civil law cases
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Constitutional Law: Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) Publication in the Official Gazette (Enforceability of a Statute) FACTS: Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition. ISSUE: Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and enforceable. HELD: Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and validity. The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect. TAADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
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ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD: The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
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G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa
Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30
September 1987 denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision in said case had become
final; and the second Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as
required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did
not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still
resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned by
petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private
respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a
daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of
its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing
facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon.
Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and
awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was
affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy
of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day
of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file
a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the
Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on
September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
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This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA
461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot
be extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July
30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly
enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed
with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the
Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or
deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate
and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the
grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of
the Courts Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within
which the rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as
yet, not strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within
the grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No.
73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners motion for extension of time was filed on September
9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence,
it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding
said rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to
apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official
Gazette as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary
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to petitioners view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in
the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective.
It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions
of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated,
and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial courts decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring
shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
of last clear chance, which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this
case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for
lack of merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
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DIGEST: he firewall of a burned out building owned by Felisa De Roy collapsed and
destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of Luis Bernal resulting in injuries and
even to the death of Bernals daughter. De Roy claimed that Bernal had been warned prior
hand but that she was ignored.
In the RTC, De Roy was found guilty of gross negligence. She appealed but the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC. On the last day of filing a motion for reconsideration, De Roys
counsel filed a motion for extension. It was denied by the CA. The CA ruled that pursuant to
the case of Habaluyas Enterprises vs Japzon (August 1985), the fifteen-day period for
appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
De Roys counsel however argued that the Habaluyas case should not be applicable because
said ruling was never published in the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette
before they can be binding.
HELD: No. There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the Official
Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the
SCRA and law journals.
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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION G.R. No. 158761
ADMINISTRATION,
Petitioner, Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
December 4, 2007
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
For review under Rule 45 are the March 6, 2003 Decision[1] and June 10, 2003
Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769, which
dismissed petitioners appeal of the July 23, 2001 Order[3] of the Pagadian City
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Civil Case No. 4282-2K, and denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, respectively.
On November 13, 2000, respondent Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for membership in the Board of Directors of Zamboanga
del Sur II Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II (ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the
screening committee resolved to disqualify respondent because his spouse was an
incumbent member of theSangguniang Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del
Sur. Based on the Electric Cooperative Election Code (ECEC), promulgated by
petitioner National Electrification Administration (NEA), a candidate whose spouse
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occupies an elective government position higher than Barangay Captain is prohibited
to run as director of an electric cooperative. ZAMSURECOs by-laws, however, do
not provide for such ground for disqualification.[4]
On November 21, 2000, respondent filed a Petition for Prohibition and
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 4282-2K with the Pagadian City RTC.
ZAMSURECO filed a Motion to Dismiss and Answer on November 24, 2000,
which the RTC denied. However, it issued a temporary restraining order, ordering
ZAMSURECOs officials to refrain from conducting the election for directorship set
on December 2, 2000.
The RTC said that the petition was dismissible because of the failure of
respondent to exhaust all administrative remedies, as required by Section 2, 2.C of
the ECEC Guidelines on the Conduct of District Elections for Electric Cooperative.
The section required that a protest arising from disqualification shall be filed with
the screening committeein not less than FIVE (5) days before the election. The
screening committee shall decide the protest within FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from
receipt thereof. Failure of the applicant to file his/her protest within the above-cited
period shall be deemed a waiver of his right to protest.[5]
As observed by the RTC, respondent had urgently filed the petition
on November 21, 2000 because the election sought to be restrained was going to be
held on December 2, 2000 and November 20 was a holiday. Under the
circumstances, respondent had little time to exhaust the remedy in Sec. 2 of the
Guidelines, such that an exception could be made. More importantly, according to
the RTC, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies cannot be invoked in the
instant case since the guidelines prescribing the administrative remedy is a subject
matter of the ECEC, which is at issue, and is exactly what is being sought to be
invalidated.[6]
On December 12, 2000, respondent filed a motion to withdraw the amended
petition, and to admit a second amended petition that impleaded NEA as
indispensable party.Respondent also averred that the ECEC was null and void
because it had not been published. On December 20, 2000, the RTC admitted the
second amended petition, issued a writ of preliminary injunction to prevent the
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conduct of election for directorship, issued summons to NEA, and required NEA to
comment if the ECEC was published in any newspaper of general circulation.[7]
On January 29, 2001, NEA filed a motion for extension of time to file an
answer, and subsequently on April 10, 2001, a Motion for Leave to Admit Pleading
to which a Motion to Dismiss was attached. NEA questioned the jurisdiction of the
RTC and alleged that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.[8]
In its July 23, 2001 Order,[9] the RTC denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss
for being filed out of time. More importantly, it noted NEAs failure to state whether
the ECEC was indeed published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by
the New Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. The RTC said the failure
rendered the ECEC null and void. As regards the lack of jurisdiction and non-
exhaustion of administrative remedies, the RTC noted that NEA erroneously relied
on Sec. 59 of Presidential Decree No. (PD) 269 and misapplied the cases it cited.
According to the RTC, Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to order, ruling or decision
of the NEA in the exercise of NEAs quasi-judicial functions. And the RTC noted
that Secs. 51 to 58 refer to hearings, investigations, and procedures. On the other
hand, the validity of the ECEC, subject of the instant petition, was an exercise of
NEAs quasi-legislative function or rule-making authority.
Further, according to the RTC, NEA took Sec. 58 of PD 269 out of context
when it said Sec. 58 dealt with the administrative remedy available to petitioner. It
said that Sec. 58 presupposed a ruling or decision of the NEA and there was none in
the case before it. The RTC ruled in favor of Gonzaga, and ordered ZAMSURECO
to accept Gonzagas certificate of candidacy for director.[10] The RTC denied NEAs
motion for reconsideration.
The CA Ruled that the Courts Have Jurisdiction Over
Issues on Legality of Codes
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. The CA denied due course and
dismissed the petition. It said that NEA was not exercising its quasi-judicial powers
but its rule-making authority. In the case before the trial court, the CA stressed that
the issue involved the interpretation of the ECEC, and to this extent, NEA had no
jurisdiction because the issue is within the province of the courts.
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The CA denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its June 10,
2003 Resolution. Hence, we have this petition.
The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
SECTION 59 OF P.D. 269
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING
THE TRIAL COURTS NULLIFICATION OF THE ECEC
Issues Involving NEAs Rule-Making Authority
Are Cognizable by Regular Courts
The petition has no merit.
Sec. 59 of PD 269 provides:
SEC. 59. Court Review.The Supreme Court is hereby given jurisdiction to
review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or set aside such
order, ruling or decision when it clearly appears that there is no evidence before the
NEA to support reasonably such order, ruling or decision, or that the same is
contrary to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of the NEA. The evidence
presented to the NEA, together with the record of the proceedings before the NEA,
shall be certified by the NEA to the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling or decision
of the NEA may likewise be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari
in proper case. The procedure for review, except as herein provided, shall be
presented by rules of the Supreme Court. Any order or decision of the NEA may
be reviewed on the application of any person or public service entity aggrieved
thereby and who was a party in the subject proceeding, by certiorari in appropriate
cases or by a petition for review, which shall be filed within thirty (30) days from
the notification of the NEA order, decision or ruling on reconsideration. Said
petition shall be placed on file in the office of the Clerk for the Supreme Court who
shall furnish copies thereof to the NEA and other interested parties.
Petitioner argues that based on the foregoing provision, only the Supreme
Court has the authority to review the acts of NEA as an administrative body with
adjudicative and rule-making power. It cited NEA v. Mendoza, using the Courts
pronouncement that:
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[T]he power of judicial review of NEAs order or decision pertains to the Supreme Court as decreed in Section 59 of P.D. 269 which vests specifically on the Supreme
Court the jurisdiction to review any order, ruling or decision of the NEA and to
modify or set aside such orders, rulings or decisions.[11]
It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers to order, ruling or decision of NEA.
What is being challenged in this case is the decision of the screening committee of
ZAMSURECO to disqualify respondent. Likewise assailed is the validity of the
ECEC, particularly, whether the requirement of publication was complied with. The
ECEC was issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making authority, not its quasi-
judicial function. Hence, the issue regarding the controversy over respondents
disqualification and the question on the ECECs validity are within the inherent
jurisdiction of regular courts to review. Petitioners reliance on NEA is
misplaced. The subject in that case was the electricity rates charged by a cooperative,
a matter which is clearly within NEAs jurisdiction. The issue in the present petition,
however, centers on the validity of NEAs rules in light of the publication
requirements of the Administrative Code and New Civil Code. The present issue is
cognizable by regular courts.
With regard to the second issue, we find no error in the appellate and trial
courts nullification of the ECEC. The CA correctly observed that while
ZAMSURECO complied with the requirements of filing the code with the
University of the Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof of publication in
the Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general circulation. Without compliance
with the requirement of publication, the rules and regulations contained in the ECEC
cannot be enforced and implemented.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is
otherwise provided.
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, reinforced the requirement of publication and outlined the procedure, as
follows:
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Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every Agency shall file with the University of
the Philippines Law Center three (3) Certified copies of every rule adopted by
it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction
against any party or persons.
(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall
carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and
shall be open to public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity In addition to other rule-making requirements provided
by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15)
days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by
law, or specified in this rule.
Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect Laws shall take effect after Fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
We have already emphasized and clarified the requirement of publication in
this Courts Resolution in Taada v. Tuvera:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity which shall begin fifteen
(15) days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by
the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (Emphasis supplied.) [12]
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The aforequoted ruling was reiterated in Dadole v. Commission on
Audit,[13] De Jesus v. Commission on Audit,[14] and Philippine International Trading
Corporation v. Commission on Audit.[15]
In the case at bar, the ECEC was issued by petitioner pursuant to its rule-
making authority provided in PD 269, as amended, particularly Sec. 24:
Section 24. Board of Directors. (a) The Management of a Cooperative shall
be vested in its Board, subject to the supervision and control of NEA which shall
have the right to be represented and to participate in all Board meetings and
deliberations and to approve all policies and resolutions.
The composition, qualifications, the manner of elections and filling of
vacancies, the procedures for holding meetings and other similar provisions shall
be defined in the By-laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies, rules and
regulations x x x.
The ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the country. It is not a mere
internal memorandum, interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply with the requirements of the Civil
Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. In previous cases involving the election
of directors for electric cooperatives, the validity of the ECEC was not put in
issue. The ECEC then enjoyed the presumption of validity. In this case, however,
respondent directly questioned the validity of the ECEC in his second amended
petition. The trial court thus required petitioner to show proof of publication of the
ECEC. Petitioner could have easily provided such proof had the ECEC actually been
published in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general circulation in the
country. This simple proof could have immediately laid this case to rest. Petitioners
failure to do so only implies that the ECEC was not published accordingly, a fact
supported by the certification from the National Printing Office.
Lastly, petitioner avers that a petition for mandamus and prohibition should
not have been resorted to by respondent. The proper recourse, according to
petitioner, is a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner miserably errs on this
point. Rule 63 on declaratory relief states:
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Section 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested under a deed, will,
contract or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute,
executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a
declaration of his rights or duties thereunder.
As stated above, a requirement under Rule 63 is that the petition for
declaratory relief must be filed before any breach or violation the questioned
document may cause. In the instant case, it cannot be gainsaid that a breach has not
yet occurred since an actual dispute has already arisen between ZAMSURECO and
respondentthe screening committee of the cooperative on the erroneous
implementation of a code whose legality and implementation is being questioned.
On the other hand, it is familiar and fundamental doctrine that a writ of
prohibition or mandamus may issue when x x x a board unlawfully excludes another
from x x x enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled x x x.[16]
Considering that the screening committee of the board has excluded
respondent from being elected as board member of ZAMSURECO because of the
latters improper implementation of the code, a petition for mandamus and
prohibition is the proper recourse.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition, and AFFIRM IN TOTO the March
6, 2003 Decision and June 10, 2003 Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 68769. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
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WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
A T T E S T A T I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] Rollo, pp. 34-39. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Portia Alio-Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino. [2] Id. at 40. [3] Id. at 41-49. [4] Id. at 45. Art. 2, Sec. 7 of the ECEC specifically provides:
8. He/she does not hold an elective office in the government nor appointed to an elective position
above the level of a Barangay Captain.
x x x x
12. His/her spouse is not disqualified under Nos. 6, 7 and 8.
x x x x
14. Any bonafide member seeking election or re-election and any incumbent director shall satisfy
all of the above-mentioned qualifications. Non-compliance with any single item shall mean
disqualification or termination. [5] Id. at 43-44.
[6] Id. [7] Id. at 41. [8] Id. at 21, 41-42. [9] Supra note 3. [10] Id. at 42-44. [11] No. L-62038, September 25, 1985, 138 SCRA 632, 637. [12] No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446, 453-454. [13] G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA 262. [14] G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998, 294 SCRA 152. [15] G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 177. [16] RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2. Petition for prohibition.When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to
desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs
as law and justice may acquire. x x x x
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station,
or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled,
and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent, immediately or at some other time to be specified by the court, to do the act required to
be done to protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the
wrongful acts of the respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)
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GARCILLANO vs. THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, et.al G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008
Facts:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the
Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes,
notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential
elections. These recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend
the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation
which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and
wasteful expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of
general circulation only in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress,
however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that
the rules have never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form
available to anyone for free, and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
Issue:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation through
the Senates website, satisfies the due process requirement of law.
Held:
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The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in pamphlet form available at
the Senate, is not sufficient under the Taada v. Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the
rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,"
precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Taada is mandatory to comply
with the due process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a persons liberty at risk. A person
who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic
Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more
incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional
equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or
electronic documents. It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in violation of the
Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The
conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure."
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Manzano vs Sanchez
Manzano vs. Sanchez
AM No. MTJ-001329, March 8, 2001
FACTS:
Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May
21, 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her
husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus, respondent Judge ought to
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of
David and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as
manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of
Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.
Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they
are both separated is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
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G.R. No. 10010, Chu Jan v. Bernas, 34 Phil. 631
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
August 1, 1916
G.R. No. 10010
CHU JAN, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUCIO BERNAS, defendant-appellant.
Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.
ARAULLO, J.:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality
of Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant
respectively. Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of
the cockpit had declared the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant in the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo,
asking that his own rooster be declared the winner. The justice of the peace court
decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the defendant appealed to the
Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the appeal, the plaintiff
filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the defendant to
abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the
stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both sums of wager being
held for safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs
of both instances against the defendant.
The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to
dismiss with the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of
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First Instance rendered judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to
costs. The defendant excepted to this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the
same court on November 8th of the same year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering the
provincial treasurer of Albay and, if necessary, the municipal treasurer of Tabaco of
the same province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it to its owner, the
plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on appeal by
means of the proper bill of exceptions.
The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment
appealed from ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is
not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that
he does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of
no law whatever that governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions
concerning cockfights.
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a
case submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules
applicable to a certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by
him and his not knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that
can serve to excuse the court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them
without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing
that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in
the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be
observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are
reversed and to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence
they came for due trial and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made
with regard to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., took no part.
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G.R. No. 119987-88, People v. Veneracion et al., 249 SCRA
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
DECISION
October 12, 1995
G.R. No. 119987-88 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, Branch 47, Manila, HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused
individual in a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any
discretion in imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?
, J.:
The sole issue in the case at bench involves a question of law. After finding that an accused individual in
a criminal case has, on the occasion of Rape, committed Homicide, is the judge allowed any discretion in
imposing either the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua or Death?
The facts antecedent to the case before this Court, as narrated by petitioner, 1 involve the perpetration
of acts so bizarre and devoid of humanity as to horrify and numb the senses of all civilized men:
On August 2, 1994, the cadaver of a young girl, later identified as Angel Alquiza wrapped in a sack and
yellow table cloth tied with a nylon cord with both feet and left hand protruding from it was seen
floating along Del Pan St. near the corner of Lavesares St., Binondo, Manila.
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When untied and removed from its cover, the lifeless body of the victim was seen clad only in a light
colored duster without her panties, with gaping wounds on the left side of the face, the left chin, left
ear, lacerations on her genitalia, and with her head bashed in.
On the basis of sworn statements of witnesses, booking sheets, arrest reports and the necropsy report
of the victim, Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. Jr. Jeofrey of no fixed address, and Henry Lagarto y Petilla, of 288
Area H. Parola Compound, Tondo, Manila were later charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide in
an Information dated August 8, 1994 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, National Capital
Judicial Region. Said Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138071, reads:
That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and
confederating together with one alias "LANDO" and other persons whose true names, identifies and
present whereabouts are still unknown and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of
their superior strength and nocturnity, and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by
taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting
her head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7)
years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said occasion the said ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY,
a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death
immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Subsequently thereafter, Ernesto Cordero y Maristela, a.k.a. "Booster," of 1198 Sunflower St., Tondo,
Manila, Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta, a.k.a. "Lando," of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, Richard
Baltazar y Alino, a.k.a. "Curimao," also of 1274 Kagitingan St., Tondo, Manila, and Catalino Yaon y
Aberin, a.k.a. "Joel," of 1282 Lualhati St., Tondo, Manila were accused of the same crime of Rape with
Homicide in an Information dated August 11, 1994, docketed as Criminal Case No. 94-138138, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR," JEOFREY and HENRY LAGARTO y
PETILLA who have already been charged in the Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense under
Criminal Case No. 94-138071, and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their
superior strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking
ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a nearby
warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a thick piece of wood and
-
stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and
consent and on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates ABUNDIO LAGARTO y
PETILLA caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
The two criminal cases were consolidated to Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, presided
over by respondent Judge.
Duly arraigned, all the accused, except Abundio Lagunday who was already dead, (allegedly shot by
police escorts after attempting to fire a gun he was able to grab from SPO1 D. Vidad on August 12,
1994), pleaded "Not Guilty." Abundio Lagunday was dropped from the Information.
After trial and presentation of the evidence of the prosecution and the defense, the trial court rendered
a decision 2 on January 31, 1995 finding the defendants Henry Lagarto y Petilla and Ernesto Cordero y
Maristela guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentenced both
accused with the "penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law." 3
Disagreeing with the sentence imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila on February 8, 1995, filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Decision be "modified in that the penalty of death be
imposed" against respondents Lagarto and Cordero, in place of the original penalty (reclusion perpetua).
Refusing to act on the merits of the said Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Judge, on February 10,
1995, issued an Order denying the same for lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portion reads:
The Court believes that in the above-entitled cases, the accused Lagarto and Cordero have complied
with the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal. Consequently, for lack of jurisdiction, this
Court cannot take cognizance of the Motion for Reconsideration of the Public Prosecutor of Manila.
WHEREFORE, the order earlier issued by this Court regarding the Notices of Appeal filed by both herein
accused is hereby reiterated.
The Clerk of this Court is hereby directed to transmit the complete records of these cases, together with
the notices of appeal, to the Honorable Supreme Court, in accordance with Sec. 8, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the instant petition.
The trial court's finding of guilt is not at issue in the case at bench. The basis of the trial court's
determination of guilt and its conclusions will only be subject to our scrutiny at an appropriate time on
appeal. We have thus clinically limited our narration of events to those cold facts antecedent to the
instant case relevant to the determination of the legal question at hand, i.e., whether or not the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction when he failed
and/or refused to impose the mandatory penalty of death under Republic Act No. 7659, after finding the
accused guilty of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
We find for petitioner.
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges, under the guise of
religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are
required by law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A government of
laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it
without fear or favor," 4 resist encroachments by governments, political parties, 5 or even the
interference of their own personal beliefs.
In the case at bench, respondent judge, after weighing the evidence of the prosecution and the
defendant at trial found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape with
Homicide. Since the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime for which respondent judge
found the accused guilty was Republic Act No. 7659, he was bound by its provisions.
Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 provides:
Sec. 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
-
1. By using force or intimidation.
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons,
the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be
death.
When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion
thereof, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death. . . .
6
Clearly, under the law, the penalty imposable for the crime of Rape with Homicide is not Reclusion
Perpetua but Death. While Republic Act 7659 punishes cases of ordinary rape with the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua, it allows judges the discretion - depending on the existence of circumstances
modifying the offense committed - to impose the penalty of either Reclusion Perpetua only in the three
instances mentioned therein. Rape with homicide is not one of these three instances. The law plainly
and unequivocably provides that "[w]hen by reason or on the occasion of rape, a homicide is
committed, the penalty shall be death." The provision leaves no room for the exercise of discretion on
the part of the trial judge to impose a penalty under the circumstances described, other than a sentence
of death.
We are aware of the trial judge's misgivings in imposing the death sentence because of his religious
convictions. While this Court sympathizes with his predicament, it is its bounden duty to emphasize that
a court of law is no place for a protracted debate on the morality or propriety of the sentence, where
the law itself provides for the sentence of death as a penalty in specific and well-defined instances. The
-
discomfort faced by those forced by law to impose the death penalty is an ancient one, but it is a matter
upon which judges have no choice. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of
laws. In People vs. Limaco 7 we held that:
[W]hen . . . private opinions not only form part of their decision but constitute a decisive factor in
arriving at a conclusion and determination of a case or the penalty imposed, resulting in an illegality and
reversible error, then we are constrained to state our opinion, not only to correct the error but for the
guidance of the courts. We have no quarrel with the trial judge or with anyone else, layman or jurist as
to the wisdom or folly of the death penalty. Today there are quite a number of people who honestly
believe that the supreme penalty is either morally wrong or unwise or ineffective. However, as long as
that penalty remains in the statute books, and as long as our criminal law provides for its imposition in
certain cases, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law regardless of their private
opinions. It is a well settled rule that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality
of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of the Legislature which enacts them and the
Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the judiciary is to interpret the laws
and, if not in disharmony with the Constitution, to apply them. And for the guidance of the members of
the judiciary we feel it incumbent upon us to state that while they as citizens or as judges may regard a
certain law as harsh, unwise or morally wrong, and may recommend to the authority or department
concerned, its amendment, modification, or repeal, still, as long as said law is in force, they must apply it
and give it effect as decreed by the law-making body. 8
Finally, the Rules of Court mandates that after an adjudication of guilt, the judge should impose "the
proper penalty and civil liability provided for by the law on the accused." 9 This is not a case of a
magistrate ignorant of the law. This is a case in which a judge, fully aware of the appropriate provisions
of the law, refuses to impose a penalty to which he disagrees. In so doing, respondent judge acted
without or in excess of his jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack of
jurisdiction in imposing the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua where the law clearly imposes the penalty of
Death.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The case is hereby REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents in
consonance with respondent judge's finding that the private respondents in the instant case had
committed the crime of Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the decision
imposing the death penalty.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Padilla, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
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Separate Opinions
NARVASA, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I draw up
this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to the appeal taken
by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge. It will be recalled that
respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution -
praying that his decision sentencing both accused to suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the
penalty of death be imposed" - for the reason that since the accused had already "complied with the
legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It
was precisely that refusal that prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of
certiorari at bar.
It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the court
rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal. This proposition
considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive for the remand of the
case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents,"
might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial Court to act in cases over which it
had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.
The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because rendered
"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment being void, the appeal
attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not be deemed to have thereby
lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said that it is being required by this Court to act in cases
over which it has already lost jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it
and its modification of the judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a quo impose
the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of guilt on the part of
private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my conformity with the procedure
adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary were it not for the contrary
-
observations that the petition herein should either have been dismissed or consolidated with the
criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.
Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court does
not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is before us in the
case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the
correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge refused to comply with in grave
abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be
consolidated is an appellate recourse wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of
guilt and the absolution of private respondents.
Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special civil
action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment desired in the
appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil procedure 2 requires, among
others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common question of law or fact. This is
essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal procedure 3 which contemplates charges
for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character.
Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or criminal
actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of the latter
situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special civil action is a
pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to both the trial courts in
the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the implementation of revisory power.
The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of
respondent judge - erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty - corrected on that score in the
first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from his judgment shall
proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of appellants. The
corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended judgment containing the proper penalty
shall be the basis for the review as to whether appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that
ultimate penalty. To have the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the
appellate proceeding strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the
figurative posture of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the
horse and the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.
It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the appellate
review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the basis therefor, with
this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart precedes the horse. True, an
appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court may raise the penalty to the
-
appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes, what is there to prevent appellants
from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the arguments that, instead of the acquittal or
reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement would be the death sentence?
Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw his
appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee's
brief in this Court is permitted. 5 Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the appeal in order
that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the case on the merits, 6
why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject to such contingencies - with
the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of alternative theories in two sets of pleadings
by both parties - when with the decisive sweep of the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and
the real areas of contention are laid bare?
Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of error
from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in
the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should
be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic review. That provision calling for
automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves equally the interests of both the defense
and the prosecution through protective features established by case law.
Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty of death
and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall nonetheless proceed,
albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The automatic review of the case
shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an exception to the provisions of Section 8,
Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are
not provided for and may not be availed of by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.
The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to procedural
due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the corresponding penal
sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case subserves the ends of these
fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal before this
Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal brings the case wide
open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be precipitate and might be so
perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.
-
With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition, it
should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.
Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Davide, Jr., J. concurs.
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, C.J., concurring:
I concur with the conclusions and dispositions set forth in the opinion of Mr. Justice Kapunan. I draw up
this separate opinion merely to address a question which may be raised in relation to the appeal taken
by the accused from the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent Judge. It will be recalled that
respondent Judge declined to act on the merits of motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution -
praying that his decision sentencing both accused to suffer reclusion perpetua be "modified in that the
penalty of death be imposed" - for the reason that since the accused had already "complied with the
legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal," the Trial Court had lost jurisdiction over the cases. It
was precisely that refusal that prompted the institution in this Court of the special civil action of
certiorari at bar.
It is indeed axiomatic that once an appeal is perfected from a judgment, jurisdiction is lost by the court
rendering the judgment; and jurisdiction over the case passes to the appellate tribunal. This proposition
considered, and following respondent Judge's reasoning, this Court's directive for the remand of the
case "to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the penalty of death upon private respondents,"
might appear to be open to question, since it would require the Trial Court to act in cases over which it
had lost jurisdiction. Such a conclusion is not warranted.
The judgment in question is void, and has been annulled and set aside by this Court, because rendered
"without or in excess of . . . jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction," in so far as it imposes, in light of the facts found to have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt, a penalty other than that peremptorily prescribed by law. The judgment being void, the appeal
attempted to be taken therefrom is inefficacious. The Trial Court may not be deemed to have thereby
lost jurisdiction of the cases. It cannot thus be said that it is being required by this Court to act in cases
-
over which it has already lost jurisdiction. There exists no legal obstacle to the remand of the cases to it
and its modification of the judgment so that it may comply with the mandatory prescription of the law.
REGALADO, J., concurring:
I concur without reservation in the ponencia in this case and its directive that the court a quo impose
the correct penalty of death as provided by law and consequent to its findings of guilt on the part of
private respondents. Indeed, this separate opinion which explicates my conformity with the procedure
adopted and the mandate thereof would not have been necessary were it not for the contrary
observations that the petition herein should either have been dismissed or consolidated with the
criminal case elevated on appeal by private respondents.
Such digression from the judgment unconditionally accepted by the other members of the Court does
not impress me as being concordant with the Rules of Court and decisional law. What is before us in the
case at bar is an original civil action invoking the extraordinary writ of certiorari for the imposition of the
correct penalty specified by law, which legal duty respondent judge refused to comply with in grave
abuse of his judicial discretion. 1 On the other hand, the criminal case with which it is sought to be
consolidated is an appellate recourse wherein the relief sought is primarily the reversal of the finding of
guilt and the absolution of private respondents.
Evidently, the determinative issues involved and the limited relief sought in the present special civil
action are entirely different from the issues for resolution and the modificatory judgment desired in the
appealed criminal case. The basic rule in consolidation of cases in civil procedure 2 requires, among
others, the same subject matter and the existence of a common question of law or fact. This is
essentially the same as the rule on consolidation in criminal procedure 3 which contemplates charges
for offenses founded on the same facts, or forming part of a series of offenses of similar character.
Also, these reglementary requisites for consolidation require two or more ordinary civil or criminal
actions, and not a special civil action in combination with the former. The impropriety of the latter
situation is specially underscored where the resolution of the controversy in the special civil action is a
pre-judicial matter in the appealed criminal case. These considerations apply to both the trial courts in
the exercise of original jurisdiction and to the appellate courts in the implementation of revisory power.
The purpose of the present original action for certiorari is to have the erroneous judgment of
respondent judge - erroneous because he imposed the wrong penalty - corrected on that score in the
first instance. After such correction shall have been effected, then the appeal from his judgment shall
proceed for the desired review by this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of appellants. The
corrective action must proceed first and the resultant amended judgment containing the proper penalty
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shall be the basis for the review as to whether appellants are truly guilty and have to be meted that
ultimate penalty. To have the certiorari action proceed simultaneously and in unification with the
appellate proceeding strikes me as an aberrant procedure. While it does not exactly square with the
figurative posture of putting the cart before the horse, it does result in the same absurdity of both the
horse and the cart moving abreast at the same time along the same judicial path.
It would even be worse if, as suggested, this certiorari action should be dismissed and the appellate
review be conducted with the judgment containing an unauthorized penalty as the basis therefor, with
this Court closing its eyes to such a flagrant mistake. This time the cart precedes the horse. True, an
appeal throws the judgment a quo open for review and the Court may raise the penalty to the
appropriate punitive level. But, as the People pertinently observes, what is there to prevent appellants
from withdrawing their appeal upon sensing from the arguments that, instead of the acquittal or
reduced penalty aspired for, the ultimate denouement would be the death sentence?
Jurisprudence tells us that before the case is submitted for decision, an appellant may withdraw his
appeal in the appellate court. 4 Generally, the withdrawal of an appeal before the filing of the appellee's
brief in this Court is permitted. 5 Assuming that the Court denies the withdrawal of the appeal in order
that the mistake in the penalty imposed may be corrected in the judgment of the case on the merits, 6
why should the appellate course of the proceedings still have to be subject to such contingencies - with
the inevitable waste of time and effort in the formulation of alternative theories in two sets of pleadings
by both parties - when with the decisive sweep of the adjudgment here the doubts are dissipated and
the real areas of contention are laid bare?
Nor is that all. Appellants have come to this Court through the medium of an appeal by writ of error
from a judgment of the trial court imposing the wrong penalty of reclusion perpetua. If the mistake in
the penalty is now rectified with the death sentence being substituted therefor, as undeniably it should
be, then the case will consequently be before this Court on automatic review. That provision calling for
automatic review when capital punishment is inflicted 7 serves equally the interests of both the defense
and the prosecution through protective features established by case law.
Thus, even if the accused had unnecessarily appealed from the judgment imposing the penalty of death
and he thereafter withdraws his appeal, the automatic review of the case shall nonetheless proceed,
albeit without the benefit of briefs or arguments from the accused. 8 The automatic review of the case
shall proceed even if the death convict shall escape, 9 as an exception to the provisions of Section 8,
Rule 124, and such automatic review cannot be waived. 10 The aforementioned beneficial effects are
not provided for and may not be availed of by the accused in an ordinary appeal to this Court.
The automatic review of the death sentence ensures the right of the condemned person to procedural
due process on appeal, and safeguards the interests of the State by exacting the corresponding penal
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sanction decreed by law. The disposition adopted by the Court in this case subserves the ends of these
fundamental policies, hence my unqualified assent thereto.
VITUG, J., dissenting:
The ponencia itself indicates that the case against the convicted accused is already on appeal before this
Court. Thus, the instant petition, in my view, has become academic since an appeal brings the case wide
open for review and consideration. A ruling on the petition would be precipitate and might be so
perceived as peremptory on the imposition of the death penalty.
With all due respect, it is my personal view that if the Court is not disposed to dismiss the petition, it
should at the very least be consolidated with the appealed case.
Accordingly, I am constrained, at this time, to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
Davide, Jr., J. concurs.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, p. 4, Except as to the penalty imposed, petitioner and respondent court are in agreement as to
the essential facts of the case.
2 Rollo, pp. 24-51.
3 Rollo, p. 28, The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the information as against
ROLANDO MANLANGIT for lack of evidence, and finding both accused HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA and
ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA "guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH
HOMICIDE charged in the Information of these cases, and sentencing both accused the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law."
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Said accused are further ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the private complainant the sum of
P100,000 for the death of the victim, ANGEL ALQUIZA; the sum of P500,000 for moral damages, and the
amount of P52,000.00 for actual damages representing expenses incurred for the wake and funeral of
the victim. They are further ordered to pay the costs of these suits.
SO ORDERED. (ANNEX 'A', Petition)
4 Act of Athens (1955).
5 Id.
6 Emphasis supplied.
7 88 Phil. 36 [1951]. 8 Id. at 43-44. 9 Rule 120, sec. 1. REGALADO, concurring: 1 People vs. Olaes, 105
Phil. 502 (1959); People vs. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35 (1951); People vs. Carillo, et al., 85 Phil. 611 (1950). 2
Section 1, Rule 31. 3 Section 14, Rule 119. 4 U.S. vs. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918). 5 People vs. Mendoza, 93
Phil. 581 (1953). 6 See People vs. Roque, G.R. No. 53470, June 26, 1981, 105 SCRA 117. 7 Sec. 10, Rule
122. 8 People vs. Villanueva, 93 Phil. 927 (1953). 9 People vs. Vallente, L-37937, September 30, 1986,
144 SCRA 495; People vs. Cornelio, et al., L-1289, June 10, 1971, 39 SCRA 435. 10 People vs. Daban, L-
31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.
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Case Digest, People vs. Purisima, No. L -47757-61, January 28, 1980
FACTS: Informations were filed to 26 individuals from Manila and Samar, individually and separately,
before the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Samar for illegal possession of deadly weapon or
violation of Presidential Decree No. 9 pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept 21 and 23, 1973.
On the motion to quash by the accused, the three respondent judges: Judge Purisima and Judge
Macaren, both of CFI of Manila; and Judge Polo of CFI of Samar, issued in the respective cases filed
before them an order to quash or dismiss the informations on a common ground Lack of essential
elements to constitute an offense penalized by PD No. 9. The respondent judges stated that to
constitute the said offense, two elements must be present; (1) possession of any bladed, blunt or
pointed weapon outside of residence as stated in par 3; (2) and intended to use it to commit or abet
subversion, rebellion, etc as stated in the preamble of the said PD. The People, as petitioners, thru the
Solicitor General, contended that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive activities and the
intent of the accused are irrelevant since its is a statutory offense and punishing the possession of such
deadly weapon is not only to eradicate subversive acts but also criminality in general. The petitioners
also argued that the preamble is not an essential part of an act and cannot prevail over the text of the
law itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners arguments as to the intention and scope of PD No. 9 (3) correct?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court says that the intention of PD No. 9 (3) is to penalize the acts which are
those related to the desired result of Proc. No. 1081 and Gen. Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are to suppress
those who commit or abet lawlessness, rebellion, subversive acts and the like. The preamble of PD No. 9
also clearly concurs to that, though the preamble is not a part of the statute, it is the key to determine
what is the intent and spirit of the decree and determine what acts fall within the purview of a penal
statute.
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Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79
FACTS: On Spetember 11, 1908, Martinez was riding a carromata in Ermita along the left side of the
street when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant to which a pair of horses was attached came
along the street in the opposite direction at great speed. The horses ran into the carromata and
wounded Martinez servely. The defendant presented evidence that the cochero was a good servant and
a reliable and safe cochero. And that he was delivering stuff so he tied the driving lines of the horses to
the front end of the delivery wagon and went inside the wagon to unload the stuff to be delivered. But
while unloading, another vehicle drove by whose driver cracked a whip and made some noises which
frightened the horses and which made it ran away. The cochero was thrown from the inside of the
wagon and was unable to stop the horses. The horses collided with the carromata.
ISSUE: W/N the employer is liable for the negligence of his cochero
HELD: No. Defendant not liable. Cochero was not negligent. What happened was an accident. It has
been a custom or a matter of common knowledge and universal practice of merchants to leave horses in
the manner which the cochero left it during the accident. This is the custom in all cities. The public,
finding itself unprejudiced by such practice has acquiesced for years.
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Van Dorn vs Romillo
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
139 SCRA 139
FACTS:
Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married
in Hong Kong in 1979. They established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were
divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with Theodore Van Dorn. A suit
against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the
Galleon Shop, is a conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an
accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is
binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue
petitioner to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law. Petitioner is not bound to her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her
nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to be
served.
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G.R. No. 37048, Gonzalez v. Gonzalez, 58 Phil. 67
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
March 7, 1933
G.R. No. 37048
MANUELA BARRETTO GONZALEZ, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, defendant-appellant.
AUGUSTO C. GONZALEZ, Jr., ET AL., intervenors-appellees.
Quintin Paredes and Barrera and Reyes for appellant.
DeWitt, Perkins and Brady for plaintiff-appellee.
Camus and Delgado for intervenors-appellees.
HULL, J.:
Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present residents of the City of
Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and
wife in the Philippine Islands until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time
have not lived together as man and wife. Of this union four children were born who are now 11, 10, 8
and 6 years of age. Negotiations between the parties, both being represented by attorneys, continued
for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to allow the plaintiff for her support and that of
her children, five hundred pesos (P500) monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or
necessity, and the title of certain properties to be put in her name. Shortly after this agreement the
husband left the Island