claassen 2010 the place of autonomy in a capability theory of justice

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THE PLACE OF AUTONOMY IN A CAPABILITY THEORY OF JUSTICE

Rutger Claassen, Leiden University

Draft text, for presentation at Politicologenetmaal, 2010.

Please do not quote.

Introduction

The role of freedom or autonomy in the capability approach is very much in dispute. This has

to do, amongst other things, with the fact that the approach tries to combine and balance

concerns for ‘well-being’ (broadly conceived, as including human flourishing, human

development, etc.) with concerns for ‘freedom’ (broadly conceived, as including autonomy or

agency). In this paper I will look at the place that has been assigned to the concept of

autonomy by authors who have worked on the capability approach so far, and then argue that

the capability approach should be tied to autonomy in a different and more fundamental way.

In the traditional picture a concern for autonomy motivates the move from

functioning to capability. Autonomy is exercised because people are allowed to choose

whether or not to realize a specific functioning that they have a capability to. I will refer to

this as autonomy’s functionings-choosing role. I will argue this role for autonomy is

important, but still insufficient. In addition we should select our list of basic capabilities on

the basis of each capability’s contribution to the realization of personal autonomy. Thus, I will

argue for a capability theory which is not geared towards the realization of opportunities for a

good life (or human flourishing, or well-being), but towards the realization of opportunities

for an autonomous life. The conceptual place for autonomy which I propose is capability-

selecting: it determines which capabilities are to count as basic capabilities in the first place.

A caveat is in order. A distinction needs to be made between the capability approach

as a general approach to evaluation and more specific capability theories, which can be seen

as applications of the general approach. In this paper I will be concerned only with capabilitytheories of justice, not with other applications of the capability approach. It is a matter of

some dispute whether this is a substantial restriction (given the often all-encompassing nature

of theories of justice), but it nonetheless helps to define our focus here. The hall-mark of the

application of the capability approach to justice is that it (i) uses capabilities as the relevant

metric of justice, (ii) identifies some list of basic capabilities which a political entity (most

often but not necessarily a state) must guarantee for its citizens as a matter of rights or



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entitlements1, and (iii) specifies which distributive rule it uses for distributing these basic

capabilities (Anderson 2010, 82). Along these lines several more or less worked-out

capability theories of justice have been proposed, such as those by Martha Nussbaum,

Elizabeth Anderson and Ingrid Robeyns (Nussbaum 2000; Anderson 1999; Nussbaum 2006;

Robeyns 2003). The capability theory whose embryonic core is sketched in this paper should

be understood as a competing theory. Since Nussbaum’s theory is the most worked-out

example, I will refer to it at many stages of my argument in order to clarify the contrast I have

in mind with these other theories.2

The paper is set up as follows. First I distinguish two interpretations of the capability

notion: one which sees capabilities as constitutive parts of the good life, and another which

sees capabilities as all-purpose means. The former ties the capability approach to a notion of

well-being or human flourishing, while the latter is open to other possibilities. One of these is

to treat capabilities as all-purpose means to the development of autonomy (section 1). Second

I investigate more closely Nussbaum’s explicit arguments for refusing to tie her capability

theory to autonomy. I show how they fail to provide decisive arguments against the use of a

concept of autonomy (section 2). From this point, the paper is directed to the positive case for

the move to autonomy. First I discuss which conception of autonomy fits the capability

approach best. I use a concept of autonomy inspired by Joseph Raz. His three conditions of

autonomy (personal abilities, independence and an adequate variety of options) should be at

the heart of an autonomy-developing capability theory of justice. This can be done by making

a crucial distinction between a list of primary (which guarantees personal abilities and

independence) and secondary capabilities (for an adequate variety of options). Each of these

has a different status in a theory of justice (section 3). Finally, I discuss how such a theory has

to deal with the problem of selecting the relevant primary capabilities. Here I will explore the

idea that the primary capabilities can be modeled as analogous to the items on Rawls’s list of

primary goods. This leads me to endorse a list which includes the Rawlsian basic liberties and

access to income and wealth (but also economic security in a broader sense) and adds separate

capabilities for health and education (section 4).

2. The Functionings-Choosing Role for Autonomy

The functionings-choosing role for autonomy is most often described in terms of ‘freedom’,

not ‘autonomy’. The capability approach’s commitment to freedom is the reason to endorse

1 This leaves open the question whether philosophers or democratic publics should be the ones to make

such lists. The only thing required is that a full theory would include such a list to define a just society.2 It can be a matter of dispute whether these other theories resemble Nussbaum’s theory or my theory

more closely.



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capabilities, not functionings. For example, Amartya Sen makes a distinction between well-

being and agency and a further distinction in each of these between freedom and achievement.

This generates four categories: wellbeing-freedom, well-being achievement, agency freedom

and agency achievement. According to Sen the theoretical apparatus of the capability

approach only deals with well-being, both well-being freedom (capability) and well-being

achievement (functionings)(Sen 1985, 200-203, 1992, 56, 1993, 35). In this construction the

term ‘freedom’ is reserved to mark the idea that we are free to choose which forms of well-

being (which functionings) to achieve. I think that what Sen refers to as freedom here can

well be described as an exercise in autonomy.3. That it is autonomy which is at stake in the

ability to choose functionings is perhaps brought out most clearly by Serena Olsaretti:

‘My main claim is that capability approach can plausibly be seen to adopt a model of

well-being which views the endorsement of valuable functionings as constitutive of

well-being (…). Freedom to achieve valuable functionings, as well as the freedom to

forgo them, is then an appropriate standard of individual advantage’ (Olsaretti 2005,

98).

In this view, the overall focus of the capability approach on well-being derived from

achieving functionings is maintained. A crucial component of deriving well-being from your

achieved functionings, however, is that you realize the functionings you voluntarily endorse.

The idea of voluntary endorsement (which Olsaretti explicitly relates to the work of Raz,

Dworkin and Scanlon) is nothing else than the exercise of an autonomous choice. When we

endorse a functioning, we actively put our weight behind it – it is not something that we

passively accept as happening to us. While we need not agree with the details of the

endorsement model that Olsaretti subsequently develops, her basic idea of voluntary

endorsement describes very well what we also find in Nussbaum, Sen and others when they

talk about the need for the state to realize capabilities, and leave the choice for specific

functionings to individuals.4

This role gives autonomy an important role in capability theories of justice and I will

not remove or transform it in what follows. I will however argue that it is insufficient, for the

3 Sometimes Sen himself refers to ‘positive freedom’. E.g. (Sen 2002, 586).4 It is a separate question whether such a restriction to capabilities is always tenable. For example,

Nussbaum has repeatedly argued that in some situations the state will have to make sure that citizensactually function in certain ways, instead of being satisfied to guarantee capabilities for suchfunctioning (Nussbaum 2000, 2006). I think Nussbaum is right that such exceptions to the capabilityapproach’s basic line, where direct coercion is asked for, will need to be granted. However, I also agree

with her that when this is suitably dealt with, these exceptions do not undermine the basic commitmentto restrict the theory to the realization of capabilities. I have treated this question extensively in[omitted for refereeing].



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functionings-choosing role leaves intact the capability approach’s strong commitment to a

theory of the objective human good in deciding which capabilities to function are to count as

basic. Capabilities are constitutive parts of the good life. I will call this the objective good

interpretation of functionings (and thus also of capabilities to these functionings). This

interpretation pervades Nussbaum’s capability theory, especially in her earlier work. In one

typical remark, she states that the capabilities are ‘not just instrumental to further pursuits:

they are held to have value in themselves, in making the life that includes them fully human’

(Nussbaum 2000, 74). To bring out this idea, we can best look at an earlier article, in which

Nussbaum argued for a broadly Aristotelian strategy to answer the challenge of relativism.

This strategy involves three steps:

‘What he [Aristotle, author] does, in each case, is to isolate a sphere of human

experience that figures in more or less any human life, and in which more or less any

human being will have to make some choices rather than others, and act in some way

rather than some other. (…) Aristotle then asks, what is it to choose and respond well

within that sphere? And what is it to choose defectively? The ‘thin account’ of each

virtue is that it is whatever being stably disposed to act appropriately in that sphere

consists in. There may be, and usually are, various competing specifications of what

acting well, in each case, in fact comes to. Aristotle goes on to defend in each case

some specification, producing, at the end, a full or ‘thick’ definition of the virtue.’

(Nussbaum 1993, 245)

The identification of different ‘spheres of existence’ is the key to this strategy. The idea of

good (virtuous) action is to be defined relative to each sphere of existence. Examples of

Aristotelian spheres that Nussbaum mentions are ‘fear of important damages, especially

death’ (appropriate virtue for this sphere: courage), ‘bodily appetites and their pleasures’

(virtue: moderation), ‘distribution of limited resources’ (virtue: justice), etc. In the remainder

of her article, Nussbaum defends this procedure against the relativist and makes it clear thatshe has a similar strategy in mind for her capability-oriented (rather than virtue-oriented)

theory: it puts forwards conceptions of what it means to be well-functioning in the most

important spheres of human existence. If we follow this argumentative strategy, the basic

capabilities are clearly constitutive parts of the good life – each capability with respect to

another sphere of existence. The good life, for Nussbaum, is defined as a ‘fully human life’ –

her criterion of selecting basic capabilities is to ask which capabilities we cannot do without,

on pain of not recognizing our life as a fully human life (Nussbaum 1990, 1995). The length

and definiteness of Nussbaum’s list of basic capabilities can be seen as making explicit the

consequences of such an appeal to a criterion of human flourishing.



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The centrality of such a theory of the objective good creates obvious problems of

perfectionism. The ambition to prescribe, in each sphere of experience, what the relevant

capability should be and to make the ensuing list the cornerstone of citizen entitlements to

government action, has been taken by many as a sign that the capability approach is

objectionably perfectionist.5 For example, Eric Nelson recently argued that the celibate, the

misanthrope, the Christian Scientist and others could reasonably complain that Nussbaum’s

capability list includes items that are offensive to them (capabilities to sexual satisfaction,

affiliation and use of certain medicines). The standard move that they do not have to act upon

their capabilities doesn’t help, Nelson claims, since these people are nonetheless required to

fund a state that guarantees the actual ability to exercise the functionings to all: ‘even if I

myself consider sex to be sinful, I am required to fund somebody else’s Viagra’ (Nelson

2008, 100). This criticism seems to me convincing. The objective good interpretation, in

prescribing a specific account of the good life, does overreach the boundaries of what a

political community should be expected to do for its citizens, even if it only provides for

capabilities. The fact that it provides certain capabilities and not others makes for substantive

commitments that some citizens would rightly reject. It is important, though, to be clear about

where actually the problem lies.

The problem starts when a political community shows a commitment to certain moral

ideals even when it only promotes certain capabilities to realize specific functionings. Such a

commitment is evident from the fact that it chooses to promote these capabilities and not

others. Any list is in that sense non-neutral. It is telling that Nussbaum never seriously

discussed what it would mean for a state to actually give people capabilities to many of the

things on her list. Why should the state make sure people are ‘able to laugh’ (part of her

capability to play), ‘able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the

world of nature’ (her capability for ‘other species’), or ‘to love those who love and care for

us’ (part of her capability for ‘emotions’)? Does Nussbaum think that modern states already

are preoccupied with these kinds of things? (so that her list codifies actual practices). Many of

these things may be important for a lot of citizens (though not all: some serious types havelittle interest in laughing, some metropolitan types have no interest in nature, etc.). But even if

the moral value of these capabilities is widely recognized, that does not mean that there is a

political obligation to realize them. What is lacking is a separate argument for the political

importance of these capabilities. In many cases, such an argument would be hard to make.

Practically, the state may not be best placed to realize them. Principally, the problem is in the

5 Although not always expressed in these terms, see (Arneson 2000) (Nelson 2008) (Jaggar 2006)

(Okin 2003)



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thick account of well-being that many items on Nussbaum’s list express. They remain

controversial for at least part of the population.

If the objective good interpretation would be the only interpretation available, this

criticism would be fatal to the capability approach as a whole. This is what Richard Arneson

has claimed. He argues that for a full theory of justice it needs to be possible to rank the

relevant capabilities objectively, ‘according to the well-being value of each functioning’

(Arneson 2010, 108). As far as I know, it is agreed by almost all commentators that the

capability approach presupposes a list of objectively valuable functionings. Sen developed the

capability approach, after all, as an alternative to subjective measures (such as utility or

preference). Now the trick is that Arneson equates such an objective ranking with a ranking of

objective good or objective well-being (or again, ‘an objective standard for assessing quality

of life’, 2010, 115). Other options do not occur to him. It seems to be impossible for him – as

for others – to detach the idea of well-being from the capability approach. Functionings

represent individuals’ well-being, that’s their whole point. But since it is the theory of

objective well-being that makes the capability approach so controversial as a normative

political theory, it is important to see if other interpretations are possible.

We can save the capability approach if we give the concepts of capabilities and

functionings a different interpretation; not as objective goods but as primary goods. Such a

primary good interpretation of capabilities has indeed been hinted at in Nussbaum’s more

recent writings, where she has claimed that the basic capabilities are very close to primary

goods, and that it is ‘rational to want them whatever else one wants’ (Nussbaum 2000, 88). It

seems that Nussbaum thinks these interpretations can simply be juxtaposed. I think, however,

that this cannot be right.6 For Rawls primary goods are means to ensure that each person can

realize the conception of the good of her own choosing.7 Nussbaum, however, cannot give the

same answer, at least not as long as she also wants to maintain the objective good

interpretation of the capabilities notion. For in the latter interpretation the substantive question

of the good life is not relegated to individuals’ choices, but it consists of a well-specified list

of basic capabilities (where the only choice left is whether or not to convert these capabilitiesinto functionings).

Thus, the objective good interpretation and the primary good interpretation of

capabilities are incompatible. Since Nussbaum doesn’t acknowledge this incompatibility, she

hasn’t faced the question what a consistent primary good interpretation of the capabilities

would mean for the other parts of her – or any other – capability theory. In the final sections I

6 I here use Rawls’ original formulation and ignore Rawls’s later reformulation of primary goods as

‘things citizens need as free and equal persons’, to fit his turn to political liberalism. See (Rawls 2005[1993], 180) For the problem with the latter formulation see (Nelson 2008, 114)7 This is his thin theory of the good. See (Rawls 1999 [1971])



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will defend a specific version of the primary good interpretation, according to which the

capabilities are all-purpose means to the development of personal autonomy. However, first I

will discuss two distinct reasons Nussbaum has given for not tying her theory more closely to

the concept of autonomy. I will argue that we need not accept these reasons, but I will also

show that Nussbaum does raise two concerns that an autonomy-based capability theory needs

to address. Thus, this discussion provides us with an agenda of challenges for an autonomy-

based capability theory.

2. Nussbaum’s Criticisms of Autonomy

In earlier work Nussbaum argued that the basic capabilities on her list are generated through

an interpretation of the concept of ‘human nature’; by asking what it is for a life to be fully

human.8 She presented this notion of humanness explicitly as an alternative to a liberal notion

of autonomy. Here is how she counters the objection that her Aristotelian conception is

neglectful of autonomy:

‘the Aristotelian insists that choice is not pure spontaneity, flourishing independently of

material and social conditions. If one cares about autonomy, then one must care about the

rest of the form of life that supports it and the material conditions that enable one to live

that form of life. Thus the Aristotelian claims that her own comprehensive concern with

flourishing across all areas of life is a better way of promoting choice than is the liberal’s

narrower concern with spontaneity alone, which sometimes tolerates situations in which

individuals are in other ways cut off from the fully human use of their faculties.’

(Nussbaum 1992, 225-226)

In this passage, it seems to me, Nussbaum presents a false opposition between her

Aristotelianism and liberalism. It is not the case that one must either resort to a liberal theory

which is neglectful of the ‘material and social conditions’ of autonomy or endorse anAristotelian theory which promotes such conditions through a vision of flourishing in all areas

8 I leave out of consideration her more recent assimilation of her theory to Rawlsian political liberalism, by which the list of capabilities is thought to represent part of an overlapping consensus. The strategyof political liberalism, geared as it is towards the elucidation of the political values inherent in actually

existing democratic societies, seems to me to be obviously at odds with he capability approach’suniversalist aspirations. Moreover, Nussbaum nowhere makes clear how her conversion to politicalliberalism affects her capability theory; it is apparently to be simply attached to the robust Aristotelianframework without necessitating any changes in the framework. This seems to me unconvincing.

Similarly, for a rejection of the view that Nussbaum succeeds in being a political liberal (which I share)and an argument that Nussbaum already is a comprehensive liberal (which I would deny), see (Barclay2003)



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of life. By contrast, a liberal can very well be concerned with the material and social

conditions of autonomy without resorting to this kind of Aristotelianism. She can do so by

listing conditions which enhance the capacity for choice, to be used in all areas of life,

without defining flourishing in all these areas.

The crucial distinction which allows the liberal this ‘third way’ between the formal

type of liberalism that Nussbaum sets up only to reject and her own thick Aristotelianism, is

the distinction between the development of autonomy and its exercise. For Nussbaum

autonomy is apparently only realized if one has the opportunity for flourishing in all areas of

life: in the passage above this is treated as a necessary means of acquiring the material and

social conditions mentioned. However, this overstates what is necessary for building up

autonomy, potentially assigning to all these spheres an autonomy-developing function. In

many actions in many spheres of a life we are not so much developing our capacity for

autonomy, but rather exercising it in this or that way. If I am right about the importance of

this distinction, then the liberal has a strong argument when he complains to the Aristotelian

that he wants to prescribe how persons should flourish in all areas of life instead of leaving

this to their own choices. Instead, the capability theory should be geared towards the

realization of those capabilities which necessarily contribute to the development of personal

autonomy.

When taking this route, the liberal has a ‘perfectionist’ goal: that of giving people the

opportunity to develop their autonomy. In other words, he does recognize a conception of the

good life, i.e. the good life is a life led autonomously. Compared to other perfectionist

conceptions, this conception of the good life is the most liberal one available, since it leaves

more room for people to choose their ends in life than any other conception. This does raise

the question how an autonomy-based capability theory would distinguish between capabilities

which develop autonomy and capabilities in which autonomy is merely exercised; and

whether the latter have a role to play in such a capability theory at all. This is a first item on

our agenda, which I will take up below (see section 3).

In a more recent exchange with Linda Barclay, Nussbaum has given a second reasonfor rejecting a fundamental role for a concept of autonomy. Here, faithful to her political

liberal turn, Nussbaum is anxious to refute Barclay’s contention that she is a comprehensive

liberal.9 She points to the specific Western tradition of the idea of autonomy, and argues that

it includes the idea ‘that one denies that God is a necessary part of the justification of moral

9 Barclay had based this claim mainly on the fact that Nussbaum argues in favour of capabilities, not

functionings. As I have argued earlier in this paper, I do not believe that this functionings-choosing rolefor autonomy is sufficiently strong. Whether or not it is sufficient to qualify for the label

‘comprehensive liberal’ is a matter that depends on one’s definition of comprehensive liberalism.However, I do find it strange that Barclay thinks Nussbaum’s theory – with its elaborate moralanthropology – is just aimed at realizing the value of autonomous choice.



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claims’ (Nussbaum 2003, 41). Since this notion of autonomy is unacceptable to some

(reasonable) religious comprehensive doctrines, Nussbaum rejects it. Instead and partly to

compensate for this, she emphasizes that her list does include the capability for practical

reason: everybody should have the ability to ‘form a conception of the good and to engage in

critical reflection about the planning of one’s life’ (Nussbaum 2003, 39).

In reply, we should start by recognizing that the historical notion of autonomy that

Nussbaum has in mind, however important, is highly specific. The contemporary literature on

autonomy contains an overwhelming amount of different notions of autonomy. None of them

a priori has a less legitimate claim to be ‘the’ notion of autonomy than the one that Nussbaum

associates autonomy with. This throws doubts on a strategy which takes a highly specific

interpretation of autonomy and then concludes from one of its alleged unsatisfactory features

(i.e. a certain dismissiveness towards religion) that autonomy as such is to be rejected. Maybe,

however, her rejection of this specific notion of autonomy is not of so much importance if we

can put the emphasis on the other half of her strategy, that autonomy is already included in the

form of the capability for practical reason. This may be especially so since she has argued that

this somehow is a privileged capability (together with the capability for sociability) in that it

‘suffuses’ all the other capabilities (Nussbaum 2000, 82). Doesn’t that guarantee a sufficiently

strong place for autonomy in the capability theory?

The problem with this strategy is that the inclusion of many of the other capabilities

besides practical reason remains contentious (for the reasons given in section 1). These other

capabilities contribute to well-being, but it is not clear why states should, as a matter of

justice, make sure that people have opportunities for choosing these welfare improvements.

Of course we might imagine a capability theory which would have removed all these other

capabilities from the list, so that we now have a one-item list, with only the capability for

practical reason on it. Don’t we have what we want then? In a sense, we do. Such a capability

theory would restrict itself to the development of autonomy. However, such a one-item list

would be uninformative. It is not enough to state at a higher level of abstraction that the

capability for practical reason is to be promoted; what we want to know is how this abstractcapability for practical reason is to be promoted; i.e. what more specific capabilities are

needed to realize it (and some capabilities on Nussbaum’s list may be necessary to that end).

In other words, we are looking for a list of autonomy-developing capabilities, with

autonomy (or practical reason) itself as the relevant background criterion (replacing

Nussbaum’s elusive criterion of human flourishing). What we need to start with, then, is a

conception of autonomy itself, which is going to inform our list. This is the other item on our

agenda, which I will now start with.

3. A Capability Conception of Autonomy



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In a broad sense the concept of personal autonomy refers to the idea that ‘people should make

their own lives (…) The ideal of personal autonomy is the vision of people controlling, to

some degree, their own destiny, fashioning it through successive decisions throughout their

lives’ (Raz 1986, 369). This idea can be developed in several directions and there are many

details that would have to be defended for a full theory of autonomy. In this section I can only

offer some main clarifications to show what kind of conception of autonomy would be

suitable as the guiding criterion in a capability theory of justice. This will inevitably leave

room for further differentiations and disagreements, but the main aim is to present a

conception of autonomy which is sufficiently determinate to show the attractions of an

autonomy-based capability theory.

A good starting-point is Joel Feinberg’s distinction between four different meanings

of the word autonomy: as the capacity to govern oneself, as the actual condition of self-

government, as an ideal of character, and as the sovereign right to govern oneself (Feinberg

1986, 28). An autonomy-based capability theory would combine Feinberg’s first and fourth

senses of autonomy. Its final goal, as a normative political theory, is to ensure people’s right

to self-government. It ensures this right by giving them the capacity to govern themselves. If

people so disposed act upon their capacity they will find themselves in an actual condition of

self-government (Feinberg’s second sense of autonomy). Whether or not this is what they do,

however, is outside of the capability theory’s concern, strictly speaking. The capability theory

only guarantees the right to the capacity for self-government.10

The next question is what that

capacity entails.

To answer that question, it is useful to distinguish two components to autonomy (here

and hereafter I use the word in Feinberg’s first sense: as the capacity for self-government). An

often-used distinction is that autonomy involves two crucial abilities: the capacity to form and

revise one’s plan of life and the capacity to realize this plan in one’s actions. The first part has

to do with the agents’ preferences, beliefs, and reasons for them and their internal coherence

in a plan of life. It asks for the agents’ control in the process of forming and revising this plan.The second part asks for control at the moment when in our actual course of life we try to

realize this plan. Both parts are crucial and belong together. There is a lack of autonomy both

when we are the slave to our own conception of the good and when we are unable to realize

this conception. The next question is which conditions for autonomy have to be present for an

individual to possess these two components of autonomy.

10 Such a restricted ambition also means that the capability theory does not treat autonomy as a moral

ideal (Feinberg’s third sense). It only treats the opportunity to live autonomously as a moral ideal.



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To that end the three conditions of autonomy presented by Joseph Raz are useful (Raz

1986, 372-378). First Raz states there have to be ‘appropriate mental abilities’. I would prefer

to call these ‘personal abilities’, a term encompassing the necessary cognitive but also

emotional and volitional abilities for forming, revising and executing a life plan, with all the

perseverance and strategic rationality that may be necessary.11 Second, there is what Raz calls

‘independence’, which is violated both by manipulation and by coercion. Manipulation refers

to an interference with the formation of one’s plan of life (or one of the beliefs, preferences

etc. underlying that plan), while coercion interferes with the execution of that plan. Third, we

need an ‘adequate range of options’. When we form a life plan we need to be aware of

different possible life choices (e.g. several different career options), and when we execute the

plan these options need to be actually open to us. Both their availability in reality and their

availability in our imagination are to be included in this demand. As this brief overview

hopefully makes clear, all three conditions of autonomy each help to realize both components

of autonomy.

With these general clarifications about autonomy in mind, we can now turn to the

connection with capability theory. At the heart of a capability theory of justice is a list of

basic capabilities which each citizen is entitled to. In the present theory these basic

capabilities are those that develop the capacity for autonomy. This would mean that as a first

step we need to make sure that together these basic capabilities cover the content of Raz’s

three conditions of autonomy. The conditions of autonomy will have to be ‘translated’ into

capabilities with the same content. I propose to treat the first two conditions are the proper

subject of the list of basic capabilities. These basic capabilities ensure that people have the

requisite personal abilities and independence. How to devise such a list probably is the

biggest challenge to the development of an autonomy-based capability theory. This matter I

will treat separately in the next section. For the moment presuppose that we succeed in

establishing a satisfactory list of autonomy-developing capabilities. We then face the question

of how to deal with the third condition, of an adequate range of options. Of course there is the

pernicious question of how much variety of options is ‘adequate’ (a problem for capabilityand non-capability theories alike). More pertinent to our problem of how to structure an

autonomy-based capability theory of justice is whether the guarantee of such a range of

options should be a political obligation in the same way that this is true for Raz’s first two

conditions. I do not think this is the case. This asymmetry is reason to treat the third condition

separately.

11 I will leave it open what these precise abilities are and how they relate to ‘the self’. It is here that

there is room for dispute, following the discussions in the literature on personal autonomy. Accordingto Christman, the standard conception of autonomy involves both ‘authentic conditions’ and‘competency conditions’ (Christman and Anderson 2005, 3).



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Inclusion on the basic list would make this condition, like the other two, an

entitlement for citizens to be guaranteed by the relevant political authority. Normally however

these options are not created by political authorities, but by citizens themselves in the exercise

of their autonomy. Just to mention one example, normally governments are not involved in

the creation of any particular occupation, let alone a wide range of sufficiently differing

occupations available on the labour market. What occupations are created and what vanish,

depends on the spontaneous processes of economic life, where market demand, technological

developments and other factors together determine the outlook of the division of labor at any

point in time. If all works well, this spontaneous process will by itself create a sufficient

variety of occupations to choose from. If so, it seems eccentric to ask the government to keep

open any particular option, just because one citizen insists on this particular option. If an

occupation vanishes, those who would like to hold it will simply have to deal with the

consequences (the argument similarly applies to other areas of life: options for practicing

different religions, different hobbies, different forms of family life, etc.).

As a consequence, citizens in a just society will normally have two sets of

capabilities. The basic – or as I will call them henceforth – primary capabilities are given by a

fixed and finite list of capabilities corresponding to the autonomy conditions of personal

ability and independence. These are the subject of entitlements to be safeguarded by political

authority. Separate from that, there is an endless and ever-changing list of secondary

capabilities to which citizens will have access because other citizens have created them

through the free exercise of their capacity for autonomy. In modern societies this list will

feature ‘the capability to become an accountant’ and ‘the capability to become a computer

programmer’, while in earlier times these items would not have been on the list, while others

– such as ‘the capability to become a weaver’ or ‘the capability to become an alchemist’ –

would (this is not to say that access to these occupations is, or ever was, unconditional). With

such a split between primary and secondary capabilities, we can do justice to the distinction

between autonomy development and autonomy exercise and give theoretical expression to the

idea that the political responsibilities are different for each of them.This however doesn’t mean that there are no political obligations with respect to the

secondary capabilities at all. I have only stated that there is no direct political responsibility to

guarantee entitlements to them, as for the primary capabilities. But there are two more indirect

responsibilities which I would propose to acknowledge.12

First, while the creation of an

adequate range of secondary capabilities can be left to the spontaneous processes of civil

12 This indirect line of argument is a less perfectionist alternative to Raz’ insistence that government

should directly promote valuable options. This feature of his theory has been criticized as overly perfectionist or even conservative. See (Brink 2000, 70-71), (Mulhall and Swift 1996, 334-336), (Neal1994, 47),(Waldron 1989, 1131).



13

society, there may be a political task in making sure that each citizen is aware of these

options. Some citizens may be situated in a social environments which restricts their horizon

of experience, so that they are unaware of many important options open to them. In these

cases political authorities may have to step in to increase their awareness of these options.

This may alternatively be conceived as falling under the creation of ‘independence’

(removing social barriers which manipulate their consciousness) so that it is already in the

remit of the primary capabilities. Even if thus conceptualized it remains however important to

note that the creation of independence explicitly has as of one of its subjects the awareness of

the available secondary capabilities. A second indirect political responsibility arises when

spontaneous processes for whatever reason fail to deliver an adequate range of secondary

capabilities. One can imagine that in certain extreme cases civil society fails, whether due to

natural disasters, dominating social groups or any other cause. If the range of available

options becomes particularly sparse and monotonous, one can imagine that political

authorities would have to play a stimulating role. A satisfactory account of this responsibility

(which I cannot give here) here would show both the opportunities and limitations of this kind

of political action.

This is, in very rough sketch, what a capability-selecting role for autonomy could

look like. In conclusion I would like to draw attention to the fact that this makes the

functionings-choosing role for autonomy to appear in a different light as well. According to

that role, individuals exercise autonomous choices to what extent to convert their primary and

their secondary capabilities into achieved functioning. The conversion of the primary

capabilities is especially interesting. Since these are now interpreted as autonomy-developing

capabilities, an individual who makes full use of his primary capabilities comes to in life in a

realized state of full autonomy (i.e. autonomy in Feinberg’s second sense). An individual who

makes only partial use of his primary capabilities will be in such a state to a lesser extent. He

will have the capacity for autonomous living to the same extent (since that it guaranteed

across the board), but will not seize upon that capacity at every turn. For example, he may

decide to leave decisions in a certain area of his life to authorities to which he submitshimself. The capacity for autonomy is a global capacity. Its possession is perfectly compatible

with more local decisions not to exercise a specific personal ability for autonomy (Raz’s first

condition) or not to insist upon his independence (Raz’s second condition) in a specific area

of life.

In this way, the capability theory’s core distinction between capability and

functioning neatly maps onto the distinction between a formal and a more substantive notion

of autonomy (Dworkin 1988, 12). Every citizen is formally autonomous, and can decide for

himself whether or not to lead a more substantively autonomous life. This allows the

autonomy-based capability theory to immunize itself against the prominent criticism of



14

theories which adhere to a too substantive notion of autonomy as a life of self-realization.13

This capability theory allows but does not require such a life. On the other hand, it becomes

equally invulnerable to those who think that a formal notion is too meager for a theory of

justice. Such a formal notion allows individuals a more substantively autonomous life. The

capability theory proposed here has the theoretical resources to accommodate both the formal

and the substantive notion of autonomy into its edifice, with the autonomous choice of

individuals themselves as the bridge which holds both notions together.

4. The Selection of Primary Capabilities

I now have to turn to the task that I have postponed so far, to discuss how to select autonomy-

developing capabilities. The suggestion that I want to explore in this section is that we should

take the idea of capabilities as analogous to primary goods more literally than we have done

so far.

Up to this point the analogy consisted of the fact that capabilities, like primary goods,

should be seen as ‘all-purpose means’ (see section 1). In the literature on the relation between

(basic) capabilities and primary goods as respective metrics of justice, the emphasis has been

laid on the difference between the two. The main difference is that capabilities, unlike

primary goods (or ‘resources’ more generally) do justice to individual variations in the ability

to convert these resources into a successful life. This difference however does not prevent us

from constructing a theory in which the list of primary capabilities is analogous to the list of

primary goods in a stricter sense: the same items that feature on the list of primary goods then

feature on a list of capabilities.

The reason why this suggestion is worth exploring is that Rawls’s list of primary

goods was originally meant to establish the same purpose as the capability theory proposed

here: to enable people to live a life of their own choosing. Rawls’s thin theory of the good

runs parallel to the conception of autonomy specified in the previous section (even if not all

the details match). So if Rawlsian primary goods serve to make people autonomous (in histerms), why not establish a list of primary capabilities which make people autonomous (in the

sense defended here)? Rawls’s list of primary goods contains five items (abbreviated

presentation):

(i) the basic rights and liberties

13 The autonomy notion to which Nussbaum objected (see section 2), is an example of this. But a

similar criticism of a substantive autonomy notion inspired Rawls’ and Larmore’s turn to politicalliberalism (Rawls 2005 [1993]) (Larmore 1987). The capability approach doesn’t have to make such aturn.



15

(ii) freedom of movement and free choice of occupation

(iii) powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of authority and responsibility

(iv)

income and wealth

(v)

the social bases of self-respect.14

Could these primary goods be converted into primary capabilities? If so, the resulting

capability theory would retain the advantage of catering to individual variability (compared to

their primary good formulation), while it would avoid the criticism of perfectionism of a more

extensive list (like Nussbaum’s). We can discuss this question by distinguishing three

categories of potential primary capabilities.

First there are certain primary goods for which it may be easy to translate them in the

language of capabilities, namely, those primary goods which are themselves described in

terms of liberties (categories i, ii and iii above). Nussbaum had already made this step by

including the political liberties on her list of basic capabilities (capability 10: ‘being able to

participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political

participation, protections of free speech and association’). In a similar way we can take the

civil and political liberties as items on an autonomy-based list of primary capabilities. After

all, capabilities are freedoms, i.e. opportunities to enjoy freedom of movement, of association,

of speech, etc. We might say the basic liberties are already capability-like items on Rawls’s

list of primary goods. They are included on our capability list mainly to satisfy Raz’ second

condition of autonomy: independence. The basic liberties serve to make possible a sphere of

free action for each individual, where he/she can follow his own life plan without interference

by others.15

In a second category we find items on Rawls’s list of primary goods which are not so

readily translatable into analogous capabilities. These are the primary goods of income and

wealth and the social bases of self-respect (categories iv and v). I will leave the latter out of

consideration here.16

Income and wealth however are of special importance, since they are the

most ‘resourcist’ of all primary goods. Those working within the capability approach havedenied that income and wealth are of direct importance with respect to measurements of

14 (Rawls 2001, 58-59)15 [add discussion of what it means to have their ‘fair value’ (Rawls) and whether individual variationin having these capabilities plays a role in the capability theory].16

The status of this primary good has always remained controversial in Rawls, probably because –unlike the other primary goods – it doesn’t play a role in his two principles of justice. Rather, itunderlies these others, especially the basis liberties (Rawls: ‘the basis for self-respect in a just society isnot then one’s income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties’

(Rawls 1999 [1971], 477)). I propose therefore not to treat this as a separate primary capability. Just asfor Rawls self-respect emerges in an otherwise just society which delivers the requisite primary goods,so it will emerge in a society which guarantees people’s autonomy-based primary capabilities.



16

justice. The argument has always been that one cannot measure people’s freedom (in terms of

their capability sets) by measuring their incomes. If justice is to be measured in terms of

people’s capabilities, then, there seems to be no role for an analogous primary capability.

Should we simply omit this item? It seems to me that that would underestimate the role

income and wealth play in the development of people’s autonomy. The condition of

independence does not just require that one’s basic liberties are secured. Such a situation still

leaves all kinds of dependences in the private sphere. If there is to be independence in the full

sense of the term, then, a certain level of income and wealth may very well be seen as a

prerequisite. This guarantees the kind of social and economic standing that is necessary to

speak up against these private others and risk conflicts with them (family members, powerful

individuals within one’s community or at work, etc.).

If independence has such preconditions in the socio-economic sphere, the relevant

primary capability should probably be broadened, not just to include income and wealth, but

‘economic security’ in a wider sense. This term would then encompass a subset of specific

capabilities which guarantee security. Just to mention one example, a sufficient level of

income and wealth make it possible for one to quit one’s job if one has a conflict with one’s

employer: it gives one an exit-option from any specific position and guarantees independence

in this sense. But to use this exit-option is an often painful option of the last resort.

Independence at one’s work arguably should include more protections than the protection

offered by one’s bank account. For example, if one has been the victim of sexual harassment

by a colleague, there should also by a legal remedy to fight against this kind of conduct, not

just the option of leaving. Thus, I conclude that a primary capability for economic security

should be on the list, comprising the ability to earn or receive a sufficient level of income and

wealth but going beyond this to include other safeguards for independence (I leave open the

details of these here).

A third category is those items which do not figure on Rawls’s list primary goods, but

which should arguably be included on the list of primary capabilities. Here we take

inspiration from those which criticized Rawls for not acknowledging certain goods as primary, and see if they are candidates for primary capabilities as well. I will restrict myself to

two of them (there might be more). Rawls has been reproached not to have added health care

and education on his list. Whether or not that is correct, these must surely figure on our list of

primary capabilities (Daniels 2010; Brighouse and Unterhalter 2010). Opportunities for

education and health care are two of the main ingredients which safeguard the personal

abilities necessary for autonomy (Raz’s first condition). Good education helps develop the

cognitive, emotional and volitional qualities which together make it possible for adults to

form a conception of the good and live one’s life according to it. Good health care helps to

ward off threats against these abilities; in as far as this is within human competence at all. As



17

primary capabilities, the political obligations towards education and health care can be fine-

tuned to take account of individual variations in people’s possibilities to take advantage of

these resources.17

Finally, after we have established a list of primary capabilities there is the question of

the relevant distribution rule. Nussbaum has argued that the capability approach is a

sufficientarian approach, which seeks to guarantee each of the basic capabilities up to a

certain threshold level (Nussbaum 2006). This fits well with the idea that all of the conditions

of autonomy admit of degrees. As is a commonplace in the autonomy literature, one can have

the personal abilities, independence and adequate range of options to a smaller or larger

extent. Accordingly, one can be more or less autonomous. This idea naturally leads to a

sufficientarian distribution rule for the primary capabilities. We will need to set a minimal

threshold level of autonomy, which the state is to provide for its citizens and then translate

this into thresholds for each specific primary capability. Where exactly these thresholds

should lie, is beyond the reach of this paper. We can only determine after we have established

a more definitive basic list, the exact importance of each basic capability to the overall goal of

autonomy, and above all, what level of autonomy itself we judge to be minimally acceptable

in our society.

Conclusion

This paper has argued for taking the concept of autonomy as central to the development of a

capability theory of justice. In such a theory a conception of autonomy serves to select a list

of primary capabilities as well as certain indirect political obligations towards secondary

capabilities. In addition it leaves room for people’s autonomous choice to convert these

capabilities into actual functionings, thereby deepening their politically guaranteed capacity

for autonomy into a substantively autonomous life, to the extent they judge fitting. Thus the

notion of well-being loses its separate theoretical standing in the capability theory. Arguably,

an autonomous life brings well-being to the person living it because of it being autonomouslychosen. This however is not the primary focus of the theory. Just societies are not directly

responsible for the well-being of their citizens, but merely for their freedom to live a good

life.

17 Apart from health-care and education, arguably the personal abilities for autonomy are alsodeveloped in the most intimate private sphere, the family (and in a circle of friends, neighbours, etc.).

Direct interference in this sphere is a more delicate matter from a political point of view. So we wouldhave to recognize some indirect political obligation to step in once this sphere fails heavily to providewhat it should in this respect. This is probably not best conceptualized as a primary capability itself.



18

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