clarke-1995-international journal of urban and regional research

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Institutional Logics and Local Economic

Development: A Comparative Analysis

of

Eight American Cities

SUSAN

E. CLARKE

Overview

Profound global economic transformations and attendant social changes are prompting

changes in local political arrangements. With the exception of a few large cities, these

political changes are as yet uncharted and the extent to which they signal disjunctures in

local democratic processes remains understudied. Indeed, although a vast political

economy literature documents urban change prior to

1990,

its main themes are now often

less relevant in explaining these local political changes (Ash, 1994).Through the

1980s

urban regime theory appeared well-suited to analysis

of

the impacts of changing economic

and political conditions on local political processes. Yet regime theory is silent on several

critical issues associated with recent political changes, particularly how to read the

diverse local institutional settings in which economic development decisions are made. In

part, these silences stem from unnecessarily narrow renditions of regime theory. To

continue to be useful, these analyses need to incorporate institutional change issues

associated with restructuring processes.

Drawing on new institutionalism approaches, this essay develops a schema for

characterizing the new institutional terrain for economic development policy-making in

American cities. This schema distinguishes among cities in terms of (1) the institutional

orders or logics involved in shaping development patterns and processes and (2) the

complexity of this local institutional setting. It delineates arenas permeated by the logics

of bureaucracy and democracy and those penetrated by the logic of capitalism and

corporate organization. It assesses institutional complexity in terms of the diffusion of

standardized policy elements across organizations. In both instances institutionalization is

conceptualized as a process, rather than a set of specific organizations. This directs the

analytic focus to the conditions under which shifts in institutional logics occur and the

conflicts and struggles associated with the politics of institutional change. Such mapping

of the local institutional terrain is a necessary step towards a more rigorous understanding

of the political transformations underway in a postindustrial, postfordist era.

*

This research was supported in part by the National Science Foundation and the Center

for

Public Policy

Research at the University of Colorado at Boulder. Laura Brunell provided invaluable research assistance in

conducting over 100 phone interviews with comm unity activists and in developing data analysis strategies. An

earlier version

of

this paper entitled Comparing Patterns

of

Local Political Change was presented at the

Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in 1992.

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514

Susan E. Clarke

Urban regime theory and institutional settings

Regime theories emphasize the mediation of structural constraints on local politics by

various political arrangements that allow coalitions to form and govern in local

communities (e.g. Elkin, 1980; 1985; 19 87; Stone, 1989; Stone e t a l . , 1991). This offers

a fruitful means of meshing concerns about structural constraints and contextual

variations. Most theories and notions of regime change centre on coalitions formed

around core business-government interests; broader-based coalitions are possible,

however, and recent comparative work explores the conditions under which different

coalitions emerge and persist (e.g. Stone

e t a l . ,

1991; Turner, 1992; Walton, 1990;

Clavel and Kleniewski, 1990).

There are drawbacks to limiting analysis to the composition of governing coalitions

(Horan, 1991; Elkin, 1987). W hile regime theories anticipate mo re autonomous state and

societal interests in econom ic development decision processes, they a re less clear on how

and when these interests matter (Kantor and Savitch, 1993). Thus, understanding the

dynamics of regime composition may be necessary but it is not sufficient for

understanding how ideas and interests are accommodated in local policy choices.

A

narrow focus on regime composition and the possible relationship between regime

composition and policy choices obscu res the important ways in which the overall structure

of the local institutional terrain affects the ability of groups to influence policy.

The policy effects of regime composition and institutional channels must be

distinguished analytically before we can understand their interactions. The

accommodation of interests in governing coalitions and in institutional arrangements are

two distinct processes; they can influence policy choices in independent but also

potentially overlapping paths. M ost regime studies, how ever, represen t the relationship of

regime composition and policy choice as relatively direct: more progressive policies are

associated with more inclusive governing coalitions (Stone, 1987; Elkin, 1987; Goetz,

1994; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Turner, 1992). But the preferences of som e governing

coalition members could be blunted by an institutional setting that is inimical to

democratic logics. Furthermore, provisions for designated representation in local

economic development institutions may provide channels for influencing policy even in

the absence of regime incorporation of these interests.

A

perspective encompassing both

regimes and institutions would anticipate local policy choices corresponding to interest

representation in these two aren as; to the extent that governing regimes a re inclusive and

democratic logics pervade these institutions, more progressive development policies are

possible. More restricted interest representation or less coherent institutional settings

would result in more eclectic policy agendas. To understand local economic development

policy choices increasingly requires cogn izance of interest representation in institutional

channels as well as in the dynamics of regime composition.

Regimes, interests and institutions

This is an especially important consideration in analyses of contemporary economic

development policy-making in American cities. The profusion of federal community and

economic development programmes since the 1960s has increased the complexity and

fragmentation of local institutional environments. Programmes from the US Department

of Housing and Urban Development, the Economic Development Administration and

other federal agencies prompted the formation of separate line agencies for economic

development and, more indirectly, the initiation of special authorities and quasi-public

developm ent corpo rations in many com munities. Equally importan t, they also introduced

designated interest representation processes as a complement to electoral interest

incorporation in redevelopment policy processes.

In

doing

so,

they shored up the

legitimacy

of

these processes by ensuring broad political representation in programmes

aimed at reorganizing the local employment base and land use patterns. Although these

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Institutional logics and local economic development

515

tended to b e project-specific representation strategies, they offered an a lternative means

of bringing marginalized voices to the table. In particular, designated representation can

overcome the lack of group resources and electoral clout that often precludes

representation in the electoral arena.

Until recently, the character of local regimes appeared to be strongly influenced by

these national programmes and resources (Fainstein and Fainstein,

1983;

Mollenkopf,

1983).

Most efforts to distinguish broad h istorical stages or phases in local redevelopment

politics characterize different periods in terms of regimes dominated by specific

configurations

of

interests and policy orientations (Fainstein and Fainstein, 1983; Elkin,

1985).

These variations distinguish regimes over time and across cities; since most

regime theory is based on postwar redevelopment experiences, regime change in the

1960s and 1970s in American cities is often implicitly attributed to federal resources

providing selective incentives for inclusion of minorities and neighbourhood groups.

But as cities rely increasingly on local resources fo r revitalization activities, they are

freed from this federal oversight on whether and how community interests will be

represented in redevelopment efforts. Although regime change is implicitly associated

with resource base changes in most extant models, they offer little guidance for

anticipating either the direction of ch ange in the scope of postfederal regime s o r the menu

of institutional options for accomm odating interests in local economic developm ent policy

decisions. It is unclear, for exam ple, w hether the withdrawal of external public resources

and pressures necessarily means a reversion to the dominance of core business/

government coalitions and a limited public voice. This is a tacit assumption in many

versions of urbzn regime theory but there is no systematic empirical test of this

relationship of resource base change , reg ime inclusiveness a nd local developm ent policy

choices. Some groups may be able to sustain representation even in the absence of

external mandates and resources while others face relative decline or are supplanted by

new interests. The consequent public voice is likely to be shaped by the different

institutional modes available, the bargaining advantages they provide (Kantor and

Savitch,

1993)

and the trade-offs they present to local groups. By influencing the goals

and strategies of state, market and societal interests, these institutional channels may yield

local developmen t choices that do not correspond directly o r obviously to the preferences

of governing regime members.

Inclusiveness and governing coalitions

Are there theoretical grounds for anticipating a

narrower scope of interest representation in the absence of external public resources?

Fainstein and Fainstein

(1983:287)

predict that the weakening ties between national and

local politics will mean greater local diversity and less patterned regularity in local

regimes. But given the political and economic context of Am erican cities, it is reasonable

to assume that most governing reg imes ar e likely to be dominated by core producer

interests controlling economic resources and public officials vested with the political

authority to govern (Stone,

1980).

Without external resources, the systemic bias is

towards narrow governing coalitions (Stone, 1980; Peterson, 198

1 .

However, overt

business resistance to an expanded coalition may not be the primary factor underlying this

trend . More limited coalitions may also emerg e due to the sheer difficulties of m obilizing

and organizing minority and neighbourhood interests and sustaining their participation.

And there is growing evidence that the withdrawal of federa l programm e fu nds has led to

increased conflict between m ayors and council mem bers ove r local developm ent roles and

priorities (Clarke and Gaile,

1992).

In this politicized setting, business interests may be

reluctant and elected leaders may be wary of building coalitions that may include these

broader conflicts and hamper effective action.

Stone

(1989)

argues, how ever, that local governing coalitions seek sufficient scope to

encompass and coordinate the groups necessary for generating enough cooperation to

carry out governance activities. His account of the emergence

of

a bi-racial governing

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516 Susan

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coalition in Atlanta underscores the strategic incorporation of groups controlling

resources seen as essential to governance. At one point, neighbourhood groups in Atlanta

were

on

the brink of assuming this strategic importance. Their failure to do

so

in Atlanta

(and in Pittsburgh) stemmed from their inability to achieve an overarching organizational

coherence as well as from cuts in federal neighbourhood programme funds that would

have supported their participation (Jezierski,

1990).

More inclusive representation may also emerge to the extent that economic

restructuring, recessions and demographic changes in cities bring about disarray within

dominant coalitions and political opportunities for expanded representation (Fainstein,

1987;

Skocpol,

1979).

Alliances with key groups such as planners, lawyers, and non-

profit making organizations may be more feasible under these conditions (Fainstein,

1987:328).

Past coalitional efforts of minorities and low income groups have depended

heavily on elite disarray and third-party alliances, albeit often supported with external

resources (Piven and Cloward, 1971

;

Mollenkopf, 1983).

Finally, communities have a history of cultural and social patterns of more or less

inclusive representation practices. Historical links between city governments,

neighbourhoods and local groups may forestall major changes in the scope of interest

representation even in the absence of federal funds. Walton confirms the importance of a

historical tradition of popular action and a network of community-based organizations in

fashioning more autonomous policies in response to restructuring pressures

(1990:251).

More recent policy history, particularly local variations in interest representation in the

Community Development Block Grant programme (Goetz, 1987) and Urban

Development Action Grant projects (Clarke,

1986;

Rich,

1992; 1993),

will also affect

potential shifts.

Interests and institutional channels

The growing importance of public

-

rivate partnerships and the move to off-budget

development organizations in American and European cities underscores the need to

extend any analysis of local development politics beyond governing regimes and electoral

arenas to encompass institutional settings. This shift of development decisions to quasi-

public organizations now renders electoral control much less meaningful than in other

policy areas. The trend toward two political arenas with different political bargaining

approaches, one where representation is determined by competitive processes and one

aimed at non-competitive, exclusive representation, is increasingly important. The latter

arena, crowded with public

-

rivate partnerships and local development corporations,

bypasses electoral competition and limits representation only to those groups with the

resources necessary to ensure sufficient cooperation. Thus the capture of state power

through electoral means may not be sufficient to influence development choices

if

the

institutional logic is corporate-based. From this perspective, the organizational and

institutional attributes of both the local state and capital are important factors in shaping

development policy orientations (Hall, 1987). The issue is not technical capacity per se

but the incentives for coherent and stable choices embedded in the institutional structure,

or the state apparatus itself, and the bargaining advantages this creates for different

interests (Kantor and Savitch, 1993).

Jezierski finds both electoral incorporation and corporatist theories necessary for this

expanded analytic scope. As she points out, incorporation models imply that if interests

can gain local-state power, they will automatically exert some influence within the

public-private partnerships (1990:219). The theoretical implication is that broad-based

electoral coalitions can influence local policy through majority decision rules. The

inclusiveness of interest representation rests on competitive electoral politics; the state is

not viewed as an entity with its own interests or strategic representation needs. By

contrast, corporatist theorists anticipate more inclusive institutional representation

corresponding to state interests, even in the absence of external pressure or resources. In

.

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the meso-corporatist version, state leaders designate organizations which reflect the

concerns of categories of interests, such as neighbourhoods or environmental groups

(Cawson, 1985), for incorporation into institutionalized economic policy-making

processes in order to reduce uncertainty and enhance implementation success (Schmitter,

1979). This echoes Stones argument o n strategic inclusion but centres on the institutional

arena; it emphasizes the ways in which designated representation in institutionalized

decision-making processes can fuse representation and control needs, two important

concerns in carrying out local economic development activities.

Uneven conceptualizations For analytic purposes, governing regimes and institutional

channels are addressed separately. There a re sufficient empirical grounds, howeve r, fo r

assuming that cities varied political responses to econom ic development deman ds can be

traced to the interactions of regime coalitions and institutional setting (Logan and

Swanstom, 1990; King and Pierre, 1990; Stone et al. , 1991; Turn er, 1990; Kantor and

Savitch, 1993; Clavel, 1983; Robinson, 1989). Our ability to make more persuasive

arguments linking regimes, institutions and policy choices, however, is hampered by

uneven conceptualizations of regime dynamics and the institutional setting. While there

are compelling, if not consistent, arguments about the dynamics of regime composition,

as noted above , there is less guidance in understanding local institutional settings . In most

studies, local institutions are treated as indicators of the capacity of the local state or

regime to control financial and bureaucratic resources and of the likely effectiveness of

the local state in reaching development policy goals and managing conflict

e . g .

DiGaetano and Klemanski,

1993; Kantor and Savitch, 1993). For example, many

accounts of the conditions under which cities choose progressive strategies rather than

compliant or corporate-centred strategies stress the importance of regime composition

and local political capacity (W alton, 1990; Go etz, 1990). But local political capacity is

rarely specified in a mean ingful way; more capacity tends to be associated with b etter,

i.e. more progressive decisions, but there is no reason to assume this would be the case

and there are no thresholds to determine when these conditions are met. Political

fragmentation arguments suffer similar flaws, although there is more systematic

evidence of the relationship between the multiple veto points and diverse decision rules

inherent in fragmentation, and the consequent policies exacerbating social and spatial

inequities (Bowman and Pagano, 1988; Weiher, 1991; Lewis, 1994). More precise

characterizations of policy intervention mechanisms can be suceptible to problems of

scale; categorizing policy intervention capacity in terms of centralAoca1 integration, fo r

example, obscures significant variations in local institutional settings within the less

integrated American system

(c f .

Kantor and Savitch, 1993).

In this focus on how institutional features affect the ability of regimes to get things

done, there is less attention to the interaction of interests and institutions in development

policy-making. Yet the institutions and routines of local economic development policy

arenas shape group preferences, available resources and potential interest representation

options. To focus primarily on this shaping proposition, however, results in a more

nuanced but essentially static analysis. Drawing on new institutionalism perspectives

redresses some of these shortcomings: it introduces the argument that local economic

development policy choices are contingent on the institutional logics and the degree of

coherence characterizing local institutional settings.

Restoring the institutional focus to the study

of

local political

change

The new institutionalism

is,

of course, not

so

new. (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Ostrom,

1990; North, 199 0; Zuckin and DiM aggio, 1990; DiM aggio and Pow ell, 1990). Nor is it

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518 Susan E. Clarke

an undifferentiated approach: the views of historical institutionalists and rational choice

institutionalists diverge significantly on questions of coalition formation and the effects of

institutions on goals and preferences (Thelen and Steinmo,

1992).

New institutionalism

approaches differ from earlier institutionalist perspectives in a number of important ways.

In Thelen and Steinmos

(1992)

account, the old institutionalism emphasized detailed

configurative studies of formal institutional structures. Comparative analysis proceeded

through a juxtaposition of these studies, with little theoretical orientation. In contrast,

historical institutionalists (Thelen and Seinmo,

1992)

view institutions in relational terms,

as they structure relations of power among contending groups. Institutions shape both the

strategies and the goals of political actors; they also contribute to political processes in

which a number of plausible and unexpected outcomes are possible. This perspective

centres on the social and political construction of goals, strategies and preferences rather

than a narrower focus on how the institutional context affects strategic calculations and

choices. New ideas and their articulation through institutional channels can change how

interests are perceived and thus affect which coalitions form and which do not

ibid.:9) .

As

Thelen and Steinmo put it, institutions constrain and refract politics but they are never

the sole cause of outcomes

(1992:3).

Restoring an institutional focus to the study of local politics can illuminate the search

for a new institutional fix which Peck and Tickell (1994) contend is characteristic of a

postfordist period.

It

is necessary to avoid reading off institutions from economic

conditions or politics from institutions however, by empirically comparing intermediate

level institutions and the processes involved in shaping place (Shlay, 1993) across cities.

Bringing concepts of intermediate-level institutions into regime analysis retains the focus

on mediation of macrolevel socioeconomic change but provides a means for examining

non-trivial differences in politics and policies across cities facing similar structural

pressures. Differences in the local institutional terrain will influence how restructuring

pressures affect the goals and strategies of different groups, and how and when they are

incorporated in governing coalitions and/or designated for representation in local

economic development institutions.

Institutionalizationprocesses in local economic development policy-making

One of the key distinctions of the new institutionalism is the conceptualization of

institutionalization as a process involving elements such as organizational forms,

structures and rules rather than specific organizations (DiMaggio and Powell,

1991:14).

These elements, rather than concrete organizations, become institutionalized in an

organizational field such as local economic development policy-making

.

Institutionalization therefore denotes the diffusion of standard rules and structures rather

than an adaptive process fitting organizations to particular settings

ibid. 27).

This

improves on nominal classifications of economic development organizations as public or

private sector organizations; here, for example, publicness is reflected in the degree of

democratic control over rules and procedures governing organizational resource

acquisition, rather than legal status (Bozeman, 1987). From this perspective, the conflicts

between different institutional orders or logics and the degree to which a particular logic

is institutionalized become core analytic questions in understanding changes in local

development politics.

Contesting institutional orders

Friedland and Alford

(1991

explain political change in

terms

Of

contradictions and conflicts between different interdependent institutional orders

present in modern society. These institutional orders each have a central logic in which

certain material practices and symbolic systems serve as organizing principles

ibid,

249). Conflicts occur when there is disagreement over which institutional logic should

guide particular activities and to which categories of people it should apply

ibid. :

256) .

The important political conflicts regarding local economic development policies

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Institutional logics and local economic development 5 19

involve contradictions between the institutional logic of capitalism, the state and

democracy. Given that local economic development is a relatively new and unsettled

policy field, local conflicts centre on whether the appropriate institutional logic is the

accumulation and commodification practices of capitalism, the rationalization and

routinization of state bureaucratic organizations, or the decision-making participation and

popular control of democracy (see Friedland and Alfrod, 1991:248). As a new set of

policy responsibilities and roles, local economic development issues compel some typeof

institutional response: either the logic of the market is extended to the state and

democracy or the logic of the state and democracy is extended to local markets. The

former appears most likely although attempts to extend bureaucratic controls and popular

participation to economic development activities are not as infrequent in American cities

as one might think (e.g. Goetz, 1994; Kantor and Savitch, 1993).

But since the burgeoning of local economic development activities in the mid-1970s

(Clarke and Gaile, 1992; Goetz and Clarke, 1993), market symbols and practices he

rhetoric of partnerships, leverage and entrepreneurs re rife. Institutional change in

local economic development appears to entail a shift in the institutional setting from one in

which state bureaucracies manage development with the legitimation of democratic

procedures to one in which market logic is pervasive. If market challenges to the

institutional orders of the state and democracy prevail, either bureaucratic organizations

adopt the practices and symbols of market logic or new quasi-public organizations which

are better able to do

so

become dominant. If these challenges are rebuffed, economic

development policies will be shaped by bureaucratic and democratic practices and

symbols. Although beyond the scope of this paper, a critical task for analysis would be

understanding the conditions under which these contesting institutional orders lead to

institutional transformations. Here, cities are characterized by the dominance of market

or state/democratic institutional orders and the extent to which core practices and symbols

are institutionalized.

The degree

of

institutionalization

The language of the new institutionalism perspective

connotes a vigorous process of contesting institutional orders and a diffusion of key

elements he rules and procedures of different orders. One implication of the

diffusion viewpoint is that greater institutionalization leads to less variety and diversity in

local economic development policy environments. The recent diffusion of

public- rivate partnerships, leverage ratios and entrepreneurial elements across

American cities and beyond (Barnekov, Boyle and Rich, 1989; Mayer, 1994) exemplifies

this process. It is a rich example of how these standard elements make local economic

development processes more similar across cities and thus reduce investor uncertainty

about how local officials will handle these relatively new roles and responsibilities. Not

every local organization becomes a public- rivate partnership but the reliance on the

partnership logic and symbols is pervasive; development organisations unwilling or

unable to refashion their structures and procedures in compatible ways are overridden by

those that do or by new organizations embodying these features.

In DiMaggio and Powells terms, the extent to which such elements are coupled

across organizations is an empirical issue (1991:29). One can therefore characterize the

complexity and diversity of local economic development policy settings in terms of how

pervasive the diffusion of standard rules and structures is relative to more adaptive

features. In cities where the standardized rules and procedures for economic development

policy-making are loosely coupled and not pervasive, institutionalization is relatively low.

There are multiple agencies, differing levels of authority, and numerous informal

linkages and communication networks in play (Roe, 1994). As a consequence, there is

more variety, flexibility and organizational diversity in the local policy environment but

also more potential instability as organizations continually adapt to changing

circumstances. Furthermore, there is more uncertainty and possibly conflict over turf

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issues and the appropriate rules and routines to use in different cases. Given this setting,

policy processes may be slower and policy choices may be less effective but the

opportunities for interest representation may be greater and more diverse. In contrast,

cities where econom ic development policy -making rules and procedu res a re mo re tightly

coupled across organizations are more institutionalized. The policy setting is more

homogenous and stable; organizations ar e run by professionals and interest designation is

driven by organizational compatibility with dominant rules and procedures. The

ascendance of non-profit making organizations in housing and development arenas in

American cities, for example, is partially accounted for by their melding of democratic

and corporate institutional logics. This tight coupling, however, may make the local

institutional structure more vulnerable to external shocks (DiMaggio and Powell,

1991)

such as the loss of federal funds or credit crunches.

Mapping local institutional settings f o r economic development policy-mak ing: eight

cities

The following analysis of local institutional change in economic development policy-

making draws on these two dimensions of institutional change. These features of the

institutional terrain do not necessarily correspond to a particular regime composition;

indeed, tho se responsible for institutional designs are rarely the sam e as those who benefit

(Thelen and Steinmo,

1992).

The schema characterizes cities according to the dominant

institutional logic in local economic development policies and the degree of

institutionalization of this logic. Given the normative and theoretical issues involved, a

systematic comparison of several carefully matched cases is used to unravel these

processes (Yin, 1984; Browning

et

al. 1984; Ragin, 1987). Eight little-studied central

cities are involved: Tulsa and Oklahoma C ity, OK; Dayton and Cleveland,

OH;

Macon

and Columbus, G A ; and Tacoma and Seattle, W A . These pairs were chosen according to

several criteria. First, each pair is located within the same state to minimize comparability

problems arising from interstate differences in state authorized spending, service

responsibilities, legal municipal requirements and state policies and regulations. Second,

each pair was active in federal redevelopment programmes and suffered comparable cuts

in federal aid during the 1980s. Th ird, in varying w ays, each pair of cities has previously

incorporated minority and neighbourhood interests in federal redevelopment projects.

To developers these generally appear as second tier cities. Each city had a

population of over

100,000

in

1976

(making them eligible for most federal development

programmes); their central city populations in 1990 ranged from 512,000 in Seattle to

116,896 in Macon. Overall, each city underwent difficult restructuring processes

stemming either from lack of diversity in the local economic base (Seattle, Tacoma,

Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Macon, Columbus) or from dependency on manufacturing

(Cleveland, Dayton). In terms of changing production functions, they include classic

deindustrializing cities which have been losing both manufacturing jobs and population

since the

1970s

(Cleveland and Dayton) as well as new manufacturing centres with

growth in manufactuirng employment and above average population growth (Macon,

Oklahoma City, Tu lsa) (Negrey and Zickel, 1994).As in most Am erican cities, economic

and political issues are increasingly metropolitan in nature and ar e exacerbated by racial

and class segregation; only Columbus has a consolidated city-county government.

Governmental structures are diverse and surprisingly volatile: with the exception of

Daytons commission form and Tacomas council-city manager structure, each city is

governed through mayor-council structures; however, in response to legal challenges

Tulsa changed from commission to mayor-council in the early

1990s

and Columbus

changed to primarily district based elections in 1993. Finally, each city experienced elite

disarray prompted by economic transformations and corporate reorganizations in the

1980s (Oklahoma City, Tulsa, Tacoma, Cleveland, Dayton) or by reform challenges

which expanded electoral representation in the 1970s (Columbus, Macon, Seattle).

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Institutional logics and local economic development 52

1

StatelDemocracy Logic Market Logic

Highly

Institutionalized

Less

Institutionalized

Seattle

Dayton

Tacoma

Macon

Tulsa

Cleveland

Columbus

Oklahoma City

Figure 1

Variations in local institutional settings

Figure 1 maps the institutional terrain in each city. Based on interviews with local

officials, community activists and site visits from 1991- , city economic development

policy-making proce sses a re charac terized as being regulated by the institutional logic of

either the state/democracy o r the market. Although econom ic development projects may

themselves accommodate a mix of tightly and loosely coupled processes, the degree to

which the institutional terrain is tightly or loosely institutionalized further distinguishes

cities from each other. What is not evident in this figure (but is discussed below) is the

source and direction of institutional transform ation. Since the purpose here is to indicate

how new institutionalism perspectives can inform the study of local political change by

specifying important variations in institutional features, only brief accounts of the

individual cities are provided (see Appendix).

Cities where state/democracy institutional orders persist In four cities Seattle,

Dayton , Tacoma and Macon conomic development policies continue to be regulated

primarily through bureaucratic structures and democratic decision processes. As

DiMaggio and Powell point out, there is no necessary virtue associated with these

institutional logics; rather they indicate curre nt settlements on the app ropriate institutional

logics fo r econom ic development activities (199 1

30).

Both Seattle and Tacom a operate

under narrow state constitutional constraints on local lending of credit to businesses.

Although in other cities such constitutional limitations often spawn a host of quasi-public

organizations that circumv ent these constraints and dominate policy-making the key

actors in both these cities are agencies and organizations which operate according to

bureaucratic and democratic conventions.

In Seattle these rules and procedures ar e tightly coupled across organizations. T hat is,

the standard economic development organizational elements include an emphasis on

standardized decision criteria, citizen participation, fairness, multiple values including

environmental as well as economic goals, non-commodification of environmental and

social values and due process (see Frieden and Sagalyn, 1989). Although the

public rivate Seattle Econo mic Development Comm ission (SED C), which was set up

by the Mayor in the mid-1980s as an advisory body, urged newly-elected Mayor Norm

Rice to set up a separate line agency for economic development in 1989 (i.e . not even

attempting to extend the market logic or rhetoric), Rice initially resisted and moved

economic development responsibilities into

t h e

Office of Long-Range Planning. This

Office is also responsible for implementing local growth managem ent initiatives while the

King County Economic Development Council is the operational agency for state growth

management issues. Shortly before his re-election bid in 1993, Rice established the line

agency, the Office of Economic Development. Repayments from UDAG loans are

channelled through the Office of Budget and Management to cover Community

Development Department staff salaries and operating c osts. Seattle is noted for balancing

public concerns and private corporate interests through extensive public participation in

its redevelopment projects. The Pikes Place Market is a well-known example (Frieden

and Sagalyn, 1989); more recent initiatives to develop a 74 acre open space, the Seattle

Commons, evolved from an initial proposal to create a passive buffer zone into a plan

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including affordable housing, job creation and pedestrian-oriented neighbourhood

development.

Yet the homogeneity stability and professionalism of this highly institutionalized

state logic is challenged most vocally by neighbourhood activists who disparage Seattle

politics as Nice Politics. To these groups, the routinization and rationalization provided

by bureaucratic controls means that uneven development processes and polarized

communities are overlooked. Furthermore, the at-large electoral system weakens

neighbourhood demands even though many candidates run on neighbourhood platforms.

Currently the 13 District Councils established in the city charter channel neighbourhood

demands from Neighbourhood and Community Councils up to the city council. Interest

designation on the SEDC and even Rices electoral climb from the Rainier Valley, one of

the most distressed areas, to the Mayors Office is not seen as sufficient for achieving

neighbourhood-based goals. Although framed in terms of contesting bureaucratic and

democratic logics, Seattles economic development policy-making setting would have to

incorporate market procedures to allow many neighbourhood-based groups to enter into

the financial and real estate activities they seek. There are few local economic

development corporations (LDC) in Seattle, some special public district authorities for

redevelopment areas (again, bureaucratic logic), LISC activities and a state-wide

consortium of community-based development groups. There are more LDCs in the

housing area as well as a strong consortium of non-profit housing developers that works

with local and state agencies. The non-profit consortium model seems to be a

countervailing and necessary organizational form for attempting to refashion bureaucratic

logic in the face of market logic challenges.

Dayton represents a more loosely coupled institutional setting. The combination of a

weak executive and weak legislative branch in its commission form of government

prompted Dayton to delegate public authority for economic development decision-making

outside the formal political structures at a much earlier date than most cities. Two

arrangements exemplify these efforts at the citywide and neighbourhood level: the

establishment

of

neighbourhood-based Priority Boards in 1971 and the formation of the

Dayton Citywide Development Corporation in 1972. As a quasi-public organization, the

Dayton City Development Corporation intervenes in downtown development activities by

providing gap financing and debt financing to private investors.

As

an essential service of

city government, the Priority Boards allow the city to devolve certain service and project

responsibilities to the neighbourhood level.

Given the lack of adequate political authority in the formal structure, the DCDC acts

as a policy instrument for the city, pursuing the citys economic development agenda with

the cooperation of private sector interests. In contrast, the Priority Boards provide a

highly institutionalized, relatively open framework for decision-making and deliberation

but they have been limited to neighbourhood rather than city-wide issues. The citys

development portfolio is, therefore, dominated by the DCDCs downtown revitalization

projects; most neighbourhood projects entail recreational and infrastructure issues. Thus

the territorial dimensions

of

economic development policy-making operate relatively

independently of each other with little institutionalized coordination. Curiously absent is

some sense of a strong state hand in the DCDC and Priority Board arrangements. In

contrast to Cleveland, these are public rather than private sector efforts to structure the

development policy context; they meld corporate logic with some sense of democratic

participation and state regulation. Yet the local state role has been primarily to set up these

frameworks in the mid-l970s, to ensure their legitimacy, to provide their continued

resource base, to participate in their initial rule-making and rule enforcement decisions

but then to step back and leave on-going negotiations to the participants.

The institutionalization of the Priority Board infrastructure channels neighbourhood

participation and representation in city policy processes, giving a formal voice to

neighbourhood interests that wouldnt otherwise occur. The Priority Boards, however,

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are increasingly challenged by a new institutional layer of neighbourhood development

corporations and historical district organizations. Neighbourhood development initiatives

stemm ing fro m the Dayton Comm unity R einvestment A ct Alliance mobilized a younger

generation of African Am erican activists who have responded to the lack of a coherent

agenda by pushing for investment-oriented strategies rather than conventional set-aside

programmes. In addition to this reinvestment gap, the introduction of neighbourhood

development organizations and federal housing programm es has provided an alternative

means of accessing resources. To the extent that new economic development

organizations can mobilize and articulate an alternative economic development vision,

their chances for influencing the policy context are greater than in Cleveland.

The dominant institutional logic in Tacoma and Macon is similar to Seattles but the

state/democracy elements are m ore loosely coupled. Thus their policy settings are more

diverse, but also more unstable as organizations continually adapt to fit changing

circumstances. Tacoma was more active in federal development programmes than

Seattle; Tacomas institutional structure is a series of overlays from past federal

initiatives, including Urban Renewal, Model Cities, CDBG and UDAG. Although

Tacoma was one of the first cities in the country to provide business assistance through

these agencies, the cuts in federal funds allowed some elements of popular control to

undermine this bureaucratic o rder through the district electoral channels.

A progressive coalition on the city council, the election of a new mayor and the

appointment of a new city manager prompted a reorganization of city policy priorities in

the late

1980s.

In

1990

economic development was downsized from a separate agency

(created in

1986)

to a unit in the new Planning an d Development Services Department.

Housing issues cam e to the fore. T he council wanted to earm ark UDA G repayments for

affordable housing rather than channel it to the developm ent agencies as in the past; they

also wanted to enact a new excise tax for the same purposes. In the face of state social

service cuts, the city allocates general funds to non-profit making o rganization s for social

services that were formerly supported by CDBG funds.

The institutional terrain is further fragmented by the Port Authority, the Municipal

Authority and the Urban Policy Committee. The Port Authority is a separate municipal

corporation with elected officials and its own taxing and bond authority. Although it

receives city services, it pays no city taxes. The M unicipal Corporation, a separate public

corporation with five appointed members, approves the development proposals packaged

by the Community Development Department and generally uses its broad financing

powers to get around constitutional limits. Similar to this fragmented state order, the

Urban Policy Committee (UPC) reflects fragmentation in democratic orders. The UPC

was established as a neighbourhood advisory body to the city council during the Model

Cities era in Tacoma. Its 25 members were originally elected and the UPCs

recommendations tended to be adopted by the council. The council now appoints its

members and is attempting to rein in the UPC by narrowing its scope and weakening its

advisory role. There are no LDCs in Tacoma but there are Neighbourhood Business

Districts, county-level CDCs and Economic Development Corporations (EDCs). In its

rehabilitation of the Union Station rail terminal area, the city rejected the idea of setting

up a Public Development Authority because of local concerns about the citys ability to

control PD A fin ances. T he trade-off of gove rnance capacity for financial flexibility led to

the establishment of the Union Station District Development Association, a CDC-like

private, non-profit making organization with no specific financing authority. Although

Tacoma has a limited redevelopment portfolio, this effort to impose democratic control

over organizational resource issues is a characteristic feature.

Macon carries out economic development activities in eight different departments

controlled by five different political bodies.

A

seasoned local poli tic ian, T o m y C .

Olmstead, won a landslide election in 1991 on the promise of bipartisan initiatives to

bring business and government together.

In

1992 the city attempted to overcome this

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fragmentation through the formation of the M acon Economic D evelopment Comm ission,

a public- rivate partnership focussing on industrial recruitment. Macon

2000,

also

formed in

1992,

is a partnership of business, government and community interests to

support educational reform . U p to this point, most of the citys other partnerships were

with state and federal agencies. Although recent mayors have been aggressive about

economic development issues, the city council is more conservative; it recently voted

down a bond issue and has been slow to take up tax-increment financing opportunities.

Neverth eless, in the early

1990s

econom ic develop men t activities accounted for over 3 0 %

of

the community development budget, primarily in support of industrial development

and up from the

10

average of a few years ago. Macons relatively successful

downtown revitalization efforts started over

20

years ago; they centre on historic

preservation initiatives, with a loose coalition of preservationist groups, neighbourhood

groups, and local black and white business leaders defining the development agenda. T he

mayor appoints m embers to the P roject Area C omm ittee to coordinate city development

projects, mostly for infrastructure and housing. Through this group there has been some

targeting to poor minority neighbourhoods as well as the establishment of a strategic

housing plan and a minority business office park. Macons redev elopm ent efforts include

historic preservation projects now encompassing projects to preserve historic

African- Am erican neighbourhoods as well as the downtown hom es of the historic white

elite.

These cities are instances where the institutional order of state/democracy practices

still regulates public economic development initiatives. These efforts are more coherent

(i.e. tightly coupled and institutionalized) in Seattle than in Dayton, Tacom a and Maco n.

Seattles local political capacity is homegrown: federal development activities were less

prevalent in Seattle than in the other two cities so its institutional setting consists of a

higher proportion of o rganizations which a re custom-fitted to the local context. W ithout

reverting to political culture arguments, it can be said that the institutional orders

regulating local economic development policies in Seattle mesh together bureaucratic

public planning and democratic popular control practices. Although this includes a strong

neighbourhood voice, demands a re channelled through bureaucratic and, more indirectly,

at-large electoral links. Thus, although minority groups and neighbourhoods are included

in the governing coalition, the demands for change from groups interested in

neighbourhood economic development cannot be accommodated without an extension of

market logic into public institutions. This would undermine bureaucratic controls; m ost of

the institutional change in Seattle has come from within the political community rather

than in response to external shocks.

In contrast, the institutional settings in Dayton, Tacom a and M acon ar e rooted in past

federal programmes. As the funds supporting those activities decline, the economic

development field in these cities becomes increasingly volatile. Given its weak leadership

structure, Dayton appears to have stalled; city policies are increasingly challenged by a

younger generation of neighbourhood-based African-American activists. In Tacoma and

Macon the city councils have responded to the diminishing ability of local bureaucracies

to regulate public development activities by reasserting legislative prerogatives and

decision powe rs. In Tacom a this means a chang e in policy priorities, while in Macon the

city council seeks to stem local public involvement in econom ic development altogether.

Cities where market institutional orders dominate Since this category reflects the

diffusion of market symbols and practices into local policy arena s, less detail on specific

settings is provided and more emphasis is given to contesting institutional orders.

Cleveland is an especially interesting case: Clevelands institutional transformation is

somewhat incomplete but reflects a shift from a loosely institutionalized public capacity

dominated by state/democratic rules and procedures, iis in Tacoma, to processes

characterized more by market rules and procedures. Clevelands local political capacity

8

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for economic development policy-making is grounded in its extensive participation in

federal development programmes. The tension between bureaucratic and democratic

controls over development activities continues to be addressed by agencies which

routinely allocate some development funds to individual council members. Given

Clevelands success in securing federal development funds, this largesse still allowed

bureaucratic control of local development initiatives but legitimated these activities

through the councils participation. As the UDAG programme began to bring market

practices and symbols into local policy arenas in the mid-l970s, this logic was diffused

throughout Clevelands economic development structure. The city was extraordinarily

active in the UDAG programme; it became adept at negotiating deals with complex

financial packages that often included revenue streams and profit-sharing. The city staff

underw ent professional training in development finan ce through w orkshops put on by the

National Development Council. Thus Clevelands initial institutional transformation

occu rred through the diffusion of market elem ents and the professionalization of city staff

under federal auspices. As part of this process a public-private, non-profit ma king,

citywide development corporation was established and staffed by the city. In addition, a

network of non-profit making LDCs was established and funded by the city to carry out

housing and economic deve lopment at the neighbourhood level. Some of these operating

expenses come from the council members allocations; city staff review all LDC

proposals but rarely turn on e down.

Although the logic of the market entered Clevelands institutional field through

federal initiatives, the cuts in federal funds accelerated the extension of market logic to an

arena where some bureaucratic and democratic controls persisted. Now, Clevelands

economic development policy-making is being dominated increasingly by Cleveland

Tomorrow, a consortium of top business leaders who have set up an equity pool for

investment in downtown development. The consortium takes an equity position in each

project and has set up a separate foundation to fund neighbourhood economic

development. Although Cleveland Tomorrow consults with the city on development

projects, the initiative as well as the rules and procedu res ar e controlled by m arket logic.

While there is political incorporation of minority and neighbourhood interests in the

governin g coalition, there is less representation in these key development institutions. T he

new institutional context dampens the potential for collective action and internal

deliberation; neighbourhood groups are encouraged to compete and m aximize their rent

seeking behaviour at the expense of other groups. Clevelands portfolio is dominated by

large down town developm ent projects such a s the restoration of the Terminal T ow er rail

centre in historic Public Square, a new baseball stadium and the Rock and Roll Hall of

Fame. Neighbourhood projects primarily involve commercial redevelopment and some

inner city housing.

There is little direct bureaucratic or democratic regulation of public economic

development activities in Tulsa, Oklahoma City and Columbus GA; in these cities, the

institutional setting is dominated by an arra y of off-budget organizations which op erate by

market rules and procedures. The institutionalization is high in that market logic and

standard market elements dominate in Tulsa and Columbu s with no strong bureaucratic or

political presence as in Cleveland. In Tulsa, this is due in part to state constitutional

constraints on local government credit activities, unstable political leadership in recent

years and a level of federal programme activity which is insufficient to generate public

bureaucratic capacity. Throughout the 1980s all federal funds were handled by one line

agency; CDBG funds were used to support a separate Community Development

Depa rtment and to facilitate land packaging for projects carried out by the Tulsa Industrial

Development Authority (TIDA) and the Tulsa Economic Development Corporation

(TEDC). The TIDA has been in place since the 1960s; it is becoming more active as a

special developer and financing source for large-scale projects as federal programme

funds disappear. Although the TE D C was set up as a citywide development organization ,

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Clarke

it now targets minority business development and job creation in selected

neighbourhoods. Electoral interest representation is becoming more inclusive following a

court suit forcing elections in 1990 along new district lines; the interest representation in

development institutions, however, is minimal. The citys portfolio includes extensive

downtown redevelopment and some minority business development in the historic

African

-

American commercial district of Greenwood. The source of institutional

change in Tulsa appears to be in federal initiatives; the local political capacity is located in

off-budget organizations which are regulated by market practices rather than bureaucratic

and democratic controls.

Columbus GA has a similar institutional setting with off-budget organizations

capitalized by federal programmes. The CDBG was also a prime source of economic

development funds in Columbus; initially these funds were targeted to seven areas but

now they are used for more general economic development activities. CDBG funds were

used to capitalize a revolving loan fund and to set up a local development corporation that

now reviews CDBG and Small Business Administration (SBA) loan proposals. A Local

Development Authority was also capitalized with CDBG funds for capital improvements

and has independent bonding authority. SBA funds support a new Minority Assistance

Corporation providing business loans; both CDBG and SBA funds are currently involved

in the rehabilitation of the Liberty Theater in the historic black business district area.

Another revolving loan fund for new start-ups is administered by a bank consortium

working with the city. With the decline in federal funds, economic development has been

moved out of the Mayors office and back to the Community Development Department;

the city council is again becoming more active on economic development issues.

Redevelopment efforts have been initiated by the business leadership which centre on

downtown revitalization. The rehabilitation of a former Confederate munitions factory

into a hotel and office centre spurred protests from the African-American community

for greater attention to their cultural heritage. In both Tulsa and Columbus the issue is

whether democratic and bureaucratic controls can be extended into an institutional arena

constituted by federal programmes which diffuse market practices.

Oklahoma City reveals very little institutional capacity for economic development in

the public sector and few economic development initiatives. State institutional orders are

also undeveloped: because of state constraints on city fiscal authority and taxing powers,

the city operates through over 30 Public Trusts ff-budget authorities used for service

provisions and capital improvements. These Public Trusts have independent bonding

authority and are isolated

from democratic controls. City economic development

functions are assigned to the Budget and Management Information Office and all UDAG

and CDBG funds are administered through this general government office, there being no

separate economic development staff. There are regular informal meetings between city

officials and local developers but the public development role is nearly non-existent. Most

economic development activities are at the initiative of the Oklahoma City Chamber of

Commerce, which now encompasses the Oklahoma Industrial Authority and the

Oklahoma City Economic Development Foundation. In both Tulsa and Oklahoma City,

the energy crises and recession prompted the exit of some old, monied families. Since the

1 9 8 0 ~ ~he younger business leadership is more likely to act independently of the old

families and the oil and gas lobbies (Morgan et a l . , 19915). These shake-ups in the

business leadership were a catalyst for reorganization of the Chamber of Commerce; the

recent initiatives for public- rivate partnerships emerged from this more coherent

business community.

Conclusion

By drawing on new institutionalism notions of contesting institutional orders and varying

6

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degrees of institutionalization, the salient features of the institutional terrain in eight

American cities can be mapped. These maps indicate that market-based institutional

orders are not pervasive: state/democratic institutional orders persist in several cities,

bolstered by strong citizen organization networks in Seattle, a decentralized political

structure in Dayton, and contesting elected officials in Tacoma and Macon. In these

cities, both elec toral incorporation and designated representation processes ar e relatively

inclusive; that is, the cumulative representation patterns in the governing coalitions and

economic development institutions shore up democratic logics. The policy effects are

most ev ident in Seattle where the tightly coupled institutional orde r produces a relatively

coherent, public-centred, economic development orientation. In Dayton, Tacoma and

Macon the more loosely coupled institutional setting dilutes the policy preferences of

members of the governing coalition; the policy initiatives are smaller scale and less

coherent.

Looking across cities indicates that the federal government remains a m ajor sou rce of

local institutional transformation. Federal programmes initially promoted state-centred

bureaucratic rules and procedures to manage local economic development, then more

recently diffused market practices and organizational forms throughout local economic

development settings. The vacuum created by federal funding cuts is prompting renewed

efforts at dem ocratic policy control through city councils in some cities but is also leaving

cities vulnerable to organ izational steering by business interests. In co ntrast to analyses of

national institutions, local institutional chang e in Am erican cities appea rs to be relatively

common. Concomitantly, periods of local institutional stability are punctuated more

frequen tly by crises and transformation (Krasne r,

1984).

The consequence is not

so

much

the breakdown of existing institutions and clea r policy d isjunctures but local institutional

overlays and accretions. Furthermore, these interventions are mediated by political

fragmentation at a national and local level. Fragmented national authority dilutes the

content of policy initiatives to be implemented a t the local level (King,

1992).

Similarly,

splintered local government structures preclude wholesale shifts in policy direction by

multiplying the relevant decision arenas, the necessary decision chains and the possible

veto points (Immergut,

1992).

Th e loose coupling of public economic deve lopment organizations evident in most

American communities is overcome, on occasion, by arrangements that limit these

decision points in order to forge consensus and policy stability

(ibid., 1992),

e.g. the

formation of Cleveland Tom orrow and the M acon Econom ic Development Com mission.

Most often, these institutional arrangements shift decision-making outside the electoral

aren a; this makes organ ized political activity by m inority and neighbourhood groups less

viable, and subjects their views and ideas to routines an d decision criteria that limit their

success. Less frequently, as in Seattle, strong political leadership provides consensus

through short-term coalitions that restrict the continued consideration of alternative

choices encouraged by fragmented government structures and majority decision rules

(cf .

Immergut,

1992).

While this schema sets out institutional configurations and policy d ifferences across

cities, it may obscure changes within these cities over time

(c f .

Thelen and Steinmo,

1992).

Indeed, in the course of this study, Tulsa and Columbus changed their governing

structure in response to legal pressures and other cities continued to revamp their

institutional apparatus for economic developm ent.

So

fa r, these changes suggest increased

coherence in the dominant institutional logics rather than shifts in power relations or

policy direction. The thrust of the institutionalist argument, how ever, suggests that these

institutional shifts may reconstitute interests and goals over time in ways that will affect

future policy choices. A further concern is that this admittedly classificatory exercise

slights our understanding of the analytic tip in institutional logics, that moment when

relatively stable logics tip in favour of another institutional order (cf . Roe, 1994).

Parallel to the notion of a linguistic tip, the analtyic tip signifies the build up of negative

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sentiment to existing logics or discourse, such as the state-centred orientation of the

fordist era and the abandonment of that discourse for a new logic. Fo r many cities the new

analytical point of departure is the need for public- rivate cooperation; the trade-offs

involved are minimized in the emphas is on finding a comm on ground . Th e institutionalist

approach suggested here enhances efforts to push beyond these initial classificatory

approaches. A more extended analysis of the sources of institutional change, the

conditions under which different institutional orders come to regulate local economic

development activities and the circumstances contributing to the tip from one logic to

another promises to enrich studies of local political change.

Appendix

Brief descriptions of the eight cities follow:

Columbus,

GA

has a relatively dive rsified but wage and job-p oor local econom y. With the

establishment of Fort Benning during the first world war, the growth and mergers of

several local industries with national firms after the second world war, and the more

recent influx of educational, banking, insurance and medical services, Columbus has

outgrow n its dependency on the textile indu stry. In

1990

the population stoo d at

280,000;

most of

the

economic growth is occurring within the consolidated (since

1971)

metropolitan area but outside the downtown core in increasingly segregated patterns.

Among southern cities, Columbus is distinctive for a recent history of competitive

mayoral elections featuring Republican, biracial, reform challenges to the white hat,

white suit boys of the traditional Democratic machine (Gaddy,

1988).

There is also a

history of intense civil rights activities going back to the late

1940s

and overshadowed by

the assassination of local NAACP leader Dr Thomas H . Drewer, Sr. on the downtown

streets in

1956.

Federal court challenges to Columbus primarily at-large electoral

structure culmina ted in the

1993

transformation to a council of eight districts and tw o at-

large seats. The consolidated City-County Commission includes six at-large and four

single member districts. Although Columbus is now

5 9 %

African- American,

representation on the consolidated Commission and Authorities is minimal.

Macon,

GA

also has a historic dependency on textile manufacturing and military

installations but has a m ore strategic location (84 miles south of Atlanta) at the nexus of

three major interstate highways and three rail lines. Macons population is 116,896. The

local economy is becoming more diversified with employment concentrated in services,

retail trade, government and manufacturing. The M acon-Warner Robbins Air Force base

is a major employer, although just south of Macon city limits, and is part of a growing

aerospace industry in the area . In addition there w ere

17

international firms in the area as

of

1993.

Macon has a weak, mayor-council form of government with three members from

each of five wards; the first post in each ward is elected at-large, the second and third

from within the ward. The at-large members are usually white and constitute a white

voting majority on the council. Several prominent African Am erican businessmen have

been incorporated into the privatist regime that has dominated Macon politics since the

1970s. African-Americans now make up 52% of the population in this residentially

segregated city; Africa n- Am ericans and women have been regularly represented on the

Coun cil since the late 1970s. African- American support in the Democra tic prima ries has

been crucial for any mayoral candidate since the late

1940s.

Local politics invariably

involve Bibb County although the city and county are not consolidated as in Columbus.

Several powerful city- ounty Authorities are key development organizations; they

include a mix of elected and appointed members, with several African- Americans

gaining county office by appointment since the mid-1970s. By the 1990s African-

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Am ericans were in key leadership positions on the County Commission, the School Board

and nearly every Authority.

Cleveland,

OH is in the industrial manufacturing heartland of the United States. The city

suffered severe economic dislocations during the 1970s and 1980s; manufacturing

employm ent fell by 18.3 from 1982- 1987and now constitutes only 23 of the labour

force. It is emerging as a regional finance, service and health facilities centre; hospitals

and medical research centres are now the citys largest employer. Reflecting these

transitions, there has been a turnover in 65 of the co rporate leadership positions in the

last eight years. With a population loss of 12.4 from 1980-1992, Clevelands

population is now 502,539. Ov er three quarters of the city is designated a state enterprise

zone, eligible for generous tax abatements.

Cleveland has a m ayor-council structure with a city council elected by 21 wards. An

electoral coalition including neighbourhood groups put Mayor Michael White, an

African-A merican , and a reform-dominated city council in office in 1989 to carry out a

neighbourhood agenda. 46.8 of the population are African-American and 4.6 are

Hispanic. Despite the prominence of several African

-

American politicians, including

the Mayor and fo rmer City Council President, Cleveland ranks as one of the most racially

segregated cities in the United States.

Dayton, OH describes its location as Am ericas Crossroad s he intersection of two

major interstate highways in Ohios Miami Valley. The city underwent massive

disinvestment and suburban ization of both population and industry in the 1970s. General

Motors historically dominated the local economy but downsized substantially in the

1980s; only 18.6 of the labour force remain in manufacturing jobs. The nearby

Wright- atterson Air Force Base, 32,000 jobs strong, mitigated some of these losses;

the facility generates substantial subcontraacting as well as numerous research parks

oriented to technology transfer. Over 80 of job growth in the area comes from the

expansion of existing businesses. Daytons population now is

183,189.

Th e city m anager-commissioner system originated in Dayton. Daytons city mana ger

works in tandem w ith an at-large, nom inally non-partisan comm ission (five members) and

a weak m ayor form of go vernment. The comb ination of both a weak executive and weak

legislative branch shifts important responsibilities to the bureaucracy; it also prompted

Dayton to delegate public authority for economic development decision-making outside

formal political structures at a much earlier date than most cities. A distinctive Priority

Board structure also devolves some budgeting authority and decision powers to

neighbourhoods. 40.2 of the central city are African- American; other ethnic and

racial minorities represent less than 2 of the population. Dayton rem ains one of the most

racially segregated American cities. African

-

Am ericans have served as comm issioners

since the early 1980s; in the early 1990s an African-American became mayor and two

African Am ericans, including a wom an, were elected comm issioners.

Oklahoma

City,

OK is the state capital and largest city (444,719 in 1990). Over 50 of

the state population resides in the Oklahoma City and Tulsa metropolitan areas in a

northeast outhwest urban corrid or. The local economy is diversifying through federal

government installations such as Tinker Air Force base and increased manufacturing.

Independent real estate interests have not been pa rticularly pow erful; oil and gas lobbies,

more oriented to the national than the local arena, predominate.

Although now over 400 square miles, Oklahom a City is represented by eight elected

district councilors and over

42

appointed boards and commissions. It is a weak

ma yor- council city. Ok lahom a City has the largest Native American population

(5 .5 )

of any American city; these group s, however, a re hampered politically by tribal cleavages

and dispersed, non-urban settlement; they rarely mobilize for electoral politics. Although

the ethnic and racial communities are small relative to other American cities (under 25 ),

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Oklahoma City has the largest share of African- Am ericans (16 % ) in the state as well as

a growing Hispanic

(5 )

and m odest Asian population. Currently tw o of the eight council

representatives are African Am erican.

Tulsa, OK

is an archetypal American community. In both

1980

and 1990, Tulsa emerged as

the

city most representative of the American population: its averages on age distribution,

racial

mix

and housing prices a re the closest to national averages (Lohr, 1992). Both Tulsa

and Oklahoma City went through the mid 1970s boom and bust cycle, then suffered more

hits from the 1982 and 1986 recessions and energy crises and a series of bank, and savings

and loan, failures. Along with Oklahoma City, Tulsa is part of an aerospace triangle

including McD onnell Douglas and Rockwell manufacturing facilities as well a s the American

Airlines (the states largest employer) reservations system. S ince 1985, em ployment growth

has been strong in service industries, transportation, communication, insurance firms and

manufacturing (Curtis, 1991). By 1992, Tulsa was outstripping Oklahoma City

in

growth

rate as well as wage and salary employment growth.

In 1990, Tulsas population reached 37 6,302. T he African- Am erican population is

13 % of the city; the Native Am erican population (4 .7 % ) is scattered across the white and

African Am erican northern neighbourhoods and there is a small Hispanic community

(2. 6% ). Until 1990 Tulsa operated with a partisan comm ission form of go vernment, in

which a mayor and four commissioners elected at-large acted as both legislators and

adm inistrative heads. A lawsuit filed by the N AA CP in 1987 challenging the commission

form for diluting black voting strength provided the lever for various charter revision

proponents to act together. In

1990

the city held elections under a district based, strong

mayor-coun cil format; a 4-year term mayor was elected at-large and nine 2-year term

councillors were elected by districts. Two of the new council were women, including an

African- Am erican woman who joined one other African-American on the council; a

woman became mayor in the early 1990s.

Seattle,

WA

is a city historically dominated by the Boeing Company. The two Boeing Busts

in 1969-1971 and 19 82-19 84 devastated the economy in terms of taxes and

unemployment. Boeing was the largest local employer as well as the source

of

many

subcontracts to other local firms. As Boeing recovered in the mid-1980s it fuelled an

econom ic boom , now also encompassing the Port of Seattle and its Pacific Rim trade and

a high tech industry including MicroSoft and 350 other software companies

(Bowermaster, 1991). Seattles population growth in the 1980s was double the national

rate (18 % vs. 9% ): both downtown and suburban areas grew . By the end of the decade

suburban and county growth p redominated; in 1990 the city population stood at 512,00 0

while the rest of King County had nearly 1.5 million. B oth Seattle and Tacom a are bound

by 1990 state legislation requiring comprehensive land use planning around growth

centres.

Seattle has enjoyed a long history of citizen-based organizational politics, particularly

among w omens group s, environmentalist group s and good governmen t groups. Not only

are there a large numb er of active groups, there ar e also an unusual number of federations

of groups. City elections ar e at-large; they ar e bipartisan but all may ors since 19 70 have

been Democrats (Gordon et al . , 1991). 75% of Seattles population is white; the Asian

(11.8 %), black (10.1 ) and Hispanic ( 3 .6 % ) population is growing steadily, with Asians

increasing most rapidly. The African American comm unity has been relatively stable

since the second world war ibid.). n the 1989 election, council member Norm Rice

becam e the citys first African-A merican may or; he easily won re-election in 1993. By

the early 1990s a majority of the council members were women (at one point all council

mem bers were wom en), including African-American and Asian wom en.

Tacoma, WA copes with a job-poor economic base dependent on outside forces: key

features include the Port of Tacoma (governed by separate commissioners), the extensive

_

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Editor

and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 1995


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53 1

land holdings in military installations at Fort Lewis and national shipbuilding and lumber

corporations. Until the late 1970sTacoma could still be described as a labour town with

over half the workforce unionized; the political tradition is blue collar and Democratic.

Labour lost its edge as locally owned businesses merged with national corporations, the

local smelter finally closed down and the Port Authority operations became subject to

greater scrutiny.

Tacoma runs on the nonpartisan city manager model. Since 1993, elections

of

five

city council members are by district; three other council seats are nominated and elected

at-large. With a population of 176,664,Tacoma is

11

African-American, 6.9 Asian

and 3.8 Hispanic. Both women and African-Americans have held Council seats,

although it is a weak mayor office; in 1989a woman was elected mayor, followed by an

African-American in 1994. There were over

55

active neighbourhood organizations in

the early 1990s; United Neighbourhoods of Tacoma, a federation of these groups, has

been active since 1979.

Susan E.

Clarke University of Colorado at Boulder, C B 330, Boulder CO, USA.

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