoUSdoctrinesofstabilisationandreconstructionoperations–aswellascounterinsurgency.TheUSAestablishedanOfficeof the Coordinator for Reconstruction and StabilisationundertheStateDepartmentin2004.ItfollowstheEuropeanexample in striving to create various kinds of reserves ofinternationallydeployablecivilianexperts172.Inordertobridgedepartmental gaps, in 2005 a National Security PresidentialDirective on the management of interagency efforts wasissued,andaninteragencyplanningdoctrineforstabilisationand reconstruction operations was launched173. The USDepartmentofDefenceanticipatesbuildingfuturecivil-militaryteamsonPRTlessons174.

NATO is looking towards enhancing deployable civilianexpertisesaswell175.ItisforeseeablethatNATOwilladoptthePRTsasabasemodelforfutureintegratedcrisismanagementattacticallevels.

The European Union has not thus far undertaken anintegrated mission using both sets of capabilities jointly,buthasdualandcloselycoordinatedstrategicandplanningstructures for both military and civilian crisis managementwithintheframeworkofEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy(ESDP)176.

Foryearscivilianandmilitarycomponentshaveco-formedtheUNpeaceoperations,butinthosecasesintegrationtakesplace in the mission headquarters; peacekeeping battalionsarenotintegratedwithlocalUNsub-offices.ConsideringthenatureofthePRTsandthewidecriticismfromhumanitarian-developmentactors,itisunlikelythatUNoperationswilladoptPRTtypesofformations.

Inconclusion,thePRTsprovidemanyvaluableinsightsintocrisismanagement–butarebecomingoutdatedandare inurgent need of reform. They have offered “potential” but

171 Therearewidedifferencesinmodelsbetweenthetwotheatres.SomecomparisonsofthePRTsinAfghanistanandIraqaretobefoundinDrolet2006.

172 USDepartmentofState2007b.173 WhiteHouse2005;USJointForcesCommand2005.174 USDepartmentofDefence2008,6.175 Howard2008;San2008.176 More on EU internal civil-military coordination in Khol

2006.

have also remained “a bit of a muddle.”177 Closer researchintoconcreteactivitiesonthegroundwouldbeneeded.

177 McNerney2005,33,44.


8 Futureresearch

Basedonidentifiedbestpractises,itcouldbepossibletomodelanidealPRT.Inhispaperfrom2005,JakobsenrecommendsthatDenmarkfollowtheUKmodel“whichisgenerallyconsideredtobethemostsuccessful.”178ItistruethattheBritishmodelincludesfeaturesthatISAFconsiderstobebestpractises,suchasatightlyintegratedcommandgrouporfocusingonsecuritysector reform. Humanitarian agencies and NGOs favour themodelforitslimitedroleinreconstruction.ThesuperiorityoftheUK,orNordic,modelcannot,however,beconfirmedwithaconceptualorliterature-reviewtypeofstudyasreflectedinthispaper.Thatwouldcallformoredetailedfieldresearch.Inaddition,theoriginalBritishmodelhaschangedsubstantiallysince the UK left northern Afghanistan and was deployedto Helmand in south. These changes have not been muchresearchedasofyet.

AsufficientbodyofconceptualresearchonthePRTsalreadyexists.Whatislackingisatrulycomparativestudythatwouldexaminetherealfunctioningofthemodelsontheground.Anextensivequestionnaireandinterviewprocessforall26PRTsshouldbeorganised,inthesamefashionaswasdonewiththeUSPRTsbyPeritoandtheUSInteragencystudy.Theresultsoftheprojectshouldbemadepublic.

Afterits initialphaseofaconceptualstudy,alsothisPRTresearch project should be directed more towards actualapplications of the concept on the ground. More detailedinformation on organisations, practices of civil-militaryintegrationandtheactivitiesoftheunitsoughttobecollected.Furtherresearchwouldthusnecessitatefieldtripstoobserveandinterview,gatherexperiencesandcomments,andtofindandverifyupdatedfacts.Toavoidduplicationandawasteofresources,anyfutureFinnishresearchmustbelinkedtootherorganisationsandinternationalresearchprojects.

DirectionsforfuturePRTresearchcould,for instance,bebasedonstudyinginternalaspects,models,andwidercontext.A study on the internal aspects should include relationsbetween contributing nations and question how the leadnationsandothercontributorsarecomplementingeachotherinthePRTs,orwhatarethepossiblefrictionsinmultinationalunits?Alsothemodesofactualcooperationshouldbeanalysed

178 Jakobsen2005,4.

while answering questions on internal relations: how is thedaily civil-military work organised and how do the differentorganisationalculturesrelatetoeachother?

Regardingthemodels,apubliccomparativestudyshouldbe carried out covering the analysis of all national modelsbasedoninterviewsandobservationsinthefield.MorestudyisneededbeyondthethreeoriginalmodelsdevelopedbytheUS, theUKandGermany. For instance, theDutch,Spanish,Lithuanian and Hungarian models have been less studiedinternationally. Another question is the Nordic model: howhasitdevelopedfromtheoriginalBritishone;andhowaretheNordic cooperation and collaborative procedures arranged?Is thereanycomplementaritybetweenthemodels?Anotherquestion concerns the civilian-led PRTs. How do civilian-ledunitsfunctionandwhataretheirlimitationsandopportunities?ThisanalysiscouldalsocovertheIraqicase.

A wider context should also be mapped in relation toPRTsand thewhole-of-governmentapproach.Whatare thestrengthsandweaknessesofbringingawhole-of-governmentapproachtotheprovincial/tacticallevelinAfghanistan?Doesthe PRT-driven whole-of-government approach endangerthe broader, comprehensive approach of the internationalcommunity?Theexternalrelationstootheractorsinthefieldnecessitate a broader analysis of PRTs and UNAMA. How isthislinkagebetweenthepoliticalandsecuritymissionsbuiltinprovinces?Couldafusionofthetwobeafuturemodel?AlsothePRTasaddedvalueinstabilisationoperationsneedstobecovered.WhatisthewiderimportanceofthePRTexperimentforcrisismanagement inpost-conflictcontexts?Whatcouldbeidentifiedasbestpractisetobeutilisedinthefuture?Whatcouldbeplausiblecontextualcriteriaforasimilarconcepttobelaunchedsomewhereelse?

Beyondthesethreestudythemes,remainsthesubjectofmilitaryscienceandcivil-militaryintegration.Whichstrandsinthe military tactical and leadership doctrines are supportiveof PRT types of activities that integrate military and civiliancapabilitiesand look forenablersandmultipliersexternal totheforceitself?


Annexes

A. ISAF troops

ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS & PRT LOCATIONS

Herat

Qala-e-Naw

MeS

Chaghcharan

Tarin KowtFarah

Meymana

LashkarGah

QalatKandahar

Konduz Feyzabad

ISAF PRT

Regional Command

PRT Lead Nation

KABUL

RC(C) Kabul

Mission: Conduct military operations in the assigned area of operations to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan(GIRoA) in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment with full engagement of Afghan National Security Forces, in order to extend government authority and influence, thereby facilitating Afghanistan’s reconstruction and enabling the GIRoA to exercise its sovereignty throughout the country.

Key Facts:• Commander: General (USA) David D. McKiernan• 41 Troop Contributing Nations• ISAF Total Strength: approx 50,700• ISAF AOR (Afghanistan land mass) 650,000 km²• 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)

Regional Command North: (appx strength 4,400)HQ RC(N) in MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)

• Forward Support Base MAZAR-E-SHARIF (DEU)• PRT MAZAR-E-SHARIF (SWE)• PRT FEYZABAD (DEU)• PRT KONDUZ (DEU)• PRT POL-E KHOMRI (HUN)• PRT MEYMANA (NOR)

Regional Command West: (appx strength 2,980)• HQ RC(W) in HERAT (ITA) • Forward Support Base HERAT (ESP) • PRT HERAT (ITA)• PRT FARAH (USA)• PRT QALA-E-NOW (ESP)• PRT CHAGHCHARAN (LTU)

Regional Command South: (appx strength 19,100)• HQ RC(S) in KANDAHAR (CAN) (rotates CAN, NLD, GBR)• Forward Support Base Kandahar (multinational)

PRT KANDAHAR (CAN)PRT LASHKAR-GAH (GBR, DNK, EST)PRT TARIN KOWT (NLD,AUS)PRT QALAT (USA,ROU)

Regional Command Capital: (appx strength 5,420)HQ ISAF in Kabul (Composite)HQ RC(C) in Kabul (FRA)KAIA (BEL)

Current as of 6 October 2008

Pol-e-Khomri

Khowst

AsadabadMether Lam

Jalalabad

Ghazni

Sharana

Bagram

Gardez

Bamyan

RC(N)

RC(W)

RC(S)

RC(E)

Panjshir Nuristan

Wardak

Regional Command East: (appx strength 18,800)• HQ RC(E) in BAGRAM• Forward Support Base BAGRAM (USA)• PRT LOGAR (CZE)• PRT SHARANA (USA)• PRT KHOST (USA)• PRT METHER LAM (USA) • PRT BAMYAN (NZL) • PRT PANJSHIR (USA)• PRT JALALABAD (USA)

• PRT GHAZNI (USA)• PRT ASADABAD (USA)• PRT BAGRAM (USA)• PRT NURISTAN (USA) • PRT WARDAK (TUR)• PRT GARDEZ (USA)

International Security Assistance Force

Note on numbers: Totals are approximations and actual numbers change daily. Number of troops will never be exact and should be taken as summaries.

ISAF PRT

Regional Command

PRT Lead Nation

KABUL

Logar


Source:http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf,lastaccessed4.11.2008.

ISAF EXPANSION

STAGE 4 (EAST)

5 October 06

STAGE 1 (NORTH) 2004

STAGE 3 (SOUTH) 31 Jul 06

STAGE 2 (WEST) 2005

NATO Mission In Afghanistan: On 9th August 2003, NATO assumed authority for the ISAF mission. The NATO mission consists of 5 phases:• Phase 1 Assessment and Preparation, including operations in Kabul (completed)• Phase 2 Geographic expansion (completed)• Phase 3 Stabilization• Phase 4/5 Transition / Redeployment

Expansion: In October 2003, the UN Security Council authorized the expansion of the NATO mission beyond Kabul. In October 2004, Stage 1 of the expansion to the North was completed with Stage 2 in the West following in September 2005. Stage 3 of the expansion to include the South was completed on 31 July 2006 and Stage 4 to include the East occurred on 5th October 2006, at which stage the geographic expansion phase was completed.

Troop Contributing Nations (TCN): The ISAF mission consists of the following 41 nations (the troop numbers are based on broad contribution and do not reflect the exact numbers on the ground at any one time).

International Security Assistance Force

* Turkey recognises the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name Current as of 6 October 2008

Slovenia

280Sweden9Luxemburg2730France1080

120

750Denmark50700Total (rounded)

Singapore2350Italy415Czech Republic

20600725Romania7Ireland280Croatia

70Portugal82500Canada 8330

United ArabEmirates

1130Poland240Hungary460Bulgaria

800

Ukraine455Norway130Greece420

135

3310Germany45Azerbaijan

1770Netherlands1Georgia1

780Spain200Lithuania80Finland140

Belgium

Albania

Austria

Australia

Slovakia

Iceland

Turkey

70

155

70

United States

Jordan 70

0

Estonia Latvia

New Zealand

0

The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia*

United Kingdom

.

3

0


B. Generic PrT models

American German British Nordic Turkish

Partneringnations 0-1 4-5,ContinentalEuropean

2,North-European 1,North-European 0

Size(MIL) 40-120 400-500 150 150-200 70

Size(CIV) 3-5 10-20 20-30 8-15 15

Leadership MilitaryCommandersupportedbyembeddedcivilianrepresentatives

Dual:MilitaryCommanderandCivilianHead,leadingrespectivecomponents

Jointbetweenmilitary,politicalanddevelopmentrepresentative

MilitaryCommanderinconsultationwithjoint(CIV-MIL)CommandGroup

CivilianCoordinator

Securityactivities(MIL;CIV)

Forceprotection;policetrainingandinfrastructuresupport

Forceprotection,modestpatrols,policeinfrastructureandtraining;policementoring,trainingandinfrastructuresupport

Extensivepatrols;policetrainingandinfrastructuresupport

Extensivepatrols,operations,forceprotection;policetrainingandinfrastructuresupport

Protectiontotheciviliancomponent;policetrainingandinfrastructuresupport

Governanceactivities

Regularliaisonwithkeyleaders,infrastructuresupporttolocaladministration

Regularliaisonwithkeyleaders,supporttojusticesystem

Regularliaisonwithkeyleaders,supporttojusticesystem

Regularliaisonwithkeyleaders,directsupportlefttotheUNandothers

Regularliaisonwithkeyofficials,training&infrastructuresupporttolocaladministration


Reconstruction&developmentactivities

PRTprojectsthroughvariousDoDandUSAIDflexiblefunds(infrastructureineducation,healthandwater),otherUSAIDprojectsexternaltothePRTs(roads,waterinfrastructure,localadministrationtraining)

PRTsupporttolocalplanning,PRTCIMICprojects(education,water),PRTexternalfundingtoavividNGOcommunity(economicdevelopment,education,water,energy)

PRT&externalsupporttolocalplanning,PRTrefrainedtofacilitationthoughnewlymodestCIMICprojects(water,roads),PRTexternalDfIDaidthroughNGOsandnationalprogrammes(villagedevelopment,governance,water,education)

PRT&externalsupporttolocalplanning,PRTrefrainedtofacilitation,occasionalQIPsbybothMILandCIV,PRTexternalaidthroughNGOsandnationalprogrammes(villagedevelopment,governance,water,education)

DevelopmentaidandtechnicalsupportthroughthePRT(education,health,agriculture)

Provincialaidflow (Eventensof)MillionsofUSDannuallyboththroughandexternaltothePRTs.Sumsvarydrasticallybetweenprovinces

SomemillionsofEURannually,mostlyexternaltothePRTs

LessthanonemillionpoundsthroughthePRTannually,nearly20millionpoundsexternally

USD5-15millionannually,nearlyallexternaltothePRTs

USD6.5millionthroughthePRTannually

Operationalenvironment

Highriskareaswithfrequentseriousincidents,mostlyrobustISAFandOEFcombattroopspresence,closetonon-operationaladministrationandservices,fewNGOsandlimitedUNpresence

Lowtomidlevelrisk,sporadicseriousincidents,fewISAForOEFcombattroops,slowlyreconstitutingadministrationandservices,fairlystrongNGOandUNpresence

Highriskareaswithfrequentseriousincidents,robustISAFandOEFcombattroopspresence,closetonon-operationaladministrationandservices,fewNGOsandlimitedUNpresence,giganticopiumproduction

Lowtomidlevelrisk,sporadicseriousincidents,fewISAForOEFcombattroops,slowlyreconstitutingadministrationandservices,fairlystrongNGOandUNpresence

Midlevelrisk,sporadicseriousincidents,someISAForOEFcombattroops,slowlyreconstitutingadministrationandservices,fairlystrongNGOandUNpresence



Special ThefirstPRTmodel PartofthestrongGermancommunityinthenortheast

TheonlyPRTtorunactivecounter-narcotics

DevelopedfromtheBritishmodel

CivilianPRTwithonlysupportivemilitarycomponent

Rationale Reconstructionfocuswithcounter-insurgencymindsettowin‘heartsandminds’

Stabilisationandreconstruction

StabilisationthroughSSR

StabilisationthroughSSR

Reconstructionanddevelopment

Typicalcritique PoorqualityofQIPs,inefficientsupporttolocalcapacitybuildingcomparedtosumsflowingin,PRTspoliticising/militarisinghumanitarianaidanddevelopment

Heavyrestrictionsontheuseofmilitarycapabilities,fairlylargereconstructionassistanceinsufficientlyalignedwiththeAfghangovernment

Localpeopledemandmorevisiblesupporttoreconstructionanddevelopment

Localpeopledemandmorevisiblesupporttoreconstructionanddevelopment

-


Monographs, Papers and Articles

Abbaszadeh,Nima,MarkCrow,MarianneEl-Khoury,JonathanGandomi,DavidKuwayama,ChristopherMacPherson,MeghanNutting,NealinParker&TayaWeiss(2008):Provincial reconstruction Teams: lessons and recommendations.Princeton:PrincetonUniversity.Availableathttp://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf,lastaccessed27.2.2008.

AfghanistanStudyGroupReport(2008):revitalizing our efforts – rethinking our strategies.SecondEdition.CenterfortheStudyofthePresidency.Availableathttp://www.thepresidency.org/pubs/Afghan_Study_Group_final.pdf,lastaccessed5.3.2008.

Cassidy,RobertM.(2006):“Thelongsmallwar:indigenousforcesforcounterinsurgency”.Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly,Summer2006,47-62.Availableathttp://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/06summer/cassidy.pdf,lastaccessed11.12.2007.

CCIC(2007):Canada’s whole-of-government approach in Afghanistan: implications on development and peace-building.Briefingpaper.SubmissiontotheIndependentPanelonAfghanistan.Canada’sCoalitiontoEndGlobalPoverty.Availableathttp://www.ccic.ca/e/docs/002_humanitarian_2007-12_ccic_submission.pdf,lastaccessed18.12.2007.

Clark,DavidJ.&RaymondA.Millen(2006):The vital role of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations.USArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute:CarlisleBarracks.Availableathttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil309.pdf,lastaccessed20.11.2007.

Drolet,JohnD.(2006):Provincial reconstruction Teams: Afghanistan vs. Iraq – should we have a standard model?CarlisleBarracks:USArmyWasCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute.Availableathttp://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/ksil333.pdf,lastaccessed20.11.2007.

Dziedzic,MichaelJ.&MichaelK.Seidl(2005):Provincial reconstruction Teams and military relations with international and nongovernmental organizations in Afghanistan.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.SpecialReport147.Availableathttp://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr147.pdf,lastaccessed29.11.2007.

Gauster,Markus(2007[2006]):Provincial reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an innovative instrument of international crisis management being put to the test.GeorgeC.MarshallEuropeanCenterforSecurityStudies.OccasionalPaperSeries,No.16.Availableathttp://www.marshallcenter.org/site-graphic/lang-en/page-pubs-index-1/static/xdocs/research/static/occpapers/occ-paper_16-en.pdf,lastaccessed4.4.2008.

Godsave,Hannah(2007):The Provincial reconstruction Team (PrT) model of post-conflict intervention: progress in Afghanistan and future Prospects.MADissertation.Conflict,securityanddevelopmentprogramme.London:King’sCollege.

Guidelines(2008):Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan.20May2008–Version1.0.

Howard,Martin(2008):“CEP’sroleinStabilisationandReconstruction.Editorial”.PerCEPtions Newsletter,no5,July2008,1-2.

References


IndependentPanel(2008):Independent panel on Canada’s future role in Afghanistan.Finalreport.Availableathttp://www.independent-panel-independant.ca/pdf/Afghan_Report_web_e.pdf,lastaccessed26.2.2008.

Jakobsen,PeterViggo(2005):PrTs in Afghanistan: successful but not sufficient.DanishInstituteforInternationalStudies,ReportNo.6.Availableathttp://www.diis.dk/graphics/Publications/Reports2005/pvj_prts_afghanistan.pdf,lastaccessed28.11.2007.

Khol,Radek(2006):“Civil-militaryco-ordinationinEUcrisismanagement”.InCivilian crisis management: the EU way.EuropeanUnionInstituteforSecurityStudies,ChaillotpaperNo.90,123-138.Availableathttp://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/chai90.pdf,lastaccessed10.12.2007.

Lane,Roger&EmmaSky(2006):“TheroleofProvincialReconstructionTeamsinstabilisation”.rUSI Journal,June2006,46-51.

McNerney,MichaelJ.(2005):“StabilizationandreconstructioninAfghanistan:arePRTsamodeloramuddle?”Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly,Winter2005-2006,32-46.Availableathttp://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/05winter/mcnerney.pdf,lastaccessed28.11.2007.

Orsini,Dominique(2007):“Walkingthetightrope:dealingwithwarlordsinAfghanistan’sdestabilizingnorth”.rUSI Journal,October2007,46-50.

Patrick,Stewart&KaysieBrown(2007):Greater than the sum of its parts? Assessing “the whole of government” approaches to fragile states.NewYork:InternationalPeaceAcademy.

Perito,RobertM.(2005):US experience with Provincial reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: lessons identified.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.SpecialReport152.Availableathttp://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr152.pdf,lastaccessed29.11.2007.

Perito,RobertM.(2007):Provincial reconstruction Teams in Iraq.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.SpecialReport185.Availableathttp://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr185.pdf,lastaccessed10.12.2007.

Perito,RobertM.(2008):Embedded Provincial reconstruction Teams.USIPeaceBriefing.UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace.Availableathttp://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0305_prt.html,lastaccessed21.7.2008.

Piiparinen,Touko(2007):”Aclashofmindsets?Aninsider’saccountofProvincialReconstructionTeams”.International Peacekeeping,Vol.14.No.1,January2007,143-157.

PRTMeymaneh(2007):Guidelines.UnpublishedpapercirculatedwithinISAF.

San,Burcu(2008):“StabilisationandReconstruction:aNewGrowthAreaforNATO?”PerCEPtions Newsletter,no5,July2008,9-10.

Save the Children(2004):Provincial reconstruction Teams and humanitarian-military relations in Afghanistan.Availableathttp://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Save_the_Children_UK_-_PRTs_and_Humanitarian-Military_Relations_in_Afghanistan_2004_09.pdf,lastaccessed20.11.2007.

Sedra,Mark(2004):Civil-military relations in Afghanistan: the Provincial reconstruction Team debate.AsiaPacificFoundationofCanada.Availableathttp://www.asiapacificresearch.ca/caprn/afghan_project/m_sedra.pdf,lastaccessed21.11.2007.

Stapleton,BarbaraJ.(2007):“Ameanstowhatend?WhyPRTsareperipheraltothebiggerpoliticalchallengesinAfghanistan”.Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,Fall2007,Vol.10,Issue1.Availableathttp://www.jmss.org/2007/2007fall/articles/stapleton.pdf,lastaccessed15.12.2007.

USInteragency(2006):Provincial reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: an interagency assessment.USDepartmentofState,USDepartmentofDefence&USAgencyforInternationalDevelopment.Availableathttp://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADG252.pdf,lastaccessed23.11.2007.

Waldman,Matt(2007):Falling short: aid effectiveness in Afghanistan.AgencyCoordinationBodyforAfghanRelief(ACBAR).Availableathttp://www.acbar.org/ACBAR%20Publications/ACBAR%20Aid%20Effectiveness%20(25%20Mar%2008).pdf,3lastaccessed.3.2008.


International organisations

[ISAF2007]InternationalSecurityAssistanceForce(ISAF)(2007):Provincial reconstruction Team Handbook.Thirdedition,3February2007.Kabul:ISAF.

NATO(2005):NATo Provincial reconstruction Teams: ISAF PrT operations in Afghanistan and the implications and consequences for civil-military relations.Seminarreport,NATOCIMICCentreofExcellence,29–30September2005.Availableathttp://www.cimic-coe.org/ccoe_download/prt_report.pdf,lastaccessed29.11.2007.

UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(2001):resolution 1386: on the situation in Afghanistan.Availableathttp://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N01/708/55/PDF/N0170855.pdf?OpenElement,lastaccessed11.12.2007.

UnitedNationsSecurityCouncil(2003):resolution 1510: the situation in Afghanistan.Availableathttp://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/555/55/PDF/N0355555.pdf?OpenElement,lastaccessed11.12.2007.

UNODC(2008):Afghanistan opium Survey 2008. Executive Summary.UnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime.Availableathttp://www.unodc.org/documents/publications/Afghanistan_Opium_Survey_2008.pdf,lastaccessed5.9.2008.

WorldBank(2007):Service delivery and governance at the sub-national level in Afghanistan.Availableathttp://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/Publications/448813-1185293547967/4024814-1185293572457/report.pdf,lastaccessed25.3.2008.

Government sources

BMZ(2007):Afghanistan > Cooperation.GermanFederalMinistryofEconomicCooperationandDevelopment.Availableathttp://www.bmz.de/en/countries/partnercountries/afghanistan/cooperation.html,lastaccessed13.12.2007.

CanadianMinistryofNationalDefence(2007):The kandahar Provincial reconstruction Team activities.Availableathttp://www.forces.gc.ca/site/kprt-eprk/act_e.asp,lastaccessed11.12.2007.

DfID(2007):Afghanistan programme.DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment.Availableathttp://www.dfid.gov.uk/countries/asia/afghanistan-programme.asp,14.12.2007.

DutchMinistryofDefence(2007):Uruzgan.Availableathttp://www.mindef.nl/missies/afghanistan/uruzgan/,lastaccessed11.12.2007.

DutchMinistryofForeignAffairs(2007):Development aid spending in Afghanistan.Availableathttp://www.minbuza.nl/en/themes,international-cooperation/afghanistan/afghanistan-in-ontwikkeling/Development-Aid-spending-in-Afghanistan.html,lastaccessed11.12.2007.

GTZ(2007):GTZ in Afghanistan.GermanAgencyforTechnicalCooperation.Availableathttp://www.gtz.de/en/weltweit/europa-kaukasus-zentralasien/670.htm,lastaccessed13.12.2007.

HouseofCommons(2006):Commons Hansard written answers text for 31 october 2006.Availableathttp://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200506/cmhansrd/cm061031/text/61031w0023.htm,lastaccessed28.11.2007.

NorwegianMinistryofForeignAffairs(2007):Norwegian led PrT in Faryab.Availableathttp://www.norway.org.af/prt/faryab/faryab.htm,18.12.2007.

USDepartmentofDefence(2005):reconstruction Team opens in Panjshir.Panjshir,21November2005.Availableathttp://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/nov2005/a112105ms3.html,lastaccessed13.12.2007.

USDepartmentofDefence(2008):Statement of Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defence for Policy ryan Henry.StatementbeforeHouseArmedServicesCommittee,SubcommitteeonOversightandInvestigations.Washington,DC,14February2008.Availableathttp://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/OI021408/Henry_Testimony021408.pdf,lastaccessed27.2.2008.


USDepartmentofState(2007a):Fact sheet on Provincial reconstruction Teams (PrTs).Availableathttp://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/20060223_prt_fact_sheet.html,lastaccessed10.12.2007.

USDepartmentofState(2007b):Stabilization and reconstruction operations: learning from the Provincial reconstruction Team (PrT) experience.CoordinatorforOfficeofReconstructionandStabilization.StatementbeforeHouseArmedServicesCommittee,SubcommitteeonOversightandInvestigations.Washington,DC,30October2007.Availableathttp://www.state.gov/s/crs/rls/rm/94379.htm,lastaccessed21.11.2007.

USJointForcesCommand(2005):US Government Draft Planning Framework for reconstruction, Stabilization, and Conflict Transformation.J7PamphletVersion1.0.Availableathttp://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/training/crs_pam051205.pdf,lastaccessed3.1.2008.

WhiteHouse(2005):National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44.December7,2005.Availableathttp://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-44.html,lastaccessed18.8.2008.

News

Al Jazeera(2007):“NationbuildingkeyinAfghanistan”.23December2007.Availableathttp://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/8346FBA2-39E2-42A3-88B4-077E794B71DA.htm,lastaccessed2.1.2008.

Asia Times online(2008):“InAfghanistan,blurredlinescostlives”.August202008.Availableathttp://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JH20Df02.html,lastaccessed5.9.2008.

Irinnews(2007a):“PRTsaccusedofspendingunequalamountondevelopment”.Kabul,4May2007.Availableathttp://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=71949,lastaccessed12.12.2007.

Irinnews(2007b):“Humanitarianspacemustberegained–UNAMA”.Kabul,17December2007.Availableathttp://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=75902,lastaccessed30.1.2008.

Irinnews(2008):“Afghanistan:Some1,000civilianskilledsinceJanuary-NGObody”.Kabul,1August2008.Availableathttp://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=79565,lastaccessed10.8.2008.

IWPr(2007):“NortherngovernorlashesoutatNATO”.InstituteofWarandPeaceReporting.Mazar-eSharif,23July2007.Availableathttp://iwpr.net/?p=arr&s=f&o=337318&apc_state=henh%20,lastaccessed12.12.2007.

reliefweb(2003):“TheProvincialReconstructionTeam(PRT)inAfghanistananditsroleinreconstruction”.31May2003.Availableathttp://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/OCHA-64BGJ7?OpenDocument,lastaccessed13.12.2007.


Authors

Mr.Oskari EronencurrentlyworksasanAdvisorforSecurityandDevelopmentinthePoliticalDepartmentoftheMinistryforForeignAffairsofFinland.Previously,heactedasa jointresearcherforboththeCrisisManagementCentreFinlandandtheFinnishDefenceForcesInternationalCentre(FINCENT).HehasservedasaPoliticalAdvisorintwoProvincialReconstructionteamsoftheISAFoperationinnorthernAfghanistanin2006–2007.HeholdsaMasterofSocialSciences(Pol.Sc.)fromtheUniversityofJyväskylä,Finland.

Ms. Kirsi Henriksson is the Head of Research andDevelopmentat theCrisisManagementCentreFinland.Shehas a Master of Arts in General History from the Universityof Tampere, Finland. Previously, she has worked as aResearcher in the Tampere Peace Research Institute, as wellas a Researcher and Lecturer at the Department of History,University of Tampere. Since2006 shehasworkedasChiefEditor of a scientific journal published by the Finnish PeaceResearchAssociation,Kosmopolis.Herregionalexpertise lieswithinNorth-Africa,especiallywithAlgeria.

Dr. Ari Kerkkänen has Ph.D. from the University ofHelsinki (2001).Currently,heworksasDirectorof theCrisisManagementCentreFinland.Hisformerappointmentsareasfollows: University Researcher (University of Helsinki, 2006),Political Advisor (Multinational Task Force North, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 2005), War Crimes Intelligence Analyst (UNInternational Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia,2002–2005), Political Monitor and Senior OperationsOfficer in Serbia (EUMM 2001–2002), UN Military Observer(UNPROFOR1994–1995),UNStaffOfficer(UNPROFOR,1993)and UN Operations Duty Officer (UNIFIL, 1991–1992). HisregionalexpertiselieswithintheMiddleEastandtheWesternBalkans.

Mr.Jari MustonenisonleaveofabsencefromthepostofaSeniorResearcherattheCrisisManagementCentreFinland.CurrentlyheworksasanAssociateStrategicPlanningOfficerin the Peacebuilding Support Office (PBSO) at the UnitedNations Peacebuilding Commission. Mr. Mustonen holdsa Master of Arts in General History from the University ofJoensuu,Finland.Hehas served inpeacekeepingoperationsinBosnia-Herzegovina(SFOR2001–2002,EUFOR2005–2006)andinAfghanistan(ISAF2004).

Mr. Hannu Rantanen is the Research Director at theEmergencyServiceCollegeofFinland.HeholdsaLic.Phil. inInformationTechnologywhichhereceived in2003fromtheUniversityofKuopio,Finland.Hehas12yearsexperienceatthe Emergency Services College, before which he spent 15yearsattheFinnishStateComputerCentre.Hismainareaofexpertiseisintheuseofinformationtechnologyinemergencyresponse.Inaddition,heisamemberofUNDisasterAssessmentand Coordination team, with particular knowledge of largescaleinternationalemergencies.Overthelast30yearshehasworkedonanumberofinternationalassignments,mainlyintheMiddleEast.

Ms.Olivia Šetkić istheResearchCoordinator(recruitmentandtraining)ofCrisisManagementCentreFinland.SheholdsaMasterofArtsdegreefromtheUniversityofHelsinki,Finland.Ms. Šetkić has served ECMM/EUMM as a Political Monitorand as a Senior Operations Officer in Bosnia-Herzegovina1999–2000.In2002sheassistedintheimplementationoftheEarlyVotingSysteminKosovofortheOSCE.ShehasservedintheBalkansinseveralelectionsasaShortTermObserverandElectionSupervisorfortheOSCE/ODIHRandtheCoE.


Mr.Jari SundqvistisonaleaveofabsencefromthepostofResearchCoordinator(technology)attheCrisisManagementCentre Finland. Previously he has worked for the Ministryof Defence of Finland. He holds a Lic.Tech. and Master ofSecurity from the Helsinki University of Technology, Finland.CurrentlyheworksasanAdvisortotheKPSDirectorateforIT&CommunicationsinEULEXKosovo,secondedbyFinland.

Ms.Tanja TamminenisonaleaveofabsencefromthepostofResearcherattheFinnishInstituteofInternationalAffairs.ShehasaMasterofSocialSciences(Pol.Sc.)fromtheUniversityofTurku,Finland.Currently,sheworksasaReportingOfficerinEULEXKosovo,secondedbyFinland.HerregionalexpertiselieswithinWestern-Balkans,especiallyinKosovo.


Hulkontie 83, PO Box 1325, FI-70821 Kuopio, Finland tel. +358 (0)71 875 0341 fax +358 (0)71 875 3650 www.cmcfinland.fi

CMC FINLAND CIVILIAN CRISIS MANAGEMENT STUDIES IN THIS VOLUME:

Coordination and Cooperation on Tactical and Operational Levels: Studying EU-ESDP

Crisis Management Instruments in Bosnia and Herzegovina

JARI MUSTONEN

Recruitment and Training in Civilian Crisis Management: Learning from the

ECMM/EUMM Experiences

OLIVIA SETKIC

Building Capacity for the Palestinian Civil Police: EUPOL COPPS and Communications Project

ARI KERKKÄNEN − HANNU RANTANEN − JARI SUNDQVIST

Human Security in Post-Status Kosovo: a Shared European Responsibility

TANJA TAMMINEN

PRT Models in Afghanistan: Approaches to Civil-Military Integration

OSKARI ERONEN

ISBN 978-952-67127-0-3

ISSN 1797-2140

CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies

CMC Finland yEARBOOK 2008 on

Civilian Crisis Management Studies