Clearing the Jungle:1

Conceptualizing and Measuring2

Trust and Trustworthiness*�3

Paul C. Bauer�4

August 20135

First draft prepared for the ECPR General Conference, Bordeaux 20136

Please do not cite7

Abstract8

This study investigates the concepts of trust and trustworthiness. The vagueness9

in which both concepts are defined, measured and related to other concepts in10

the social sciences impedes the accumulation of scientific knowledge. Building on11

previous definitions and research, an attempt is made to provide a general con-12

ception for both concepts. This conception may serve to structure past research,13

as well as serve as a starting point for future research. It is flexible enough to de-14

scribe a wide variety of cases in which both concepts are at stake. Subsequently, a15

simple classification of causes of trust and trustworthiness is suggested. Besides,16

various implications of this conception are discussed such as its relation to other17

relatively closely linked concepts and its differences regarding earlier definitions.18

Finally, ways of measuring trust and trustworthiness are reviewed, criticized and19

potential improvements suggested.20

21

Keywords: trust, trustworthiness, social trust, generalized trust, political trust22

*I am grateful to Matthias Fatke, Birte Gundelach and Richard Traunmuller for discussions andfeedback as well as various other colleagues and friends for fruitful discussions.

�Paul C. Bauer, Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Switzerland,paul.bauer@ipw.unibe.ch, www.paulcbauer.eu

�Initially, the term “clearing the jungle” was used as a joke in a presentation. Basically, however,it illustrates the effort that lies behind this paper.

1 Introduction23

In his classic “Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics“ Giovanni Sartori (1970)24

criticizes the bad habit of broadening the extension of concepts by obfuscating their25

connotation. To be able to make meaningful comparisons between observations such26

as countries or individuals, we need universal concepts that can travel across time and27

place. Concepts have to assume the role of data containers that is they should imply a28

way of measuring them (Sartori 1970: 1035, 1052-1053).29

Research on the two popular concepts trust and trustworthiness suffers from three prob-30

lems and resulting negative effects.1 First, there is a vast number of definitions and31

many are elusive, ambiguous and blurry. We are in a “conceptual morass” (Barber32

1983: 1), a situation many scholars have lamented (Bigley and Pearce 1998; Hosmer33

1995; Lewicki and Bunker 1995; Luhmann 2000; McKnight and Chervany 1996; Shapiro34

1987). This condition makes it extremely difficult to structure and compare research35

that has been made so far.2 As a result of this conceptual vagueness, theories con-36

necting these concepts to other phenomena are often compulsorily blurry and elusive.37

Especially in the case of trust, various scholars have coined different sub-concepts such38

as “particularized trust” which further adds to the confusion. As a result debates that39

evolve around these concepts often seem at cross-purposes.340

Second, definitions of trust and trustworthiness are often followed by completely de-41

tached empirical measurement, i.e., there is a definition-measurement misfit. As a42

consequence empirical tests of the theoretical arguments used to relate trust and trust-43

worthiness with other phenomena are often useless since they do not really test those44

arguments but rather relationships between measures of something else.45

Third, the clear difference between trust and trustworthiness is often blurred both in46

discussions of the concepts itself and in theories as well as empirical investigations47

linking these concepts to other phenomena (cp. Hardin 2002). In general, in contrast48

1Already in 1983, Barber (1983: 1) pointed out: “Today nearly everyone seems to be talking about“trust””. The popularity of these concepts is increasing and they are widely discussed in various fields inthe social sciences. A web-of-knowledge-search specifying “trust” and “trustworthiness” to be includedin the title results in 19.522 hits in the former and 409 hits in the latter case. These numbers arereduced to 10.452 and 286 respectively if we choose to restrict the search to journals belonging to thegeneral category of “social sciences”. However, these figures are still considerable (Numbers from 19thJuly 2012). In general there is an increasing trend in the number of publications.

2See Bromiley and Cummings (1995); Hosmer (1995); Lewicki and Bunker (1995); McKnight andChervany (1996); Mishra (1996); Sitkin and Roth (1993) for noteworthy attempts to typologize researchon trust.

3Note the debate between Fisher, van Heerde and Tucker (2010), Hooghe (2011) and Fisher, vanHeerde-Hudson and Tucker (2011)

1

to trust, the concept of trustworthiness has received less attention, although, it is the49

essential “twin” of the concept of trust.50

Altogether, trust and trustworthiness suffer from conceptual stretching and the above51

described effects impede an accumulation of knowledge. To preserve the value of these52

concepts for the social sciences we should rely on a conception and measures that fulfill53

the requirements mentioned by Sartori (1970). If we fail to do so, the concepts of54

trust and trustworthiness will meet the fate of scraping an existence as vague umbrella55

concepts.4 Accordingly building on rich and valuable previous work the present study56

seeks an answer to the general question: How should we define (i.e. what are) and how57

can we measure the concepts of trust and trustworthiness? 558

I assume that “formalizing” concepts is a useful counter strategy against the illness of59

conceptual stretching and resulting problems. Moreover, I firmly defend the view that60

conceptual clarification, in other words establishing a conception of a phenomenon and61

corresponding ways of measuring a phenomenon logically precedes the search for causes62

and consequences of a phenomenon.63

In section 2 a wide variety of definitions are systematically evaluated and analyzed. The64

aim is to derive the necessary characteristics of and a conception for trust and its “twin”65

trustworthiness. In section 3 real-life cases that fall under the respective conception,66

i.e., the extension of this conception are discussed. The choice of these real-life cases67

both depends on the system we would like to study as well as the relevance of specific68

cases for that system. Section 4 suggests a basic way of classifying causes of trust69

and trustworthiness. Section 5 discusses the relation of trust and trustworthiness with70

other concepts and some fundamental conceptual issues. Finally, resulting ways of71

measurement, problems in current measurement and potential solutions are discussed72

in Section 6. The conclusion summarizes the article. In the appendix (Section 8)73

the here presented conception of trust and trustworthiness is compared with previous74

definitions.75

2 The intension of trust and trustworthiness76

Several notions reappear across a broad number of definitions of trust and trustworthi-77

ness that were coined by different authors. In other words there seems to be an implicit78

consensus regarding necessary characteristics of the concepts of trust and trustwor-79

4Note the discussion by Adler and Kwon 2002 on the concept of social capital.5Few works study both trust and trustworthiness together. See, for instance, Ben-Ner and Hall-

dorsson 2010; Colquitt et al. 2007; Hardin 2002; McKnight and Chervany 1996. These works reappearthroughout this paper, and especially in section 8.

2

thiness across a wide number of scholars. These are discussed below and taken as a80

starting points to derive the conception defended in this study.81

First, several notable scholars agree on the fact that trust and trustworthiness play a82

role in situations that can be described referring to three elements (Baier 1986, Hardin83

1992: 154, Hardin 2002, Luhmann 1979: 27, Sztompka 1999: 55).6 For instance, Baier84

(1986) points to the importance of differentiating between different trustees and the85

behavior in this relation, thus, “taking trust to be a three-place predicate (A trusts B86

with valued thing C)” (Baier 1986: 236). Slightly reformulated, when speaking about87

trust we essentially speak about a truster A that trusts (judges the trustworthiness88

of) the trustee B with regard to some behavior X.7 Turning this statement around we89

may speak of a trustee B who is trustworthy with regard to some behavior X8 and90

a truster A.9 These three parameters are enough to define the concepts of trust and91

trustworthiness. In addition, as I will argue in Section 3, they are subtle in that they92

may be replaced with differing real-life trustees and behaviors. Certainly, one could93

add further parameters (e.g. in situation/context S), however, that would unnecessarily94

increase the complexity of an otherwise parsimonious statement. Moreover, it can be95

convincingly argued that most if not all additional parameters (such as situation S)96

should be seen as causal factors that explain both trust and trustworthiness and, thus,97

do not belong to the concepts itself (see section Section 4). In this regard, abstraction98

and simplification from complex reality is regarded as a necessity in deriving a useful99

conception. Besides, the above formulation illustrates that a differentiation between100

trust and trustworthiness is of fundamental importance. Even “when there is no call101

for trust, a person or institution can possess the attributes of trustworthiness, which102

assure potential trusters that the trusted party will not betray a trust” (Levi and103

Stoker 2000: 476). Logically, a trustee can be trustworthy independently from the level104

of trust a truster has in him. As a consequence, a truster can under- or overestimate105

the trustworthiness of a trustee.106

Second, there is a temporal dimension. When we speak about trust it is a generally107

accepted characteristic of the concept the it refers to expectations about future behavior.108

Many authors have defined trust in this way even if their definitions differ in many109

other respects (see, e.g. Bacharach and Gambetta 2001: 150, Baier 1986: 235, Barber110

1983: 8-9, Dasgupta 1988, Gambetta 1988: 217, Luhmann 1988: 97, Mayer, Davis and111

6Likewise, the conception of trust defended by Barber (1983) seems to consist of three elements.7The term behavior also encompasses passive behavior or non-behavior such as refraining from

robbing someone, stealing a bike etc.8Below, the synonymous expressions “behave trustworthy” or simply “be trustworthy” are used

interchangeably.9Instead of simply using the term “behavior”, Sztompka (1999: 55) uses the term content, but X

has also been called the domain by Levi and Stoker (2000: 476).

3

Schoorman 1995: 712, Offe 1999: 47, Sztompka 1999: 25). Similarly, most scholars to112

not directly define trustworthiness but discuss factors that should impact the future113

behavior of someone such as the willingness and ability to behave in a certain way114

(McKnight and Chervany 1996: 34).10. Now, corresponding to a truster’s expectation115

in the presence (trust), a trustee may behave trustworthy in the future or may have116

behaved trustworthy in the past (see Figure1). Hence, we can differentiate between117

past and future trustworthiness.118

Figure 1: Temporal dimensionPresence

Truster’s judgment

Past

Future

Trustee’s behavior Trustee’s behavior

Third, both concepts are closely linked to the idea of probability. The idea of trust as119

a probability seems fairly clear. Several authors directly refer to “probability” in their120

definitions, often to “subjective probability”.11 For instance, Gambetta (1988: 217)121

asserts that “trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective122

probability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will123

perform a particular action”. Similarly, Offe (1999: 47) seems to embrace the idea of124

a probability as he writes: “Trust is the belief concerning the action that is to be ex-125

pected from others. The belief refers to probabilities that (certain categories of) others126

will do certain things or refrain from doing certain things”. Dasgupta (1988: 62, 65-66)127

gives the example of a customer who is unsure whether a salesman is trustworthy or128

untrustworthy and “imputes a (subjective) probability p to the salesman being honest”129

whereas honesty designates trustworthy behavior. Coleman (1990: 99) does not explic-130

itly define trust as a subjective probability, however, he develops a formal model for131

the “placement of trust” in which the mentioned subjective probability appears as an132

expectation namely the “probability that the trustee is trustworthy”. The above defi-133

nitions are widely cited by other scholars in the field, who also seem to have embraced134

the idea of trust as a probability, a probability in the Bayesian sense that quantifies a135

subjective belief that the trustee will behave trustworthy.12136

In is later works Nooteboom (2002: 39-41) rejects the idea of trust as a subjective prob-137

ability for two main reasons: First, if the subjective probability is 1, no uncertainty is138

10The term behavior seems somewhat connected to humans, however, as I will argue later, a generalconception of trust and trustworthiness should also encompass trust in and trustworthiness of things,e.g. someone may trust a car not to break down.

11Hence, it is here a probability in the Bayesian sense, as individual belief about another person’spotential behavior.

12Another scholar who refers to the term ”‘probability”’ is Gamson (1968: 54), an idea that is pickedup by Easton (1975: 447) in his discussion of trust as a part of the concept of ”‘diffuse support”’.

4

left which seems to be an essential characteristic of the concept of trust. However, this139

is a conceptual question. In everyday language the expression “trust someone 100%”140

is a common expression in several languages such as English, German and Spanish.141

Moreover, even if we conceptualize trust as a probability going from 0 to 1 it is unlikely142

that humans will often come up with judgments of “1”, because they are aware that143

future events are always uncertain. Even if they do it is their subjective judgment and144

objectively we know that they might be wrong, hence, a value of 1 can be equaled145

with 99.99%.13. Second, Nooteboom (2002: 41, 42) criticizes that the idea of subjec-146

tive probability seems to be too rational and calculative which may no be the case147

for most humans. However, this seems an empirical question rather than a conceptual148

one. Individuals may fail in their judgments, i.e., their probability estimations. As149

researchers we simply have to be aware of that problem when it comes to measurement.150

Besides, relying on the idea of subjective probability does not necessarily mean that we151

resort to scales from 0 to 100%. If we are convinced that humans are more simplistic152

in their judgments we could resort to less precise scales. Finally, even if human’s do153

not consciously make probability calculations, the probability notion represents a very154

useful conceptual tool.14 All in all, the positive aspects of defining trust as a subjective155

probability outweigh the negative ones.156

The idea of trustworthiness as a probability is not directly stated in the literature.15157

Rather, different scholars discuss attributes or factors that may raise trustworthiness,158

i.e., the probability that one lives up to expectations. For instance, Mayer, Davis and159

Schoorman (1995: 716) discuss factors of trustworthiness, namely factors or character-160

istics of a trustee that might lead the truster to judge the trustee of being trustworthy.161

According to the authors the most important and constantly reappearing characteris-162

tics are ability, benevolence and integrity (Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995: 717).163

Likewise, Levi and Stoker (2000: 476) define trustworthiness as attributes that might164

be possessed by a trustee B. First, “a commitment to act in the interests of the truster165

because of moral values that emphasize promise keeping, caring about the truster, in-166

centive compatibility, or some combination of all three” and second, “competence in167

the domain over which trust is being given” (Levi and Stoker 2000: 476). Similarly,168

in their study McKnight and Chervany (1996) outline four beliefs that seem important169

and connected to a ’willing and able’ definition of trustworthiness. ”[I]f one is consis-170

13Benjamin Franklin’s statement seems to support this idea: “[I]n this world nothing can be saidto be certain, except death and taxes” (Franklin 1907: 69).

14Recent research investigates cognitive development and learning under the notion of the proba-bilistic mind (see Sanders 2011). This research shows that children learn in ways that are well describedby probabilistic models (Gopnik 2012: 1626). Akin to this research the notion of subjective probability,i.e., a Bayesian view of trust seems useful in conceptualizing the evolution of trust judgments.

15In general, direct definitions of trustworthiness are scarce. For exceptions see Rotter and Stein(1971), Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) and Dasgupta (1988: 53).

5

tently (predictably) proven to be willing (benevolent) and able (competent) to serve the171

trustor’s interests in an (honest) manner, then one is worthy of trust indeed” (McK-172

night and Chervany 1996: 34-35). In the same way, Hardin (2002: 28-29) discusses173

factors that may generally raise the probability that we live up to our commitments,174

namely three categories of reasons that make people trustworthy - internal inducements,175

i.e., dispositions to be trustworthy, external inducements such as legal institutions that176

incentivize people to be trustworthy but also a mixture of internal and external in-177

ducements such as norms that are both internalized but also externally sanctioned.178

Also, Bacharach and Gambetta (2001: 153) discuss different properties that can make179

a trustee trustworthy such as general moral principles supporting altruistic behavior,180

context-specific norms, individual character traits, evolved or cultural dispositions or181

a trustee’s susceptibility to possible rewards and punishments. Also Rotter and Stein182

(1971: 335) seem to embrace the idea of trustworthiness as a probability as he writes:183

“[T]rust and trustworthiness are closely related. The less trusting an individual, the184

more he is likely to lie or to deceive others”, i.e., to be untrustworthy. Hence, although185

not explicitly stated the idea of trustworthiness as a probability seems to be implicit186

behind many elaborations, namely in that the different attributes of trustworthiness187

described above may raise the the probability that an actor behaves trustworthy.188

Nonetheless, these ideas should be formalized somewhat more. Fundamentally, a single189

trustee B can behave trustworthy or untrustworthy, i.e., be trustworthy or not (e.g.,190

keep a secret to himself vs. not keeping it to himself). Thus, trustworthiness is a191

binary phenomenon (Ermisch and Gambetta 2006: 8). Consequently, trustworthiness192

can be understood as a probability for the following reasons. If a trustee acts once and193

he behaves trustworthy his trustworthiness is 1 vs. 0 if he behaves trustworthy. If he194

acts 3 times and twice displays trustworthy behavior and once untrustworthy behavior,195

that trustee’s trustworthiness is 0.66. If a group of individuals acts once, we also get196

a probability which is 0.5 if 50% of the group members displayed trustworthy behavior197

and 50% didn’t. If the members of this group act several times we also end up with198

a probability. For instance, if 100 group members act 10 times and 450 of the sum of199

1000 actions correspond to untrustworthy behavior the trustworthiness of this group is200

0.45%.201

Two complications are necessary. First, X may vary that is we might look at different202

behaviors. Hence, we may observe repeated acts of a single trustee or a trustee group203

regarding different behaviors, e.g. betray secrets, keeping borrowed items etc. - but204

then we also simply get a probability across different Xs.205

Second, as mentioned above (see Figure1) we have to introduce a temporal notion206

namely differentiating between past trustworthiness and future trustworthiness. The207

former is observable as behavior that has happened already. The latter can not be208

observed and measured. In contrast, to past trustworthiness that was basically de-209

6

scribed in the last paragraph, future trustworthiness can be conceived of as a Bayesian210

probability. However, in contrast to trust, future trustworthiness is the probability we211

would estimate if we had all information necessary to arrive at a perfect judgment as212

opposed to the imperfect subjective judgment of some truster with limited information.213

Clearly, we can only measure past trustworthiness empirically, but we certainly can try214

to predict future trustworthiness.215

Fourth, trust and trustworthiness are generally linked to behavior that has a positive216

value for the truster (e.g. neighbor returning borrowed money; friend keeping a secret;217

car not breaking down). In other words, trust and trustworthiness rest on the premise218

that A has a preference with regard to behavior X. A prefers that B displays a behavior219

XT rather than behavior X¬T . XT then is the trustworthy behavior. Adding this220

assumption differentiates the concept of trust from simple expectations. This idea is221

reflected in many accounts of trust and trustworthiness. Mostly, because authors refer222

to the fact that trust and trustworthiness are related to the interest of the truster (see,223

e.g. Hardin 2002; Levi and Stoker 2000; McKnight and Chervany 1996 etc.). Others224

do so more implicitly in that they restrict the behavior of the respective relationships225

to behavior that is against the interest of the truster. For instance, Rotter and Stein226

(1971) refer to lying or deceiving to others.16227

Fifth, trust and trustworthiness are at stake in all sorts of relations and scholars differ228

in the restrictiveness with regard to the trusters (As), trustees (Bs) and behaviors (Xs)229

they investigate in their research. Certain authors provide a more specific description230

of the behavior.17 For instance, (Rotter 1967: 651) defined interpersonal trust as “an231

expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word, promise, verbal or written232

statement of another individual or group can be relied upon”. This conception restricts233

X to “keeping a promise”. In another work, Rotter and Stein (1971: 651) provide a234

conception of trustworthiness that is akin to Rotter’s definition of interpersonal trust235

namely trustworthiness as truthfulness. This conception is narrow in that it restricts236

the behavior in the relation to truth-telling.237

However, an applicable and general conception should be flexible enough to encompass a238

wide variety of behaviors as well as non-human trustees. In other words, the extension,239

the cases, i.e., relations to which a useful conception of trust and trustworthiness should240

apply must be sufficiently big. Trusters daily make myriads of trust judgments (=241

16Is it important that the trustee is aware of the truster’s preference? In my view it is not important.Moreover, there are many factors that cause a trustee to act according to the truster’s preference suchas norms, sanctioning authorities as discussed in section 4.

17Researchers investigated trust of individuals in general, but also more specific groups such aspatients, criminals, taxi drivers etc. Similarly, trustees in empirical research reach from others ingeneral to more specific trustees such as the police, family members, friends etc. Finally, researchersinvestigated specific behavior such as lying etc.

7

probability estimations) regarding different trustees and different behaviors. These242

judgments are reflected by the trustworthiness of myriads of trustees and behaviors.243

Again, a conception should be flexible enough to describe myriads of relations in which244

trust and trustworthiness are at stake. This can be achieved by keeping the abstract245

placeholders ABX and replacing them with specific content depending on our research.246

For the social sciences we can generally agree that A should encompass single individual247

human beings or groups of humans. B, in turn, should be a placeholder that can be248

filled with different objects, certainly single individuals and groups of individuals (e.g.249

a government), but also with physical objects (e.g. a die, a car, a plane) or institutions250

(e.g. a certain law, democracy as a set of institutions, the legal system).18 X, in turn,251

may refer to behavior of different sort, such as “does not steal my bike”, “serves well252

in protecting the civic rights” and “won’t crash”. This flexibility is useful as long as253

researchers clearly state the substance of the elements ABX of the cases they investigate.254

If we investigate relations between humans, we should clarify that both trusters and255

trustees are humans in our research. If, we use the conception presented above and256

simply specify the respective substance for the single elements we make these choices257

explicit.258

To sum up, relations (of trust and trustworthiness) can be described by three elements259

and concern behavior to which a preference by the truster A is attached. Both concepts260

designate probabilities : In the case of trust a subjective probability, in the case of trust-261

worthiness probability as both the “perfect” estimation regarding future trustworthy262

behavior as well as the frequency of past trustworthy behavior (temporal dimension).263

Besides, a useful conception should be flexible enough as to encompass all sorts of264

cases, i.e., have a broad extension. These characteristics may be used to derive a unified265

conception:266

Trust PA is truster A’s subjective estimation of the probabil-267

ity that trustee B displays behavior XT preferred by truster A268

(rather than X¬T ). Future trustworthiness PBfutureis the perfect269

estimation of the probability that trustee B displays behavior XT ,270

whereas past trustworthiness PBpast is the frequency of past trust-271

worthy behavior XT by trustee B.272

Both PA and PB potentially depend on all three elements of the relation (ABX) and, as273

probabilities, PA and PB may take on values from 0 to 1. Moreover, PA is not necessarily274

related to PB since A may over- or underestimate B’s trustworthiness with regard to275

18This conception differs from that of Hardin (2002) who clearly excludes “abstract” trustees suchas the government, in his encapsulated interest view of trust. In contrast, I suggest trust and trust-worthiness should be conceptualized without this restriction.

8

X. Besides, trust is a property of truster A whereas trustworthiness is a property of276

trustee B (Levi and Stoker 2000).277

3 Extension: The choice of A, B and X278

We have to restrict ourselves to certain cases both when we try to measure trust and279

trustworthiness but also when we investigate levels as well as search for causes or280

consequences of these phenomena. Naturally, we choose a subset of all possible cases281

by specifying ABX and choosing categories that are more or less expansive in other282

words that encompass the universe of all possible As, Bs, Xs or just a small subset of283

them. The number of cases we are looking at, depends on this choice.284

More importantly, this choice comes with a trade-off. On the one hand we may be285

interested in the very specific case of two persons. For instance, we may be interested286

in the case of Peter (=A) who has a certain level of trust in John (=B) to return 20 euros287

that he borrowed him (= XT ). We could come up with a specific explanation of what288

affects Peter’s trust PA or Johns’s trustworthiness PB in this specific case. For instance,289

John might be rich which may result in high levels of trust and trustworthiness. John290

can easily return the money and Peter knows that. If John would be in financial trouble291

or the amount of money would equal 50000 $ we would expect PA and PB to change.292

Regarding this very specific relationship, we may arrive at a very precise estimation of293

PA and PB , may easily identify the causes for the respective levels of PA and PB and294

may well predict the consequences of low levels of PA and PB, e.g. Peter doesn’t give295

John the money in the first place, and if he does, John likely will fail to return it.296

As social scientists we are normally interested in finding regularities across a large297

number of cases. Hence, we will not restrict the universe of cases to Peter’s trust298

relation with his brother John that concerns borrowing a certain amount of money.299

Rather we would try to measure levels of PA and PB across a large number of cases and300

try to find causes and consequences of levels PA and PB for a large number of them.301

The choice of A and B depends on the social system we study. Some researchers are only302

interested in subsets of the “world”. For instance, if a researcher is interested in trust303

and trustworthiness within companies (and not societies) than automatically the cases304

he investigates are reduced, i.e., A and B are restricted to people within companies.305

Another researcher might be interested in all individuals of a country. Here, A and B306

encompass much more cases. A could be any individual in that country, B could be307

any other individual in that country. Clearly there is a trade off : The fewer cases are308

subsumed under the chosen categories for ABX, the more precise our theories, i.e., the309

theoretical connections between PA, PB and other phenomena will be.310

9

The choice of X depends on the following question: For which X would low trust PA311

and low trustworthiness PB impede cooperative relations or cooperative behavior, i.e.,312

entail high costs for the respective social system. In short, our choice depends on the313

relevance of the respective behaviors for the system we study.19 For instance, when we314

study companies we may probably come up with behavior such as knowledge-sharing315

(see Mooradian, Renzl and Matzler 2006) that we deem absolutely relevant for a well-316

functioning of a company.20 When we study societies we may come up with many Xs317

and even have to subsume them under a more general category such as “stealing my318

property”.319

To sum up, when studying trust and trustworthiness we should follow the advice of320

Barber (1983: 17) and “always specify the social relationship or social system of refer-321

ence” that is we should make explicit who the trusters and trustees are we are interested322

in, e.g. members of societies, families or companies. This choice already restricts the323

trusters A and the trustees B we are theorizing about and among which we try to mea-324

sure trust and trustworthiness. Subsequently, we have to reason which behaviors are325

relevant in that system.21 If we are interested in the role of trust and trustworthiness326

across societies, which seems to be the case for many comparativists working empiri-327

cally, we have to think about which trust judgments are important in individuals’ daily328

lives and in what respect trustworthiness regarding these judgments is important.329

330

4 Specifying causes of trust and trustworthiness331

In general, one should not confuse trust and trustworthiness (PA and PB) with their332

causes and consequences. In what concerns the causes of trust and trustworthiness333

among humans, we should rely on a simple categorization.334

To start, both trust judgments PA as well as the probability of trustworthy behavior PB335

19Luhmann (2000: 103) emphasizes the importance of trust for different systems: “A system -economic, legal, or political - requires trust as an input condition. Without trust it cannot stimulatesupportive activities in situations of uncertainty or risk”.

20Among scientists it is important that one scientist can trust the other not to steal his idea. IfPA is low, A won’t share his ideas. Costs arise because B may have given A good advice on how torealize this idea. Gambetta and Hamill (2005) studies trust of taxi drivers in clients. If PA is low ataxi driver won’t pick a customer and the customer won’t get home.

21Naturally, when it comes to empirical measurement we might as well seek an indicator thatmeasures, i.e., predicts a person’s trust or trustworthiness regarding many Bs and Xs.

10

depend on considerations (C). Different levels of trust and trustworthiness are caused336

by individuals’ considerations.22337

First, trust is a cognitive judgment (a probability estimation) that rests on considera-338

tions CA. CA represent those beliefs, knowledge, memories that A relies on to estimate339

the probability of B with regard to XT . These considerations CA do not belong to340

the concept of trust itself but should rather be seen as causal elements that explain341

variance in probabilities estimated by different trusters. CA is related to ABX in that342

different trusters A potentially rely on different CAs that also vary as a function of B343

and X. To give an example: Some As may focus on the moral values that they think B344

possesses whereas other As may rather consider the potential sanctions that B might345

be subject of when they judge the trustworthiness of others. But we may also find that346

most trusters rely on similar CAs.2324347

Second, trustworthiness is the actual probability that B will do (or has done) XT and348

not A’s estimation. It is an attribute of B not of A. There are, again, considerations CB349

that should influence this probability. One can theorize about the beliefs and knowl-350

edge CB that influence B’s trustworthiness. For instance, B may be very trustworthy351

because s(he) considers the potential punishment of untrustworthy behavior through352

the well-functioning law system with regard to a certain X and truster A.25.353

Most research centers on the impact of factors F that are external to trusters and354

trustees.26 For instance, we could investigate the effect of police density on certain355

cases and the corresponding probabilities. However, it is essential that in making the356

theoretical connection between these external factors F and PA or PB we take the route357

- at least in our theoretical reasoning but ideally also in our empirical tests - over the358

considerations C that individuals might have. We may reason which considerations359

these factors F trigger which in turn influence trust and trustworthiness. For instance,360

we could argue that a well-functioning law system F will affect the consideration CBs of361

humans living under this law system in that it increases the knowledge and consideration362

22For instance, Levi and Stoker (2000: 499) emphasize that when investigating trust we shouldfocus on the “kinds of considerations that may enter into judgments of trustworthiness, and hence,trust”.

23Hardin (2002: 9) outlines the importance of the behavior X for the trust judgment: “I mighttrust you with respect to X but not with respect to ten times X“. Similarly, if B is replaced by “closefamily member“ or “close friends“ trust should be higher than if it is replaced with “stranger in thestreet“.

24A may fail in arriving at a realistic estimate of B’s trustworthiness. Some trusters may constantlyunderestimate the trustworthiness of different trustees because their mental considerations are largelyfed by sensationalistic media reports on crime and betrayal.

25We are theorizing about humans here. For relations in which B is not represented by persons onecan simply replace CB by certain attributes that this object might have

26One should not mix up the differentiation I make here with Hardin (2002)’s differentiation betweenexternal, internal and mixed motivations of trustworthiness.

11

of potential punishment. On average this might lead to an increase of PB for cases for363

which the law system assures punishment of untrustworthy behavior.364

In sum, we should follow a basic distinction between factors F that influence trust and365

trustworthiness and the considerations C that mediate the effects of F on PA and PB366

(F → C → PA/PB). By specifying the respective elements in our theories we may367

arrive at clear arguments how certain external factors (e.g. the law system) raise or368

reduce PA and PB. Again, one has to point to a “trade off” mentioned before: The369

fewer cases are subsumed under the chosen categories for ABX, the more precise our370

theories, i.e., the theoretical connections between PA, PB, C and F will probably be.371

In contrast, the more cases our conception encompasses the more blurry our theories372

will be. Besides, it is logical that our theories concerning causes and consequences of373

trust and trustworthiness need somehow to be adapted to the cases that we defined374

before in other words the law system is only relevant for certain cases. Depending on375

the substance we choose for ABX, the causes and consequences of the probabilities we376

focus on may differ dramatically.377

5 Some clarifications regarding other concepts378

The here derived conception of trust and trustworthiness can be used to clarify some379

fundamental misunderstandings.380

First, the above understanding establishes that trust is a cognitive judgment and no381

behavior. Hardin (2002: 58) regards this position as “trivially evident”, however, re-382

searchers often mix cognitive judgments and ensuing behavior in their theories and383

definitions.27 In that it is helpful to make the terminological differentiation between384

“trust” and “trusting behavior” (Barr 2003) that may result from a certain level of385

trust. Consequently, trusting behavior, e.g. A lending 20 euros to B - may be a conse-386

quence of a certain level of trust, i.e., the subjective probability the truster estimates387

(e.g. PA > 0.7).28 In contrast, trustworthiness designates the probability of trustworthy388

behavior.389

Since trust is an expectation about future behavior it is not necessary that some ex-390

change or action took place. The same is true for trustworthinessfuture since it refers391

to the perfect estimation of the probability of future trustworthy behavior. However,392

trustworthinesspast refers to behavior that has happened in the past. Hence, trust and393

27For further information on this distinction we refer to the corresponding clarifications in his book(Hardin 2002: 58-60).

28I should be noted that high trust could also lead individuals not to behave in certain ways, e.g.not to engage in monitoring other individuals and try to control them.

12

trustworthinessfuture can easily be differentiated from the concept of cooperation (cf.394

Herreros and Criado 2008: 55). In the case of past trustworthiness this is more difficult.395

Second, we should treat trust and confidence as synonyms as many authors are doing396

already. However, we should probably use the former term since there is some disagree-397

ment in the literature. For instance, following Luhmann (1988: 97) and Deutsch (1960:398

124) one can sensibly argue that the term confidence represents a narrower understand-399

ing of trust, namely the case where the trust judgment exceeds a certain threshold in400

the positive direction (e.g. PA ≥ 0.7). Confident individuals are individuals with a high401

level of trust. Luhmann writes: “The distinction between confidence and trust thus402

depends on perception and attribution. If you do not consider alternatives [...], you are403

in a situation of confidence” (Luhmann 1988: 97) Clearer are the words by Deutsch404

(1960: 124) who describes confidence as “the individual’s assumption that the event405

he desires rather than the event he fears will occur”. However, when we speak of “low406

confidence” and “high confidence” it seems to increase the concepts similarity to trust.407

Again, to simply avoid these conceptual pitfalls we should stick to the term trust.408

Third, it doesn’t make sense to treat trust and mistrust/distrust as two distinctive409

concepts (for other positions see, e.g. Hardin 2002: 89, Lewicki and Brinsfield 2012).410

Similarly to Gambetta (1988), I suggest to treat mistrust as synonym for trust, only411

that the scale is reversed. Hence, PA = 0.9 that B behaves in a way preferred by A412

represents a high level of trust and at the same time a low level of mistrust. For in-413

stance, if we ask “How high is the probability that the government will spend your tax414

money in a meaningful way” than the lower the estimated probability the higher the415

level of mistrust and the lower the level of trust.29. If the probability is low we would416

expect individuals to behave in ways that suspicious individuals do. For instance, A417

will probably not borrow B any money if he is assumes that B will likely not return418

the money. The question whether trust and mistrust represent two different concepts419

was discussed earlier. Wrightsman and Wuescher (1974) and Lagace and Gassenheimer420

(1989) argued that mistrust and trust are two distinct constructs. However, construct-421

ing multiple scales to measure both trust and mistrust Omodei and McLennan (2000)422

find that one “trust scale” underlies these items. Luhmann (1980) regards distrust both423

as the opposite and as a functional equivalent of trust (Barber 1983: 21). In sum, it424

seems to make sense to measure trust and mistrust on one single scale.425

Fourth, we may define a term more precisely that is constantly reappearing in the426

literature, namely trust radius (see, e.g.Delhey, Newton and Welzel 2011, Freitag and427

Traunmuller 2009, Fukuyama 2001, Harrison 1985: 7-8, Harriss 2003, Realo, Allik428

and Greenfield 2008, Reeskens 2012,Sztompka 1999: 42, Welch, Sikkink and Loveland429

29We could also reformulate this statement so that it is the low probability that is preferred by A.Then, the higher estimated probability the higher the level of mistrust.

13

2007). Fukuyama (2001: 8) defines it as follow: “[a]ll groups [...] have a certain radius430

of trust, that is, the circle of people among whom co-operative norms are operative”.431

Fukuyama’s conception is a useful starting point since it calls attention to the fact that432

the trust radius is somewhat related to the number of people. However, the author433

defines “trust radius” recurring to another concept, namely, norms that could built a434

foundation for both trust and trustworthiness.435

Here I define the term departing from our conception. Mathematically, the radius436

describes the distance between the center of a circle (that would be truster A) and437

the circle line. The plane of the circle encompasses different Bs that display different438

distances (= radius) with regard to A. A certain trust radius simply implies that PA is439

the same for the Bs that are located within this circle. Hence, if A has a certain trust440

radius it means that he does not estimate different probabilities for Bs that lie within441

the respective circle defined by the radius (for the same X nota bene). Logically, we then442

have to specify what “distance” we are talking of. This task is left to researchers using443

the term. For instance, Putnam (2000: 466) outlines that trust with a short radius444

encompasses people close to the truster, whereas trust with a long radius encompasses445

people at greater social distance. However, the often used term social distance has446

been conceived in different ways as is discussed by Karakayali (2009). Accordingly,447

researchers relying on the term “trust radius” have to come up with clear definitions448

of “distance” or “social distance” respectively rather than working with a vague or no449

definition of the term.450

Fifth, trust and trustworthiness are complementary to risk. Corresponding to the two451

concepts there are two types of risk that are simply the complementary probabilities452

of PA and PB respectively. RA = 1 − PA is the subjective risk of the truster A. When453

I have a high level of trust in someone to, e.g. bring me back a purse that I lost (e.g.454

PA = 0.9), then I estimate the risk that he does not bring back my purse as very low (e.g.455

RA = 1 − PA = 0.1). They same is true for trustworthiness. RBfuture= 1 − PBfuture

is the456

“objective” true risk complementary to the best estimation that someone will behave457

trustworthy if we had all necessary information. RBpast = 1−PBpast is the past risk that458

we can simply calculate observing past trustworthy or untrustworthy behavior.459

6 Measuring trust and trustworthiness460

Naturally, the multitude and vagueness of definitions of trust and trustworthiness did461

not lead to a common way of measuring the two concepts. Most empirical studies are462

characterized by a gap between definition and measurement. This concept-measurement463

misfit has also lead to a misfit between theories and the empirical data they are tested464

14

with. There is a dichotomy between survey research that relies on various survey ques-465

tions to measure trust (and sometimes trustworthiness) and experimental research, i.e.,466

laboratory experiments in which both concepts are measured by observing participants467

behavior. As argued above our conception can be used to describe a potentially infinite468

number of real cases. In our empirical investigations we have to make sure we capture469

those As, Bs and Xs we are interested in. The methods used also set boundaries on470

the As, Bs and Xs we are able to study. For instance, most experimental research471

investigates student populations and monetary exchanges.472

6.1 Measurement in lab experiments473

Trust has long been investigated in experimental research, often by playing the classical474

trust game coined by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) or modified versions.3031 The475

general structure of the trust game in experiments (TGE) is the following: Truster476

A is given a certain amount of money. A then chooses to send all, some, or non of477

this amount of money to the trustee (recipient) which is called the “amount sent”. The478

“amount sent” is multiplied by some factor and received by trustee B. A keeps the rest to479

himself. B, the recipient, chooses to send all, some, or none of the received money back480

to the sender which is called the “the amount returned”(see, e.g. Ashraf, Bohnet and481

Piankov 2006: 197, Camerer 2003: 44, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995; Croson and482

Buchan 1999; Glaeser et al. 2000). Trust is simply equated with the “amount sent” and483

measured with the “average amount sent” across trusters, trustworthiness is equated484

with the “amount returned” and measured with the “average amount returned” across485

trustees. In other words, the more A sends the higher A’s trust, the more B returns486

the higher B’s trustworthiness.487

Researchers in this tradition sometimes refer to definitions (see, e.g. Berg, Dickhaut488

and McCabe 1995) but mostly simply outline that the classic trust game is played (see,489

e.g. Croson and Buchan 1999) or equate trust and trustworthiness with what they are490

measuring (see, e.g. Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2006: 197).491

Ermisch and Gambetta (2006) and Ermisch et al. (2009) convincingly criticize the492

classical version of the game and suggest to use a modified version. First, participants493

are given money to play in the game, hence, “they may not feel any sense of property”494

(Ermisch and Gambetta 2006: 6) which influences behavior and potentially leads to495

30See Camerer (2003) for a review of experimental research up to 2003; See Glaeser et al. (2000);Bellemare and Kroeger (2007) for applications, i.e., modifications of the classic game.

31Participants in these games have found to display irrationally high amounts of trust and trustwor-thiness which challenges the behavioral foundations of micro-economic theory (Ermisch and Gambetta2006: 3). See Johnson and Mislin (2011) for a meta-analysis of data based on the game suggested byBerg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).

15

an overestimation of trust. Second, the game generally does not reflect the essential496

elements in decisions about trusting or being trustworthy. Since trustees are not told497

that the game is about trustworthiness they may interpret the “amount send” as an498

act of unilateral generosity and perceive no obligation to return anything (Ermisch499

and Gambetta 2006: 8). Besides, it is up to the trustee to define which “amount500

returned” (e.g. half or the whole sum) reflects trustworthy behavior (Ermisch and501

Gambetta 2006: 9) which in turn also facilitates the intrusion of motives such as “gift502

giving” or “let’s be kind” (Ermisch and Gambetta 2006: 18). Moreover, in real life503

situations, trustworthiness is a binary phenomenon (Ermisch and Gambetta 2006: 8),504

either a trustee is trustworthy or not with regard to a specific expected behavior. Third,505

experiments should mirror trust situations in real life (Ermisch and Gambetta 2006:506

11-12). Framing the game as a loan situation helps because participants encounter507

these situations in real life and know what behavior is expected in them (Ermisch and508

Gambetta 2006: 18). Fourth, the classical trust game is designed in such a way that509

reciprocity or fairness will be the main factors influencing trustworthiness. Rational510

self-interested individuals will (or should) not behave trustworthy. Hence, this design511

does not account for the factors, e.g. sanctions, that might be the most important ones512

in real life(Ermisch and Gambetta 2006: 12, 13).32. Ermisch and Gambetta (2006: 11)513

conclude that “to call the standard form of TGE a trust game is a misnomer” and,514

suggest a game with modified rules that reflect their criticism.515

In how fare can we relate the here defended conception of trust and trustworthiness516

to measurement in experiments? First, lab experiments do measure trustworthiness517

defined as the probability of behavior given that the trust game is binary (see above).518

However, regarding trust they measure it indirectly since they measure behavior that519

may result from a certain level of trust, i.e., A will send money when PA is high. This520

distinction is obvious if one uses the terms “trusting behavior” (Barr 2003) or “behav-521

iorally exhibited trust [and trustworthiness]” (Fehr et al. 2002) as some experimental522

researchers do.523

Indeed, following our conception one could measure trust quite simply in experiments524

namely by querying participants PA before letting them act in the experiment (in other525

words measuring their subjective probability that B will behave as they prefer in the526

trust game). One way is to query expectations regarding the size of the “amount re-527

turned”.Fehr et al. (2002: 532) measure such an expectation in their experiments and528

find that this expectation predicts behavior (see Table 4 in their article). Better and529

more in line with our conception (since trustworthy behavior is binary) is to measure530

the expectation that the trustee will behave trustworthy in the binary trust game sug-531

32Different studies try to test factors such as control or sanctioning ability in experimental settings.See Buskens, Raub and van der Veer (2010) and van Miltenburg, Buskens and Raub (2012)

16

gested by Ermisch and Gambetta (2006). Actually, (Ermisch et al. 2009: 751) mention532

the “expectation that the trustee will do X, framed in terms of a probability” (Ermisch533

et al. 2009: 751) as one component that goes into the decision to trust, i.e., into trusting534

behavior and find that a “person’s expectation of the chances of return is strongly re-535

lated to their experimental trust decision” (see also Ermisch and Gambetta 2010: 370).536

These results seem to underline the value of using specific and precise survey questions537

to measure trust.538

Apart from that, some general criticism that also applies to the trust game of Ermisch539

et al. (2009) seems warranted. First, the meaning of trust and trustworthiness changes540

with the rules of the game. For instance, Glaeser et al. (2000) double the “amount sent”541

instead of tripling it as in the classic game by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995).33542

Fehr et al. (2002)use a very different game to measure trusting behavior. Ermisch et al.543

(2009) again suggest a game with different rules. As long as researchers do not agree on544

a common design (binary vs. non-binary, specific multiplier) it is impossible to compare545

results since the meaning of trust and trustworthiness changes. Here, I urge researchers546

to follow the suggestions of Ermisch et al. (2009).547

Second, these experiments are restrictive from a general point of view. On the one548

hand we may ask: What can we learn from theses experiments for monetary exchanges549

among humans in general? The more important question is: What can we learn for550

other cases of trust and trustworthiness that are not about exchanging money? The551

cases investigated in these experiments only represent a small number of ABX∞ with A552

and B most often restricted to student populations and X restricted to money exchanges.553

Before I argued that we should study those cases that we deem relevant for a certain554

social system. Pertaining to the classical problem of external validity, we may wonder if555

the X captured in these experiments is relevant for the social system we are interested556

in. The same is true for the populations we study whose observed behavior may not be557

representative of other populations (Henrich, Heine and Norenzayan 2010). In addition,558

it is huge challenge to design trust games that reflect and allow for testing the impact559

of the manifold real-life factors such as inequality, poverty, a functioning law system560

that impact trustworthiness and as a consequence trust in our societies.34 To sum up,561

33Trust and trustworthiness (PA and PB) should vary depending on the behavior (X) that is ex-pected of the trustee. As shown by Johnson and Mislin 2011 trust as measured in lab experimentsvaries with the amount of money that is at stake. Specifically, Johnson and Mislin (2011) show thattrustworthiness - the amount returned - is impacted by the amount by which the experimenter multi-plies the amount sent. Naturally, monetary returns are seldom varied in experiments (see, e.g. Ermischet al. 2009: 751), however, this is a necessary step to get more valid results.

34In this regard, Ermisch and Gambetta (2006: 11) write: ‘[P]eople may be fiercely competitive andself-interested when playing games precisely because they are games, but in life they may be payingtheir debts and respecting their matrimonial vows”

17

researchers should be aware of the above mentioned problems and greater intellectual562

effort should go into designing experiments that take them into account.563

6.2 Measurement in surveys564

Measurement in surveys equally faces compelling challenges. The quality of responses in565

surveys strongly depends on the respective questions (see, e.g. Oberski 2011; Saris and566

Gallhofer 2007; Schwarz 1999) and criticism regarding the standard survey questions567

for trust has risen in recent years.568

Trust has a long history of measurement in surveys with items tapping trust in different569

categories such as individuals, governments and so on. Rotter (1967) who investigated570

interpersonal trust can be regarded as one of the pioneers and, to my knowledge, was571

one of the first to develop a set of questions. Rotter (1967) departed from a clear572

definition and than proposed multiple items that in combination should be used to573

measure interpersonal trust. Today, studies in sociology and political science largely574

focus on the concept of generalized trust and are largely based on a single survey item575

(with slight variations): “[G]enerally speaking, would you say that most people can be576

trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”(ESS 2012)35 In the577

classical version respondents could indicate their answer on a 2-point scale answering578

“most people can be trusted” vs. “you can’t be to careful in dealing with people”.579

Nowadays, answer scales with more categories are used.36 Similarly, political trust has580

been investigated relying on different questions. Stokes (1962) who was interested in581

tapping basic evaluative orientations towards government, was the first to introduce582

survey questions measuring political trust known as the NES trust-in-government ques-583

tions (Levi and Stoker 2000: 476-477). These questions were then later followed by a584

variety of questions that were used to measure political trust and closely related con-585

cepts an overview of which is given by Citrin and Muste 1999. Most measures mirror586

the question: “[P]lease tell me on a score of 0-10 how much you personally trust each of587

the institutions I read out. 0 means you do not trust an institution at all, and 10 means588

you have complete trust” (ESS 2012). This item is somewhat similar to the generalized589

trust question, only that it queries trust in different institutions.590

Measurement of trust in surveys is problematic for the following reasons. A first mayor591

flaw is that all too often survey questions on trust do not seem to result from a clear592

35Evidence, on whether this question predicts trusting behavior in experiments is mixed (Capra,Lanier and Meer 2008; Ermisch et al. 2009; Glaeser et al. 2000; Fehr et al. 2002)

36In the European Social Survey 5 respondents answer on an 11-point scale: “Please tell me ona score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can’t be too careful and 10 means that most people can betrusted.”.

18

conception. This may also explain why most questions fail to acknowledge that the593

concept requires the specification of three elements - a truster, a trustee and some be-594

havior of the trustee. The amount of trust always also depends on the behavior X in595

the respective case. If we do not specify this behavior, respondents automatically fill596

in different specifications with regard to X while answering the question.37 A recent597

study by Hetherington and Husser (2012) in which the authors find strong interactions598

between political trust and issue salience, illustrates my point. The authors argue that599

people evaluate governmental trustworthiness according to certain issues, depending on600

the salience of these issues. When defense issues are salient people evaluate governmen-601

tal trustworthiness considering defense issues. This result clearly stems from the fact602

that no X is specified in the classical political trust questions. Querying respondents’603

trust in government with regard to a specific X, e.g. the creation of a successful defense604

policy, should solve this problem. Hardin (2002: 9) early on pointed out that the ex-605

pression “A trusts B” is elliptical, however, it seems as if this idea only slowly diffuses606

among the scholarly community.607

Second, besides forgetting the X many trust questions are too vague regarding the608

trustee B.38 For instance, the “most people” question is criticized because the category609

“most people” invites respondents to fill in their own individually varying specifications610

(Sturgis and Smith 2010; Miller and Mitamura 2003). In other words, it is not valid611

across individuals because it is too unspecific with regard to the Bs (the trustees). The612

same should be true for most political trust questions. Whereas the term “parliament”613

probably elicits similar considerations among different respondents (even this can be614

questioned), a term like “politicians” carries the danger of inviting different respondents615

to think of different persons. As a result, we may get different values not because of616

true differences in trust in politicians, but rather because of differences in respondents’617

question interpretation.39 In this regard, Dekker (2011: 15) shows that answers to618

questions querying trust in political institutions, seem to be based on a variety of very619

different opinions depending on the respondent. As a consequence, scholars try to find620

out what has been measured by the classic questions. For instance, in a recent article621

Delhey, Newton and Welzel (2011) investigate how the standard question measuring622

generalized trust (see above) is related to other questions measuring trust in in- and623

out-groups. The authors conclude that the “radius” of what respondents understand624

by “most people” varies across countries. Clearly, this problem is reinforced when com-625

paring respondents from different language backgrounds.626

How should we deal with these problems? In general, we should spend more time on627

37When asking the standard generalized trust question during a survey in Germany, I was confrontedwith a counter question: “Trust? With regard to what?”.

38Eventually, this problem also applies to X if we do specify it in questions.39This may also concern the term “trust”.

19

developing new and better questions that can be used in future surveys rather than628

spending to much time on trying to find out what has been measured by the classic629

questions.630

First, we need a clear conception of trust and subsequently questions that clearly repre-631

sent our definition of trust. The here presented conception should help in that it leads632

to a way of measuring trust. It requires to specify two elements (Bs and Xs) in survey633

questions rather than only B. Second, if we define trust as a subjective probability we634

should try to query a probability from the respondent either through an ordinal scale635

(very likely, fairly likely, not too likely, or not at all likely) or ideally through a continu-636

ous probability scale.40. Thereby we also avoid using the term “trust” in our questions637

which is good since “[o]rdinary-language usages of the term trust are manifold and ill638

articulated” and the term may has “many and varied meanings” in vernacular appli-639

cation Hardin (2002: Preface, XX). Unsurprisingly, it can be a challenge to translate640

“trust” into different languages. In contrast, the concept of probability seems to travel641

much better. In sum, we should ask respondents to indicate with what probability they642

expect certain trustees B to display certain behaviors X. In this regard it is encourag-643

ing that (Ermisch and Gambetta 2011: 760) find that a “person’s expectation of the644

chances of return is strongly related to their experimental trust decision” (see also Er-645

misch and Gambetta 2010: 370). See Bauer and Freitag 2013 for a first implementation646

of this idea in a normal survey.647

Second, more generally when relying on survey data we have to be concerned with mea-648

surement inequivalence both across individuals and groups of individuals. The more649

ambiguous and blurry the questions, the higher the danger that individuals system-650

atically vary in their trust and trustworthiness scores not because of true differences,651

but because the measurement instruments induce bias. When developing questions we652

have to make sure that the terms, i.e., the concepts that appear in these questions are653

interpreted equivalently by people belonging to different sub populations.41 As argued654

above, ridding trust questions from the term “trust” is one step. The concept of “prob-655

ability” reflects our conception and it is such a fundamental element of our lives that it656

should be understood across the globe and attenuate the problematic of measurement657

inequivalence.658

Measurement of trustworthiness in surveys is a challenge. Trust as a subjective proba-659

bility can be directly queried. In the case of trustworthiness we may query respondents660

about their behavior, but clearly, that is an indirect measure in that we do not observe661

40Clinton and Manski (2002) discuss the use of probability scales in survey questions.41For instance, the term “family” probably encompasses more people in Arabic countries, than in

Western European countries which may render a trust in family question a cross-culturally invalidmeasure. The broader and the more vague the concepts in questions the higher potential measurementerror.

20

their behavior directly. Still, it is possible to confront respondents with situations of662

trustworthiness (with different As and Xs) in surveys and query whether they would663

or have behaved trustworthy in these situations (corresponding to trustworthinessfuture664

and trustworthinesspast). Subsequently, we may calculate the probability as frequency665

of trustworthy behavior across questions or across respondents.666

So far studies have measured trustworthiness rather indirectly or tried to measure at-667

tributes that should influence trustworthiness. Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe and Smith668

(2002) try to predict trustworthiness in the classic game of Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe669

(1995) using the Machiavellian scale42 which seems to work. Then there are survey ques-670

tions that measure “legal permissiveness”. Marien and Hooghe (2011) investigate the671

relationship between political trust and legal permissiveness. In the European Social672

Survey 1999 respondents are asked: “Please tell me for each of the following statements673

whether you think it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in be-674

tween, using this card.” with regard to aspects such as “cheating on tax if you have675

the chance”, “taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)” or676

“someone accepting a bribe in the course of their duties”. These indicators somehow677

seem to tap trustworthiness with regard to some cases. Another example is Bicchieri,678

Xiao and Muldoon (2011: 174) who measure a norm of reciprocity (also a norm of679

trusting) querying participants’ expectations about which behaviors, in the context of680

a trust game, bring about punishment by others.681

Nonetheless, as mentioned above we ideally would directly query respondents whether682

they would behave or have behaved trustworthy with regard to some B and some X (e.g.683

stolen a stranger’s bike; returned a stranger’s purse; kept a friend’s secret). (Ermisch684

and Gambetta 2011: 3) suggest that questions querying a person’s trustworthiness685

would not “for obvious reasons” yield credible answers, hence, the survey trust litera-686

ture is “inevitably silent on trustworthiness”. However, I do not share this pessimistic687

outlook. It should not be ruled that it is possible to get “truthful” answers to sensitive688

questions. To avoid getting biased answers respondents have to perceive that their an-689

swers are totally anonymous, i.e., that no one his able to identify them when they give690

true but potentially undesirable answers. Survey methodologists have long been work-691

ing on the problem of sensitive questions and continue to do so (see Nederhof 1985 for692

some strategies). Recent research on these methods yields promising results (see, e.g.693

Coutts and Jann 2011; Jann, Diekmann and Hoglinger 2013). Besides, online surveys694

represent the future of survey data collection and there is evidence that the problem695

of reporting sensitive information decreases with this mode of data collection (Joinson696

1999; Kreuter, Presser and Tourangeau 2008). Taking into account the drawbacks of697

42This scale goes back to Christie (1970) and was designed to measure “a test-taker’s tendencytoward Machiavellian behavior, in particular cynicism, a penchant for manipulativeness, and the beliefthat the end sanctifies the means” (Gunnthorsdottir, McCabe and Smith 2002: 54).

21

experimental research (in which social desirability may play a role, too), research on698

measuring trustworthiness in surveys should be pursued.699

700

7 Conclusion701

This study started by identifying three problems that pervade research on trust and702

trustworthiness. First, there are countless definitions of trust and trustworthiness and703

many of them are diffuse and blurry resulting in vague theories. Second, there is a704

misfit between definitions and measurement and as a consequence empirical tests of705

theories about trust and trustworthiness become futile. Third, the distinction between706

trust and trustworthiness is all to often blurred in scholarly work. These problems lead707

to the following research question: How should we define (i.e. what are) and how can708

we measure the concepts of trust and trustworthiness?709

Building on previous work by different scholars (see appendix for a comparison be-710

tween the presented conception and previous definitions) the following conception was711

derived: Trust is A’s subjective estimation of the probability that B displays behavior712

XT preferred by A rather than X¬T . Future trustworthiness is the “perfect estimation”713

of the probability that B displays behavior XT . Past trustworthiness is the frequency714

of past trustworthy behavior XT by B.715

The elements A, B, X in this conception are placeholders for manifold real life categories.716

It is a researcher’s task to specify what cases s(he) investigates by specifying these717

elements and replacing them with categories of appropriate specificity. This choice718

depends on a researcher’s assessment which Xs are the most relevant ones for the system719

s(he) investigates in that low trust and trustworthiness cause a decrease in cooperation,720

communication etc. Clearly, it is essential to differentiate between trust, behavior that721

may result of a certain level of trust and trustworthiness. In what regards causes of722

trust and trustworthiness it was argued that a basic distinction between factors external723

to the individual and considerations internal to the individual that might mediate the724

impact of these external factors should be made.725

The proposed conception has several advantages. It forces us to clarify what content726

we subsume under the different elements ABX. It forces us to be clear what cases727

we investigate, i.e., who the trusters and trustees are (e.g., members of a company, a728

family or a society) and what behaviors (Xs) we deem relevant in that system. When729

we theorize about the causes and consequences of trust and trustworthiness, it forces730

us to be exact and explicit. If we forward an explanation on differing trust levels731

among individuals we have to specify for which As, Bs and Xs this explanation is valid.732

22

Comparative research investigating the origins of generalized trust is mostly vary vague733

in this regard (see e.g. Hooghe et al. 2009). Finally, this conception allows us to734

organize and typologize research on trust and trustworthiness in a more systematic and735

meaningful way. To sum up, it seems as if the conception of trust and trustworthiness736

presented in this study could represent a useful starting point for future research.737

There is a long tradition of empirically measuring trust and trustworthiness both in738

experiments as well as in surveys. Here, it was argued that trust, defined as above is best739

measured using survey questions. However, these should be more specific than the usual740

standard questions that are used right now. Trust games measure trusting behavior, not741

trust. Trustworthiness, in turn, can both be measured with survey questions that query742

past or hypothetical future behavior as well as by observing behavior in experiments.743

Key draw backs in experimental research are the focus on monetary exchanges (X) and744

specific populations (B). Regarding the latter point, the studies by Fehr et al. (2002)745

and Ermisch et al. (2009) is groundbreaking. Key challenges for survey researchers lie746

in developing and using survey questions that were derived from a clear conception,747

and are more precise as to minimize measurement error and increase measurement748

equivalence. A first attempt can be found in Bauer and Freitag (2013). The fact749

that more precise questions predict trusting behavior in experiments is encouraging.750

Importantly, the “consensus” that attitudinal survey questions are poor predictors of751

behavior in trust games (Capra, Lanier and Meer 2008) seems wrong given that we752

simply have to ask the right questions. The use of survey question for measuring (past753

or future) trustworthiness is a field that needs further study, however, current research754

and results regarding methods to ask sensitive questions seem very encouraging.755

8 Appendix: Comparison with earlier definitions of756

trust and trustworthiness757

It is necessary to discuss differences between conceptions of trust and trustworthiness758

that have been forwarded earlier and the one presented here. As mentioned at the759

beginning definitions of trust and trustworthiness are numerous.43 The present defi-760

nitions were chosen after a thoroughgoing inquiry into the literature. It is impossible761

to discuss all definitions. For this reason I chose to resort to the criterion of citations.762

Those definitions were chosen that got by far most citations on Google Scholar (June763

2012). Earlier definitions comprise important elements used here, however, they are764

often different regarding other elements. The definitions are listed in Table 1 and the765

reader may jump between my discussion and the corresponding definitions using the766

43Table 1 (p.59) in the study of McKnight and Chervany (1996) nicely illustrates this fact.

23

links in the text. Additionally, I will discuss some sub concepts to the concept of trust767

that may be neatly organized referring to the here proposed formal statement and its768

corresponding elements.769

8.1 Definitions of trust770

Deutsch (1960) (see def.) made one of the earliest attempts to nail down the con-771

cept of trust. Deutsch (1960) does not define trust itself but rather what he terms a772

“trusting choice”. In addition, Deutsch (1960: 124) suggests in which situation one is773

likely to make this choice, namely “one trusts when one has much to lose or little to774

gain” and “one needs considerable confidence in a positive outcome to trust”. In other775

words, Deutsch (1960) conceptualizes trust as taking a decision, as behavior. However,776

Deutsch (1960) writes that confidence is needed to make a trusting choice. Thus, what777

Deutsch (1960) calls “trust choice” is not the same as the view defended here, however,778

when the author uses the term “considerable confidence” it is quite close to the under-779

standing proposed here in that PA needs to be of certain height to engage in trusting780

behavior.781

Barber (1983: 8) (see def.) outlines that trust describes various types of expectations782

that social actors have of one another in social relationships and social systems. The783

conception proposed here encompasses those expectations mentioned by Barber (1983).784

For instance, “I trust human life to survive” (Barber 1983: 9) can be fit in with our785

formal statement.44 In addition, Barber (1983: 16-17) emphasizes that referral to these786

expectations requires specifying the social relationship or social system of reference.787

Our formal definition automatically forces us to be explicit when it comes to the rela-788

tionships we are talking about.789

Baier (1986: 235) (see def.) provides the useful outline of the necessary three elements790

of a trust relation (truster-trustee-behavior). However, Baier also refers to “another’s791

possible but not expected ill will” in her trust definition. This is problematic since the792

definition already includes CA (A’s considerations) that should be kept apart from the793

concept of trust itself if we follow the ideas presented here. Besides, referring to “ill794

will” excludes situations in which external factors force others to behave untrustworthy795

regardless of their potentially benign intentions.796

The definition by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995: 712) (see def.) seems close to our797

definition. However, whereas PA mirrors the “expectation” mentioned in the definition,798

“willingness” seems like an additional variable on top of that expectation. Moreover,799

in contrast to the authors’ conception, PA may well be (to some extent) based on As800

44However, we defined above that to speak of trust the truster needs to have some preference withregard to Bs behavior. It is less clear whether this requirement is always met regarding the first typeof expectations mentioned by Barber (1983).

24

ability of controlling or monitoring B. This possibility should not be precluded by a801

definition of trust.802

The conception presented here is more general than that by Offe (1999: 47) (see def.)803

in that the trustee is not restricted to persons. One may even discuss a person’s trust804

in his/her car with our definition of trust. Besides, Offe’s referral to “well-being” is805

problematic because of the vagueness of the term. In my view it is better to use the806

here presented definition and clearly specify which X one is investigating.807

Sztompka (1999: 25)’s (see def.) definition differs because it combines both a trust808

judgment and a resulting behavior. As argued extensively trust should be differenti-809

ated from behavior that might be a consequence.810

Hardin (2002) (see def.) suggests what he terms the encapsulated-interest view of trust,811

namely “I trust you because I think it is in your interest to take my interests in the812

relevant matter seriously” (Hardin 2002: 2). Hence, trust involves expectations that813

are grounded in the trusted’s concern with the truster’s interest (Hardin 2002: 7).814

Hardin (2002: 52) points out that systematic analyses of trust that are grounded in815

other bases of trustworthiness (such as moral commitments, norms and bald commit-816

ments) would be useful, however, he focuses on encapsulated interest as the ground for817

trustworthiness and trust in his work. In my view it is precisely these other bases (and818

their consideration by trusters) that may play a role in many situations, hence, a sound819

definition of trust should not exclude them. Moreover, Hardin (2002: 153) emphasizes820

the importance of knowledge and of iterated interaction and that the trusted values821

the continuation of the relationship for his account of trust. Thus, he precludes the822

concept’s application to Bs in which these conditions are not met (e.g. governments).823

The here presented conception does not make this restriction.824

The trust definition of Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010)(see def.) differs from the one825

presented here in that it is a behavioral definition requiring that the truster acts. Like826

previous definitions it shuffles together trust (as defined here) and trusting behavior.827

Moreover, the authors outline that trust may vary from complete distrusting to “blind”828

trusting. This seems similar to the here proposed probability scale. However, the end-829

point of the scale - a subjective probability of 100% does not necessarily equate “blind”830

trusting since it may very well be based on rational considerations.831

To conclude, as argued in Section 2, many of these conceptions contain very useful832

facets. In building a new general conception of trust we can draw on the wealth of earlier833

conceptual work. Accordingly, the here presented conception has much in common834

with several of the definitions presented here, however, at the same time it also displays835

deviations with regard to many aspects as argued above.836

25

8.2 Sub concepts of trust837

In addition, to various definitions of trust a vast number of sub concepts have been pro-838

posed by different authors. These sub concepts were paralleled by debates surrounding839

the forms of trust. Departing from our formal conception what does it mean then, if840

we speak of different forms and dimensions of trust respectively? Basically, it means841

that individuals display different levels of trust depending on B and X. In other words842

dimensionality enters a trust judgment both with regard to the trustee (B) and the843

preferred behavior (X).45844

Actually, scholars have pointed out that we should differentiate between different sub845

concepts of trust. Newton (2001: 7) suggests: “[...] it makes little sense to use the846

term trust as a generic analytical concept, for there seems to be no such thing. We847

must stop talking about trust as if it were a single, indivisible entity, or part of a basic848

personality syndrome, and remember to qualify the term with a context-specific prefix849

- ’family trust’, ’social trust’, ’political trust’, ’neighborhood trust’.“850

Is that a useful advice? Certainly, we are free to speak of “family trust” if A and B851

include family members. However, the advantage of the here presented formal state-852

ment is that it allows for clearly specifying which cases one is interested in and which853

corresponding probabilities one would like to investigate. Hence, it is a conception that854

encompasses these different sub concepts. In other words, we can state the conception855

presented here and then simply make a clear statement what As, Bs and Cs we are856

talking about.857

To start, Rotter (1967: 651)’s definition (see def.) of interpersonal trust is comprised858

under the general conception of trust defended here, in that it restricts B (the trustees)859

to individuals or groups of individuals. In addition, Rotter’s definition is quite re-860

strictive with regard to the X. Social trust can normally be regarded as a synonym of861

interpersonal trust.862

Applying the formal statement reveals that the definition of moralistic trust (Uslaner863

2002: 18) (see def.) encompasses a trust judgment plus specific considerations that864

this judgment is based on. In that it mixes trust and the potential considerations that865

should impact the level of trust.866

Uslaner’s definitions of generalized trust (see Uslaner 2002: 26 and Uslaner 2008: 63)867

(see def.) are somewhat vague. “”Most people”46 might designate “a majority of people868

that is more than 50%”. Moreover, this definition does not specify the behavior of the869

relation. Several other authors have provided definitions of the same concept, in other870

45Although, one could also make an argument that variation in A may result in multi-dimensionality,e.g. speak of “naive trusters” or “mad trusters”. Moreover, one could speak of different forms of trustwhen the corresponding judgments are based on different Cs.

46Survey research has shown that respondents also interpret this question differently (Sturgis andSmith 2010).

26

words there is no common stance of what this concept really means (see, e.g. Stolle871

2002; Whiteley 2000; Bjornskov 2006 and many others). Common, to these definitions872

seems to be the idea that trustee B is an individual not known to the truster (Freitag873

and Bauer 2013: 26).874

A concept that is often regarded as the “opposite” of generalized trust is particularized875

trust that is defined as “[p]lacing faith only in our own kind” (Uslaner 2002: 28) (see876

def.). Unfortunately, again, this definition is vague since we do not know who/what is877

meant by “own kind”, i.e., which group characteristics it may designate and what the878

behavior of the respective trust relations is. Just as in the case of generalized trust,879

particularized trust has been defined in various ways. Mirroring generalized trust,880

definitions of particularized trust seem to hold that the Bs are individuals that are881

personally known to the truster (Freitag and Bauer 2013: 26).882

Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1994: 139) (see def.) coined two more sub concepts namely883

knowledge-based trust that “is limited to particular objects (people or organizations)884

[and] general trust [that] is a belief in the benevolence of human nature in general and885

thus is not limited to particular objects”. In other words, in the case of knowledge-886

based trust the Bs are specific and known to the truster. General trust, in contrast,887

is simply a belief. Regarding our conception we would say that general trust is not888

trust itself but rather a consideration that should influence manifold trust judgments889

regarding different Bs (= humans) and Xs.890

Two further sub concepts are thick trust (see def.) that refers to trust with a short ra-891

dius, encompassing only others who are close to the truster and thin trust which refers892

to trust with a long radius, encompassing people at a greater social distance from the893

truster (Putnam 2000: 466). As argued earlier these sub concepts are only useful if we894

clearly define the terms trust radius and social distance.47895

Whereas the above mentioned sub concepts can be attributed to the sphere of social896

trust, political trust is defined differently. The usual definition of political trust (see897

Hetherington and Husser 2012: 313) (see def.) is quite restrictive since it restricts B to898

“government”. However, political trust is also used for trust in other actors belonging899

to the political system. Moreover, it is difficult to operationalize because it requires900

measurement of normative expectations (that vary across individuals) and subsequently901

the performance evaluations.48 Again, political trust has also been defined in multiple902

ways. Here, I argue that political trust describes those relations in which A is an in-903

dividual, B is an actor in the political arena such as a government, a party etc. X is904

47There is also the concept of “naive” or “blind” trust (see, e.g. Offe 1999: 47, 57). Following thedescribed conception it would mean that individual’s subjective probability is high regardless of B, Xthat should impact the trust judgment because the individual doesn’t take these factors into account.

48See Seyd (2011) for an attempt to provide appropriate measurement that really reflects the defi-nition above.

27

often left unspecified but should be filled with “enacts good social policies” or “doesn’t905

waste tax money”.906

In sum, there not only many different definitions of trust, but also many definitions of907

sub concepts to the concept of trust. These sub concepts partly suffer from the same908

problem as trust, namely that often there is no generally accepted way of defining them.909

The formal conception presented here helps to organize these sub concepts. Certainly,910

we could go on and discuss more sub concepts. However, if we depart from the formal911

understanding defended here we can observe that most sub concepts simply specify one912

of the elements ABX more restrictively, for instance B as human individuals in social913

trust. This, however, can also be achieved if we use the here suggested formal statement914

as a definition and then describe the content of the single elements. This allows us to915

depart from a single general conception of trust. Finally, definitions that mix up the916

trust judgments and the different considerations on which the trust judgment may be917

based (or even external factors) are unhelpful. As mentioned before, internal considera-918

tions C or external factors F that might impact trust (and also trustworthiness) should919

be distinguished from the concepts themselves.920

921

8.3 Definitions of trustworthiness922

The concept of trustworthiness has received far less attention by scholars. At the same923

time trustworthiness potentially is the far more important resource in societies, a hid-924

den treasure that has yet to be seized and brought to the collective consciousness of925

social scientists. Corresponding to this imbalance in attention, the literature has seen926

many definitions of trust and few definitions of trustworthiness.927

Rotter and Stein (1971: 335) conceive trustworthiness as the likelihood of lying or de-928

ceiving others. This understanding is very close to our conception in that it refers to929

the probability of untrustworthy behavior, however, at the same time it restricts X to930

lying and deceiving others (see Section 2).931

The definition by Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010: 65) (see Table 1) is different in that932

a trustee B may be very well willing to display a certain behavior, however, unable to933

do so. Some of the “attributes of trustworthiness” that were mentioned above reveal934

this point. For instance, a trustee may be willing to act favorably towards a person935

A, however, fail to do so if he/she simply hasn’t the competence to do so (see Levi936

and Stoker 2000). In other words, some Bs may simply lack the competence to fulfill937

certain expectations by others. When we define trustworthiness in terms of PB (an938

objective probability) we take into account that there are certain attributes and also939

external factors that may trump the willingness to display trustworthy behavior and940

28

thus decrease PB. Accordingly, I would suggest that Ben-Ner’s definition rather refers941

to a concept of “willingness to behave trustworthy”.942

Dasgupta (1988: 53) argues that “[t]rustworthiness concentrates on a person’s overall943

disposition, his motivation, the extent to which he awards importance to his own hon-944

esty”. Hence, like numerous authors do implicitly (see Section 2) he defines the concept945

via - and shuffles the concept with - factors that should influence trustworthiness in my946

view.947

In some, the here defended conception of trustworthiness contrasts Rotter and Stein948

(1971) in that it is broader and X is not restricted to truthfulness, it contrasts the ear-949

lier mentioned discussion of attributes of trustworthiness (cp. Dasgupta 1988) in that950

it represents a direct definition of trustworthiness and it contrasts the direct definition951

by Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010) in that it describes the probability of B displaying952

X that may be influenced by a person’s willingness/motivation/disposition but is not953

equated with such. Attributes of the trustee (such as competence, benevolence etc.)954

may influence this probability. Accordingly, when trying to explain trustworthiness we955

may recur both to considerations C of the trustee (e.g., arguing that a trustee B has956

internalized a norm of reciprocity and thinks accordingly) but also to external factors957

F that may raise his/her trustworthiness.958

Table 1: Definitions of trust and trustworthiness

Deutsch 1960 (goback)

Deutsch (1960: 124) describes the essential features of a situation in whichan individual is confronted with “a choice to trust or not in the behavior ofanother person” namely that the “individual is confronted with an ambiguouspath, a path that can lead either to an event perceived to be beneficial [...] orto an event perceived to be harmful [...] If he chooses to take an ambiguouspath with such properties, I shall say that he makes a trusting choice; if hechooses not to take the path, he makes a distrustful choice.” Deutsch (1960:124) suggests in which situation one is likely to make this choice, namely “onetrusts when one has much to lose or little to gain” and “one needs considerableconfidence in a positive outcome to trust”.

Barber 1983 (goback)

Barber (1983: 8) outlines that trust describes various types of expectationsthat social actors have of one another in social relationships and social sys-tems and differentiates between a general one and two specific subtypes whosefulfillment/or not has various functional/dysfunctional consequences for the re-lationships and social systems in which actors are engaged. The most generalis trust as “expectation of the persistence and fulfillment of the natural and themoral social orders” followed by trust as the “expectation of technically com-petent role performance from those involved with us in social relationships andsystems” and finally trust as the “expectation that partners in interaction willcarry out their fiduciary obligations and responsibilities, that is, their duties incertain situations to place others’ interests before their own” (Barber 1983: 9).

Baier 1986 (goback)

Baier (1986: 235) asserts that “[t]rust [...] is accepted vulnerability to another’spossible but not expected ill will (or lack of good will) toward one”. ”Trust, Ihave claimed, is reliance on others’ competence and willingness to look after,rather than harm, things one cares about which are entrusted to their care.”Baier (1986: 259)

29

Gambetta 1988 (goback)

”trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective prob-ability with which an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents willperform a particular action, both before he can monitor such action (or inde-pendently of his capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context inwhich it affects his own action (see Dasgupta and Luhmann in particular, thisvolume).” (Gambetta 1988: 217) ”Firstly, it tells us that trust is better seenas a threshold point, located on a probabilistic distribution of more generalexpectations, which can take a number of values suspended between completedistrust (0) and complete trust (1), and which is centered around a mid-point(0.50) of uncertainty” (Gambetta 1988: 218) ”In conclusion, trusting a personmeans believing that when offered the chance, he or she is not likely to behavein a way that is damaging to us, and trust will typically be relevant when atleast one party is free to disappoint the other, free enough to avoid a risky re-lationship, and constrained enough to consider that relationship an attractiveoption.” (Gambetta 1988: 219)

Dasgupta 1988 (goback)

”’trust’ in the sense of correct expectations about the actions of other peoplethat have a bearing on one’s own choice of action when that action must bechosen before one can monitor the actions of those others.” Dasgupta (1988:51) ”In defining trust I have spoken of one’s expectations regarding others’choice of actions that have a bearing on one’s own choice of action.” Dasgupta(1988: 53)

Yamagishi and Ya-magishi 1994 (goback)

”Trust can thus be defined as a bias in the processing of imperfect informationabout the partner’s intentions. A trusting person is the one who overestimatesthe benignity of the partner’s intentions beyond the level warranted by theprudent assessment of the available information.” (Yamagishi and Yamagishi1994: 136)

Fukuyama 1995 (goback)

Fukuyama (1995: 26) defines trust as “the expectation that arises within acommunity of regular, honest, and cooperative behavior, based on commonlyshared norms, on the part of other members of the community”

Mayer, Davis andSchoorman 1995(go back)

Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995: 712) define trust as the “willingness of aparty to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expecta-tion that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor,irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party.”

Offe 1999 (go back) Offe (1999: 47) writes: “Trust is the belief concerning the action that is to beexpected from others. The belief refers to probabilities that (certain categoriesof) others will do certain things or refrain from doing certain things, which ineither case affects the well-being of the holder of the belief, as well as possiblythe well-being of others or a relevant collectivity”.

Sztompka 1999 (goback)

“Trust is a bet about the future contingent actions of others” Sztompka (1999:25); ”trust consists of two main components: beliefs and commitment” Sz-tompka (1999: 25); ”Trust is more than just contemplative consideration offuture possibilities. We must also face the future actively actively, by com-mitting ourselves to action [...] trust involves commitment through action”Sztompka (1999: 26)

30

Luhmann 1988 (goback)

”the problem of the function of trust, which is my primary interest (Luhmann1979), and which leads to a different approach to conceptual problems” (Luh-mann 1988: 95); ”trust is a solution for specific problems of risk” (Luhmann1988: 95); ”Both concepts [trust and confidence] refer to expectations whichmay lapse into disappointments.” (Luhmann 1988: 97); ”Trust, on the otherhand, requires a previous engagement on your part. It presupposes a situationof risk.” (Luhmann 1988: 97); ”If you choose one action in preference to oth-ers in spite of the possibility of being disappointed by the action of others, youdefine the situation as one of trust.” (Luhmann 1988: 97); ”Moreover, trustis only possible in a situation where the possible damage may be greater thanthe advantage you seek (Deutsch 1958; 1962: 302ff.).” (Luhmann 1988: 98);”Trust is only required if a bad outcome would make you regret your action”(Luhmann 1988: 98);

Hardin 2002 (goback)

”trust as encapsulated interest” (Hardin 2002: 1); “I trust you because I thinkit is in your interest to take my interests in the relevant matter seriously”(Hardin 2002: 1); ”incentive compatibility, while necessary, is not sufficient forthat account, which further requires that the trusted values the continuation ofthe relationship with the truster and has compatible interests at least in partfor this reason” (Hardin 2002: 5);

Ben-Ner and Hall-dorsson 2010 (goback)

”Trusting is the inclination of a person ”A” to believe that other persons ”B”who are involved with a certain action will cooperate for A’s benefit and willnot take advantage of A if an opportunity to do so arises. A - the trustor - musttherefore be willing to show his or her vulnerability by taking the risk that B -the trustee - may act in a way that does not benefit A. The concept of trustingrequires that the action hold the potential of a loss by the trustor; it doesnot require but is compatible with a potential gain and/or loss by the trustee.Trusting can vary from complete distrusting to complete or ’blind’ trusting.”Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010: 65); “Trustworthiness is the willingness of aperson B to act favorably towards a person A, when A has placed an implicit orexplicit demand or expectation for action on B. The implicit demand may entaila situation in which a child is drowning and B is expected to do something tosave the child, that B drive with care and stop at pedestrian crossing when Ais on the road, or that B reward an investment made by A, like in the trustgame.” Ben-Ner and Halldorsson (2010: 65-66)

Sub-concepts of trustRotter 1967 (goback)

“Interpersonal trust is defined here as an expectancy held by an individual or agroup that the word, promise, verbal or written statement of another individualor group can be relied upon” Rotter (1967: 651)

Uslaner 2002 (goback)

“Moralistic trust is the belief that others share your fundamental moral valuesand therefore should be treated as you would wish to be treated by them”Uslaner (2002: 18); “Generalized trust is the perception that most people arepart of your moral community” (Uslaner 2002: 26); “Placing faith only in ourown kind is particularized trust” (Uslaner 2002: 28)

Yamagishi and Ya-magishi 1994 (goback)

“Whereas knowledge-based trust is limited to particular objects (people ororganizations), general trust is a belief in the benevolence of human nature ingeneral and thus is not limited to particular objects” (Yamagishi and Yamagishi1994: 139)

31

Putnam 2000 (goback)

“Trust embedded in personal relations that are strong, frequent, and nested inwider networks is sometimes called “thick trust”. On the other hand, a thinnertrust in “the generalized other,” like your new acquaintance from the coffeeshop, also rests implicitly on some background of shared social networks andexpectations of reciprocity. Thin trust is even more useful than thick trust,because it extends the radius of trust beyond the roster of people whom we canknow personally”(Putnam 2000: 136)

Hetherington andHusser 2012 (goback)

“defining political trust as the ratio of people’s evaluation of government per-formance relative to their normative expectations of how government ought toperform” Hetherington and Husser (2012: 313)

32

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