CICERO'SCONCORDIA:THE PROMOTION OF A POLITICAL CONCEPT

IN THE LATE ROMAN REPUBLIC

Mark A. Temelini

Department of HistoryClassics Program

McGill University, MontrealJanuary 2002

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partialfulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Classics.

© Mark A. Temelini 2002

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Abstract

The aim of this dissertation is to explain the meaning of concordia by

surveying the historical context in which it emerged. The thesis concentrates

on the period 63-43 B.C. because it is in this crucial period that the concept

achieves its most articulate and influential defence by the Roman orator,

statesman, and philosopher, Marcus Tullius Cicero. My intention is to

review the important writings and speeches of Cicero and to situate them in

the political struggles in which he was implicated.

By placing the concept of concordia in this political context, a clearer

picture emerges than is available in the current literature about how Cicero

promoted, defended, and skillfully redefined the concept of concordia in order

to achieve his political aims. What emerges are three identifiable meanings

of the concept of concordia. The first is the longstanding conventional

Roman republican idea of concordia as unity, friendship, and agreement. The

second is what Cicero called the concordia ordinum, an innovative idea of

concordia as a harmony or coalition of the two Roman orders of the senate

and equites. The third is the idea of concordia as a consensus omnzum

bonorum - what Cicero called concordia civium or concordia civitatis. This

idea represents an important shift in the thinking of the Roman orator who

began to see the survival of the republic as depending on a consensus that

went beyond the coalition of the senate and equites.

ii

Résumé

Le but de cette étude est d'expliquer la signification de concordia à

travers un examen attentif du cadre historique dans lequel le mot surgit.

Cette thèse se concentre sur la période entre 63 et 43 av. J.-C. car il est

precisément dans ces vingt ans que le concept est articulé et defendu de la

façon la plus complète et influente par l'orateur romain Marcus Tullius

Cicero. Mon intention est de passer en revue les plus importants écrits et

discours de Cicéron et de les situer dans le contexte des luttes politiques dans

lesquelles il était impliqué.

En situant le concept de concordia dans son contexte politique, on

obtient une image plus claire que dans les écrits existants qui analysent

comment Cicéron a promû, défendu et habilement affiné la notion de

concordia pour parvenir à ses fins politiques. L'analyse relève trois sens du

concept de concordia. Le premier dérive de l'idée de concordia comme unité,

amitié et accord, idée ancienne et conventionelle dans la Rome républicaine.

Le deuxième sens est une innovation de Cicéron qui développe l'idée de

concordia ordinum pour définir l'harmonie ou la coalition des deux premiers

ordres politiques dans la Rome républicaine: le sénat et les equites. Le

troisième sens est l'idée de concordia comme consensus omnium bonorum­

ce que Cicéron appelle concordia civium ou concordia civitatis et qui

représente une évolution importante dans la pensée de l'orateur romain.

Cicéron désormais considère que la survie de la république dépend d'un

consensus qui dépasse l'accord du sénat et des equites.

iii

Acknowledgements

1 wish to thank. Professor T. Wade Richardson for his supervision and

advice. 1 am particularly grateful to Eugenio Bolongaro for editing and

proofreading the manuscript and for providing insightful comments. A note

of appreciation also goes to Mauro Lo Dico for his kind research assistance.

Many special thanks to my brother Michael for his invaluable

comments and profitable discussions and to my brother Leonard for ,always

showing an interest in my field of study with his inquiries.

Lowe everything to my parents Dr. Walter Temelini and tMrs. Louise

Temelini who have always inspired and encouraged me and helped me to

learn. This dissertation is dedicated to them.

Above aU, 1 am deeplyindebted to my wife Vita who has endured

much and has stood by me from the very beginning of my academic

adventures with continuous and unceasing support. This dissertation is also

dedicated to her and to my daughter Sofia who has made it aU worth while.

iv

Abstract

Résumé

Contents

ii

iii

Acknowledgements i v

Chronology vi

Introduction 1

1. Consul Popularis, 63 9

i. Towards a Political Policy 9ii. Concordia and the Failure of the Rogatio Servilia Agraria 17iii. Asserting a State of Concordia 29iv. Concordia Ordinum against Catiline 32

2. The Fragility and Failure of Concordia Ordinum,62-58 49

i. Rex Peregrinus 50ü. Clodius and the Courts 57iii. Pompey's Return 59iv. The Publicani and the Asiatic Tax Contract 63v. Isolation, Betrayal, and Exile 66

3. Concordia and Consensus in tota Italia,57-50 81

i. The Post-exile Speeches 83Ïi. An Appeal for a Dedication to the Goddess Concordia 89iÏi. Consensus Omnium Bonorum 95iv. Otium cum Dignitate 105v. The Definitive Break-up of Triumviral Concordia 118

4. Harmony in Crisis, 49-43 125

i. Demetrius' Book De Concordia 125Ïi. Societas Humanitatis 139

. iÏi. Quae fuit Oratio de Concordia! 147iv. Armies Unite to Secure Harmony for the Republic 157

Conclusion 160

Bibliography 163

Index Locorum 174

v

Chronology

76

69

80

81

Cicero barn, Arpinum, January 3.

Brother Quintus born.

Cicero serves under Pompey's father in the Social War.

Civil war.Marius Hees from Sulla.

Sulla's eastern campaigns (to 83). Marius returns ta Rome.

Marius dies.

(or earlier) De Inventione Rhetorica.

(early) Sulla returns from east; revives civil war against Marians.

Proscriptions begin. Sulla becomes dictator legibus jaciendis reipublicaeconsti tuendae.

Proscriptions end. Senatorial role is restored and strengthened.Pro Quinctio (judge and committee of assessors).t

Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino (jury of senators).(?) Marriage to Terentia.

Cicero travels to Athens, Asia Minor, and Rhodes.

Daughter Tullia born.

Sulla dies.

Cicero returns to Rome. Civil war: Lepidus is killed; his supporters fleeto Spain.

Pompey's Spanish campaign against Roman general Sertorius (to 71).Pro Quinto Roscio Comoedo (judge and committee of assessors).

Cicero embarks on a senatorial career: quaestor at Lilybaeum in Sicily.

Spartacus: revolt of gladiators and slaves, crushed 1:y Crassus andPompey.

Pro Tullio (board of recuperatores).

Pompey and Crassus consuls.Divinatio in Caecilium (jury of senators).In Verrem (part 1, jury of senators; part 2, 5 speeches as if to jury ofsenators - not delivered). Jury reformed by lex Aurelia iudiciaria.

Cicero aedile.Pro Fonteio (jury of senators and equites).Pro Caecina (board of recuperatores).

1 For speeches, the audience or setting is noted.

vi

79-77

79

78

77

75

73-71

71

70

106

102

89

88

87

86

85

83

82

68 Father dies.Earliest Epistulae ad Atticum.

66 Cicero praetor.De Imperia Cn. Pompei (public meeting).Pro Cluentio (jury of senators and equites).

65 Son Marcus born.Pro Cornelio (jury of senators and equites).

64 In Senatu in Toga Candida (senate). Brother Quintus publishesCommentariolum Petitionis.

63 Cicero consul.De Lege Agraria (speech 1, senate; speeches 2 and 3, public meetings).Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Rea (popular assembly).In Catilinam (speech l, senate, in temple of Jupiter Stator; speeches 2and 3, public meetings; speech 4, senate, in temple of Concordia).Pro Murena Gury of senators and equites).

62 Pro Sulla (jury of senators and equites).Pro Archia Gury of senators and equites).Earliest Epistulae ad Familiares.

61 Pompey retums from eastem campaigns.P. Clodius tried for sacrilege (acquitted); Cicero is a hostile witness.

60 Meeting of first triumvirate (without legal sanction).

59 Caesar consul.Pro Flacco (jury of senators and equites).Earliest Epistulae ad Quintum Fratrem.

58 mid-March: Clodius drives Cicero out of Rome and into exile.

57 August 4: recalled from exile.September 4: triumphant return to Rome.Post Reditum in Senatu (senate).Post Reditum ad Quirites (public meeting).De Domo Sua (college of pontiffs [senators]).

56 Conference of triumvirs at Luca.Pro Sestio Gury of senators and equites).In Vatinium (jury of senators andequites).Pro Caelio (jury of senators and equites).De Haruspicum Responso (senate).De Provinciis Consularibus (senate).Pro Balbo (jury of senators and equites).

55 Pompey and Crassus consuls II.In Pisonem (senate).

vii

54 Pro Plancio (jury of senators and equites).Pro Scauro (jury of senators and equites).Pro Rabirio Postumo (jury of senators and equites).

53 Crassus defeated and killed by Parthians at Carrhae.Cicero elected augur.

52 Pompey consul III (without a colleague until August).Clodius murdered.Pro Milone (jury of senators and equites).De Oratore completed (begun in 55).De Republica completed (begun in 54).De Legibus begun.

51 July: Cicero governor of Cilicia.

50 July: leaves Cilicia. Nov. 24: arrives in Italy.

49 Civil war. Caesar victorious in Italy and Spain.Cicero joins Pompey in Greece.

48 BatUe of Pharsalus. Pompey murdered in Alexandria.Cicero returns to Italy.

47 Caesar returns to Italy. Cicero pardoned.

46 Battle of Thapsus. Cato commits suicide at Utica.Cicero divorces Terentia (Jan.); marries Publilia (Dec.).Brutus.Paradoxa Stoicorum.Orator.Partitiones Oratoriae.De Optimo Genere Oratorum.Pro Marcello (senate, addressed to Caesar).Pro Ligario (before Caesar, in the forum).

45 Daughter Tullia dies.Cicero periodically away from Rome.Caesar defeats Pompeians at battle of Munda.Academica.Timaeus.De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum.Pro Rege Deiotaro (before Caesar, in Caesar's house).

44 Ides of March: Caesar assassinated.Tusculanae Disputationes (begun 45).De Natura Deorum (begun 45).De Senectute.De Amicitia.De Divinatione.De Fato.

viii

Topica.De Officiis.De Legibus (completed).Orationes Philippicae in M. Antonium.

(speech 1, Sept. 2, senate.speech 2, not delivered, as if to senate in Sept.speech 3, Dec. 26, senate.speech 4, Dec. 26, public meeting.)

43 Civil war. Mutina: D. Brutus besieged by Antony;Octavian defeats Antony.Orationes Philippicae in M. Antonium.

(speech 5, Jan., senate, temple of Jupiter Capitolinus.speech 6, Jan., public meeting.speeches 7-14, Jan-Apr., senate.)

Nov. Il: Meeting of second triumvirate (sanctioned).Proscriptions against aU political opponents.Dec. 7: Cicero murdered.

ix

Introduction

One of the most important ideas to emerge from the Roman republic

was the concept of concordia, and one cannot understand this period of

history without a clear understanding of il. Furthermore, concordia was also

the keystone of the inteIlectual enterprise of republican Rome's most

prominent orator, statesman, and political philosopher, Marcus Tullius

Cicero. Indeed it would be difficult, if not impossible, to understand the life

and works of Cicero without a clear understanding of the meaning of

concordia. It was Cicero's most cherished ideal, something he championed,

something he tirelessly defended; it was a subject that he addressed on

countless occasions in his speeches, correspondence, and treatises.

The last century of the Roman republic witnessed fierce competition by

an embattled oligarchy, the rise of military dynasts, a series of civil wars and

urban riots, and vigorous literary activity,l yet through it aIl the figure who

gave his name to the age was Cicero.2 Born in a prominent and wealthy

equestrian family from the municipium of Arpinum, Cicero served briefly in

1The literature includes: the poetry of Catullus (87-54) and Lucretius (99-55), warcommentaries by Caesar (102-44), historical monographs by Sallust (86-35), biographies byNepos (110-24), and the works by the outstanding antiquarian Varra (116-27). In addition, theScaevolae, father and son, were brilliant students of jurisprudence. For the vast non-extantmaterial, see the survey of Henry Bardon, La Littérature latine inconnue, Vol. l, L'Époquerépublicaine (Paris: Klincksieck, 1952), 149-371.

2 It is calledthe "Ciceronian era" by Erich S. Gruen. The Last Generation of the RomanRepublic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974),387; "age of Cicero" by MichaelCrawford, The Roman Republic (Glasgow: William Collins Sons & Co., 1978),160; and "Ciceronianage" byThomas N. Mitchell, Cicero: The Ascending Years(New Haven: Yale University Press,1979), 203; see also David Shotter's pamphlet The Fall of the Roman Republic (London:Routledge, 1994) in which the author has e1ected ta don the caver with Cicero's portrait bust yetthe chapter headings introduce the major demagogic and military figures of the age.

1

the Social War (but did not enjoy combat), waseducated at Rome and Athens,

rose through the senatorial ranks of the cursus honorum to become the first

novus homo in thirty-one years to reach the consulship and bestow the status

of nobilitas upon his gens. However, his family' s prominence did not

survive his death.

This dissertation will review and offer an interpretation of the concept

of concordia during Cicero's lifetime. It examines in what way Cicero was

committed to this traditional Roman policy, how he expanded and changed

its meaning and how he made it one of the fundamental governing

principles of his political career. 1 will employ the approach of historical

survey in order to place the concept in its proper social and political context.

The presentation will make use of Cicero's original speeches, correspondence,

and treatises, as well as commentaries on these works, in an effort to find an

appropriate and cohesive framework.

The approach, then, is to place the concept of concordia in its historical

context. It is not the first time that this has been attempted. The few existing

studies on the subject have also employed the survey approach. The work by

H. Strasburger, Concordia Ordinum, eine Untersuchung zur Politik Ciceros

(Leipzig, 1931; rpt. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1956), is not without value but it is

outdated and is presented as a patchwork of Ciceronian excerpts. In Ettore

Lepore's elaborate study, Il princeps ciceroniano e gli ideali politici della tarda

repubblica (Napoli: Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, 1954), the author

examines the rhetorical transition from concordia ordinum to consensus

omnium bonorum; but a more theoretical approach makes this text difficult

to read. The present dissertation represents the first study of Cicero's

concordia in English. Books and articles on the subject have not been

2

plentiful but do offer a variety of perspectives. Henry C. Boren, IICicero's

Coneordia in Historieal Perspective,lI (in Laudatores Temporis Aeti: Studies in

Memory of Wallace Everett Caldwell. Chapel Hill: The University of North

Carolina Press, 1964, 51-62) and E. D. Eagle, IICatiline and the Concordia

Ordinum," (Phoenix, 3, 1949, 15-30), provide a glimpse of the political

environment leading up to Cicero's poliey of concordia ordinum. P. Jal's

study, lI«pax Civilis» - «Concordia»," (Revue des études latines, 39, 1961, 210­

231), shows how the term IIconcordia" substitutes for IIpax" in Cicero's last

series of speeches against Antony. The technical and sociological

contributions by G. Achard, Pratique rhétorique et idéologie politique dans les

discours "optimates" de Cicéron (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981) and C. Nicolet,

L'Ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine (312-43 av. J.-c.) (V 01. l, Paris:

Éditions E. de Boccard, 1966; Vol. II, 1974) are careful researches on the boni

and the equites and their role in Cicero's policy. Indeed practically every

biography of Cicero has something to say about concordia. But despite the

central importance of this term in Cicero's political career, these and other

studies have not, to my mind, explored its full range of connotation.

Three Meanings of Concordia

Through Cicero's speeches, correspondence, and treatises we get a vivid

portrait of a man who deeply believed in Rome's republican principles and

institutions and who tirelessly worked to defend these principles and

institutions, despite the upheavals surrounding him. The concept he

eonstantly invoked in support of them was concordia. In fact, throughout mslife, Cicero promoted and defended three interpretations of concordia: a

traditional or conventional interpretation which is used to define or describe

3

the harmony of the republic; a novel interpretation which Cicero caUs

concordia ordinum; and an interpretation he caUs concordia civium or

concordia civitatis, which he uses interchangeably with consensus omnium

bonorum. My position is that the three meanings are aU related and not

necessarily mutuaUy exclusive, but they are also different in many important

respects. The dissertation will show how the differences in meaning are

constituted by the different political drcumstances in which the concepts were

used.

1. Harmony of the Republic

In the traditional or conventional sense, concordia meant public

harmony or the harmony of the republic. It was a basic principle or belief that

the foundation of a weU functioning state must be the unity, friendship,

agreement or reconciliation of its citizens. This Roman belief in concordia

was similar to the Greek ideal of homonoia. Furthermore, it was personified

as a purely abstract Roman deity - the goddess Concordia - who had been an

object of worship sinee the early Roman republic and in whose honour many

temples and statues were built. For example, in 367 B.C.3 Marcus Camillus

built a temple to the Roman goddess Concordia in the forum to commemorate

the accord reached between patricians and plebeians (Plut. Cam. 42.3-5).4 This

Roman deity corresponded to the Greek cult of Homonoia whose largest

temple had been dedicated at Agrigentum in Sicily in the fifth century.

3 Ali dates are B.C. unless otherwise indicated.

40ther aedes or statues to Concordia followed in 304 (Livy, 9.46.6; Pliny, N. H. 33.19)and in 216 (Livy 22.33.7f, 23.21.7). In 121, after the death of the popularistribune C. Gracchus,the senate ordered the consul L. Opimius to restore Camillus' temple in commemoration of thecessation of hostilities between the senatorial oligarchy and the populares(App. B. Civ. 1.26;Plut. C. Gracch. 17.6). This was the last temple dedicated to Concordia in the republican period.

4

2. Concordia Ordinum: "The Ciceronian Tradition"

As a result of the various struggles emerging out of bis political

engagements, and because of his own personal status, Cicero coined a new

definition of concordia which he called concordia ordinum - the harmony of

the orders. First defined and put into practice in 63, concordia ordinum is an

interpretation of concordia meaning a political harmony, an alliance or a

coalition between two orders of Roman society: the senate and the equites. In

all of Cicero's writings, there are only five references in which concordia is

presented in the same sentence with ordinum.5 The two words are only

found once as a linked phrase in ordinum concordiam (Att.1.18.3). Yet, there

is no conclusive evidence that the phrase concordia ordinum was used prior

to Cicero. Many scholars agree, therefore, that he was the first to link these

two terms. Consequently, there is a conventional belief that concordia

ordinum is a uniquely Ciceronian expression, that the expression forms part

of "the Ciceronian tradition."6

My thesis will show how the term was coined not for abstract

philosophical reasons, but because of a number of urgent political concerns.

That is, Cicero very skillfully manipulated the existing meaning of concordia

5 Glu. 152: equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos, concordia coniunctissimos essecupiunt; Gat. 4.15: quos ex...dissensione huius ordinis ad societatem concordiamquerevocatos...haec causa coniungit; Att. 1.14.4: de gravitate ordinis, de equestri concordia, deconsensione Italiae; Att. 1.17.9: multa...a me de ordinum dignitate et concordia dicta sunt; Att.1.18.3: senatus auctoritatem abiecit et ordinum concordiam diiunxit; Fam. 12.15.3: concordiam etconspirationem omnium ordinum; cf. Har. Resp. 60: consensus ordinum est divulsus.

6 Nicolet, L'Ordre équestre, l, 635; S. P. Oakley, A Commentaryon Livy: Books VI-X(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997),723; cf. Strasburger, 1-14. Quentin Skinner ("Machiavelli'sDiscorsi and the pre-humanist origins of republican ideas," in Machiavelli and RepublicanismCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990,130,136) claims that for Cicero ''the ideal ofconcordia ordinum had been oLoverriding importance" and that the "entire tradition of thought"that Machiavel1i repudiated "was nothing less than the Ciceronian vision of concordia ordinum."Skinner's interpretation has prompted other scholars, such as Maurizio Viroli ("Machiavelli and therepublican idea of politics," ibid., 157), to refer to the preoccupation with concordia ordinum as"the Ciceronian tradition."

5

so that it could be used to justify his political aims. Cicero began his public life

by appealing to the conventional meaning of republican harmony as a way of

dealing with disagreements over Sulla's reforms, over the management of

economic resources, and to deal with the antagonism of certain ambitious

individuals. He soon realised that his own success and the harmony of the

Roman republic could only be achieved within a kind of coalition, and thus

he began to see concordia as a political strategy. The strategy was to build an

alliance, and in effect political harmony, between the two major orders of the

state: the senate and the equites. In other words, Cicero applied the term

afresh to a specific political strategy of building a bond between these two

major orders. Cicero's political aims were also grounded in his personal

status. He was a man of equestrian heritage from the ltalian countryside who

achieved senatorial status in Rome. As both an eques and a senator he thus

felt a sincere moral obligation to defend both orders.

Consequently, the advice and direction Cicero gave to his friends and

colleagues was that all senatorial magistrates serving Rome and the provinces

should maintain good working relations with the financial and commercial

interests represented by the equites.7 However, Cicero justified this advice by

arguing that this strategy would enable the senate to achieve what everyone

assumed it should: the protection and maintenance of stability, greatness, and

liberty of the republic.

My thesis will show that because of his remarkable political abilities

Cicero did achieve sorne success. By ingeniously appealing to the

longstanding conventional Roman principle of concordia and by expanding

7 For example, in 59, in the name of concordia ordinum, Cicero advised provincialgovernors including his brother Quintus ta protect the needs of the business community in arderta guarantee peaceful existence and prosperity for Rome (Q. Fr. 1.1.32).

6

and redefining the criteria by which it could be applied, Cicero introduced a

new term in the Roman vocabulary and with it was able to promote his own

vision of republicanism as a balance between the interests of the senate and

equites.

3. Concordia Civium or Concordia Civitatis

While there has been much discussion about Cicero's concept of

concordia ordinum, few scholars recognise that around 57, Cicero abandons

the notion of concordia ordinum and adopts the more inclusive concept of

concordia civium or concordia civitatis. Lacking the limited and somewhat

elitist connotation of concordia ordinum, the concept of concordia

civium/civitatis meant a rallying of allloyai Roman citizens of any rank, the

unity of all good or honest people who supported the principles of the

republic. In this way once again Cicero redefines the traditional concept as a

political strategy, but this time it is also used synonymously and further

defined with consensus omnium bonorum.

Once again we can look to political events as well as Cicero's own

personal troubles for an explanation as to the origins of this new political

vocabulary. When the concordia ordinum collapsed and Cicero was sent into

exile in 58, he struggled with the problem of how to regain his influence in

Roman politics. His answer came in the fifties. Reflecting on those who

helped him return from exile, Cicero amends his earlier understanding of

concordia as a coalition of two orders to now mean a consensus omnium

bonorum, a raUying of aU good citizens. Once again he based his political

strategy on an appeal to the Roman convention of concordia, but only this

time his strategy was to apply the concept in more universal terms than to a

7

coalition of the senate and equites. In effect Cicero attempted to build a larger

coalition in the name of concordia. He argued that it was not the two orders

but actually the moral excellence of the vir bonus who could lead the Roman

republic to concordia. And the moral excellence of the vir bonus would be

achieved through the studia humanitatis. In other words, Cicero argued that

the good citizen, endowed with humanitas, is bound to preserve the safety

and good order of the republic and therefore otium cum dignitate.

Cicero's passion for the institutions of the Roman republic drove his

unparalleled devotion to the importance of concordia. When this did not

seem to be enough, his dedication to consensus helped to further define the

significance of harmony or general agreement in the name of good

government. But, however skillfully Cicero promoted such an ideal, it

proved difficult for him to muster and maintain support for concordia in an

age of military leaders who were able to offer more in terms of immediate

compensation to their supporters than Cicero's political rhetoric.

Despite his best efforts, the concordia ordinum collapsed and the

consensus omnium bonorum could not be achieved. The political turmoil in

the forties forced Cieero to retire temporarily from polities and declare that the

republic was finished. He devoted himself to philosophy and developed a

more universal notion of collective republican rule which he termed societas

humanitatis. In his lifelong quest to promote harmony, he coined all three

phrases.

8

1

Consul Popularis, 63

The present constitution should be vigorouslydefended because I have declared myself to theRoman people to be the defender of otium andconcordia for the present year. (Leg. Agr. 3.4)1

This chapter will try to show how Cicero's idea of concordia and its

promotion did not just materialize once he entered his consulship. It was

part of the political and social environment in which he pursued his judicial

and political career. But once he became consul in 63, he was able to promote

and publicize the term with all the resources of his rhetoric. Cicero begins his

campaign in favour of concordia in his consular speeches against Rullus. In

these orations, Cicero established his political aims in the guise of a "true"

popularis committed to achieving concordia. In his speeches against Catiline,

Cicero developed a more innovative notion of concordia by identifying

clearly the political groups to which he looked for support.

Towards a Political Policy

As a triallawyer, or jurisconsult, Cicero would express his views on the

current political situation and begin to articulate the political attitude that

emerged as he rose to the consulship. From 81 to 70, during the Sullan period

and its aftermath, a concordia ordinum or consensus bonorum apparently did

not exist in Cicero's vocabulary, but, fundamental views later encompassed in

1Translations of Cicero and other ancient authors are based on those in the LoebClassical Library volumes. with occasional very minor changes to assist in focusing the discussion.

9

his consular policy and later ideas were in the early stages of development.2

Sulla's work is mentioned with a significant degree of sympathy (Verr. 2.3.81)

and Cicero clearly believed the op ti m i and bon i had to defend the good

government the dictator had recently organized.3 In an early definition, a vi r

bonus was required to conduct himself upon principles of duty and custom

for the sake of public opinion and the common feelings of humanity (Quinet.

47,51).4 Senatorial jurors were advised to prove that they were boni (Rose.

Am. 139). They had to show justice toward equites like the falsely-accused

Roscius (Rose. Am. 142), who was himself bonus and an Italian municipal

aristocrat loyal to Rome. The boni included many from the local ruling

classes throughout Italy and Cicero appealed to their common interests (Verr.

1.54). Citizens would support the boni so long as the livelihood of innocent

individuals and welfare of the state were protected and ensured (Rose. Am.

149, Tull. 36) from audacious, greedy, and opportunistic individuals like

Naevius, Chrysogonus, and Verres.

A serious warning is given of the disastrous results criminal behaviour

would bring upon the causa nobilitatis unless checked properly by the boni

(Rose. Am. 136). The aristocratie regime reinstated by Sulla could only

survive if it dissociated itself from and showed resistance to the excessive

powers of criminals Cicero designated as homines postremi, men who had

2 Boren, 59, points out that Cicero "did not specifically speak of a concordia ordinumbefore his consulship."

3 For a detailed description of Sulla's constitutional enactments, see Arthur Keaveney,Sulla: the Last Republican (London:1982),169-213. Sallust and Plutarch provide the onlysubjective view that Sulla's reforms were established in the name of concordia. In 80 Sulla was 50obviously content with his new constitution that he proudly claimed to be sitting in harmony withhis fellow consul Metellus (Plut. Sull. 6.5: oS 'YE Kat 'fils lfjlOS MÉn}.}.ov Oll-OVOLaS, EVTlJXLaVal. nâraL). In contrast to Lepidus' criticisms (Sali. Hist. 1.48.24-25), Philippus 100 the senate indefence of Sulla's policyof pax et concordia (Sali. Hist.1.67.5, 10, 13).

4 The boni are al50 later described as lauti et locupletes(A tt. 8.1.3, cf. AU. 1.19.4).10

found their political niche by gaining wealth in the proscriptions and

confusion of the civil war (Rose. Am. 135-139). Cicero's political statements

were directed against these pauci, the "few" radical representatives of the

senatorial order who were liable to inflict damage on the aristocratic system

with their ceaseless corrupt practices.5 It was the duty of the law-courts

(recently reorganized by Sulla and presided over exclusively by senators)6 to

protect good citizens by enforcing strict justice against malicious individuals

like Verres, a senatorial govemor, who took advantage of the system's

potential for excesses. In the process, the jury had to avoid disrepute by not

engaging in scandalous administration of justice through the protection of

those who came from its own senatorial rank (Div. Caee. 8). Judicial

responsibility proved too exclusive for the senate. With the enactment of the

lex Aurelia Cotta iudiciaria in 70, just after the Verrine speeches were

published, the jury system was expanded to include a harmony of orders.7

Duties were now shared by an equal representation of senators, equites, and a

class of citizens called tribuni aerarii.8 In essence, it was the duty of the

equites to ensure that senatorial solidarity did not lead to the acquittaI of

5 Div. Gaec. 70; Verr. 1.36; De Imp. Gn. Pomp. 65; Glu. 152.

6 Sulla had given the senate strict control of the law-courts but had increased itsmembership to 600 by adlecting 300 equites sc that "equestrian"-senators could still be includedin the juries.

7 Since Gaius Gracchus' tribunate in 123 the senate and equites continually competed forcontrol of the courts; for further reference see H. Hill, The Roman Middle Glass in the RepublicanPeriod(Oxtord: Blackwell, 1952), 113ff.

8 The tribuni aerariiwere actually part of the equestrian order but with a lower propertyrating. This would have given the order a two-thirds majority in the courts; see Flac. 4 whereCicero classes them with the equites proper. For a detailed explanation of them, see C. Nicolet,The World of the Gitizen in Republican Rome, trans. P. S. Falla (Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1980), 161-166. Under the terms of the lexGassia tabellaria the jurors gave their verdict byballot. These and other laws are catalogued and explained by Giovanni Rotondi, Leges PublicaePopuli Romani (Milan, 1912; rpt. Hildesheim, 1962).

11

guilty senators and of the senators to supervise the actions of the equites. As a

result, Cicero could court the favour of the equestrian class as well as many

optimates.

Cicero's eoneordia ordinum was linked to a social development which

integrated the equestrian order into the political arrangement of the city: their

association with community life coincided with the Lex Roscia theatralis of 67

(plut. Cie. 13). With the enactment of this law by the tribune L. Roscius Otho,

all men of equestrian status had the first fourteen rows of seats reserved for

them at any theatre. As a result they gained a visible presence with the

senatorial order before the viewing public. This represented a manifest

honour reflecting their duties to the state.9

In 66, as praetor, Cicero marked the triumph of the equestrian order by

moulding public opinion in support of Manilius' bill De Imperio. Cn. Pompei.

91n social standing, the equites were almost equal to senators freely intermarrying withpatrician nobles and gaining entry to the senate. As a class they preferred the pursuit of money topolitical responsibility, and they formed the non-political section of the upper class. Among theequites the publicans were considered the most noteworthy grouping, with much politicalinfluence, and they were frequently helped by the senate (Verr. 2.3.168). Their estates allowedthem to bid for contracts which brought a higher retum on capital than agriculture. Ciceroconstantly praised their strength and zeal with phrases such as flos enim equitum Romanorum(Plane. 23); cf. De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 17; Verr. 2.2.175; Rab. Post. 3: C. Curtius, princeps equestrisordinis, fortissimus et maximus publicanus; and associates them with equestrian jurors. Thepublicans performed functions which were vital to the state. They negotiated contracts for militarysupplies, public works, and collection of taxes and duties. Considering the importance of thesebusiness operations for the state, one person could not shoulder ail the responsibility and risk,and as a result these equestrian contractors formed partnerships, or companies (societatespublicanorum) whose members owned shares (partes); for companies and shareholders, seePolyb. 6.17 and Cic. Fam. 13.9.2 re: a Bithynian company. Among the shareholders were alsomembers of the traditionalland-owning class of senators, who were debarred by law fromperforming publican duties (Cass. Dio 55.10.5; 69.16). Another group within the mixed lot ofequiteswere the negotiatores. Numerous in ail the provinces of the republic and beyond, theywere mainly traders who had a share in every business transaction that involved buying, selling orexchange of goods. Principally connected to trade, the profession al50 included bankers,moneylenders, and real estate dealers. For evidence of trade in Italy and the provinces, see T.Frank, An Economie Survey of Ancient Rome (Baltimore: Pageant Books, 1933-1940), l, 276,284,355; III, 135-7, 143-4, 334ft; IV, 26-32; P. A. Brunt, 'The Equites in the Late Republic,"Second International Conference of Economic History, Aix-en-Provence, 1962. Vol. l, Trade andPolitics in the Ancient World,117-149. Rpt. in The Crisis of the Roman Republic: Studies inPolitical and Social History, ed. R. Seager (Cambridge: Hefter & Sons Ltd., 1969),83-117.

12

In the east, military affairs had been going badly for Roman commanders.

The tribune Manilius, a popularis, announced the necessary bill for an

extraordinary command which had Pompey in mind and Cicero stepped

forward to lend the measure his full cooperation.

For the first time in his political career, the orator addressed an

assembly (contio) in the Roman Forum. The structured elegance of the

speech was planned with the intention not only to persuade the plebs

(electorate) but most of all to win favour from the optimates (governing

class)j even if it meant briefly dwelling on the shortcomings of the aristocracy

for its inability to check corrupt practices of a few provincial governors (De

Imp. Cn. Pomp. 64).10 Cicero agreed with Manilius that only an eques such as

Pompey could be appointed to command in Asia, for only he had the ability to

restore harmony and stability in the eastern provinces just as he had done in

Spain years earlier (De Imp. Cn. Pomp. 62-63).11 Advocating such a "popular"

measure might seem duplicitous but reflected the political standpoint of a

moderate optimate bowing to the needs of the moment while in pursuit of

the consulship.

Aiso in 66, Cicero's understanding of equestrian demands was weIl

demonstrated in the Pro Cluentio in which he advocated a basic working

arrangement with the senate in the name of concordia. But the case also

stands in contrast to his popularis sentiment of the earlier speech. Before a

10 P. MacKendrick (The Speeches of Cicero: Context, Law, Rhetoric, London: Duckworth,1995, 14) praises the speech as "perhaps the most elegantly structured of ail Cicero's speeches"and continues his praise by comparing it to concordia: "It is proportioned, balanced, harmonious:the rhetorical equivalent of the harmony of the orders which was Cicero's Iifelong ideal."

11 ln this passage Cicero reminds his audience how L. Philippus, the pro-Sullan senator in76, had such great hope in Pompey's abilities that he called for the general's appointment againstSertorius; cf. Sallust (Hist. 1.67) who adds that Philippus nominated Pompey in the name of paxand concordia.

13

jury of senators and equites, Cicero repudiates the rabble rousing campaigns of

the popularis tribune and homo postremus Quinctius who took the

opportunity to excite popular indignation against the senate (Clu. 88f). The

case arose from the fact that his client, Cluentius, was inappropriately charged

under the sixth section of the Sullan statute, the lex Cornelia de sicariis et

veneficiis, which dealt with judicial murder. The argument was that Sulla

made the provisions of this sixth section operative only against senators, who

were only allowed to act as jurors under the Sullan constitution. Therefore,

the section did not apply to his client who was a member of the equestrian

order. Thus the Sullan statute could not be invoked in this case. Here Cicero

takes the opportunity to provide a solid definition of concordia:

The single aim and object of this (believe me, gentlemen, and look

the danger in the face) is the extension of liability under this statute

to include the equestrian order. This aim is not shared by all

senators but only by a few. For those senators who have a ready

protection in their own uprightness and innocence (as may

truthfully be said of you and of all whose lives are innocent of party

spirit) are anxious that the equites should occupy a position second

only to that of the senatorial order and most firmly allied to it by the

bond of unaniinity [equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos,

concordia coniunctissimos esse]. (Clu. 152)12

This was Cicero's first actual reference to the bond of concordia between the

12 Nec nunc quicquam agitur - mihi credite, iudices, et prospicite id, quod providendumest - nisi ut equester ordo in huiusce /egis pericu/um conc/udatur. Neque hoc agitur ab omnibus,sed a paucis. Nam ei senatores, qui se facile tuentur integritate et innocentia, qua/es ut veredicam, vos estis, et ceteri, qui sine cupiditate vixerunt, equites ordini senatorio dignitate proximos,concordia coniunctissimos esse cupiunt.

14

two major orders of the state.13

Pr~vious proposaIs by Drusus in 91 and most recently by Sulla included

the equites in an augmented senatorial nobility. However, these laws did not

really address the aspirations of this order which was primarily interested in

business and not in politics. This is aptly pointed out in a comparison

between the livelihood of the senator-politician and the equestrian­

businessman. Members of the senatorial class were subject to political

prosecutionswhich were alleviated by the many honours and privileges

obtained from the offices of the cursus honorum (Clu. 154). On behalf of the

equites he states: "satisfied with our own order sheltered from the storms of

popular prejudice and legal actions such as this 1t is unfair that We should be

debarred from public recognition and yet not be free from the danger of

political prosecution in the courts" (Clu. 153-154; cf. 150»)4

Cicero's political attitude is alSO revealed in his brother's

Commentariolum Petitionis: the equites and the majority of the senators

ratified his application for the consulship, while he had gained the sympathy

of the people through his support for Pompey and ms defence of Cornelius in

65. Only the nobiles, the aristocratie gentry, posed a threat to ms campaign,

since Cicero had aroused their suspicions in his support of a popular measure.

He would have to explain to them that he had always sided politically with

the optimates, and that speeches of a popular nature were merely to gain

Pompey's support, and he had never been an adherent of the causa

13 HiII.161, states that it is not justifiable to take "too literally either Cicero's picture of theself-righteous indignation of the [equites] or his estimate of the number of senators who opposedhis line of argument, for he was already developing that conception of the collaboration of the twoupper classes (concordia ordinum) which was to become his political panacea."

14 sed ordine suo...contentos fuisse...vitam remotam a procellis invidiarum et huiuscemodi iudiciorum sequi maluisse.. .iniquum esse eos, populi beneficiis esse privatos, iudiciorumnovorum periculis non carere.

15

popularis.l5

It is evident that Cicero's emerging political attitude was based on a

moderate optimate position which recognized the benefits of the collective

rule of the group (i.e. the boni) and repudiated administrative and judiciary

corruption allegedly caused by a minority (i.e. the pauci). But political

conceptions or a clear political programme are not revealed. Not even the In

Toga Candida establishes any aims for the consular candidate. Cicero's success

in the elections of 64 can be attributed to the intrigues of Caesar, Pompey, and

Crassus. Pompey opened up new areas of investment for the publicani,

members of the equestrian order, who did not want the organization of the

state to be disrupted for fear of losing profitable ventures. The optimates, on

the other hand, were against the further implementation of extraordinary

powers previously handed to Pompey. The "platform" speech In Toga

Candida demonstrated how Cicero united these two groups (equestrian

publicani and optimates) and gained their trusted support. He charged his

two main opponents, C. Antonius and Catiline, and their influential

supporters, Caesar and Crassus, as insurgent radicals and violators of justice

intent on destroying the republic.l 6 As champion of law and order his win in

July 64 proved the existence of a coalition willing to back mm in the name of

harmony and peaceful existence.l7 Cicero probably had many ideas that went

beyond current issues. But the ideas were relegated to the background with

the aim of first achieving the highest executive position in the state in

keeping with one of the main principles set forth in the introduction of the

15 Comm. Pet. 5: nos semper eum optimatibus de re publiea sensisse, minime popularisfuisse.

16 Asconius, ln Orationem in Toga Candida, 83, 87, 90.

17 Eagle, 21; Strasburger, 38; Leg. Agr. 2.3ft; Pis. 3.

16

De Republica (1.10): a man who wished to help the state must first achieve

power.l8

On January 1,63, Cicero formaUy achieved the most powerful executive

position in the republic as both he and his feUow consul C. Antonius marked

their coUegiality by establishing concordia with each other.l9 Three

interesting events occurred in his consular year: the rogatio Servilia, the

conspiracy of Catiline, and the unity created between the financial interests of

the equestrian class and the governing oligarchy. AU of these brought to the

forefront and helped put into action Cicero's poHcy of concordia within the

current economic and political situation of the decade.

Concordia and the Failure of the Rogatio Servilia Agraria

Agriculture was considered an important and respectable occupation in

Italy.20 Following Ti. Gracchus' major land distribution reforms of 133 the

motives for leges agrariae were always the relief of urban overpopulation and

compensation for returning army veterans. Many free-born citizens of the

urban plebs who were forced by civil war to migrate to Rome aspired to return

to the countryside. The grain dole was not sufficient for a free male citizen to

18 Since his youth Cicero was devoted to the Homeric motto, "Far to be the best and to bedistinguished above others" (0. Fr. 3.6.4: no}..}..ov àPl.OTEUEtV KaÎ. vndpoxov ~J.lJ.lEVal. a~}..wv.

Cf. Iliad 6.208 and 11.784) which represented his ambitious desire to be first and excellent.

19 Leg. Agr. 2.103: exconcordia, quam mihi constitui cum col/ega. The importance ofconsular harmony was notOO in the De Republica (2.54) in reference to Lucius Valerius Potitusand Marcus Horatius Barbatus, consuls in 449, who both favoured measures to preserve theconcordia of the republic. A similar type of consular concordia was echoed by Sulla in 80 (Plut.Sul/. 6.5; see above n. 3). In contrast, when consuls such as Cinna and Octavius were unwilling toestablish harmony with each other in 87 the result was civil war: Cinna Si concordiam eum Octavioconfirmare voluisset, in re publica sanitas remanere potuisset(Phil. 13.2).

20 Off. 1.151: omnium autem rerum, exquibus aliquid acquiritur, nihil est agri culturamelius, nihil uberius, nihil dulcius, nihil homine Iibero dignius. For a discussion on this richlydocumented topic see, interalia, A. Cossarjni, "II prestigio dell'agricoltura in Sallustio e Cicerone,"Atti dell'istituto veneto di scienze, lettere ed arti, 138 (1979-1980), 355-364.

17

support bis family. Likewise, without any other source of income most

unemployed or retired soldiers had no other choice but to return to their

traditional rurallivelihood. Having been forced to seUle in colonies they

worked the land, earning a living as farmers. Some were not successful, but

sold their land and resided in the city searching for other means of

employment. As a result Rome's population continually increased. Private

property rights were strict,21 so the government was reluctant to purchase

land and distribute it to its citizens. The aristocracy was especially unwilling

to remove and relocate tenants who were settled under Sulla's dictatorship,

for fear of violent retaliation. Land allotments were needed to repopulate the

countryside and reestablish vibrant farming communities after the civil and

servile wars of the 70s. There was also concern in the enhanced prestige and

loyal following gained by returning generals ifbeneficia of land were given to

their soldiers.22 But the economic turmoil of the sixties proved too great and

relief was needed. The Rullan bill thus became the first insightful and

detailed agrarian measure for land distribution after Sulla's dictatorship.23

On December 10, 64, when the new tribunes took office, P. Servilius

Rullus proposed a comprehensive agrarian bill which had profound

implications and was scheduled to be brought before the senate at the

21 Cic. Off. 2.73: in primis autem videndum erit ei, qui rem publicam administrabit, ut suumquisque teneat neque de bonis privatorum publiee deminutio fiat; also Off. 2.78; Rep. 1.43.

22 Gruen, 387.

23 The senate did approve a/exP/otia agraria in 70 of which very little detailed informationis known. It was originally intended only for the veterans of Pompey and Metellus after the civil andservile wars in the preceding years. But the law was delayed apparently due to political oppositionagainst the powerful commanders and by further campaigns in the east in the sixties which meant

. Pompey needed his soldiers once again. For further discussions, see E. Gabba, U Lex P/otiaagraria," Laparo/ade/passato, 13 (1950),66-68; R. E. Smith, "The LexP/otiaAgrariaandPompey's Spanish Veterans," C/assica/Quatter/y, 7 (1957),82-85. On earlier agrarian proposais,see G. Tibiletti, "Ricerche di storia agraria romana 1: La politica agraria dalla guerra annibalica aiGracchi," Athenaeum, 28 (1950), 183-266.

18

beginning of 63. Known as the rogatio Servilia agraria, its particu1ars can only

be ascertained from Cicero's three speeches in opposition, entitled De Lege

Agraria contra Rullum. Rullus proposed that needy Roman citizens

throughout Italy should be settled in coloniès set up on public land of the ager

Campanus and the campus Stellas. This measure would resolve the

overpopulation in Rome and would make land immediately available for

Pompey's troops retuming from the Mithridatic Wars.

The bill was set within an intelligent framework. About forty clauses

perceptively outlined the supervision, purchase, and distribution of the land

allotments (Leg. Agr.3.4). Procedural regulations were designed to be

impartial and many were already set on precedent. An authoritative body of

ten elected members were to hold office for five years to oversee and

administer the project. This commission would have the help of a full

support staff which included architects, clerks, scribes, and surveyors in order

to regulate all the necessary supplies (Leg. Agr.2.33). The election process was

well thought-out. A chief presiding officer would select by lot seventeen of

the thirty-five tribes in the popular assemblies whose members would elect

the ten man commission. Candidates had to be present at Rome. A position

as decemvir could be combined with a magisterial office of the cursus

honorum. Proceedings would be ratified by a lex curiata in which tribunician

vetos would be banned.24

The scope of the bill was original, yet, at the same time, problematic in

the eyes of senatorial officiaIs. It was the traditional dutYof Roman

24 For a description of the election procedures, see Leg. Agr. 2.16-17, 2.20-21, 2.24,2.26, 2.28-30. On precedents for Rullus' electoral clauses, see E. Gabba, "Nota sulla rogatioagraria di P. Servilio Rullo,' in Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire offerts à A. Piganiol (1966),2:769-775. The use of seventeen tribes would reduce voter intimidation and bribery; see E. G.Hardy, Sorne Problems in Roman History(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924),83.

19

government to distribute public land. A vast fertile area in Campania

immediately south of the via Appia surrounding the rivers Voltumus and

Clanius just north of Roman Neapolis was the main area for the project of

land distribution. This rich agricultural zone of the ager Campanus and

campus Stellas had still remained ager publicus, that is public land controlled

by the Roman government. Both territories provided a continuous source of

revenue to the state treasury from numerous rented properties. Rullus'

proposaI would deny that guaranteed steady income to the treasury. Five

thousand private citizens would have the chance to buy public lots of ten to

twelve Roman acres (iugera) within those territories (Leg. Agr. 1.20, 2.76-86).

In another measure, if landowners throughout Italy were looking to

sell their property but were unwilling to locate or could not find adequate

individual purchasers through negotiatores, then the state would be obligated

to purchase the property then sell it to any private citizen in need of the land.

Thus, the bill gave the seller the state as its customer. The state would give

full compensation to anyone, even the Sullan colonists who wished to

dispose of their holdings (Leg. Agr. 2.68-70,3.3,3.6-14). Under the new law,

the recipients would be those who had been ousted from their farms during

the Sullan period. They would recover their land at state expense. Skilled

farmers would replace frustrated veteran soldiers and their efforts would

allow the agricultural economy of Italy to increase. With ready money

veteran soldiers could invest in other ventures, thus involving another

segment of Roman society, namely financiers and bankers. The idea was to

create a stronger privately based agricultural economy. And if the individual

land owner faced difficulties he could rely on the government to bail him out

by purchasing the land. As one modern scholar aptly points out "Rullus'

20

proposal was perspicacious and thoughtful."25

A plan for new or increased sources of revenue for financing the

project was also part of the bill. Public sites in Rome and other public

properties throughout Italy would be marketable commodities.26 In addition,

the sale of certain portions of ager publicus in rich agricultural areas of Asia

Minor, Cyprus, Egypt, and other Roman provinces would provide the

government with ready cash; not to mention the booty and spoils that were

stockpiling throughout Rome's temples and coffers. These gains in revenue

were to aUow the government to purchase and aUocate land to colonists

throughout ltaly.27 If the bill had become law, the land distribution project

would ultimately have increased the amount of taxable citizens, which would

have become a boon to the state.

AU these well-drawn-up measures point to the fact that this bill focused

on the need to improve the life, weifare, and relations of citizens in Roman

society. 5ince Pompey and his troops were still on their voyage back .from the

eastern campaigns, the initial five thousand settlers would have been the

unemployed or underemployed plebs urbana first and foremost. Ready cash

was needed for these immediate settlements. Pompey's veterans would be

25 Gruen, 391.

26 This was not a new idea, just the enforcement of a senatorial decree passed during thetime of Sulla in 81; see Leg. Agr. 1.3-4, 2.35-37.

27 For public land in Roman provinces, see Leg. Agr. 1.5-6,2.47-58.3.15; on vectigalpayments, Leg. Agr. 1.10, 2.56-57, 2.62; on war booty, Leg. Agr. 1.12-13, 2.59; on buying andsellingofrealestateinltaly, Leg. Agr. 1.16-17,2.31,2.33-34.2.73,2.75.

21

compensated once they returned.28 In the end, insufficient gratia, lack of

auctoritas, and inferior oratorical prowess doomed Rullus' bill.29 Overall it

was a novel, harmonious, well-planned, and far-sighted piece of legislation

which, nonetheless, Cicero strenuously opposed.

Now in the ranks of the nobilitas, Cicero's first order of business as

consul in 63 was to speak against this agrarian proposal presented by Rullus.

Having ascribed self-seeking motives to the tribune, Cicero criticized Rullus'

role as rogator, presiding officer, and candidate on the commission (Leg. Agr.

2.20-21). He alluded to the influential political support from powerful

individuals who were against Pompey.30 And the safeguard and protection of

the public treasury which gained considerable profit from the rentaI

properties of the ager publicus was a cause of serious concern for Cicero. If

passed, the law would take away a part of the state's source of income and

cause a break with long established tradition.31 Cicero was convinced that the

decemvirs would auction off whole provinces in order to finance this

venture.32 He is not against agrarian reform (Leg. Agr. 2.10), yet such a law

28 Pompey was honoured in the bill and was exempt from relinquishing his spoils, Leg.Agr. 1.13, 2.60; landed benefits were expected by his troops, Leg. Agr. 2.54; the immediateavailabilityforreadycash isclearfrom Leg. Agr. 1.2: nunc praesenscerta pecunia numerataquaeritur, see G.V. Sumner, "Cicero, Pompeius, and Rullus, n Transactions and Proceedings ofthe American Phi/o/ogical Association, 97 (1966), 569-582. The plebs urbana were the ruraltribesmen (ex-country dwellers and dispossessed farmers) who had moved to the city, Leg. Agr.2.65, 2.71, 2.79.

29 These inferences are suggested by Gruen, 394 and n. 144.

30 Leg. Agr. 1.11, 1.16, 1.22, 2.20, 2.23, 2.46, 2.63, 2.98. Modern conjectures point toCrassus and Caesar: Hardy, 68-98; M. Gelzer, Caesar: Po!itician and Statesman, trans. PeterNeedham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968),42-45; E. J. Jonkers, Social andEconomie Commentaryon Cicero's De Lege Agraria Orationes Tres (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963),7-8;doubts are raised by Sumner, 572-573 and Gruèn, 389.

31 Leg. Agr. 1.21, 2.80, 2.84, 3.15.

32 Leg. Agr. 1.1-2,2.38-46; see Hardy, 74-77.

22

presented before him would exhaust the state's treasury, increase taxation,

cause public land to disappear, and threaten to put excessive power in the

hands of the decemvirs. This economic tum-around would unbalance the

state of concordia. In his opposition to the bill, he equated himself with the

republic (Leg. Agr. 2.103) and devoted himself to the harmony, well-being, and

survival of the state. Concordia signified a state of existence that needed to be

preserved and this meant a campaign against any proposaI that disrupted this

condition. Personal necessity and political conviction demanded that he

continue to work for harmony in the state and between the orders that offered

him electoral support. Thus, the consul-orator does not limit his discussions

to the confines of the senate house but contrives to have the best of both

worlds by persuading both senate and people that he is working for their

interests with his concem to repel the proposal by the popularis tribune.

The debate around Rullus' bill coincided with the beginning of Cicero's

term as consul. In his first month, Cicero took care to define his political aims

and lay out his political programme for carrying out ms duties in office (Leg.

Agr. 1.22-27,2.5-6). As a result of being electeduniversi populi Romani

iudicio (Leg. Agr. 2.6),33 he declared to both the senate and people that he was

a consul popularis working for the preservation of concordia and otium (Leg.

Agr. 1.23,2.6, 3.4; cf. Rab. Perd. 11). His plan would be to manage affairs in a

way which he thought was beneficial for the people rather than support

measures by popular tribunes that indicated what the people wanted done.34

33 By asserting the sovereign power of the assemblies Cicero links his election to apopularistechnique; see Robin Seager, ·Cicero and the Word Popularis," ClassicalQuarterly, 22(1972), 331 and 333.

34 There is evidence that Cicero opposed other popular measures (introduced bytribunes) early in the year (Cass. Dio 37.25, Plut. Cic. 12); see the discussion in E. G. Hardy, TheCatilinarian Conspiracy in its Context: a re-studyof the Evidence (Oxford: Blackwell, 1924),33-34.

23

He states: "the present constitution should be vigorously defended because 1

have declared myself to the Roman people to be the defender of otium and

concordia for the present year" (Leg. Agr. 3.4).35 Such a pledge was in faet a

commitment to defend the established legislation and traditional values of

Roman government set forth by its constitution.

Concordia signified a state of existence, a result and condition as

symbolized and made permanent by its eponymous temple in the Roman

forum.36 It therefore meant agreement, a strong bond of unity among three

classes of citizens in Roman society (senators, leading citizens, masses) who

had similar interests and recognized the working institutions of Rome's

political system. These citizens were classified as boni, men of principle or (as

French scholars note) les gens de bien, whose voices were heard in the senate,

magistracy, and popular assemblies. This harmony was solidified by the

traditions of the mos maiorum and brought about with the aid of justice

enforeed by law. Citizens were satisfied that their interests, safety, and liberty

were protected by the uninterrupted and harmonious activities of the forum,

organization of the law courts, and active legislation so that they could live

free from anxiety andfear. The result of concordia was 0 ti u m (often linked

with tranquillitas and pax) which qualified the condition of harmony. Otium

indicated the particular state of tranquillity and calm in the republic when

there was no civil disorder (seditio, tumultus). This condition a110wed a11

citizens to enjoy peaee safely without danger (Leg. Agr. 2.9: impune in otio

35 hune statum rei publieae magno opere defendendum putem qui otii et eoneordiaepatronum me in hune annum populo Romano professus sim.

36 The temples and altars dedicated to Coneordia belonged to the senatorial tradition.There were none dedicated to otium, tranquillitas, dignitas, pax. The people, represented by thetribunes, dedicated their temples to Libertas.

24

esse).37

In the agrarian speeches, the word popularis is redefined with the use

of optimate values so that Cicero may claim to be the true popularis, not his

opponent. The values listed in the Pro Sestio38 as constituents of the

optimate ideal for concordia and otium were those attacked by Rullus and his

colleagues in 63 (Leg. Agr.2.10). In his effort to be accepted by both groups,

Cicero wanted to be seen as a consul popularis on the via optimas. In the first

speech to the senate opposing Rullus' bill, Cicero declared "1 am now speaking

of the danger to our safety and liberty" (Leg. Agr. 1.21), thus appropriating two

main themes belonging to the popularis tradition, salus and libertas39 and

challenged Rullus to defy his power as consul and promoter of peace: "For, in

examining everything which is pleasant and agreeable to the people, we shall

find nothing so popular as peace, harmony, and quietness [quam pacem,

quam concordiam, quam otiumf' (Leg. Agr.1.23).40 Cicero equates populare

with the things that are "pleasing and agreeable to the people." But then he

37 Leg. Agr. 1.23; 2.7-9; Mur. 78; Red. Quir. 20; Dom. 15; Pis. 73; Rep. 1.49, 1.69; 2.69;Phil. 5.41. For a further explanation on how the term was applied to certain ancient standards it ispossible to look to the Greek philosopher Speusippus (c. 407-339). In his book Definitions,traditionally appended to Plato's works, there are two entries for the term 6~OYOl.a, the ancientGreek equivalent to concordia. The first definition incorporates partnership and harmoniousagreement: ua sharing (Ko~vwvia) in ail existing things, a concordance (ow<pwyia) in thoughts andconceptions" (413b); and the second is related to unanimity:"a similarity of opinion (6~ooo~ia)

between rulers and ruled, how they ought to rule and be ruled" (413e).

38 The values of the optimate tradition are Iisted as: re/igiones, auspicia, potestasmagistratum, senatus auctoritas, leges, mos maiorum, iudicia, iuris dictio, fides, provinciae, socii,imperii, laus, resmi/itaris, aerarium (Sest. 98).

39 For the view that a popularis shows interest in the salus of the people, see De Or.3.138, Verr. 2.1.153, Red. Sen. 20, Sest. 107, Phil. 7.4; for /ibertasasapopularistheme, seeVerr. 2.1.163, Leg. Agr. 2.16, Rab. Perd. 12,16, Dom. 77, 80.

40 Etenim, ut circumspiciamus omnia, quae populo grata atque iucunda sunt, nihil tampopulare quam pacem, quam concordiam, quam otium reperiemus. Observe the fine distinctionbetween a conventional and a true popularis: consul veritate, non ostentatione popularis(Leg.Agr. 1.23).

25

offers a series of optimate slogans: pax, concordia, otium and passes these

words off as "popular" catchwords when in fad they were always those of the

conservative faction which aimed to maintain law and order, and continue

business as usual.41 He guaranteed to the senate that he would continue the

propaganda of these slogans which were the foundation of senatorial

authority. The senators were well aware of the bold expedient of declaring an

optimate policy in the interests of the people.42 Politieal aims for the year

were affirmed at the end of the speech where Cicero promises to repel

dangers, such as this fraudulent popular proposal (Leg. Agr. 1.24), and protect

tranquillitas, pax, otium for the benefit of maintaining dignitas43 - the

politieal domination of the aristocratie landholding minority in Rome's

hierarchical social system:

But if, conscript fathers, you promise me your zeal in upholding the

common dignity, 1 will certainly fulfill the most ardent wish of the

republic, that the authority of this order which existed in the time of

our ancestors, may now, after a long interval, be seen to be restored

to the state. (Leg. Agr. 1.27)44

When Cicero addressed the people his approach was slightly different.

41 For an account of political catchwords, see Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution(Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1939; rpt. 1952), 149-161; Nicolet, L'Ordre équestre, l, 663,666; MacKendrick, 56; Mitchell, 202-203; L. Perelli, /1 pensiero politico di Cicerone. (Firenze: LaNuova Italia. 1990),87-88.

42 Such an action was not without its forerunners in Roman politics: Valerius Potitus andHoratius Barbatus were hominum concordiae causa sapienter popularium (Rep. 2.54).

43 See Neal Wood, Cicero's Social and Political Thought(Los Angeles: University ofCalifornia Press, 1988), 194-195.

44 Quodsi vos vestrum mihi studium, patres conscripti, ad communem dignitatemdefendendam profitemini, perficiam perfecto, id quod maxime res publica desiderat, ut huiusordinis auctoritas, quae apud maiores nostros fuit, eadem nunc longo intervallo rei publicaerestituta esse videatur.

26

His specifie aim was to pursue a popular policy but not in the manner of

Rullus and his colleagues who had betrayed the commoda and salus of the

people on the pretext of "popularity," which threatened the lives of the boni

and aroused hopes in the improbi (Leg. Agr. 2.7-8).45 lnstead, Cicero would

commit himself to the true commoda of a popular policy: pax, libertas, otium

(Leg. Agr. 2.10). He continues the propaganda of optimate slogans but makes a

slight alteration by substituting the term concordia for the new slogan libertas

from the popularis tradition and again passes them off as "popular"

catchwords. Cicero's intention is to contrast the despotic will of the tribunes

proposing the agrarian law who aim "to set up kings in the republic" with the

original function of the tribuneship (Leg. Agr. 2.15).46 The tribune and the

decemviri, the committee members who would have been put in charge of

the application of the law, would take advantage of their influential position

and introduce a real tyranny, a regnum which would threaten the libertas of

the Roman people. Of course, this would not appear favourable to the many

citizens in the audience who elected the tribunes for their obligation to

libertas, a value which, for Cicero, consisted in respecting the existing laws of

the constitution.47 At the end of the speech, Cicero reiterates his programme

with yet another slight variation: "there is nothing so desired by the people as

that which l, a consul who is a true friend of the people, offer you for this

year: pax, tranquillitas, otium" (Leg. Agr. 2.102).48 Considering his colleague's

, 45 Promoters of a new legislation such as this were themselves defined as improbi andimpotentes(Rab. Perd. 22; Mur. 24).

46 Perelli, 80.

47 Leg. Agr. 2.102; Glu. 146,155; Rab. Perd. 10.

48 nihil esse tam populare quam id, quod ego vobis in hunc annum consul popularisadfero, pacem, tranquillitatem, otium.

27

past alliances, Cicero reassures his audience that a bond of concordia does

indeed exist between them (Leg. Agr. 2.103)49 and by checking sedition he

promises the people in the forum that concordia and 0 ti u m will be preserved

during his consular tenure (Leg. Agr. 3.4). Cicero addresses his audience as

the boni, the people whose political influence depended on elections, whose

rights depended on the courts and on the propriety of officials, and whose

economic prosperity depended on the preservation of pax, concordia, otium,

the true popularis goals. An of which were the political and economic

principles set out by traditional republicanism.50 The bill was withdrawn and

Ru1lus was not heard from again.

It is significant that in these speeches Cicero views the senatorial

governing body and Roman citizens as a single entity. In the three versions

of his political programme, concordia, libertas, tranquillitas are central

qualifiers of pax and 0 ti u m. These aims are binding on all citizens, a

combination of values and phrases adopted from the popularis and optimate

traditions. Once again there is the suggestion as to which groups are

committed to maintaining the principles of republican government and

which groups pose a threat to it. The optimates and their supporters, who

make up the entire nation, are distinguished as the boni.51 In opposition to

them were the improbi, politically fickle and unprincipled, who inc1ined

49 C. Antonius campaigned with Catiline during the consular elections; and bath wereattacked by Cicero in the toga candida speech. Antonius was also believed to have supportedtwo previous defeated tribunician bills. For the importance of consular harmony, see above n. 19.

50 Leg. Agr. 1.26-27; 2.7-9,2.101-103; Rab. Perd. 34; Faro. 1.9.12; Sest. 51; cf.Rep.1.69.

51 The boni can also be described as the verus populus from whom Cicero, the verepopularis, sought support; Seager, 334.

28

towards the populares.52 These tribunes who called themselves populares

and claimed to be concemed with populares' causes were, in Cicero's view,

really working against the people's interests, so they could not be populares.

Setting out these proposais allowed Cicero to achieve a great deal. He claimed

the title popularis, which meant much since it derived from populus (Leg.

Agr. 1.25,2.43),53 and appropriated it for himself and the cause of the

optimates. Thus it could be said that he designated himself as consul

popularis on the via optimas since he reformulated the traditional political

vocabulary for the preservation of concordia. It was Cicero's political aim to

defend the government and public order from the economic innovations

proposed by Rullus and his improbi supporters since, in his view, the

government's primary function was to maintain property rights (Off 1.15,

1.20f; 2.73; Rep. 3.24) and property owners were not to be stripped of their

possessions by force. This desire to moderate or to participate in two camps

also reflects his efforts to bring senators and equites together in a common

cause to frustrate an attempted putsch by extremists. Having risen from the

ranks of the equestrian orderI Cicero entered the consulship intent on

defending the new noble status he had achieved for his gens.

Asserting a State of Concordia

Throughout his consulship, Cicero pursued the aims described in the

agrarian speeches to promote concordia and defeat the improbi. For example,

early in the year, the people in a theatre voiced their disapproval of Roscius

52 T0 the man who is popu/aris corresponds improbus (Sest. 197) and /evitas, politicalfickleness or irresponsibility (Sest. 139, Phil. 7.4); for a further account, see Seager, 336.

53 For more evidence on Cicero's derivation of popularisfrom populus, seeVerr. 2.3.48,Har. Resp. 42, Dom. 77.

29

Otho for bis law granting the equites a privileged seating arrangement at

theatrical performances.54 Their outrage probably reflected the animosity feH

towards unscrupulous moneylenders and financiers who were members of

that order. In response, the equites showed their support for Roscius with

applause, and disorder arose. Cicero, an eques and now self-proclaimed verus

popularis, summoned a public meeting at the temple of Bellona to resolve

the confrontation. As in some of bis speeches, he no doubt pointed out the

merits of the law in question, followed by the invaluable role of the

equestrian order in charge of business activities and the people's role to

support it and the institutions of the republic for the preservation of

concordia and otium. The people were convinced and refrained their

attacks.55

In another situation, several tribunes agitated for reform when they

persisted in their appeal to revoke one of Sulla's laws stripping citizenship

rights.from ·the sons of the men proscribed by the dictator twenty years earlier.

Cicero knew the law was unjust but believed that Sulla's enactments were to

be honoured for the preservation of stability and peace in the republic, and

repealing any law would only lead to political disintegration.56 In this case,

he opposed the bill for fear that embittered citizens would acquire

magistracies and threaten the constitution. He was now a noble member of a

senate created by Sulla whose members still honoured his memory and many

had profitable investments in properties acquired after the proscriptions.

54 For a description of the law. see above p. 12.

55 The speech is listed in Att. 2.1.3. For details of its content, see Plut. Cie. 13, Pliny N. H.7.116. The role of the equites is explained in De Imp. en. Pomp. 17-20.

56 Similarly, for the sake of eoneordia, Cicero also supported Caesar's enactments in 44(see below p. 147).

30

Cicero had no choice but to defeat the proposaI so as not to endanger the

concordia and otium enjoyed by the status quo.57

In 1ate spring or early summer, the trial of the senator Rabirius for the

murder of the tribune Saturninus, which occurred in 100, was also promoted

as a popular undertaking against the optimates. In this trial, Caesar and the

tribune Labienus sought to overthrow the power of the senatus consultum

ultimum (which authorized Saturninus' death) and assert the sovereignty of

the people by reestablishing the right of appeal to the assembly (from the

quaestiones).58 Cassius Dio reports that this case caused the greatest disorder

(37.26-28). The issues were more political than personal as Cicero focused his

defence on the senate's strength as an influential governing body.

In reference to the events of 100, Cicero warned that the internaI

plottings of revolutionaries (not leaders of foreign nations) were the major

threat to Rome's survival; advice that was pertinent even in his own time.

And it was the united resistance of equites and boni mobilized by the senate's

ultimate decree which preserved the dignitas and libertas of republican

institutions against the seditiosi and improbi (Rab. Perd. 20-22,27,33-35).

Accordingly, Cicero believed that no citizen should be punished for violating

laws while in the process of protecting the safety of the country when

sanctioned by the senate's ultimate decree to do so. This was affirmed in the

precept salus populi suprema lex esto (Leg. 3.8; Phil. 11.28). In his view, the

senate JIhad the power and responsibility to determine when the public safety

57 For references to the speech, see Quint. 11.1.85; Pliny, N. H. 7.117; Casso Dio37.25.3; Plut. Cie. 12.1; the speech is Iisted in Att. 2.1.3. For Cicero's opposition to the proposaiand attitude toward the repeal of laws, see Pis. 4, Leg. Agr. 2.10, Verr. 2.5.12, Sull. 63.

58 ln 100 Saturninus led a revoit which prompted the senate to pass its consultum ultimumallowing consuls to employ any means to save the state. Rabirius was one of a few senators stillalive in 63 who had been a party to the death and 50 charged. Sources in T. R. S. Broughton, TheMagistrates of the Roman Republic, 1(New York: American Philological Association, 1951),576.

31

was threatened and to authorize extraordinary measures to remove the

threat," thus "the decree was an official dedaration by an authorized body that

a state of emergency existed."59 Cicero makes it known that a special

cooperation should transpire among three significant groups whenever a

domestic crisis arises. The auctoritas senatus, consulare imperium, consensio

bonorum must form a coalition to defend against the juror and audacia of

popular reformers. The senate formulates the policy which the consuls

executeand the people unite to support (Rab. Perd. 2-4, 34). As a result, the

unity (Le. concordia) of these political groups strengthens the harmony and

safety of the state. The trial itself ended without a decision but Cicero's loyalty

to a senatorial measure was announced emphatically.

Furthermore, these three examples illustrate very practical

circumstances in which Cicero maintained the traditional Roman ideal of

harmony. The unity, agreement or reconciliation of Rome's citizens secured

the harmony of the republic. It is also apparent that from this experience a

new concept of concordia is emerging - a harmony of orders. This new

concept becomes dearer in the speeches against Catiline.

Concordia Ordinum against Catiline

The practical means of securing otium and the concordia of the mixed

constitutional order wouldbe the creation of a concordia ordinum.60 It was

Cicero's aim to save the government and public order by obtaining the

cooperation of senators and equites against the economic innovations

proposed by Catiline and his faction. By birth of equestrian status and now a

59 Mitchell, 210.

60 Wood, 198.

32

senator of the highest rank, Cicero saw his duty as that of consolidating and

leading the men of property and wealth, his "army of the rich" (AU. 1.19.4).

Concordia ordinum meant a strong bond of unity between the boni of the

senatorial and equestrian orders, specifically designated as lauti and locupletes

(AU. 8.1.3). Us mission was to protect the economic and political well-being of

the status quo. This was the only moment in Cicero's political career when he

had actually persuaded citizens to gather around mm, like an army, against

the threat of Catiline for the preservation of republican values.

Events began during the election campaigns in July. Once again,

Catiline was determined to reach that elusive consular position and in order

to gain a wider range of support he proposed to cancel aIl debts (tabulae

novae).

Catiline's policy of tabulae novae originates in the economic conditions

of the time. The burden of debt had reached a significant height in 63 when

war expenditures had created widespread indebtedness and a serious shortage

of money (Off 2.84). The Social War, civil wars of the 80s and against Lepidus

in 77, followed by the slave revoit led by Spartacus of 73-71 brought violence

and devastation to the Italian countryside. This led to a social and economic

crisis which grew more severe from the cost of the wars against Sertorius and

Mithridates and by pirates who interrupted trade and export by extending

their marauding practices to inc1ude coastal communities.61 The pirate

menace had causedincreased food prices and the great expenses incurred in

defeating Sertorius and Mithridates had decreased the amount of money

available for credit. Domestic grievances included the hardship of the

61 P. A. Brunt, "The Army and the Land in the Roman Revolution," Journal of RomanStudies 52(1962),73; and ItaHan Manpower 225 S.C.-A.D. 14, 108f; M. W. Frederiksen, "Caesar,Cicero and the Problem of Debt," Journal of Roman Studies 56 (1966), 132-33.

33

urban poor62 and fierce exactions of creditors. At the beginning of 63, popular

discontent toward money-lenders saw the proposa! of a bill for debt

cancellation but it was not passed (Cass. Dio 37.25.4). In light of these

circumstances Catiline took a solid political initiative when he made the

cancellation of debts the main focus of his campaign.

Catiline's supporters included bankrupt veterans who had failed as

farmers, and spendthrift nobles who were constantly in debt (Mur. 49). He

also drew support from a desperate group against the optimate govemment:

descendants of the proscribed, bankrupt aristocrats, unprincipled youth, and

ealamitosi (Mur. 50). But his poticy would antagonize many respectable

senators and alienate equites, traders, and shopkeepers whose livelihood

depended on credit and money-Iending. Any thought of gaining assistance

from Crassus and Caesar would also be hopeless since the latter had been

recently elected Pontifex Maximus and relied on the financial backing of the

former who was himself an eques and friend of the financiers and money­

lenders.63 Catiline distanced himself further from the optimates after sorne

unwise remarks against the state in the senate (Mur. 51) followed by life­

threatening proclamations against Cicero in his role as consul (Plut. Cie. 14,

Casso Dio 37.29). On election day, Cicero arrived to conduct his duties as

presiding officer wearing a breastplate and protected by private bodyguards.

Such a pretentious display lessened Catiline's chances for the consulship and

the equestrian financiers had no alternative but to unite with the optimates

and vote for L. Licinius Murena and D. Iunius Silanus.

62 Sail. Cat. 37; for the wretched conditions of the population in Rome, see Z. Yavetz,"The Living Conditions of the Urban Plebs in Republican Rome," Latomus 17 (1958), 500-517;and P. A. Brunt, "The Roman Mob," Past and Present35 (1966), 11-18. For rural dissatisfaetion,see P. A. Brunt, Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic(London: Chatto and Windus, 1971), 131.

63 Catiline received support fram Caesar and Crassus a year earlier; see Eagle, 19-23.

34

Again unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain the consulship through

constitutional means, Catiline apparently planned to overthrow the

government by force. Many from the rural population were ready to join the

urban plebs in their support of a noble who guaranteed the cancel1ation of

debts once power was obtained.64 Cicero specifically lists six large groups

which supported Catiline (Cal. 2.17-23).65 However, in spite of this substantial

support, Catiline had already suffered two defeats in his bid for the consulship

and as a result of this third fallure was led to seek other means to gain power.

In the first plot, he planned uprisings in Rome and throughout Italy on

Oetober 28. It was betrayed with written evidence to Cicero, who revealed it to

the senate on Oetober 21. The senate acknowledged the crisis, passed the

consultum ultimum, and declared a state of emergency. Now with official

moral backing from the senate, Cicero took military precautions. He brought

troops into the city and sent officers to secure law and order in various parts

of Italy. The date planned for Catiline's uprising passed uneventfully. But he

persevered and so a second attempt was planned for November 7. This time

his violent designs included the murder of Cicero and other senators, riots

throughout Italy, conflagration, looting, and a march on Rome. The plot was

again thwarted because of Cicero's informant among the conspirators. The

consul summoned the senate on November 8 where he delivered his first

Catilinarian oration and denounced Catiline who was in attendance. Cicero

64See Sali. Cat. 33.1 and 4-5,37.4-9 for an account of the background to the conspiracy.

65 i) Wealthy men who were unwilling to sell their land to repay their debts (Their attitude isexplained by Frederikson, 130 and 137-138.) ii) Men who were in debt and expected to gainpositions of power through revolution. iii) Colonists from Sulla's armies who profited from theconfiscations, had Iived beyond their means and expected new proscriptions in order to freethemselves from debt. iv) Men in financial straits with age-old debts who merety wanted to avoidtheir problems by joining with CatiIine. v) Criminals. vi) The wanton and malevolent young men ofthe city.

35

reminded his audience of the background to the present crisis (Cat. 1.1-10). He

then pointed to the actions of the senators, which proved Catiline's lack of

support among them, and to the garrisons of equites and others with which

Cicero had guarded the city (Cat. 1.13-20). The equites had honoured the

consul and senate with their allegiance as they stood around the temple of

Jupiter Stator, protecting the meeting place (Cat. 1.21). Catiline was urged to

leave the city. Confident of equestrian loyalty, Cicero was not afraid to make

promises to his fellow senators.66 He asserted that Catiline's departure had

shown the unity (consensio) of consul, senate, equites, and citizens and would

lead to the crushing of the conspiracy, the preservation of the republic, and

the safety of property and fortunes of all Romans (Cat. 1.32-33). Catiline

immediately left the city and before long he and ms followers were declared

enemies of the state (hostes). The designation hostis allowed Cicero, as

consul, to proceed with any action that the senate deemed favourable for the

protection of the republic against hostile citizens.

This consensio against the conspirators reflects a political unity as weIl

as a military one and with the help of the equites the concordia ordinum

showed its military strength. This appeal for unity is pointed out more clearly

in the speech to the people. Many among the Roman masses did originally

support the conspiracy.67 It was Cicero's duty to convince them otherwise.

On November 9 he assumed his role as consul popularis and appeare.d in the

forum. Speaking in front of the people (Cat. 2), Cicero avoided identifying his

66 Throughout his pre-consular years Cicero concentrated his efforts on defending theinterests of the equestrian class, the same class from which his family had originated. Many of his"good friends the Roman equiteS' (De /mp. Cn. Pomp. 4) followed the trials of Fonteius, Oppius(Quint. 5.13.1 and 21), and Cluentius who themselves alsa had many equestrian followers (Font.12, 46) who were present at the trials.

67 Cat. 2.8, 4.6; Mur. 78-79; Sail. Cat. 37.1.

36

audience with Catiline's supporters and discouraged the whole populace from

joining a conspiracy led by depraved aristocrats whose interests had nothing

in common with theirs. Cicero succeeded in splitting the urban plebs from

the conspirators by convincing them that Catiline's aim was anarchy and not

economic reform (SalI. Cat. 48.1). Cicero warns those who want to destroy the

peace which exists in the republic to abandon their goals because, {irst of aU,

he himself is vigilant and guards the republic and: "in the second place, the

body of loyal citizens has exceptional courage, complete harmony [magnam

concordiam1 and strength in their large numbers, and there is also a strong

force of soldiers" (Cat. 2.19).68

For the first time Cicero introduces himself as a consul togatus dux et

imperator (Cat.2.28).69 But not before he compares his leadership abilities to

those of the popular leader Pompey.70 He prides himself on the fact that he is

a civil magistrate who will do his best to save the state through constitutional

means without reverting to civil war. Of course, Cicero prefers to avoid a war

against Catiline but is ready with troops throughout ltaly if forced to do so

(Cat.2.28).

In the midst of Catiline's insurrection, an incident occurred which

threatened to jeopardize the continuation of Cicero's policy. The threat to

concordia came from those few conservative senators (pauci nobiles) whom

68 deinde magnos animos esse in bonis viris, magnam concordiam, maximammultitudinem, magnas praeterea militum copias.

69 The toga was the clothing worn by a civilian; it represented peace (cf. Cicero's remarkcedant arma togae, concedant laurea laudi quoted in his speech ln Pisonem 73-74). For thecontrast between the civil and military powers, see C. Nicolet, .. Consul Togatus: remarques sur levocabulaire politique de Cicéron et de Tite-Live," Revue des études latines, 38 (1960), 236-263.

70 Cat. 2.11: Omnia sunt externa unius virtute terra marique pacata: domesticum bellummanet, intus insidiae sunt, intus inclusum periculum est, intus est hostis. Cum luxuria nobis, cumamentia, cum seelere certandum est. Huic ego me belle ducem profiteor, Quirites.

37

he occasionaUy criticized during his rise to office. They resented the election

of another /lnew man" to succeed Cicero in the consulship for 62 and so

accused Murena of electioneering bribery.71 Cato led the prosecution against

the designated consul. The trial itself took place while Catiline sat with his

battle-ready troops in Etruria so the charge against Murena, that is, his guilt or

innocence, was not the main issue in Cicero's defence strategy. In the

interests of the state Cicero prays:

To the immortal gods that Murena's acquittaI may preserve mm for

his consulship, that your [the jury's] opinion given in your verdict

may taUy with the wishes of the Roman people expressed in their

votes, and that this agreement may bring peace, harmony, calm, and

tranquillity [pacem, concordiam, otium, tranquillitatem] to

yourselves and to the Roman people. (Mur. 1)72

What was vital to Cicero's policy was that there had to be two consuls

for the foUowing year, not one, and both had to be intelligent and energetic

enough to continue his own line of action against the ongoing dangers from

Catiline and his followers:

What 1 am doing, gentlemen of the jury, 1 am doing not only out of

friendship with Lucius Murena and for his good name but 1 declare

and caU upon you to bear witness that 1 am doing it for the sake of

peace, quiet, unity, liberty, our preservation [pacis, oti, concordiae,

71 For ambitus, see L. R. Taylor. Party Po/ities in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1949),67-68.

72 precor ab dis immortalibus ob eiusdem hominis consulatum una eum saluteobtinendum, et ut vestrae mentes atque sententiae eum populi Romani voluntatibus suffragiisqueeonsentiant, eaque res vobis populoque Romano paeem, tranquillitatem, otium eoneordiamqueadferat.

38

libertatis, salutis] in short the very lives of us aU. (Mur. 78)73

But apparently Cato, the academic lawyer and idealistic stoic philosopher

(Mur. 3, 61-63), lacked the foresight to appreciate the dangerous situation into

which he could thrust the state if his prosecution was successful.

A conviction for Murena meant exclusion from office and would have

encouraged Catiline (Mur. 79, 85). To gain support in his cause, Cicero plays

to the sympathies of the equestrian members of the jury having reminded

them of Murena's success in looking after their business interests while

governor of Narbonese Gau1.74 This would encourage them further to protect

pax, otium, salus (Mur. 86). The jury of senators and equites was convinced

enough to acquit Murena for the safety of the republic.

In this trial, Cicero again reveals himself as the practical man of action

in his determined effort to maintain his policy and suppress the Catilinarian

conspiracy. His motives for defending Murena were linked to his duty as

consul: to protect law and order and preserve national security (Mur. 4,79).

Again he takes the opportunity to extol the virtues of the consul togatus and

appeals to the jury and allloyal citizens that a major crisis will be resolved

through constitutional means, with their combined help (Mur. 84). We can

see that the same political aims that were evident in the Rullan speeches were

also presented and forcefully stressed here: the optimate slogans pax,

concordia, otium, tranquillitas were combined with the popularis slogans

libertas and salus. In protecting these aims, Cicero's political thinking reaches

73 Ego quod facio, iudices, cum amicitiae dignitatisque L. Murenae gratia facio, tum mepacis, oti, concordiae, Iibertatis, salutis, vitae denique omnium nostrum causa facere clamo atquetestor.

74 Mur. 42, 53, 69, 89.39

a peculiar aspect.75 The civil man of action (togatus) does not deny the need

for a military presence. And this is where Cicero's consular colleague has a

key role. C. Antonius was more a capable general than active politician and as

Cicero was at Rome maintaining support among the orders C. Antonius' duty

would be to protect Rome from Catiline's attacks. This way pax et concordia

could be maintained.76

Cicero sees a combination of these qualities in his client. Murena was,

like Cicero, a "new man" and likely to prove sympathetic to his own policies

and prepared to continue them in the following year. Cicero devotes a large

part of the speech (Mur. 15-53) refuting the prosecution's claim that a "new

man" was prone to corrupt practices and demonstrates Murena's superior

qualifications for consular office. Also, Murena had the military experience

and connections to organize and lead the forces of senatorial government

against any opposition to concordia, especially if Catilinarian sympathies were

revealed during his consulship.77

When Catiline left Rome, the conspiracy did not end, however. An

embassy of Allobroges, a tribe from Narbonese Gaul, who had come to Rome

to seek redress for grievances, was solicited for military aid by Catiline's co­

conspirators. They agreed to carry letters to their fellow-countrymen outside

Rome. The Allobroges betrayed the conspirators and handed over the

documentary evidence to Cicero. On December 3, all the conspirators were

75 Mur. 30: Duae sint artes igitur quae possint locare homines in amplissimo gradudignitatis, una imperatoris, altera oratoris boni.

76 Mur. 84: Di faxint ut meus conlega, vir fortissimus, hoc Catilinae nefarium latrociniumarmatus opprimat! ego togatus vobis bonisque omnibus adiutoribus hoc quod conceptum respublica periculum parturit consilio discutiam et comprimam.

77 ln 73 Murena led forces in Asia, Bithynia, and Pontus, in 65 and 64 he commanded theforces in Transalpine Gaul (Mur. 20, 42, 68, 89); for dates, see Broughton, Il, 131.

40

arrested and led to the temple of Concordia where a meeting of the senate had

been convened to discuss the nature of their activities. The conspirators were

charged with treason and detained in custody.78

Later in the day, Cicero narrated the course of events to the people in

the forum in his third speech against Catiline. In it he describes the senate

session which had just taken place and his role in the arrest of the five co­

conspirators. Taking pride in the fact that he had saved the state without the

need of a civil war, Cicero comments on the effects of past civil wars:

And those civil wars, citizens, were not concemed with destroying

the republic but with changing iL.And yet aU those conflicts, none

of which sought the destruction of the republic, were resolved not

by a peaceful reconciliation [reconciliatione concordiae] but by the

slaughter of citizens. (Cal. 3.25)79

By unveiling the plans of the coup and the perpetrators involved through a

peaceful process, and thus restoring concordia, Cicero was honoured with a

public thanksgiving (supplicatio). This was the first time in Roman history

that a magistrate had received this honour in recognition of the distinguished

actions of his civil, as opposed to his military, power.80 He did not have to

resort to arms to suppress the conspiracy but was nevertheless prepared; in

78 Cat. 3.3-14; Sali. Cat. 46.5-47.2.

79 A tque il/ae dissensiones erant eius modi, Quirites, quae non ad delendam sed adcommutandam rem publicam pertinerenLAtque il/ae tamen omnes dissensiones, quarum nullaexitium rei publicae quaesivit, eius modi fuerunt ut non reconciliatione concordiae sedinternecione civium diiudicatae sint.

80 Cat. 3.15, 3.23: togati me unD tofJato duce et imperatore vicistis.

41

case of a riot the temple was always surrounded by armed equites.8I The

consul could now address Pompey as an equal. He performed his duties to

Rome as a complement to the generaYs,82 the former working within the city

and the latter working outside it both for the same goal: to maintain pax et

concordia. Cicero's current political thinking finds the salvation of the

republic in the alliance of civilians and soldiers, senate and equites.83

As much as Cicero praised his role as consul togatus, a military

presence was never too far away from himself and the senate. Factions on

both sides threatened the proceedings of the next two days. The forum was

filled with armed men who threatened Catiline's followers (SalI. Cat. 48).

Throughout the city, the partisans of the conspirators themselves threatened

an uprising in order to free their comrades. Sorne even attacked the houses

where the prisoners were detained while others paid gangleaders to incite

public disturbances.84 To contend with these threats, and to demonstrate his

own military zeal, Cicero stationed many guards around the forum, adjacent

81 Sail. Cat. 49.4. In the years after his consulship Cicero continued to boast that he hadsaved the state without the use of direct force (Sest. 47: sine armis etiam consul rem publicamconservarat.), although it is obvious he did intimidate his opponents with arms (a fact which henever acknowledged).

82 Cat. 3.26: eandemque diem intel/ego, quam spero aeternam fore, propagatam esse etad salutem urbis et ad memoriam consulatus mei, unoque tempare in hac re publica duos civisexstitisse quorum alter finis vestri imperi non terrae sed caeli regionibus terminaret, alter huiusimperi domicilium sedisque servaret. Cf. Cat. 4.21-22 where Cicero praises the military leaderswho expanded Rome's empire and prefers acknowledgement within this group rather than in agroup of leaders who had triumphed in civil war because qui autem ex numero civium dementiaaliqua depravati hostes patriae semel esse coeperunt, eos, cum a pernicie rei publicae reppuleris,nec vi coercere nec beneficio placare possis; Att. 6.1.2 (February 20, 50): dies prid. Kal. lan.suavem habuit recordationem clarissimi iuris iurandi quod ego non eram ob/itus; Magnus enimpraetextatus il/o die fui.

83 Cat. 4.22: Neque ulla profecto tanta vis reperietur quae coniunctionem vestramequitumque Romanorum et tantam conspirationem bonorum omnium confringere et labefactarepassit. The roles of the civilian and soldier are contrasted in Mur. 19 f; see also Nicolet, "ConsulTogatus," 247.

84 App. B. Civ. 2.1, 2.5; Sail. Cat. 50.42

temples, and the approaches to the temple of Concordia where the senatorial

proceedings took place; he also increased the number of enlisted men in case

they were needed. But his main support came from the equites whose

finandal interests he had constantly defended in the courts and who, in turn,

wanted no disruption to their business activities.85 The praetor Torquatus

was in charge of posting many equestrian guards throughout the dtY(Su lI.

34). Even Cicero's friend Atticus, more a business man than a general, was

stationed with a troop of armed equites near the Capitoline hill ready to avert

any trouble.86

Cicero also summoned all Romans to enlist and volunteer their

services for the safety of the republic in case more forces were needed against a

possible uprising by the partisans of the conspirators. 50 many people

answered his caU and presented themselves in the forum that the clerks could

not register them all. Equites, tribuni aerarii, scribae, ingenui, tabernarii,

libertini, and many more showed unity for Cicero's cause to preserve order,

rights of property, and the safety to earn a living in peace and security

(otium).87

85 Cie. Cat. 1.21,1.32,2.25,4.15,4.22; Red. Sen. 12,32; Pis. 7; Sull. 51; Dom. 74;Sest. 28; Flac. 96; Phil. 2.16, 2.19, 7.24; Att. 1.14.4,2.1.7; Q. Fr. 1.1.32; Nepos, Att. 4; Sail. Cat.49.4, 50.1-3; Plut. Cic. 14; Casso Dio 37.29,37.35.3-4; cf. equestrian merita: Fam. 13.9.2; ProvoCons. 10; Q. Fr. 1.1.35.

86 A tt. 2.1.7 (June 60); Plut. Caes. 8. It is difficult to determine exactly who were theequitatus whom Cicero referred to in his letter to Atticus (Att. 2.1.7). Aceording to M. 1. Henderson(''The Establishment of the Equester Ordo, " Joumal of Roman Studies, 53, 1963, 62) they werethe publicani or their peers, and the adulescentes nobiles. While Atticus led the publicaniassignifer ac princeps 50 L. Torquatus led the iuventutesalso as princeps ac signifer(Sull. 34).These iuventuteswere the senatorial members of the equites equo publico and aise members ofthe eighteen centuries in the comitia centuriata (Mur. 73). According to Plutareh (Caes. 8.2)Cieero's equitatusduring this year were VEav(aKo~. In Cieero's works,onlythe senatorial equitesare ever described as adulescentes or iuvenes, simply because they entered the senate at theage of thirty (Phil. 2.16, 2.44).

87 Phil. 2.16; Cat. 4.14-18; Casso Dio 37.35.3-4.

43

After more evidence was presented to the senate on December 4th (SalI.

Cat. 48-49), it was on the 5th that Cicero consulted the serrate about the fate of

the imprisoned conspirators. It was not until this day that he revealed the

substance of the speeches against his opponent. Later in his career, Cicero saw

the Nones as a pivotaI moment in the understanding of concordia that he

was able to forge between the senate and the equites.88 When the senators

assembled in the temple of Concordia,89 to debate on the type of punishment

that might be exacted, Silanus proposed the death penalty and many agreed

until Caesar pleaded for life imprisonment. His appeal gained much support.

It must have been quite an intense and heated debate since a group of armed

senators from equestrian rank got carried away and actually threatened Caesar

for ms lenient attitude. This menacing act might have put pressure on sorne

to change their decision but it surely proved the existence of Cicero's coalition

in action.90

When it was his turn to speak, Cicero urgently requested his fellow

senators to reach a decision (Cat. 4.1-7). After brief counter-arguments against

Caesar (Cat. 4.8-13), he passed to the main theme of ms speech, the concordia

ordinum, a uniting of citizens of aU ranks and classes in the interest of

preserving order, common political interests, rights of property and fortunes,

and otium (Cat. 4.16). Up to this point we have seen how the earlier speeches

88 AN. 1.19.6 (Mareh 15. 60): utsemel Nonarum il/arum Deeembrium iunctam invidia aemu/torum inimicitiis eximiam quandam atque immortalem gloriam consecutus sumo

89 The senate meetings took place in aedem Goncordiaeon the 3rd (Gat. 3.21) and the4th (Sali. Gat. 49.4) 50 there is rea50n to believe that it al50 took place there on the 5th whichwould make the proeeedings appropriately symbolie; see Beryl Raw5On, The Politics ofFriendship: Pompey and Gicero(Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1978),186.

90 Suet. lui. 14; aecording to Plutarch (Gaes. 8) armed equitesalso threatened Caesar ashe left the senate meeting; cf. Sali. Gat. 49.4: armed equites had al50 threatened Caesar outsidethe senate meeting the day before. For a view on this pressure tactie, see Strasburger, 41.

44

opposing Catiline revealed the socio-political groups towhich Cicero looked

for support. Now, however, he deals with the question more clearly. It had

been suggested to him that the resources of the state might not be adequate to

enforce a verdict condemning those on trial. This was not so, for he and the

Roman people had seen to all necessary precautions with care and vigilance.

Having pointed to the unanimity clearly shown by the previous day's

enlistments and the partisan crowd in the forum, he retorted (Cat.4.14):

Omnes adsunt omnium ordinum homines, omnium generum, omnium

denique aetatum and then proceeds to enumerate the various groups

(ordines) in this common front.91 The people solidly supported the senate.92

ln the final resolution of the conspiracy, Cicero finds the ultimate

opportunity to praise the successful harmony of the equestrian and senatorial

orders. Firstly, a reconciliation between the two groups was effected when

shared control of the juries of the criminal courts had been resolved by the lex

Aurelia iudiciaria in 70. Secondly, the equites were first on the list to take up

arms and register as enforcement troops indicating their solidarity with the

senate.93 Under his guidance as consul, the coalition was solidified:

After many years of disagreement, this day and this cause has

brought them [the equites] back to an alliance and harmony with

your order [the senate], and reunites them with you. If we maintain

forever in the republic this union which has been established in my

consulship, 1 promise you that hereafter no civil and domestic strife

91 See above p. 43.

92 Cat. 4.18: Ouse cum ita sint, patres conscripti, vobis populi Romani praesidia nondesunt: vos ne populo Romano deesse videamini providete.

93 Strasburger, 42; Eagle, 29.

45

will touch any part of the state. (Cat.4.15)94

Cicero repeatedly assures his audience that all ordines were prepared to

protect the republic. The alliance between the senate and the equites together

with the collaboration of other ordines95 fromthe broaderbased consensio

bonorum was a testimony to Cicero's programme of preserving order, rights

of property, pax, concordia, otium, and libertas against the perditi cives (Cat.

4.18-24). With all people in the senate and the forum rallying behind him

and providing political support and military intimidation, Cicero had shown

his policy in action.

But the consul was not the last to speak. Cato impugned Caesar's

motives so forcefully that he convinced the whole senate to decree the death

sentence.96 And Cicero was left to carry out the final decision. For ms skillful

and effective leadership without resorting to a civil war the people applauded

(Plut. Cic. 22), the senate declared him parens patriae and offered him the

corona ClVlca.

One individual was not content with the events that had transpired.

Metellus Nepos, the tribune-elect for 62, prevented Cicero from delivering the

speech to the people that was customary for an outgoing consul. The basis for

Nepos' opposition was Cicero's responsibility for the execution, without a

trial, of Roman citizens (i.e. members of the Catilinarian conspiracy) (Fam.

94 quos ex mu/torum annorum dissensione huius ordinis ad societatem concordiamquerevocatos hodiernus dies vobiscum atque haec causa coniungit. Quam si coniunctionem inconsu/atu confirmatam meo perpetuam in re publics tenuerimus, confirmo vobis nullum posthacma/um civile sc domesticum ad ut/am rei publicae partem esse venturum.

95 For a description of the other ordines, see B. Cohen, "Sorne Neglected Ordines: TheApparitorial Status-Groups," in Des ordres à Rome, Ed. Claude Nicolet (Paris: Publications de laSorbonne, 1984), 23-60.

96 Plut. Cie. 20, C. Minor23; Casso Dio 37.36; Fior. 2.12; Vell. Pat. 2.35; Sail. Gat. 52.8-53.4.

46

5.2.7-8).97 Cicero had expressed fears regarding repercussions from the

conspiracy (Cat. 4.23) but the success of his eoneordia ordinum may have

subdued these fears. Despite not being able to deliver his speech he still had

to pronounce the usual brief oath of officially leaving office. Plutarch says on

the last day of the year Cicero swore a new form of oath that "he had saved his

country and maintained its supremacy" (Cie. 23.2).

With the co-operation of the senators and of the equites, Cicero

preserved public order and had a share in maintaining the stability of the

current government against Catiline's threat. Having termed this policy of

co-operation eoneordia ordinum, he wholeheartedly prepared to manage

and consolidate it into an active coalition among the better and more reliable

segments of society.98 50 long as this coalition remained intact he assured the

senate that no civil and domestic strife would ever touch the state again (Cat.

4.15).

Throughout his life, Cicero constantly reminded people about the

successes of his consulship and continued to believe that Catiline had been

blocked by a solid coalition of senators, equites, and Italians whose first

thought was the good of the republic. In a diatribe directed at Lucius

Calpurnius Piso eight years later, Cicero summed up his consulship as if it

were the speech denied to him by Nepos:

Indeed, my consulship was so conducted from its beginning to its

end, that 1 did nothing without the advice of the senate, nothing

without the approval of the Roman people; upon the rostra 1

97 Rawson, 94; Fam. 5.2.8: Cicero's strong speech against Nepos in the senate onJanuary 1, 62. Att. 1.13.5 (January 61): Cicero was preparing this speech for publication. Thereare references to the published speech in Quint. 9.3.50 and Gell. N. A. 18.7.7.

98 Att. 1.17.10 (December 5, 61), Att. 1.19.4.47

constantly defended the senate, in the senate house the people;

1 welded the populace with its leaders, and the equestrian order

with the senate. (Pis. 7)99

For Cicero, the events against Catiline proved the efficacy of the concordia

ordinum, and he was convinced that it would continue to guarantee the

stability of the republic)OO

99 Atque ita est a me consulatus peractus, ut nihil sine consilio senatus, nihil nonapprobante populo Romano egerim, ut semper in rostris curiam, in senatu populum defenderim,ut multitudinem cum principibus, equestrem ordinem cum senatu coniunxerim. Cicero's conceit inreference to his consulship was weil known in his own day: in a letter ta Atticus dated June 43, M.Brutus remarked thatCicero boasted more about his Nonesof December than the conspiratorsagainst Caesar about their Ides of March: non omnibus horis iactamus Idus Martias similiter atqueil/e Nonas Decembres suas in ore habet (Ad Brut. 1.17.1). Seneca (the Younger) referred to theconsulship: non sine causa sed sine fine laudatus (Dial. 10.5.1); see also Plut. Cic. 24.1 and CassoDio 37.38.2 for similar stories. For an aspect of Cicero's personality, see A. E. Douglas, Cicero(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968),24-26; and Walter Allen, Jr., "Cicero's Conceit," Transactionsofthe American Philological Association, 85 (1954), 121-144.

100 Cicero had always believed he had established concordia: Har. Resp. 60; Pis. 4; Off.3.88; Aff. 1.14.4,1.16.9,1.17.9-10,1.18.3; Fam.1.9.12, 17. Mitchell, 238, n. 131.

48

2

The Fragility and Failure of Concordia Ordinum,62-58

Thus, in maintenance of my settled policy, 1 amdefending as best 1can the concordia 1 myselfcemented. (AU. 1.17.10)

In 62, embarking on his new role as senior statesman, Cicero declined

to carry out the duties of a proconsular official. His desire was to govern the

Roman state as princeps senatus, the leading politician of the day, and to boast

about his accomplishments.l He deferred governing a province in order to

stay in Rome to oversee and defend his policy of concordia, and to advise the

new consul Murena.2 And, in fact, concordia ordinum would be severely

tested by religious, business, and military concerns. Within two years political

misfortunes and personal animosities would dismantle his vision and, as we

shaH see, make him ashamedly proclaim that the harmony of the orders had

been dissolved. Also, to Cicero's disappointment, the establishment of the

first triumvirate would impart a military charader to the Roman constitution

which served merely to invest the leaders with a semblance of legality. The

speeches and private letters during this period provide a noticeable view of

the hostile political and social environment encountered by the orator. The

envy, hatred, and slander that Cicero would encounter from those he called

improbi resulted in the isolation that forced him into exile.

1 Fam. 5.7.3 :ea, quae nos pro salute patriae gessimus, orbis terrae iudicio ac testimoniocomprobari; cf. Fam.5.6.4.

2 He feared that if he were to leave no one would remember his success in the senate orthe law courts. This was a sentiment earlier expressed when he retumed from his duties in Sicilyas quaestor; see T. N. Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman(New Haven: Yale University Press,1991),63-97.

49

Rex Peregrinus

In the meantime, Cicero continued his activity in the law courts,

defending two important clients, Sulla and Archias. The senate-equestrian

solidarity which had quelled the struggle of the Catiline-led populares is

emphatically invoked in Cicero's defence of his client Sulla. As he tries to

make his fellow-senators forget the illegal aspects and severity of the

Catilinarian repression, a friction, resulting in a rift, arises between the novus

ho m 0 and the ranks of the nobilitas. His safety is compromised, so he shows

that he is a moderate by protecting Sulla, while tenaciously reaffirming ms

class-conscious municipal origins against the verbal insults of the aristocrats

who consider him a rex peregrinus (Sull. 21-25). He has to justify his past

political actions against the envious and resentful accusations and criticisms

of opponents, improbi, and even sorne old friends.

New qualities of compassion and moderation are revealed, in contrast

to the uncompromising attitude demonstrated and subsequent action taken

when he was consul and the state was in danger a year before.3 Cicero is

seeking a wider circle of support in his guise as a moderate (Sull. 1,20,87,92).

In April 62, a demand in a letter to Pompey alludes to Cicero's concern for his

friend's dismayed and despondent veteres hostes and novi amici (Fam. 5.7.1).4

Fearful of lack of support from the senatorial class because of his novitas

3 Sufl. 1: "1 am weil pleased that an occasion has been offered me of enabling loyal citizensto recognize my leniency and mercy that used to be known universally but are today virtuallysuspended. 1am pleased too that 1can force unprincipled (improbl) and abandoned (perditl)citizens, now that they have been subdued and defeated, to admit that, unrelenting and firm as 1was when the republic was collapsing about us, 1became mild and compassionate once it hadbeen saved."

4 For the identity of veteres hostes, novi amici, see Lily Ross Taylor, "Caesar and theRoman Nobility," Transactions of the American Philological Association, 73 (1942), 19; Gruen,81, n. 149; and O. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: Epistulaead Familiares, 1,62-47 B.C. (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1977),280-281.

50

(Sull. 3, 4, 7) but dedicated to the inseparable responsibility to the Tes publica,

Cicero's expression is noteworthy:

There is, then, no reason why you should pick upon me to omit

from this great company of distinguished men. Duty is indivisible

and the cause of loyal men [omnium bonorum] is common to

all...There is no political interest that is mine exclusively. The

occasion for action fell to me and not to them [i.e. the optimates] but

we all shared the distress the terror and the danger. Indeed, 1could

not at the time have been the leader to safety, had not others been

willing to accompany me. For this reason, as a private citizen, 1

must now share with everybody else that responsibility which

during my consulship was peculiarly mine and shared with a few

others. 1 say this, not to divide out the envy, but to share the praise;

part of my burden 1 share with no man, a share in the renown 1 give

to aliloyal citizens [bonis omnibus]. (Sull. 9)5

These words convey Cicero's growing fear of isolation and reveal a new

departure: the replacing of the waning concordia with a causa. The bonorum

omnium causa would soon develop into the coniunctio expressed in a letter

to Atticus (1.16.6) and then into consensus.6 Emphasis, we note, is put upon

the leadership qualities and abilities embodied in the princeps, obviously

Cicero himself. The speech precisely states Cicero's responsibility and

5 Qua re nihil est quod ex tanto comitatu virorum amplissimorum me unum abstrahas;simplex officium atque una bonorum est omnium causa...Nulla est enim in re publica mea causapropria; tempus agendi fuit magis proprium quam ceteris, doloris vero et timoris et periculi fuit il/acausa communis; neque enim ego tune princeps ad salutem esse potuissem, si esse alii comitesnoluissent. Qua re necesse est, quod mihi consuli praecipuum fuit praeter alios, id iam privatocum ceteris esse commune. Neque ego hoc partiendae invidiae, sed communieandae laudiscausa loquor; oneris mei partem nemini impertio, gloriae bonis omnibus.

6 Lepore, 115.

51

charader as princeps ad saiutem against the accusations of his friends and

enemies and provides a clear explanation of the leader's political duty,

responsibility, and individual merit.

In contrast, the most damaging reproach to Cicero's charader is that of

rex peregrinus (Sull. 21-25). This humiliating and derogatory accusation is

made by L. Manlius Torquatus, a member of a patrician gens and therefore

from the more conservative fadion of the senatorial nobilitas.7 Cicero begins

his defence in this way:

At this point, gentlemen of the jury, Torquatus says that he cannot

bear my tyranny. What tyranny are you talking about, Torquatus?

My consulship, 1 suppose. 1 gave no orders; on the contrary 1 obeyed

the senate and aliloyai citizens. During this magistracy, far from

establishing a tyranny, 1 suppressed one. Or do you mean not that 1

was a tyrant when 1wielded an all-embracing power but that 1 am a

tyrant now as a private citizen? (Sull. 21)8

As in Sull. 9 above, he repeats the nature of his consular initiative to

his comites. He emphasizes the fad that there will be no pradical or far­

reaching results from this defence, as he continues: "Publius Sulla expects

from me no limitless resources, no misuse of my power, nothing but the

conscientious discharge of the duties of a counsel for the defence" (Suil. 21).

7The patricians were·the privileged class of citizens, identified with the patres (senators)of the early republic and had an ancestry firmly based in the city of Rome. From 367 they sharedthe consulship with the plebeian class and retained much of their social prestige.. However, of theoriginal seventy patrician gentes represented in the senate in the early republic there remainedonly fourteen by the mid-50s. On patricians, see H. H. Scullard, A Historyof the Roman World,753 to 146B.C. Fourth ed. (New York: Routledge, 1980),63-66, 80, 89-91, 117-123.

8 Hic ait se il/e, iudices, regnum meum ferre non passe. Ouod tandem, Torquate,regnum? Consulatus, credo, mei; in quo ego imperavi nihil et contra patribus conscriptis et bonisomnibus parui; quo in magistratu non institutum est videlicet a me regnum, sed repressum. An tuin tanto imperio, tanta potestate non dicis me fuisse regem, nunc privatum regnare dicis?

52

Taking offence at being called the third foreign tyrant, peregrinus rex, after

Tarquin and Numa, instead of being honoured as a foreign consul, peregrinus

consul, "from a town which has twice brought salvation to this city and

empire" (Sull. 23),9 Cicero adamantly defends not only his status as a Roman

citizen and novus homo but also the rights of aIl Roman cltizens who are

inhabitants of Italy.lO Stress is on the municipales, not just Rome. If the city

of Rome is to remain strong, then the elite must recognize the strength and

worth of the Italian municipales.ll AlI cltizens should be recognised as equals

no matter from what town they come from in Italy. In this way, onlya

peregrinus could see the value in concordia between the patriclan-Ied senate

and the peregrinus-Ied equites. Hence, a condescending attitude toward

Torquatus' patriclan status and the patricii in general is justified: "Not a11

men are able to be patriclans and, to tell the truth, they do not even care about

it; nor do men of your own age think that they are your inferiors because they

are not patriclans" (Sull. 23). Cicero's aim is to arouse invidia in the senators

and equites who sat on the jury, few of whom were patriclans. Vpon his

retum from exile, the importance of the Italian municipal element will carry

much weight in the formation of the concept of consensus omnium

9 This is a reference to his famous Arpinate predecessor Marius, also a novus homo, whowas declared consul seven times and protected Rome's welfare by defeating the Germanicinvaders in 102-101. Cicero often compared himself with Marius' role as saviour of Rome (Red.Quir. 9, Sest. 50, Leg. 2.6).

10 Cicero's political success granted his "municipal" family an aristocratic status whicharoused contempt from many patricians: Catiline taunted him as an inquilinus civis urbis Romae(SaI. Cat. 31.7; cf. App. B. Civ. 2.2); Metellus Nepos (Plut. Cic. 26.6) mocked him repeatedly byasking "T(s ool) 1TaTllP Èonv;" Clodius (Att. 1.16.10) ridiculed him with "quid homini Arpinati cumaquis calidis?" Additional reproaches are found at Har. Resp. 17, and in [Sai.] Inv. in Cic. 1:reperticius, accitus ac paulo ante insitus huic urbi civis, 4: homo novus Arpinas, 7: Romule Arpinas(cf. Quint. 9.3.89). In retaliation, Cicero sometimes expressed his own views on Roman snobbery(Fam. 3.7.5). See A. Desmouliez, Cicéron et son goût (Brussels: Latomus, 1976), 116-118.

11 On Cicero's affection for Italy, see E. 1. Salmon, "Cicero, Romanus an Italicus Anceps,"in Cicero and Virgil: Studies in Honour of Harold Hunt (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1972), 75-86.

53

bonorum. Here it is revealed in an aggressive tone that does not necessarily

relegate the importance of concordia ordinum12 but promotes a new type of

harmony among a wider range of individuals or groups:

How much more will be those fellow-candidates of yours who are

élite of the whole of Italy and are now going to contend with you for

office and every position of importance! Take care that you do not

caU any of them a foreigner or you will be swamped by your

foreigners' votes! If they bring to the election vigour and drive,

believe me, they will knock your boastful talk out of you and make

you wake up; the only way in which they will let you defeat them

for office is by merit. (Sull. 24)13

In denying the accusation of regnum, he begins to justify the motives

orads of a regium genus, as he had to defend himself against those who

considered him non diligentissimum consulem sed crudelissimum

tyrannum (Cat. 2.14; cf. 1.30) before he took action against Catiline. In fact,

after the conspirators were executed Plutarch notes that Cicero was accused by

his enemies of abusing his consular power and aiming at regnum.l 4 This is

Cicero's response:

You may of course think it tyrannical to live in such a way that you

are in bondage to no man nor even to any passion; to make light of

12 Lepore, 117, notes that the Pro Sul/a indicates Cicero's break with the concept ofeoneordia ordinum; see below n. 17.

13 Quam tibi il/os competitores tuos peregrinos videri neeesse erit qui iam ex tota /talladeleeti teeum de honore ae de omni dignitate eontendentf Quorum cave tu quemquamperegrinum appelles, ne peregrinorum suffragiis obruare. Qui si attulerint nervos et industriam,mihi erede, exeutient tibi istam verborum iaetationem et te ex somno saepe exeitabunt necpatientur se abs te, nisi virtute vineentur, honore superari.

14 Cie. 23.1-3: in which his opponents use phrases such as Tl)V K~Klfpwvos ÔlJVUOTE\UV

and TlJV K~KÉpWVOS lmun:(uv llEya.}.,TIV to describe his magistracy.

54

an excesses; to need neither gold, nor silver, nor any other

possession; to give your opinion freely in the senate; to consult the

people's interests more than their wishes; to yield to no man; to

resist many. If you think that this is tyrannical, then 1 admit that 1

am a tyrant. (Sull. 25)15

A counter-accusation is made, alluding to a certain despotic ancestor

familiar to an Romans: "The suspicion of being a tyrant is quite foreign to my

character; but if you ask who have tried to establish tyrannies at Rome, do not

search through historical records, you will find them in your own family

tree" (Sull. 27).16 Cicero's continued opposition to the "ideas of all

unprincipled citizens [omnium mentes improborumf' against "aliloyal men

of every dass and rank [omnes boni omnium generum atque ordinum]"

(SuU. 28-29), namely the law-abiding citizens who shared his outlook, initiates

the political battle which results in his exile but also anticipates the consensus

omnium bonorum prodaimed in the post-exile speeches. According to

Lepore, the Pro Sulla marks the beginning of a new or, shall we say, expanded

concept of harmony. No longer the narrow alliance of senate and equites

anchored in special interests of the top two orders, but the rallying of allloyai

Roman citizens throughout Italy against the ideas of popular demagogues.l 7

Later in the same year, this commitment to all good men is

15 Nisi forte regium tibi videtur ita vivere ut non modo homini nemini sed ne cupiditatiquidem ulli servias, contemnere omnis libidines, non auri, non argenti, non ceterarum rerumindigere, in senatu sentire libere, populi utilitati magis consu/ere quam vo/untati, nemini cedere,mu/tis obsistere. Si hoc putas esse regium, regem me esse confiteor.

16Marcus Manlius Vulso Capitolinus, an ancestor of Torquatus, consul in 392, preventedthe Gauls from capturing the Capitoline hill and was later accused of attempting to set up a tyranny(Livy 5.31, 6.14-20).

17 Lepore, 118. At this time Cicero still believed in the political groups that made his ownconsulship a success and promoted him to the position of princeps senatus. But without thepowers of the consulship behind him he now realized he had to appeal to a wider audience.

55

immediately reflected in his defence of Archias. In the speech, Cicero refers to

the artes quae ad humanitatem pertinent (Arch. 2) which is the literary

education human beings should pursue in order to become good citizens. He

believed that literature was didactic. By constantly referring to his own

political accomplishments (Arch. 14,20), especially in the wake of his triumph

over tyranny during his consulship, Cicero illustrates the practical advantages

of this literary education which, for the ancients, meant an education in

philosophy. The study of literature becomes amoral endeavour. It aims at

the moral excellence of the vir bonus. In this way, the good citizen is bound

to preserve the safety and good order of republican government and of society

(Arch. 15-16).

But Cicero feU that his viri boni needed another influentialleader,

besides himself, who would be willing to unite and cooperate with them.

The one time consul togatus was now a consularis togatus in need of a

military ally. Having equated himself publicly with Pompey a year before, he

hoped the general would be this man and privately expressed his intentions

of becoming a "Laelius" to him (Fam. 5.7»)8 Hence, the republic would be

safe under the protection of a civilian-soldier alliance.l 9 But this would not

be realized. Three events in 61 opened an unmendable breach between the

senate and equites causing the final demise of his concordia ordinum and

leading to the creation of a military amicitia, a concordia by another name,

between Caesar, Crassus, and Pompey, in its place.

181n 147-146, Gaius Laelius was a member of Cornelius Scipio Aemitianus Minor's militaryentourage in Africa and was an important figure in the Scipionic Circle which promoted Iiteratureand philosophy. The friendship between Laelius and Scipio was 50 famous that Cicero marksthem as his central figures in his work De Amicitia. In this letter Cicero envisages for himself asimilar role as friend and adviser to Pompey. On Laelius and Scipio, see Scultard, 313, 318, 362.

19 Cicero continues on the same politicalline expressed in the Catilinarian uprising; seeNicolet, "Consul Togatus," 247-248.

56

Clodius and the Courts

The first crisis for concordia ordinum came in a scandal which occurred

in December 62 when P. Clodius Pulcher, a patrician and quaestor designate,

violated the sacred celebration of the Bona Dea. The ritual was restricted to

females, and Clodius, disguised as a woman, was unlucky enough to be

caught in attendance prior to a tryst with Caesar's wife.20 Roman moral fabric

wasshaken, and at the beginning of 61 the pontifices declared the matter nefas

after it had been referred to the senate andVestals (Att. 1.13.3). Subsequently,

an attempt was made by the senate to have a law passed allowing a special

jury to be chosen by an appointed praetor. Cicero participated in the debate21

and took an unyielding stand against Clodius, fearing: "that what with neglect

by the honest men and resistance by the dishonest men these proceedings

may be productive of great mischief in the body politic" (Att. 1.13.3).22 The

motion failed, but another was passed by the tribune Q. Fufius Calenus for a

trial to take place with a proper jury selected in the customary manner from

the senate, equites, and tribuni aerarii according to the law passed in 70 (Att.

1.14.5,1.16.2).23 Clodius was brought to trial on a charge of incestus,

sacrilegious indecency. Although the accused insisted that he had not been

present at Rome on the day the crime was committed, Cicero was one of

many witnesses called to contradict the alibi (Dom. 80, Mil. 46, Att. 2.15).

20 The celebration in honour of "The good goddess" was part of the official religiouscalendar and took place in the home of a magistrate, in this case of Caesar the pontifex maximusand urban praetor. See further John O. Lenaghan's A Commentary on Cicero 's Oration DeHaruspicum Responso(The Hague: Mouton & Co. N.V. Publishers, 1969),61 and 75.

21 For a discussion on Cicero's motivation to participate in the trial, see W. J. Tatum,"Cicero and the Bona Dea Scandai," C/assica/ Phil%gy, 85 (1990), 202-208.

22 ne haec neg/ecta a bonis, defensa ab improbis magnorum rei publicae ma/orum causasit. Cf. Att.1.14.1-2, 5.

23 For composition of the juries, see above p. 11.

57

Caesar had recognized Clodius' potential as an ally, so he convinced Crassus

to bribe the jury for his acquittaI. This further scandaI, when it wa~ revealed,

generated antagonism in the senate between conservative nobles and

moderate equestrian newcomers and brought disrepute to the equites, who

had tainted the law courts through the finandal resources of the richest

equestrian-backer, Crassus. 5ince through an anomalous law only senatorial

jurors could be tried for dishonest practices, a proposal was made to the senate

to review the subject of legal immunity for equites (Le. non-senatorial jurors)

from prosecutions for judidal corruption, a questionable privilege which they

had enjoyed for many years.24 It is explained to Atticus in this way:

The state of the republic in which we live here is weak, sad, and

unstable. 1 suppose you have heard that our friends the equites

have pretty well broken with the senate; to begin with they were

greatly annoyed by the promulgation under a senatorial decree of a

bill providing for an investigation into the conduct of jurors guilty

of taking bribes. (Att. 1.17.8)25

Although it is not known who proposed the bill (promulgatum),

possibly the consul M. Piso,26 Cato moved the decree and led the

investigation (Att.2.1.8).27 The attempt to invalidate the equites' judidal

24 C. Gracchus transferred the repetundae court to wealthy non-senators in order tocounter flagrant senatorial corruption. Sulla reformed the composition of the courts but did notalter the immunity of non-senators on these courts.

25 Nos hic in re publica infirma, misera commutabi/ique versamur. credo enim te audissenostros equites paene a senatu esse diiunctos; qui primum iIIud va/de graviter tu/erunt,promu/gatum ex senatus consu/to fuisse ut de eis qui ob iudicandum accepissent quaereretur.

26 Nicolet, L'Ordre équestre, 1,615.

27 "[Cato] speaks in the senate as though he were living in Plato's republic instead ofRomulus' cesspool. What could be fairer than that jurors who take bribes should be brought totrial? Cato moved accordingly and the senate agreed. Result, the equites declare war upon thesenate house, not upon me" (Att. 2.1.8).

58

privilege seemed only a threat since no law was actually passed (Att. 1.18.3).28

For Cicero the dispute with Clodius was symptomatic of an imminent crisis

which threatened to undermine the concordia achieved during his

consulship:

1 can only answer that, unless some god or other takes pity on us,

the settlement of the republic which you attribute to my policy and 1

to divine providence, and which seemed unshakeably established

upon the unity of aH honest men and the prestige of my consulship,

has slipped through our fingers in this one trial. (Att. 1.16.6)29

AlI this created tension between the orders and concordia was seriously

compromised. But Pompey's return to Rome was most on people's minds.

Pompey's Return

In December 62, Pompey the Great returned to Italy after five years of

accumulating military accomplishment. Pirates had been removed from the

whole Mediterranean Sea and the persistent threat of Mithridates in the east

had finally been brought to an end; all accomplished with relatively little loss

of Roman life. A clear sea meant safer trading routes to and from the new

and additional rich eastern provinces. AH the different eastern rulers, now

clients of Rome, patiently awaited orders from the general who had

negotiated a fair settlement which needed only to be ratified by the Roman

senate. No previous Roman general had ever returned with such great

acquisitions of land, spoils, prestige, and loyal following of soldiers who weH-

28 Seven years later it again materializes during the proceedings of the Pro RabirioPostumo.

29 rei publicae statum ilium quem tu mec consilio, ego divine confirmatum putabam, quibonorum omnium coniunctione et auctoritate consu/atus mei fixus et fundatus videbatur, nisi quisnos deus respexerit, e/apsum seito esse de manibus une hoc iudicio.

59

deserved land compensation. His imperium and auctoritas was

unprecedented. The memory of Sulla's brutal march on Rome was still

disturbingly vivid and it was feared that Pompey might do the same and rid

the capital of his enemies. But he surprised everyone.

After Pompey had landed at Brindisi with his victorious army, he

discharged all his soldiers and he arrived at Rome with a small entourage. By

this action of republican constitutionalloyalty, any fear of a government­

overthrow disappeared. Aware of his powerful position, he was more

vainglorïous than ambitious, more inclined towards awaiting his rewards for

his accomplishments than running risks with anything else. The fact that

such a great man had shown he fully.respected the laws of the land and did

not attempt hostile action, was worthy of eternal praise and a very

honourable example for aU citizens.

In spite of aU his accomplishments, Pompey returned to Rome under

unfavourable conditions. The senate did not admire or fear the great general.

In fact, it envied him and thought him unworthy of his powerful position.

Its reluctance to grant him the honour of triumphal garments and a

supplicatio for his Eastern victories was confirmed by an obstruction over the

ratification of his administrative arrangements in that region and refusaI of

land allotments for his veterans.3D It was a critical moment for concordia, as

several more events indicate that the senate did not want Pompey involved

in its affairs. For example, he was denied a command against Catiline's

army,31 he was not awarded a triumph for the campaign against the pirates,

30 Provo Cons. 11.26-27; Vell. Pat. 2.40.5.

31 Sull. 31; Ad Brut. 1.17.1; Sali. Cat. 17.43; Suet. luI. 16; Plut. Cie. 23. Cat. Min. 26.

60

and he was refused the administration of a prestigious public works project.32

Pompey's request for a deferment of the consular eleetions, held in July 62,

was also refused by the senate, under the instigation of Cato. This request

would have allowed Pompey to support, in person, the candidature of his

loyal military colleague Marcus Pupius Piso (Plut. Cat. Min. 30.1-2). Pompey

also found it difficult to impress the senate with his disapproval of Clodius'

prosecution. Senators distrusted him so much that he withdrew in

humiliation and continued to appeal to Cicero's oratorical abilities to promote

his reputation and prestige (Att. 1.18). Cicero complied but maintained doubts

about their friendship (Att. 1.13.4).

In mid-February 61, Cicero wrote a letter to Atticus commenting on the

general unpopularity of Pompey, whose first speech in the senate had failed to

impress both the improbi and the viri boni (Att. 1.14.1). Cicero still wanted to

be seen as a leading political figure33 in his constant attempt to be duly

acknowledged as saviour of the republic during his term as consul with the

implementation of concordia. He describes his busy day in the senate

defending Pompey and promoting stability:

ln a word, 1brought the house down. And why not, on such a

theme - the dignity of our order, concord between senate and

equites, unison of Italy, remnants of the conspiracy in their death

throes, reduced price of grain, internal peace? You should know by

now how 1can boom away on such topies. (Att. 1.14.4)34

32 Vell. Pat. 2.34.2, 2.40.5; Casso Dio, 36.17a.

33 See Nicolet, "Consul Togatus, " 246.

34 quid multa? clamores. etenim haec eratlmôeEOl.S, de gravitate ordinis, de equestriconcordia, de consensione /ta/iae, de intermortuis re/iquiis coniurationis, de vilitate, de otio. nostiiam in hac materia sonitus nostros.

61

Amid the self-prodaimed clamores from his fellow senators for his success,

he is content that "the senate is quite an Areopagus, thoroughly resolute,

strict, and courageous,"(Att. 1.14.5).35 This was not just an idle statement but

refiected Cicero's pride in the senate's daim to firm leadership.

The senate's nerve as a decision making body had strengthened in the

last couple of years. As has been noted, it had used its emergency powers at

the end of 63 to deal with Catiline's serious threat to overthrow the

govetnment, and, except for the execution of the five conspirators, bloodshed

was avoided in Rome. This would not have been realized without the

support of the equestrian order which agreed with the senate's decision and

acted as Rome's police force during this time of crisis. This is what is meant

by Cicero's boast de gravitate ordinis, de equestri concordia (Att. 1.14.4). In a

further show of strength, the senate's commanders Metellus Celer and C.

Antonius annihilated Catiline and his forces in northern Italy early in 62,

thus the military threat was over.36 But the deployment of these forces was

excessively contested. For a brief period in January 62, the senate again passed

its "ultimate decree" to suspend from office its own unruly and pertinacious

magistrates.37 This new get-tough attitude would be tested by the

troublesome episode soon instigated by the publicani.

35 senatus'"Apnos miyos. nihil eonstantius, nihil severius, nihil fortius.

36 Sail. Cat. 56-61; Casso Dio 37.39-41; Plut. Cie. 22.5; App. B. Civ. 2.7.

371t was Cicero's original proposai that allowed Metellus Celer and C. Antonius to lead themilitary forces against Catiline's army. Nepos continued his antagonism against Cicero andproposed that Pompey should command the armies. Several magistrates including Caesar andCalpurnius Bestia supported hirn but Cato vetoed the proposai and in the ensuing tumultuousc1amor the state of emergency was declared; as a result, bath Nepos and Caesar were removedfrom their offices. On these events and Nepos' actions, see Fam. 5.2; Suet. lui. 16; Plut. Cie. 23,Cat. Min. 26; Casso Dio 37.43.1; Rawson, 94; Shackleton Bailey, .Cieero: Epistulaead Fami!iares, l,273-274.

62

The Publicani and the Asiatic Tax Contract

When Pompey's seulement opened up new economic frontiers in the

wealthy eastern provinces, a weightier issue for Cicero's concordia was

introduced in the last months of 61.38 Competition was fierce for lucrative

contracts in this first year after the victory over Mithridates. Consequently, a

company of publicani, the most important economic group within the

equestrian class,39 filed a petition before the senate to reduce a considerable

overbid on a newly ratified five year contract for the collection of taxes in one

of the new provinces of Asia. Besides obvious greed and miscalculation,

there is no clear explanation, ancient or modern, as to why the successful

company had overbid.4o But the request to reduce the contract by one-third41

created a series of heated debates between the two orders during at least two

senate meetings in December. Under Crassus' leadership many "equestrian"

senators defended the publicani and approved the reduction. Cicero thought

the appeal was a disgrace but felt compelled to support it in order to keep

concordia intact and prevent further division between the two orders:

An invidious business! The demand was disgraceful, a confession

38 Although Pompey's settlement was not legally ratified by the senate it was stillrecognized as a contribution to Roman imperial expansion and thus open for safe economicexploitation. Details of the issue are found in two of Cicero's letters: Att. 1.17.9-10 (December 5,61), and Att. 1.18.7 (January 20, 60).

39 Described as fias equitum Romanorum, ornamentum eivitatis, firmamentum rei publieaeby Cicero (Plane. 23).

40 For a complete examination, see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Roman History, 65-50 B.C.: FiveProblems," Journal of Roman Studies, 52 (1962), 135-137; E. Badian, Publieans and Sinners:Private Enterprise in the Service of the Roman Republie (New York: Comell University Press,1972; revised 1983), 100-101; Lenaghan, 46-48; Nicolet, L'Ordre équestre, l, 616 on theevidence of Casso Dio 39.59.2, suggests that it could possibly be due to a recent hostile invasionof the unknown eastern province in question which would make it difficult for the tax companyrecoup its bid.

41 Casso Dio 38.7.4; App. B. Civ. 2.13; Suet lui. 20.

63

of recklessness. But there was the gravest danger of a complete

break between senate and equites if it had been turned down

altogether. Here again it was 1principally who stepped into the

breach. Through my efforts they found the senate in full attendance

and in generous mood, and on the kalends of December and the day

following 1 discoursed at length upon the dignity and harmony of

the orders [de ordinum dignitate et concordia] ...Thus, in

maintenance of my settled policy, 1 am defending as best 1 can the

alliance [concordiam] 1myself cemented. (Att. 1.17.9-10)42

He would be willing to satisfy the publicani only "to keep the good

cause alive in the senate" (Att.2.16.4). Cicero was involved in this matter for

the good of the republic, as he attempted to forestal1 impending separation

betweenthe senatofs and equites. His dual social rank as eques and novus

h 0 m 0 in the senate demanded il. Throughout his life he had always

staunchly defended the interests of the publicani.43 Noteworthily, in the

speech on Pompey's command (De Imp. en. Pomp. 17) senators and the

people had already been lectured on the importance of maintaining ties to

those who control the finances of the state. If the senate could grant the

publicani their demand, then there would be doser ties with the equites. But

42 invidiosa res, turpis postu/atio eteonfessio temeritatis. summum erat perieulum ne, sinihi/ impetrassent, plane alienarentur a senatu. huie quoque rei subventum est maxime a nobisperfectumque ut frequentissimo senatu et Iiberalissimo uterentur, multaque a me de ordinumdignitate et eoneordia dieta sunt Ka/. Dee. et postridie...sie ego eonservans rationeminstitutionemque nostram tueor, ut possum, il/am a me eonglutinatam eoneordiam.

43 Pro Fonteio, Pro Cluentio, De Imperio Cn. Pompei are the main speeches in whichCicero defended the interests of the pub/ieani: /n Verrem 2.2.181 and 186 shows that he devotedhis early forensic career to them and, in order to earn their gratitude, avoids any offence to them.They were an important electoral group in his rise to the consulship (Comm. Pet. 1.3). Cn.Plancius, his client in 54, was a prominent publieanus. Cicero alsa wrote a letter of commendationon behalf of the Bithynian company of publieaniin 51 (Fam. 13.9); for Cicero's obligation towardpublieani, see Wood. 106-107; for the suggestion that Cicero possibly owned shares incompanies, see Badian, 115 and 152, n. 105.

64

Cato and his reactionary faction of fellow noble senators strongly opposed the

request and managed to obstruct it and to hinder the tax-collectors' efforts. By

respecting the decision of the censor who leased the contract to the highest

bidder they had followed proper senatorial procedure.44

By deciding not to abandon the financial interests of ms army of

locupletes (Att. 1.19.4), Cicero had shown himself sympathetic toward the

publicani. In a letter to ms brother Quintus, now govemor of Asia in the

wake of the publican company's overbid of 61, he explains that the aim of

those who govern is to maintain "the greatest possible happiness of the

govemed" (Q. Fr. 1.1.24). As he admits that his brother's province is packed

with conflicts among the tax-farmers themselves and the different classes of

the population so it provides a challenge to any Roman govemor: "Ah, but

among these very men serious disputes arise, numerous wrongs spring up,

and great conflicts are the result" (Q. Fr. 1.1.7). Their importance posed

serious contradictions for the brothers:

And yet to a11 your goodwi11 and devotion to duty there is a serious

obstacle in the publicani; if we oppose them, we shall alienate from

ourselves and from the commonwealth an order that has served us

we11 and has been brought through our instrumentality into close

association with the commonwealth; and yet, if we yield to them in

everything, we sha11 be acquiescing in the utter ruin of those whose

security, and interests, we are bound to protect. (Q. Fr. 1.1.32)45

44 Under the Gracchan lawof 123, the contracts for the province of Asia were leased bythecensorsto companiesof equites; see Verr. 2.3.12, Att. 1.17.9, Provo Cons. 12.

45 Atqui huie tuae voluntati ae diligentiae diffieultatem magnam afferunt publieani; quibussi adversamur, ordinem de nobis optime meritum et per nos eum republiea eoniunetum et a nobiset a republiea diiungemus; sin autem omnibus in rebus obsequemur, funditus eos perirepatiemur, quorum non modo saluti, sed etiameommodis eonsulere debemus.

65

For Cicero, therefore, the interests of Roman citizens residing in his brother's

province (or in any Roman province) must suffer in order to preserve the

concordia ordinum. In principle, the representatives of the senate in a

province must, whenever possible, reconcile their duty to the provincials

with the interests of the publicani. Cicero is weIl aware of the latter's knavish

tacties "1 therefore know pretty weIl what happens to allies in distant lands

from the complaints 1 have heard from citizens in Italy" (Q. Fr. 1.1.33).46 This

concern for the weIl-being of the publicani is so important that it virtually

determined the destruction of the concordia ordinum, which slowly

disintegrated between February 61 and June 60 as Cicero's invaluable

correspondence vividly demonstrated during this time.

Isolation, Betrayal, and Exile

The first letter of 60 dated January 20 provides proof of the isolation

46 Cicero had always hoped that provincials and publieani could re50Ive their differences.When his brother Ouintus brought a matter to the senate regarding disputes over excise dutieson transferred goods in his province, Cicero promised Ouintus that he would grant the pub/ieanihis full support so long as the publieani had come to a favourable agreement with the provincialadministrators. In this way he could support their cause in the senate and possibly mend the riftbetween the coneordia ordinum. But this was only spoken about privately and was not a publicissue for Cicero (Aff. 2.16.4). When Cicero became governor of Cilicia in 51 he described toAtticus the attitude he wished to uphold when dealing with the publieani: "You seem to want toknow how 1manage about the publieani. 1dote upon them, defer to them, butter them up withcompliments and arrange 50 that they harm nobody" (Att. 6.1.16). Atticus defends the publicans'interests by complaining about Bibulus' edict (proconsul of Syria 51): "the only novelty is thesaving clause of which you wrote to me that it constituted 'a very serious precedent against ourorder. on But Cicero reassures him that he has a clause in his edict which is favourable to thepublieani as he explains what it contains exactly: "Most surprising of ail: the rates of interestspecified in their agreements with the provincials were maintained even by Servilius [governor ofCilicia 78-74]. My system is this: 1fix a date, giving plenty of time, and say that if they pay beforethat date 1shall applya rate of one percent; if not, then the rate in the agreement. So the nativespaya tolerable interest and the tax farmers are delighted with the arrangement, since they now getverbal compliments and frequent invitations to their hearts' content" (Att. 6.1.16). The result isthat the publieani remain on friendly terms with the Roman governor. It should not be 50 surprisingthat Cicero implements a low interest rate: his fairness as Roman governor is an effort to avoiddisagreements and promote goodwill between the cities of his province and the tax farmers; for afurthertreatment, see Nicolet, L'Ordre équestre, l, 678-679; and Badian, 88 and 114f.

66

which Cicero began to feel as disagreements deepened the disharmony

between the two orders: ita sum ab omnibus destitutus (Att. 1.18.1). He was

distraught at the previous year's events and a sense of failure tormented him:

"Thus the year saw the overthrow of the two foundations of the constitution

which 1 (and 1 alone) had established. The authority of the senate was thrown

to the winds and the harmony of the orders dissolved [ordinum concordiam

diiunxit]" (Att. 1.18.3).47 The concordia ordinum was a non-entity as far as he

was concerned and prompted Cicero to finally admit that "the senate had been

deserted by the equites" (Att. 2.1.7). A lack of confidence develops toward the

senatorial oligarchy and the powerful men of the time. This distrust is

combined with the necessary search for a politician who must indicate

substantial worthiness in his role as a practical statesman, so he resorts to a

Greek pun to emphasize his point: sed interea 1TO~1."f1.KOS àvllP 01JB' ovap

quisquam inveniri potest (Att. 1.18.6).48 From this moment, Cicero searches

for a different way to re-group the ordines who are at the mercy of the dynasts

and populares.

No longer does Cicero concentrate his full efforts on the nobilitas and

old ruling class which has proven to be uncompromising. At the same time,

he does not want to detach himself from the viri boni who represent the

principles of the constitution. He does not hide his views on the weakness of

the senate or the poor political consciousness of the oligarchy and admits he

must now seek out new supporters, praesidia (AU. 1.19.6). The imbalance

being created by the break-up of his concordia emphasizes his new moderate

views and the need for a political intermediary is evident: "In fact I now

47 sic ille annus duo firmamenta rei publicae per me unum constituta evertit; nam etsenatus auctoritatem abiecit et ordinum concordiam diiunxit.

48 "But ail the while not 50 much as the shadow of a statesman is to be found."67

avoid treading on anybody's toes, though without currying popularity or

sacrificing principle. My whole line of conduct is nicely balanced" (Att. 1.19.8).

His isolation is highlighted as he tells Atticus that he has "been holding to

this optimate road without supporters or companions" (Att. 1.20.3). The

ingratitude of the boni forces him to retreat from Rome and spend most of his

time at his country villas in Antium and Formiae where he wishes to throw

himself into his studies (AU. 2.16.3).49

The same intense disagreements which disappointed Cicero in the

senate between those of noble and equestrian rank forced Pompey and Crassus

into their infamous coalition with Caesar. An invitation to join them was

declined by the orator (Ait. 2.3.3-4)50 but it seems that concordia was given

sorne attention also during this unique moment. A coin was issued with the

head of the goddess Concordia just as the first"triurnvirate" was established

in 60 and statues were set up in her honour.51 Through the influence of his

fellow triumvirs, Caesar was elected consul in 59 and began his term in office

under the auspices of the goddess with a speech about concordia between

himself and his fellow consul M. Calpurnius Bibulus,52 just as Cicero had

proc1aimed four years earlier with his consular colleague (Leg. Agr. 2.103).53

But it was soon revealed that Caesar's version of concordia was to promote

49 Cf. Att. 2.4.2: interea quidem cum Musis nos delectabimus.

50 Cf. Att. 4.6.2; Provo Cons. 41. This would not have been the ideal civilian-soldieralliance advocated in the Pro Murena.

51 Other coins and statues were issued in 55 when the triumvirate was renewed; seeS. Weinstock, DivusJulius(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971),261 and 263.

52 App. B. Civ. 2.10: hO)'OlJS Èv TÛ ~OlJÀij 1fEpî OIlOVO(aS Ô~ÉeETO 1fPÔS BV~Àov.

53 For the importance ofconsular harmony, see above p. 17, n. 19.68

his interests in his coalition, not his colleague's.54 On the occasions when the

senate refused him, Caesar appealed to the comitia tributa and his good friend

the tribune Vatinius to sponsor his laws. For Pompey, he arranged the

ratification of the eastem settlement and land for his veterans; for Crassus

(and to oblige the equestrian order), he adjusted the contract for the publicani

in Asia, and to Cicero's dismay he not only abolished custom duties in Italy

but also approved the passage of the agrarian law which assigned the ager

Campanus to needy families (a modified version of the Rullan land bill),

measures which decreased the amount of internaI revenue.55 The senate was

annoyed,56 and once these laws were passed the concordia of the two orders

suffered a further setback and could never be fully restored.57 In tum, Caesar

rewarded himself with the proconsular commands of Transalpine and

Cisalpine Gaul, and nlyricum,58 positions which would take him away from

Rome and Italy for approximately ten years.

Cicero's correspondence in 59 reveals continuing criticisms and

disagreements with his opponents, as he speaks confidently about his

54 Bibulus was forced to keep a low profile throughout most of the year (Suet. lui. 20.1 ;Plut. Gaes. 14.6).

55 For Cîcero's immediate reaction to these laws, see Att. 2.16.1-2, 2.19.3;cf.Suet.JuI.20.3.

56 For Caesar's quarrels with the senate, see Casso Dio 38.1-8.

57 ln addition, Cicero's brother Quintus, as governor of Asia, consulted the senateregarding complaints by provincials for unfair excise duties on transferred goods imposed by thepublicani. For the sake of concordia ordinum Cicero told Atticus that he would support thepublicans' cause in the senate only if they came to some private agreement with the provincials(Art. 2.16.4). Nothing more is known of the situation but, amid the tensions, it shows Cicero'songoing concerns for good relations between the two orders; cf. Lenaghan, 195, n. 60.7.

58 The lex Vatinia secured Pompey's acta, contract for the publicani, and Caesar'scommands in Cisalpine Gaul and lIIyricum for five years. The senate later added Transalpine Gaul(Suet. luI. 22.1; Casso Dio 38.8.5).

69

unchanged political attitude.59 Doubts appeared wbile he was worrying about

the opinion of the optimates.60 Afraid to see the dominance of the senate

pass to the tris homines immoderatos (Alt. 2.9.2), he is aware of the danger to

all and insists on the need of support from everyone. There was a time when

the senate stood firm based on the concordia ordinum, then the alienation of

the equites led to the collapse of its authority; a bitter affirmationis expressed

following opinions on the improbitas of the powerful dynasts, the culpa of

Cato, and the attacks from Clodius as reasons for the conversio rei publicae: "1

prefer to make a bad voyage under another pilot than to steer a good course

with such ungrateful passengers" (Att.2.9.3).61 Despite moments of

optimism62 in his struggle for the protection of constitutional values and

loyalty among the optimates,63 there were constant announcements of

impending doom: tota periit (Alt. 2.21.1).64

The courts were once again used as a platform from which to defend

bis coalition against the opposition instigated by the triumvirs. Two trials are

noteworthy in their attempt to vindicate bis actions for the republican cause

in 63, and provide an opportunity to criticise the power of the three dynasts.

59 Att. 2.4.2: neque mihi umquam veniet in mentem...paenitere quod a me ipso nondesciverim; and Att. 2.18.4: de non nullis aliis rebus angor equidem, sed iam prorsus occallui.

60 Att. 2.5.1: quid enim nostri optimates, si qui reliqui sunt, loquentur?

61 male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare; cf.Lepore, 125; Jérôme Carcopino, Cicero: the Secrets of his Correspondence, trans. E. O. Lorimer(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1951),207,236,319.

62 Att. 2.24.4: nos tamen in his miseriis erecto animo et minime perturbato sumushonestissimeque <et salutem> et dignitatem nostram magna cura tuemur.

63 Att. 2.3.4: semper nobis videatur 'ds otwvôs ap~oTos àllvvaoea~ 'lTEPî. m:tTPTls.'

64 Cf. Q. Fr. 1.2.15: Rem publicam funditus amisimus; Art. 2.25.2: re publica nihildesperatius, iis quorum opera nihil maiore odio.

70

First, Cicero defended C. Antonius, bis consular colleague, charged with

maiestas arising from bis involvement against the Catilinarian conspirators.

It ended in conviction and the accused was sent into exile.65 Cicero also

defended L. Valerius Flaccus, another former associate from ms annus

mirabilis.66 The defendant was charged with extortio~ res repetundae,

during his term as propraetor in the province of Asia in 62, but Cicero tried to

convince the jury that the trial was actually a pretext for an attack against the

auctores, duces, principes involved in the suppression of Catiline's conspiracy

against the state four years earlier.67 In attempting to secure an acquittaI, he

urged the jury to demonstrate that the concordia ordinum which existed

against a previous would-be demagogue (i.e. Catiline) was still active against

the current tyrants who charged his dient.68 The senate would require a

confirmatio auctoritatis derived only from the verdict of a jury whose

representatives acted on behalf of the prevailing cooperative attitude of the

equites (Flac. 4).69 But Cicero could never lose sight of the main issue. Res

repetundae indicated a daim for restitution. For this reason, the prosecution

chose a site in the forum attended by a large and impressionable audience, 80

65 The little information that is known about this trial derives fram the Pro Flacco; see Hill,174; Gruen, 288-289.

66 The trial washeld in August following Att. 2.25.1; cf. L. R. Taylor, 'The Date andMeaning of the Vettius Affair," Historia 1 (1950),48. Cicero also boasts of a successful acquittaiearlier in the year for a certain Aulus Thermus (Flac. 98).

67 Flac. 96: iIIud vero terri non potest, quod per senatores et per equites Romanos, quihaec omnia pro salute omnium communi consilio, una mente atque virtute gesserunt, harumrerum auctores, duces, principes spoliari omnibus tortunis atque civitate expelli posse arbitrantur.Etenim populi romani perspiciunt eandem mentem et voluntatem.

68 Flac. 1, 3, 66, 94; cf. Att. 2.21.6; Q. Fr. 1.2.16; HiII,175; Gruen, 290-291.

69 Flaccus was tried before a jury that was composed of seventy-five members equallychosen from the senate, the equites, and the tribuniaerarii. In Flac. 4 the tribuniaerarii arecombined with the equites giving a number of fifty.

71

caution had to be used by the defence attorney. At sorne moments during the

trial, Cicero prudently lowered his voice when he wanted to convey

controversial matters about ms client only to the jury and not to the listeners

outside, since if these points were overheard by the crowd an unfavourable

atmosphere might be created against Cicero and his team of loyal followers:

"It was for this particular charge, Laelius, that you sought this site and that

crowd. You know how vast a throng it is, how close-knit [quanta concordial

and what influence it can have in public meetings" (Flac. 66).70 Concordia

among groups of people who share similar attitudes created a forceful and

fearfulopposition.71 Evidently, by prevailing upon "the wealthy by fear, the

poor with rewards, and the stupid by deception" the prosecution and its allies

summoned an undisciplined mob to witness the proceedings and cause

disorder (Flac. 15). This was probably in response to the public criticisms

against the triumvirs exhibited in the theatre throughout Caesar's

consulship.72 It is intolerable for Cicero that the crowd could be influenced by

greed and duress of his opponents instead of the valour of the loyal senators

and equites who fight for the common safety of ail (Flac. 96). Although the

result of the trial is not known,73 the closing segments of the speech contain

pleas which emphasize a disappointing neglect and disregard for harmony of

70 Ob hoc crimen hic locus abs te, Laeli, atque il/a turba quaesita est; scis quanta sitmanus, quanta concordia, quantum valeat in contionibus.

71 This type of harmony among friends was noted in the DeAmicitia 23: "And if it is notunderstood how great the force of friendship and harmony is, this may be gathered fram quarrelsand disputes. For what house is 50 firm, or what state 50 weil established as not to be able to beutterly overthrown by hatred or strife? Whence we may form an estimate as to how much goodthere is in friendship."

72 Att. 2.19.3; H. H. Scullard, From the Gracchi to Nero (Fifth edition, New York: Methuen& Co., 1982),115; Taylor, Party Po/itics, 228, n. 10.

73 Scholars favour acquittai: see Scullard, From the Gracchi, 427, n. 18; C. Macdonald,Cicero, vol. X (The Loeb Classical Library, 1977),431; Hill, 175.

72

the orders (Flac. 97-98,103-105).

Yet in view of the correspondence of the time, scholars agree that

Cicero continued to focus his attention on a more comprehensive group, the

boni.74 As previously stated, they comprised a larger segment of society who

defended good government in the name of the Roman constitution. The

boni showed support for anyone courageous enough to make a stand against

the triumvirs (Att.2.18.1). Described as modesti homines, they inc1uded

citizens of any rank from towns throughout Italy (Att. 2.13.2, 2.19.2). A1ready

in Ju1y 59, a year before his exile, Cicero was focusinghis efforts on a renewed

commitment to harmony based on consensus of the boni: "1 think 1 have very

firm backing in my old consular army of aU honest men [exercitum bonorum

omniuml inc1uding the moderately honest" (Att. 2.19.4). An undiminished

optimism for their support is maintained when conducting governmental

affairs and defending political principles: "1 myself, as 1 think and hope and

forecast, am protected by a powerful bastion of general goodwill" (Att.

2.25.2).75 As Lepore states, this must imply the definitive failure of Cicero's

traditional view of concordia ordinum. He is not seeking the support of only

two orders but of aH classes in the struggle against those few people who want

to silence him in defiance of the Roman constitution and in order to destroy

the stability of Roman civitas.76 In fact, in the years foHowing his exile, the

74 Taylor, ''The Date and Meaning of the Vettius Affair," 49, n.13; Strasburger, 51;Lepore, 126. It is important to note that in Cicero the term boni is somewhat unstable because itrefers both to an ideal of political conduct and an actual political group.

75 Cf.Att. 2.24.4: "1 receive warm assurances of general goodwill."

76 Lepore, 128. Cf. Att. 2.19.3: "But now there is only one universal cry, though withhatred rather than power behind if'; Att. 2.20.3: "As things are the civitas is dying a strangemalady. Disapproval of what has been done and indignant complaint are universal."; Att. 2.21.1:"The republic is finished...But now 1am afraid that what with the hisses of the crowd and the talk ofthe respectable and the outcry in Italy, they are thoroughly exasperated."

73

focus is more on this concordia civitatis than anything else. With Clodius'

hostility increasing,77 and hardly any support from Pompey, Cicero got ready

to defend himself expecting support from a11 classes, while aware of the lack

of harmony between the two major orders; there is also a desperate attempt to

persuade Atticus to return to Rome and lead Cicero's exercitus in hopes of

reestablishing the political aims that were so prominent in 63 (Att. 2.21.6). A

declaration in the Pro Flacco acknowledges the consensus Romans exhibit

against those who disregard the Roman constitution: "The Roman people

shows what it feels in every way it can; men are unanimous in what they

think, in what they want and in what say. It is for this reason that, if anyone

caUs me there, 1 come" (Flac. 96-97).78 The faith maintained in the boni which

appears in the defence for Flaccus is coloured with more precise significance

in one last letter to his brother Quintus in December from Rome:

And yet it seems that people are not likely to desert our cause...This

is how the matter stands: if Clodius gives notice of an action .against

me, the whole of Italy will rally around me, so that we shaUleave

[the court] with tenfold glory; but if he attempts to carry things

through by violence, the enthusiasm not of friends alone, but also

of strangers, leads me to hope that 1 may oppose force to force. Ail

men are promising to put at my disposal themselves and their

children, their friends, clients, freedmen, slaves, and to end up

with, their purses. My old group of supporters is fired with

enthusiasm and affection for me. If there are any who before were

77 Clodius' hostility originated in 61 when Cicero testified against him during the Bona Deascandai which subsequently led to a continuous battle of wits between both of them in the senate(AU. 1.16.9-10) and finally resulted in Cicero's exile.

78 omnibus rebus quibus potest populus Romanus significat quid sentiat; nulla varietasest inter homines opinionis, nulla voluntatis, nulla sermonis. qua re, si quis iIIuc me vocat, venio.

74

inclined to be either unfriendly or lukewarm, their hatred of these

tyrants is such that they are now joining the ranks of the loyal

[bonis]. (Q. Fr. 1.2.16)79

The fate of the republic was entirely under the influence and authority

of the new dynasts, principes, who competed vigorously for potentia and

dignitas. As the voice of concern for most senators, on his voyage upon the

via optimas, Cicero displays a genuine tone of uneasiness when he declares:

"Oh, if indeed we might keep the splendid tradition and the discipline we

have inherited from our ancestors! But 1 do not know now by what

agreement it is slipping out of our hands" (Flac. 15).80

In 58, Caesar departed for Gaul on a campaign which would last almost

ten years. But Rome still feU his influence with the election of his agent P.

Clodius into the tribunate.81 Clodius immediately won the people's approval

with the enactment of two major laws: one provided for grain to be

distributed free to citizens, and the other legalized trade guilds (collegia). The

effect of the latter was particularly pernicious. The guilds became organized,

political clubs which disrupted order and security in Rome.

Clodius also secured the senate's allegiance with a law that prohibited

the censor from debarring senators from participating in senatorial

proceedings. Henceforth, a senator could only be debarred when found guilty

79 Nostrae tamen causae non videntur homines defuturi...Si diem nobis Clodius dixerit,tota ltalia concurret, ut multiplicata gloria discedamus; sin autem vi agere conabitur, spero fore,studiis non solum amicorum, sed etiam alienorum, ut vi resistamus. Omnes et se et suos liberos,amicos, clientes, libertos, servos, pecunias denique suas pollicentur. Nostra antiqua manusbonorum ardet studio nostri atque amore. Si qui antea aut alienores fuerant, aut languidiores,nunc horum regum odio se cum bonis coniungunt.

80 0 morem praeclarum disciplinamque quam a maioribus accepimus, si quidemteneremus! sed nescio quo pacto iam de manibus elabitur.

81 As pontifexmaximus Caesar transferred Clodius from the patrician to the plebeian gens(early in 59) sa that he couId be eligible for the tribuneship and extend his politica\ career.

75

of misconduct both by the censor and the senate itself. He also built an

alliance with the consuls by promulgating the lex de provinciis consularibus

which entrusted Piso and Gabinius with a five-year command in their

provinces. It is evident that Clodius gained considerable popularity for his

measures. This was an ingenious tactic for it would not bring any opposition

against his last measure primarily directed against Cicero and apparently

sanctioned by the triumvirs.82

In February, Clodius proposed the lex de capite civis Romani, a law

banning any person who had executed Roman citizens without a trial. In this

way he was exploiting the ill will already developed by Metellus Nepos

toward Cicero's role against the Catilinarian conspirators. But, as we have

seen, Clodius bore his own personal grudge. Having sensed liUle support

from the senate, which was partly responsible for the measures of December

63 (Dom. 50, Sesto 53), Cicero did not make a personal appeal to that body.

Instead, he donned mouming garments and solicited support from the people

and his army of boni.83

As a sign of solidarity, many equites also dressed in mourning

garments while the distinguished senators Hortensius and Curio led a

delegation to speak against the bill in the senate on Cicero's behalf.84 As a

82 Cicero (Sest. 39) alludes to the dynasts' inactive participation in the discussion of thismeasure. For a description of these measures, see W. JeftreyTatum, The Patrieian Tribune:Publius Clodi!Js Pulcher (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 150-153. ForClodius' relations with the triumvirs, see E. Gruen, "P. Clodius: Instrument or IndependentAgent?" Phoenix 20 (1966),120-130; R. Seager, "Clodius, Pompeius and the Exile of Cicero,"Latomus 24 (1965),519-531; and A. W. Lintott, "P. Clodius-FelixCatilina?" Greeee and Rome 14(1967), 157-169.

83 Att. 3.10.2, 3.15.5; Red. Sen. 12; Red. Quir.8, 13; Sest. 25; Pis. 77; Plane. 87; Plut.Cie. 30.5-31.1; Casso Dio 38.16.2-6; App. B. Civ. 2.15.

84 The delegation included M. Lucullus, L. Torquatus, and the praetor Lentulus Crus whoalso lobbied Pompey to intervene (Sest. 41; Pis. 77; Plut. Cie. 31).

76

result, many senators had shown their support by wearing mourning

garments also. When a deputation of equites petitioned the senate for a

hearing, Gabinius, the presiding consul, brusquely repulsed them and

banished their zealous equestrian leader L. Lamia from the city on the ground

that he was inciting the equites to riot. Soon after a consular edict strictly

forbade senators from donning mourning attire. In a final effort to neutralize

both senatorial and equestrian support for Cicero's cause, the consuls, who

had once been on friendly terms with the orator, betrayed him by publicly

denouncing the execution of the Catilinarians. Thus, in appreciation for the

Lex de provinciis consularibus, they showed their allegiance to Clodius.85

The tribune took advantage of his popular following and incited his

operae to harass Cicero and intimidate his senatorial and equestrian

partisans.86 He continued his attacks against the senate by inviting

Hortensius and Curio to a contio where the two senators were publicly

humiliated, and by forcing an extraordinary command on Cato.87 It then

became evident that the senate's auctoritas was weakened and resistance

futile. With this behaviour against the optimates, Clodius, who came from a

well-known noble family with a long line of senatorial members, betrayed his

family' s contribution to this institution.S8

When the lex de capite civis Romani was ratified on March 20, Cicero

followed the advice of sorne of his friends and left Rome, ostensibly to save

85 Cie. Red. Sen. 12f1., 32; Red. Quir.13; Dom. 91, 96,131; Sest. 25ft.; Pis. 11, 13f.,17ft.; Planc. 861.; Plut. Cic. 31.1; Casso Dio 38.16.5-6.

86 Sest. 27; Mil. 37; Plut. Cic.30.5.

87 The lex Clodia de imperio Catonis established Cato pro quaestore pro praetore whiehtook him abroad for an extended period (Cass. Dio 38.16.5).

88 Cf. Tatum, 155-156; Lintott, 165-167.

77

his country a second time by averting further bloodshed.89 He called itfuga

(Att. 3.3), thus his "flight" from the city was voluntary. Clodius capitalized on

this opportunity and quickly promulgated another law specifically targeted

against the orator. On April 24, the Lex CLodia de exsilio Ciceronis was passed

and once Cicero received information regarding the sentence of exile he left

Brundisium and set out for Greece while his urban and country residences

were destroyed in the name of Libertas.9o

During the following months, Cicero's correspondence revealed the

bitterness, sorrow, and profound despair that prevailed over his shattered

personal prestige: "Can 1forget what 1 was and not feel what 1am or what 1

have lost?" (Att. 3.10.2).91 When ms depression intensified, he could not

endure the fad that he had lost his rights as a citizen, his wealth and property,

and all those dear to him as he questioned his identity: "What am 1 now?"

(Att.3.15.2). In his despondency he cursed those who were hostile to him and

betrayed him.92

In the meantime, loyal supporters (praesidium bonorum) in Rome

showed defiance toward a clause in Clodius' law banning "any motion or

mention" of Cicero (Att. 3.15.6; cf. Red. Sen. 8) and initiated measures for his

recall by calling attention to the benefits he had conferred upon the state (Red.

89 Att. 3.15.4; Pis. 78; Plut. Cie. 31.4; Casso Dio 38.17.4,38.16.5.

90 With Cicero and Cato gone the senate was left without effective leadership. For anexplanation on how the Jex de exsilio made permanent and official Cicero's voluntary withdrawaltrom Rome, see Tatum, 156-166.

91 Ali of Book 3 Ad Attieum consists of Cicero's letters from exile; aise Q. Fr. 1.3, 1.4, Fam.5.4 and 14.1-4. They are dated from ca. March 22, 58 to early February 57.

92Att. 3.9.2, 3.15.2; Q. Fr. 1.3.8; cf. Red. Quir. 21.

78

Sen. 21).93 The first attempt was made on June 1, when the tribune Ninnius

Quadratus proposed a restoration decree in the senate, but it was vetoed by his

colleague Aelius Ligus (Red. Sen. 3; Sesto 68). In August, Domitius

Ahenobarbus planned to bring the case before the senate but without success

(Att.3.15.6). The elections for 57 brought in many magistrates loyal to Cicero's

cause, especially the consul-elect P. Cornelius Lentulus Spinther; his colleague

Metellus Nepos, once Cicero's rival, would also cooperate (Att. 3.23.1,3.24.2).

In late September, the tribune-elect P. Sestius prepared a bill (Att. 3.20.3)

and travelled to Cisalpine Gaul in order to secure Caesar's approval since "he

thought that to establish the harmony of citizens [ad concordiam civium] and

to carry out his purpose it was important that Caesar should not be

unfavourable to my cause" (Sest. 71).94 Sestius obtained a cautious reply from

the general and by this time Pompey had joined the movement after he

himself had several quarrels with Clodius.95 The tribune-elect Milo also

followed a consistent poHcy for gamering support among citizens for Cicero's

restoration, something which would earn him praise later (Sest. 87). On

October 29, eight tribunes appealed for Cicero's recall but again their decree

was vetoed by Clodius (AU. 3.23.1). On December 10, the new tribunes had

taken office and Clodius became a private citizen once more. One more

93 Ali the proposais for Cicero's recall failed. A letter to Atticus (3.23) informs that each ofthe proposed restoration bills had subtle problems in its wording which contravened other existinglaws. There was the possibility for Clodius'Iaw to be repealed, as Cicero noted: "Clodius attachedsanctions to his bill to make it a/most impossible for it to be invalidated by the senate or theassembly (Att. 3.23.2, italicsare mine).

94 pertinere et ad concordiam civium putavit et ad perficiundi facu/tatem animum Caesarisa causa non abhorrere.

95 Pompey's quarrels with Clodius started as early as April and grew steadily worse until inAugust the general was threatened with murder (Att. 3.8.3, Dom. 66; Ascon. 46-47 Clark); in aletter dispatched on October 25 Cicero had received word from Atticus that Pompey had joinedthe cause for his restoration (Att. 3.23.1).

79

unsuccessful attempt to recall Cicero was made by the tribune C. Messius

(Red. Sen. 21), but only the authority of a new consul's legislation of the

following year could bring Cicero back to Rome.

With the failure of the concordia ordinum and lacking an alliance with

a senatorial oligarchy which did not seem able to stand up to the power and

influence of the three dynasts, Cicero could not escape the legislation that

forced him into a lacrimose exile. The adverse circumstances which led to his

political failure slowly forced him into the field of political theory and

philosophical writing for which he was well suited. The efforts made by the

tribunes of the people and the overwhelming cordiality of the Italians he met

on the route back to Rome made him realize the need for a different type of

concordia beyond the confines of the two major orders based in the capital.

He attempted to draft a new policy of political coexistence which he called

consensus and he coined the phrase consensus omnium bonorum.

Consumed with excitement for a more overall view of harmony Cicero

broadened and refined his outlook to include tota Italia.

80

3

Concordia and Consensus in tota !talia, 57-50

Ali my knowledge, experience, reading...goes toprove not that men have held the same unvarying"convictions tiU their death but rather that they haveadapted them to political circumstances, to thetendency of the times, and to the considerations ofconcordia. (Plane. 94)

Upon his return from exile in 57, Cicero embraced the idea of harmony

to explain the support provided to him by all Roman citizens. He experienced

a wider contact with the ltalian people who applauded him along the route

from Brindisi to Rome (AU. 4.1.4). In five post-exile speeches: Post Reditum

in Senatu (Sept. 5), Post Reditum ad Quirites (Sept. 7), De Domo Sua (Sept. 30),

Pro Sestio (Feb./Mar. 56), and De Haruspicum Responso (May 56),1 the idea of

unanimity emerges frequently from the numerous occurrences of the terms

om nis, totus, and cunctus. Concordia was still a themebut no longer equated

with the failures of concordia ordinum before his departure. The context of

concordia itself became an all encompassing consensus which would include

aU classes of Roman society throughout ltaly in a wider and more permanent

political foundationwhich would include the concept of otium cum

dignitate. Cicero ceased to refer to concordia ordinum and responded with

new political slogans such as concordia civium or consensus universorum

and bonorum.2 Concordia and consensus were now associated with Italia and

1 1have included the Pro Sestio in the group commonly considered as the quartet of post­exile speeches because of the prevailing theme of consensus within the work and becauseSestius was partly responsible for Cicero's return. According to Lenaghan, 46, Oratio DeHaruspicum Responso lOis probably the correct form of the title.'~

2 Nicolet, L'Ordre équestre, 1,642,650.

81

cIves. Harmony for the sake of a community of citizens, the civitas, became

the main concem.

As Rome evolved from a smaU city state into the capital of an

expanding empire, an ever-increasing number of leading men from the

Italian gentry became more prosperous and graduaUy infiltrated the political

stronghold of the traditional Roman aristocracy, which was slowly losing its

grip on the concentration of power at the capital. The dom i nobiles from the

Roman m unicipia throughout Italy, who had supported Cicero's election

campaigns through the cursus honorum, had already achieved common

cultural, social, and economic interests with Rome. As Roman citizens, they

had risen to the status of equites and senators, and as such could participate in

the govemmental process in the capital. Equally important, from Cicero's

point of view, was the fact that these dom i nobiles would retum to their own

municipalities where they could play a role in raUying popular support for

the civic ideals Cicero was himself promoting at the centre of the empire.

The events surrounding the oratoes recal1 justify this new direction in

Cicero's political thinking. Duovir of Capua, Pompey had a resolution carried

which declared the law de exsilio Ciceronis a privilegium and caHed on aU

Italy to aid Cicero.3 Pompey's actions supported the consul Lentulus' appeal

that aH Italy should vote for Cicero's restoration.4 For this reason, to effect

lasting political change the need for cooperative efforts from a consensus

Italiae was included in Cicero's fresh promotion of concordia.

Cicero constantly credited the outcome of ms restoration to the

cooperation among an good Roman citizens, who were united in the cause of

3 Red. Sen. 29,31; Provo Cons. 43; Pis. 80; Mil. 39.

4 Red. Sen. 24; Dom. 85; Sest. 50, 128; Planc. 78; Plut. Cic.33.4.

82

his recall. In fact, the boni, which included an Roman citizens throughout

Italy, were praised for this united effort. A rather large amount of propaganda

in the Post Reditum speeches champions this new version of harmony or

unanimity.

The Post-exile Speeches

During the ludi Apollinares in July 57, "a most striking demonstration

of the political potential inherent in theatrical occasion was witnessed at

Rome" in favour of the exiled Cicero.s Roman citizens from an classes

demonstrated unequivocal public support for the orator. At the theatrical

shows, unanimous applause was given to the senators and consul P. Lentulus

Spinther for the decrees passed in favour of Cicero's return to Rome. Clodius

had been the only official to oppose the resolutions. In fact, when he arrived

at the theatre, the audience shouted, cursed, and made rude gestures at him.

During the performance of the comedy Simulans, the actors looked straight at

Clodius in disapproval and chanted in a mocking tone: "For this, Titus, the

end of your vicious life is in front of you" (Sest. 118).6

Similarly, passages from Accius' tragedy Eurysaces, read by the great

tragic actor Aesopus, expressed the grief of the people toward Cicero: "who

helped the republic with a firm spirit...üur most distinguished friend in our

most important baUle" (Sest. 120-121).7 The audience knew these lines

referred to Cicero and applauded wildly. Their longing was great for the man

5 Richard C. Beacham. The Roman Theatre and /ts Audience (London: Routledge.1991),159.

6 huic, Tite, tua post principia atque exitus vitiosae vitae.

7 qui rem publicam certo anima adiuverit, ...summum amicum summo in bel/o.

83

"endowed with greatest genius" (Sest. 121).8 Aesopus also interpolated lines

from the Andromache of Ennius: "You allow him. to be banished, you cause

him. to be driven away, you suffer now that he has been exiled." He hinted to

the senate, equites, and Roman people that they had erred by banning Cicero

from the city (Sest,121-122).9

Cicero praised the tribune Milo for gaining complete concordia in order

to procure his return: "his purpose was simple, his method was consistent,

fully supported by general agreement and complete unanimity [plena

concordiae]" (Sest. 87),10 Sestius' concern with concordia civium (Sest. 71;

Red. Sen. 20) and Milo's search for support for plena concordia demonstrate

that Cicero had a working relationship with the tribunes of the plebs, the

popular element of Roman society, and therefore his ideas were channelled

through them to the common people. Milo not only had support from

consuls, senate, and equites all from noble backgrounds but also Italia erecta

made up of bonorum ac fortium civium (Sest. 87).

On September 5, 57, Cicero delivered his first post-exile speech, Post

Reditum in Senatu, thanking those responsible for his return, attacking his

enemies, and providing reasons for his departure. In the presence of his

fellow senators, he did not mention the concordia ordinum which was once

the foundation of hispolitical thought, but rather the gratitude toward a

concordia of citizens:

You decreed that no contrivance should be employed by any to

8 summo ingenio praeditum.

9 Cicero (Sest.1 OG) extolled the importance of the ludi as an opportunity for theexpression and observation of public opinion when he emphasized that "the opinion and will ofthe Roman people concerning public affairs can be most effectually shown in three places: at ameeting (contio), at an assembly (comitium), at a gathering for plays and gladiatorial shows."

10 simplex causa, constans ratio, plena consensionis omnium, plena concordiae.84

impede your end; that any who should impede it should be visited

with your deep resentment; that such impediment would constitute

an act of hostility to the republic, the safety of patriots, and the unity

of citizens [concordiamque civiuml, and that the man responsible

for it would be made the subject of an immediate motion to your

body. (Red. Sen. 27)11

It was the rousing unanimity of allltalian people, defined as the splendorem

Italiae totius ordinumque omnium, who we1comed him (Red. Sen. 28).

By the singulari studio atque consensu (Red. Sen. 2), the senate showed

unanimous party spirit by voting for his reca1l416-1 (Red. Sen. 26) with

Clodius alone opposed. Sogreat was its consensus de salute (Red. Sen. 5) that

the senate risked threats of violence in regard for the dignitas in patria of a

distinguished member. Stock historical examples are used to contrast the

overwhelming consensus exemplified in Cicero's recall; a tactic which

ultimately drew attention to his important place in the republic. The

nobilissimi et clarissimi consulares P. Popilius Laenas and Q. Caecilius

Metellus Numidicus depended on influential family connections who could

orny muster tribunician decrees for their retum from exile,12 and not on a

senate united with magistrates and the people of Italy as in Cicero's case. In

fact, not even Marius, sometimes worthy of Cicero's praise as a fellow­

Arpinate, was recalled by the senate during his two-year banishment (88-86)

and so neady wiped it out in the interest of his equestrian colleagues. Cicero's

11 decrevistis, ne qui ulla ratione rem impediret; qui id impedisset, vos gravitermolesteque laturos; J1Ium contra rem publicam salutemque bonorum concordiamque civiumfacturum, et ut ad vos de eo statim referretur.

12 Laenas (cos. 132) went into voluntary exile in 125, having been persecuted by thetribune C. Gracchus. He was recalled in 121 with appeals fram his family and kinsfolk. Numidicus(cos. 109) went into exile in 100 after disputes with the tribune Saturninus. His family and kinsfolk,which included the Servilii and the Scipios, procured his recall in 98.

85

social-political connections far-outweighed the desperate efforts made by his

brother Quintus and son-in-law C. Piso. For Cicero there was a unity of action

that went beyond mere family connections: the auctoritas et consensio of

senatorial magistrates, vox et convocatio of the Roman people, the motus of

cuncta Italia, imploratio of the res publica, the decreta municipiorum et

coloniarum, all restored potestas, virtus, fides of an invaluable Roman citizen

(Red. Sen. 36-39).13

Two days later, on September 7, Cicero delivered his second post-exile

speech, Post Reditum ad Quirites, at a public gathering in the forum. It was of

the same type as the one delivered in the senate but a Uttle more sentimental,

colloquial, and exaggerated. He played upon the credulity of the people by

invoking the power of the gods for the preservation of incolumitas, otium,

and concordia:

Fellow-citizens, on the day when l vowed to sacrifice myself and my

fortunes in the cause of your safety [incolumitas], tranquillity

[0 ti uml, and union [concordia], l prayed to Jupiter Best and Greatest,

and to the other immortal gods that if ever l placed considerations

of my own interest before those of your welfare, l might be visited

with eternal retribution. (Red. Quir.1)14

13 Cicero did not just miss his native land but he mourned the honours, wealth, dignity,and happiness which he enjoyed in Rome and his country villas: Art. 3.26: potius vita quam patriacarebo; Q. Fr. 1.3.6: nunc in hac tam afflicta perditaque fortuna neque me neque meos /ugerediutius possim; Att. 3.15.6: Quid de bonis? Quid de domo?; cf. Red. Quir. 3: res familiares suaquemque de/ectat: reliquae meae fortunae recuperatae plus mihi nunc vo/uptatis adferunt quamtum inco/umes adferebant. For the importance of virtus, see Mitchell, Cicero: The SeniorStatesman, 14-16, 29~33; for fides, see Victor Pôschl, "Quelqùes principes fondamentaux de lapolitique de Cicéron," Comptes rendus des séances de l'académie des inscriptions et belles­/ettres(Paris, 1987), 346-347; and Wood, 135~136.

14 Quod precatus a/ove optimo maximo ceterisque dis immortalibus sum, Quirites, eotempore, quum me fortunasque mea pro vestra inco/umitate, otio, concordiaque devovi, ut, simeas rationes umquam vestrae saluti anteposuissem, sempiternam poenam sustinerem meavo/untate susceptam.

86

Proud of his selfless ad of voluntary withdrawal from the city followed by the

legislated exile (that he was forced to accept), he had been accepted back to

Rome by "so striking an agreement of Italy, and so zealous a co-operation of

honest men, with all the other magistrates in agreement" and even by the

gods, who marked the event approvingly with bountiful harvests (Red. Quir.

18).15 In gratitude Cicero further promised to devote himself to the people of

the republic (Red. Quir. 5).

The emphasis in describing events changed according to his audience's

view of political figures. For example, the popular favourite Marius is treated

more graciously than in the previous speech to the senate two days before,

and is unashamedly described as his fellow-townsman (municeps meus) and

saviour of the republic (Red. Quir. 19). Again, comparing his exile to those of

Popilius, Numidicus, and Marius, Cicero concentrated on the unique

unanimity which assured his restoration and freed him from anxiety:

50 numerous were the champions, advocates, and promoters of my

restoration that 1 far surpassed these historical characters in prestige

and support...[Their cases] were never discussed in the senate...No

motion of the municipalities and colonies was advanced for their

, restoration, but all Italy [cuncta Italia] recalled me three times by its

decrees. (Red. Quir.9-10)16

Subsequently:

A full senate...honoured my worthiness in the most complimentary

15 tanta consensio Italia, tantum studium bonorum omnium, consentientes ceterimagistratus.

16 adiutores, auctores hortatoresque ad me restituendum ita multi fuerunt, ut longesuperiores omnes hac dignitate copiaque superarem...Numquam.. .in senatu mentie factaest. .. Nul/us in eorum reditu motus municipiorum et coloniarum factus est; at me in patriam ter suisdecretis Itafia cuncta revocavit, cf. John Nicholson, Cicero's Return from Exile: The Orations PostReditum (New York: Peter Lang Publishing,1992), 41.

87

terms possible, and recommended my cause to you [Quirites], and to

aU the towns and colonies. Thus did consuls, praetors, tribunes, the

whole senate, and ail Italy intercede for me. (Red. Quir.15-16)17

He wants the Roman people to deem him worthy of the republic which

showed by its unanimous consent its conviction that its dignitas (prestige)

could not survive without him (Red. Quir. 25). Even when Pompey appealed

for Cicero's return he declared that the people "were begged by the senate, the

Roman equites, and ail Italy" (Red. Quir. 16).18 The theme is continued and

elaborated in the two other speeches regarding his exile.

The loyal citizens believed that Cicero would restore peace to the state:

"since, they argued, aU hope of otium and concordia lay in my return,

whereas my departure had meant a daily apprehension of turmoil" (Dom.

15).19 His selfless act primarily for the bon i, who always supported him, was

supposed to restrain Clodius from further cruelty toward Roman citizens.20

Cicero insists that his return brought prosperity, stability, and harmony back

to the people: "so on my retum fertility, plenty, hope of tranquillity, security

of mind, justice, constitutional government, popular concord [concordia

populi], and senatorial authority seemed to be reinstalled with me" (Do m.

17).21 But again he humbly stresses that his recall from his "glorious" disgrace

17 frequentissimus senatus...dignitatem meam quibus potuit verbis amplissimis ornavit,sa/utem vobis, municipiis, c%niis omnibus commendavit. /ta me...consu/es, praetores, tribunip/ebis, senatus, /talia cuncta deprecata est.

18 tum me in perorando posuit vos rogari a senatu, rogari ab equitibus Romanis, rogari ab/taliacuncta; cf. Sest. 107; Pis. 34.

19 quod in mec reditu spes oti et concordiae sita videbatur, in discessu autem cotidianusseditionis timor.

20 Dom. 6,3: "1 with my whole body met the full onset of civil strife (discordiarum). n

21 sic reditu ubertas agrorum, frugum copia, spes oti, tranquillitas animorum, iudicia,/eges, concordia populi, senatus auctoritas mecum simu/ reducta videantur.

88

was only due to un um consensum (Dom. 75), from aIl the people of Italy:

senate, equites, publicans, clerks, guilds; even provinces and client kingdoms

(Dom. 72-6). In bis defence, it was no longer suitable or advantageous for him

to even mention the harmony of the orders that worked along with him

during bis consulship. Instead, he coyly reworked the phrase to emphasize

that bis support derived ex auctoritate senatu consensu bonorum omnium,

"from the authority of the senate and union of aIl good men" (Dom. 94). A

subsequent plea rings forth:

Let us sweep tbis spirit of discord from our society; let us rest from

our everlasting quarrels ...There was a time when the fabric of our

state was so firm and sound that it could survive the carelessness of

the senate and even the injustices of citizens. It cannot any

longer.. .it is by concordia alone that we can maintain the present

condition of the state. (Har. Resp. 60-61)22

The unity of the orders may have been shattered (Har. Resp. 60) but not the

unitYof aIl good men in the state.

An Appeal for a Dedication to the Goddess Concordia

Particularly interesting for the purposes of this study is also Cicero's

speech De Domo Sua, delivered on September 30, 57. This speech provides

further evidence that the orator's notion of concordia is becoming much

more encompassing than the unitYbetween senators and equites.

In the early part of tbis text, Cicero relates the amount of discordia that

existed while he was in exile and how matters such as spes otii, tranquillitas

22 Tol/atur haec e civitate discordia...Fuit quondam ita firma haec civitas et valens, utnegligentiam senatus vel etiam iniurias civium ferre passel. lam non potest...Qua re hune statum,qui nunc est, qualiscumque est, nulla alia re nisi concordia retinere possumus.

89

animorum, and concordia populi were resolved upon his retum (Dom. 17).

The goddess Concordia is always present in the speech and her temple

provides the sacred backdrop for the injustices brought upon him and the

Roman people. Since the temple was the usual meeting place for the senate

during the disputes with Clodius it also became a gathering place for

supporters of the senate and Clodius alike (Dom. 11). There is a continuous

focus on the goddess Concordia when a comparison is provided between the

moral character of C. Cassius Longinus and the audacious character of the

tribune Clodius. The former was censor in 154 who revered the goddess

Concordia and wished to dedicate a statue to her in the senate-house; the

latter was a violator of concordia and criminal to the Roman people (Dom.

130-131,136-137).

Addressed to the College of pontiffs, state clergy who were elected

officiaIs (i.e. magistrates, senators), De Domo Sua was to all outward

appearances about the consecration of a house. But its context was political

self-justification. For members of the Roman ruling classes, religion was an

integral part of the political process (Dom. 1, 31, 141). Cicero insists repeatedly

on the importance of proper legal and religious procedure (Dom. 127-129,136,

138), although he flatters the pontiffs consistently (Dom. 3, 45, 104, 105, 132,

142) while deferring to their expertise (Dom. 33). He praises the dutiful

conduct of a second-century censor in a period when the senate held control

and the people did not lack liberty (Dom. 130). By associating the goddess

Concordia with contemporary events, the theme of defender of harmony in

the state is constantly conveyed. With statements such as "he wished to

dedicate a statue of Concordia in the senate-house, and to dedicate the senate­

house itself to this goddess," was there any reason for the current College of

90

pontiffs to prevent the man before them from dedicating "both statue and

senate-house to Concordia" (D 0 m. 130) in the same way a previous censor

had?23

The reiteration of the same example of an earlier temple dedication six

times in the last few paragraphs of the argumentatio, just before the peroratio,

is not coincidental.24 Rhetorical evidence of this kind promotes the

possibility that Cicero himself was seeking approval from his fellow pontifical

magistrates possibly to dedicate a temple or statue to Concordia, which only

the senate could approve. The last nobilis to gain such approval was Opimius

in 121, when internaI order was threatened by the revoit of the tribune C.

Gracchus.25 Cicero did constantly promote the Nones of December as the

symbolic date when concordia ordinum defeated the Catilinarian conspiracy

and thus preserved the concordia of the republic (Ad Brut. 1.17.1). But there is

no documented proof of a monumentum Concordiae (similar to that of

Opimius) commissioned by the senate to go aiong with ms title of pater

23 Q. Mareius eensor [164 ]signum Coneordiae feeerat idque in publieo eolloearat. Hoesignum C. Cassius eensor[154]eum in euriam transtulisset, collegium vestrum eonsuluit num quidesse eausae videretur quin id signum euriamque Coneordiae dediearet. .. Res il/a plena iustitiae,sapientiae, dignitatis. Censor enim, penes quem maiores nostri, id quod tu sustulisti, iudieiumsenatus de dignitate esse voluerunt, Coneordiae signum volebat in euria euriamque ei deaededieare.

24 Dom. 130;131 : Praeelara voluntas atque omni laude digna; praescribere enim searbitrabatur ut sine studiis dissensionis sententiae dieerentur, si sedem ipsam ae templum publieieonsili religione Coneordiae devinxisset. 136: sed ut revertar ad ius publicum dedieandi, quod ipsipontifiees semper non solum ad suas eaerimonias sed etiam ad populi iussa adeommodaverunt,habetis in eommentariis vestris C. Cassium eensorem de signo Coneordiae dedicando adpontifieum eonlegium rettulisse, eique M. Aemilium pontificem maximum pro conlegiorespondisse, nisi eum populus Romanus nominatim praefecisset atque eius iussu faceret, nonvideri eam passe reete dedieari. 137: videtisne praetori urbano negotium datum ut euraret ne idsaerum esset, et ut, si quae essent ineisae aut inscriptae litterae, tollerentur? 0 tempora, 0 mores!tum eensorem, hominem sanctissimum, simulaerum Coneordiae dedieare pontifiees in temploinaugurato prohibuerunt.

25 Plut. C. Graech. 17; App. B. Civ. 1.26.

91

patriae and privilege of the corona civica.26 Since Nepos blocked Cicero's bid

for a valedictory speech at the end of his consular tenure, an appeal to

Concordia was also denied to him.27 Clearly an indirect appeal for approval is

at stake after his return from exile, although his stoic beliefs for a dedication

to a deified abstraction such as Concordia might have prevented him from

doing so (Nat. D. 3.61).

In Cicero's speech, a contrast exists between Concordia and Libertas.

The interests of the senate and people are represented by the goddess

Concordia, while Libertas is promoted by the rabble rouser Clodius, professed

as a liberator (Dom. 110,131).28 Maintaining a strict tradition to Concordia is

at the foundation of his discourse. The strict censor C. Cassius, in 154,

consulted the whole college of pontiffs about the dedication of a statue of

Concordia. The pontiffs had created a precedent having told Cassius that the

dedication of a statue was illegal without the expressed permission of the

Roman people. Once granted, the pontiffs ordered an accompanying

inscription chiselled out (Dom. 136).

26 ln one of his most celebrated politicalletters to Lentulus (Fam. 1.9) of December 54,Cicero provides information regarding monumenta that were erected or restored during thecourse of his consular administration. Evidence from Q. Fr. 3.1.14 and Har. Resp. 31 documentsthat he was put in charge of the restoration of the aedes Tefluris. But there is no mention of adedication or restoration of the temple of Concordia in any letter or speech; in regard to the othermonumentumShackleton Bailey (Cicero: EpistulaeAd Familiares, 1,312) notes: "The mostplausible guess is Lange's, that this [monumentum] was some building started in Cicero'sConsulship to commemmorate the suppression of the Catilinarian conspiracy. Clodius hadapparently effaced the inscription and substituted one bearing his own name."

27 A clue as to how Cicero might have introduced his appeal for a dedication to thegoddess Concordia in the speech denied to him at the end of his consular term may be gainedfrom the diatribe directed at Lucius Calpurnius Piso in which Cicero sums up his consulship asfollows: "Indeed my consulship was so conducted from its beginning to its end, that 1did nothingwithout the advice of the senate, nothing without the approval of the Roman people; upon therostra 1constantly defended the senate, in the senate house the people; 1welded the populacewith its leaders, and the equestrian order with the senate" (Pis. 7).

28 Ch. Wirszubski, Libertas as a Politicalldea at Rome during the Late Republic and EarlyPrincipate (Cambridge: University Press, 1950),103.

92

In contrast, Clodius, mocker of religion, consulted only his feckless

relative Pinarius Natta, though his act was impious and unprecedented, and

the location of his new shrine highly conspicuous (Dom. 130-132). In fact,

according to Cicero, Clodius feared the prestige of the rest of the College of

Pontiffs. How would pontiffs like P. Servilius Vatia Isauricus or M. Terentius

Varro Lucullus, pillars of the republic, have greeted Clodius' proposaI to

consecrate the house of its acknowledged saviour? The pontiff whom

Clodius actually used was unworthy of his family' s ancestral rites and

incompetent to perform the present ones. With impunity Clodius pollutes

religion by the impiety of his act (Dom. 131-137).

Within the last sections of the argumentatio, there is the culmination

of the orator's own identification with the republic. Concordia envelops what

MacKendrick likes to term Cicero's "l'état Cfest moi" syndrome, which:

Is intended to impress, as is the stress on the universal mourning at

his absence (Dom. 99) and rapture at his return (Dom. 76), and the

unanimous view (Dom. 5, 10, 14, 26, 122, 132) that he should return,

as being the preserver of the republic, which equates him with the

gods, and therefore gives him an even greater daim to the pontiffs'

favour. (The Speeches of Cicero, 159)

The unanimous view from princeps senatus,ordines omnes, Italia tota,

cunctae gentes had aH harmoniously confirmed that Cicero, who had not lost

his status as civis since in his view the laws pertaining to his exile were

passed illegaHy, was the one who preserved the urbem atque imperium

(Dom. 132). Accordingly, Cicero feels that bis return brought the gods and

people concordia (Dom. 17). He even maintains that the gods themselves had

played a role in securing ms return and expresses his gratitude throughout his

93

speech (Dom. 17, 26, 31, 39, 94). It is this sense of gratitude and duty to both

the gods and the people that justifies the interpretation that his repeated

references to the goddess Concordia - such as the story of Cassius and

Concordia (D 0 m. 136-137) - are in effect an implicit request for the permission

to dedicate a statue to Concordia, a permission which only the pontiffs and

the senate could grant. The goddess will not be spoken about with SUCh

emphasis again until the turmoil in 43.

The importance of the dedication of the senate to Concordia is also

stressed in Cicero's speech in defence of Sestius. Although Sestius' trial took

place in 56, Cicero recounts the events that happened during his consulship.

He mentions the temple of Concordia (Sest. 26) where the senate had

pronounced the death sentence for Catiline and his fellow-conspirators.

Mention of the temple recalls the memory of his consulship because this is

the very place where his idea of concordia ordinum began, - the "emergency"

coalition of senators and equites. When Sestius was tribune-elect in 58 he was

a supporter of Cicero's cause of concordia civium and appealed to Caesar:

"since he thought that to establish the harmony of citizens [ad concordiam

civium] and to carry out his purpose it was important that Caesar should not

be unfavourable to my cause" (Sest. 71).29 Cicero praises the tribune Milo for

gaining complete concordia and consensio in 57 in order to procure his return

from exile that same year: "his purpose was simple, his method was

consistent, fully supported by general agreement [piena consensionis] and

complete unanimity [pIena concordiae]" (Sest. 87),30

29 pertinere et ad concordiam civium putavit et ad perficiundi facultatem animum Caesarisa causa non abhorrere.

30 simplex causa, constans ratio, plena consensionis omnium, plena concordiae.94

Consensus Omnium Bonorum

The political turmoil of the mid-fifties, which cu1minated in 53 when

riots prevented elections and resulted in Pompey's sole consulship of 52, was

a litmus-test for Cicero's ideas. While writing his trilogy: De Oratore (55-52),

De Republica (54-52), and De Legibus (begun in 52) as practical guides for the

vir bonus he witnessed the disintegration of the triumvirate, the civil strife

between Milo and Clodius which resulted in the latter's murder, and

Pompey's quest to restore order in Rome with the backing of the optimates in

the senate. At this time, Pompey was the dominant figure in Rome. His

preeminent position rested on his own auctoritas,31 the service of many

legates and tribunes,32 and the loyalty of numerous provincial colonists and

clientes. This made him the foremost princeps (Pis. 25) of the Ciceronian age.

Cicero illustrates what he means by theterm princeps in the De

Republica. The princeps is described as a gifted leader presiding over the

magistracies, whose auctoritas moderates over hostilities to bring peace and

harmony, as Numa Pompilius had done for a1most forty years (Re p. 2.27). At

the same time, the princeps is also a magistrate and not above the law: any

citizen had the right to appeal verdicts (provocatio) against a magistrate

including the princeps in order to preserve the harmony of the state. For

Cicero, this exemplifies the libertas of the Roman people (Rep. 2.54).

31 After he conquered Spain, Africa, Asia, and defeated the pirates in the Mediterraneanhe wascalled victor omnium gentium (Pis. 16), invictissimuscivis(Pis. 34), domitororbis(ManiliusAstron. 1.793). In 55, Pompey built Rome's first permanent stone theatre, as a visible sign of hispower and wealth, and dedicated it to Venus Victrix.

32 ln 67, he had between15 and 24legates; in 57, he received control of the corn supplyfor five years with proconsular imperium and fifteen legates; in 55. he became consul with Crassusand received the Spanish provinces for five years which he governed through legates. WhileCrassus set out for Syria and Caesar's command in Gaul was extended another five years Pompeystayed in the suburbs of Rome until he was made sole consul in 52. His position as proconsul withimperium did not allow him to enter the sacred pomerium, 50 tribunes and senators representedhim at senate meetings.

95

But of course the importance of concordia civitatis is acknowledged as

the foundation of the Roman res publica: Brevi multitudo dispersa atque

vaga concordia civitas facta erat (Rep. 1.40).33 From this there was a balanced

and stable combination of the three simple, good forms of government:

kingship, aristocracy, democracy:

When a sovereign people is pervaded by a spirit of harmony and

tests every measure by the standard of their own safety and liberty,

no form of government is less subject to change or more stable.

And they insist that harmony is very easily obtainable in a republic

[in ... re publica...concordiam] where the interests of aIl are the same,

for discord arises from conflicting interests, where different

measures are advantageous to different citizens. (Rep. 1.49)34

In a more dramatic demonstration, a lesson in music-theory provides

the example as to how harmony must be achieved in the state in order for the

ideal statesman to have the proper environment to teach ms fellow citizens:

For just as in the music of harps and flutes or in the voices of

singers a certain harmony of the different tones must be preserved,

the interruption or violation of which is intolerable to trained ears,

and as the perfect agreement and harmony is produced by the

proportionate blending of unlike tones, so also is a state made

harmonious by agreement of dissimilar elements, brought about by

a fair and reasonable blending together of the upper, middle, and

lower classes, just as if they were musical tones. What the

33 "In a short time a scattering and wandering multitude had become a body of citizens bymutual agreement." .

34 eoncordi populo et omnia referente ad ineolumitatem et ad libertatem suam nihil esseinmutabilius, nihil firmius; faeillimam autem in ea re publiea esse eoncordiam, in qua idem eondueatomnibus; ex utilitatis varietatibus, euro aliis aliud expediat, nasei discordias.

96

musicians caH harmonia in song is concordia in a state [in civitate

concordia], the strongest and best bond of permanent union in any

republic; and such [concordia] can never be brought about without

the aid of justice. (Rep. 2.69)35

It is evident that Cicero appreciated a pleasant tune,36 and in this way he is

amplifying his commitment to harmony by recognizing that concordia

civitatis can only succeed with the participation of citizens from aU status­

groups, summi et infimi et medii. As he had learned after his retum from

exile, harmony could not succeed only with the participation of citizens from

the wealthy senatorial and equestrian classes. Consequently, Cicero's laws for

his ideal state point out:

If the senate is recognized as the leader of public policy, and aU the

other orders defend its decrees, and are willing to aUow the highest

order to conduct the government by its wisdom, then this

compromise, by which supreme power is granted to the people and

actual authority to the senate, will make possible the maintenance

of that balanced and harmonious constitution [teneri ille moderatus

et concors civitatis status1

so long as /lthat order shaH be free from dishonour and shaH be a model for

35 ut enim in fidibus aut tibiis atque ut in cantu ipso ac vocibus concentus est quidamtenendus ex distinctis sonis, quem inmutatum aut discrepantem aures eruditae ferre nonpossunt, isque concentus ex dissimilfimarum vocum moderatione concors tamen efficitur etcongruens, sic ex summis et infimis et mediis interiectis ordinibus ut sonis moderata ratione civitasconsensu dissimillimorum concinit; et quae harmonia a musicis dicitur in cantu, ea est in civitateconcordia, artissimum atque optimum omni in re publica vinculum incolumitatis, eaque sine iustitianullo pacto esse potest.

36 Cf. Leg. 2.38-39 where Cicero dictates a temperate view in music.

97

the rest of the citizens" (Leg. 3.28).37

After his retum from exile, the idea of consensus becomes a broader

part of the notion of concordia. It was not just a governing principle of

Cicero's politics but also fundamental in his definition of the state:

WeIl, then, a republic is the property of a people. But a people is not

any collection of human beings brought together in any sort of way,

but an assemblage of people in large numbers associated in an

agreement with respect to justice and partnership for the cornmon

good. (Rep. 1.39)38

Justice and partnership for the cornrnon good constituted unifying elernents

for an enduring res publica. SaIlust's phrase: concordia parvae res crescunt

(Iug. 10.6) defined Cicero's thought adequately enough in view of man's

nature as a social and political creature in pursuit of particular interests in

collaboration with others, not in solitude (Rep. 1.39),39 and as such: Brevi

multitudo dispersa atque vaga concordia civitas facta erat (Rep. 1.40; SaIl. Cat.

6.2).

According to Cicero, the idea of consensus was expressed within the

balanced interplay of the three basic elernents of the mixed constitution:

rnagistracy, senate, and people, and in the consensus omnium bonorum, in

which the boni do not refer only to rnernbers of the two privileged orders, but

37 si senatus dominus sit publici consilii, quodque is creverit, defendant omnes, et siordines reliqui principis ordinis consilio rem publicam gubernari velin t, possif ex temperatione iuris,cum potestas in populo, auctoritas in senatu sit, teneri il/e moderatus et concors civitatis status, ... Isordo vitio careto, ceteris specimen esto. In the sequel to the De Republica, the De Legibusprovides the laws for Cicero's ideal state; its third book is devoted to the legislative, judicial, andexecutive powers of the state.

38 Est igitur, res publica res populi, populus autem non omnis hominum coetus quoquomodo congregatus, sed coetus multitudinis iuris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatus.

39 Cf. Aristotle, Politics 1.1253A: "Man is by nature a polîtical animaL"

98

also to the populus and plebs loyal to the senate. Following Plato, Cicero's

view of civil government demands that those who govern should not make

decisions for a select group but for the benefit of aIl the governed, which

fulfills an indispensible condition of concordia within the totum corpus rei

publicae (Off. 1.85).40 Menenius Agrippa's fable of the limbs and the body

serves as an example for the metaphor totum corpus rei publicae to further

explain the totality of a harmonious state (Off. 3.22).41 Developed further, the

concept of concordia is defined in terms of musical harmony (Rep. 2.69, above).

This matches Plato's ideal of homonoia when harmonia is the musical

metaphor used to show that temperance is the virtue that unifies the

strongest, intermediate, and weakest classes of the state together in wisdom,

courage, wealth, and justice (Resp. 4.432a-b). According to Plato, harmony

govems an orderly world, state, and soul, as explained in the Gorgias: "Wise

men tell us that heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by

communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance, and justice; and that

is the reason why they calI the whole of this world by the name of order

(kosmos), not of disorder or dissoluteness" (508a). Cicero appreciated the

importance of unity among a variety of multiple elements, as he points out:

The great men of the past, having a wider mental grasp, had also a

far deeper insight than our mind'seye can achieve, when they

asserted that aIl this universe above us and below is one single

whole, and is held together by a single force and harmony of nature

[consensione naturae]. For there exists no class of things which can

40 For Cicero's allusions to Plato, see Andrew R. Dyck, A Commentaryon Cicero, DeOfficiis (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1996), 220-222.

41 Livy narrates the fable (2.32.8-12). For Greek influences regarding the fable, see Dyck,526-7; cf. Arnaldo Momiglïano, "Camillus and Concord," C/assica/ Quarter/y, 36 (1942), 117-18.

99

stand by itself, severed from the rest, or which the rest can dispense

with and yet be able to preserve their own force and everlasting

existence. (De Or. 3.19)42

In this way, consensus omnium bonorum becomes the principle by which

the republic must continue to exist: hune statum, qui nunc est, qualiseumque

est, nulla alia re nisi eoneordia retinere possumus, said Cicero around the

time of the triumviral conference at Luca in 56 (Har. Resp. 61).43

The concept of the boni which Cicero is now placing in the foreground,

was in fact important throughout the orator1s legal and senatorial career.

Cicero marked the boni, also known as optimi, as his loyal supporters and

defenders of the res publiea, pax, and 0 ti u m.44 A first definition for this group

was actually expressed in Pro Quinctio in 81.45 They were characterized as

defenders of the laws and of civil peace and concord.46 This view was notable

in the aUack on senatorial corruption of the juries in the oration against

Verres in 70 and is explicit at the end of the speeches: "the infringement of a

Roman citizen's rights, in whatsoever land, and among whatsoever people, is

a thing which affects the freedom and dignity of aIl Roman citizens/l (Verr.

42 veteres illi maius quiddam animo complexi, multo plus etiam vidisse videntur quamquantum nostrorum ingeniorum acies intueri potest, qui omnia haec, quae supra et subter, unumesse et una vi atque consensione naturae constricat esse dixerunt. NuJ/um est enim genus rerumquod aut avu/sum a ceteris per se ipsum constare aut quo cetera si careant, vim suam atqueaeternitatem conservare possint.

43 "It is by unity of will alone that we can maintain the present condition of the state, suchas it is." See Poschl, 341.

44 Each influential political figure had his own circle of bonifrom which to draw support;see W. K. Lacey, "Boni atque Improbi," Greece and Rome, 17 (1970), 10-11: G. Achard, "L'Emploide boni, boni viri, boni cives et de leurs formes superlatives dans l'action politique de Cicéron,"Les études classiques, 41 (1973), 209-210.

45 See above p. 10.

46 Lacey, 13.

100

2.5.143).47 Similarly, in Pro Caecina: "For he who thinks that the law [ius

civile] is to be despised is sundering the bonds which maintain not only

judicial procedure but the weH-being and life of the community...no

institution in our state deserves to he so carefully preserved as the law" (70).48

Dignitas, libertas, and aequitas had to be duly maintained and secured by the

rule of law (Clu. 146) and preserved by the boni.

It was not until Cicero's consulship, when, along with concordia

ordinum, the consensus bonorum was the description for the unanimous

support he had gained during his term of office. At the end of his second

agrarian speech before an assembly of the people in the forum, it was clearly

stated: "You, whose influence is based on your votes, your liberty on the laws,

your rights on the justice of the courts and equity of the magistrates, and your

property on peace, you ought to preserve your 0 t i u m by aH possible means"

(Leg. Agr.2.102).49 Only the consensus politics of the boni could ensure the

maintenance of legislation and civil harmony for the common people.

But the boni were not always a united group. It frustrated Cicero that

sorne "so-called" boni were supporters of Catiline, Clodius (Cael. 12; Har.

Resp.48), and the triumvirate (Fam. 1.9.1). In addition, Cicero maintains that

it was their ungratefullack of support that forced him into exile (Att. 2.16.2,

3.13.2; Fa m. 1.9.5). They were occasionally a cause for disappointment and

their support was not always guaranteed as Cicero had explained to Atticus

47 sed ubicumque terrarum etgentium vio/atum ius civium Romanorum sil, statuitis idpertinere ad communem causam Iibertatis et dignitatis.

48 Nam qui ius civile contemnendum putat, is vincu/a revellit non modo iudiciorum, sedetiam utilitatis vitaeque communis;...nihil esse in civitate tam diligenter quam ius civile retinendum.Cf. Rep. 1.49: quare cum /ex sit civilis societatis vincu/um, ius autem /egis aequa/e, quo iuresocietas civium teneri potest, cum par non sit condicio civium?

49 vos, qoorum gratia in suffragiis consistit, /ibertas in /egibus, ius in iudiciis et aequitatemagistratuum, res familiares in pace, omni ratione otium retinere debetis.

101

after Clodius' acquittal on the charge of impiety in the Bona Dea scandal in

June 61: "That status of the res publica...which seemed to have been secured

by the union of omnes boni, and the influence of my consulship...has slipped

from our grasp" (Alt. 1.16.6). A main feature in Cicero's thought was that the

boni were always supposed to support the rule of law and otium, they were

not to disregard the processes of law by the flagrant bribery exhibited in

Clodius' trial. In his view, no one can pose as a vir bonus and succeed since

impostors of peace and concordia are ultimately found guilty: nummarius

interpres pacis et concordiae non probabatur (Clu. 101).50 There was bitter

reaction to Caesar's consulship in 59 when those who called themselves boni

turned their allegiance toward the triumvir: "n won' t be [Caesar's] army that

will keep me under so much as the ingratitude of the honest men [boni] as

they are so-called, who have never made me the slightest return or

recompense, material or verbal" (Alt.2.16.2). Opportunistic boni such as these

revealed their disinterest to oppose Caesar's rule. Cicero acknowledges that

the law of vis is the law of nature (Sest. 91H). He opposed the politics of

coercion throughout the fifties which became most prominent in Caesar's

consulship in 59 and the second consulship of Pompey and Crassus in 55, all

the result of triumviral collusion. He further opposed the power exercised by

the tribune Clodius,51 and the continuous civil strife instigated by him and

Milo up to 52. The senate was left powerless amidst it all. Coercion, or

forceful imposition of one's will, weakened the dignitas of political office and

mocked the privilege of auctoritas inherent in that office. Any legislation

passed by magistrates who forced themselves into political office through

50 "His pose as the paid agent of peace and goodwill carried no conviction."

51 This is revealed in the post-exile speeches, especially De Domo Sua.102

bribery or intimidation should, in Cicero's view, be considered void and of no

legal effect since the voters were not given the chance to exercise their

democratic rights and their support was obtained through coercion.52 Much

attention in the De Republica has been given to the conclusion that the state

should be guided by a single individual, a rector or princeps, but the work,

taken together with the De Oratore and De Legibus, points out that "the res

publica was based on law, and that law was backed by the consensus of omnes

boni" also referred to as optimates.53 For Cicero, the optimates represent the

vast majority of citizens, aU sani, boni, and beati because they hope for otium

cum dignitate (Sest. 98), whereas the leaders of the plebs are the pauci, the

fraudulent few whose support was bought through coercion.

Thus for greater political effectiveness and philosophical reasons,

Cicero abandons the notion of concordia ordinum, with its rather limited

elitist membership, and extends his thoughts more to the aU inclusive

consensus omnium bonorum and concordia civium.54 The boni come to

refer to Cicero's supporters and defenders of the res publica, who were

encouraged to respect the laws and maintain harmony within the state. They

included senators,55 equites,56 businessmen and financiers,57 prominent

52 Lacey, 14.

53 Lacey, 15; cf. Marcus Wheeler, ·Cicero's Politicalldeal," Greece and Rome, 21 (1952),49-56. By knowing the republic and its laws the good citizen could detend the state and itsinstitutions through his oratorical abilities.

54 Cicero's tirst thoughts about a consensus omnium bonorum were expressed in SuU.29 and Flac. 99 and was later developed philosophically in Sest. 71 and 106, Mil. 87, Fat. 2, Off. 1.8.

55 Mur. 70; Att. 4.8a.2; Leg. 3.20.

56 Att. 2.16.1, 2.19.3, 9.12.3; Off. 2.27; Fam. 13.11.3; cf. Nicolet, L'Ordre équestre, 1,190.

57 Verr. 2.3.183; Mil. 94; cf. Comm. Pet. 53.

103

citizens, the newly enfranchised, and citizens from many other classes of

Roman society.58 They were not an elite group but a broad socio-political

force designated as defensores rei publicae and amantes rei publicae (Cat. 3.5;

flac. 8; Sesto 116) whose role was to re-inforce the poUties of the senate as a

governing body and respect senatorial authority.59 This is made clear in the

Pro Sestio (96, 97, 100) when the boni are re-defined as optimates. A larger

group of people at every sociallevel are optimates who respect the

constitution and love peaee (Sest. 98). Senators, equites, municipales,

negotiatores, rustici,60 and enfranehised are aIl eonsidered wealthy and sani,

and described as those who "have sought to engage in politics" (Sest. 96).61 As

pointed out in Cicero's eorrespondenee at this period a bonus vir must also be

a bonus civis.62 Bonus, and its superlative optimus, indicate the moral

quality of the honest citizen, a person of principle whether judge or

financier.63 The term is often associated with honestus,fortis, beatus,

fortunatus, and locuples to further qualify the eharacter of the good citizen.64

58 See Achard, "L'Emploi de boni," 209, n. 15.

59 J. Hellegouarc'h, Le Vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous larépublique(Paris: Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1963), 492; Achard, 210 and 212.

60 Sorne rustici were already considered wealthy inhabitants of thecountryside in Rose.Am. 20.

61 versari in re publica...studuerunt; this attitude is alsa found in Leg. Agr. 2.9 and Rep.1.52.

62Att. 7.7.5,10.1.3,10.11.4; Faro. 5.21.1.

63 Verr. 2.1.75, 2.3.183, 2.4.102.

64 Quinet. 24; Rose. Am. 24, 140; Verr. 2.1.127; Sest. 98; Gael. 14; Plane. 86; Mil. 4;Phil. 13.16, 13.23.

104

Otium cum Dignitate

Affiliated with this new outlook of civic harmony is an aim denoted as

otium cum dignitate. This tranquil standard of peaceful existence and

stability was supposed to emerge from the cooperation demonstrated "among

the citizens of Italy. As we have seen, 0 t ium itself had already been

implemented in a political context during the consulship of 63, used

synonymously with the terms pax and concordia, and frequently repeated

within catchphrases including pax and libertas (especially in the speeches De

Lege Agraria).

For the Romans, pax meant simply the absence of war brought about by

the legal existence of a treaty or pactio.65 Otium conveyed the moralquality of

this pax and was often used as itssynonym.66 Hs phiiosophicai value67 and

socio-politicai significance68 indicated the internaI tranquillity in astate free

from civil strife.69 This calmness in the state provided the necessary Ieisure

that could be enjoyed by those who appreciated a period of rest from regular

work or retirement trom duty.7o When civil disorder was highest, otium was

65 Weinstock, 267.

66 Jal, "ccPax Civilis» - ccConcordia»," 216. In many current texts otium is often transJatedas "peace" or "tranquillity" and so "Ieisure" results from this peaceful condition.

67 Pierre Boyancé, "Cum Dignitate Otium," Revue des études anciennes, 43 (1941),172-191.

68 Ch. Wirszubski, "Cicero's Cum Dignitate Otium: A Reconsideration," Journal of RomanStudies, 44 (1954), 1-13.

69 See Leg. Agr. 2.9 where pax externa is contrasted with otium domesticum.

70 Phil. 11.38: (the veterans) qui otio delectantur.

105

often expressed in direct contrast to bellum (civile).71 Otium also represented

a necessary condition for the existence of harmony, as Caesar pointed out in

his speech to the people of Hispalis in Spain: neque in otio concordiam neque

ln bello virtutem...retinere potuistis (B. Hisp.42).72

From the beginning of his consulship and for the next twenty years,

Cicero used the terms otium, pax, and concordia in various combinations,

sometimes placed opposite bellum or seditio, in order to define the true or

expected condition of the state in times of civil disturbance and civil war.73

Sallust used the same terms to describe expectations for the Sullan years.74

Caesar also hoped for otium in 49 (B. Civ. 1.5.5), having wished for quietem

Italiae, pacem provinciarum, salutem imperii (B. Civ. 3.57.4).

As a political slogan, otium cum dignitate had a relatively short run of

only four years. The two key words first occur in the two Post reditum

speeches of September 57. Subject and theme are succinctly explained and

defined in the Pro Sestio (96-99, 104) delivered in February 56. A year later, it

is treated again in the first section of the De Oratore. Finally in 54, it is cast in

the long letter of political apology written to Lentulus (Fam. 1.9.21).

In gratitude for Pompey's loyal efforts effecting his recall from exile,

71 Sali. Hist. 1.77.11: (Lepidus) metuit otium, odit bellum.Cat. 1.25, 4.17; Mur. 83; Rep.2.43; Off. 1.77; Att. 2.1.4 (June 60): ac nunc quidem otium est. This contrast is significant in thecivil war period of the forties: AU. 7.18.2 (Feb. 49), Att. 9.7.1 (April 49); Fam. 2.16.2 (May 49), Fam.5.21.2 (April 46}, Fam. 10.31.6 (April 43}, Fam. 10.32.5 (June 43); Matius is auctoroti in March 49(Att. 9.11.2) but in April 44 (AU. 14.2.3) he is inimicissimum oti; Fam.11.2.2 (April 44); Att. 14.21.2and 14.21.4 (May 44), Att. 14.22.1 (May 44), Att. 15.2.3 (May 44), Att. 15.1.5 (May 44), Att.16.168.2 (July 44), Att. 16.16C.3 (July 44); Fam. 11.20.4 (May 43).

72 "Consequently you have neVér been able to maintain harmony in peace or high moralein war."

73 Leg. Agr. 1.23-24, 2.102, 3.4; Mur. 1, 55, 78, 86; Q. Fr. 1.1.34; Red. Quir. 1, 20; Dom.15, 137; Provo Cons. 39; Pis. 73; Marcell. 27; Fat. 2; Phil. 1.17, 2.113, 5.41, 8.10-11, 10.3,11.36,13.7; Ad Brut. 1.15.4.

74 Hist. 1.48.25: pax et composita ...otium.

106

Cicero said: "he gave to me, a personal friend, all that he had given to the

whole state salutem, otium, dignitatem" (Red. Quir. 16). Salus was also

Cicero's consular slogan and he reminds his audience that:

On the day when 1 vowed to sacrifice myself and my fortunes in the

cause of your safety, tranquillity, and union [incolumitate, otio,

concordiaque] 1prayed that if ever 1had placed considerations of my

own interest before those of your safety [saluti], 1 should sustain

eternal punishment (Red. Quir. 1).75

There is a connection between the state's welfare in 63, in which he saved the

state against Catiline, and his exile in 58 for the sake of the people's welfare.

5ince Cicero identified himself with the state, his restoration coincided with

the restoration of 0 ti um to his fellow citizens.76

Public rioting instigated by Clodius' operae and disruption of civic

administration caused Cicero to turn his attention to otium. Praise was

bestowed upon those magistrates such as Lentulus and Milo (Sest. 87) who

worked within the honourable confines of organizational government

pleading their case in the senate for Cicero's return. Senatorial decrees in the

exile's favour and a proposal for his recall were sanctioned by a public vote in

the comitia centuriata. This was in contrast to the illegality of Clodius'

tribunate (ratified during Caesar's consulship a year before) which made his

bills de capite civis Romanis and de exsilio Ciceronis invalid. 5ince the first

law forced Cicero to flee Rome, the latter law was also illegal because Cicero

was denied his civil right to defend himself at his own trial, thus he was

75 eo tempore quum me tortunasque meas pro vestra incolumitate, otio concordiaquedevovi, precatus sum ut, si meas rationes umquam vestrae sa/uti anteposuissem, sempiternampoenam sustinerem mea vo/untate susceptam.

76 J. P. V. O. Balsdon, "Auctoritas, Dignitas, Otium," C/assica/ Quarter/y, n.s. 10 (1960),47; Nicholson, 43.

107

condemned in absentia.77 Use of force and violence by Cicero's opponent to

ensure an objective contrasted with Cicero's unselfish withdrawal from Rome

to prevent his supporters from resorting to violence on his behalf (Red. Sen.

6; Red. Quir.14).

ln Pro Sestio, Cicero defines 0 tium cum dignitate as the course of action

for the optimates, comprising viri boni, within the balance of a mixed

constitution. At the head of the constitution was a strong senate elected by

the people, supported by omnes boni, and served by the annually elected

magistrates entrusted with the administration of Roman affairs. The loyal

supporters had to be sani, beati, financially secure, and could come from any

social class in Italy with the ability to defend the unsurpassable dignity,

prominence, and principles of the senate in the capital and support the

organization of Roman republican government. In this way, the ideal was

promoted by a consensus Italiae, whose members were the optimates, the

entire senatus populusque Romanus, that is, aH patriotic citizens loyal to the

Roman constitution (Sest. 97f).

Cicero envisaged resistance from sorne conservative members of the

Roman nobility since they resented Italian municipal aristocrats infiltrating

the senate.78 In spite of this hostility, Cicero makes an appeal for conciliation

for the purpose of political harmony. In the interest of otium treachery from

those boni who were supposed to help in Cicero's restoration is pardoned in

return for dignitas:

1 pass over the crimes committed against me by certain people. It is

not the time to recall these injuries, even if 1 were able to avenge

77 Tatum, 156; Nicholson, 43.

78 Red. Sen. 33; Red. Quir. 21; Att. 3.9.2; Nicholson, 43-44.108

them, which 1 would nevertheless prefer to forget. My whole life

should be lifted to a different level: 1 must thank people for their

services, cherish the friendship proven by fire, wage war against

open enemies, pardon timid friends, 1 must not expose traitors, and

1 must calm the grief arising from my departure by the dignitas of

my retum. (Red. Sen. 23)

There is also an inclination to honourably overlook certain disservices,

since the preservation of universal harmony is considerably more significant

than to retaliate:

The requital 1 shall exact for their crimes shall be accommodated to

the provocation 1 have received from each class; 1 shall punish

unpatriotic citizens by a wise administration of the state;

treacherous friends by crediting nothing and suspecting everything,

the envious by a devotion to glory and virtue, and the cheating

merchants by recalling them home and holding them responsible

for their provincial administration. (Red. Qu i r. 21)

Cicero will pardon those who have injured him but will hold

accountable anyone who has disregarded the salus of the state. He is mainly

referring to A. Gabinius and L. Calpurnius Piso, proconsuls in 57, who were

busily creating trouble in their provinces.79 Civil harmony is at the core of

Cicero's ideal of otium cum dignitate. Devious and immoral behaviour,

bribery, corruption, disregard for the law, and constitutional disrespect should

not be left unpunished. Contentedly confident of his ability Cicero explains:

Fellow citizens, l set greater concem by showing my gratitude

79 Parthia's friendly relations with Rome were weakened by the imprudence of Gabinius,who as proconsul of Syria, supported a rebel brother of King Orodes II. This led to skirmishesagainst Roman armies in Armenia and Mesopotamia where Crassus was eventually defeated.Piso's administration in Macedonia was attacked byCicero in two speeches (Prov. Cons. and Pis.).

109

to you, to whom 1am so deeply indebted, than by visiting

upon my enemies requital for the cruel wrong 1 have

suffered at their hands. Indeed it is an easier matter to

avenge a wrong than to repaya kindness; there is less effort

involved to be superior to wicked men than to be at the same

level with good men [bonis] ; and furthermore, one is not so

strictly bound in duty to requite disservice as to recompense

service. (Red. Quir.22)80

On numerous occasions, it satisfies mm immensely to proc1aim a deep feeling

of thanks to ms loyal supporters, the boni, among all social orders in the

senate, forum, comitia, and aliltaly whom he summons to act as participants

in the promotion of civic harmony.81

In essence, otium exists in the absence of political strife and disorder

and dignitas is the maintenance of a public figure' s personal image and

prestige within the c1imate of otium. The De Republica (1.43) acknowledges

gradus dignitatis. As supreme council of the state, the senate's dignitas was

unsurpassable and, as such, the equestrian order's dignitas would always

follow as secondary (Dom. 74; Suet.Vesp. 9). Dignitas represented a

politician's reputation and status, his position in relation to others in the

social order or community. It was important for any political figure in the

late republic to promote and preserve his public image (Leg.Agr. 3.4; Plane.

93-94). Florus placed dignitas as the main reason for the triumvirate's

association: Pompey had to defend his dignitas against Cato's

80 and following: "Animosity can be appeased with appeals or dismissed in considerationof the republican and common welfare, or checked by the difficulty of revenge or fade with time.But it is not permissible that you be persuaded from dishonouring your benefactors...nor is anyexcuse admissable for postponing the recollection of favours" (Red. Quir. 23).

81 Nicholson, 45.

110

uncompromising political position; Crassus was firmly based with birth,

wealth, and dignitas; and together IICaesar being desirous of winning, Crassus

of increasing, and Pompey of retaining his position [dignitatem], and all alike

being eager for power, readily came to an agreement to seize the government"

(2.9-11).82 Once back in Rome Cicero proclaimed: III took the republic with me

and retumed at the height of my prestige [dignitate]" (Dom. 87)83 - a proud

expression since, as he says: III had always made dignitas my rule of life, and

thought that nothing in life was to be sought for by a man without it" (Sest.

48).84 This attitude changes when Pompey and Crassus gain the consulship of

55 by intrigue, manipulation, and potential threat of force. Cicero feU he

could no longer speak with dignitas in the senate and preserve an

independent attitude in politics (Fa m. 1.8.3). At which point he was more

than ready to retire into a life of scholarly 0 ti um (Fam. 1.8.3-4). Furthermore,

Gabinius' acquittaI in October 54 caused this complaint: lIyou can see that

there is really no republic in existence, no senate, no law-courts, no position

of authority [nullam dignitatem] held by any one of us" (Q. Fr. 3.4.1).85 50

Cicero decided to seek 0 ti u m at his Tusculan villa (Fa m. 3.4.6). For a private

individual, 0 tium referred to the enjoyment of retired life or the tranquillity

of not participating in a public life. But indulgence in voluptas due to otium

was not considered dignus (Sest. 138). Retirement from public life to engage

in scholarly pursuits was regarded honestum otium (Sail. Cat. 4). Accordingly,

82 Caesare dignitatem comparare, Crassa augere, Pompeio retinere cupientibus,omnibusque pariter potentiae cupidis de invadenda re publica facile convenit.

83 afui simul cum republica redii cum maxima dignitate.

84 cum omnia semper ad dignitatem rettulissem nec sine ea quicquam expetendum essehomini in vita putassem.

85 vides nul/am esse rempublicam, nul/um senatum, nulla iudicia, nul/am in ullo nostrumdignitatem.

111

Cicero looked forward to otium senectutis (Att. 2.3.4).86 But he did not enjoy

the violence that prevailed over his honestum otium (Fam. 5.21.2).

In public matters, otium referred both to the peace that resulted after

foreign conflicts87 and political domestic tranquillity or freedom from civil

war.88 For the sake of otium the boni must pledge to defend with dignitas:

"religious observances, the auspices, the powers of the magistrates, the

authority of the senate, the laws, ancestral custom, criminal and civil

jurisdiction, credit, our provinces, our allies, the renown of our sovereignty,

the army, the treasury" (Sest. 98).89 Ail political, social, religious, and

economic institutions must be preserved and maintained with honour for

the prosperity and welfare of the state and its constitution.90 In contrast,

when the boni capitulated to the malicious schemes of treacherous populares,

for the sake of seeking a peaceful compromise and avoiding civil unrest, then

a c1imate of otium sine dignitate was achieved (Sest. 100), and also described

as otium quod abhorreat a dignitate (Sest. 98). This was supposed to be

avoidable when the people and optimate politicians agreed with one another.

In Cicero's opinion, the people had no desire for civil war (Sest. 104) and

otium cum dignitate meant precisely astate free from civil and foreign strife

and respect for the decision made by the electorate and by the elected members

of government. In turn, the dignitas of the members of the senatorial council

86 A life away trom poUtics was never too far from his mind: quid si cessare Iibeat et in otiportum confugere?(Att. 4.6.2).

87 Sallust (Iug. 41.4) described the military victories of Rome in the second century B.e.as otium ab hostibus.

88 otium domesticum( Leg. Agr. 2.9), salus communis atque otium(Sest. 5,15).

89 religiones, auspicia, potestates magistratuum, senatus auctoritas, leges, mos maiorum,iudicia, iuris dictio, fides, provinciae, socii, imperii laus, res militaris, aerarium: ct Sesto 137; Leg. 2.8.

90 Balsdon, 47.

112

dignitatem rei publicae sustinent (Do m. 3). As supreme council, it was the

role of the senate to welcome aU citizens from aU classes according to

industria and virtus (Sest. 137).

The Pro Sestio and the four speeches pertaining to Cicero's return from

exile praise the restoration of ordedy government (D 0 m. 25) and contrast the

breakdown of government in 58 due to a) the inferior leadership of the two

consuls Piso and Gabinius who were unworthy of that office (Dom. 62, 91),

b) the novus dominatus (Dom. 68), which caused Cicero's banishment and

expeUed the res publica with him (Dom. 87), and c) the continuous faction

fighting of Milo and Sestius against Clodius. Because of his acts against Cicero

and the republic Oodius was oti et pads hostis,...cum tibi salus esse in otio

nulla posset (D 0 m. 12-13), whereas Cicero's recaU was spes oti et concordiae

(Dom. 15) since during his exile otium and the dignitas of government had

disappeared {D 0 m. 2).91

After all the talk of consensus omnzum bonorum and 0 tium cum

dignitate Cicero entered into "a strange new phase"92 when he supported

Caesar publicly. In March 56, in a private letter to Quintus, Cicero expressed

his astonishment at the "monstrous" senatorial proposaIs granted to Caesar

after the triumvir's two-year campaign in Gaul (Q. Fr. 2.4.5).93 Yet, Cicero's

public "palinode" De Provinciis Consularibus, published a few months later,

was a panegyric of Caesar's achievements in Gaul and revealed that he

91 Balsdon, 49.

92 D. R. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero(London: Duckworth, Ltd., 1971), 84.

93 The proposais granted were: 1) Caesar would not be succeeded by a consul of 55,thus foregoing the operation of the Jex Sempronia; 2) A commission of ten legates, instead of therequisite three, appointed by the senate would assist in the organization of the province; 3) Astipendium to cover the expense of four extra legions. For a treatment of these proposais, seeJ. P. V. D. Balsdon, "Roman History, 65-50 B.C.: Five Problems," Journal of Roman Studies, 52(1962), 137-139.

113

supported the senate's decision in securing the passage of the three

proposals.94 The speech was also a dedaration of his support for the

triumvirate,95 since, by now, consensus ordinum est divulsus (Har. Resp. 60).

This new alignment was all in the name of concordia. He concedes that

Caesar had never really been his enemy and so gives him a favourable vote,

if, among other things, "it is a question of sorne honourable mention, l will

have regard for concordia in the senate" (Prov. Cons.47).96 In another speech,

Cicero makes it dear that he was the one who actually tabled the three

proposals and believes political conditions should be adjusted to the

conditions of the moment: "1 desired certain ends, strove for them, did my

best: they were not secured...nor did 1 think it more advisable to be swayed by

my old disagreement with Caesar than to adapt myself to the present needs of

the republic and promote concordia" (Balb. 61).97 Similarly, a subsequent

explanation is provided when disapproval is shown against the political

inconsistency of his new alliance. In response to the daim of forfeiting

dignitas, Cicero argues that a politician must sometimes regard his own safety

after doing his best for the safety of the state (Fam. 1.7.7). A politician has the

94 For the reference to the term "palinode," see Att. 4.5.1-3; and the discussion in D. R.Shackleton Bailey, Cicero's Letters to Atticus, \1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965),app. Il, 233-234. Cicero admits he had to be cautious before allying himself with Caesar (Att.4.6.2), but declares that he was encouraged by the senate's position and 50 lent it his support(Prov. Cons. 25).

95 Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman, 184-185. Cicero's support for Caesar was al50demonstrated in the non-extant speech Pro Caesare in Senatu delivered after the conference atLuca and before the delivery of the De Provinciis Consularibus; see Jane W. Crawford, M. TulliusCicero: The Lost and Unpublished Orations(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1984),158-162.

96 si honos quidam, senatus concordiae consulam.

97 voluimus quaedam, contendimus, experti sumus: obtenta non sunLneque medissensioni meae pristinae putavi potius adsentiri quam praesentibus rei publicae temporibus etconcordiae convenire.

114

liberty to assess situations (Plane. 93) and must adapt himself to changing

circumstances if necessary for the public good. He changed his political views

orny because that was the way by which he could further the state's welfarei a

politician must always move with the times:

AlI my knowledge, experience, reading...goes to prove not that men

have held the same unvarying convictions till their death, but

rather that they have adapted them to political circumstances, to the

tendency of the times, and to the considerations of harmony [ratio

concordiae]. (Planc. 94)98

Shackleton Bailey interprets the volte-face in this way:

[Cicero] needed to assert himself somehow...and a demonstration in

favour of Caesar would gratify his now almost pathological rancour

against the purblind, supercilious aristocrats who had ''betrayed''

him in 58, grudged his self-glorified renaissance in 57, petted the

abominable Clodius, and rejected his superior statesmanship in

jealousy of himselfand pigheaded hostility to Pompey. (Cicero, 85)

The ratio concordiae with the triumviral coalition was both economic

and persona!. Territorial expansion resulted in new sources of wealth and

Cicero supported Caesar's military capabilities in stabilizing Gaul as a Roman

province for economic motives (Prov. Cons. 32). It was not possible to oppose

a general who had accomplished such extraordinary military feats for the

welfare of the republic (Pis. 81). The economic advantages of foreign

conquests could not go unnoticed. Roman citizens living in Italy already

98 Ego vero haec didici, haec vidi, haec scripta legi...non semper easdem sententias abiisdem, sed, quascumque rei publicae status, inclinatio temporum, ratio concordiae postularet,esse defensas.

115

enjoyed tax exemptions since the conquests of the eastem provinces.99 The

publicani gained enormous profits from tax-contracts. In the Gallic territories,

there were already merchants, negotiatores (middle men/ agents), and

businessmen who promoted and increased commercial interests in trade and

opened markets for local craftsmen and imported raw materials. Many

Roman citizens bought land in Gaul and exaded enormous profits.lOO Later

on, when the colonisation of Gaul had been achieved and the census and

collection of tributum was working at peak efficiency Velleius Paterculus

affirmed: "The Gallic territories pay into the treasury a sum equal to, or just a

little less than, that of Egypt, Spain, and other countries" (2.39.2). Cicero's

personal reasons mainly originate from the deal his brother Quintus made to

join Caesar's staff in return for the triumvir's support of Cicero's return from

exile.l°1

In an elaborate letter written to P. Lentulus Spinther in December 54,

Cicero was dissatisfied with the status of the boni and their abandonment of

his cause considering the lengths he went to in order to defend his policy of

concordia. Clodius is described as inimicum .. .legum, iudiciorum, otii, patriae,

bonorum omnium (Fam. 1.9.10). There is an argument that the coalition of

Pompey, Caesar, and Crassus was justified: "If 1saw that the state was in the

hands of unscrupulous and abandoned citizens, as occurred in the days of

Cinna, no dangerous threats would force me to join their cause" (F am.

99 Inhabitants in Italy were exempt from tributum and only paid vectigalia which wasrevenue derived from public lands, mines, saltworks, and general rents from state property.

100 The Pro Quinctio demonstrates this clearly.

101 See Mitchell, Cicero: The Senior Statesman, 189.

116

1.9.11).102 This statement is followed by words of praise for Pompey and

Caesar (Fam. 1.9.11-12). A reconciliation with Crassus was a difficult but

necessary undertaking.103 When Cicero attacked Gabinius in the senate for

restoring Ptolemy Auletes as king in Egypt in 55 Crassus, then consul with

Pompey, defended Gabinius and called Cicero "exile" (Cass. Dio 39.60.1). The

insult left an indelible mark: "He and 1 were by this time on quite good terms,

for in the interests of public harmony [communis concordiae causa] 1had, as it

were, expunged by a voluntary amnesty all the very serious injuries he had

done to me" (Fam. 1.9.20).104 He is apologetic for his sudden conversion into

an adherent of the triumvirs. It is evident from several passages that both

Cicero and Lentulus appreciated the loyal support from consensus omnium

bonorum; the boni were declared optimates during Cicero's consulship (Fam.

1.9.17), agreed withhis opinions from 63 to 59 (Fa m. 1.9.12), protested his

exile in 58 (Fam. 1.9.13) regardless ofbeing "scattered" and "discouraged"

(Fam. 1.9.17), regained life and motivation by Lentulus during his consulship

in 57 which resulted in Cicero's retum (Fam. 1.9.14 and 17), but at the time

this letter was written, they had ultimately deserted the cause of preserving

otium cum dignitate (Fam. 1.9.20) by their votes in the senate and the law­

courts: "You will not find the feeling of our loyal citizens what it was when

you left, Lentulus. That feeling...has now been totally neglected by the very

men most bound to respect it" (Fam. 1.9.17). Therefore, Plato's advice had

102 Ego si ab improbis etperditis eivibus rempublieam teneri viderem, sieut et Cinneistemporibus scimus,...ne perieulis quidem compulsus ullis, ad eorum eausam me adiungerem.

103 For the fitful relationship between Cicero and Crassus, see Bruce A. Marshall, "Ciceroand Sallust on Crassus and Catiline," Latomus, (1974), 804-813 and "Problems in the Career ofCrassus," Liverpool Classieal Monthly, 3 (June 1978),159-164.

104 Ego, eum mihi eum il/o magna iam gratia esset, quod eius omnesgravissimas iniuriaseommunis coneordiae causa voluntaria quadam oblivione eontriveram.

117

always beenfollowed: "assert yourself in politics as long as you can make your

opinion credible to your citizens, for it is as wrong to use violence against

your country as against one of your parents" (Fam. 1.9.18).105

The Definitive Break-up of Triumviral Concordia

After the triumvirate was renewed in 55, coins were again issued

featuring the countenance of the goddess Concordia106 symbolizing renewed

hope for harmony. However, the triumvirate ended in discord a year later

following the death of Iulia, guarantor of concord between her father Caesar

and husband Pompey.107 At this point, Cicero found it necessary to retire

briefly into a life of contemplation, foregoing a possible second term as

consul.1os

With the death of Crassus in Syria on June 1, 53, the triumvirate was

reduced to a duumvirate and the division of power between the two

remaining generals was more difficult to maintain. It was only a matter of

time before the competitive Roman spirit encouraged one to prevail over the

105 Crito51c: f3ui{EOem BÈ OVX OOLOV OVIE Il-llTÉpa OVTE 1TaTÉpa, 1TO},.lJ BÈ TOlJTWV

En nTTOV TTlV 1TaTpÎOa. Cicero deeply admired Plato and described him as "the man who was byfar the wisest and by far the most learned whom Greece has produced" (Leg. 2.39).

106 Weinstock, 261, n. 10.

107 Vell. Pat. 2.47.2: inter Cn. Pompeium et C. Caesarem concordiae pignus, lulia uxorMagni, decessit. Val. Max. 4.6.4: totius terrarum orbis... tranqui/litas tot civilium bel/orumtruculentissimo furore perturbata non esset, si Caesaris et Pompei concordia communis sanguisvinculo constricta mansisset.

108 It seems as though Cicero enjoyed a period of otium away from the law-courts and thesenate mainly due to the fact that he was appointed a legatuson Pompey's staff; it was a positionwhich would not allow him to stay within the sacred pomerium, 50 he lived close extra urbem (Aft.4.19.2). He was alsa elected to the augural college in 53. After defending Rabirius in 54 there isno record of any clients until Milo in 52. Atticus had returned to Italy in November 54 (Aff. 4.19.1)and Cicero enjoyed the presence of his friend's company until his own departure for Cilicia in 51(Aff. 5.1). During this period the De Oratore and De Republica were completed whereas the DeLegibus had just been started.

118

other. Pompey's imperium proconsulare allowed him to stay in Rome while

his legates govemed Spain under his auspicia. Although his proconsular

command did not permit him to step into the sacred pomerium of the city,

Pompey could still take part in all the governmental proceedings by making

the senate come to him and meet outside the sacred limits. He also kept ms

popularity with the masses by providing them with Rome's first permanent

stone theatre and inaugural games. But the turmoil and civil disorder at

Rome weakened rather than strengthened his reputation. In fact, a new

building and special games could not disguise the unhealthy hostilities (or

malaise) in the city. In 53 there were so many acts of violence and riots by the

opposing armed mobs led by Clodius and Milo that meetings of the comitia

could not be held for proper elections. The city was at a political standstill as

the great Pompey was incapable of controlling the situation. Mattersgot

worse when word reached Rome that Crassus andhis army were defeated in

the sands of Syria and that serious insurrections from Gallic tribes needed

Caesar's immediate attention. If the senate and the triumvirs themselves

could not manage to bring the republic back to the concordia civitatis Cicero

hoped for, then aIl was in serious jeopardy.109

The elections for 52 had to be postponed numerous times due to

persistent scuffles and conflicts. Clodius and Milo, impetuous agitators, were

among the candidates for office. Clodius sought a position as praetor, whereas

Milo wanted the consulship, both resorted to such methods of intimidation

and violence that the result was an unprecedented event in republican

109 ln a despondent tone Cicero urged Atticus: quin tu huc advolas et invisis iIlius nostraerei publicae germanae puta<mina>? ..olface dictaturam (Aff. 4.19.1). On the deterioration of thetriurnvirate, see Gruen, Last Generation, 451-454; Scullard, From the Gracchi, 118-122; andTaylor, Party Politics, 142-148.

119

history: the year 52 began without any elected representatives.110

At the beginning of the year the final conflict between the two main

agitators came to an end with the death of Clodius. But Rome's (and Milo's)

troubles were not over. The mob who admired Clodius and believed him to

be their protector and an avenger of their cause honoured their leader by

building a funeral pyre so close to the curia that the latter bumed to the

ground. The patres conscripti were naturally outraged and finaUy nominated

an interrex, who in turn entrusted Pompey to stand as sole consul (until

August) with the duty to save the republic from further discord.lll

Pompey had proved his ability to overcome the distrust or hostility of

people and nations and win their regard or favour. As sole consul, he could

be relied upon because he was: i) admired by the plebs for his munificence and

by the equites for opening the eastern provinces to their business activities,

li) respected by the senate because he was less threatening than Caesar and less

understanding with the populares, and after all, iii) the only man at the time

with unmatched authority. Prompt new legislation (leges Pompeiae)

included a severe law on v i s, under which Milo was prosecuted for Clodius'

murder. Cicero was hired as his defence lawyer but was intimidated by the

soldiers guarding the court and thus not allowed to speak.112 Milo was

convicted and went into exile at Massalia in southem Caul.

The two main agitators of Rome were finally gone and once their

followers had been dispersed the city once again experienced a period of calm

and order due mainly to Pompey's efforts. AIl in aU, Pompey's loyal devotion

110 For the violent political feud between Clodius and Milo, see Gruen, 443-444.

111 For the events in 52, see R. Seager, Pompey: A Political Biography (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1979), 142-150; and Taylor, 148-152.

112 The speech was later published as a political pamphlet.

120

to Rome gained him proper admiration from the good men of the senate.

Meanwhile Caesar's reputation was hindered by the uprisings in Gaul, which

were viewed more as events provoked by his ambitious audacity than by his

loyalty to Rome. In this way, Pompey could now be considered even greater

than his declared cognomen, having saved the republic not with an army but

within the limits of legislation and mos maiorum. In August 52, Pompey

showed respect for the Roman constitution's requirement of two consuls and

so he took Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio as his colleague for the remaining

part of the year. As a reward for his services and loyalty to the constitution,

the senate extended Pompey's proconsular imperium of Spain until

December 31, 47 and so he was allowed to remain in Rome to protect the state.

By the end of 51, after a three-year military campaign which saw the

total subjugation of Gaul, Caesar held more power than the senate wished to

recognize. His superior military ingenuity and loyal army were about to

become fatal factors in a proconsular imperium that was about to expire. He

decided to remain an extra year to stabilize the region.

According to the lex Licinia Pompeia of 55, Caesar's five year term as

proconsular governor in Gaul would end on February 28, 50 without the

possibility for renewal (Cass. Dio 29.33). Thus he would become a private

citizen once again and be brought to trial basically for refusing to cooperate

with the senate..Of course, he wanted to avoid this by possibly seeking the

consulship (Cass. Dio 40.51; Suet. lui. 28). But the elections of the consuls S.

Sulpicius Rufus and M. Claudius Marcellus in 51 and L. Aemilius Paulus and

C. Claudius Marcellus in 50 only instigated hostilities at Rome. The

optimates' attacks on Caesar began with M. Claudius Marcellus who med to

bring Caesar's term to an end by declaring that the war in Gaul was over as

121

early as of September 51 and the army should be dismissed. But Pompey and

the other consul Rufus opposed such an illegal proposal.113

The following year, 50, the optimates continued their attacks onCaesar,

who curiously gained the support of Curio. The tribune, indebted to the

general (Cass. Dio 40.61), vetoed a decision by C. Claudius Marcellus regarding

a possible successor to Caesar in Gaul. Also, two of Caesar's legions were

taken away in order to be transported to the war against the Parthians who

had just· invaded Syria. But they remained quartered at Capua. In the first

week of December, Marcellus convinced his fellow-senators that since

Caesar's behaviour was aiming toward tyranny and he was preparing an

invasion of Italy all ms commands should be revoked and given to

Pompey.114 The senate agreed and Marcellus asked Pompey to defend the

republic against Caesar.

The pact of the triumvirs in 60 was now reduced to a two-man

competition between the soldier-statesman Caesar and the great Pompey,

conqueror of three worlds. And the senate could only look on as the events

unfolded between them; considering it to be impossible for Caesar to preserve

such a vast empire with the traditional institutions already in place, and

daring Pompey not to think that he could displace the current political

organization.l15

On December 9, 50, Cicero dispatched a letter to Atticus telling him that

he was glad that his term as governor in Cîlicia had ended and he was on ms

113 For a discussion on the Jex Licinia Pompeia, see Seager, 150-152.

114 Pompey's reputation was very much intact as proven by the enthusiastic supportamong the masses after he recovered from his iIIness (Plut. Pomp. 57).

115 Seager, 153-159; Taylor, 157-161; Gruen, 483-490.

122

way back to Rome which, as Cicero says, was "all for the best" (Att. 7.3.2).116

He was eager to continue ms senatorial duties in the city and promote

concordia or sorne aspect of it: "For if matters can be brought either to a

peaceful settlement [ad concordiam) or to victory for the honest men, 1 should

in both of these two cases wish to help or at any rate not to be on the outside"

(Att.7.3.2).117 Caesar's power and influence had become too great and Cicero

would still only support Pompey as ms helmsman to protect the concordia of

the state: "the only bark for me will be the one that has Pompey at the helm.. .I

shaH urge Pompey to concordia. For my feeling is that things are in a very

perilous state indeed" (Att.7.3.5).118 But the brief meeting with Pompey did

not result in a positive outlook. Since Pompey was estranged from Caesar

war seemed inevitable: "he talked as though we were certainly in for war,

nothing to suggest a hope of agreement [ad spem concordiaef' (Att. 7.4.2).1 19

Yet Cicero did not want to believe that Caesar was impetuous enough to wage

such a war. It was the hope for concordia, that is, an agreement or

compromise between the two generals, not pax that stirred Cicero's eagerness

to save the republic from the turmoils of a bellum civile.120 To seek pax

would only imply a war was about to take place.l21

116 sed 'quid si hoc melius?' saepe opportune dici videtur, ut in hoc ipso.

117 sive enim ad concordiam res adduci potest sive ad bonorum victoriam, utriusvis rei meaut adiutorem ve/im esse aut certe non expertem. Throughout Oecember, Cicero constantlyurged and argued for concordia; see Seager, 159-160; and Rawson, 156-157.

118 mihioKaq,os unum erit quod a Pompeio gubernabitur.. .Pompeium ad concordiamhortabor; sic enim sentio, maximo in pericu/o rem esse.

119 ita mecum /ocutus est quasi non dubium bellum haberemus: nihil ad spem concordiae.

120 Att. 8.2.1,8.110.1: concordiam restituere; and 9.7B.1.

121 Jal, 210-219.

123

Against lhis unsettled atmosphere can be set the popular teachings of

the Pythagorean astrologer Publius Nigidius Figulus, a contemporary figure at

this time. His divinatory calendar, the Tonitruale, contained bis

interpretations of the annual thunderstorms and foretold concord or

conflict.l22 Lucan placed Nigidius at the end of the first book of the Bellum

Civile conjuring darkomens at the outbreak of the civil war.

122 Figulus' works were collected in the sixth c. A.D. by loannes Laurentius Lydus, Liberde Ostentis et Calendaria Graeca Omnia, ed. C. Wachsmuth (Lipsiae: Teubner, 1897); 29.112C.3:1TOÀq.lOV ~Jl<l)l}Àl.OV à1TE1.ÀEÎ; 33.128C.13: WETllP\aV 1lEe' OIlOVO\aS ôl)Àoî; 34.134A.16: ollOVOllOEl.

o ÔlllJ.OS 1TPOS E\PllVl)V; also 33.130C.10, 33.1328.27, 35.138A.13, 37.1468.16, 37.1460.26;Weinstock, 264.

124

4

Harmony in Crisis, 49-43

We met frequently, greatly seeking for a line ofpolicy that might lead to peace and concordiacivium. (Fat. 2)

Disagreement and the stress of civil war in the forties brought about a

flurry of dialogue regarding harmony and discord. Cicero's correspondence,

the replies he received, and the exchange among those he influenced after the

numerous speeches against Mark Antony emphasized the great concern for

concordia among aU Roman citizens. After the death of bis friend Pompey,

who valiantly championed the cause of the senate, and the death of bis dear

daughter Tullia, Cicero withdrew from public life for two years (46-44). In tbis

period of honestum otium he absorbed bimself in scholarly writing and

dweUed upon his humanitas.

Demetrius' Book De Concordia

While Cicero approached Rome at the beginning of January 49, the

senate agreed that Caesar would be declared a public enemy if he did not

relinquish bis proconsular command of Gaul. On the night of January 11,

Caesar had crossed the Rubicon, the river that divided Cisalpine Gaul and

Italy. A day after the civil war had begun, Cicero had these words for Tiro:

1 arrived outside Rome on January 4. Nothing could have been a

greater compliment than the way people came out to meet me. But

1 found the city inflamed with civil discord, or rather with civil war,

and when 1 wanted to heal the wounds, as 1 think 1 could have

125

done, 1 came up against the ambitions of particular individuals; for

on both sides there are people who actually want to fight. (F am.

16.11.2)1

In the weeks that followed, Cicero tried to be a mediator between

Pompeians and Caesarians, informing Tiro: /lEver since 1 reached the area of

Rome 1 have not ceased my efforts to further agreement [concordiam]by

thought, word, and deed" (Fam. 16.12.2).2 He was criticised for this middle-of­

the-road approach and was amazed that the bon i, the well-disposed men of

principle, actua1ly yearned to engage in a civil war with the improbi. But the

senate was unprepared for war and the majority (i.e. those loyal to Pompey

and the republican cause) inc1uding the consuls, C. Marcellus and L. Lentulus,

fled Rome and its environs in a panic (Fam. 16.12). To Cicero's dismay,

Pompey also left and retreated to Roman Calabria with his army. But not

before he entrusted Cicero to take over the military governorship of the

Campanian coast which he accepted, stationing himself at Formiae for a few

months. In the meantime sorne members of Caesar's faction tried to sway

Cicero from his Pompeian sympathies. But he kept his neutrality solid,

informing Atticus that he was in constant contact with Caesar and Pompey

and a1ways urging both generals to come to sorne agreement (concordia).3

The brief letters exchanged between Pompey and Cicero (at the behest of

1 Urbem accessipridie Nonas lanuar. Obviam mihi sic estproditum, ut nihil potuerit fieriornatius. Sed incidi in ipsam flammam civilis discordiae vel potius belli; cui cum cuperem mederi et,ut arbitror, possem, cupiditates certorum hominum (nam ex utraque parte sunt, qui pugnarecupiant) impedimento mihi fuerunt.

2 equidem ut veni ad urbem, non destiti omnia et sentire et dicere et facere quae adconcordiam pertinerent.

3 Att. 8.2.1: ego ad Caesarem unas Capua litteras dedi, ...brevis sed benevolentiamsignificantis, non modo sine contumelia sed etiam cum maxima laude Pompei; id enim il/asententia postulabatqua ilium ad concordiam hortabar (Formiae, February 17, 49).

126

Caesar) are not as cordial as one would expect. In February, two quite

uncomplimentary notes from Pompey urge Cicero to join him. at Luceria on

the 10th (Alt. 8.IIA), then Brundisium on the 20th (AU. 8.UC). Cicero's

extensive and very courteous answers fail to fulfill expectations. Pompey is

assured of his friend's expressed intention to join him but Cicero has reasons

for delaying and thus avoiding a meeting entirely: "It did not enter my mind

that in the state's interests you would be going overseas. 1was in high hopes

that we should succeed either in establishing concordia, which appeared to

me the most expedient course, or in honourably defending the state in Italy"

(Att.8.UD.I).4

By the end of February, great anxiety had overwhelmed Cicero as to

how to deal with the rift between Pompey and Caesar. In a state of

uneasiness, he asks Atticus for a certain book on concordia from one of his

Greek associates: "Iremember a book 1TEPÎ. •Ollovoias being brought to you by

Demetrius of Magnesia, dedicated to yourself. Would you kindly send it to

me? You see what sort of position 1 am considering" (Att.8.11.7).5 The next

day, another letter is sent to Atticus seeking ms trusted advice in this whole

situation. The feeling of uncertainty as to how Cicero can best serve his

beloved republic is monumental, and the state of affairs causes him incredible

indecision begging the question: "Is a peacemaking role required or does all

rest with the warrior?" Almost in an act of desperation, he insistently

demands, yet again, for a copy of the book on a subject he so cherished: /lAs 1

wrote to you earlier, please send me the book Demetrius of Magnesia

4 suspicionem nullam habebam te rei publicae causa mare transiturum, eramque in spemagna fore ut in Italia possemus aut concordiam constituere, qua mihi nihil uti/ius videbatur, autrem publicam summa cum dignitate defendere. See also Art. 8.11 B.

5 Memini librum tibi adferri a Demetrio Magnete ad te missum 1TEPl. 'Ollovoias. eum mihivelim mittas. vides quam causam mediter (Formiae, February 27, 49).

127

dedicated to you on concordia" (Att. 8.12.6).6 While Cicero was obviously

eager to acquire a current Greek point of view, it is not known in what way

this book was beneficial since it seems to have been retumed immediately by

mid-March, with barely a comment. An idea of the book's contents may be

gathered from earlier publications on concordia by notable Greek individuals.

The factious hostilities in and among Greek states during the fifth and

fourth centuries led to erudite admiration for homonoia among notable

Athenian orators and philosophers who reflected on how the spread of

sedition seriously threatened any attempt at Greek unity. Political agreement

between the members of communities was an ongoing struggle due to

constant intemecine wars. Thucydides describes the dangerous effects of

discord (stasis) as fanatical aggression which overpowers democratic and

oligarchie leaders alike, causing suspicion and extreme urgency in everyone

(3.82-83).

In Athens, the two factions, oligarchs and democrats, were always

struggling for power and each thought its system of govemment was superior.

to the other. Homonoia was always seen as the product of the democrats. Yet,

even the oligarchs practised homonoia, for even their rule needed agreement

and unity to exist. The overthrow of the four hundred member oligarchy in

411 restored the democrats and re-established homonoia (Thuc. 8.93).

Differences were settied among opposing members and civil disturbances

subsided temporarily unti1404. In this year, the Delian League crumbled as

Athens capitulated under Sparta's dominance and endured an oligarchy of

thirty tyrants. The onset of discord revealed the breakdown of communal

spirit and the appeal for homonoia resulted in the tyrants' brief rule which

6 quod ante ad te scripsi, Demetri Magnetis librum quem ad te misit de concordia velimmihimittas (Formiae, February 28, 49).

128

ended in 403 when democracy was once again restored.

During this period, Lysias and Andocides described the conditions that

reunited Athens under homonoia. Citizenship rights and property rights,

that were taken away by the oligarchs were important aspects of the internaI

harmony of the city and civic life. A cityprospered only if homonoia was

preserved by the generosity, wisdom, self-control and devotion of its citizens

(Dem. 20, Mys. 140). Discordexisted at Athens when the oligarchs ruled and

the opposition democrats suffered "atimia" and exile. When the exiles were

welcomed back and the disenfrartchised citizens reinstated, the struggle for

peace and freedom was achieved (Mys. 106-7).

Plato (c. 429-347) provided a speculative outlook in his philosophy

regarding homonoia. He examined how goodness, justice, friendship, and

legislation are key elements for harmony to exist in the city-state. But since

citizens always had opposing opinions on methods toward achieving

homonoia then disagreements were good so long as discussions did not

develop into factional conflicts.7

Plato disapproved of war and described it as an unnatural existence

(Resp.5.470c-d). He saw it as an illness that created an imbalance within the

harmonia of a political body,8 and described it more ,as "dissension" rather

than "sedition" (Leg.5.774d). War puts injustice in the place of justice and

friendship, factors which provide order in astate (Resp. 1.351d, 1.352a). He

writes: "There is no greater evil for astate than for one to divide it and make

it into many, and no greater good than for someone to unify it and keep it

7 Alc. 127d; Cleit. 409~, 410a-b; Resp. 1.351c-e, 4.432a-b, 8.545c-d, 8.554c-e; Pit.260b, 311a-c; Leg. 703c, 4.708d, 759b; Phdr. 237d, 256b, 263a.

8 Platoreferstothe Hippocratic notion of harmonia in Phlb. 31c; Symp. 186b-187e; Phd.85e-86d.

129

whole" (Resp. 5.462b-c). Basically, unity brings stability. Once astate is

divided into many parts there can be no possibility for a common unity or

sharing between those parts. In his opinion, a body of individuals living as

members of a community must make their services available to fellow

members of that community in order for it to grow (Prt. 322b; Resp. 2.369b-d).

In this way the society develops an inherent or natural social connection (Leg.

3.678ff; Pol. 301e-302b), kindness, and common heritage (Resp. 5.470f; Leg.

4.708c-d;Menex.237b-238b).9

Both Demosthenes (384-322) and Isocrates (436-338) independently

sought practical and strategie solutions for implementing and enforcing

homonoia in order to keep Athens strong. Threats from neighbouring states,

Persia, and a growing military influence by Philip of Macedon kept the two

orators busy in their political endeavours.

As a prosecutor, Demosthenes was concerned with internaI homonoia

and its civic importance to the public. The Athenian habits in winning rights

by free debate, honouring the constitution, agreeing with the laws, and

cancelling unjustified debts all created harmony. In this way, Athens was

more prosperous than other city-states. Since the Spartans and the Thebans

did not honour justice as the Athenians did, then their brand of homonoia

was inferior (Lept. 11-13, 108-110; Andr. 76-78).

In the Philippics, Demosthenes' struggle against the barbarian Philip of

Macedon in 341 allowed the orator to promote the strategie importance of a

homonoia among Greek states against a common enemy. The envy,

contempt, pardon, hatred, and bribery that were imported into Greece had

ruined society (3.39). Philip had become a menace causing disunion and

9 See Jal, 222.

130

corruption. The message was c1ear: homonoia could not be bought by the

invader (3.38). Demosthenes successfully convinced his fellow Athenian

citizens to persuade all Greek states to suspend their differences and battle

together in a common cause against Philip. A national state of homonoia was

created in order to preserve and protect the unique civic harmony of

individual Greek states. The Hellenic League was formed. But the Greek

alliance did not continue after a defeat at Chaeronea in 338.

Cicero's determination in the promotion of concordia is comparable to

the consistency in which the concept appears in the works of one of the Greek

orators he most admired, namely Isocrates (De Or. 2.10; Brut. 32). This

eloquent writer expressed an unwavering loyalty in his continuallonging for

goodness, justice, and homonoia. His speeches and treatises provide a c1ear

view of the political history of Greece.

After ten years of composition, Isocrates published the Panegyricus in

380. With Athens at the helm, he championed the cause of homonoia among

the Greeks for the purpose of war against the barbarian Persians. Only this

way could Athens regain its lost supremacy. Athens was so weakened after its

defeat in the war against the allies in 355 that Isocrates then advocated a

return to a more sober constitution in which the Areopagus would exercise its

ancient general supervision over aU aspects of society.IO This was actually a

plea for the restricted form of democracy of Solon. In his appeal for a just and

orderly government of the people, he daims that it is the spirit of fairness

among citizens that brings society into homonoia and advances the power of

the city (Areop. 68-70). Only with internaI homonoia strengthened can

Athens strive for leadership over Greece by persuading fellow Greeks that

10 Cf. Cicero's remark in 61 that the senate had become an Areopagus (AU. 1.14.5).131

homonoia is a noble cause for war against the Persians (Antid. 36-37). Against

the wishes of Demosthenes, Isocrates attempted to convince Philip to unite

Greece against the Persians (Phil. 16,39-41, 141). And, in a last attempt to

promote the cause of panhellenism, the Panathenaicus, written in 339

extolled the principles of homonoia. But the Greeks did not heed the calI.

Philip had his own schemes, defeated them the following year and became

undisputed master of the Greek world.ll

While Demetrius' book On Concordia was in Cicero's possession he

admitted to Atticus that his incapacity to make concrete decisions at this

crucial time was due to his intellectual superiority: "the underlying causes of

events always affect me more than the events themselves" (Att. 9.5.2: March

10). Eisewhere, he further stated: "But not to abandon myself wholly to grief, 1

have taken certain subjects as themes, as it were, which bear on politics and

the present times" (Att. 9.4.1). One of these themes is of course provided by

Demetrius' book, which leads him to ponder matters in Greek:

Ought a man to remain in his country under a tyrant? Ought he to

strive for the overthrow of a tyrant at aU costs, even if the existence

of the state is going to be endangered thereby? ..Ought he to use

reasoningrather than arms to save his country under a tyrant?

Should a statesman live quietly in retirement while his country is

ruled by a tyrant or should he take every risk for freedom' s

sake? ..These are the questions in which 1 exercise myself, debating

11 Angelo Gonella, Isocrate: Il Panegirico (Milano: Carlo Signorelli Editore, 1967), 18. Forfurther analyses on the Greek notion of homonoia, see Angelo Nucciotti, Isocrate: Panatenaico(Milano: Carlo Signorelli Editore, 1961),5-14 and Gonella, 5-20.

132

the pros and cons now in Greek now in Latin. (Att. 9.4.2)12

After relating these thoughts to the fact that the spirit and passion for peace

negotiations must be followed by proper action from the highest officiaIs in

the state, he is appalled that the consuls L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus and C.

Claudius Marcellus deserted the capital and so did nothing in this regard.

Also, Pompey's immense naval mobilisation in order to secure command of

the Mediterranean filled Cicero with anger and sadness:

This whole fleet is being collected from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre,

Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium,

Lesbos, Smyma, Miletus, Cos, in order to cut off supplies

from Italy and occupy the grain-growing provinces. (Att. 9.9.2)13

As a result, within two weeks Demetrius' book was promptly returned to

Atticus.l 4 He questioned his allegiance and a sense of betrayal toward his

country came over him: "Was l, whom sorne have called the parent and

saviour of this city, to lead troops of Getae and Armenians and Colchians

against her? Was 1 to bring famine upon my fellow citizens and devastation

upon Italy?" (Att. 9.10.3).15

Such a contemplation about the need to take arms at this moment was

12 EL fJ.EVETÉOV Èv T'Ô lraTpîô~ TlJPUVVOwÉVTjS uilTi}s. Et 1TUVTI. TP01T41 rupavv\OosKaTâÀ.lJ01.v 1TPUW,UTElJTÉOV, Kàv llÉÀ.À.U ~i\à Toiho 1TEPÎ. TWV o~wv 1] 1TO}..1.S K1.vôvvruOE\v ...EL1TE1.paTÉOV àpllyE1.V T'fi 1TUTpŒ1. TlJpaVVOWÉVU KU1.p41 KUÎ. }..OY41 llâÀ.}..ov fj 1TO}..Éllû). EL 1TO~1.nKOVTà ljOlJxâ{E\V àvuxwPlloUVTâ 1TOL Tils 1TUTPLoOS TlJpaVVOWÉVTjS il ô~à 1TUVTÔS hÉov K1.VÔlIVOl}TtjS È~El}OEp(as 1TÉp1.... In his me consultationibus exercens et disserens in utramque partem tumGraecetum Latine (Formiae, March 12,49).

130mnishaecc/assisA/exandria, Co/chis, Tyro, Sidone, Arado, Cypro, Pamphylia, Lycia,Rhodo, Chio, Byzantio, Lesbo, Smyrna, Mi/eto, Coo ad interc/udendos commeatus /taliae et adoccupandas frumentarias provincias comparatur(Formiae, March 17,49).

14Att. 9.9.2: itaque postea Demet'; librum de concordia tibi remisi (Formiae, March 17, 49).

15 me, quem non nulli conservatorem istius urbis parentemque esse dixerunt, Getarum etArrneniorum et Co/chorum copias ad eam adducere? me meis cMbus famem, vastitatem inferreltaliae?(Formiae, March 18,49).

133

instigated by the many people who addressed him as imperator in their

correspondence.l6 One such individual was L. Balbus whose citizensbip

Cicero had defended seven years earlier. Acting outwardly in a neutral way,

though he was Caesar's financial agent at Rome, he urged Cicero to carry on

with his efforts of reconciliation: "1 beg you, dear Cicero, put your thoughts

and concern upon a plan well worthy of your noble character, 1 mean bringing

back Caesar and Pompey to their former harmony [in pristinam concordiam]"

(Att.8.15A.1).l7 An attempt was also made to persuade the orator to join

Caesar's camp. Cicero's allegiance would have been valuable since whatever

course he took would probably be followed by aIl the undecided.l8

Even Caesar addressed him as im perator in a subsequent note and

beckoned him to Rome immediately to seek his counsel, influence, position,

and assistance in a further attempt to secure bis support, or at least neutrality

(Att.9.6A). Balbus continued to write on Caesar's behalf, confident that only

Cicero could contribute to the restoration of harmony between the two

generals:

From this [copy of Caesar's letter] you will see how anxious he.is to

restore good relations [concordiam reconciliare] with Pompey and

how far removed from any sort of cruelty. 1 am of course very

pleased that these are his views. As regards yourself and your

16Att. 8.11A, 8.11C, 8.15A, 9.7B, 9.13A, 10.8A, 10.8B; considering the reluctanceCicero had in taking up the position and his earlier pride as consul togatus note also the letters inwhich he appropriates the title at this time: Att. 8.11 B, 8.11 D, 9.11 D; Fam. 2.16. He was firstdesignated imperatorwhile governor of Cilicia from July 51 to July 50 and now due to his recentappointment as military governor of Campania.

17 Obsecro te, Cicero, suscipe curam et cogitationem dignissimam tuae virtutis, utCaesarem ut Pompeium...rursus in pristinam concordiam reducas (Balbus at Rome to Cicero atFormiae ca. March 1, 49).

18 Antony also tried to persuade Cicero to join Caesar's camp (Att. 10.8A).

134

sentiments of loyalty and gratitude, 1 feel exactly as you do, my dear

Cicero, that your raputation and duty do not allow of your bearing

arms against one from whom you give out that you have received

so great a service. (Att. 9.7B.1)19

It is evident that sorne sort of agreement had to be sought between the two

generals in order to avert civil war and people were counting on Cicero to calI

the meeting between Caesar and Pompey that never was. About March 20,

Cicero responded to Caesar's earlier request for advice and showed

enthusiasm for peace negotiations:

However, hope led me towards the notion that, as suits the wisdom

which you possess in so admirable and exceptional a degree, you

might be desirous in instituting negotiations for tranquillity, peace,

and civic harmony [de otio, de pace, de concordia civiumt and 1

conceivedmyself to be by nature and public image not ill fitted to

help in such an undertaking. (Att. 9.11A.1)20

But Pompey still had to be swayed to return to Rome for one meeting to take

place privately and another before the senate for the sake of civic harmony.

Cicero continues his plea but rather than merely asking, he begs and implores

Caesar:

To spare arnid Y0uf grave preoccupations some time to consider

how by your kindness 1 may meet the daims of honour, gratitude,

19 ex qua perspicere poteris quam cupiat concordiam et Pompei reconciliare et quamremotus sit ab omni crudelitate; quod eum sentire, ut debeo, valde gaudeo. de te et tua fide etpietate idem me hercule, mi Cicero, sentio quod tu, non posse tuam famam et officium sustinereut contra eum arma feras a quo tantum beneficium te accepisse praedices (Balbus to Cicero atFormiae, March 10 or 11,49); cf. Phil. 2.24.

20 spe tamen deducebar ad eam cogitationem ut te pro tua admirabili ac singulari sapientiade otio, de pace, de concordia civium agi velle arbitrarer, et ad eam rationem existimabam satisaptam esse et naturam et personam meam.

135

and loyalty in the remembrance of a single obligation. Even if my

request concemed only myself I should hope that from you I should

obtain it; but I believe it concerns both your honour and the public

welfare that l, as a friend of peace and of you both, should through

you be retained as the most appropriate agent for restoring the

harmony between you two and of our fellow-citizens [et ad vestram

et ad civium concordiam...conservari). (Att. 9.11A.3)21

Caesar was already on his way to Rome to convene a senate meeting and

arrived April 1, but not before he made a scheduled stop at Formiae to have a

private meeting with Cicero. Since Pompey had already left Italy for Greece a

week before, nothing decisive was accomplished as Cicero told Atticus (Att.

9.18; cf. Att. 9.16). Since no reconciliation was imminent Cicero did not find it

necessary to attend Caesar's senate meeting. His decision not to attend was

also due to the fact that three hundred of the nobler and more influential

Roman senators, including both consuls, were already with Pompey at

Thessalonica. Their support ensured that Pompey was representing true

senatorial interests and defending the republican cause.

At Rome, in the presence of hundreds of partisan senators (at least

enough to establish a quorum), Caesar expressed his intention for the

restoration of pax et concordia and proposed to send messengers to Pompey to

negotiate a settlement.22 Expectations were not trifling, since at sorne point

21 ut in tuis maximis curis aliquid impertias tempons huic quoque cogitationi ut tuabeneficio bonus vir, gratus, pius denique esse in maximi benefici memoria possim. Quae sitantum ad me ipsum pertinerent, sperarem me a te tamen impetraturum, sed, ut arbitror, et ad tuam'idem et ad rem publicam pertinet me etpacis et utriusque vestrum amicum, et ad vestram et adcivium concordiam per te quam accomodatissimum conservari (From Cicero at Formiae to Caesar atBrundisium, March 19 or 20, 49).

22 Casso Dio 41.15.4: Kal. TO TE>"ElJTaLOV npÉo13E\S lmÉpTE Ti}s EtPllvlls Ka\. l.mÈp Ti}sollovoias o<j>wv napaXPllp.a npas TE TOVS im<iTolJs Kal. npos TOV llop.Tfl'\\ov nEIl<j>ellVa\È:oll'YlloaTo; cf. 41.16.4.

136

during the year two of Caesar's loyal followers, Decimus Iunius Brutus and C.

Vibius Pansa, issued coins with a representation of two dasped hands, the

symbol of concordia.23 He promoted a new policy termed nova ratio vincendi

in which he pledged to treat the vanquished with extraordinary generosity

(Att.9.7C.l). But before dealing with his rival personally, Caesar proceeded to

Spain to defeat the Pompeians at llerda.24

One individual who was present at Caesar's senate meeting was

Servius Sulpicius Rufus, the moderate consul of 51 who resisted the extreme

policies of his colleague M. Marcellus.25 Famous as a jurisconsult, he was

considered a man of peace with great sanctity of character.26 ln a letter to his

friend dated April 28 Cicero explains his plan to leave Italy. He reveals that,

although their intentions were honourable, they both had made a mistake

(error fuit) in the direction of their policy. Cicero is not clear about what they

should have done besides advising for harmony and a peaceful reconciliation

between the two generals:

You assume a close connection between your cause and mine; well,

we were certainly both guilty of a like mistake, though our

sentiments were most loyal. For whatever the policy of each of us,

what we had in view was harmony [consilia ad concordiam

spectaverunt], and as there was nothing more to the advantage of

Caesar himself, we imagined that we were even earning his

23 Weinstock, 264 and n. 7.

24 Att. 10.4.8: inde ipsum cum exercitu, ubicumque Pompeius esset. eius interitumfinem illi fore.

25 Fam. 4.3.1; for a description of Caesar's senate see, Syme, ch. 6: "Caesar's NewSenators," 78-96; alsa, introduction to Att. 10.1 in G. E. Jeans, The Life and Letters of MarcusTullius Cicero (London: MacMillan and Co., 1925), 221.

26 Cicero eulogized him in the Ninth Philippic.

137

gratitude by our advocaey of peace. How greatly we have been

deceived, and to what a pass things have come, you can see for

yourself. (Fam. 4.2.3)27

At tbis point Cicero had failed in bis efforts as mediator and he was ready to

give up and retire (Att.9.10.3). He had put bis hopes in Pompey but

developed grave reservations about the general: sullaturit, "He is playing at

being Sulla" (Att.9.10.6).28 Caesar's attitude was just as menacing. Curio had

reported that Caesar had no intention of continuing the res publica: "[Caesar]

hates the senate. 'Everything shall come from me,' is bis motto" (AU.

10.4.9).29 It was also revealed that the polley of nova ratio vincendi was

implemented to render Caesar more popular but would not relax bis cruelty if

he lost the public's favour (Att. 10.4.8). Cicero was already led to belleve that:

"Both have aimed at personal domination, not the happiness and fair fame of

society" (Att. 8.11.2).30

Concordia was not a topic in Cicero's correspondence for the next four

years (that is, the duration of the civil war). After the battle of nerda, Caesar

retumed to Rome and was nominated dictator for eleven days in order to

preside over the election of consuls. He took this opportunity to once again

promote his nova ratio vincendiby carrying out three important measures: a

27 Quod existimas meam causam coniunctam esse cum tua, certe similis in utroquenostrum, cum optime sentiremus, error fuit. nam omnia utriusque consilia adconcordiamspectaverunt; qua quom ipsi Caesari nihil esset utilius, gratiam quoque nos mire ab eodefendenda pace arbitrabamur. quantum nos fefellerit et quem in Jocum res deducta sit, vides;cf. Shackleton Bailey, Cicero: Epistulae Ad Familiares, 1,492, n. 151.

28 Pompey's desire ta imitate his one-time mentor was repeated a few more times: Att.9.10.2,9.11.3, 9.14.1; cf. Q. Fr. 3.4.1 wherethere was aconcern that Pompey may have aimed attyranny.

29 odit senatum. 'a me' inquit 'omnia proficiscentur.

30 dominatio quaesita ab utroque est, non id actum, beata et honesta civitas ut esset.138

compromise on the question of debts,31 amnesty to exiles under the acts of

Pompey and Sulla,32 and full extension of citizens' rights to colonists of

Novum Comum inTranspadane Gaul and Gades in Spain.33 Cicero criticised

and distrusted these acts of c1ementia (Att. 7.11.1,10.8.2).

In the meantime, about June 11, 49, Cicero had already left for Greece

(Fam. 14.7). The decision to support Pompey's senatorial forces and the

Ilexiled" government was more in Une with his policy than to remain in Italy

under Caesar's revolutionary armies. He stayed in Thessalonica for quite a

while (with many of the emigrated senators) and by May 48 joined Pompey's

camp at Petra near Dyrrachium. He remained there until Pompey was

defeated by Caesar at the decisive battle of Pharsalus on August 9 (Fam. 9.9;

Att. 11.4). A month later, Pompey was treacherously murdered in Egypt. By

early November, Cicero returned to Italy (Att. 11.5) but did not yet venture to

Rome, while the war continued for two more years against other remaining

Pompeian forces.

Societas Humanitatis

Upon Cicero's return to Rome in 46 after his reconciliation with Caesar,

who granted him and many Pompeian sympathisers a full pardon, he

engaged himself in rhetorical writings and political science,34 and defended

few clients. However, early in 45, after the death of his daughter Tullia and

31 The substantial justice of which is proved by Rufus' letter to Cicero in early 48, Faro. 8.17.

32 Milo was the only exception to this amnesty decree.

33 The franchise of the Transpadane Gauls had probably been informally granted beforeconsidering the large number of Latins and Roman citizens living in the province; Jeans, 125.Gades was not even an Italian town, 50 marked a new departure in policy; Jeans, 243.

34 The works are: Brutus, Paradoxa Stoicorum, Orator, Partitiones Oratoriae, De OptimoGenere Oratorum.

139

the final downfall of senatorial Pompeian forces at Munda in Spain, Cicero

retreated to his country houses, mainly preferring the one at Tusculum, and

devoted himself entirely to philosophical and rhetorical study and writing.35

The proliferation of so many philosophical and rhetorical treatises within the

space of two and a hall years helped Cicero come to terms with the "downfall

of the republic" (Off 3.4; cf. fam. 9.17.1), Caesar's demagoguery and the

perplexity that followed ms murder,36 and offered consolation for his

daughter's untimely passing.37

This period of otium38 is linked to a greater devotion to humanitas

which fundamentally means "human nature" (natura humana): the qualities

and feelings of mankind. Cicero's conception of human nature can be drawn

35 Between February 45 and December 44 his output included: Academica (a technicalwork on scepticism and probability), Timaeus (a translation of Plato's dialogue), De FinibusBonorum et Ma/orum ( five books on ethical theory), Tuscu/anae Disputationes (five books onsuffering, death, and immortality), De Natura Deorum (three books on the nature of the gods), DeSenectute, De Amicitia, De Divinatione, De Fato (essays on old age, friendship, free will, and fate),Topica (an adaptation of Aristotle's Topïca),De Officiis{three books on practical duties), andcompleted De Legibus (begun in 52); other non-extant works included: Conso/atio, Hortensius,and De Gloria.

36 With Caesar as dictator and political freedom at an end these were the "times inimical tovirtue" (Orat. 35). Ten years earlier Cicero had already noted that the republic was dying (Att.2.20.3, 2.21.1, 2.25.2) and now he believed it was indeed non-existent: the senate was a husk ofits former greatness (Att. 4.19.1) and contained no honest men (Att. 7.7.5), Caesarwascommonlyknown as rex{Att. 13.37.2) and when his death introduced another civil war Cicero agreed with hisfriends that omnia perisse {Att. 14.1.1) especially since even Antony demonstrated monarchietendencies (Fam. 11.8.1); cf. MacKendrick, The Speeches of Cicero, 443.

37 He frequently expressed his sorrow in his philosophical treatises and explained hisreasonsfor starting on them: nunc vero et fortunae gravissime percussus vu/nere etadministratione rei pub/icae /iberatus d%ris medicinam a phi/osophia peta et oti ob/ectationemhanc honestissimam iudico (Acad. 1.11); haec studia renovare coepimus, ut et animus mo/estiishac potissimum re /evaretur et prodessemus cMbus nostris, qua re cumque possemus (Div. 2.7),and cf. Off. 2.2-5, Nat. D. 1.9. For the overwhelming grief expressed in many of his letters seeRobert E. Proctor, "Cicero in Grief: The Classical Soul Revealed," in Defining the Humanities{B1oomington: Indiana University Press, 1998),59-75; cf. G. O. Hutchinson, "Consolation," inCicero's Correspondence: A Literary Study{Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988),49-77.

38 Cicero always looked forward to otium in hisold age (Att. 2.3.4) but would havepreferred better circumstances than the current one; he described this period of scholarly writingas honestum otium (Fam.4.4.4, 7.33.2; Acad. 1.11; Off. 2.4, 3.3; cf. Fam.5.21.2).

140

from the De Natura Deorum (2.78-79,133,147-158) and De Legibus (1.22-25).

Humans are superior to aU animaIs. The supreme god created humans and

provided them with five divine qualities which rendered them different

from the other living creatures: a soul (animus), reason, thought, speech

(ratio, cogitatio, oratio), and virtue (virtus). In appreciation for having

received divine intelligence, faith, virtue, and concord, the Roman maiores

deified Mens, Fides, Virtus, and Concordia. Thus, humans share many

qualities with the gods and together they must live by law and justice in a

universe that formsa single world state (civitas).39

However, just as the gods provided their divine gifts to humans in

order to separate them from the animaIs, humans were not supposed to sit

idle. It was man's duty to add his own contribution to these divine gifts and

in thisway the term h umanitas was coined by Cicero to express the ideal

educational programme which he caUed studia humanitatis (Arch. 3).40

Human beings should pursue a literary and cultural education, which

inc1uded Greek literature and science, in order to become good citizens. Only

the artes quae ad humanitatem pertinent (Arch. 2) marked the more refined

and cultured human being.41 The mental cultivation befitting a human

combined an aversion for war and civil strife with intellectual culture, an

39 Leg. 1.23: ut iam universus hic mundus sit una civitas communis deorum atquehominum existimanda; Nat. D. 2.154: Est enim mundus quasi communis deorum atque hominumdomus, aut urbs utrorumque.

40 Cicero uses the term humanitas and its congeners humanus and homo over 600 times;it occurs most frequently in De Oratore, Disputationes Tusculanae, and De Officiis. Humamlas isoften linked to litterae, doctrina, studium, and sermo (for sources, see J. Hellegouarc'h, 268, n. 5).

41 Gael. 54 (in praise of L. Lucceius): Ille vir illa humanitatepraeditus, iIIis studiis, iIIisartibus atque doctrina; Q. Cie., Comm. Pet. 33: Habes tecum ex iuventute optimumque etstudiosissimum humanitatis; ln Pis. 68, philosophers are called homines eruditissimi ethumanissimi; Verr. 2.4.98: P. Scipio homo doctissimus atque humanissimus.

141

admiration for philosophie study, a noble character and learning.42

Humanitas also describes the humane conduet, kindness, and politeness

exhibited among friends as weil as the tie of affection for fellow-citizens. This

is clearly revealed in Cicero's correspondence in which the company,

conversation, and correspondance of friends is stated to be invaluable to

him.43

As the moral excellence of the vir bonus is improved through studia

humanitatis, the good citizen is bound to preserve the safety and good order

of republican government and of society (Arch. 15-16). Endowed with

humanitas, the vir bonus could lead the state toward concordia (Phil. 5.40).

Cicero himself boasts of this achievement (Arch. 14,20). Any man who

possessed the humane conduet exemplified by humanitas would not be able

to commit atrocious deeds, as he says, magna est enim vis humanitatis (Rose.

Am. 63). AU men should recognize the universal society of the human race

and 1/consider the interests of every man, whoever he may be, simply because

of the fact he is a man" (Off 3.26-27).44 Cicero refuses to grant the name of

human being to anyone who does not recognize a community based on

justice and does not share in the duties of the societas humanitatis (Rep. 2.48)

42 Modern scholars agree that Roman humanitas goes beyond the Greek definition ofpaideia. Humanitasmeans "'earned" as weil as "Iearning" and includes other values such ascharacter, virtus, mansuetudo, clementia, aequitas, iustitia "while paideia focuses mainly onculture" and 50 "humanitasdoes not have any corresponding term in Greek" (Vito R. Giustiniani,"Homo, Humanus, and the Meanings of 'Humanism, ... Journal of the History of Ideas, 46, April­June, 1985,185; with Proctor, 212, n. 14, and Wolfgang Schadewaldt, "Humanitas Romana,"Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel derneueren Forschung, pt. l, vol. IV, 1973, 43-62).

43Att.1.5.1, 1.13.1,6.1.1,13.9.1, 16.13a.1; Q.Fr.2.8.1-2, 2.13.3; Fam.3.1.2, 5.2.6,7.8.1,16.21.3.

44 ut homo homini quicumque sit, ob eam ipsam causam, quod is homo sit; cf. Oscar E.Nybakken, "Humanitas Romana," Transactions of the American Philological Association,70(1939), 408.

142

and who behaves like asavage toward his fellow men, showing disinterest in

the welfare of humanity (Off. 3.32).45 In addition, all virtues are united in

serving the societas humana,46 and even law has its foundations in the fad

that nature has inclined men to care for and be kind to their fellow men.47

Memory, modesty, intuition, fearlessness, and love of justice (the guardian of

human society) are the mental endowments which enable man to act in a

kindly fashion toward fellow citizens and preserve the societas humanitatis

(Fin. 2.113). A common and universal human duty is the proper treatment

of others:

"Honourable men treat the greatest strangers, indeed, even their

greatest enemies in this manner, for the sake of public opinion

[hominum existimationis] and the common feelings of humanity

[communis humanitatis]; so that, having never themselves done

anything unpleasant to others knowingly [scientes], nothing

disagreeable can justly befall them by way of reprisaIs" (Quinet.

51).48

Man's duty is that he must ad knowingly (scientes) and with purpose

for the sake of communis humanitatis and hominum existimationis, which

45 Rep. 2.48: Quis enim hune hominem rite dixerit, qui sibi eum suis eivibus, qui deniquecum omni hominum genere nul/a iuris communionem, nul/am humanitatis societatem velit?;·Off. 3.32: ista in figura hominis feritas et inmanitas be/vae a communi tamquam humanitatis corporesegreganda est.

46 Fin. 5.65-66: quidquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam exposuicarltate ae societate humana non abhorrebit.

47 Leg. 1.43: Atque si natura confirmatura ius non erit virtutes omnes tol/entur; ubi enimlibera/itas, ubi patriae caritas, ubi pietas. ubi aut bene merendide altero aut referendaegratiaevo/untas poterit existere? nam haec nascuntur ex eo, quia natura propensi sumus ad diligendoshomines, quod fundamentum iuris est.

48 Haec in homines alienissimos, denique inimieissimos viri boni faeiunt et hominumexistimationis et eommunis humanitatis causa, ut, eum ipsi nihl1 a/teri scientes incommodarint, nihi/ipsis iure ineommodi eadere passit.

143

will win him honour and distinction from his fellow men.49 But men's

hopes can be deceptive and lead the good man astray (De Or. 3.6). Offences

will certainly occur and must be handled justly. For this reason all men in a

good society need the virtues of kindness, clemency, and forgiveness. Thus,

humanitas conveys the qualities of clementia, mansuetudo, and benignitas,50

and includes those human refinements of sociability, politeness, good-nature,

and mature wit (comitas, facilitas, Zepos) which make up or define the

cultured man.51 This polite and refined attitude provided a balance for

Roman gravitas and severi tas and people such as Atticus and Sextus Aufidius

were praised for typifying this successful combination of severitas et gravitas

cum humanitate.52 Kindness and strict self-discipline of the homo Romanus

made him a valued citizen in the societas humanitatis.

As mentioned, one important quality linked to humanitas was

clementia. In this regard, the appeal to Caesar's humanitas was echoed in

three notable speeches of this post civil war period. Acknowledgement of the

commander's generosity for granting pardons to Pompey's supporters was

underlined in the Caesarian orations: Pro Marcello, Pro Ligario, Pro Rege

Deiotaro in which Caesar was encouraged to adhere to his program of

reconciliation through clementia and policy of nova ratio vincendi. In

general, Cicero distrusted Caesar's benevolent disposition but only endorsed it

49 Nybakken, 409.

50 Rep. 2.27; De tmp. en. Pomp. 42; Sull. 92; Mur. 65; Aff. 12.44.1, 14.13B.3, 15.1.1;Fam. 11.22.

51 Fam.10.1.4, 16.21.3; Off. 1.145; Att. 1.13.1, 16.16A.6; Mur. 66; Red. Sen. 59;Brut. 83-86: describing Laelius' exceptional qualities, Cicero designates Romans of the secondcentury B.C. as in ipso humanior, ut faciles essent in suum cuique tribuendo.

52 For Atticus, see Leg. 3.1; for Aufidius, see Fam.12.27.

144

for the sake of his clients and concordia civium.53

In the first speech, Pro Marcello, Cicero speaks highly of the dictator's

iustitia and aequitas (Marcell. 12,32). He thanked Caesar for his clementia

toward Marcellus who was allowed to return to Rome and be among his

fel10w citizens once again.54 In the next two speeches, Cicero had the difficult

task of defending his clients before Caesar who presided over the trials. The

orator was mostly concerned with gaining a favourable verdict and so

appealed to Caesar's policy of humanitas. The premise of fraternal unity in

the Pro Ligario (5, 34) stressed the pathos of separation from family members.

Harmony reigned between Ligarius stationed in Africa and his brothers at

Rome. The appeal to humanitas (Lig. 12-14,16,29) would induce a forgiving

mood and encourage Caesar to restore concordia among citizens and give his

client the right to return to his family and friends at Rome. In November 45,

Cicero represented his last client and former ally of Pompey. King Deiotarus

was charged with attempted murder against Caesar. The irony was that the

king of Asia Minor was always very loyal to Rome and cared about the

welfare of the Roman people to such a degree that he was willing to protect

them when he heard "nothing concerning your [i.e Caesar's] proposaIs,

nothing concerning your desire for pax and concordia" before the civil war

began (Deiot. 11).55 In this plea for his client's pardon, Cicero extended his

own disappointment at the failed negotiations between Caesar and the

senatorial forces led by Pompey and admitted that he yielded to the power of

53 Cf. Aff. 14.1.1 where Cicero's friend Matius is said to have commented: 'etenim si il/e(Caesar] tali ingenio exitum non reperiebat, quis nunc reperiet?' ; and Fam. 4.4.

54 The Pro Marcello was a speech of thanks, delivered in the senate with Caesar inattendance: itaque pluribus verbis egi Caesari gratias(Fam. 4.4.4).

55 nihil il/e de condicionibus tuis, nihil de studio concordiae et pacis.

145

Pompey and joined him. in a moment of danger. This misguided allegiance

was the basis for Caesar to grant clementia (Deiot. 12-13).

This speech also appealed to Caesar's contribution to concord and in

particular to the policy of nova ratio vincendi which meant a prescribed form

of clemency for the defeated (Att. 9.7C.1) and, in turn, increased his own

popularity (Att. 10.4.8). In his role as the new Romulus, Caesar was believed

to be the only one who could restore concord in Rome.56 A letter to the

general recommended the restoration of peace and concord,57 Colonies with

the name Concordia Iulia were founded.58 In an effort to promote the new

regime, a coin was issued with the head of the goddess Pax on the obverse and

clasped hands holding the caduceus, symbols of concord and peace, on the

reverse.59 In an act of appreciation toward Caesar's demonstration of

clemency and most of an restoration of peace and harmony the senate decreed

in 44 that a temple of Concordia Nova be built and a festival day be added to

the ludi Romani in his honour.6o This new temple to a goddess with a

unique epithet was never constructed. The plan was abolished when Caesar

56 Dion. Hal. Anf. Rom. 2.11.2: oihw ô~ apa /3Éf3a~os ~v il t PWlla(wv ÔIlOVO~ T'DV

àPxTlv ÈK TWV u1Tà (' p(l)IJ.U~OV KaTaOKElJaoOÉvTWV ~aI3o'Ûoa Wwv, WOTE oùoÉnoTE 0\' ailJ.ŒTOSKal. <i'ÔVOlJ ToÎl KaT' ànljÀwv ÈxwPlloav ÈVTOS É~aKoo(wv Kal. TP~(lt::oVTa ÈTwv; cf. Art. 14.1.1.

57 Sallust addressed a letter to Caesar in which the economic and political aspects ofconcordia are described for the maintenance of peace: Firmanda igitur sunt vel concordiae bonaet discordiae mala expelfenda (Ad Gaes. Sen. 1.5.3); and further, concordia is expressed withinthe context of clementia: Ea vera clementia ent, consuluisse ne merito cives patria expellerentur.retinuisse ab stultitia et falsis voluptatibus, pacem et concordiam stabiluisse (Ad Gaes. Sen. 1.6.5);on clemency as a traditional Roman virtue, see Weinstock, 234ft.

58 Nertobrigae (Pliny 3.14), Apamea (Pliny 5.149); Weinstock, 264; for lulia Concordia seeR. Stillwell, The Princeton Encyclopedia of Glassical Sites (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1976),421-422.

59 Coin of L. Aemilius Buca; Weinstock, 265.

60 Cass. Dio 44A5: VEWV TE t Ü\J.ovo(as KawllS, biS Kal. Ô\' aÙTO"Û E1.PllVOÎlVTEs,otKoôolllloa~, Kal. 1TavrlYUP~v a"ihij ÈTlloîav aYHv Eyvwoav. Weinstock,265.

146

was murdered on the Ides of March.

Cicero always beHeved that Caesar desired tyrannical power (Att. 10.1.3,

10.4.2,10.8.6) and so justified the murder as tyrannicide (Off. 2.23-28,3.19,3.32,

3.82-85). In the De Officiis, written after Caesar's death, Cicero took the

opportunity to severely criticize Caesar's ambitions (1.26,3.36,3.83), his

demagoguery (1.64, 2.21, 2.78.), his need to confiscate property (1.43, 2.29, 2.83­

84,3.36), and his harsh treatment of Rome's enemies and allies (1.35, 2.28,

3.49). This behaviour, according to Cicero, had placed Caesar outside the

boundaries of the societas humanitatis. And so he defended those citizens

who had murdered the dictator because they performed their duty for the

republic by injuring a tyrant who had harmed their country, community, and

mankind in general (Off 3.19,3.32).

In early autumn Cicero re-emerged into the political arena and

embarked on his last and most tenacious rhetorical assignment of criticising

Mark Antony in the Philippics.

Quae fuit Oratio de Concordia!

Two days after Caesar's assassination, on March 17, the senate

convened in the guarded temple of Tellus where Mark Antony delivered a

rousing speech about concordia. One of the important highlights was

acknowledging Dolabella as his consular colleague, whom he was unwilling

to accept on an earlier occasion (Phil. 1.31). Cicero was also present and

expressed his desire for concord.when recommending the compromise of an

amnesty for Caesar's assailants and confirmation of his acts (Phil. 1.23, 13.10).

The historian Cassius Dio, writing in the third century A.D., reports that at

this meeting, in which the senate was deliberating for the welfare of the

147

nation, Cicero appealed for harmony and the abandonment of personal

differences (44.33). For as was said in the De Fato, he was always committed in

seeking for ea consilia quae ad pacem et ad concordiam civium pertinerent

(2).61 After the meeting, the conspirators did pledge themselves to the

amnesty (Cass. Dio 44.34.3) and in the traditional sign of concord shook hands

with the two consuls in agreement (App. B. Civ. 2.142, 2.594).

In the first week of July, the praetor C. Antonius held the Apollinarian

Games in place of M. Brutus, the conspirator who fled Rome after Caesar's

murder. While the games took place, Cicero is proud to say that he went to

the island of Nesis, in the Bay of Naples, to meet Brutus who was thinking of

nothing but peace and of the concord of rus feIlow-citizens.62 On the 17th,

Cicero set out for Greece.

At Leucopetra, men from Rome told him a settlement was in sight

(AU. 16.7.1). AIl ex-consuls and ex-praetors were summoned by Brutus and

Cassius to attend a senate meeting on August 1. It was expected that Antony

would give up his daim to Gaul, the root of the trouble, and conciliatory

edicts from both sides had been issued. Brutus and Cassius were prepared "to

live in perpetuaI exile as long as the harmony of the republic [concordia

reipublicae] was ensured."63 But on the scheduled day of the meeting L. Piso,

Caesar's father-in-Iaw, bitterly attacked Antony. In reply, Antony issued a

violent edict repudiating Brutus and Cassius. They in turn replied that rus

letter was like rus edict "insulting, intimidating, and quite improper;" the rest1

of the letter was just as threatening:

61 "A Une of policy that might lead to peace and concord of citizens."

62 Phil. 10.8: videbam; ..nihi/ nisi de pace et concordia civium cogitantem; Att. 16.1-4.

63 Vell. Pat. 2.62.2: Quippe M. Brutus et C. Cassius... testati edictis, Iibenter se vel inperpetuo exsilio victuros, dum reipublicae constaret concordia.

148

Just reflect how intolerable it is for praetors to be unable to resign

sorne of their prerogatives in the. interest of civil harmony and

freedom [concordiae ac libertatis causa] without being threatened by

the consul with military force. As we are sure of our ground, we are

not to be intimidated by you. We do not think it right to submit to

threats, nor do we agree to do so; nor do we think it the business of

Antony to issue orders to those whoseactions have made him a

free man. If other circumstances demanded that we should engage

in a civil war, your letter would be useless; letters full of threats

carry no weight with free men. You know perfectly well that we are

not to be pushed around; we think that your threats are designed to

make our sensible approach seem to be motivated by fear. We are

anxious that you should have an important and honourable

position in a free republic; we shall not provoke you, but we value

our own freedom more highly than your friendship. Please review

very carefully what you are undertaking, and the means at your

disposal; reflect on how long Caesar reigned, not how long he lived.

We pray to the gods that whatever you plan may serve the interests

of the state and yourself; if they do not, we hope that the free

republic may be preserved, and that you yourself may suffer as little

149

as possible. Fam. 11.3.3-464

Antony intensified his hostility toward Brutus and Cassius when they tried to

encourage him and Octavian to resolve their differences. The atmosphere at

Rome and in Italy was definitely not one of reconciHation but of a significant

crisis. When Cicero discovered that the agenda for the September 1 meeting

of the senate was honours to Caesar and not public business, he decided to

send his regrets to Antony for his unwillingness to attend. In a furious mood,

Antony attacked the absent Cicero at the meeting. Another meeting was

scheduled the following day, September 2, and Cicero arrived and delivered

his First Philippic Gration to confront Antony's menaces with a bold

rhetorical attack.

Cicero first defended his return to the senate, followed by a rebuke

against Antony's temper. Then he solidly re-affirmed his position on his

continuing policy of compromise and harmony. Caesar's aets had to be

maintained since they were the only foundation on which to build a strong

state. But Antony had annulled them with new laws: "those acts indeed,

conscript fathers, though 1 never approved them, 1 have thought should be so

carefully maintained for the sake of harmony [conservanda concordiae causa]

64 lIIud vero quemadmodum ferendum sit, tute cogita: non licere praetoribus concordiaeac libertatis causa per edictum de suo iure decedere, quin consul arma minetur. Quorum fiducianihil est, quod nos terreas. Neque enim decet aut convenit nobis periculo ulli submittere animumnostrum, neque est Antonio postulandum, ut iis imperet, quorum opera liber est. Nos si aliahortarentur, ut bellum civile suscitare vellemus, litterae tuae nihil proficerent. Nulla enim minantisauctoritas apud liberos est. Sed pulchre intellegis, non posse nos quoquam impelli; et fortassis eare minaciter agis, ut iudicium nostrum metus videatur. Nos in hac sententia sumus, ut te cupiamusin libera republica magnum atque honestum esse, vocemus te ad nul/as inimicitias, sed tamenpluris nostram libertatem, quam tuam amicitiam aestimemus. Tu etiam atque etiam vide, quidsuscipias, quid sustinere possis; neque, quam diu vixerit Caesar, sed quam non diu regnarit, faccogites. Deos quaesumus, consilia tua reipublicae salutaria sint ac tibi; si minus, ut, salva atquehonesta republica, tibi quam minimum noceant, optamus (trom the praetors M. lunius Brutus andC. Cassius Longinus at Naples to the consul M. Antonius at Rome, August 4, 44); cf. W.K. Lacey,Cicero and the end of the Roman Republic (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1978),149-150;and Carcopino, 365.

150

that 1 disagreed with the annulment of ms laws" (Phil. 1.23).65 As a result,

Cicero (sarcastically?) remarked, "That was quite a speech on harmony!"(Phil.

1.31),66 thus reminding Antony and the senate of the noteworthy oration after

Caesar's murder. Both consuls were warned not to disregard the common

people, who had shown their feelings for the absent Brutus in July at the

Apollinarian games. Always ready to serve the republic, Cicero concludes the

speech by stating that he would retum to the senate 80 long as no threats are

issued against mm. And in this way, he began his own concentrated effort to

promote the subject of harmony and peace throughout these series of

speeches against Antony which lasted until the following year.

The Second Philippic is a pamphlet on Antony's audacious character

(Phil. 2.23).67 He is charged with immoiality, lack of principles, and

inconsistency in political alliances. Having dishonoured the temple of

Concordia with ms Sept. 19 speech against Cicero (Phil. 2.19), the symbol of

the orator's current policy for peace, harmony, and reconciliation (Phil. 2.24), a

simple question i8 asked: "Why do the doors of Concordia not lie open?"

(Phil. 2.112).68

On December 20,44, Cicero delivered his Third Philippic Oration before

his fellow senators. Having praised Octavian, he applauded ms legions, and

approved ms levies with a series of motions. In addition, Cicero placed total

65 quae quidem ego, patres conscripti, qui il/a numquam probavi, tamen ita conservandaconcordiae causa arbitratus sum,... infirmandas hoc tempare non putarem; cf. Phil. 13.10: salvisenim actis Caesaris, quae concordiae causa defendimus.

66 Quae fuit oratio de concordia!

67 For a description of the homo audax, see Ch. Wirszubski, .. Audaces: A Study inPolitical Phraseology," Journal of Roman Studies, 51 (1961), 12-22.

68 cur valvae Concordiae non patent?; the temple's open doors would symbolize theexistence of harmony.

151

confidence in Hirtius and Pansa, the two consuls elected for 43: "For they are

thorouglùy loyal, of excellent judgement, and agree remarkably well with one

another [singulari concordia]" (Phil. 3.2).69 Their cooperation and alliance

would be undeniable for the safety of the republic: "To the forces already at

our disposal will shortly be added consuls, wise, courageous, like-minded

[concordia], who for many months have been pondering deeply on the

freedom of the Roman people" (Phil. 3.36).70 The harmony shown by the

consuls was in sharp contrast to the irreligeous behaviour Antony showed

when he "shut armed men in the shrine of Concordia when he held a senate

meeting" back in June (Phil. 3.30).71 Cicero continued to speak for harmony

and defiance against Antony.72

The attack reaches a new height in the scathing Fourth Philippic

Oration delivered to the people in the forum on the same day as the Third

Oration. Antony is now compared to Spartacus yet not even worthy to be a

self-proclaimed Catiline. For as Cicero had defeated Catiline 80 too will the

Roman people soon hear that "Antony's villainous band of brigands has been

crushed by your [i.e. the Roman people's] unprecedented cooperation with the

senate [concordia cum senatu] and by the good fortune and valour of your

armies and generals" (Phil. 4.15).73 This is a brief but severe speech

denouncing Antony's hostile attitude to the Roman republic's governmental

69 sunt enim optimo animo, summo consilio, singulari concordia.

70 ad ea enim praesidia quae habemus iam accedent consules summa prudentia, virtute,concordia, mu/tos menses de populi Romani libertate commentati atque meditati.

71 armatos in cella Concordiae, cum senatum haberet, incluserit.

72 Cf. Lacey, 161.

73 sic Antoni nefarium latrocinium vestra cum senatu concordia tanta quanta numquamfuit, felicitate et virtute exercituum ducumque vestrorum brevi tempare oppressum audietis.

152

institutions and concordia CZVlum:

And your ancestors, Romans, had to deal with an enemy who

possessed a republic, a senate-house, a treasury, unanimity and

harmony among its citizens [consensum et concordiam civium],

sorne principle on which, if the occasion admitted, to found peace

and a treaty; this enemy of yours is attacking your republic, while he

himself has none; he is eager todestroy the senate, that is to say, the

council of the world, but he himself has no public councili he has

emptied your treasury, he has none of his own. For how can he

have harmony among citizens [concordiam civium] when he has

no citizenship? How can peace be made with a man whose cruelty

is incredible and whose good faith is nonexistent? (Phil. 4.14)74

50 on January 1, 43, Cicero attacked his current "Catiline" in the Fifth

Philippic Oration by reiterating the hostile events which happened back in

September at the temple of Concordia, a significant rhetorical moment since

the term "concordia" is emphasized four times within the short span of three

paragraphs early in the speech. It is almost as if Cicero were recreating

moments in his own consulship, when the establishment of harmony was so

much a part of his own consular year. The temple was dishonoured by

Antony's evil speech and defiled by the protection of his armed brigands and

74 Ac maioribus quidem vestris, Quirites, eum eo hoste res erat qui haberet rem publieam,euriam, aerarium, consensum etconeordiam eivium, rationemaliquam.siita res tulisset, paeis etfoederis; hic vester hostis vestram rem publieam oppugnat, ipse habet nul/am; senatum, id estorbis terrae consilium, delere gestit, ipse eonsilium publieum nul/um habet; aerarium vestrumexhausit, suum non habet. nam eoneordiam eivium qui habere potest, nul/am eum habeteivitatem? paeis vero, quae potest esse eum eo ratio, in quo est ineredibilis erudelitas, fides nul/a?

153

barbarians stationed within and outside.75 Cicero had no favourite princeps

to turn to, so he put bis trust in Marcus Aemilius Lepidus, who had a key role

in preventing a civil war between Lucius Plancus and Asinius Pollo earlier in

November 44. By proposing a vote of thanks (supplicatio) in his honour,

Cicero tried to convince those present that only Lepidus could possibly bring

further peace and harmony to the republic:

Because Marcus Lepidus by his humanity and wisdom has changed a

most dangerous and mighty civil war to peace and harmony [ad pacem

concordiamque . convertit], 1propose that a decree of the senate be

entered in the following terms: "Whereas Marcus Lepidus, Imperator,

Pontifex Maximus, has on many occasions weIl and successfully

conducted the affairs of the republic,...that the senate and Roman

people, conscious of Marcus Lepidus' great and numerous services to

the republic, place high hope of tranquillity, peace, harmony, and

liberty [otii, pads, concordiae, libertatis], in his courage, authority, and

good fortune; and that the senate and Roman people will be mindful of

bis services to the republic. (Phil. 5.40-41)76

75 Phil. 5.18: at hanc pestem agmen armatorum sequebatur; Cassius, Mustela, Tiro,gladios ostentantes, sui similis greges ducebant per forum; certum agminis locum tenebantbarbari sagittarii. Cum autem erat ventum ad aedem Concordiae, gradus complebantur, lecticaeconlocabantur, non quo iIIe scuta occulta esse vellet, sed ne familiares, si scuta ipsi ferrent,laborarent. lIIud vero taeterrimum non modo aspectu, sed etiam auditu, in cella Concordiaeconloca,,: armatos, latrones, sicarios, de templo carcerem fie,,: opertis valvis Concordiae cum intersubsellia senatus versarentur latrones, patres conscriptos sententias dicere.Phil. 5.20: Cum is dies quo me adesse iusserat, venisset, tum vero agmine quadrato in aedemConcordiae venit atque in me absentem orationem exore impurissimo evomuit.

76 quod periculosissimum civile bellum maximumque humanitate et sapientia sua M.Lepidus ad paCem concordiamque convertit, senatus consultum his verbis censeoperscribendum: Cum a M. Lepido imperatore, pontifiee maximo, saepe numero res publica etbene et feliciter gesta sit, ...senatum populumque Romanum pro maximis plurimisque in rempublicam M. Lepidi meritis magnam spem in eius virtute, auctoritate, felicitate reponere otii, pacis,concordiae, Iibertatis, eiusque in rem publicam meritorum senatum populumque Romanummemorem fore.

154

An ultimatum was drawn up on January 4 for an embassy to deliver to

Antony. lt gave the general a time-limit within which he must comply to

end the siege at Mutina and evacuate Cisalpine Gaul. In the Sixth Philippic

Oration, delivered to the people that evening, Cicero was highly critical of the

decision on the embassy. He declared passionately that the Roman people

must fight for their freedom: "Matters have been brought to the utmost crisis;

the stake is freedom. Either you must be victorious, Romans, as you surely

will he in virtue of your patriotism and united will [tanta concordia], or do

anything rather than be slaves" (Phil. 6.19):77

Two or three weeks later, the envoys returned with a series of counter­

demands from Antony. In the Seventh Philippic, Cicero stated that peace

continued to be his primary concern but protested that there could be no peace

with Antony. Peace would be disgraceful, dangerous, and impossible,

especially with someone (he had to remind his audience of this) who

supported an armed stand on the steps of the temple of Concordia (Phil. 7.21).

There was a heated debate in which the senate finally declared a state of

"tumult" and Antony was called an adversary (inimicus) rather than an

enemy (hostis). Cicero, of course, vehemently opposed this move and wanted

the senate to declare a state of war. For him everything showed that a state of

war existed and, in the Eighth Philippic, he deprecates any such leniency with

Antony. In a fit of detestation he angrily rages:

This is the fifth civil war that is being waged (and all have fallen on

our own times) and the first that has taken place, not amid quarrels

and discord of citizens, but amid the most complete unity and

77 res in extremum est adducta discrimen; de Iibertate decernitur. aut vincatis oportetQuirites, quod profecto et pietate vestra et tanta concordia consequemini, aut quidvis potiU5quam serviatis.

155

extraordinary harmony [in maXlma consenSlOne incredibilique

concordia]. AU men have the same wishes, the same thing to

defend, the same feelings. When 1 say Ilall," 1 mean aU except those

whom nobody thinks worthy to be citizens. What then is the issue

at stake in the war between us? We are defending the temples of

the immortal gods, our city walls, our homes, and the abodes of the

Roman people, the altars, the hearths, and the tombs of our

ancestors; we are defending our laws, law-courts, freedom, wives,

children, and fatherlandi on the other side Marcus Antonius is

striving and fighting to perturb and upset all these things; he wants

to regard the plunder of the republic as his reason for war; partIy to

dissipate our possessions, and partIy to disperse them among his

traitorous murderers. (Phil. 8.8)78

Still, in March, at a meeting of the senate, Cicero in the Tenth Philippic

secured the senate's approval for a military position for Brutus due to the fact

that the latter followed Cicero's policy and thought "of nothing but of peace

and of the harmony of his fellow-citizens."79 Brutus was appointed govemor

of Greece and Macedonia and commander of the armies in those countries,

protecting them from C. Antonius. Similarly, the next day, in the Eleventh

Philippic, Cicero proposed that Cassius should obtain command in Syria to

defend it against Dolabella, stating: "1 am so far from honouring these

78 hoc bellum quintum civile geritur - atque omnia in nostram aetatem inciderunt - primumnon modo non in dissensione et discordia civium sed in maxima consensione incredibiliqueoonoordia. omnes idem volunt, idem defendunt, idem sentiunt. cum omnis dico, eos excipioquos nemo civitate dignos putat. Quae est igitur in media belli causa posita? nos deorumimmortalium templa, nos muros, nos domicilia sedesque populi Romani, aras, fooos, sepulcramaiorum; nos leges, iudicia, libertatem, ooniuges, liberos, patriam defendimus: contra M. Antoniusid molitur, id pugnat ut haec omnia perturbet, evertat, praedam rei publicae causam belli putet,fortunas nostras partim dissipet partim dispertiat parricidis.

79 Phil. 10.8: hunc videbam...nihil nisi de pace et oonoordia civium cogitantem.

156

enemies of tranquillity, concordia, laws, law-courts, and liberty, that 1cannot

help but hate them as much as 1 love the republic" (Phil. 11.36).80 Apparently,

Cassius was not qualified, so the commission was given to the two consuls.

ln mid March, Cicero delivered the Thirteenth Philippic in which he

deprecated peace and rejected any form of compromise with Antony.S1 At

first glance it might be surprising that he views war, not negotiations, as a

justifiable means against those who do not recognize the peace, liberty, safety,

and harmony that Roman institutions achieve. This is not quite

contradictory when negotiations fail against an enemy of the state (i.e.

Antony). Cicero believed that a pact of peace with Antony was simply a

prescription for slavery for the Roman people. So a war against him was

necessary for the safety and harmony of the republic (Phil. 13.1-3).

Armies Unite to Secure Harmony for the Republic

At the second baUle of Mutina, Antony's forces withdrew and he was

dec1ared a public enemy. At the end of May, after Lepidus joined forces with

Antony, Plancus and D. Brutus regrouped and combined their armies at

Cularo (Grenoble) on June 9 and, with no help from Octavian, pursued their

opponents (Fam. 10.18,10.23). In a joint dispatch to the senate, people, and

plebeians of Rome, Plancus and Brutus reassured their supporters to have

confidence and hope in them "in this great crisis, since you see that both of us

generals and both of our armies too are joined in exceptional harmony

80 ego vero istos oti, concordiae, legum, iudiciorum, Iibertatis inimicos tantum abest utornem uteffici non passit quin eos tam oderim quam rem publicam diligo.

81 The subject of reconciliation (concordia) with Antony had been discussed in the senatein early March; cf. Phil. 13.36: Concordiae factam esse mentionem scribitis in senatu; and Phil.12.18.

157

[singulari concordia] tomeet every risk for your sake" (Fam. 11.13a.2).82 They

make it a point to tell Cicero that their combined armies, united in concordia,

will help save the republic. C. Furnius, a member of Plancus' staff, also

reassured Cicero "about the cordial relations [de concordia] between Plancus

and Brutus" which made the orator "most hopeful of victory" (Fam.

10.26.1).83 At the end of June, Cicero sent a letter to Plancus on behalf of the

senate: "AU our hopes rest on you and your colleague...The cordial agreement

between you [concordia vestra] clearly expressed to the senate in your joint

dispatch gave extraordinary pleasure both to the senate and the entire state

[cuncta civitasf' (Fam. 10.22.1).84 He also expressed similar words in a letter to

Brutus: "Your union with your colleague and the harmony between you

[concordiaque vestra], which is made clear in your common dispatch, is the

most gratifying thing thathas happened to the senate and people of Rome"

(Fam. 11.15.1).85 Plancus frequently asserted to Cicero his loyalty to the

republic, but the uncertain strength of his army is explained in his last letter

to Cicero on July 28, 43 (Fa m. 10.24). He eventually deserted D. Brutus and

joined forces with Antony and Lepidus in late summer.

Cicero realized Octavian's power and urged the senate to win his

support. But the senate recognized only Sextus Pompeius as the embodiment

of Pompey's old senatorial party. Eventually even Octavian joined forces

82 eum et nos et exereitus nostros, singulari eoncordia eoniunetos, ad omnia pro vobisvideatis paratos.

83 Quod de Planei et Bruti eoncordia scribis, in eo vel maximam spem pono vietoriae,(Cicero to Fumius, end of June, 43).

84 ln te et in col/ega omnis spes est, ...Concordia vestra, quae senatui deelarata litterisvestris est, mirifiee et senatus et euneta civitas delectata est.

85 Coniunctio tua cum col/ega concordiaque vestra, quae litterls communibus declarataest, senatui populoque Romano gratissima aecidit.

158

with Antony and dispensed with the senate's help. Cicero's last extant letter

to bis dear friend M. Brutus, dated July 27, 43, appeals for him. "to come to the

rescue of the republic" (Ad. Brut. 26.1).86 He is disgusted that the victorious

armies of Mutina refused to take risks and pursue a fleeing enemy and that

Lepidus joined forces with Antony and declared war on the state. On behalf

of everyone, "with such unanimity among senate and people" (Ad. Brut.

26.2),87 Brutus is urged to return to Italy.

Shortly thereafter Octavian crossed the Rubicon and marched on

Rome, signalling the final blow to Cicero's policy. After being declared

consul, he united with Antony and Lepidus to form a second triumviral

commission with autocratic powers for five years to reorganize the state. The

triumvirs proscribed their opponents and confiscated lands. Three hundred

senators and two thousand equites were killed, and among them was Cicero.

86 ut rei publicae subvenires.

87 in tanto senatus populique consensu.

159

Conclusion

The aim of this thesis has been to explain the meaning of concordia by

surveying the historical context in which it emerged. 1 chose to concentrate

on the period 63-43 B.C. because it is in this crucial period that the concept

achieves its most articulate and influential defence by the Roman orator,

statesman, and philosopher, Marcus Tullius Cicero. My intention was not

merely to review the important writings and speeches of Cicero but to situate

them in the practical struggles in which he was implicated and thus to trace

the different uses of Cicero's political watchword. This done, a clearer picture

has emerged than is available in the current literature about how Cicero

promoted, defended, and skillfully redefined the concept of concordia in order

to safeguard his beloved republic.

Placing the concept of concordia in its historical context, that is to say,

reviewing the important political events of the period 63-43 with concordia as

the subject, shows that there are three recognisable meanings of the concept:

the longstanding conventional Roman republican idea of concordia as unity,

friendship, and agreement, which secured the harmony of the republic; the

innovative idea of concordia as a political harmony or coalition of the two

orders of the senate and equites - what Cicero called concordia ordinum; and

the idea of concordia as a consensus omnium bonorum - what Cicero called

concordia civium or concordia civitatis.

These three varieties of concordiashare the notion of being the

fundamental principles of a stable republic. Since the early Roman republic,

the avoidance of internaI divisions and discord was regarded as an

160

indispensable condition of greatness, prosperity, and liberty.

Yet, these varieties of concordia have important differences, and the

differences can be seen when the question becomes how to preserve concord.

As a result of the many struggles of his public and private life, Cicero provides

three answers to this question, of which two are uniquely his contribution.

One answer, foUowing the conventional meaning of concordia, is thata

republic must eliminate hatred and build friendship and agreement among

its citizens. The second, which Cicero is the first to suggest, is a concept he

caUs concordia ordinum: the best way to secure concord in a republic is to

maintain a balance between its two main orders, namely the senate and the

equites. The third is also new: the key to preserving concord must be to

preserve the common good in a consensus of aU good people.

What 1 have argued is that the meaning shifted in direct response to

the political need of the day. Therefore the best way to understand the

different meanings is to grasp the underlying context in which these concepts

were used. When the conventional idea of concordia was not sufficient to

achieve his aims, Cicero coined the term conèordia ordinum. When

concordia ordinum failed, Cicero tried to reach a wider audience, and in the

fifties appealed for concordia civium or concordia civitatis, used

interchangeably with and further defined as consensus omnium bonorum.

But the political turmoil in the forties again outflanked Cicero's best

intentions, and he was forced to retire temporarily from politics and declare

that the republic was finished. He devoted himself to philosophy and

developed a more universal notion of collective rule which he termed

societas humanitatis. In his lifelong quest to promote harmony, Cicero's

legacy was to introduce these phrases into Roman and European vocabulary.

161

It has been my contention in this dissertation that despite the central

importance of concordia to Cicero's political career, the existing literature has

not done justice to the concept. Indeed, the very diversity of its meaning has

been overlooked.l In spite of the fallure of eoneordia ordinum and his

inability to put into practice the eoneordia civium/civitatis, Cicero never

abandoned his belief that both connotations of eoneordia should be the

founding principles of the Roman res publiea. Nor does he ever disavow the

belief that the traditional meaning of eoneordia as friendship should be the

foundation of a stable republic. This meaning of eoneordia was well articulated

in the treatise De Amicitia, written in 44, a year before his death. 50, he writes:

If it is not understood how great the force of friendship and eoneordia

is, this may be gathered from quarrels and disputes. For what house

is so firm, or what state so well established as not to be able to be

utterly overthrown by hatred or strife? Whence we may form an

estimate as to how much good there is in friendship. (Amie. 23)2

1 For example, the failure to recognize the important differences even appears in a recentcommentary by the Cambridge political scientist Quentin Skinner, who conflates the threemeanings employed by Cicero ("Machiavelli's Discorsi and the pre-humanist origins of republicanideas," 130-134). He states that according to Cicero "the surest way 'to introduce sedition anddiscord into a city isto look after the interests of only one part of the citizens, while negating the rest(Off. 1.85);'" and continues "it follows that the key to preserving civic concord must be to giveprecedence to the ideal of the common good over any selfish or factional interests." What Skinnerdescribes is in fact not concordia ordinum but concordia civium, which gives precedence to thecommon good. When he writes about Machiavelli's contribution to western political thought, he errsagain. One feature of Machiavelli's Discorsi, Skinner explains, was his defence of the "tumults" thatdisfigured the politicallife of early republican Rome. According to Machiavelli it was due to thedisunion and turmoil between the plebs and the senate that Rome became a pertect republic.Skinner says Machiavelli is repudiating "nothing less than the Ciceronian vision of the concordiaordinum" (136). However, 1have shown that when Cicero wrote about the avoidance of internaistrife he was not just speaking about the "plebs and senate." By not distinguishing the twodifferent meanings of concordia, Skinner's commentary is an example of the conceptuallimitationsthat exist in the current Iiterature.

2 Id si minus intellegitur, quanta vis amicitiae concordiaeque sit, ex dissensionibus atquediscordiis percipipotest. Quae en/in domus tam stabt1is, quae tam firma civitas est, quae non odiis etdiscidiis funditus possit everti? Ex quo, quantum boni sit in amicitia, iudicari potest.

162

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173

1. Works of Cicero

i. Speeches

Index Locorum

De Imperio en. Pompei4 3617 12,6417-20 3042 14462-63 1364 1365 Il

Responso539229101895,48,89, 114100

De Domo Sua123510Il12-13141517252631333945506263666872-767475767780858791949699104

9011390, 1139393901139325,88, 1Œ>,11388, 90, 93, 9411393,9490,949094907611388791138943,110899325,2925,5782111,11377, 11389,94779390

De Domo Sua - cont.105110122127-129130130-131130-132131131-137132136136-137137138141142

De Haruspicum1731424860-616061

9092939090,91909377,91,929390,9390,91,9290,9491, 106909090

174

De Lege Agraria De Lege Agraria - cont.1.1-2 22 2.47-58 211.2 22 2.54 221.3-4 21 2.56-57 211.5-6 21 2.59 211.10 21 2.60 221.11 22 2.62 211.12-13 21 2.63 221.13 22 2.65 221.16 22 2.68-70 201.16-17 21 2.71 221.20 20 2.73 211.21 22,25 2.75 211.22 22 2.76-86 201.22-27 23 2.79 221.23 23,25 2.80 221.23-24 106 2.84 221.24 26 2.98 221.25 29 2.101-103 281.26-27 28 2.102 27, 101,1061.27 26 2.103 17, 23, 28, 682.3ff 16 3.3 202.5-6 23 3.4 9, 19, 23, 24,2.6 23 28,106,1102.7-8 27 3.6-14 202.7-9 25,28 3.15 21,222.9 24, 104, 105,

112 De Provinciis Consularibus2.10 22, 25, 27, 31 10 432.15 27 11.26-27 602.16 25 12 652.16-17 19 25 1142.20 22 32 1162.20-21 19,22 39 1062.23 22 41 682.24 19 43 822.26 19 47 1142.28-30 192.31 21 Divinatio in Caecilium2.33 19 8 112.33-34 21 70 112.35-37 212.38-46 22 In Catilinam2.43 29 1.1-10 362.46 22 1.13-20 36

175

In Catilinam - cont. In Pisonem - cont.1.21 36,43 68 1411.25 106 73 25,1061.30 54 73-74 371.32 43 77 761.32-33 36 78 782 36 80 822.8 36 81 1162.11 372.14 54 In Verrem2.17-23 35 1.36 112.19 37 1.54 102.25 43 2.1.75 1042.28 37 2.1.127 1043.3-14 41 2.1.153 253.5 104 2.1.163 253.15 41 2.2.175 123.21 44 2.2.181 643.23 41 2.2.186 643.25 41 2.3.12 653.26 42 2.3.48 294.1-7 44 2.3.81 104.6 36 2.3.168 124.8-13 44 2.3.183 103, 1044.14 45 2.4.98 1414.14-18 43 2.4.102 1044.15 5,43,46,47 2.5.12 314.16 44 2.5.143 100-1014.17 1064.18 45 Orationes Philippicae4.18-24 46 1.17 1064.21-22 42 1.23 147,1514.22 42,43 1.31 147, 1514.23 47 2.16 43

2.19 43, 151In Pisonem 2.23 151

3 16 2.24 135, 1514 31,48 2.44 437 43,48,92 2.112 15111 77 2.113 10613f 77 3.2 15216 95 3.30 15217ff 77 3.36 15225 95 4.14 15334 88,95 4.15 152

176

Orationes Philippicae - cont. Post Reditum in Senatu5.18 154 2 855.20 154 3 795.40 142 5 855.40-41 154 6 1085.41 25,106 8 786.19 155 12 43,76,777.4 25,29 20 25,847.21 155 21 78,807.24 43 23 108, 1098.8 156 24 828.10-11 106 26 8510.3 106 27 84-8510.8 148, 156 28 8511.28 31 29 8211.36 106, 157 31 8211.38 105 32 43,7712.18 157 33 10813.1-3 157 36-39 8613.2 17 59 14413.7 10613.10 147,151 Pro Archia13.16 104 2 56,14113.23 104 3 14113.36 157 14 56, 142

15-16 56, 142Post Reditum ad Quirites 20 56, 142

1 86, 106, 107 .3 86 Pro Balbo5 87 61 1158 769 53 Pro Caecina9-10 87 70 10113 76,7714 108 Pro Caelio15-16 87-88 12 10116 88, 107 14 10418 87 54 14119 8720 25, 106 Pro Cluentio21 78,108,109 88f 1422 110 101 10223 110 146 27, 10125 88 150 15

177

Pro Cluentio - cont. Pro Milone - cont.152 5, 11, 14 46 57153-154 15 87 103154 15 94 103155 27

Pro MurenaPro Rege Deiotaro 1 38,106

11 145 3 3912-13 146 4 39

15-53 40Pro Flacco 19f 42

1 71 20 403 71 24 274 11,71 30 408 104 42 39,4015 72,75 49 3466 71,72 50 3494 71 51 3496 43,71,72 53 3996-97 74 55 10697-98 72-73 61-63 3998 71 65 14499 103 66 144103-105 72-73 68 40

69 39Pro Fonteio 70 103

12 36 73 4346 36 78 25,39, 106

78-79 36Pro Ligario 79 39

5 145 83 10612-14 145 84 39,4016 145 85 3929 145 86 39,10634 145 89 39,40

Pro Marcello Pro Plancio27 106 23 12,6312 145 78 8232 145 86f 77, 104

87 76Pro Milone 93-94 110

4 104 93 11537 77 94 81,11539 82

178

Pro Quinctio Pro Sestio - cont.24 104 68 7947 10 71 79,84,94,51 10,143 103

87 79,84,94,Pro Rabirio Perduellionis Reo 107

2-4 32 91ff 10210 27 96 10411 23 96-99 10612 25 97 104, 10816 25 98 25, 103, 104,20-22 31 11222 27 100 104,11227 31 104 106,11233-35 31 106 84, 10334 28,32 107 25,88

116 104Pro Rabirio Postumo 118 83

3 12 120-121 83121 84

Pro Sexto Roscio Amerino 121-122 8420 104 128 8224 104 137 112, 11363 142 138 111135-139 11 139 29136 10 197 29139 10140 104 Pro Sulla142 10 1 50149 10 3 50

4 50Pro Sestio 7 50

5 112 9 5115 112 20 5025 76,77 21 5226 94 21-25 50,5227 77 23 5328 43 24 5439 76 25 5541 76 27 5547 42 28-29 5548 111 29 10350 53,82 31 6051 28 34 4353 76 51 43

179

Pro Sulla - cont. Ad Atticum - cont.63 31 2.3.4 70, 112,14087 50 2.4.2 68,7092 50, 144 2.5.1 70

2.9.2 70Pro Tullio 2.9.3 70

36 10 2.13.2 732.15 572.16.1 103

H. Letters 2.16.1-2 692.16.2 101, 102

Ad Atticum 2.16.3 681.5.1 142 2.16.4 64,66,691.13.1 142, 144 2.18.1 731.13.3 57 2.18.4 701.13.4 61 2.19.2 731.13.5 47 2.19.3 69,72,73,1.14.1 61 1031.14.1-2 57 2.19.4 731.14.4 5, 43, 48, 61, 2.20.3 73,140

62 2.21.1 70,73,1401.14.5 57,62,131 2.21.6 71,741.16.2 57 2.24.4 70,731.16.6 51,59, 102 2.25.1 711.16.9 48 2.25.2 70,73,1401.16.9-10 74 3.3 781.16.10 53 3.8.3 791.17.8 58 3.9.2 78, 1081.17.9 5,65 3.10.2 76,781.17.9-10 48,63,64 3.13.2 1011.17.10 47,49 3.15.2 781.18 61 3.15.4 781.18.1 67 3.15.5 761.18.3 5,48,59,67 3.15.6 78,79,861.18.6 67 3.20.3 791.18.7 63 3.23 791.19.4 10, 33, 47, 65 3.23.1 791.19.6 44,67 3.23.2 791.19.8 68 3.24.2 791.20.3 68 3.26 862.1.3 30,31 4.1.4 812.1.4 106 4.5.1-3 1142.1.7 43,67 4.6.2 68,112,1142.1.8 58 4.8a.2 1032.3.3-4 68 4.19.1 118, 119, 140

180

Ad Atticum - cont. Ad Atticum - cont.4.19.2 118 9.18 1365.1 118 10.1 1376.1.1 142 10.1.3 104,1476.1.2 42 10.4.2 1476.1.16 66 10.4.8 137, 138, 1467.3.2 123 10.4.9 1387.3.5 123 10.8.2 1397.4.2 123 10.8.6 1477.7.5 104, 140 10.8A 1347.11.1 139 10.8B 1347.18.2 106 10.11.4 1048.1.3 10,33 11.4 1398.2.1 123, 126 11.5 1398.11.2 138 12.44.1 1448.11.7 127 13.9.1 1428.11A 127,134 13.37.2 1408.11B 127,134 14.1.1 140, 145, 1468.11C 127, 134 14.2.3 1068.11D 134 14.13B.3 1448.11D.1 123,127 14.21.2 1068.12.6 128 14.21.4 1068.15A 134 14.22.1 1068.15A.1 134 15.1.1 1449.4.1 132 15.1.5 1069.4.2 132-133 15.2.3 1069.5.2 132 16.1-4 1489.6A 134 16.7.1 1489.7.1 106 16.13a.1 1429.7B 134 16.16A.6 1449.7B.1 123, 134-135 16.16B.2 1069.7C.1 137, 146 16.16C.3 1069.9.2 1339.10.2 138 Ad Brutum9.10.3 133, 138 1.15.4 1069.10.6 138 1.17.1 48,60,919.11.2 106 26.1 1599.11.3 138 26.2 1599.11A.1 1359.11A.3 136 Ad Familiares9.11D 134 1.7.7 1159.12.3 103 1.8.3 1119.13A 134 1.8.3-4 1119.14.1 138 1.9 929.16 136 1.9.1 101

181

Ad Familiares - cont.1.9.51.9.101.9.111.9.121.9.131.9.141.9.171.9.181.9.201.9.212.162.16.23.1.23.4.63.7.54.2.34.3.14.44.4.45.25.2.65.2.7-85.2.85.45.6.45.75.7.15.7.35.21.15.21.27.8.17.33.28.179.99.17.110.1.410.1810.22.110.2310.2410.26.110.31.610.32.5Il.2.2

101116116-11728,48,11711711748, 11711811710613410614211153137-138137145140, 1456214246477849565049104106, 112, 140142140139139140144157158157158158106106106

Ad Familiares - cont.Il.3.3-411.8.1l1.13a.211.15.111.20.411.2212.15.312.2713.913.9.213.11.314.1-414.716.11.216.1216.12.216.21.3

Ad Quintum Fratrem1.1.71.1.241.1.321.1.331.1.341.1.351.2.151.2.161.31.3.61.3.81.42.4.52.8.1-22.13.33.1.143.4.13.6.4

149-15014015815810614451446412,4310378139126126126142, 144

65656,43,6566106437071,74-757886787811314214292111,13817

182

iii. Rhetorical Treatises De Legibus - cont.3.20 103

Brutus 3.28 97-9832 13183-86 144 De Natura Deorum

1.9 140De Oratore 2.78-79 141

2.10 131 2.133 1413.6 144 2.147-158 1413.19 99-100 2.154 1413.138 25 3.61 92

Orator De Officiis35 140 1.8 103

1.15 291.20f 29

iv. Philosophical Treatises 1.26 1471.35 147

Academica 1.43 1471.11 140 1.64 147

1.85 99,162De Amicitia 1.77 106

23 72,162 1.145 1441.151 17

De Divinatione 2.2-5 1402.7 140 2.4 140

2.21 147De Fato 2.23-28 147

2 103, 106, 125, 2.27 103148 2.28 147

2.29 147De Finibus 2.73 18,29

2.113 143 2.78 18, 1475.65-66 143 2.83-84 147

2.84 33De Legibus 3.3 140

1.22-25 141 3.4 1401.23 141 3.19 1471.43 143 3.22 992.6 53 3.26-27 1422.8 112 3.32 143, 1472.38-39 97 3.36 1472.39 118 3.49 1473.1 144 3.82-85 1473.8 31 3.83 147

183

De Officiis - cont. Asconius3.88 48 Orationum Ciceronis Quinque

EnarratioDe Republica 46-47 79

1.10 171.39 98 In Orationem in Toga Candida1.40 96,98 83 161.43 18, 110 87 16

·1.49 25,96,101 90 161.52 1041.69 25,28 Caesar2.27 95, 144 De Bello Civili2.43 106 1.5.5 1062.48 142, 143 3.57.4 1062.54 17,26,952.69 25, 96-97, 99 De Bello Hispaniensi3.24 29 42.5 106

Quintus Cicero2. Works of Other Ancient Authors Commentariolum Petitionis

1.3 64Andocides 5 16On the Mysteries 33 141

106-107 129 53 103140 129

Cassius DioAppian 29.33 121Bellum Civile 36.17a 61

1.26 4,91 37.25 232.1 42 37.25.3 312.2 53 37.25.4 342.5 42 37.26-28 312.7 62 37.29 34,432.10 68 37.35.3-4 432.13 63 37.36 462.15 76 37.38.2 482.142 148 37.39-41 622.594 148 37.43.1 62

38.1-8 69Aristotle 38.7.4 63Politics 38.8.5 69

1.1253A 98 38.16.2-6 7638.16.5 77,7838.16.5-6 7738.17.4 78

184

Plato - cont. Respublica - cont.Cleitophon 2.369b-d 130

40ge 129 4.432a-b 99,129410a-b 129 5.462b-c 129-130

5.47Oc-d 129Crito 5.470f 130

51c 118 8.545c-d 1298.554c-e 129

Gorgias508a 99 Symposium

186b-187e 129Leges

3.678ff 130 Pliny703c 129 Naturalis Historia4.708c-d 130 3.14 1464.708d 129 5.149 1464.759b 129 7.116 305.774d 129 7.117 31

33.19 4Menexenus

237b-238b 130 PlutarchCaesar

Phaedo 8 4485e-86d 129 8.2 43

14.6 69Phaedrus

237d 129 Camillus256b 129 42.3-5 4263a 129

Cato MinorPhilebus 23 46

31c 129 26 60,6230.1-2 61

Politicus260b 129 Cicero301e-302b 130 12 23311a-c 129 12.1 31

13 12,30Protagoras 14 34,43

322b 130 20 4622 46

Respublica 22.5 621.351c-e 129 23 60,621.351d 129 23.1-3 541.352a 129 23.2 47

186

Cicero - cont. Bellum Catilinae - cont.24.1 48 37.4-9 3526.6 53 46.5-47.2 4130.5 77 48 4230.5-31.1 76 48-49 4431 76 48.1 3731.1 77 49.4 42,43,4431.4 78 50 4233.4 82 50.1-3 43

52.8-53.4 46C. Gracchus 56-61 62

17 9117.6 4 Bellum Iugurthinum

10.6 98Pompeius 41.4 112

57 122Historiae

Sulla 1.48.24-25 106.5 10,17 1.48.25 106

1.67 13Polybius 1.67.5 10

6.17 12 1.67.10 101.67.13 10

Quintilian 1.77.11 106Institutio Oratoria

5.13.1 36 Invectiva in Ciceronem5.13.21 36 1 539.3.50 47 4 539.3.89 53 7 5311.1.85 31

Seneca (the Younger)Sallust DialogiEpistulae Ad Caesarem Senem 10.5.1 48

1.5.3 1461.6.5 146 Speusippus

DefinitionsBellum Catilinae 413b 25

4 111 413e 256.2 9817.43 60 Suetonius31.7 53 Divus Iulius33.1 35 14 4433.4-5 35 16 60,6237 34 20 6337.1 36 20.1 69

187

Divus Iulius - cont.20.3 6922.1 6928 121

Vespasian9 110

Thucydides3.82-83 1288.93 128

Valerius Maximus4.6.4 118

Velleius Paterculus2.34.2 612.35 462.39.2 1162.40.5 60,612.47.2 1182.62.2 148

188