christoph sonntag's mmalebogo: the missionary diary as a secular source in the reconstruction...

South African Historical Journal 36 (May 1997), 168- 192

Christoph Sonntag’s Mmalebogo: The Missionary Diary as a Secular Source in the Reconstruction of Bagananwa History, 1892-1895*

LIZE KRIEL University of Pretoria

‘Ratshatsha’, derived from the onomatopoeic ‘rat-a-tat’ of his rifle, was the sobriquet earned by chief Kgalusi (Mma)Lebogo for his bravery during the Boer-Bagananwa War of 1894. When Mmalebogo personally surrendered, the Zuid-Afrikaansche Republiek (ZAR) thereby achieved its victory over the Bagananwa. In spite of his capitulation and the subsequent six-year absence from his Blouberg domain spent in a Pretoria prison, Mmalebogo was immediately reinstated as chief by his people upon his return in 1900.’

Of particular value in understanding Mmalebogo during the turbulent years before his imprisonment is the diary of Christoph Sonntag of the Berlin Missionary Society (BMS) who was stationed at Blauberg’ from 1892 to 1897. On the surface, Sonntag’s diary is the missionary’s narrative, reflecting his sentiments towards and his role in the subjugation of the Bagananwa. But Sonntag’s daily entries as often reflect the political thinking and diplomatic manoeuvring of Mmalebogo independent of Sonntag’s narrative. In contrast to his missionary predecessors, Sonntag was a sensitive observer, and his narrative contains layers of information which lend themselves to decoding and

This article is a revised version of my paper ‘The Relationship between the Bagananwa and Missionary Christoph Sonntag: 1892-1 895’, prepared for presentation at the South African Historical Society Biennial Conference, University of Pretoria, July 1997. I am grateful for the comments and assistance of Fred Morton, Johannes du Bruyn and Annekie van der Merwe. I also wish to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Centre for Science Development of the Human Sciences Research Council.

R.H. Massie, Zhe Nufive Tribes offhe Transvaal (London, 1905). 54; T.J. Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity in the North-Western Transvaal and the South African Republic, c.1836- 1896’ (MA dissertation, University of the North West, 1993), 183. Following J.A. van Schalkwyk’s example, the mountain is referred to as ‘Blouberg’ and the mission station as ‘Blauberg’: see J.A. van Schalkwyk, ‘Die Kultuurhistoriese Betekenis van die Sendingstasies in die Blouberg-Omgewing, Noord-Transvaal”, Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Kultuurgeskiedenis, 4, 4 (1990), 248.

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CHRISTOPH SONNTAG’S MMALEBOGO 169

interpreting the interaction between missionary and chief as well as to gaining insights into the person of the chief. Experiences recorded in the diary as the missionary’s own activitiesreveal clearly Mmalebogo’s initiative, calculationand resilience; they also explain why, even a hundred years after the Boer-Baga- nanwa War, Ratshatsha’a memory is still honoured by his people. In the still- recited praise poem he is

[the] majestic Lebogo [whose] shields and spears foil foes[,] Rat~hatsha!~

Rather than a gloss of this African leader, Sonntag’s diary depicts the very qualities captured in Bagananwa poetry and enhances our understanding of Mmalebogo’s character and thinking at a crucial period in Bagananwa history.

The Diary as Source

Like other sources a diary is a historical text that has been constructed out of a personal vision, regardless of how depersonalized the language is in which it is written. In their attempts to record reality, human observers cannot reflect it like a mirror. They, as we, have to (re)construct it with our minds, and ‘colour’ it intentionally: we select and thereby conceptualize through language. Thus the problem of subjectivity is reduced to the problem of monitoring reliability. The criterion when using a diary as source is not whether it is subjective or not (diaries are subjective by nature), but whether it is, indeed, what it claims to be.4

The Sonntag diary (written in German) can claim only to be personal perceptions, communicated through an inherently Eurocentric form of literature,’ by a German missionary, but one who happened to have been a sensitive observer. It was certainly not written to present ‘the black point of view’, as has been claimed, on the diarist’s behalf, by one reviewer of the 1983 published translation.6 The published translation in English, which has been abridged and revised, is the work of Christoph’s son Konrad.’ The complete original

3. 4.

5.

6. 7.

Makhura ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 183. M. van Faassen, ‘Het Dagboek: Een Bron als Alle Andere?’, Theoretische Geschiedenis, 18,

R. Dekker, ‘Egodocumenten: Een Literatuuroverzicht’, Tiidschrifi voor Geschiedenis, I01 (1988), 183. ‘New Light on an Old Mountain War’, Sunday Times (Extra), 19 Feb. 1984. C. Sonntag, My Friend Maleboch, Chief of the Blue Mountains, edited by K. Sonntag (Pretoria, 1983).

I (1991). 5-6.

170 LIZE KRIEL

manuscript, for the years 1886 to 1895, is reposed in the National Archives in Pretoria.’ Konrad Sonntag’s selections during the translation process resulted in a publication that focuses on the dramatic events around the 1894 war and leaves out many entries pertaining to the development of the relationship between the missionary and the chief in the years preceding the war.

Oddly, Sonntag’s original diary has not been used in research on Bagananwa history, even prior to the appearance of the published translation. Colin Rae, a contemporary of Sonntag, wrote a long account of the 1894 war that was hardly more than a badly copied montage of the newspaper clippings of his day.g N.C. Weidemann used archival and oral sources, but not Sonntag’s diary, to compile an account of the ‘Malaboch’ War in the Afrikaner tradition of historiography.” During the 1980s and 1990s the Bagananwa and Blouberg became the topic of extensive linguistic,’ ’ literary’* and anthropological studies.I3 Through his dissertation and several papers on related topic^,'^ T.J. Makhura has established himself as an authority on Bagananwa history, though he used only the translated Sonntag diary. He has concluded that Sonntag ‘cannot be absolved from the general reprehensible role he played in hastening the subjugation of the Bagananwa’.’’ And further:

8

9.

10.

11 .

12.

13.

14.

15.

Transvaal Archives Depot, Pretoria (hereafter TAB), A. I28 1, Sendeling Christoph Sonntag, 1886-1895. A transcription of this manuscript, commissioned by the late G. Sonntag and currently in the private ownership of I . Sonntag, was made available to the author. C. Rae, Malaboch, or Notesfrom my Diary on rhe Boer Campaign of 1894 against the Chief Malaboch of Blaauwberg, District Zourpansberg. South African Republic (Cape Town, 1898). N.C. Weidemann, ‘Die Malaboch-Oorlog ( I 894)’ (MA dissertation, University of Pretoria, 1944). This was also published in Historiese Studies, 7, 1 (1947), 1-48. A.E. Kotzt, ‘Die Fonologiese Sisteem van Hananwa’ (MA dissertation, University of South Africa, 1987). In standard Northern Sotho orthography, HananiudBahananwa has preference to GananwdBagananwa. A.P. van der Menve is doing research on Bagananwa praise poems for her doctoral thesis ‘Linking the Past and the Present through Hananwa and Lobedu Literature’ (registered title, Department of African Languages, University of South Africa). J.A. van Schalkwyk, ‘Ideologie en die Konstruksie van ’n Landelike Samelewing: ’n Antropologiese Studie van die Hananwa van Blouberg’ (DLitt et Phil thesis, University of South Africa, 1995). Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’; T.J. Makhura, ‘The Role of Women in the Boer- Bagananwa war in the Northern Transvaal, 1894-1895’ (Paper presented at the Fifteenth Biennial Conference of the South African Historical Society, Rhodes University, 2-5 July 1995); T.J. Makhura, ‘Mercenaries and Missionaries in the Boer Subjugation of the Bagananwa in the Northern Transvaal’ (Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association, San Francisco, California, November 1996); T.J. Makhura, “‘The softening of the Rock”: Political and Socio-Economic Changes in the Bagananwa Society, Northern Transvaal, 1895-1910’ (Paper presented at the Sixteenth Biennial Conference ofthe South African Historical Society, University of Pretoria, 6-9 July 1997). Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 135.


... the Berlin Missionaries who worked among the Bagananwa should, on the whole be seen as another agency of conquest, operating consciously and unconsciously in collaboration with other colonial agencies ... towards a similar goal of subjugating the Bagananwa. This contention has been put more forcefully by Majeke.

... it was perhaps by far the Rev. Sonntag who clearly demonstrated the extent to which the missionaries were accomplices in the political subjugation of the Baganan- wa.I6

Makhura’s evaluation of Sonntag follows the general debate in the historiography of South African missions and missionaries over the past decades. After Majeke and Hutchinson’s claims had caused a stir in the 1950s, the view of missionaries as agents of capitalism and colonialism gained general acceptance.” Jean and John Comaroff more recently explained the relationship between the Southern Batswana and the British missionaries as a ‘cultural confrontation - of domination and reaction, struggle and innovation’.’’ According to the Comaroffs, the British missionaries’ long conversation with the Batswana proceeded at two levels: the attempt to convert them to Christianity and the effort to inculcate the signs and practices of European culture in their indigenous world.’’ The Berlin missionaries exposed the Bagananwa to similar ‘cultural subversion’,20 although not in the name of ‘God and Great Britain’.2’ Sonntag’s presence at Blouberg in 1894, as a subject of the Boers, implicates him also in the violent subjugation of the Bagananwa by the ZAR. Mmalebogo’s ‘innovation’ is confirmed by the extent to which he had managed to regulate the complex interaction between chief and missionary in this war situation.

Blouberg in the 1890s

Blouberg, lying west of the Soutpansberg in the present-day Northern Province, has been regarded as the heartland of the Bagananwa since they first arrived in the area early in the nineteenth century. They first came into contact with the

16. Ibid., 95, 117. 17. N. Majeke, The Role of Missionaries in Conquesf (Alexandra, 1952); B. Hutchinson, ‘Some

Social Consequences on Nineteenth Century Missionary Activity among the South African Bantu’, Africa, 27.2 (1957), referred to and commented on by J . du Bruyn and N. Southey, ‘The Treatment of Christianity and Protestant Misdionaries in South African Historiography’, in H. Bredekamp and R. Ross, eds, Missions dnd Chrisfianily in Soufh African History (Johannesburg, 1995), 36-8. J. and J. Comaroff, Of Revelafion and Revolution: Chrisfianiy, Colonialism and Conscious- ness in Soufh Africa, vol. I (Chicago, 1991), xi.

18.

19. Ibid., 311. 20. Ibid., xii. 21. Ibid., 309.

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Voortrekkers in the 1 8 3 0 ~ . ~ ~ In 1868 their land was formally incorporated into the territorial boundaries of the ZAR. In practice, though, it had probably been regarded as such already by the late 1 8 5 0 ~ . ~ ’

The BMS established its mission in the region in the late 1860% during the rule of Matsiokwane Leb~go. ’~ Land was bought from the ZAR and the Blauberg Mission Station established under missionary E.B. Beyer in 1868. Missionary C.H.C. Stech took over from Beyer in 1874 and was present during the breach within the Bagananwa leadership, which occurred between Kgalusi and his half-brother Kibi (Ramatho) in 1879. Stech was joined at Blauberg by A.G.E.G. Herbst in 1886. After a dispute with Kgalusi Mmalebogo, he left the region; Herbst was also ordered to leave by the chief.”

Under these circumstances, Christoph Sonntag arrived at Blauberg on 15 August 1892 as the new missionary. He was the son of small farmers and townspeople in East Prussia. Of Evangelical Lutheran upbringing, Sonntag was raised by a family that had been used to making a good living through perseverance and hard work. He was well educated first as a teacher before going through the intensive BMS training programme.26 Before coming to Blauberg, he spent four years at Botshabelo, a BMS settlement for Bakopa and Bapedi Christians along the Olifants River.27 Apart from his native German, Sonntag had a good knowledge of Hebrew and Greek and arrived in the Blouberg understanding English, Dutch and Sepedi.’*

The Bagananwa among whom Sonntag launched his missionary career were politically and socially quite diverse. Apart from the split between Kibi and Mmalebogo, several other semi-independent chiefs and sub-chiefs were also affiliated to Kgalusi’s domain.29 Mmalebogo’s followers, who held him as the

22. 23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 29, 36. J.S. Bergh, ‘Die Veranderende Grense van “Transvaal” 1840-1 994’. Historia, 4 I , 2 (I 996), 15. The Bagananwa royal family is called by the name Lebogo/Mmalebogo. In all further references, for the purposes of this article, the title Mmalebogo will only be used for Matsiokwane’s son, Kgalusi Lebogo (Ratshatsha). His brother and rival, Ramatho (Kibi) Lebogo, who had a smaller following than Kgalusi, will be referred to as Kibi. See also Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, i-ii. D.W. van der Merwe, ‘Die Geskiedenis van die Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in Transvaal, 1860-1900’, Argiefjaarboek vir Suid-Afrikaanse Geskiedenis, 46, 1 (Pretoria, I984), 1 15-20; Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, ii; Sonntag, h& Friend Maleboch, 1. Sonntag, My Friend Maleboch, xiii; Notizen aus dem tdglichen Leben. Missionar Christoph Sonntag, 1886-1895 (transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G . Sonntag), 1. Transcription ofTAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, pp. 62-123; Van der Menve, ‘Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in Transvaal’, 40. Sonntag, h& Friend Maleboch, xiii. Makhura, ‘Mercenaries and Missionaries’, 13; Transcription of TAB, A. I28 1, commissioned by G. Sonntag, p. I6 I .


legitimate successor to Matsiokwane, were more numerous and much stronger than Kibi’s fa~tion.~’ This may explain why Kibi sought Boer support in his attempts to undermine Mmalebogo and strengthen his own position. Socially the community was divided among royals and commoners while the changing economy, subject to migrant labour and gun running, had begun to affect the occupations of both men and women and lead to changes in traditional gender roles.” The small but growing Christian minority (Mujukune) were unequivo- cally devoted to their new faiths and divided between the Methodist (Wesleyan) and Lutheran (BMS) denominations.”

As Boer activities intensified in the area, so did their demand on natural and human resources, resulting in increased unease and suspicion among the Bagananwa. Yet Mmalebogo’s people retained a fairly independent existence within the Boer state, because they had ways of empowering themselves: by obtaining firearms and relying on Blouberg as a natural fortress. By the 1880s, however, the position of the Bagananwa deteriorated rapidly following the return of control over the Transvaal to the Boers after an interplay of British administration from 1877 to 1881. The Transvaal Boers, who had become nationally conscious during the years of British rule, expressed their anti-British sentiment by attacking the powerful, though increasingly vulnerable, African chiefs within their state. By the mid 1880s, the ZAR adopted a policy aimed at placing under direct ZAR control the entire northern frontier region. Permanent occupation by more white farmers was encouraged and facilitated by removing African communities from their land to locations. Tax was collected more vigorously to supplement the income of the Boer state but also to drive African labour to the farms of the white occupant^.^'

Mmalebogo had every reason to resist the implementation of such a policy. Incorporation into the Boer ‘state’ not only implied a new institutional order of political control. It also implied that the whole Bagananwa ‘state’, or condition of existence, as they had known it until then, would be terminated: culturally,

30.

31.

32.

33.

Massie, Native Tribes ojthe Transvuul, 52-4; Director of Military Operations, Native Strong- holds and Locutions ojthe Trunsvuul (London, 1907), 18. See Makhura, ‘The Role of Women’, 1-2; G.H. Franz, ‘Mmalebogo’, Die Huisgenoot, 23, 881 (10 Feb. 1939). 89. Van der Menve, ‘Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in Transvaal’, I 18, 160; Transcription ofTAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G . Sonntag, pp. 130, 131, 136, 146. See J.W.N. Tempelhoff, ‘Die Okkupasiestelsel in die Distrik Soutpansberg, 1886-1 899’ (DLitt et Phil thesis, University ofSouth Africa, 1989). 3-13,3640,492; Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 67, 80, 84; TAB, SS. 4208, R. 3863/94, Rapport van den Superintendent van Naturellen over het jaar 1893, p. 19.

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economically and p~l i t ica l ly .~~ In 1888, Mmalebogo declined to resettle in the location offered to his people along the Mogalakwena River,35 and in 1890, the Boers’ tax-collecting efforts at Blouberg were thwarted when some of Mmalebogo’s people fired shots and the chief refused to deliver the suspects.36

The arbitrary and unscrupulous tactics of Boer officials in the area only worsened the strained relations with the Bagananwa.” Local officials such as Native Commissioner Barend Vorster (sen.) lacked the power to enforce this policy on their own and they attempted to arouse Pretoria’s support with continuous reports of the ‘unrest’ caused by Mmalebogo:

The worst kind of brutality and rebelliousness were displayed towards the government of the ZAR.”

If affairs are not settled this winter [1891], it will be a lot more difficult to enforce the law at a later stage”.

The blacks of Blouberg in particular, are a great disadvantage to our district. Cattle are frequently stolen and then driven to the safety of Blouberg, where the thieves are being protected by Mmalebogo. The blacks who do pay taxes continually allude to Blouberg and Soutpansberg and want to know why the people over there do not have to pay. In my opinion the time has come to subdue the blacks of Blouberg and S~utpansberg.~’

A month prior to the war:

Mmalebogo still behaves in the same menacing way ... Until this day not a single shot was fired by the burghers, but Mmalebogo had shot at several patrols. His behaviour is

34. For an application of the Comaroffs’ dual interpretation of the concept ‘state’ to the Bagananwa experience, see Van Schalkwyk, ‘Ideologie en Konstruksie van ’n Landelike Samelewing’, 97-8; J. and J. Comaroff, Erhnography and the Historical Imagination (Boulder,

Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 143. TAB, SS. 4140, R. 17552/90, B.J. Vorster - Superintendent van Naturellen, 5 Dec. 1890, pp.

The Press, 8 June 1894; Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 154. TAB, SS. 4140, R. 17552/90, B.J. Vorster -Superintendent van Naturellen, 5 Dec. 1890, pp. 78-9 (my translation). TAB, SS. 4140, R. 594/91, B.J. Vonter - Superintendent van Naturellen, I June 1891, p. 95 (my translation). TAB, SS. 4209, R. 3863/94, B.J. Vorster - Superintendent van Naturellen, 15 Jan. 1894, pp. 17-18 (my translation).

1992), 235-6. 35. 36.

37. 38.

39.

40.

78-9.


very inimical. In all respects, Mmalebogo’s behaviour towards the government is still hostile . . .4’

The impression was created with Paul Kruger’s government that Mmalebogo was a recalcitrant chief and a threat to the security of the Boer state: ‘The report I received from Commandant Vorster on the delivery of the ultimatum [to Mmalebogo] on 27 April [1894], clearly proves that Mmalebogo wants nothing but to bid defiance to law and order.’42 The Pretoria government took note that additional advantages were to be gained from the military campaign called for to crush Mmalebogo, such as serving as a warning to other northern chiefs reluctant to submit to the policy of the Boer government: ‘The government ... hoped that as soon as this chief [Mmalebogo] was subdued, the other chiefs would realizethat it was in their own interest to humble themselves, and comply with the laws of the country in future.’43 It would also help to relieve the labour shortage in the gold-mining industry:

The natives will be brought to their bearings and incidentally the question of a cheap and adequate supply of future labour will be settled ... instead of being a source of anxiety to the Government, [the blacks] will do something towards solving the labour difficulty at Wit~atersrand.‘~

Local officials turned Mmalebogo into a culprit also because they had much to gain personally in a war against Mmalebogo. The Pretoria newspaper, The Press, was very outspoken about the greed of Soutpansberg officials: ‘It is a fact that certain officials have become quickly wealthy during their residence amongst the natives in the North.’45

After the war, Sonntag wrote in his diary that half of the almost four thousand head of cattle originally taken from the Bagananwa had disappeared when the Boers finally convened for the formal division of their booty. ‘The suspicion that Vorster among others had had a share in the missing two thousand head was loudly voiced to his face.’46

41.

42.

43.

44. 45. 46.

TAB, Landdrost ZAR, Argief Zoutpansberg 15, BB. 726 and BB. 846, Waarnemende Landdrost Pietersburg - Commandant Generaal, 12 May 1894, 21 May 1894 and 22 May 1894, pp. 715, 761 and 780 (my translation). TAB, SS. 4413, R. 8813/94, Commandant Generaal - President Kruger en Uitvoerende Raad, 9 May 1894, pp. 62-3 (my translation). S.P.E. Trichard, Geschiedenis, Werken en Streven van ... Luitenant-Kolonel der Vroegere Stuats-Artillerie ZAR door hemzelve Beschreven, edited by O.J.O. Ferreira (Pretoria, 1975), 59 (my translation). The Press, I I June 1894 and 28 May 1894. The Press, 6 Aug. 1894. Sonntag, Friend Muleboch, 128.

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Dynamics of the Sonntag-Mmalebogo Relationship

Because the first BMS missionaries at Blauberg had jeopardized the mission by refusing to recognize Mmalebogo as the effective authority, Sonntag was careful not to make the same mistake. Sonntag’s image of Mmalebogo determined the way he positioned himself towards other parties in the area. Both he and his BMS supervisors acknowledged Mmalebogo as the person who, in practice, exercised the most authority over the people among whom Sonntag had come to ~ o r k . ~ ’

Sonntag’s predecessor,Carl Stech, was insensitive to Mmalebogo’s position and had a poor relationship with him as a He seemed to have been too eager to remind the chief that the land on which the missionary stood had been purchased from the ZAR and therefore assumed that he was free to proselytize among the Bagananwa. Stech ignored the fact that he was wholly dependent on the consent of the chief and his people for the privilege of working among the Bagananwa. Stech also provided Native Commissioner Barend Vorster the sort of exaggeration claims about the situation in the Blouberg area that Vorster depended on to justify calling government for a more drastic enforcement of their submission policy:

Here in Blouberg we are suffering terribly under the cruel and wild people, because they want to attack my [mission] Station. The last time I visited you with the cart, there was great commotion and the people [Bagananwa] became wild, alleging that I was now going to find the Boers to bring war to the land.4y

Stech claimed that the Bagananwa had threatened to destroy his vegetable garden and orchard and bum down his house. The missionary asserted that the land of the Blouberg area was too good for the Bagananwa, who did nothing but sit idly every day. Inviting the wrath of the Lord, Stech called for a commando to attack the Bagananwa, who, according to Stech, believed that they could never be defeated.”

At a time of mounting tension between the Bagananwa and the Boers, a missionary like Stech was the last kind of intermediary Mmalebogo desired. The chief took him amiss for the discord between the Wesleyan and BMS Chris-

47.

48. 49. TAB, SS. 4140, R. 17552/90, C. Stech - B.J. Vorster, 1 Feb. 1891, pp. 88-92 (my

50.

Sonntag, My Friend Maleboch, 4; Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, pp. 126-7, 132. Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G . Sonntag, pp. 126-8.

translation). TAB, SS. 4140, R. 17552/90, C. Stech - B.J. Vorster, I Feb. 1891, pp. 88-92.


tians.” Rumours also had it at the time that the Boers were suspecting him of illicit trade in firearm^.'^ Under these circumstances he left Blouberg in 1892 ‘without leave or farewells[, which] had made a very poor impression on the Chief and his people. In [Mmalebogo’s] eyes the missionary had fled.’” The chief showed his contempt for such arbitrary behaviour by ordering Stech’s successor, Herbst, also to vacate Blauberg. Thus before Sonntag’s arrival, the BMS had received a clear message: the Bagananwa were prepared to do without a missionary who challenged the authority of their leaders and unnecessarily drew the attention of the Boer officials to them. Sonntag realized from the outset that he was in no position to compel the Bagananwa leaders to accept any conditions. 54

Christoph Sonntag wanted to live among the Bagananwa, to teach and convert them to Christianity and to serve the Bagananwa Christians. In order to do that, he needed the consent of the chief of the Bagananwa. Only a good relationship with the chief of the people would make it possible to have a good relationship with the people themselves and improve his chances to convince them of his message. Asking permission was not only courteous, but it was also the law of the Boer state in which the Bagananwa lived. No missionary society was allowed to operate in the Transvaal unless it could prove to the ZAR government that the leadership of the specific African community among whom they would like to settle, had given its consent.” Although the Bagananwa did not recognize the claims of Boer authority over them, Sonntag had to assume otherwise.

Sonntag understood that he could not remain at Blauberg unless he also submitted to all the Boer laws that applied to him. Under no circumstances was a missionary allowed to undermine the authority of the ZAR government. The missionary was bound by all the laws of the state applicable to any other citizen. Disobedience or defiance invited suspension of the missionary’s activities and his prosecution by the state.56 In other words, whatever Sonntag’s personal

51. Sonntag, A@ Friend Maleboch, I ; Van der Merwe, ‘Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in

52. 53. 54. 55 .

Transvaal’, 118. Franz, ‘Mmalebogo’, Die Huisgenoot, 23, 881 (10 Feb. 1939), 89. Sonntag, h@ Friend Muleboch, I . Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, p. 126. See Van der Merwe, ‘Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in Transvaal’, 12-14 for a discussion of TAB, SS. 74.. R. 77/66: ‘Voorlopig reglement ter regeling van de verkondiging des Evangelies onder de heidensche bevolking der ZAR’ (‘Provisional regulations regarding the preaching of the Gospel to the heathen population of the ZAR’), 28 Jan. 1899; and ZAR 25: ‘De Locale Wetten der ZAR, 1849-1885, Maatregelen van voorzorg tegen bedrog en misleiding by de uitbreiding van het Evangeliurn onder de Heidenen’ (‘Measures to prevent deceit and deception in the spreading of the Gospel amongst the Heathens’). Van der Merwe, ‘Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in Transvaal’, 12-14. 56.

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convictions or feelings were, he had to present himself and behave in a manner that was acceptablenot only to the Bagananwa, but also to the ZAR government.

Sonntag arrived in chief Mmalebogo’s territory when the situation had become extremely tense. As the Boers pursued their aims, Mmalebogo stood all the more to lose his authority, perhaps his freedom and even his life. Conversion to Christianity and mission teaching were hardly foremost in the chiefs mind - though a missionary who risked aggravating existing tensions was always a liability. A missionary who would divide the Bagananwa among themselves, who would advocate Boer views, or who would lay claim to Bagananwa land, was unwelcome. By the same token, a missionary who would defy Boer authority in an attempt to identify with the Bagananwa cause would risk bringing down the wrath of the Boers not only upon himself, but also upon the very people whom he was trying to assist.

Only if Sonntag fell outside these categories were Mmalebogo and his ministers prepared to contemplate having a missionary in their midst. A missionary who was willing to act as news agent could be useful, as could a missionary who did not draw Boer attention to himself, but who also demanded some respect from the Boers.

In addition to Sonntag’s idealistic resolutions and plans of action, the missionary’s role was shaped by what the Bagananwa leadership hoped to gain from his presence in their domain. Sonntag’s proximity was desirable and his involvement in Bagananwa society was tolerable insofar as the missionary regarded matters which he might categorize as ‘secular’ and therefore of secondary importance, as of utmost importance to the Bagananwa, especially when dealing with the Boers. Mmalebogo needed more than a missionary who simply respected his authority, unlike Sonntag’s predecessors; but the chief knew all too well that the only kind of missionary which could possibly be of any use to the Bagananwa in secular affairs had to be on good terms with the ZAR officials. If the Bagananwa wanted the sustained benefit of the services of a missionary as intermediary between them and the ZAR government, they could not make any demands on him that would jeopardize his relationship with the Boer state.

Sonntag’s behaviour proves that he was sensitive to Mmalebogo’s position as the paramount power in the vicinity of the mountain and that he was reluctant to use his own position in a way that would challenge that of Mmale- bogo. Sonntag, for example, refused to act as agent for the introduction of ‘white’ customs. When in March 1893, a trader asked him to help to procure permission from Mmalebogo for establishing a store in his territory, Sonntag refused.


I told him straightforward, that I did not want to have anything to do with issues of this sort ... So many people have already requested permission to open a store in Mmalebo- go’s land. Up until now, every request was turned down by Mmalebogo.”

Sonntag appeared to support Mmalebogo’s desire to control the spread of Western influences into his domain by prohibiting the store.

He was also especially mindful of the tension between Mmalebogo and the Boers, with whom the missionary was reluctant to have warm relations. Sonntag also did not feel obliged to be particularly friendly or helpful to the Native Commissioner. He explained his acquaintance with Vorster, on 17 October 1892, as follows:

... it had for long been my intention to introduce myself to Commissioner Vorster. Even though I had nothing special to discuss with him [literally translated from the German: ‘Even though I had nothing to do with him’] he was still the Government representative and it coulddo no harm [literally translated: ‘it couldonly befor thegood’] if I paid him the respect due to him as a Government ~f f ic ia l .~’

Sonntag understood that in Mmalebogo’s eyes, the Commissioner was, in Sonntag’s words, the ‘natural enemy’59 of the Bagananwa. Eager to present himself favourably to Mmalebogo, Sonntag’s own impatience with the Boers is evident from the entries in his diary. In the hyperbolic language so typical of him when preaching the Gospel, he once referred to the Boers as the ‘wolves’6o with whom inevitably he had to associate, in order to make headway. Though he found it exceedingly tedious, Sonntag was obliged to respect their custom of stopping to exchange pleasantries each time he passed a Boer homestead, lest they be greatly offended.6’ In contrast, Sonntag was much more at ease with observing courtesies among the Bagananwa.

While avoiding tensions with the Boers, Sonntag was also careful not to contribute to further tension among the Bagananwa themselves. He wished to work under the auspices of Mmalebogo and the other chiefs. He was aware of the breach between Mmalebogo and Kibi, whom he called Mmalebogo’s greatest

57. 58. Sonntag,

59. 60. 61.

TAB, A. 1281, pp. 538-9: Sendeling Christoph Sonntag, 1886-1895 (my translation).

Sonntag, p. 133 (my italics). Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, p. 172. Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, p. 110. TAB, A. 1281, p. 536: Sendeling Christoph Sonntag, 1886-1895.

Friend Muleboch, I I; transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G.

180 LIZE KRIEL

sub-chief,62 but he treated both with equal ~o rd ia l i t y .~~ Nor did he express any notion of challenging the authority of any of the other chiefs:

I asked the Chief [Sonntag’s spelling: ‘Monake’ - Manaka?], to support the teacher [missionary] in every way, to visit the church himself and to support it as much as he can. With superfluous words, which one will soon notice, were but nothing more than words, he promised to do his best. Help, real help, one cannot expect from these chiefs. [The chiefs, of course, would rather have been interested in ways in which Sonntag could be helpful to them.] It is, nevertheless, always good to honour them with a visit and give them a good word. Even if it has no direct benefit, they will still be able to say: ‘The Christians appear, after all, to be people who know the proper way to behave’ and so they [the chiefs] will not create any stumbling blocks for us [the Chr i~ t ians .1~~

This diary entry confirms that Sonntag wanted the chiefs to regard his behaviour as proper.

Establishing a Relationship

Mmalebogo required Sonntag to be humble and patient before being granted a first audience and permission to operate as missionary among his subjects. The two Christians who approached Mmalebogo on Saturday 20 August with the missionary’s first request were sent back with the message that the missionary should not bother him in the near future.65 Two days later, Sonntag’s messenger arrived at Mmalebogo’s again, this time with a blanket as gift, requesting an audience for 27 August. Mmalebogo sent back the blanket, letting Sonntag know that taking the gift would imply that he had accepted Stech’s claim to the land on which the mission station was built. From Mmalebogo’s point of view, this treatment had the desired effect upon Sonntag. He would not dare to raise the land issue again; he was but only too grateful that the chief had not also asked him to vacate the station.66 The meeting of 27 August did not take place either. Mmalebogo postponed it indefinitely, thereby emphasising Sonntag’s dependence upon the chiefs benevolence. He could not proceed with his work, because he

62.

63.

64. 65. 66.

TAB, A. 1281, p. 480: Sendeling Christoph Sonntag, 1886-1895. The translator of the English version preferred to add the description ‘Maleboch’s greatest rival’ to the text. See Sonntag, @ Friend Maleboch, 10. The published English translation of the diary contains many examples of Sonntag’s admiration for Mmalebogo (see pp. 7-8; 119). For the various occasions on which Sonntag took Kibi the medicine he had requested, or helped him with his reading and writing, however, one has to refer back to the original German text. See the transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, pp. 139, 142, 146-9. Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, p. 156 (my translation). Sonntag, @ Friend Maleboch, 2. Ibid., 3 .


realized that without Mmalebogo’s approval, the leaders of the smaller villages would be reluctant to associate with him.67 A week later, Mabea, Mmalebogo’s son and chief-in-waiting, paid the missionary a visit with his companions. Sonntag was given an opportunity to prove his subservience to the royal house and display whatever courtesy of which he might have been capable. He presented them with gifts and entertained them on coffee, bread and bananas.68 On 27 September Mmalebogo was again approached by two messengers from Sonntag, requesting, for the fourth time, an audience. Mmalebogo told them that Sonntag could meet him some time during the following week.69 Eventually he managed to keep Sonntag at bay for yet another month - probably an indication that he was still not sure whether or not it would be worthwhile to accommodate the new missionary in his territory. While suffering from influenza, the chief received a message of sympathy from Sonntag and shortly thereafter, Sonntag, accompanied by Herbst, showed up at the royal capital without in~itation.~’

Sonntag wrote in glowing terms about his first meeting with Mmalebogo on 27 October 1892. He interpreted the fact that, upon his departure, the chief addressed him as fshwene (‘baboon’, the totem of the Baganan~a) ,~’ as a sign that he was acceptedas the teacher of the Bagananwa. Mmalebogo was probably not as excited as Sonntag about the whole encounter, but at least his worst reservations about the presence of the missionary must have been put to rest. Sonntag gave a short exposition of what he intended with his work among Mmalebogo’s subjects. The newcomer did not claim ownership of any of the territory Mmalebogo regarded as his own and he behaved politely. In contrast to his negative encounters with previous missionaries, Mmalebogo saw in Sonntag an advantage in having a missionary who respected his authority, and who might provide a useful service. He asked Sonntag for news about happen- ings in the region, then asked Sonntag for medicine. Even so, Mmalebogo gave no impression that he was dependent on Sonntag’s services in any way,

It was not until Sonntag approached Mmalebogo again five months later that a second meeting on 21 March 1893 took place.72 Again the missionary was turned into a convenient news-agent. Sonntag, an ardent newspaper-reader, was desirous to impress Mmalebogo and eagerly answered the chiefs ‘penetrat- ing questions’ about what was happening in the country:

67. Ibid., 4. 68. 69. 10. Ibid., 5-9. 71. 12.

Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G. Sonntag, p. 131. Sonntag, h@ Friend Maleboch, 4-5.

Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 37-8. Sonntag, h@ Friend Maleboch, 9-10.

182 LIZE KRIEL

Floods in various parts of the country, building, roads, railways. For everything he had a ready ear. What interested him especially, however, was the election campaign between Paul Kruger and Piet Joubert. The chief and his people inferred that as long as the Boers were at loggerheads with each other they could have neither time nor inclination to worry about the Bagananwa.”

Sonntag’s efficiency as informant was confirmed when a few months later, on 16 October 1893, Mmalebogo took the initiative in obtaining news. He sent his senior chief to the mission station to find out more about the British South African Company’s war against Lobengula in Matabeleland. Sonntag told them what he knew from newspaper articles, also about the rumours that the Amandebele had sent for the Bagananwa’s assistance, which Mmalebogo’s ministers denied.74 Sonntag’s information gave Mmalebogo a broad view of political developments, even how those outside his region was also shaping the bellicose image of him and his people. Sonntag’s usefulness and cordial display stood in marked contrast to that of his predecessors.

Whereas Mmalebogo’s evasiveness tested the missionary’s disposition towards him and the Bagananwa community, the chief also had to ascertain Sonntag’s disposition towards the Boer authorities before concluding that the missionary was ‘safe’ for the Bagananwa. Their meeting of 2 1 March 1893 and another encounter on 10 June 1893, both concerning the ammunition issue, appear to have brought Mmalebogo to the conclusion that Sonntag would do nothing that jeopardized his relationship with the Boer authorities, much less risk his getting into any trouble with them. Mmalebogo learned as much when he raised the matter of guns and ammunition with the missionary.

Sonntag was well aware of Mmalebogo’s need to arm his community ‘well enough to withstand all enemies, especially the Boers’.75 Sonntag’s predecessors had themselves violated ZAR laws and engaged in arms and ammunition deals with local hunters.76 Although arms trading held certain attractions to Sonntag for gaining favour with the Bagananwa and enhancing the appeal of Christianity, Sonntag told Mmalebogo that the Bible was the only weapon he was interested in providing.77 The Bagananwa had managed to obtain their

73. 74.

75.

76.

77.

Ibid., 9. Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G . Sonntag, p. 170. See also T.R.H. Davenporf South Africa: A Modern History (London, 1991), 157-60. Sonntag, M y Friend Maleboch, 9. The translation corresponds with the original diary: TAB, A. 1281, pp. 537-538: Sendeling Christoph Sonntag, 1886-1895. Franz, ‘Mmalebogo’, 89. According to Franz, Beyer was an enthusiastic hunter and Stech was suspected of having participated in the illegal trade in guns. Sonntag was similarly suspicious: transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G . Sonntag, p. 162. TAB, A. 1281, pp. 537-538: Sendeling Christoph Sonntag. 1886-1895; Sonntag, M y Friend Maleboch, 10.

CHRISTOPH SONNTAG'S MMALEBOGO 183

weapons without the help of the missionary anyway.78 Gun-trading in present- day Botswana was thriving, and the Bagananwa had additional links with Lobedu and Venda middlemen, who bought guns from the Portuguese at Delagoa Bay. Migrant labourers to Kimberley and the Rand often returned home with firearms.79 In itself, the need for rifles and ammunition was not reason enough to justify the presence of the missionary in their midst.

In this respect the events surrounding the 10 June 1893 meeting are worth mentioning, especially since they are absent in the published translation. His original diary indicates that Sonntag had notified Mmalebogo beforehand that he intended to take his wife to Moletse for her confinement. Apart from asking Sonntag to bring him suits for two of his sons, Mmalebogo also sent him E l with which the chiefwanted the missionary to buy him bullets. For Mmalebogo, it was an opportunity to test the missionary's common sense and the extent of his diplomacy. Sonntag himself was pleased that the chief had at last formally requested something from him." But, when Sonntag reappeared at Mmale- bogo's on 10 June, he presented the chief with the two suits and returned the E l , claiming that he understood nothing about bullets and that he himself did not even own or know the working of a firearm. Mmalebogo's reaction proves that he saw straight through the missionary's act of pretended ignorance:

Cunningly he then asked if I [Sonntag] would have been able to bring him bullets if he showed me what they looked like, or whether it was rather out of fear of the government that I did not want to get involved in this matter."'

Mmalebogo had again brought Sonntag under the impression that he could neither be bluffed nor manipulated. Sonntag got the message, but remained resolute about abiding by the ZAR's rules:

In context the remark [as quoted above] sounded completely innocent; however, within it was disguised the cardinal question: 'on whose side do you think you are, the Boers, or mine, Mmalebogo?' I did not go deeper into the matter. As far as the supplying of weapons is concerned, even if it only involves bullets for hunting purposes, I will not and cannot reach a helping hand."'

78. 79. 80.

The Press, 2, 21 and 28 July 1894. Makhura, 'The Bagananwa Polity', 156. Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G . Sonntag, pp. 157, 161. These events were included in a typed, revised and considerably enlarged version of A@ Friend Muleboch, a copy of which was made available to the University of Pretoria by its editor, K. Sonntag. Ibid., p. 161 (my translation). Inid., p. 161 (my translation).

81. 82.

184 LIZE KRIEL

When Sonntag visited the chief again on 28 August 1893, he received a goat as gift? Mmalebogo approved of Sonntag’s presence in his domain in spite of very clear indications from the missionary that he would not offer the Bagananwa any military allegiance. Was it in spite of, or exactly because of, this? Mmalebogo deduced that a missionary picking a fight with the Boers did so on behalf of the chief under whose auspices the missionary was working. Sonntag had demonstrated that he was unlikely to bring such trouble on Mmalebogo. He was evidently eager to operate within the limits of the ZAR laws. If the time should come that Mmalebogo would need the services of a missionary for dealings with government officials, Sonntag seemed a suitable candidate to be approached. Towards such a missionary the Bagananwa were prepared to act quite c ~ r d i a l l y . ~ ~

The War

It was clear with the delivery of their ultimatum of 27 April 1894 to Mmalebogo that the ZAR was prepared to wage war unless their demands were met by the Bagananwa. The requirements were the same as six years before: Mmalebogo had to leave his mountain stronghold and move with his people to their allotted location, allow the taking of a census and pay the amount of tax as determined by the government. In 1894, as in 1888, Mmalebogo refused to comply with these conditions, which struck at the Bagananwa’s very political independence, social structure and culture.

At a pitso the Bagananwa decided to resist the Boers but to postpone violent confrontation as long as possible through delaying tactics.85 Mmalebogo evaded the exact demands of the April ultimatum and suggested alternatives which compelled the Boers to draft and deliver another ultimatum on 9 May and again on 6 June: he offered to pay tribute instead of poll-tax; he invited the Commissioner to negotiations; he sent gifts as peace offer.86 This succeeded only for several weeks. Smaller skirmishes had already taken place when the Boers launched their first major attack on 14 June 1894. A brief cease-fire was then called until 19 June, whereupon the Battle for Blouberg resumed.”

The Bagananwa and Sonntag communicated frequently with one another between 27 April until the fighting recommenced on 20 June. Sonntag recorded

83. Ibid., p. 164. 84.

85. 86. 87.

Sonntag, M y Friend Maleboch. 44: ‘They were friendly and modest, as the Bahananoa [sic] always are.’ Makhura, ‘The Bagananwa Polity’, 173. Sonntag, M y Friend Maleboch, 23, 32-3 and 49-50. TAB, SSA. 2, RA. 14/94, ‘ R h r n k re. Houding van Magato en Andere Kapiteins’, 20 June 1894, pp. 23-8; ‘Kort Verslag ontrent den Oorlog tegen Malaboch’, 26 June 1894, pp. 28-3 1.


seven personal meetings with Mmalebogo in his mountain capital. One of these meetings was initiated by Mmalebogo.** On two occasions the two men both realized the necessity for deliberation: as Mmalebogo was sending a messenger down to Sonntag, Sonntag was already preparing to ascend the mo~ntain.’~ Besides these personal meetings, Mmalebogo stayed in contact with Sonntag through his councillors, who went to the mission station below the mountain on at least ten occasions during this same period.”

Sonntag’s meetings with Mmalebogo and his councillors were not regarded by the missionary as serving their delaying strategy; he saw events in the context of his self-appointed mission to avoid conflict. He went about very openly in trying to convince the Bagananwa to capitulate rather than fight, telling them that he saw no other way in which peace could be preserved but to give in to the demands of the government. Sonntag argued that Mmalebogo should appear before Commissioner Vorster and ‘listen to the demands of the g~vernment’,~’ and before the pitso, Sonntag urged the Bagananwa

[to] think of the consequences they would have to bear if they refused. He, the Chief, was risking everything, not only his chiefship but also his life; he, as well as his people would lose everything, the very last head of cattle. I really said everything there was to say. I told him also that the Commissioner had instructed white mounted policemen and Black foot policemen to guard the lands and prevent harvesting by the Bahananoa [sic]. The Chief admitted that this would mean that his people would suffer hunger.”

Sonntag failed to influence the Bagananwa to change their policy, just as they failed to make him an accomplice in their delaying strategy. Because he was adamant that the Bagananwa would have to meet the government’s conditions, he refused even to write letters for them to accompany negotiating offers sent to the Commissioner on 3 May and again on 11 May.93 The fact that Sonntag preferred living in peace under ZAR control than witnessing the loss of life in a war reveals that he failed to appreciate how deeply the Bagananwa opposed losing their independence.

Mmalebogo nevertheless did not reproach Sonntag for his indifference, for the chief still had need of a missionary, even one with such failings. As Mmalebogo had remarked to Sonntag himself, he knew that the missionary was

88. 89. 90.

91. Ibid., 24-5. 92. 93. Ibid., 26, 35.

Sonntag, A+ Friend Maleboch, 3 (9 May 1894). Ibid., 28 (4 May 1894) and 49 (6 June 1894). Ibid., 26 (2 and 3 May 1894), 30 (8 May 1894), 35 ( I I May 1894). 43 (25 May 1894). 44 ( I June 1894). 45 (3 and 5 June I894), 50 (8 June 1894) and 58 ( I 3 June 1894).

Ibid., 28-9 (4 May 1894).

186 LIZE KRIEL

‘meaning it acknowledging his generally sympathetic attitude and other admirable qualities and abilities. Thus the missionary was still regarded as an appropriate candidate to serve as messenger or negotiator of the Bagananwa to the Boers. Sonntag was well acquainted with the Bagananwa territory; he knew their laws and customs; he had co-operated with the chief and his advisors for the previous two years; he had a good command of the languages of both sides. He was too valuable to Mmalebogo at that stage to be asked to vacate Blauberg. Expelling the missionary moreover might give him the opportunity to vindicate putting his services at the disposal of the Bagananwa’s enemies.

By keeping open the communication line with the missionary, Mmalebogo minimized any damage Sonntag might do while retaining the chance that the missionary could be put to some use. The chief tolerated, perhaps even fostered, Sonntag’s emotional attempts to convince them to give in to the government’s demands. As long as Sonntag believed that there was a possibility to make them change their minds and capitulate, he would be willing to visit Mmalebogo. As long as Sonntag was still willing to visit the Bagananwa capital, the possibility was still there that he could be persuaded to act as messenger to the Boers. As the fighting would have to be interrupted for the missionary to visit Mmalebo- go’s capital9’ once the war had commenced, Sonntag also had the potential to be of use to the Bagananwa in gaining time.

While the gentle tug-of-war between Mmalebogo and Sonntag continued, there was also the possibility that the missionary might come to a better understanding of the Bagananwa’s dilemma. As an African community, they could not rely upon the integrity of the ZAR government and its officials. Under the circumstances, the only kind of peace they could have hoped for was a ‘peace without honour’. In symbolic terms, they reminded Sonntag of the Mogananwa man who had submitted to the Boers and paid his taxes, but was then killed by the Boers (Sonntag understood the killing to have occurred accidently, but the Bagananwa were unconvinced of that).96 The way in which Vorster expressed his willingness to meet Mmalebogo9’ and the letter in which ZAR Commandant General P.J. (Piet) Joubert confronted the chief,98 were humiliating insults. As the Bagananwa put it often: ‘Vorster is not interested in the payment of tax: he wants only the head of the Chief.’99 Sonntag’s record

94.

95. 96. 97. 98. 99.

Transcription of TAB, A. 1281, commissioned by G . Sonntag, p. 218: ‘Mynheer, ich weiss, du meinst es gut.’ TAB, KG. 631: Commandant Generaal - Luitenant Wolmarans, 07:00, 28 July 1894. Sonntag, A@ Friend Muleboch, 30-2 (8 and 9 May 1894). Ibid., 26-7 (3 May 1894). Ibid., 49-50 (6 June 1894). Ibid., 32; see also pp. 26, 37-8 and 49.


of these viewpoints in his diary shows that even if he did not share the Bagananwa point of view, he was aware of it.

The Bagananwa’s deliberation with Sonntag was not in vain. After his initial unwillingness to serve the Bagananwa as messenger to the Boers in May, his attitude had changed remarkably a month later: Piet Joubert had arrived at Blouberg in the previous week to take command from Commissioner Vorster. Mmalebogo’s ambassadors approached Sonntag on 8 June with a white ox and E20 to be presented to Joubert. It was a gift of appeasement, the Bagananwa’s attempt to evade or postpone war, rather than adherence to the demands of the government so specifically stipulated in the Boer ultimatum. Yet Sonntag yielded and undertook the delivery of the gift in the company of ‘Sejome’ (Sekgoma), one of the chiefs ambassadors.’@’

On 13 June, Mmalebogo told two Christians, ‘Petrus’ and ‘Solomon’, to arrange, with Sonntag’s help, for the two Waterberg officials to negotiate with the government on his behalf. Knowing that Commandant Grobler and Commissioner Potgieter were more kindly disposed towards the Bagananwa than Vorster, Sonntag wrote a letter to support Solomon’s request, but the Boer attack of 14 June prevented its delivery. When Grobler and Potgieter visited the mission station on 16 June, they reacted favourably to Mmalebogo’s request. Putting them into contact with Petrus and Solomon, Sonntag rescued the peace effort. On 17 June Solomon informed Mmalebogo of Grobler and Potgieter’s conditions for mediating on his behalf: The Bagananwa had to leave the mountains and Mmalebogo had to appear in person before the general. Mmalebogo asked for a one-day truce to discuss the matter with his people. Sonntag was as convinced as Potgieter that after the loss of life in the battle of 14 June Mmalebogo would not approach Joubert, thereby rendering a cease-fire futile from a Boer point of view. But Sonntag deliberately kept his peace and thereby supported Grobler in convincing Potgieter to grant a cease-fire of two days, during which Mmalebogo offered to pay tax, but declined to meet Joubert down the mountain. Sonntag’s personal visit to his capital on 19 June could not convince Mmalebogo to meet with Grobler either. Sonntag’s aim was still the same as in May, to restore peace, but his behaviour reveals a change in attitude: not even willing to write a letter on their behalf a month previously, he had now consciously worked towards winning the Bagananwa more time.’”

Direct communication between Mmalebogo and Sonntag terminated after their meeting of 19 June - the last day of the truce. Mmalebogo had to hear from Sonntag ‘that after today I would not be able to meet him again, as it was

100. Sonntag, @ Friend Muleboch, 50; TAB, S S . 4314, R. 6197194, Landdrost Pietersburg - Commandant Generaals Kantoor, Pretoria, 12 June 1894, pp. 37-8.

101. Sonntag, @ Friend Muleboch. 58-9 and 64-70.

188 LIZE KRIEL

contrary to the rule of war. If he should later desire to confer with the whites he would have to do so direct under the protection of a white flag.”” Thereafter, Mmalebogo’s councillors no longer went to the mission station to confide in Sonntag.Io3 The result was that for almost forty days, during the most severe part of the war, there was no contact between Sonntag and the Bagananwa. When Mmalebogo asked for a meeting with the Boers on 3 , 4 and 6 July, he worked directly through one of their officers. The missionary heard about it through other so~rces . ’ ’~

In the light of Sonntag’s ‘arrangement’ with Mmalebogo to terminate contact on 19 June 1894, it is doubtful that Sonntag’s offer to make the mission station available to ZAR patients a week thereafter,’” was interpreted by Mmalebogo as a breach of trust. Sonntag’s concern during the war as a missionary wanting to keep up his image as abiding by Boer law was, although unintended, to Mmalebogo’s advantage. According to ZAR law, any missionary had the duty to report any suspicious behaviour or conspiracy by black people to the government. Failure to do so would entitle the government to regard him as an accomplice and treat him accordingly,Io6 as Sonntag was fully aware. To work among the Bagananwa, he had to retain the favour of the Boers:

Now that I saw that their [Bagananwa] prevarication apparently had no end, I realized that I should no longer be too considerate towards them, otherwise the Commissioner [Vorster] might accuse me of conspiring with the black^.'^'

A missionary found guilty of conspiracy was of little use to Mmalebogo. Even if Boer suspicion about Sonntag’s motives were too strong, they would be reluctant to allow him access to Mmalebogo. As foreseen by Mmalebogo before the war, a good relationship with the Boers remained a condition for a missionary to be useful to the Bagananwa.

Sonntag had reason to believe that, as the war proceeded, Boer suspicion of his loyalty was increasing. There were several reasons for Sonntag’s growing image as a Bagananwa accomplice. Sonntag’s relationship with the Boers before the war was courteous though not cordial. In October 1892, after he had

102. Ibid., 72. 103. Ibid., 50. The last visit, before the hostilities broke out in full scale, was recorded by Sonntag

on 8 June 1894. 104. Sonntag, @ Friend Maleboch, 87 and 92. 105. Ibid., 80 (27 June 1894). 106. Z.A.R. 25: pp. 143-144: De Locale Wetten der Z.A.R., 1849-1885, ‘Maatregelen van

voorzorg tegen bedrog en misleiding by de uitbreiding van het Evangelium onder de Heidenen’, artikels 5-7, discussed in Van der Menve, ‘Berlynse Sendinggenootskap in Transvaal’, 12-14.

107. Sonntag, @ Friend Maleboch, 41 (23 May 1894).

CHRISTOPH SONNTAG'S MMALEBOGO 189

met Commissioner Vorster, who was also a highly respected member of Boer society in the Blouberg, Sonntag did not take the trouble to call on him again until the outbreak of the war."* The frequent deliberation between Sonntag and Mmalebogo, from the delivery of the Boer ultimatum until mid-June, added to the suspicion. The Pretoria daily, The Press, reported about a 'good deal of feeling against missionaries in general' at the time.Io9 Even Sonntag's ringing of the mission station's bell summoning the Christians to morning prayers was interpreted as a warning signal to the Bagananwa on the day of the first major Boer attack.'" The general feeling came to be directed against Sonntag in person: 'three Boers ... said that they [Sonntag's Christian aides], other Christians and the mad Zendeling were solely responsible for the war ... tell the Zendeling that for him the bullet was waiting.'"' Accusations of espionage made Sonntag highly indignant: 'Besides, it was common knowledge that I had done my utmost to persuade the Bahananoa [sic] to submit peacefully. In these circumstances I deserved something better than to be suspected of espionage. ' I ' *

In order to counter this image, Sonntag played down his role in arranging the mid-June cease-fire"' and tried to secure his own position by increasing his contact and improving his relationship with Piet Joubert,'I4 who was known to have endorsed missionary work."' They first met on 5 June, a few days after the commandant general's arrival at Blouberg, when Sonntag was summoned to treat him for a spider-bite. Sonntag made use of the opportunity to assure Joubert that he had tried his utmost to 'bring the Bahananoa [sic] to reason'.II6 When Joubert recovered a week later, Sonntag visited him again, giving even stronger reassurancesof his endorsement of the government's action against Mmalebogo."' Thus, when the bell-ringing incident caused a stir a few days thereafter, Sonntag had already bargained for credibility in Joubert's eyes. The whole general staff paid a visit to the mission station on 22 June,"8 thereby sanctioning Sonntag's actions as being agreeable to the Boer leadership. On 4 July, in the midst of Boer-Bagananwafighting, Sonntag sought permission

108. Ibid. 109. 110. Sonntag, Friend Maleboch, 67. 1 1 1 . Ibid., 79. 112. Ibid., 67-8. 113. Ibid., 70. 114. Ibid., 67. I 15. J.A. Mouton, 'Generaal Piet Joubert in die Transvaalse Geskiedenis', Argiejaarboek vir Suid-

Afrikaunse Geskiedenis, 20, 1 (Pretoria, 1957), 270. 116. Sonntag, h@ Friend Maleboch, 47. 117. Ibid., 56. 118. Ibid.. 77.

The Press, 1 June 1894 and 13 July 1894.

190 LIZE KRIEL

from the Boer authorities to visit Mmalebogo and try to convince him to surrender. By then his relationship with Joubert was such that he had the candour to approach him with this request.”’

Sonntag was denied permission to go to Mmalebogo, confirming that Joubert’s confidence was not enough in itself to counter the Boer belief that his actions favoured Mmalebogo. As Sonntag could not get hold of General Joubert to make his request in person, he approached Commandant Malan of the Rustenburg Commando on 7 July. Joubert was traced at the fort of the Zoutpansberg Commando and all communication had to be conducted by heliographic equipment. This enabled a skeptical Malan to twist the course of events to suit his own view of Sonntag. He informed Joubert of Sonntag’s intended visit, but explicitly advised him against granting permission, claiming that the missionary was wasting their time. Joubert ignored Malan’s advice and agreed to grant a cease-fire so that Sonntag could visit Mmalebogo once more. Malan, however, told Sonntag that the part of the telegraph supposedly referring to a cease-fire was not very clear. He thereby dissuaded the missionary from undertaking the venture.’20

When it had become obvious that the Boers and their allies were about to overwhelm him in his capital, Mmalebogo himself took the initiative to make use of the missionary to gain time. Ironically, he, too, had to approach Malan with his request. This time Malan made no arbitrary decision, for which on Sonntag’s request he had apparently been reprimanded by the General.I2l This was Mmalebogo’s first attempt to make contact with Sonntag in more than a month. The content of his request was recorded in another of Malan’s telegrams: ‘Malaboch [sic] asks peace - to let the missionary come - I promised to get hold of the missionary and to send him in tomorrow - Malaboch [sic] wants to come out [surrender] in his company.”22 Alluding to the issue of peace, which was the goal of all Sonntag’s previous discussions with the chief, Mmalebogo made sure that Sonntag would be willing to co-operate. Indeed, when a cease-fire was granted on 28 July 1894 and Sonntag was informed about Mmalebogo’s request, he did not hesitate for a moment: ‘Thank God! ... Maleboch had now, definitely and at long last, decided to surrender ... Skipping breakfast, I immediately set off ...’.I2’

119. Ibid., 88, 93, 101. 120. Ibid., 93-5 and 101; The Press, 27 July 1894; TAB, KG 630, Commandant Malan - Comman-

dant Generaal, 7:30, Commandant Generaal -Commandant Malan, 09:OO; Commandant Malan - Commandant Generaal, 11:00, 7 July 1894.

121. Sonntag, A+ FriendMaleboch, 95, 96, 100-1. 122. TAB, KG. 631: Commandant Malan - Corrimandant Generaal, 16:00,27 July 1894 (my own

free translation). 123. Sonntag, h@ Friend Maleboch, 109.


As it turned out, Mmalebogo was unprepared to surrender, but the missionary’s visit afforded the starving women and children an opportunity to leave the mountain stronghold without the threat of being shot. As with their previous meetings, Sonntag tried his utmost to win Mmalebogo over to his point of view. He believed it would be best if Mmalebogo surrendered immediately: ‘I begged, I implored, I exhorted him to come with me now.”24 As previously, Mmalebogo was not convinced. Also at this late hour, it was not within the missionary’s power to intimidate Mmalebogo or his councillors. With his firm grasp of Sonntag’s character, Mmalebogo knew how to make the missionary change his mind; he too turned to the diplomacy of pleading: ‘... with heartrendering tone [Mmalebogo] said: “Mynheer, prove your love for me and my people, take the money with ~ O U “ . ” ~ ~ Despite his adamant resolutions to the contrary, Sonntag gave in: ‘He [Mmalebogo] had won Sonntag obeyed Mmalebogo’s request and tried to appease the (enraged) General Jou- bert with a gift of E50.I2’ Malan’s belief that the missionary was being used as an agent to play for time was confirmed.

As his authority slipped away, Mmalebogo’s ability to channel Sonntag’s activities into his own strategy also weakened. When he eventually did surrender on 3 1 July, he again requested the missionary’s presence (which might perhaps have prevented the Boers from leading him down the mountain at the end of a rope).”* The request was not granted.lZg Mmalebogo saw Sonntag for the last time on 6 August, when he could offer but a handshake and a short word of farewell. His last request to see the missionary, before the Boers took him to prison in Pretoria, was also reje~ted.’~’

From his first meeting with Mmalebogo, Sonntag acted within the framework of his subordination to ZAR laws. True to that principle, he went to great lengths to assist the destitute survivors of the war and accommodate them on the land surrounding the mission station.”’ However, there is no evidence that Sonntag had tried to get Mmalebogo released or that he had taken note of

124. 125. 126. 127.

128. 129. 130. 131.

Ibid., 115 . Ibid.. 116-17. Ibid., 117. Mmalebogo had presumably, over a long time, been collecting tribute from the Bagananwa who had eamed cash incomes on the Kimberley and Johannesburg mines: Franz, ‘Mmale- bogo’, 89. Sonntag, M y Friend Muleboch, I18 and 122. TAB, KG. 63 1 : Commandant Malan - Commandant Generaal, 08:20, 3 1 July 1894. Sonntag, M y Friend Maleboch, 129. TAB, S S . 4681, R. 1581/95, C. Sonntag - Commandant Generaal, 26 Jan. 1895, pp. 42-53.

192 LIZE KRlEL

or protested against the squalid conditions of their captivity.’12 Jmprisoned in Pretoria, Mmalebogo no longer lived or exercised authority within Sonntag’s ‘framework’. Severed from his domain and stripped of his powers, Mmalebogo was no longer in a position to make the missionary subservient to his strategies.

Conclusion

Writing a diary, diarists are the initiators of their own texts and also portray themselves as the initiators of the experiences they narrate. Sonntag ardently worked (and wrote his diary) with the conviction that his purpose in secular politics was to convince the Bagananwa that peaceful subordination was preferable to war. His European world-view barred him from perceiving this choice as the existential crisis it was to the Bagananwa. Not reacting to his initiatives the way he had expected, he exclaimed that he ‘could not fathom what they really wanted”” - not only because of his different world-view, but also because the initiatives were not always his, as he would have liked to believe. What he recorded in his diary as his actions, must also be read as responses to Mmalebogo’s incentives. Mmalebogo had such a good grasp of the motives and limitations determining Sonntag’s initiatives that he often succeeded in channelling the missionary’s actions to become serviceable to his own community: before the war as doctor, news-agent and benefactor providing Western goods; during the war as messenger and time-delaying agent. As long as Mmalebogo had his own authority, Sonntag’s good intentions with the Bagananwa and his credibility with the Boers could be aligned with the chiefs own strategy against the Boers. When Mmalebogo’s freedom and authority were taken away from him, he also lost the initiative in his interaction with Sonntag, terminating their relationship. When Sonntag asked himself: ‘Who will ever understand these pe~p le? ’ , ’ ’~ he did not realize how well he was understood by Mmalebogo, or that a reading of his own literary efforts - the painstaking recording of his observations in his diary - can provide insight into Mmale- bogo’s character and political thinking.

132. TAB, SS. 4403, R. 8527/94. Commandant Generaal - C. Sonntag, 4 Sep. 1894. p. 104; A.H. Duminy and W.R. Guest, eds, Fitzputrick: South Africun Politiciun. Selected Papers. 1888- 1906 (Johannesburg, 1976), 47 and 57.

133. Sonntag, My Friend Muleboch, 35. 134. Ibid.. 45.

christoph sonntag's mmalebogo: the missionary diary as a secular source in the reconstruction...

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