IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCIPLINARY HEARING BETWEEN

POLICE DETECTIVE ) CHRISTOPHER DUNN, ) APPELLANT ) APPEAL OF AN INDEFINITE ) SUSPENSION and ) ) AAA Case No. 70 390 00783 09 THE CITY OF AUSTIN )

DECISION OF INDEPENDENT THIRD-PARTY HEARING EXAMINER

Dates of Hearing: April 12-16, 2010 Date of Closing of the Record: June 9, 2010 Date of Decision: June 28, 2010 Appearances: Appellant: Tom A. Stribling, Esq. City: Constance K. Acosta, Esq. Hearing Examiner: Thomas A. Cipolla, Esq.

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I. BACKGROUND

Police Detective Christopher Dunn (hereinafter, "Appellant") was indefinitely

suspended by the City of Austin Police Department (or, "APD") on November 5, 2009

for alleged violations of APD’s General Orders, Policies and Procedures relating to Code

of Conduct: Impartial Attitude and Code of Conduct: Individual Responsibilities – Acts

Bringing Discredit upon the Department. The Appellant subsequently filed a timely

appeal on November 6, 2009 with the City of Austin’s Fire Fighters’ and Police Officer’s

Civil Service Commission requesting a hearing before an Independent Third Party

Hearing Examiner.

A hearing was held in a conference room at the City of Austin’s Learning &

Research Center located at 2800 Spirit of Texas Drive, Austin, Texas 78719. The

hearing lasted five days from April 12 through April 18, 2010. The parties were

represented by counsel noted on the cover sheet. They made argument, examined and

cross-examined witnesses, introduced documentary evidence, filed post-hearing briefs

and otherwise presented their cases in full. A certified court reporter made a transcript of

the proceedings. Finally, the Appellant was present during the entire hearing.

On May 19, 2010, two days after the close of the hearing and after the briefs were

filed, the Appellant, through his counsel, filed a Motion to Reopen the Evidentiary

Hearing. The City filed a response a few days later in opposition to the Motion. On June

1, 2010, the Independent Third Party Hearing Examiner having found good cause to

reopen the hearing, issued an order to reopen the hearing only for the limited purpose of

recalling Chief Art Acevedo to allow the Appellant to question him as to the following

issues: (1) when and how the Austin Police Department became aware of the e-mail

written by Detective Cliff Rogers noted in the Motion and the Response; (2) if an

investigation was conducted as a result of this e-mail in regard to the conduct of

Detective Cliff Rogers in the Quintana shooting case; and, (3) what, if any, discipline was

given to Detective Cliff Rogers as result of this e-mail.

The parties subsequently agreed to the following process in lieu of another

hearing: the City provide the written responses to the three questions in the form of a

deposition on the limited questions by Monday, June 7; attach a copy of the e-mail as

Joint Exhibit 44 and the deposition excerpts attached as Joint Exhibit 45 to the answers to

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the written questions; argument from the attorneys as to the relevance to be sent to the

Independent Third Party Hearing Examiner by Wednesday, June 9, 2010; and, there will

be no telephone conferences for argument. The Independent Third Party Hearing

Examiner subsequently agreed to this process.

II. ISSUES

Was the written statement of suspension (Joint Exhibit #10) legally and factually

sufficient to meet the requirements of Tex. Loc. Code §143.052(e)? More specifically,

did the written statement adequately describe the acts of the Appellant which Chief

Acevedo contends are in violation of the alleged Civil Service Rules?

Did the City of Austin prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that one

or more of the allegations in the Memorandum of Indefinite Suspension (Joint Exhibit #

10) are "true"?

Charge Number 1: Detective Dunn violated Austin Police Department General

Orders, Policies and Procedures A201b: Impartial Attitude.

Charge Number 2: Detective Dunn violated Austin Police Department General

Orders, Policies and Procedures A201a.02(B)(1)(3): Acts Bringing Discredit Upon the

Department.

If the hearing examiner finds either one or both allegations to be "true," was the

indefinite suspension of Detective Dunn appropriate considering the evidence presented,

or should the disciplinary suspension be reduced to a temporary suspension?

III. RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

AUSTIN POLICE DEPARTMENT

GENERAL ORDERS, POLICIES, AND PROCEDURES

Part A – General Policies and Procedures

Chapter 1 – Organization, Administration and Management

A201b – Responsibility to the Community

All persons in each area of the City deserve protection by fair and impartial law

enforcement and should be able to expect similar police response to their behavior

wherever it occurs. Employees shall serve the public through direction, counseling,

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assistance, and protection of life and property. Employees will be held accountable for

the manner in which they exercise the authority of their office or position. Employees

shall respect the rights of individuals and perform their services with honesty, sincerity,

curried, and sound judgment.

01. Impartial attitude

A. Employees are expected to act professionally, treat all persons fairly and equally,

and perform all duties impartially, objectively, and equitably without regard to personal

feelings, animosities, friendships, financial status, sex, creed, color, race, religion, age,

political beliefs, sexual preference, or social or ethnic background.

a. Employees will respect the rights of individuals and will not engage in

discrimination, oppression, or favoritism whether by language, act or omission.

A201a – General Conduct

* * * * *

02. Individual Responsibilities

* * * * *

B. Acts Bringing Discredit Upon the Department

Since the conduct of personnel, on or off duty, may reflect directly upon the

Department, employees must at all times conduct themselves in a manner which

does not bring reproach, discredit or embarrassment to the Department or to the

City.

1. Employees, whether on-duty or off-duty, shall not commit any act which tends

to destroy public confidence in, and respect for the Department, or which is

prejudicial to the good order, efficiency, or discipline of the Department.

* * * * *

3. Employees will not engage in any activity in which there is a potential for

conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict of interest with the lawful duties

of the employee. Conflict of interest is any activity which would tend to influence

a decision, create a bias or prejudice, or create a gain or loss for any person or

agency which would favor one side or the other in conflict with the employee’s

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official duties, or which conflicts with the accomplishment of the Department's

mission or goals.

TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §143.051, et. seq.

(Vernon 2009), Subchapter D, Disciplinary Actions

§ 143.052. Disciplinary Suspensions

(c) If the department head suspends a fire fighter or police officer, the department head

shall, within 120 hours after the hour of suspension, file a written statement with the

commission giving the reasons for the suspension. The department head shall

immediately deliver a copy of the statement in person to the suspended fire fighter or

police officer.

* * * * *

(e) The written statement filed by the department head with the commission must point

out each civil service rule alleged to have been violated by the suspended fire fighter or

police officer and must describe the alleged acts of the person that the department head

contends are in violation of the civil service rules. It is not sufficient for the department

head merely to refer to the provisions of the rules alleged to have been violated.

(f) If the department head does not specifically point out in the written statement the

acts or acts of a fire fighter or police officer that allegedly violated the civil service rules,

the commission shall promptly reinstate the person.

* * * * *

§ 143.053. Appeal of Disciplinary Suspension

* * * * *

(e) In its decision, the commission shall state whether the suspended fire fighter or

police officer is:

(1) permanently dismissed from the fire or police department;

(2) temporarily suspended from the department; or

(3) restored to the person's former position or status in the department’s classified

service.

(f) If the commission finds that the period of disciplinary suspension should be reduced,

the commission may order a reduction in the period of the suspension. . . .

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(g) The commission may suspend or dismiss a fire fighter or police officer only for the

violation of civil service rules and only after a finding by the commission of the truth of

specific charges against the fire fighter or police officer.

* * * * *

§ 143.057. Hearing Examiners

* * * * *

(c) The hearing examiner's decision is final and binding on all parties. If the fire fighter

or police officer decides to appeal to an independent third-party hearing examiner, the

person automatically waives all rights to appeal to the District Court except as provided

by Subsection (j).

* * * * *

(f) In each hearing conducted under this section, the hearing examiner has the same

duties and powers as the commission, including the right to issue subpoenas.

IV. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

A. APPELLANT

1. It is well-established law that a written statement of suspension must sufficiently

apprise a suspended officer of charges against him, and must include specific facts relied

upon by the department head to prove those charges.

2. In this case, Chief Acevedo clearly charged in the written statement of suspension that

the Appellant violated Civil Service Rule A201b – Responsibility to the Community,

however, he failed to “specifically point out in a written statement act or acts of [the

Appellant] that allegedly violated” this rule.

3. What followed was 4 ½ pages of narrative fraught with conclusions and hyperbole.

4. In his narrative, Chief Acevedo alleged that the Appellant “exhibited his bias towards

the officers and against the occupants of the vehicle,” but failed to sufficiently apprise the

Appellant of the facts relied upon to prove this charge.

5. Because of the length and structure of the “specific acts” section of the written

statement, Appellant is left to guess which specific acts chief Acevedo considers to be in

violation of Rule A210b.

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6. It is not legally sufficient to present a suspended officer with a lengthy narrative, and

then require the officer to draw his own conclusions as to what conduct is being

addressed by this disciplinary action.

7. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §143.052 requires the department head to “specifically point out

in the written statement the act or acts of the firefighter or police officer that allegedly

violated the civil service rules . . .”; the Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary defines

specific to mean “free from ambiguity”; and, the “specific acts” allegations in this case

are not free from ambiguity.

8. Appellant respectfully requests that Charge Number 1, alleging that he violated Rule

A201b: Impartial Attitude, be dismissed because the written statement of suspension was

not legally and factually sufficient to meet the requirements of Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code

§143.052(e), and that the written statement did not adequately describe the acts of the

Appellant which Chief Acevedo contends are in violation of the alleged Civil Service

Rule.

9. The Appellant does not contest Charge Number 2, namely, Acts Bringing Discredit

Upon the Department.

10. For the following reasons, the Appellant will show that Charge Number 1 is not true.

11. Chief Acevedo testified that the following acts of the Appellant are the acts which

violated Rule A201b: the May 13 e-mail entitled “Novel Ideal” (sic). See, Joint Exhibit

15; the June 24 e-mail entitled “Just in case your (sic) reading”. See, Joint Exhibit 18;

leading questions asked of the subject officers; refusal to follow the direction of the Legal

Advisor; and, the Appellant's memo written to the Chief on September 14. See, Joint

Exhibit 23.

12. Chief Acevedo ultimately distilled these alleged acts into “two things” for the

Hearing Examiner’s consideration - May 13 e-mail and the “refusal” to ask five (5)

questions suggested by legal counsel for the alleged purpose of not giving “him any

ammo”; however, for purposes of this appeal the Appellant will address all the acts

alleged to be in violation of Rule A201b.

13. In this case, Chief Acevedo's written statement of suspension did not identify a single

leading question that he believed was in violation of Rule A 201b; as a result, this alleged

act cannot be relied upon by the City to establish a violation of the Civil Service Rule.

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14. Assuming arguendo that the specific act of asking leading questions was sufficiently

raised in the written statement, the City has failed to establish a single leading question

that Chief Acevedo believed demonstrated a bias on the part of the Appellant and

violated Rule A201b; thus, this alleged “specific act” does not support a finding that

Charge Number 1 is true.

15. Chief Acevedo's written statement alleged that the Appellant expressed similar

statements in his memo to the Chief (dated September 14, 2009, Joint Exhibit 23) that

exhibited his bias towards the officers and against the occupants of the vehicle; however,

the statement never points out which specific statements in the Appellant's memorandum

exhibited bias; therefore, this alleged act cannot be relied upon by the City to establish a

violation of the Civil Service Rule.

16. Assuming arguendo that the specific act of expressing allegedly biased statements in

the September 14 memo was sufficiently raised in the written statement, the Appellant

would show that there is no evidence to establish that such statements violated Rule

A201b.

17. The memorandum was written after Internal Affairs had completed its investigation

and after the Citizen’s Review Panel and the Police Monitor’s Office had received the

completed IAD investigation; and it was written to the Chief of Police; given these facts,

it is ludicrous to assert that any statement made in this memorandum could push the

investigation in some preconceived direction in order to favor Officer Quintana.

18. Furthermore, the Appellant made a statement that his initial assessment was that this

appeared to be a “clean shoot” and this was no different than the one expressed by Chief

Acevedo on the day of the officer-involved shooting at a press conference.

19. The Appellant's statement was private while the Chief’s statement was made to the

public and this is significant because the Appellants' private opinion could not influence

any other person involved in the case.

20. Plus, this alleged “specific act” does not support a finding that Charge Number 1 is

true.

21. Because, in Chief Acevedo's mind, the May 13 e-mail was one act demonstrating

bias, and the June 24 e-mail and the refusal to listen to legal counsel was combined as a

second act of bias, the June 24 e-mail will be discussed as a single issue.

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22. The Chief’s written statement did not specifically point out what advice or direction

from legal counsel the Appellant refused to follow; as a result, this alleged act cannot be

relied upon by the City to establish a violation of the Civil Service Rule.

23. Assuming arguendo that the specific act of refusing to listen to legal counsel was

sufficiently raised in a written statement, the Appellant would show there is no evidence

to establish that he failed to follow any legal advice that he was required to follow.

24. It has been established that there were only five (5) questions suggested by legal

counsel that were not asked by any IA Detective including the Appellant.

25. Detective Harkin, not the Appellant, was the lead investigator and all witnesses who

were questioned on the subject agreed that it was Detective Harkin's responsibility to

formulate the questions to be asked of the involved officers.

26. The questions prepared by legal counsel were initially sent to Cmdr. Johnson and

Lieut. Rodriguez and if the five (5) questions were so critical that the failure to ask some

would alter the course of the investigation, it is reasonable to assume that the IA

Commander and Lieutenant would have ensured that the Detectives include these

questions in the interviews; to the contrary, Cmdr. Johnson told Detective Harkin and

Sgt. Connor that the detectives were not required to ask any of the legal counsel's

questions.

27. The decision by Cmdr. Johnson that IA was not required to answer questions

proposed by legal counsel relieved his subordinates, including the Appellant, of any duty

to ask questions and all were acting under the color of a lawful decision made by their

Commander.

28. For these reasons, it was not the Appellant’s duty to ask the five (5) identified

questions; accordingly, the City cannot charge that the Appellant showed bias because he

failed to perform an act that was not his responsibility or duty to perform; therefore, this

alleged “specific act” does not support a finding that Charge Number 1 is true.

29. In reality, the Appellant was indefinitely suspended for the May 13 e-mail and thus

the real issues for consideration are: (1) does the May 13 e-mail show a mindset of bias

towards the officers and against the occupants of the vehicle? (2) Does the mindset of

bias, standing alone, violate Rule A201b?

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30. The Appellant never suggested the manufacture of false evidence against the

occupants of the vehicle; his e-mail clearly indicates a desire to get the actual records and

determine what those records state in fact; thus, if the records had shown the occupants

were in compliance with the terms of their probation, the suggested “causation” issue

would be moot; in fact, obtaining factual information is not bias.

31. To establish this e-mail proves that the Appellant was biased towards the officers and

against the occupants of the vehicle, the City must prove that the Appellant was not open

to the possibility that Officer Quintana had violated APD policy; the Appellant's

suggestion that the occupants of the vehicle were “a” cause of the event, does not

preclude the possibility that the actions of the officers were also “a” cause.

32. To establish that this e-mail proves that the Appellant was biased towards the officers

and against the occupants of the vehicle, the City must prove that the Appellant thought

this “novel idea” would “clear” Officer Quintana; it is incredulous to suggest that this e-

mail shows that the Appellant believed he could clear Officer Quintana by simply

updating the probationary records of the vehicle’s occupants; no IA detective could

believe simply delivering the report to Chief Acevedo finding the occupants to be a cause

of the event because they violated probation would end the inquiry and “clear” Officer

Quintana.

33. Reasonable individuals can and did perceive the e-mail to show something other than

a mindset of bias; Sgts. Pat O'Connor and Mario Gutierrez received the e-mail and

neither believed that the e-mail reflected bias on behalf of the Appellant.

34. In fact, Sgt. Connor took the e-mail to show the Appellant’s inexperience with IA

investigations and told the Appellant that the investigation was not going to focus on

whether the occupants of the car were cause of the event.

35. For the foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully asserts that the City has failed to

show by a preponderance of the evidence that the May 13 e-mail reflects bias towards the

officers and against the occupants of the vehicle.

36. Assuming arguendo that the May 13 e-mail shows a mindset of bias towards the

officers and against the occupants of the vehicle, this fact standing alone does not violate

Rule A201b unless, and until, the Appellant failed to perform his duties impartially,

objectively and equitably.

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37. The City failed to show that the Appellant did not perform his duties in an impartial

manner, and to the contrary, Cmdr. Johnson verified that the Appellant’s portion of the

investigation was appropriate.

38. Therefore, this alleged “specific act” does not support a finding that Charge Number

1 is true.

39. In conclusion, the Appellant respectfully requests that Charge Number 1 be dismissed

because the City failed to prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that he

violated APD General Orders, Policies and Procedures A201b: Impartial Attitude.

40. The Appellant concedes that the May 13 e-mail was poorly worded and, in the minds

of some members of the public, created a perception of bias; while he vehemently denies

that he was in fact biased in the performance of his duties, he recognizes that even the

perception of bias can, and most likely did, bring discredit to the Department;

accordingly, the Appellant accepts that some discipline is appropriate in this case.

41. However, the Appellant believes that his indefinite suspension was patently excessive

and contravenes the principle of disparate treatment.

42. The justification for the indefinite suspension vanishes if Charge Number 1 is not

sustained by the Hearing Examiner.

43. Assuming arguendo that Charge Number 1 is sustained, the evidence actually shows

that Chief Acevedo's apocalyptical prediction of the future is not accurate.

44. The Appellant testified in an APD sex crimes case that he worked prior to his

suspension; the jury that heard the case was informed of the nature of the Appellant's

indefinite suspension, with no apparent effect; and, the District Attorney’s Office

obtained a conviction in the case.

45. Chief Acevedo testified that the Appellant was appropriately contrite, and took full

responsibility for his actions; Lieut. Spangler testified there was never any question as to

the Appellant’s truthfulness; thus, based on the evidence in this case, there is no reason to

suspect that the Appellant will ever engage in any conduct remotely similar in nature in

the future; and, for these reasons the indefinite suspension is patently excessive and

should not be sustained.

46. The evidence at the hearing indicated that there were other instances where officers in

the Department showed bias in favor of fellow officers (see, Dunn Exhibit #2), and where

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statements were made that were derogatory in nature by officers which showed an

impartial attitude and brought discredit upon the Department (see, Dunn Exhibits #3 and

#4) however, none of the officers involved received an indefinite suspension as did the

Appellant.

47. In conclusion, the Appellant respectfully suggests that his indefinite suspension was

not appropriate considering the evidence presented, and that the period of disciplinary

suspension should be reduced to a temporary suspension not to exceed fifteen (15) days.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Appellant respectfully requests that this

appeal be granted in part, and that Charge Number 1 be dismissed, and that an Order be

issued:

(1) Finding that Charge Number 1 is not true; and finding that Charge Number 2

is true;

(2) Finding that the period of disciplinary suspension should be reduced, and

ordering the period of suspension be reduced to a reasonable period not to exceed

fifteen (15) days;

(3) Restoring the Appellant to his former position or status as a police Detective

in the Austin Police Department’s classified service;

(4) Awarding the Appellant full compensation for the actual time lost as a result

of his indefinite suspension at the rate of pay provided for the position or class of

service from which the Appellant was suspended, except for compensation which

was lost during the reduced period of suspension ordered by the Hearing

Examiner;

(5) Awarding restoration of, or credit for, any other benefits lost as a result of the

indefinite suspension, including sick leave, vacation leave, and service credit in a

retirement system, except benefits which will be lost during the reduced period of

suspension ordered by the Hearing Examiner; and

(6) Expunging all reference to Charge Number 1 from the Appellant’s public civil

service file.

B. CITY OF AUSTIN

1. The key acts alleged to have violated the cited General Orders are set forth in great

detail in the indefinite suspension memo.

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2. Chapter 143.052 is a “notice” statute; it was created to give the officer notice of what

actions he took that violated the Civil Service Rules and it does not require the disclosure

of every single specific fact relied upon if sufficient notice was given to him of the nature

of the charges and the evidence sufficient to allow him to defend against the department

head’s decision to indefinitely suspend.

3. Joint Exhibit 10 is an eight page, single spaced summary of the facts and the issues

alleged to be the basis of the violations; it contains a description of the acts alleged to

serve as the basis for the rule violations and it includes overt acts, omissions, mental

processes, and intentional covert conduct to describe the totality of what the Chief

believed to be violations of the two Civil Service Rules specified; and, if “act” meant

only affirmative, physical actions taken by the officer, omissions and thought processes

could never be used to substantiate a rule violation.

4. In this regard, the Texas Supreme Court has held the letter of suspension is legally

sufficient if it “apprises” the officer of the charges against him and the facts relied upon

to prove those charges. Fireman's and Policeman's Civil Service Commission of the City

of Fort Worth, et al. v. Lockhart, 626 S.W. 2nd 492 (Texas 1981).

5. The Texas Supreme Court also recognized that a letter of suspension “is a civil action

administered by laymen and the charges need not meet the precision or technicality of a

criminal indictment” Id. @ p. 492.

6. Since the memorandum of indefinite suspension provided the Appellant with sufficient

notice of the acts for which he was being suspended even though it may not have cited

every single (f)act on his part, which it was not legally required to do, the Appellant’s

Motion to Dismiss should be denied.

7. The Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss the Impartial Attitude allegation is specious as he

distorts the charges against him by saying the City was required to prove bias; the City

was never required to prove bias; it only had to prove that he did not perform all his

duties in the investigation impartially, objectively or equitably without regard to his

personal feelings or animosities.

8. The evidence conclusively shows that the Appellant did not perform all of his duties in

the Quintana OIS investigation impartially, objectively or equitably without regard to the

Appellant's personal feelings or animosities.

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9. Assuming arguendo that the Hearing Examiner does consider bias a relevant factor in

part of the proof required of the City, the City would further argue that actual bias was

amply proven.

10. The Appellant never claimed to have started his investigation with a neutral palette or

perspective therefore, ab initio, he could not be fair or impartial from day one.

11. The Appellant’s mindset was not exactly the same as the other officers involved in

the Quintana matter, it was twofold: in favor of the officers (the “No wrong; No

discipline” ideology) and against three criminal suspects (the “blame the bad guys”

ideology); and, the second thought process was not joined in by the others and not readily

shared by the Appellant with others or the investigation team beyond the few he sent the

e-mail to on May 13.

12. The Appellant's own ideology and mental process became partiality against the

suspects in that he expressed his intention to make the suspects the causation of the OIS

shooting in order to turn the “entire event” to blame the suspects not the officers; and, his

first overt act of partiality was to articulate his ideology against the bad guys in his May

13 e-mail.

13. The Appellant was never deterred are dissuaded from the “blame the bad guys”

ideological mindset and it became his passion; he incorporated extensively compiled

probation information in his chapter of the final report even though it had no relevance as

to why Quintana shot Sanders or Smith; and, he included the probation information and

the same mental imprint as late as September 14, 2009 in his memo to Chief Acevedo.

14. Moreover, there was evidence presented at the hearing that the Appellant displayed a

similar pattern of conduct as a criminal investigator when he pressured a rape victim into

identifying the wrong suspect and then lying in his police report when he stated that the

victim made a positive identification.

15. The City has carried its burden to show a violation of the Impartial Attitude General

Order; more specifically, the same thoughts made apparent through acts, words, deeds

and evidence that demonstrate the admitted perception of bias, are the very same

elements the City was required to prove as a violation of failure to maintain an impartial

attitude of the General Order; therefore, the motion to Dismiss the Impartial Attitude

charge should be denied.

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16. After all the evidence is in, the tragic irony in this whole experience is that the

officers did not need the Appellant's “assistance” or favoritism on their behalf; had the

Appellant done what he was supposed to do and conduct a fair and impartial investigation

in the first place, the results would have been the same and no one would ever have

reason or need to question the integrity of the investigation.

17. As the IA investigator with the most recognized and respected experience, the

Appellant was in control of the key evidence at all times from beginning to end; he could

emphasize facts as needed, de-emphasize facts as needed, massage helpful answers,

deliberately not look for facts, omit to ask questions that would not provide helpful

answers and, if necessary, make inferences, as needed to get the result(s) he wanted to

achieve.

18. Further evidence of his “No wrong; No discipline” objective was his suggestion that

they (the IA investigation group) provide no “ammo” to the Department’s Legal

Advisor, that is, ask the questions the Legal Advisor developed.

19. Dunn, as well as Detective Harkin, asked Quintana leading questions and, by his own

admission, the Appellant did not ask direct or threatening questions.

20. Also, during the investigation of the charges against him, the Appellant stated on

more than one occasion that he did not want the officers to incriminate themselves or to

be placed in a situation where they had to admit or be tricked into saying something that

they felt pressured to say.

21. Moreover, the most telling part of not asking the right questions was that it is

important for an officer to be able to articulate why he shot the person in order to know

whether he did or did not violate training or tactics of the excessive force General Order;

and, the Appellant did not want to elicit answers if he could not control what the answer

would be and so the questions were never asked.

22. Starting with the May 13 e-mail, June 24 “ammo” e-mail and the lack of direct

questions for Quintana, the Appellant made it possible for his intentions of blaming the

bad guys to culminate in his memo to Chief Acevedo.

23. The Appellant’s denial of bias or intent to be biased is irrelevant if the actions were

taken without justification, excuse or alternative explanation for each one; herein, the

Appellant claims he does not know why he did each of those actions; therefore, if the

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only logical conclusion would be an admission of favoritism on behalf of the officers

and/or the undeniable lack of impartiality in his investigation or abuse of the bad guys,

feigned ignorance of the reason is unacceptable; it is as if the Appellant believes that if he

never admits to actual bias, he will not be found in violation of the General Order.

24. For all the reasons set forth above, a violation of the first General Order on Impartial

Attitude is patently obvious and should be sustained.

25. The Appellant claims he was not adequately trained in how to conduct a proper

Internal Affairs investigation, but this is a specious argument; to begin with, the

Appellant volunteered to assist Detective Harkin with the IA investigation and if he felt

like he was not adequately trained or competent, he should not have volunteered at any

point in the process; furthermore, the Appellant admitted that he received training on

conducting suspect/witness interviews and interrogations; and, in fact, he has received a

very considerable amount of training in investigations having taken over 15 courses with

more than 311 hours of investigative training.

26. Moreover, the Appellant admitted he knew he was required to conduct an objective,

fair and unbiased investigation, whether it was of a criminal or administrative nature.

27. It is not true that the Appellant had a minimal role or that he did not know whether he

was continuing in that role after he returned from his extended leave; in fact, he played a

pivotal role because he had the most valuable experience with forensic data and medical

issues as well as prime investigative experience.

28. Although on paper, Detective Harkin was technically responsible for the investigation

the Appellant reviewed all of Harkin's questions; he highlighted important ones; he

modified/edited others; and he asked a significant amount of questions during Quintana’s

interview.

29. The only person in his chain of command who was aware of the May 13 e-mail was

Sgt. Connor, and when Connor informed the Appellant that “they were not going down

that road”, Connor believed the matter was resolved.

30. Cmdr. Johnson indicated that he told the Detectives they did not have to ask all the

Legal Advisor’s questions, but he never told them they could ignore relevant questions or

concerns.

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31. Likewise, Sgt. Connor had previously utilized the Legal Advisor extensively and

would never have told them to ignore relevant legal advice being offered by the Legal

Advisor.

32. The Appellant contends that the questions from the Legal Advisor regarding other

OIS’s were asked in one form or another, but the evidence proves that they were not by

either interrogator.

33. The difference between the Appellant and Detective Harkin was that Harkin did not

believe the questions posed by the Legal Advisor were relevant, while, the Appellant’s

focus was not to ask questions so as to avoid incriminating the officers and therefore

protect them.

34. The Appellant readily admitted that his actions brought discredit to the APD, to

himself, to IA and to the investigation.

35. No testimony was presented at the hearing to deny or mitigate the extent of the

discredit or the extent of damage to the APD's reputation and credibility, which even the

Appellant admits are astronomical and in violation of the second General Order.

36. With respect to the propriety of the Indefinite Suspension, the Hearing Examiner

must decide whether indefinite suspension was reasonable in light of the evidence

presented.

37. The Texas Supreme Court has held (See, City of Waco v. Kelley, 2010 WL 571974

(Tex. 2010) that a Hearing Examiner has three options in an indefinite suspension appeal

if the charges are found to be true: 1) dismissal from the Department, i.e., affirming the

indefinite suspension; 2) impose a temporary suspension for a “reasonable” period not to

exceed fifteen (15) calendar days; or, 3) restore the officer to his former position with

wages and benefits lost as a result of the suspension.

38. If the Hearing Examiner finds the charges to be true, it is inconceivable that the third

option noted above would be considered; therefore, in the case at bar, the Hearing

Examiner must decide whether the misconduct warrants an indefinite suspension, or

rather, only a fifteen (15) days suspension or less.

39. In deciding the appropriate discipline, Chief Acevedo considered a multitude of

factors including the Appellant's work history, the nature of the violations, the motivation

for committing the violations, the effect of that misconduct on the Department, the

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community, and the criminal justice system, the context in which the misconduct

occurred (racial tensions and an ongoing DOJ investigation), whether the Appellant can

remain a contributing member of the Austin Police Department, and comparable

discipline for comparable conduct.

40. In his Memorandum of Indefinite Suspension (Joint Exhibit 10) and in his testimony,

the Chief opined that the Appellant's credibility has been forever damaged; therefore, he

has no value to the Department as a witness, officer, or as a detective.

41. Moreover, as the Memorandum of Indefinite Suspension states, there are no positions

within the APD where an officer's credibility and integrity are not paramount.

42. Finally, given what has occurred, it flies in the face of reality and practicality in the

criminal justice system that the Appellant could serve a useful role as a detective or

police officer under the Brady v. Maryland case.

43. Thus, a suspension of fifteen (15) days or less is not a reasonable period of

suspension; on the contrary, an indefinite suspension based upon these facts is

reasonable.

44. There is no evidence that the Appellant was singled out as the only subject of the IA

investigation; there is no evidence of disparate treatment as to the Appellant; further, the

Appellant can provide no comparables that are similarly situated to him and his sustained

violations; in fact, no case brought forth even comes close.

45. No other individual involved in the shooting investigation was found to have violated

the General Order on Impartial Attitude and no one on the team was similarly situated

either; Detective Harkin received a written reprimand for not conducting a thorough and

complete investigation; Sgt. Connor received oral counseling for not understanding the

gravity of the Appellant’s May 13 e-mail and not informing Lieut. Rodriguez of the e-

mail and its contents.

46. Cmdr. Johnson never informed Chief Acevedo of his belief that the evidence was

slanted in favor of the officers by the Detectives, including the Appellant, (he only

advised him of the disconcerting extent of leading questions) for if he had done so the

Chief would have acted upon Johnson’s belief and let the evidence gathered lead to

whatever results it may have.

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47. Evidence of other situations (that occurred prior to Chief Acevedo assuming

command of the APD) does not appear to be comparable.

48. The Appellant’s indefinite suspension should in all things be affirmed for violations

of failing to conduct the Quintana OIS IA investigation in a fair and impartial manner for

all the acts bringing astronomical discredit to the APD.

49. The City requests of the Hearing Examiner to sustain the violations and affirm the

courageous and forthright actions of Chief Acevedo in indefinitely suspending the

Appellant to allow the APD to begin rebuilding its reputation and credibility in the future.

V. DISCUSSION AND DECISION

(Some evidence and some argument will not be discussed where it is not

necessary to the disposition of this matter.)

This is an excerpt from Joint Exhibit #15:

“From: Dunn, Chris Sent: Wednesday, May 13, 2009 6:57 PM To: Harkin, Christian Cc: Gutierrez, Mario, Connor, Pat Subject: Novel Ideal

Let’s get Sander’s probationary records. Also check for records on others. See if he/they were in compliance and what conditions were. If he/they violated curfew and/or carrying a gun/using/carrying drugs, we can make him/them a causation of the entire event…Guezz I am so smart I scare myself. Thoughts?”

Just as the face of Helen of Troy launched 1000 ships, this e-mail launched an

investigation that yielded thousands of pages of statements and reports. Outside of the

investigation of the shooting itself, this matter has garnered almost unparalleled media

attention. Nevertheless, in this forum it comes down to a matter of employment – was

the Appellant’s indefinite suspension justified under all the circumstances, and if not,

what is the appropriate remedy?

Before addressing this matter there are a few preliminary matters to discuss. The

Appellant has raised the issue of the legal sufficiency of the written statement of

suspension. The arguments on both sides have been set forth above. I will not address

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this issue vis-à-vis the Acts Bringing Discredit Upon the Department because the

Appellant has conceded this charge at least from the beginning of the appeal hearing.

I have reviewed the Memorandum of Indefinite Suspension (Joint Exhibit #10). It

cites a specific Civil Service Rule, Rule 10.03, (see p. 1 of Joint Exhibit #10) and it then

goes on to give a narrative of what transpired following the OIS involving Officer

Quintana. On page 3 of the Memorandum, it references the May 13, 2009 email, which

was brought to the Chief’s attention on or about September 28, 2009. The Chief,

believing that the email could be a badge of bias or lack of impartiality, ordered an

investigation by the Special Inquiry Task Force (see, Id. @ p. 4).

The Memorandum then cites a discovery by that Task Force of another email

dated June 24, 2009 (see, Id. @ p. 4) authored by the Appellant (Joint Exhibit #18). That

email states in pertinent part:

“I sent Cronig the SIU interview. Pat wanted to respond to his questions/statements but I told him to just ignore. I don’t think we want to give him any ammo.” The Memorandum then goes on to indicate that questions developed by the Legal

Advisor (Joint Exhibit # 10 @ p.4) were not asked by the Appellant or the rest of the

team of investigators looking into the Quintana OIS. It also develops the notion that the

Appellant did not ask relevant questions, that he began his investigation with a

preconception of the outcome, and that he failed from beginning to end to have and

maintain an objective, fair, impartial and equitable frame of reference (see, Id. @ pp. 4-5)

It also mentions the memorandum (Joint Exhibit # 23) the Appellant sent to the

Chief in response to his request for the IA personnel to provide him their specific

recommendations and bases for the same. The Chief states that in the memo he received

from the Appellant, the Appellant “…expressed similar statements that exhibited his bias

towards the officers and against the occupants of the vehicle” (Joint Exhibit #10, p. 5).

The Memorandum then states that the actions of the Appellant were deliberate

and goes on to describe how the Appellant can no longer be effective as a police officer

or as an investigator. In pertinent part, the Chief writes:

“There is no disciplinary action, in my opinion that could rehabilitate Det. Dunn and allow him to continue to be a peace officer. With no ability to be a positive force and further benefit as a Detective or to perform investigations or even police

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duties without being challenged, I feel I have no choice but to indefinitely suspend Detective Christopher T. Dunn effective this date” (see, Id. @ p. 6).

Finally, the Memorandum of Indefinite Suspension sets forth the Department’s

General Orders (A201b – Impartial Attitude and A201a.02 (B) (1) (3) – Acts Bringing

Discredit Upon the Department (see Id. @ pp. 6-7).

As one can see from the Position of the Parties Section of this decision,

Appellant’s Counsel has vigorously argued that the Memorandum of Indefinite

Suspension does not specifically point out the act or acts which allegedly violated the

Civil Service Rule. Appellant’s Counsel went into more detail in the Appellant’s brief

and cited case law in support of this position. Of course, Counsel for the City addressed

this matter as well.

I have reviewed the statute, the case law presented by the parties in their

respective briefs, and the Memorandum of Indefinite Suspension. The statute requires the

department head point out the Civil Service Rule(s) alleged to have been violated and the

acts which the department head contends are in violation of those rules. Case law

requires some specificity, but it does not need to meet the precision or technicality of an

indictment. It also recognizes that in some cases lay people will be drafting said written

statements.

In the instant case, the Memorandum cites the Civil Service Rule alleged to have

been violated – Rule 10.03 which prohibits the violation of any of the rules and

regulations of the Police Department at page 1. It also goes on to cite those specific

General Orders violated – General Orders A210b and A201a.02(B)(1)(3) at pages 6 and

7. While it does contain a host of narrative on events, and while it does argue in favor of

the action taken (indefinite suspension), it does describe the acts of the Appellant which

the Chief contends violate the Civil Service Rule. It sets forth the two emails authored by

the Appellant at pages 3 and 4. It describes the Appellant’s rejection of asking any

questions developed by the Legal Advisor and the reticence of the Appellant to ask

relevant questions at page 4. It states that the Appellant had an apparent preconceived

notion of the outcome and that he never changed from that position at pages 4 and 5. It

also supports the last part of this allegation by stating (albeit in generalities) that his

September 14, 2009 memo showed that his impartiality or bias towards the officers and

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against the occupants of the vehicle at page 5. The alleged violation is not maintaining

an “Impartial Attitude.” The inclusion of these acts and omissions by the Appellant in

the Memorandum put the Appellant on notice of the alleged violation of “Impartial

Attitude” and I so find. Therefore, the Memorandum of Indefinite Suspension is legally

sufficient.

Turning now to the substantive issue of the Charges, I will review Charge 1 first.

General Order A201b deals with Impartial Attitude. The General Order may be broken

down into two parts: (1) the preamble which indicates that all persons in the area of the

City deserve and should expect impartial law enforcement and that police officers will be

held accountable for the manner in which they exercise their authority; and, (2) the

description of Impartial Attitude which calls for police officers to act professionally, treat

all persons fairly and equally, and perform all duties impartially, objectively, and

equitably without regard to personal feelings, animosities, friendships, financial status,

sex, creed, color, race religion, age, political beliefs, sexual preference, or social or ethnic

background and furthermore, that police officers will respect the rights of individuals and

will not engage in discrimination, oppression, or favoritism whether by language, act or

omission.

The email of May 13, 2009 standing alone, at best, indicates “bad judgment” on

the part of the Appellant and, at worst, indicates partiality toward the officers and against

the occupants of the vehicle. Some may view it just as opinion and others may view it as

the first step along the road to exonerate the officers involved in the OIS and/or blame the

occupants of the vehicle. What acts and/or omissions of the Appellant that occurred after

the email will determine whether or not the violation of “Impartial Attitude” is true.

The record indicates that the Appellant went ahead and had the information he

suggested be gathered in the May 13 email assembled – despite being told by his

immediate superior (Sgt. Connor) that the investigation was not going down that road.

He authored another email on June 24 (Joint Exhibit #18) that begins with a paragraph

which indicates that the Legal Advisor’s questions should be ignored because “I don’t

think we need to give him more ammo.” He resisted asking the questions posited by the

Legal Advisor because he felt they might incriminate the officers. See, Joint Exhibit #28,

p. 126 @ Line 2871; p. 138 @ Line 3142; p.139 @ Line 3148; p. 169 @ Line 3842; and

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p. 173 @ Line 3934. He made no effort to communicate with the Legal Advisor to

express his concern with the questions or ascertain their relevance to the investigation.

Finally, in his memo to the Chief dated September 14, 2009 (Joint Exhibit #23) he

expressed his opinion that:

“We often fail to place any blame on the subject, who was armed, who was a felon, on probation and in violation of the probation, with a violent history, with other known felons and had potentially committed other crimes not solved. Sanders put Officer Quintana in a situation where he was forced to use deadly force.” @ p. 5.

There is certainly nothing wrong with an initial assessment of a situation based

upon training and experience. There may be nothing wrong with “brainstorming” other

scenarios. However, where the Appellant was told not to go “down this road” and he

continued to press for, and gather discrediting information about the occupants of the

vehicle – information not relevant to the investigation - he showed partiality towards the

officers and against the occupants of the vehicle. When he suggested ignoring the

questions posed by the Legal Advisor and refused to ask questions that he felt might

incriminate the officers, he showed partiality towards the officers.

Based upon the memo he sent to the Chief (Joint Exhibit # 23), he seemingly

justifies his partiality by expressing the obvious notion – police officers often deal with

“bad people”. Therefore, when an incident occurs, such as an OIS, should not the police

place the blame on the “bad guys” based upon their previous records and current status?

I believe the quoted section of the memo supports the overall impression that the

Appellant showed partiality against the occupants of the vehicle.

Finally, there is the issue of the leading questions asked by the Appellant of

Officer Quintana. At the very least, leading questions provide information to the witness

that the witness might not be aware of, and, at most, they suggest answers that could

either incriminate or exonerate the witness and/or others. It is clear that the leading

questions asked by both the Appellant and Det. Harkin were troublesome for Commander

Johnson and ultimately Johnson cleaned up the report to establish the explanations and

conclusions upon more solid testimony. Given the Appellant’s statements in his emails,

it is not a great stretch to notice that his leading questions also show his partiality to

Officer Quintana and against the occupants of the vehicle.

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In conclusion, based upon the evidence adduced in this case, it appears that from

the time he wrote the May 13 email, or soon thereafter, through the end of the OIS

investigation, the Appellant manifested a lack of impartial attitude on his part in his

investigatory efforts of this OIS which is a violation of General Order A201b, and I so

find. Moreover, his actions undermined the expectation of all persons in the area of

Austin for impartial law enforcement that is warranted in this same General Order.

The remaining issue is the appropriateness of the penalty imposed – indefinite

suspension. I am going to address the severity of the penalty based upon the violations

found as well as the asserted defense of unequal or discriminatory or disparate treatment.

The Appellant has not contested the Charge of violating General Order A201a.02

(B) (1) (3) – Acts Bringing Discredit Upon the Department. The Appellant’s lack of an

Impartial Attitude during the subject OIS investigation created the perception that the

Austin Police Department cannot conduct an IA investigation in a fair, unprejudiced and

objective manner. It has obviously undermined the integrity and credibility of the APD

in the eyes of the public. It has called into question APD’s ability to “police” itself. The

Appellant’s conduct herein caused this type of discredit upon the Department. His

actions were more serious than say pulling a traffic ticket out of the system for a friend or

accepting a free meal for extra foot patrols or “drive-arounds” at a restaurant/bar. The

consequences are also more serious in that his actions have opened the door to

assumption that any IA investigation may be corrupt from the outset and that it is the IA

Detectives’ mission to exonerate fellow police officers. This is a serious matter with

serious consequences for which serious discipline is justified.

As for the violation of the Impartial Attitude, it goes without saying that given the

context of this OIS investigation, the Appellant’s actions were at the very least misguided

and misdirected, and at worst they were tantamount to a campaign to exonerate the

officers involved at all costs. Once again, under all the circumstances, his actions and

omissions constituted a serious violation of this General Order that carry with it serious

consequences for which serious discipline is justified.

The Appellant has raised the issue of unequal or discriminatory or disparate

treatment on the issue of the fairness or appropriateness of his own discipline. He has

pointed to other detectives involved in the investigation who he claims conducted

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themselves in a similar manner and who were not disciplined or received lesser discipline

than he did. He has pointed out previous incidents of “Acts Bringing Discredit Upon the

Department” where the officers involved received discipline less than an indefinite

suspension for conduct that could be considered as egregious as his own.

The “rule” on this matter is as follows:

“It generally is accepted that enforcement of rules and assessment of discipline must be exercised in a consistent manner; all employees who engage in the same type of misconduct must be treated essentially the same, unless a reasonable basis exists for variations in the assessment of punishment (such as different degrees of fault, or mitigating or aggravating circumstances affecting some but not all of the employees). Applying this general rule, one decision recognized: ‘[T]here must be reasonable rules and standards of conduct which are consistently applied and enforced in a nondiscriminatory fashion. It is also generally accepted that enforcement of rules and assessment of discipline must be exercised in a consistent manner; plus all employees who engage in the same type of misconduct must be treated essentially the same.’

In this regard, one arbitrator declared: ‘Absolute consistency in the handling of rule violations is, of course, an impossibility, but that fact should not excuse random and completely inconsistent disciplinary practices.’

Where a reasonable basis for variations in penalties does exist, variations will be permitted notwithstanding the charge of disparate treatment. Discrimination is an affirmative defense and, therefore, the union generally has the burden of proving that the employer improperly discriminated against an employee. Thus, ‘[i]n order to prove disparate treatment, a union must confirm the existence of both parts of the equation. It is not enough that an employee was treated differently than others; it must also be established that the circumstances surrounding his/her offense were substantively like those of individuals who receive more moderate penalties.

Where the union does prove that rules and regulations have not been consistently applied and enforced in a nondiscriminatory manner, arbitrators will refuse to sustain a discharge or will reduce a disciplinary penalty. However, arbitrators will uphold variations in punishments among employees if a reasonable basis exists to justify such differences . . .”

* * * * * “That [there are] variations in penalties assessed do [es] not

necessarily mean that management's action has been improper or discriminatory. . .” Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, Sixth Edition, Alan Miles Rubin, Editor in Chief, (BNA, 2003) at pp. 995-997.

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In my opinion, the Appellant has failed to show that anyone else engaged in the

same kind of misconduct that he did. No other IA Detective wrote emails suggesting that

the occupants of the vehicle be made a “cause” of the OIS or that questions from the

Legal Advisor be ignored so as not to give him (the Legal Advisor) any more “ammo”.

He is the IA Detective who directed that the background information about the occupants

of the vehicle be gathered even after being told by Sgt. Connor that they “were not going

down this road.” He admitted resisting asking any questions that he felt might

incriminate the officers. He made no effort to communicate with the Legal Advisor to

express his apprehension of the Legal Advisor’s questions or ascertain their relevance to

the investigation. He is the detective who conveyed the suggestion in an email that the

Legal Advisor was the adversary in this case. He expressed the notion that “we” often fail

to place the “blame” on a “subject” in a deadly force situation and then he sought to do

so.

There is no doubt that the investigation of this OIS was not picture perfect. Far

from it, some might say. In fact, other detectives were disciplined for their roles in this

case. Sgt. Connor received an oral counseling for not appreciating the gravity of the

Appellant’s May 13 email or reporting it to his supervisor, Lt. Rodriguez. Det. Harkin

received a written reprimand for not conducting a thorough and complete investigation

vis-à-vis not utilizing the Legal Advisor’s questions. Another Detective (in SIU)

received a performance improvement discussion for a derogatory reference made about

the occupants of the vehicle in an email. Also, in this Detective’s email was his theory

that the occupants of the vehicle were awake or feigned sleep; however, this was

considered a viable theory for investigation although, in the end, it did not lead to

credible evidence to support it. Finally, there is also the notion that the chain of command

failed to see “bias” or lack of an “Impartial Attitude” on the part of other Detectives

involved in this OIS investigation.

I have considered these matters. I see a difference between what the Appellant did

and what the others did. The Appellant expressed his feelings and/or opinions in the

emails and then followed through on his feelings and opinions. I do not have the same

amount of certainty about where the others were coming from. Therefore, I am not

convinced by the evidence adduced that any of these other Detectives were engaged in

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the same kind of misconduct or that the circumstances surrounding the Appellant’s

offense were substantively like those who received lesser discipline.

As for the other situations – the 2005 IA investigation of use of force (see, Dunn

Exhibit #2) and the 2005 “Burn, Baby, Burn” incident (see, Dunn Exhibit #3), I find that

neither is comparable to the instant case. In the former case, while the techniques

(questions) were an issue and where one detective was later removed from the

investigation, it was explained that the investigator was using a form of accepted modus

operandi of gaining the confidence of the witness to elicit information. In any case, the

Detective did receive counseling. Furthermore, the end result of that investigation was

that charges were brought against the officers involved and they were prosecuted.

In the latter case, the unfortunate comments made over the MDT brought discredit

to the Department. The officers involved received anywhere from 3 to 15 day

suspensions. However, as egregious as one might consider the comments to be, this is

not the same as expressing and exhibiting partiality towards the officers and against the

occupants of the vehicle during an OIS investigation. This undermined the credibility of

the entire APD and in particular its IA Division – and trust is a hard thing win back.

In any event, both events occurred before the tenure of Chief Acevedo. While he

may consider previously imposed discipline as a guideline, I do not think he is bound by

previous disciplines if there is a reasonable basis for doing something different. In the

instant case, I find these events are not substantially the same as the Appellant’s

circumstances and therefore, I am not drawn to a conclusion of disparate treatment.

Finally, the absence or presence of any other investigations surrounding this OIS

investigation does not mitigate the actions and omissions of the Appellant in this case or

the penalty imposed.

I agree with those who testified that the Appellant was forthright with those

investigating him and that he does now realize and take responsibility for his actions and

omissions in this matter. I do not think he is a bad person. Nevertheless, he made some

terrible mistakes as a Detective that reflect badly not only on him, but the APD. He has

violated two General Orders and the seriousness of the offenses is apparent. He has, in a

way, interfered with the business of the Austin Police Department. While he may be able

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to rehabilitate himself, there is palpable opportunity that his continued employment there

will continue to interfere with the APD and its mission.

VI. JUDGMENT

Upon these facts and for these reasons, the violation of Impartial Attitude is found

to be true; and, the violation of Acts Bringing Discredit Upon the Department is also

found to true. Both are supported by the preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore,

based upon these findings, the decision to indefinitely suspend the Appellant is justified

and not arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, both Charges are sustained and the indefinite suspension of the

Appellant is affirmed.

June 28, 2010 ss/ Thomas A. Cipolla

Thomas A. Cipolla, Independent

Third-Party Hearing Examiner