ANRV412-PL13-10 ARI 6 April 2010 16:44

Christian DemocracyStathis N. Kalyvas1 and Kees van Kersbergen2

1Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut 06510;email: stathis.kalyvas@yale.edu2Faculty of Social Sciences, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, the Netherlands;email: cj.van.kersbergen@fsw.vu.nl

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci. 2010. 13:183–209

First published online as a Review in Advance onJanuary 4, 2010

The Annual Review of Political Science is online atpolisci.annualreviews.org

This article’s doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.11.021406.172506

Copyright c© 2010 by Annual Reviews.All rights reserved

1094-2939/10/0615-0183$20.00

Key Words

European politics, political parties, Christian democratic parties,Catholic Church, religion and politics, secularization

AbstractDespite its centrality in European politics, Christian democracy cameto be the object of systematic research only recently. We review theresearch that has emerged since the mid-1990s and pinpoint its con-tributions in specifying the origins, evolution, and broader impact ofChristian democratic parties. We begin with a discussion of the ori-gins of Christian democracy and show that it is a distinctive politicalmovement; we review the state of contemporary Christian democraticpolitics, describe the impact of Christian democracy on the process ofEuropean integration, evaluate the content of the Christian democraticwelfare regime, and explore whether the European Christian demo-cratic experience travels outside Europe and Christianity, especially inthe world of political Islam. We conclude with an overview of the futureoutlook of this political movement.

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INTRODUCTION

For a long time, the most common way to be-gin a study on Christian democracy was to com-plain that this political movement was neglectedby scholars, despite its critical importance fordemocratic constitutions, party systems, andthe political-economic regimes of continentalEurope (Hanley 1994, p. 1; van Kersbergen1995, p. ix; Kalyvas 1996, p. 1; Frey 2009, p. 19–20).1 In the introduction to their edited volumeon Christian democratic parties since the endof the Cold War, Gerard & van Hecke (2004,p. 10) argue that the topic of Christian democ-racy “is as much under-researched as lackingin theoretical elaboration.” Indeed, research onChristian democracy pales when compared tothe effort that has gone into theorizing and in-vestigating empirically the twin political phe-nomena of socialism and social democracy.

This neglect is consequential. On thesubstantive side, it distorts our understandingof European politics because Christian democ-racy, with social democracy, forms the “politicalfamily” that has decisively shaped postwar Eu-ropean politics and societies, including theEuropean integration process. Clearly, it isimpossible to analyze the political history andimpact of social democracy without abundantreference to Christian democracy as its majorpolitical alternative. To put it bluntly, it is im-possible to understand contemporary Europewithout taking into account Christian democ-racy. Yet, to cite just one example, Berman’s(2006) The Primacy of Politics: Social Democracyand the Making of Europe’s Twentieth Century,fails to even mention Christian democracy, afailure that undercuts her central argumentthat Europe’s postwar period was essentially ofa social democratic nature (Lynch 2008, Muller2007). On the theoretical side, the neglect of

1Christian democratic parties also emerged in several LatinAmerican countries (most notably in Venezuela in the 1940s,Chile in the 1950s, El Salvador and Guatemala in the 1960s,and Costa Rica and Mexico in the 1980s); they remain majorpolitical players in Chile and Mexico (Mainwaring & Scully2003). Nevertheless, Christian democracy is primarily a Eu-ropean phenomenon; hence our focus on Europe.

Christian democracy reflects a deep difficultyin grasping the relationship between religionand politics in the European context, despitethe central role of religion in the emergenceof modern, secular European societies. Thisdifficulty has important implications for theway we also understand religious mobilizationin emerging democracies outside Europe.

Fortunately, since the mid-1990s, Christiandemocracy has been the focus of more researchattention than ever before. This new researchhas contributed to a much better understandingof Christian democracy: its origins, evolution,and contribution to European politics (includ-ing party and party-system formation and thepolitical economy of Western democracies), aswell as the broader theoretical issue of the re-lation between religion and politics. Ironically,however, this renewed interest coincided withwhat appeared to be an unstoppable decline ofChristian democratic parties following the endof the Cold War. As a result, the literature’s fre-quent references to Christian democracy oftenserved as a mere pretext for introducing argu-ments either about the return of social democ-racy as the presumed leading political actor inEurope or the emergence of an extreme andpopulist right prefiguring the radical reconfig-uration of European party systems. For main-stream political science, Christian democracyappeared to have become history.

This paper proceeds in seven sections. Webegin with an examination of the origins ofChristian democracy. In section two, we fo-cus on the concept of Christian democracy:Is it a distinctive political movement—and ifyes, how? In section three, we review the stateof contemporary Christian democratic politics.Section four examines the impact of Chris-tian democracy on one of the most momentousglobal developments of the twentieth century,European integration. In section five, we turnto political economy and review the Christiandemocratic welfare regime. In section six, weexplore how the European Christian demo-cratic experience travels outside Europe andChristianity. Section seven concludes with a dis-cussion of the future of Christian democracy.

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THE ORIGINS OF CHRISTIANDEMOCRACY

Contemporary Christian democratic partiesevolved from Catholic2 confessional partiescreated in the second part of the nineteenthcentury and the first part of the twentiethcentury. These parties emerged out of a largelyantiliberal and “ultramontane” (meaningleaning beyond the mountains toward Rome)mass Catholic movement that challenged theascendancy of liberalism in Europe from a“fundamentalist” and theocratic perspective (ascodified in the 1864 papal encyclical “Syllabusof Errors”). Indeed, Christian democracywas a concept coined in opposition to liberaldemocracy. Though spearheaded by theCatholic church, which feared for the loss of itsprivileges, especially in the field of education,Catholic movements gained their indepen-dence from the church through their trans-formation into parties. The Catholic churchresisted this process, which robbed it of its mo-nopolistic control over its flock, but could notthwart it because democracy provided Catholicactivists with an effective source of power andlegitimacy. Although initially ideologicallyopposed to democracy, these activists quicklyrealized that their interests lay in the consolida-tion and further expansion of parliamentary andelectoral democracy, institutions that providedthem social and political power (Kalyvas 1996).

The process through which confessionalparties were formed carried two important,though contradictory, implications. First, itturned religion into the foundational elementof confessional parties, the core of their iden-tity, but religion proved more of a hindrancethan an advantage. Second, their religious ap-peal turned these parties into highly heteroge-neous coalitions of interest groups united onlyby their initial adherence to religion; althoughthis heterogeneity increased the salience ofclass within these parties, it contributed to the

2With the exception of the Calvinist parties in theNetherlands, all other confessional parties were Catholic(Kalyvas 1996).

decrease of the salience of class in their partysystems.

The study of Christian democracy was fora long time the exclusive purview of histori-ans, typically those engaged in country-basedmonographs and in a few instances in compara-tive history (e.g., Mayeur 1980, Vecchio 1979).With few exceptions, political scientists did notstudy it (Irving 1979, Fogarty 1957). This trendwas reversed in the mid-1990s. The renewedinterest in Christian democracy had two re-lated sources. On the one hand, historians de-cided to pay more attention to a political move-ment that had always played second fiddle to itscompetitors—fascism, communism, socialism,and liberalism. Historians asked the provocativequestion whether Dahrendorf’s (1980) state-ment, that the social democratic century hadcome to an end by the late 1970s, was wrongin the sense that such a century had never ex-isted in the first place. The twentieth centuryobviously was above all a fascist and commu-nist era. Moreover, the postwar era in demo-cratic Western Europe was above all a periodof Christian democratic primacy, in contrastto what the dominant social scientific clicheimplies. Most decisively, Kaiser & Wohnout(2004b, p. 1) challenge the mainstream viewof the postwar era by pointing to the crucialrole of Christian democratic parties in anchor-ing new party systems in postwar Europe; inlegitimizing the market economy through so-cial security and welfare provisions and the in-troduction of corporatist forms of consensualsocioeconomic policy making; and in endingnational frictions and rivalries by constructingthe supranational European Union of the earlytwenty-first century.

In what is, perhaps, the most systematicanalysis of the origins of Christian democraticparties in the nineteenth century, Kalyvas(1996) analyzed the formation of confessionalparties in five European countries (Belgium,the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Italy)and the failure of such a party to effectivelyemerge in France. He called attention toan empirical paradox: Confessional partiesemerged not as a direct result of the will of

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the organized church, but in opposition to it.Likewise, these parties were not merely the re-sort of unsuccessful politicians looking for newpolitical vehicles; they were formed, instead,in opposition to existing conservative parties.To help make sense of this paradox, Kalyvasspecified a rationalist model of party formation,stressing the contingent and unintended out-comes of strategic moves made by the Catholicchurch and conservative politicians in responseto liberal anticlericalism and the rise of masspolitics during the late nineteenth century.Cost-benefit considerations by the church andthe conservatives led them both to oppose theformation of confessional parties. In light of theliberal assault, the church reluctantly opted foran interest-group strategy of mass mobilizationshort of party formation. The church tradition-ally controlled its members through hierarchyand centralization, and it correctly anticipatedthat the formation of mass organizations and apolitical party would break this unity and sub-vert the hierarchy by allowing the lower clergyand lay Catholics to become independent ofthe episcopate. However, mass organizationscould be kept on a tight leash. Meanwhile, con-servative politicians who were losing groundin the emerging democratic competition sawthe newly formed church organizations asrepositories of compliant local organizers andvoters. They also feared that the permanentpoliticization of religion and the associationwith the church would restrict their autonomy.

Although both church and conservatives op-posed the formation of confessional parties,they chose a course of action that led to the re-alization of this unwanted outcome. First, thechurch launched a mass social movement to de-fend itself from the liberal onslaught. Provokedby the increasing anticlericalism of the liber-als, this movement became politicized after thechurch decided to use it in support of thoseconservative politicians who agreed to defendthe church’s interests. The unexpected electoralsuccess of these prochurch coalitions providedthe means for the political emancipation ofCatholic activists from the church and the con-servative politicians. In other words, electoral

success provided the mechanism of transitionto the formation of confessional parties. Theformation of confessional parties reinforced adistinctive Catholic political identity, which notonly reinterpreted Catholicism in much lessdoctrinal terms but also started to challengethe religious primacy of the church in politicalmatters. As a result, political Catholicism be-came separated from the church and religion,and “[t]hus, in a paradoxical way, the politiciza-tion of religion contributed to the seculariza-tion of politics” (Kalyvas 1996, p. 245). In thisaccount, religion was primarily an electoral andorganizational asset, while the creeping trans-formation from elite to mass politics took thefirst movers by surprise and contributed to theemergence of a new political actor that was fullycompatible with the realities of a new politicalage.

WHAT IS CHRISTIANDEMOCRACY?

Until recently, political scientists tended todeny any distinctive character to Christiandemocracy. The name itself was seen as a bizarrebut ultimately inconsequential label for “plainvanilla,” middle-of-the-road, conservative par-ties, primarily characterized by pragmatism andopportunism.3 Because Christian democracywas not distinctive, there was no Christiandemocratic phenomenon and hence no need tostudy it.

This view was eventually challenged by stud-ies that established the existence of a Chris-tian democratic phenomenon and analyzed itfrom a theoretical and comparative perspective(van Kersbergen 1995; Kalyvas 1996, 1998a).The Christian democratic phenomenon canbe broadly thought to rest on two pillars: aheightened capacity of Christian democraticparties to accommodate heterogeneous groups

3Indeed, Christian democracy still tends to be treated asrather nondistinctive in such otherwise excellent handbooks,such as Kriesi’s et al. (2008) overview of European politicsand Katz & Crotty’s (2006) handbook on party politics.

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and sectors, which gave rise to an early and pro-nounced “catch-all” profile; and a creative abil-ity to both retain and tone down their religiousidentity, which was an essential feature in theirformation.

Perhaps the first systematic exploration ofthe distinctive elements of Christian democracywas that of Irving (1979, p. xviii–xix), who listedseveral principles of distinctiveness, includingthe Christian commitment to elementary hu-man rights, liberal democratic values, and classand transnational reconciliation. Building onthis, van Kersbergen (1994, 1995, 1999) ar-gued that the key concepts that made Christiandemocracy distinctive were integration, (class)compromise, accommodation, and pluralism.In his view, it was the continuous effort to inte-grate and reconcile a plurality of societal groups(or nations, in the context of European integra-tion) whose interests were often at odds thatmade Christian democracy a distinct politicalmovement.

In this framework, pragmatism and oppor-tunism could be interpreted as effects of valuessuch as integration, reconciliation, accommo-dation, and pluralism. It is likely that it was thisdimension of the Christian democratic move-ment that made it so hard to grasp—a dimen-sion that grew from the unusual organizationalstructure of this movement: internally dividedinto institutionalized factions or wings, havingclose organizational links with labor unions aswell as employers, farmers, women’s organiza-tions, and youth organizations.

The cause of this heterogeneity was anideological appeal that emphasized religion atthe expense of class. However, external inter-classism produced internal classism. PowerfulCatholic workers’ and peasants’ associationshad to be incorporated into the new parties,which ended up adopting a peculiar confed-erate structure based on organizations definedin terms of class (standen or lager). The en-suing conflicts gave rise to intensely accom-modationist and consociational practices thatwere necessary for ensuring the parties’ unityand cohesion. Mediation between these diver-gent and increasingly assertive interest groups

was imperative. As a result, Christian demo-cratic parties have displayed extreme skill indeploying and managing the politics of media-tion (van Kersbergen 1994), which their oppo-nents have derided as opportunism and a belief“that the ends justify the means.” The princi-ple of subsidiarity (higher authorities, such asthe state, should intervene only where individu-als or smaller communities are not competent),which is central in the process of European in-tegration, can also be traced back to these de-velopments (van Kersbergen & Verbeek 1994,2004). Last, the ability to accommodate diver-gent class interests within the party produceda heightened capacity to successfully appealacross classes and sectors. In van Kersbergen’s(1994) words, Christian democracy was a catch-all party avant la lettre.

This observation implies that the politicaloutlook of the Christian democratic partieswas determined by the actual balance of powerwithin it, and, as far as the movement succeededin mirroring society at large, within the nationalcommunity as well. In that respect, policy varia-tion across Christian democratic parties can beseen as a reflection of the intraparty balance ofpower.

Beyond its seemingly inherent pragmatism,it was the relation of Christian democracy to re-ligion that puzzled many observers. The move-ment’s name refers to Christianity and, by di-rect implication, to religion. Yet there is alsoa general consensus that Christian democracyshould not be confused with the official church,or even with Catholic culture in general (vanKersbergen 1995, 1999). Social Catholic polit-ical ideology goes far beyond the teachings ofthe Catholic church (the “grand tradition”) be-cause Christian democratic political and socialmovements clearly transcend the church’s so-cial and political theory and practice (the “littletradition”; see van Kersbergen 1995, ch. 10).

Prewar confessional parties, albeit friendlyto religion, avoided an institutional and ideo-logical association with the church. Likewise,the church could only protect its universal-istic identity by moving away from a directand daily involvement in politics. However, the

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confessional character of these parties could notbe shed because religion had become the ce-ment that kept their heterogeneous social basetogether. The quandary was solved in an inge-nious and momentous way. Confessional par-ties redefined religion into a nebulous human-itarian and moral concept that allowed them tobe simultaneously Christian and secular. Vagueformulations such as “religious inspiration” or“values of Christian civilization” are today thesole references to religion in the official dis-course of these parties. It is now perfectly pos-sible to be simultaneously a Christian democratand an agnostic, atheist, Muslim, or Hindu—and this is not even perceived as a contradic-tion. (In fact, this “contradiction” fuels one ofthe main objections that smaller, more ortho-dox Christian parties, like the Dutch ChristianUnion, voice against Christian democracy.)

The paradox of allegedly religious partiesgoverning highly secular societies, adoptingsecular policies, and distancing themselves fromthe church led to the characterization of Chris-tian democratic parties as opportunistic orga-nizations whose relation to religion was mean-ingless at best and misleading at worst. Hencethe issue: Either the contemporary Christiandemocratic parties’ religious profile is mean-ingless, in which case one must explain the la-bel’s persistence in a very secular context; or it isconsequential, in which case it seems irrational,as it would undermine these parties’ electoralappeal.

Explicit references to religion are scarce andperceived as risky given the highly secularizedEuropean electorates. The Scandinavian Chris-tian democratic parities provide an interest-ing, albeit limited, contrast. These parties areboth more religious and more leftist than theircounterparts elsewhere in Europe. However, asthey have become more successful, they havetoned down their religious message in an effortto capture the median voter, thus approachingthe mainstream Christian democratic model(Madeley 2004).

Placing religion front and center would im-ply that Christian democracy could never be-come a true catch-all party—especially in a

secular context where the mobilizing power ofthe church has declined considerably. Indeed,appealing to religion or confession may scareaway nonreligious voters or voters with a dif-ferent creed. In a nation where, say, 30%–40%of the population claim Catholic church mem-bership, a party that exclusively tries to mo-bilize religious voters on the basis of religiousappeals can never hope to win a parliamentarymajority. However, broadening the party’s ap-peal to include nonreligious voters or mem-bers of different creeds entails a serious riskbecause Christian democracy likely encoun-ters a trade-off quite similar to the one facedby social democracy. Paraphrasing Przeworski(1985), this trade-off could be expressed as fol-lows: When Christian democratic parties directtheir efforts to mobilizing the support of non-religious allies, they find it increasingly difficultto recruit and maintain the support of the reli-giously inspired voters. Such a dilemma, how-ever, would be relevant only if we assume thecontinuing salience of religion as an electoralmobilizer, that is, under conditions of marginalor constrained secularization. This implies thatif Christian democratic parties can be con-sidered catch-all parties at all (Krouwel 1999,2003), they could only have become catch-allparties in the late 1960s and early 1970s, whenthe process of secularization really started to af-fect political affiliation. In other words, a theoryof Christian democracy has to consider both thepolitical salience of religion and the aftermathof secularization.

At the same time, religion has also been avehicle of general political appeal, precisely be-cause it transcends class. Christian democracyhas always had strong social integrative capaci-ties by virtue of its (religiously inspired) politi-cal ideology. With respect to the topic of polit-ical democracy and electoral competition, oneof the main differences between social democ-racy and Christian democracy is that the for-mer’s vehicle for mass support was the appealto class as a principal base for political artic-ulation, while the latter employed a religiousappeal to cut across class cleavages. What there-fore seems cataclysmic for social democracy is

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beneficial for Christian democracy. To put itdifferently, what is a trade-off in social demo-cratic politics may involve a payoff for Christiandemocracy. By stressing the cross-class natureof the movement, Christian democratic par-ties managed to attract voters by appealingto “catholicity” in its literal sense. Christiandemocracy’s choice or problem has not beenwhether to seek support exclusively in one classor to rely on multi- or even nonclass forces,but rather how to formulate and implement afeasible mediation between the various layersof society, whether these are defined as classesor not. Of course, this was possible in secular-izing societies, where a toned-down version ofreligion could attract many more voters thanit lost.

As for the catch-all character of Christiandemocracy, it was not so much an effect ofthe transformation of Western European partysystems and of the growing intensity of elec-toral competition, as Kirchheimer (1966) ar-gued, but rather the manifestation of the waythe religiously inspired political ideology wasmade ready for the electoral battle. Althoughthe Christian democratic parties of continen-tal Western Europe are in several respects veryclose to Kirchheimer’s catch-all party, not allcatch-all parties are the same; the empirical evi-dence suggests that each has a distinctive profilethat takes advantage of their pragmatic, oppor-tunistic, and reformist tradition (Krouwel 2003,Frey 2009). The logic of electoral competitionforced Christian democratic parties to moder-ate the conflicts between capital and labor inorder to attract voters from the ranks of work-ers more easily. At the same time, these partiestried to stabilize other social and cultural cleav-ages that were beneficial to them. Christiandemocrats tend to choose those issues that ap-pear to be particularly apt to mitigate traditionalsocioeconomic cleavages and keep the sociocul-tural lines of conflict constant (Schmidt 1985,p. 390; Frey 2009, pp. 36–38). In short,Christian democratic parties have parlayedtheir religious background into a unique advan-tage in societies where a class compromise wasboth feasible and beneficial.

What is the relationship between postwarChristian democratic parties and prewar con-fessional parties? Two views have emerged fromthe literature. According to the first one, eventhough modern Christian democratic partiesare the heirs of the older religious (primarilyCatholic) parties, they were built up anew afterWorld War II as fully democratic and centristpolitical parties. It was only then that they ac-quired their distinctive character as religiouslyinspired, yet secular, parties that fully acceptedparliamentary democracy (Warner 2000,Conway 2003, Gehler & Kaiser 2004, Kaiser& Wohnout 2004a, Frey 2009). In that lineof thought, Frey (2009) distinguishes be-tween “pure” religious parties and Christiandemocratic parties proper on the basis of the an-alytical difference Lane & Ersson (1999) madebetween structural parties, which are basedon social cleavages, and nonstructural parties,which attempt to bridge social-structuralconflicts. Based on the Comparative ManifestoData (Budge et al. 2001, Klingemann et al.2006) and the Comparative Political Data Set(Armingeon et al. 2006), which in different wayscharacterize the organization, political ideol-ogy, electoral appeal, and government potentialof major political parties in democracies, Frey(2009) defines and classifies Christian demo-cratic parties empirically as nonstructural par-ties. These parties, which usually pick the label“Christian-democratic,” share the features ofan ideology aimed at conflict accommodation;they are internationally connected through theChristian Democratic International (currentlyCentrist Democrat International) and, in theEuropean context, via the European People’sParty (the largest political party in the Euro-pean Parliament). Based on these criteria, Freyidentifies 16 Christian democratic parties in 13European countries (see Table 1).

According to Frey, religious parties havetheir roots in traditional cleavage conflicts,whereas Christian democratic parties foster anideology that transcends cleavage-based pol-itics and has as its primary aim the mediationof cleavage-based conflicts (e.g., class conflict).With this distinction, he arrives at a position

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Table 1 Contemporary Christian democratic parties in Europea

Country PartyAustria Osterreichische Volkspartei, OVP (Austrian People’s Party)Belgium Christelijke Volkspartij, CVP (Christian People’s Party, Flemish; currently Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams,

CD&V)

Parti Social-Chretien, PSC (Social Christian Party, Walloon; currently Centre Democrate Humaniste)Denmark Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF (Christian People’s Party; currently Kristendemokraterne)Finland Suomen Kristillinen Liitto, SKL (Christian League; currently Kristillisdemokraatit)Germany Christlich-Demokratische Union, CDU (Christian Democratic Union); Christlich-Soziale Union, CSU

(Christian-Social Union, Bavaria)Ireland Fine Gael (Tribe of the Irish)Italy Partito Popolare Italiano, PPI-DC (Italian People’s Party); Centro Cristiano Democratico, CCD (Christian

Democratic Center; currently merged into the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani e Democratici di Centro, UDC)Luxembourg Chretschtlech Sozial Vollekspartei, CSV (Christian-Social People’s Party)Netherlands Christen-Democratisch Appel, CDA (Christian Democratic Appeal)Norway Kristelig Folkeparti, KrF (Christian People’s Party)Portugal Partido Popular/CDS-PP (Center Social Democrats/People’s Party)b

Sweden Kristdemokratiska Samhallspartiet, KdS (Christian Democratic Community Party; currently Kristdemokraterna)Switzerland Christlich-Demokratische Volkspartei, CVP (Christian Democratic People’s Party)

aAdapted from Frey (2009, p. 50).bFrey included, despite its name, the Portuguese Partido Popular/Center Social Democrats. It is controversial, but we think he is correct. In its politicalmanifesto of 1993, the party explicitly describes itself as Christian democratic, although the party’s statement of principles does not contain any referenceto Christian democratic ideology or tradition (see various documents at http://www.cds.pt, accessed Dec. 16, 2009).

similar to that of recent historical analyses thatstress the discontinuity between pre–WorldWar I and interwar confessional parties andpostwar Christian democracy. Indeed, severalhistorians have expressed skepticism about whatthey see as a “teleological interpretation” ofEuropean Christian democracy (Conway 2003;Kaiser & Wohnout 2004b, p. 2). These histo-rians present their work in contrast to politicalscience studies and emphasize that for modernpostwar Christian democracy to emerge, aradical break with its social Catholic, anticap-italist, and antidemocratic past had to takeplace. Thus, Conway (2003, p. 46) calls for ananalysis of Christian democracy that “while notneglecting its long-term origins and initial ide-ological character, resituates it in the immediatecontext of postwar Europe.” Partly, the criticalattitude toward “teleology” must be seen as aresponse to the sometimes overly enthusiastic,essentialist, and almost hagiographic historiesof Christian democracy written by Christiandemocrats themselves, including the otherwise

informative early studies by Einaudi & Goguel(1952) and Fogarty (1957), as well as the morerecent study by Durand (1995) (for a conciseoverview see Gerard & van Hecke 2004, pp. 12–18). The main worry here is that teleologicalinterpretations give rise to a retrospective nar-rative of a long-term democratic commitment,social compassion, and solidarity of Christiandemocrats, which distorts the reality of a pres-ence (if not dominance) within these parties ofantidemocratic, anti-Semitic, anticapitalist, an-tiparliamentary, corporatist, and authoritarianforces throughout much of their history.

Yet, pointing to continuities between pre-war confessional parties and postwar Chris-tian democratic parties should not be confusedwith a teleological reading of the Christiandemocratic phenomenon. According to Kalyvas(1996; see also Cary 1996, Leonardi & Alberti2004), the process of party formation had far-reaching political consequences that underlinean important continuity between the older con-fessional parties and contemporary Christian

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democratic ones. Take, for instance, the “catch-all” character of the postwar parties. Becauseprewar confessional parties were formed on thebasis of religious rather than class appeals, theywere socially heterogeneous from their very in-ception; and because they were built on topof mass corporate organizations formed by theCatholic church, they had to manage daily in-ternal class compromises, so they naturally be-came catch-all parties with a sensitive ear to-ward compromise.

Ultimately, perceptions of continuity anddiscontinuity are not as far apart as often imag-ined. No one would challenge the fact that post-war Christian democratic parties look very dif-ferent from their prewar predecessors; likewise,it would be difficult to deny that key elementsof their outlook, like their social concern, canbe traced back to their origins. In fact, no polit-ical scientist active in this field would disagreethat “there needs to be recognition that Chris-tian Democracy was not a uniform movementthat arrived ‘ready made’ in the history of post-1945 Europe but a dynamic and evolving phe-nomenon that was molded more by circum-stance than by intent” (Conway 2003, p. 47).Kalyvas’ (1998) stylized political account of therise of Christian democracy revolves around theparadox that Christian democracy was the “con-tingent outcome of strategic decisions made bypolitical actors, rather than the product of theseactors’ intentions and plans” (p. 294). Overall,it is fair to say that this debate reflects cross-disciplinary sensitivities; different degrees ofgenerality and theorization are acceptable inhistory versus political science.

In summary, whether initiated by politicalscientists or historians, the combination of his-torical, comparative, and theoretical methodsin the study of Christian democracy has beenbeneficial; it has facilitated the identification ofChristian democracy’s distinctive features notonly as a vote-seeking and office-seeking ac-tor but also as a policy-oriented political move-ment. Christian democracy has tended to relyon social policies with broad cross-class ap-peal in order to accumulate power, for whichthe religious appeal was beneficial. Its distinc-

tiveness was reflected in its political ideologyand through it in the social-policy regimes itfostered.

The identification of the distinctive charac-ter of Christian democratic parties helped re-verse a view that dominated political scienceuntil the mid-1990s. It should be now estab-lished that Christian democratic parties werenot merely pragmatic and opportunistic con-servative parties that went by another name.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATICPOLITICS IN CONTEMPORARYEUROPE

The national political profile of contempo-rary Christian democratic parties hinges onhow these parties translate and modify withintheir own organization the structure of conflictsfound in their national contexts (van Kersber-gen 1995, 1999). The analysis of how Christiandemocratic parties have evolved since the endof the Cold War, as reflected in the case stud-ies assembled by van Hecke & Gerard (2004),stresses the importance of historical context as akey factor for explaining the variation of Euro-pean experiences: the speed with which the Ital-ian Partito della Democrazia Cristiana (DC)4

collapsed in the 1990s (Leonardi & Alberti2004); the remarkable stability of the GermanCDU after reunification, as well as its suddendecline and its recent apparent recovery (Bosch2004); the fact that in 2002 the OVP became thestrongest Austrian party, with 42% of the vote,for the first time since 1966 (Fallend 2004); thesmall but increasing importance of the Chris-tian parties in Scandinavia (Madeley 2004);the repeated inability of Christian democratsin France to become an independent politi-cal force (Massart 2004); the failure of Span-ish Christian democracy (Matuschek 2004); thewild electoral and power swings of Christiandemocracy in the Netherlands (Lucardie 2004);the diverging paths of the Flemish-speaking

4Acronyms not defined in this paragraph are defined inTable 1.

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and French-speaking Christian democratic par-ties in Belgium (Beke 2004); and the success ofChristian democracy at the European level (vanHecke 2004).

Despite all this variation, there are impor-tant similarities that allow some generaliza-tions. In the recent history of Christian democ-racy, the main commonality is the survival of apolitical movement that should have been ex-tinct a long time ago according to seculariza-tion theory. Likewise, it is possible to say thatthe prediction of a decisive decline of Chris-tian democratic parties following the end of theCold War has been falsified. Cyclical downturnis a more correct characterization as the elec-toral disasters of the early and mid-1990s werereversed and most Christian democratic par-ties rose from their deathbeds, to use Lucardie’s(2004) apt metaphor. Italy proved to be an out-lier rather than a portent of things to come, asmany thought at the time.

To be sure, tracking the medium-term for-tunes of political parties is like aiming at amoving target. It is exceedingly hard to distin-guish deeper trends from much more commoncyclical ones, the conjectural changes from thestructural ones, the idiosyncratic and particularfeatures from the general and universal ones,the causal effects from the correlational ones.It is also hard to synthesize divergent nationaltrends into clear common patterns. At the sametime, it is also necessary to try to inductively dis-tinguish what appear to be the most interestingpatterns. Three emerge: stability, collapse, andvolatility.

Although we cannot discuss every case here,the German, Italian, and Dutch experiences de-serve special attention as intriguing instancesof variation. The decline of German Christiandemocracy began comparatively late but has notled to political insignificance. The decline ofItalian Christian democracy, in contrast, wasinitially hardly perceptible, but then sudden anddramatic, such that by 2008 only remnants ofa once-dominant party could be traced. TheDutch Christian democratic experience is oneof wild swings: steady decline, sudden recovery,decay again, and finally revitalization.

In the late 1980s, Christian democracy inGermany faced organizational, ideological, andelectoral problems that were very similar tothose of parties in other countries: loss of vot-ers and of political and governmental domi-nance, especially at the “Lander” level (Bosch2004). Secularization; the dwindling effect ofanticommunism; the transformation of tradi-tional values; poor economic circumstances;conflicts with the peace movement, the unions,and the churches; an unpopular leadership—all these factors added to the expectationthat the end of the Christlich DemokratischeUnion Deutschlands/Christlich-Soziale Union(CDU/CSU) was near. However, Chancel-lor Kohl’s CDU/CSU won the 1990 electionwith 43.8% of the vote, just 0.5% short ofhis score in the 1987 elections and >10%more than the main rival party, the socialdemocratic SPD (Sozialdemokratische ParteiDeutschlands). The German unification clearlycontributed to the unexpected victory of theGerman Christian democrats, who, probablyfor the final time, were able to play the an-ticommunism card. The inclusion of the Eastinto the German political system provided newvoters for the CDU. Traditional cleavages (reli-gion more than class) hardly mattered for thesenew voters. Instead, they picked the party thatoffered the best deal for a rapid assimilationinto West Germany. Bosch (2004, p. 59) ob-serves that between 1990 and 1994, “the CDUbecame the party of the Catholic and econom-ically powerful South and the poor atheisticEast.” The unique conditions of German pol-itics helped delay the effects of what appearsto have been the normal cause of decline ofChristian democracy in other countries, namelythe end of the Cold War (Keman & Pennings2006). However, the unification effect ran outof steam by the late 1990s. In fact, the Kohlgovernment was blamed for having underes-timated the costs of unification and for beingresponsible for mass unemployment (11% na-tionally, but a high 20% in the Eastern part),which turned into the main campaign issue in1998. At the elections of that year, the CDU suf-fered a significant drop (5.8%), and although

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its Bavarian sister party CSU managed to re-tain its vote share (down only 0.6%), the com-bined Christian democratic strength at the fed-eral level went down to a historic low of 35.2%.Christian democracy was out of power whena “red-green” coalition was formed betweensocial democrats and the Greens. In opposi-tion, Christian democracy gained back someof its strength and reached 38.5% of the votein the 2002 elections, exactly the same scoreobtained by the social democrats. The 2005elections were disappointing for the Christiandemocrats, who again lost votes (35.2%), butso did the social democrats, adding to the frag-mentation of the German party system andmaking it extremely difficult to assemble a win-ning coalition of either the center-left or thecenter-right. As a result and out of necessity,therefore, a Grand Coalition between Christiandemocracy and social democracy was forgedwith a Christian democratic chancellor at thehelm (Clemens 2007). The recent electoraloutcomes for Christian democracy and socialdemocracy in Germany and the rise of newpolitical parties [the Greens in the 1980s andthe Left Party (PDS/Die Linke) (Partei desDemokratischen Sozialismus) more recently]seem to fit the general trend in Europe: a polit-ical convergence between traditional mass par-ties of the center-left and the center-right, whilethe center declines as a result of rising electoralvolatility and the increasing strength of chal-lengers on both the left and the right. This trendis particularly strong in countries where Chris-tian democracy and social democracy have tra-ditionally been the main competitors for power.Both seem to be losing their role as pivotal pow-ers in the party systems in which they operate(Keman & Pennings 2006).

The case that contrasts most sharply withthe German developments concerns the Ital-ian DC (Partito della Democrazia Cristiana).On average, and until 1992 (excluding the one-time high of 48.5% at the elections of 1948),the DC’s share of the popular vote was al-most 34%. Then, in 1992, the party suddenlywon <30% of the vote, although the Christiandemocrats remained in government. Between

1992 and 1994, the whole Italian party systemcollapsed and with it the DC, which explodedin a plethora of small successors that never at-tained anywhere near the former strength ofthe DC. Leonardi & Alberti (2004) argue thatthe systematic failure of the DC’s political elitesto maintain the productivity of the consocia-tional construct of their party, their continuedeffort to deal in mutually advantageous com-promises and exchanges with coalition partners(especially the socialists), and their neglect ofpolitical fragmentation inside and outside theparty (e.g., the emergence of a regional con-tender) made the party unable to respond ade-quately to a series of crises, challenges, and po-litical changes that even a well-disciplined partywould have found difficult to surmount. Suchdevelopments include generally relevant eventssuch as the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapseof the Soviet Union, the international finan-cial crisis, the formulation and implementationof the European Monetary Union criteria, on-going secularization, and the rise of a populistmovement, as well as specifically Italian circum-stances: the mani pulite (clean hands) corruptionscandal, the introduction of a largely majoritar-ian electoral system, and the drifting apart of,on the one hand, the Catholic subculture andthe church, and on the other hand, the politi-cians of the DC. In the elections of 1994 (underthe new electoral system that forced parties toform electoral blocs), the Partito Popolare Ital-iano (the DC’s successor) won only 11.1%, andthe centrist “pole” of which it was part won amere 15.8%. Since then, the Christian demo-cratic legacy has been scattered over several par-ties that participate in diverging political blocsor poles, and at least two parties claim to bethe real Italian Christian democratic party (seeTable 1).

The Dutch main Protestant and Catholicparties recovered from the crisis of confes-sional politics in the 1960s and 1970s by merg-ing into a single new party, the Christen-Democratisch Appel (CDA). This party wasmore distinctively Christian democratic than itspredecessors in its social-policy profile and itscross-confessional and cross-class appeal. The

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new Christian democracy radically broke withconfessionalism, diluted denominational differ-ences between Catholics and Protestants, andproved successful in the 1980s. By the end ofthe era, the party had become the most pow-erful one, earning 35.3% of the vote in 1989.In the next two elections (1994, 1998), how-ever, the party lost an unprecedented 16.9%of the vote, its membership was drained, andthe party lost its pivotal role in coalition build-ing. In 1994, for the first time in 76 years, theChristian democrats failed to become part ofthe government. The CDA was forced to actas the major opposition party until 2002. Be-ing removed from the national center of powerimplied that it became more difficult to holdonto power at the regional and local levels(Duncan 2006, 2007). At first, the liberal rightand center-right profited from the electoralhemorrhage of the Christian democrats, but inthe late 1990s voters shifted to the left for an al-ternative (Lucardie 2004, p. 161). Many an obit-uary was written in those days for Dutch Chris-tian Democracy, but unpredictably the CDA’selectoral appeal was re-established in the early2000s, and the party became once again thebiggest in Parliament. The CDA in 2006 re-gained ∼80% of its parliamentary power of1989, and with that it could recapture the piv-otal position in coalition building.

As in other countries (and as for other par-ties), one of the main political problems ofChristian democracy in the Netherlands hasbeen to craft a convincing and electorally ap-pealing program of socioeconomic adjustmentto the new (international) economic conditionsand of welfare-state reform. The party used itsforced sojourn in opposition during the 1990sto try to revitalize its ideology, policy platform,organization, and strategies (see van Kersber-gen 2008). However, as elsewhere, this task wasseriously hindered by structural weaknesses re-lating to secularization, the decline of politicallyexpressive and fairly fixed collective identities,the ill-adapted nature of its own preferred so-cial and political model, and the loss of socialembeddedness. In the end, the CDA came upwith a modernized political ideology with roots

in the Christian democratic tradition, but it alsostarted to incorporate mainstream conservative,market-liberal proposals. None of this seemedparticularly convincing to the voters or couldaddress effectively the structural weaknesses ofthe party.

However, as in Germany and Italy, country-specific developments helped the Christiandemocrats to recover from their identity crisis.In the Dutch case, it was the arrival of right-wing populism that proved oddly beneficialfor Christian democracy. As elsewhere in theWestern world, political distrust and dissat-isfaction had been growing in the Nether-lands for some time, a trend whose depth wasmissed by the main parties. In the early 2000s,Pim Fortuyn, a political entrepreneur, beganto politicize the diffuse popular discontent andantielitism, predominantly targeting the rulingcoalition of social democrats and market liber-als. The populist challenge suddenly providedthe Christian democrats with an opportunity toescape electoral marginalization by also exploit-ing the surfacing political discontent to theiradvantage. A drastic change in the Christiandemocratic approach was the successful strat-egy of harvesting the growing dissatisfactionwith immigration and pushing for the integra-tion of the Muslim minority (van Kersbergen& Krouwel 2008). To some extent, then, the re-covery of Dutch Christian democracy, despitestructural weaknesses not unlike those expe-rienced in other countries, was contingent onthe shocking assassination of the populist PimFortuyn, a development that abruptly shiftedthe opportunity structure to the advantageof Christian democracy in 2002 (Pennings &Keman 2003, van Holsteyn et al. 2003).

Significantly, we find no instances of par-ties in Central and Eastern Europe that comenear the success of contemporary Christiandemocracy in, say, Germany or the Nether-lands.5 Why? One relatively straightforward

5The Czech Christian and Democratic Union (KDU-CSL)won 7.2% of the vote in 2006, and the Slovak Democraticand Christian Union (SDKU-DS), arguably one of the mostelectorally successful parties so far, won 18.4% in 2006.

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answer is that because this region includes Eu-rope’s most secularized countries, the electoralchances for any political party appealing to re-ligion were dim from the outset. As Bale &Szczerbiak (2008) correctly note, this reason-ing leaves out one puzzling case: Poland. Thisis a country where virtually the entire popula-tion is Catholic, half of whom regularly attendchurch; where a large proportion of the popula-tion is employed in agriculture; where there ex-ists a strong, socially conservative union move-ment; and where an anticlerical left emerged inthe early 1990s. These are conditions thoughtfavorable for Christian democratic parties toemerge and thrive (Kalyvas 1996, Frey 2009).There were indeed many attempts to estab-lish self-proclaimed Christian democratic par-ties in the early 1990s, yet the closest parties toemerge were either fully religious parties (suchas the Christian National Union) or nonreli-gious center-right/right-wing parties. In short,no successful Christian democracy arose inPoland.

Of the factors identified that account for theemergence and success of Christian democracyin continental Europe, only two were present inPoland: a high number of practicing Catholicsand the presence of an anticlerical left. Therewere five reasons for Christian democracy’s fail-ure in Poland. First, parts of Christian democ-racy’s core constituencies were either missingor fiercely competed for by other parties (e.g.,female voters disproportionately do not votefor the center-right, and an agrarian party at-tracts the peasant vote). Second, potential com-petitors on the right were not discredited byassociation with the totalitarian past. Third,the Catholic hierarchy was unwilling to back asingle Christian democratic party. Fourth, themost important civil-society organization, thelabor union Solidarity, refused to support anyof the center-right political parties. Finally, de-spite anticlericalism, there was no specific needfor an actor to defend the church’s interests,as nearly all political parties of the center-rightwere committed to Christian values and sympa-thetic to the church’s social and political agenda.

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY ANDEUROPEAN INTEGRATIONRecently, considerable attention has been paidto the role of Christian democracy in interna-tional politics, particularly in European inte-gration (see particularly Kaiser’s 2007 tour deforce). Christian democrats can credibly claimthe paternity of the idea of European integra-tion, both as a solution to war and as an an-swer to international coordination problemsthat hampered economic and social prosper-ity. They take pride in the success of “therisky undertaking of European integration: theprocess by which national sovereignty is re-nounced in order to stimulate and improvethe quality of the rule of law in the commonterritory” (Oostlander 2003, p. 131). Thereare legitimate reasons for their pride. Oneexample is the Secretariat International desPartis Democratiques d’Inspiration Chretienne(SIPDIC), founded in 1925, whose core issuewas pro-Europeanism, particularly focusing onFranco-German reconciliation (van Kemseke2006, p. 28; Kaiser 2007). Referring to Chris-tian democratic politicians during the interwarperiod, Pulzer (2004, p. 21) advises us to “rec-ognize the extent to which the idea of politi-cal action beyond the boundaries of the nation-state was alive in those decades and how manyof those who realized the European idea af-ter 1945 served their political apprenticeshipthen.”

The six nations that pioneered the pro-cess of European integration (Belgium, France,Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Nether-lands) all had well-established Christian demo-cratic parties. This is why the process ofEuropean integration was, from Britain’s per-spective, nothing more than a cover for a“Catholic conspiracy, orchestrated from theVatican” (Young 1998). As Pulzer (2004, p. 22)put it, “The odor of incense clung to the move-ment. At the heart of the new enterprise wasthe Europe of Charlemagne; it was not at allclear to everyone whether they were witnessingthe birth of a United States of Europe or theresurrection of the Holy Roman Empire.”

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The role of Christian democracy in the pro-cess of European integration has been studied indepth only recently (Kaiser 2007). This delay issurprising given the fundamental role of Chris-tian democracy in all phases of integration: theearly foundation period (1947–1957), the pe-riod of sclerosis (1960 and 1970s), the rebirthof Europe (mid-1980s), and its rapid deepeningand widening (1990s and 2000s). As Granieri(2009, pp. 3–4) provocatively argued, “If schol-ars hope to understand both the developmentof European Christian Democracy and the un-even course of European integration since the1960s, they need to appreciate the connectionbetween the crisis of Christian Democracy ina secularizing Europe and the crisis of Euro-pean identity that began at the same time.”Lieshout (1999) has convincingly shown thatpolitical, rather than economic, dynamics havebeen propelling European integration. Seenfrom an international relations and foreign pol-icy perspective, the European project “providedthe institutional context in which the contin-uous struggle for power between France andGermany could at last be fought using peace-ful means” (Lieshout 1999, pp. 1–2). Lieshoutalso shows how quickly and thoroughly thesupranational solution (the Schuman plan) thatthe French initially proposed to address the“German question” was overhauled by tradi-tional intergovernmental behavior. The gov-ernments of the member states have determinedall major steps in further European integration.Such governments are made up of political par-ties, either governing alone or in coalition withother parties. As such, understanding the polit-ical dynamics of European integration requiresan appreciation of the role political parties play.Kaiser (2007) demonstrates the crucial impor-tance of the transnational networks of Chris-tian democracy. These have been functional for“creating political trust, deliberating policy, es-pecially on European integration, marginalis-ing internal dissent within the national parties,socialising new members into an existing policyconsensus, coordinating governmental policy-making and facilitating parliamentary ratifica-tion of integration treaties” (Kaiser 2007, p. 9).

Although the association between Chris-tian democracy and European integration mustbe qualified (Christian democratic parties hadno monopoly on this idea and were inter-nally divided about it), it appears that the pro-European and prointegration stance came morenaturally for Christian democrats than for anyof their rivals (Pulzer 2004, p. 22). More-over, the core ideological concepts of Chris-tian democratic politics seemed ready-madefor European integration in four ways. First,the principles of integration and accommoda-tion are key pillars of the Christian democraticpolitical philosophy and organizational prac-tice (Irving 1979, pp. xviii–xix). Second, thedoctrine of personalism stresses that individ-uals become full “persons” only when they aremembers of their respective communities. Thesovereign nation-state is but one such com-munity: “The national community is just oneamong others—locality, workplace, religion—and not fundamentally different from a supra-national community” (Hanley 2002, p. 464).Third, with subsidiarity as a principle of gover-nance, Christian democrats possessed a quasi-federalist principle, along with long organiza-tional practice, which allowed them to structureand constrain their supranational ambitions. Fi-nally, for Catholics especially, in contrast to themore nationally oriented Protestants, the ideaof trans- or supranationalism is not particularlyalien given the transnational structure of thechurch.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OFCHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

A huge comparative literature assesses theimpact of political parties on the politicaleconomy of advanced capitalist democracies(Huber & Stephens 2001, Korpi & Palme2003, Allan & Scruggs 2004, Starke 2006).Like the mainstream literature on politicalparties, for a long time it overlooked theimpact of Christian democracy. The so-calledsocial democratic model of political economyand welfare-state emergence and growth wasdominant throughout the 1980s until roughly

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the early 1990s (Esping-Andersen & vanKersbergen 1992). The central thesis was thatboth egalitarian outcomes and the quality ofwelfare arrangements (universalism, solidarity,redistribution) were a function of the extentto which the population was organized as wageearners within the social democratic move-ment. A developed welfare state, therefore, wasinterpreted as the outcome of the accumulatedpower of the working class and its politicalrepresentative, social democracy.

The social democratic model, however,quickly ran into severe empirical problems be-cause many countries pursued social justicepolicies, had extensive programs of market in-tervention, and were generally generous so-cial spenders, yet lacked the type of socialdemocratic power mobilization that the modelposited as the cause of such a political-economicarchitecture. Apparently other parties beyondsocial democratic ones could behave as pro-welfare actors. Moreover, the model also brokedown for historical reasons: Early reforms ofcapitalism were pioneered by liberal and con-servative state elites and rarely, if ever, by so-cialists or social democrats (e.g., Bismarck inGermany in the 1880s). This all necessitated athorough theoretical and empirical revision ofthe model of welfare-state construction and ex-pansion. This was done partly by reconsideringthe role of Christian democracy in the historyof the welfare state (Huber & Stephens 2001,Seeleib-Kaiser et al. 2008).

An early answer was that Christian democ-racy (or political Catholicism) constituted afunctional equivalent or alternative to so-cial democracy for expanding the welfarestate (Stephens 1979, Wilensky 1981, Schmidt1982). Catholic social thinking on the fair fam-ily wage, compassion for the poor, and usury,for instance, clearly allowed for the adoption ofa pro-welfare stance by Christian democraticparties (Kaufmann 1989), particularly crucialin family policy (Fix 2001, Morgan 2006). Go-ing deeper, Opielka (2008) has recently arguedthat the values underlying the social and po-litical ethics and translated into modern so-cial policies clearly have Christian foundations,

in addition to their more obviously human-ist underpinnings. This is consistent with Kahl(2005, 2007), who traces the upstream effectsof Catholic, Lutheran, and Calvinist/Puritanpractices on contemporary antipoverty policies.In addition, one of the basic assumptions of thesocial democratic model was challenged: thatthe power of labor equals the power of socialdemocracy. Christian democratic parties oper-ated in the political center and enjoyed con-siderable working-class support, and they werecommonly backed by powerful Catholic unions(van Kersbergen 1995). This political constel-lation was highly favorable to welfare-statedevelopment.

The most interesting thing about welfarestates is not how much they spend, but howand on what they spend, and which social in-stitutions bear most responsibility. The moreradical differences between welfare states areof a qualitative, rather than quantitative, na-ture. There exist different types of welfareregimes, i.e., different ways of combining so-cial institutions for the provision of workand welfare: public provisions (e.g., compul-sory insurances, social services, job protectionregulation), market-based arrangements (e.g.,occupational pensions, private insurances), so-cietal organizations (e.g., religious charities, or-ganizations for voluntary work), and the family(informal care) (Esping-Andersen 1990). Thisnew conceptualization of a welfare regime fa-cilitated an improved understanding of the im-pact of politics on social policies and theireffects. It clarified that Christian democracydid not simply promote welfare-state develop-ment like social democracy; instead, the move-ment fostered a distinctive welfare-state regimethat is significantly and systematically differentfrom both the social democratic and conserva-tive/liberal social policy regimes, and its rise isconnected to the ideology of social Catholi-cism and the power of Christian democraticparties. Christian democracy is associated witha core of social policies that aggregate into awelfare-state regime funded by social demo-cratic rates of spending but with very differ-ent features (Huber & Stephens 1993, Huber

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et al. 1993, van Kersbergen 1995). The Chris-tian democratic welfare regime (Germany be-ing the prime example) is generous but passiveand transfer oriented. Its main features are in-come replacement rather than job protection orcreation, the privileging of families rather thanindividuals, the fragmentation and semipubliccharacter of major aspects of the administra-tion and execution of welfare policies ratherthan their centralization and state control, thereproduction of social status rather than the re-fashioning of the social structure, and the rela-tive obstruction of women’s access to the labormarket.

A decade and a half of research in the 1990sand 2000s further documented the causes,consequences, and contemporary reforms ofthe various regimes, including the Chris-tian democratic welfare state (Esping-Andersen1996a, Goodin et al. 1999, van Kersbergen1999, Scharpf & Schmidt 2000, Pierson 2001,Esping-Andersen et al. 2002, Seeleib-Kaiseret al. 2008). The findings on the continentalEuropean Christian democratic welfare regimecan be summarized as follows. The regimewas characterized by occupationally distinct,employment-related social insurance, combin-ing (sometimes) very high replacement rateswith generally strict levels of employment pro-tection. The system aimed to protect the male-breadwinner household. Social policy was pre-dominantly based on the principle of industrialinsurance against occupational risks, financedby earmarked payroll contributions from em-ployers and workers. Strong social-partnershiptraditions extended into the administration ofsocial insurance. The status of labor-marketpolicies was strongly correlated with the passivecharacter of social security. The regime lacked adistinctive legacy of active employment-policypriorities.

These characteristics of the Christian demo-cratic welfare regime were subsequently usedto study whether and to what extent they werecausing the difficulty in which the systems werefinding themselves in the period of economicchallenges since the oil shocks of the 1970s. TheChristian democratic regimes were haunted

by the so-called “welfare without work” syn-drome (Esping-Andersen 1996b). In the Chris-tian democratic welfare states, spiraling un-employment in the early 1980s led to a viewthat strategies of compulsory work reduction,such as early retirement and disability leave,were socially acceptable alternatives to high lev-els of unemployment among younger work-ers. The unintended result, however, was thatwithin less than a decade, labor-supply reduc-tion produced a problem of structural labor-market inactivity and an associated financial cri-sis of the employment-based social-insurancesystem. The generosity and long duration ofinsurance-based income-replacement benefits,the passivity of the benefit system, its contrib-utory financing, and relatively high minimumwages all worked together to produce a down-ward spiral of labor shedding. Payroll financingof social benefits put a premium on high pro-ductivity, but shedding less productive workersincreased the “tax” on labor because an eversmaller number of workers had to provide foran increasing number of inactive citizens. Inshort, the Christian democratic regime maxi-mized worker productivity, producing an unin-tended inactivity trap. Productivity gains wenttogether with rising wage costs and (early) exitof less productive workers, requiring yet furtherproductivity growth and adding to the pressureto further reduce the work force subsidized bypassive social policies such as early retirement(Hemerijck & Manow 2001, van Kersbergen &Hemerijck 2004).

Currently, the literature on the Christiandemocratic welfare state is focusing on explain-ing the puzzle of how the “frozen welfare statelandscapes” (Esping-Andersen 1996b, p. 24),characterized by the welfare-without-work syn-drome, are changing rapidly even though re-form was thought to be almost impossible. Thequestions are how and under which conditionsis welfare-state reform possible, and who isactually doing the reforming? Do Christiandemocratic parties still play a crucial role inthe reform of the welfare regimes to whichthey are historically attached and still politicallycommitted? Or is it the case, as much recent

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literature on the welfare state has stressed, thatthe role of Christian democracy is diminish-ing because political party struggles more gen-erally matter less and less in welfare-state re-form? Aging populations, sluggish economicgrowth, long-term unemployment, changingfamily structures and gender roles, the trans-formation of life-cycle patterns, the postindus-trialization of labor markets, the rise of newrisks and needs as well as international pressures(e.g., globalization and European integration),not only seemed to bring an end to a goldenpolitical age of expansion, but also appeared tonarrow considerably the maneuvering space forpro-welfare political actors (Huber & Stephens2001, Pierson 2001).

New theories have been proposed that ex-plain how international economic pressuresand domestic social, cultural, and demographicchallenges create pressure for radical adjust-ment. Such theories imply that governmentsof whatever political persuasion can do littlefor the welfare state’s survival in the face ofsuch overwhelming forces. Economic interde-pendence is expected to help liberal and con-servative governments pursue their agenda ofrolling back the welfare state and force socialdemocratic and Christian democratic govern-ments to adjust radically their systems of socialprotection to keep up with international com-petition. As a result, cross-national differencesbetween social-protection systems are disap-pearing as welfare-state regimes converge to-ward a lowest common social denominator (fora critical overview, see Garrett 1998, Glatzer& Rueschemeyer 2005). This view, however, iscontroversial and contested. Stephens (2005),for instance, argues that in northwesternEurope, trade openness leads to the expan-sion of the welfare state, but only under so-cial democratic or Christian democratic rule.If the secular right is in power, it does nottake place. Both social democratic and Chris-tian democratic welfare states are not only com-patible with competition on the world market,but “to the extent that they enabled wage re-straint and provided collective goods valued byemployers, such as labor training, the gener-

ous social policies actually contributed to com-petitiveness” (Stephens 2005, p. 70). Seeleib-Kaiser et al. (2008, pp. 100–5) demonstrate thatthe welfare-state reforms implemented in theChristian democratic welfare states Germany,Austria, and the Netherlands do not follow anyclear and consistent logic that one would ex-pect on the basis of partisanship. Contrary towhat van Kersbergen & Hemerijck (2004) sug-gest, Seeleib-Kaiser et al. find that there hasbeen a “Christian-democratization” of socialdemocratic social-policy positions, which hasfacilitated a shift from an exclusively Christiandemocratic type of welfare state to a liberal-communitarian model. This model stresses theneed to expand public policies to assist familiesand the necessity to correlate the right to socialbenefits much better with the obligation to par-ticipate in society (e.g., to actively seek work).The overarching political aim is to restore thesocial cohesion of the community, a type of po-litical program still closer to Christian democ-racy than to social democracy (Seeleib-Kaiseret al. 2008, p. 169).

Another recent development in thepolitical-economy literature concerns a criticalrethinking of the role of religion and Christiandemocracy in welfare-state development thatchallenges mainstream approaches. As arguedabove, the welfare-state literature originallyposited that it was the combination of Chris-tian democracy and Catholic social doctrinethat explained why Christian democraticwelfare states were as generous in termsof social spending as the social democraticones, although qualitatively different. A newperspective on religion and welfare-statedevelopment (van Kersbergen & Manow 2009)stresses how social cleavage structures andelectoral rules interact to produce the differentpolitical class coalitions behind the variouswelfare regimes. In countries with proportionalelectoral systems, the absence or presence ofstate–church conflicts was the key factor thathelped determine whether class remainedthe dominant source of coalition building orwhether a political logic not exclusively basedon socioeconomic interests (e.g., religion) was

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introduced into politics and, particularly, intosocial policy. This perspective highlights (class)coalition politics and institutional effects. Incountries with a majoritarian electoral system,only one social-cleavage dimension can be rep-resented in politics, namely the labor–capitalclass conflict. In such systems, the right tends togovern more often than the left, explaining whya residual (or liberal) welfare state emerged. Inproportional systems, more cleavage dimen-sions can be represented via party politics, andthe cleavage structure explains which partiesarise and how the middle class is integrated intothe political system. In Scandinavia, parties ofagrarian defense arose because of the absenceof a strong religious cleavage and the presenceof an urban–rural conflict. The typical uni-versal social democratic welfare state was theresult of a coalition between social democraticparties and the rural middle class. In continen-tal Europe, the second cleavage representedin the party systems, besides the dominantlabor–capital cleavage, has been the religious(state–church) cleavage, as a result of whichparties of religious defense emerged. The typ-ical continental welfare states are the productof a coalition between social and Christiandemocracy.

This approach looks at which type of mid-dle class entered into a coalition with socialdemocracy and argues that the patterns ofclass coalitions better explain the observed em-pirical variation in welfare-state development.It deemphasizes the direct role of Christiandemocracy in shaping the continental welfare-state regime, to the point where it argues thatthe features of even a prototypical Christiandemocratic welfare state such as Italy’s are theunintended and unanticipated outcomes of aclientelistic policy mode in which Catholic so-cial doctrine has no impact on policy outcomes(Lynch 2009). More generally, the fact thatthe transfer-heavy, insurance-based, family-privileging type of welfare regime is also foundoutside the OECD context and in countries(especially in Latin America) where Christiandemocracy has not been the dominant politicalactor challenges the robustness of the Christian

democratic effect.6 In fact, the recent debateon the relative weight of the various fac-tors that impact on welfare-state developmentand regime variation in Latin America maycast new doubts on the causal mechanismswidely thought to account for the emergenceof the Christian democratic welfare states (seeSegura-Ubiergo 2007, Haggard & Kaufman2008).

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACYBEYOND EUROPE ANDCHRISTIANITY

Does the Christian democratic model travelbeyond Europe and Christianity? FollowingKalyvas (1998b, 2000, 2003), we answer a qual-ified yes. Our answer implies that the legacy ofEuropean Christian democracy transcends itstemporal and spatial boundaries and carries amuch broader significance.

Our answer calls for a move that is at onceconceptual, historical, and analytical. Ratherthan attempting to compare contemporaryChristian democratic parties with contem-porary religious parties elsewhere, we shouldfocus instead on the prewar confessional partiesof Europe. First, and like many religious par-ties today, the European confessional partiesappeared in a political context that can best bedescribed as one of “emerging democracies.”This is a context characterized by considerableinstitutional uncertainty and fluidity, wheredemocratic norms are not consolidated, andpolitical actors are not necessarily commit-ted to existing institutions. Second, prewarconfessional parties can be conceptualized asorganizations engaging in “religious mobi-lization.” Despite widely differing religiousdoctrines and political and social environments,it is possible to study religious mobilization in atheoretical and comparative fashion, much as itis possible to study labor or ethnic mobilizationacross cultures, space, and time. Religious mo-bilization is characterized by five features: (a) an

6We thank Isabella Mares for pointing this out to us.

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“antisystem” critique of liberal institutions rely-ing on religious rhetoric; (b) the reconstruction,not just the mobilization, of existing religiousidentities; (c) a mass mobilization relying on awide use of selective incentives and a concomi-tant focus of economic and social issues; (d ) across-class appeal; and (e) links to pre-existingreligious institutions (Kalyvas 2003).

Focusing on religious mobilization in thecontext of emerging democracies is a move thatbuilds on an extensive recent critique of es-sentialist approaches that assume an inherentincompatibility of certain religions with lib-eral democracy, pluralism, and even modern-ization (Tibi 1990; Huntington 1996; Lewis2002, 2003). Such approaches remain prevalentin public discourse, especially after the Septem-ber 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, but enjoy littlescholarly support (Kalyvas 2000, Wiktorowicz2004, Bayat 2007, Roy 2007).

With religious mobilization defined, a num-ber of questions can be posed. Here we raise twothat focus on its causes and consequences. First,what accounts for variation in the incidence,timing, size, and type of religious mobiliza-tion? The answer must take into account demo-graphic, historical, cultural, institutional, andideological parameters. Second, can religiousmobilization possibly contribute to democraticconsolidation, and if so, how? In short, whatare the conditions for a successful political in-corporation of religiously inclined parties intoemerging democracies? Put otherwise, what isthe path out of “unsecular politics”?

It is possible to analyze the process of po-tential incorporation as an interaction betweenincumbents and religious challengers (Kalyvas1998b, 2000; Berman 2008; Altinordu 2009).Focusing on parties that rely on religious mo-bilization, Kalyvas (1998b, 2000, 2003) empha-sizes the centrality of the process of moderation,which is fraught with three key questions. First,what is the structure of opportunities affordedby the existing political system? (Are incum-bents willing to link moderation with incentivesand radicalization with sanctions?) Second,what is the structure of electoral constraints? (Isthe religious party able to win a parliamentary

majority or must it rely on electoral coalitionswith secular partners?) Third, what is the reli-gious party’s association with the religious in-stitution to which it is related? (Is this religiousinstitution centralized or decentralized?) Con-necting these three dimensions should help uspredict whether religious mobilization ends upconsolidating a fledging democracy by swayingthe religious party toward a moderate path. Letus examine these three questions in more detail.

First, a religious party’s willingness to mod-erate hinges on the structure of incentivesand sanctions faced by that party. FollowingHuntington (1993, p. 165), it is possible tosee democratic politics as entailing a “partici-pation/moderation trade-off.” Participation inelectoral politics tends to lead to the modera-tion of previously radical groups, as political in-terests, pragmatic considerations, and politicallearning take precedence over dogmatic rigidity(Nasr 1995, Anderson 2000, Schwedler 2007).Likewise, Berman (2008) emphasizes sanctionsimposed on radicalization by incumbent elites.The experience of the AKP (Adalet ve KalkınmaPartisi or Justice and Development Party) inTurkey is an example of the ability of Islamistpoliticians to understand a political opportu-nity structure that provided both incentivesand sanctions, leading to the incorporation ofpolitical Islam through a more skillful man-agement of sensitive institutional relationships(Altinordu 2009).

At the same time, however, as Altinordu(2009) warns, moderation may not be an op-tion if regime incumbents are uninterested inthe incorporation of religious parties. Insofaras emerging democracies (not to speak of au-thoritarian regimes) can be political contextswhere the opportunities attached to modera-tion are limited, we may well fail to observeit, but not because of the religious party’s un-willingness. If religious parties realize that theywill not be allowed to govern even if they wina majority (or if they are not allowed to com-pete in the first place), they may naturally turnto nondemocratic alternatives. Naive observerswill then be likely to attribute such a turn tothe religious character of the party rather than

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to the opportunities afforded to it by the polit-ical regime. In an international context charac-terized by a simplistic discourse on terrorism,undemocratic incumbents will have an incen-tive to play up a false “secular” card and reducethe opportunities available to religious partiesso as to (perversely) tip the internal balance ofreligious parties toward radical factions and jus-tify crackdowns supported by the internationalcommunity in the name of democracy, or atleast stability.

If the political system is open and oppor-tunities exist, the second question comes up:What is the structure of electoral constraintsfaced by the religious party? Is it able to win aparliamentary majority or must it rely on elec-toral coalitions with secular partners? Two pos-sibilities exist. On the one hand, when electoralconstraints are salient, religious parties will belikely to moderate via the mechanism of coali-tion formation. This was the path followed bymost confessional parties in nineteenth-centuryEurope and most recently by the BJP (BharatiyaJanata Party or Indian People’s Party) in Indiafollowing the 1996 elections. It is interesting tonote that analysts who had been skeptical aboutthe BJP’s prospects for moderation recognizedlater that “the logic of Indian politics has madeit clear to the BJP that if they want to be inpower they must find enough coalition partnersin the South and East, which is impossible with-out ideological moderation” (Varshney 1998,p. 15).

On the other hand, if electoral constraintsare lacking, that is, if parties have the capac-ity to win parliamentary majorities that al-low them to govern without partners, thenthe key explanatory variable falls on nonelec-toral constraints. This process is illustrated bynineteenth-century Belgium (Kalyvas 1998b)and contemporary Turkey (Altinordu 2009).The presence of institutional actors, such asthe army, who have the ability to guarantee thedemocratic and secular nature of the regime willbe crucial in moving these parties toward mod-eration. At the same time, however, this sce-nario can produce the failure of incorporationalong with democratic deconsolidation.

This is where the third question comes in:What kind of association exists between thereligious party and the religious institution towhich it is related? We begin by noting that theprocess of moderation can be either endoge-nous, if it is initiated exclusively by the religiousparty, or exogenous, if it is initiated by reli-gious actors associated with the party. Assumingdemocratic incumbents, religious parties poisedto win majorities in emerging democracies facea commitment problem (Kalyvas 2000). An exante credible signaling of postvictory behav-ior is critical. Though willing to moderate, theleadership of young religious parties may be un-able to send the unambiguous signals that willsatisfy ruling elites—unable, that is, to suppressthe radicals. A solution to this problem can beprovided by religious institutions. Centralized,authoritarian, and hierarchical religious institu-tions can play a positive role when they help re-ligious parties to overcome credibility problemsby shouldering the responsibility of silencingthe radicals. This is, in fact, what happened innineteenth-century Belgium but failed to hap-pen in Algeria in 1991–1992, because the lead-ership of the FIS (Front Islamique du Salut)was not helped by the decentralized structure ofIslam (Kalyvas 2000).

The lens of religious mobilization shows therelevance of the Christian democratic experi-ence for contemporary non-European and non-Christian settings, opening important and in-teresting possibilities for comparative work, asindicated by a spate of recent studies (Wickham2004, El Ghobashy 2005, Ismail 2008,Altinordu 2009).

THE FUTURE OF CHRISTIANDEMOCRACY IN EUROPE:AN OUTLOOK

We have seen that grasping the history andcharacter of Christian democracy is crucial forunderstanding European politics, including theprocess of European integration. The Chris-tian democratic experience more generally con-veys important lessons about religious politi-cal mobilization and religion as a foundational

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element of political identity, which are also rel-evant outside the European context. Moreover,as we argued, a theory of Christian democracyshould not only consider the political salienceof religion but should also inform us about thepolitical consequences of secularization. And itshould give us more analytical bite to makesense of the gradual decline, yet survival andcyclical downturn, of Christian democracy thatwe observe.

With this outlook, then, we ask whatthe future holds for Christian democracy inEurope. Presently, we can observe a multiplicityof trends, with some parties adapting to themand some bucking them. Some parties havecompletely erased any reference, even perfunc-tory, to religion, while others are toying with adiscourse on ethical and moral values, target-ing “postmodern” issues such as conception,euthanasia, etc. In some cases, a tough stanceon “law and order” issues has produced elec-toral dividends. Particularly intriguing is thesuggestion that trends in the European Parlia-ment (especially the incipient “bipolarization”)may be having some effect on national politics.Last, the issue of (predominantly Muslim) im-migration may produce changes either way: to-ward more secularization (if the issue is framedas secular versus religious values) or morereligious polarization (if it is framed as Chris-tianity versus Islam). Clearly, Christian demo-cratic parties are facing some thorny dilem-mas, and the consequences of their choices arelikely to be momentous. Various studies alreadydo an excellent job at showing how particularcontexts affect choices—but also how differentchoices are made in contexts that are not verydifferent.

Gerard & van Hecke (2004) rightly arguedthat Christian democracy is an undertheorizedtopic. Stronger theory is necessary in orderto develop a comparative framework for ex-plaining not just the historical development ofChristian democracy but also the cross-nationalvariation in the movement’s continuing capac-ity to mobilize, and its impact on the politi-cal economies of various countries, i.e., if itcan be shown that the partisan effect is still

operational. Leonardi & Alberti (2004, pp. 21–22) have identified two approaches in the studyof Christian democracy: (a) a rationalist ap-proach that treats Christian democracy as a“unitary player, with a given set of preferencesand interests and driven mainly by cost–benefitconcerns” and (b) a reflexivist approach thatsees Christian democracy as a “distinctive po-litical phenomenon with a consistent set of val-ues intrinsically reflected in its political iden-tity.” Their own alternative constructivist andinstitutionalist approach sees Christian democ-racy as “an articulate phenomenon charac-terised by political moderation and originatingfrom a ‘consociational’ pattern of interactionsthat have been more or less institutionalisedin time and space” (Leonardi & Alberti 2004,p. 24).

The distinction between the rationalist andreflexivist approaches seems overstated, as itdoes not really lead to different interpretationsof Christian democracy. Most, if not all, re-search seems to converge around the obser-vation that Christian democracy’s unique fea-tures are its capacity to mobilize a pluralityof interests and to accommodate diverse con-stituents. These features have accorded Chris-tian democratic parties a remarkable ability toadapt to a continuously changing economic, so-cial, cultural, and political environment, whichis functionally related to the development ofthe movement’s ideology, policies, and strate-gies. However, this consensus about the natureof Christian democracy does not offer us manytheoretical clues about major emerging issues.For example, under what conditions do Chris-tian democratic parties adapt successfully to anew structural context increasingly affected byongoing secularization and globalization? Un-der what conditions can Christian democraticparties adapt to new competitors such as pop-ulist parties?

Following Meguid (2005), we may tryto understand the future political prospectsof Christian democracy by focusing on thestrategic interaction among competitors.Meguid’s modified spatial model for explainingthe electoral strength of niche parties posits

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that a mainstream party is capable not only ofmoving its policy position when faced with aniche competitor, but also of manipulating thesalience and ownership of the issue that the newparty wishes to introduce into political compe-tition (Meguid 2005, p. 357). How Christiandemocratic parties strategically react to theemergence of right-wing populist challengers istherefore crucial for their survival (Bale 2008).Another issue is the more general questionof the (electoral) opportunities for religiousparties. Most analyses hold that Christiandemocracy’s fate is not linearly linked to sec-ularization. Why not? One explanation is thatsecularization is not a one-dimensional processthat implies only the severing of religious andpolitical identity. Surely, religion as a cognitiveshortcut for party identification has declinedspectacularly (Norris & Inglehart 2004), but weknow much less about how beliefs, norms, val-ues, and institutional arrangements that wereinitially Christian are transformed into secularvalues and institutions (Kahl 2005, 2007)—andhow this influences political identities. Thistransformation, however, may be an importantelement of the structural process that we labelsecularization. We therefore need to take itinto account if we are to understand not onlywhy support for religious parties is so volatilebut also why such parties manage to surviveat all. In other words, analyses that focus onstructure alone tend to suffer from a one-sidedand somewhat mechanical conception ofsecularization, and as a result, both variationand survival of religiously inspired politicalactors pose problems of explanation.

Taking a less structured approach, onemight hypothesize that the link betweensecularization and party affiliation is variablebecause religious political movements are sim-ply not the passive casualties of the changes insocial structure. Here, the literature certainlyhas part of the story right when the stress ison how the parties adapt in order to “becomemore secular in their electoral appeals,” movingtoward “‘bridging strategies’ that enable themto win electoral support from many diversesocial groups” (Norris & Inglehart 2004,

p. 211). But that may be just part of the story, assuch an analysis tends to overlook and thereforeunderestimate how religious parties them-selves are active producers of a modernizedversion of “unsecular politics” (Kalyvas 2003,pp. 293–94). This term refers to “a politicalcontext in which religious ideas, symbols, andrituals are used as the primary (though notexclusive) instrument of mobilization by atleast one major political party (i.e., a crediblecontender of power).” The modern version ofunsecular politics is the often uneasy attempt tostrip off the explicitly and exclusively religiousideological baggage, while at the same timeconstructing a new religiously inspired packageof beliefs, values, and norms. In this sense,modern Christian democratic politics is neitherreligious nor secular; it is “unsecular.” More-over, the ability to dialectically manipulate howreligion is perceived in politics may well bethe hallmark of Christian democratic parties,very much as the dialectical manipulationof class has been the foundation of socialdemocracy.

In addition, because religion has notvanished and continues to exert a significantinfluence on culture and politics, the secular-ization paradigm as derived from moderniza-tion theory has increasingly come under at-tack (Davie 1994, Stark & Iannaccone 1994,Berger 1999, Stark 1999, Martin 2005; but seeBruce 2002 for a powerful defense). Accord-ing to a former proponent but current criticof the paradigm, our world is as “furiously reli-gious as it ever was” (Berger 1999, p. 2). Politicalscientists should pay more attention to recentdebates in the sociology of religion (Aldridge2007, Davie 2007) that could provide them withwell-theorized, albeit contradictory, hypothe-ses on the likely fate of religious political orga-nizations. Either religion continues to be im-portant for the cultural and political attitudesof citizens (the point of view of the critics ofthe secularization paradigm), and as a resultthe opportunity structure for religious partiesis much more advantageous than is often as-sumed; or the social significance of religion de-clines further, with the number of religiously

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oriented individuals continuing to drop and thelevel of religiosity among believers persistentlyfalling (as the secularization paradigm holds).

Or perhaps Christian democratic parties holdthe key to survival without complete ideologi-cal capitulation.

DISCLOSURE STATEMENT

The authors are not aware of any affiliations, memberships, funding, or financial holdings thatmight be perceived as affecting the objectivity of this review.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We thank Sigrun Kahl, Philip Manow, Isabella Mares, Israel Marques, Al Stepan, and the partici-pants of the Comparative Politics Workshop at Columbia University for their helpful commentsand suggestions. We are particularly grateful to Anna Grzymala-Busse for her excellent com-ments. Kees van Kersbergen thanks the University of Konstanz’s Center of Excellence “CulturalFoundations of Integration,” and especially the Institute for Advanced Study, for their generoushospitality and support for this project.

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Annual Review ofPolitical Science

Volume 13, 2010Contents

A Long Polycentric JourneyElinor Ostrom � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 1

What Political Science Can Learn from the New Political HistoryJulian E. Zelizer � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �25

Bridging the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide: Best Practices in theDevelopment of Historically Oriented Replication DatabasesEvan S. Lieberman � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �37

The Politics of Effective Foreign AidJoseph Wright and Matthew Winters � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �61

Accountability in Coalition GovernmentsJose Marıa Maravall � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � �81

Rationalist Approaches to Conflict Prevention and ResolutionAndrew H. Kydd � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 101

Political Order and One-Party RuleBeatriz Magaloni and Ruth Kricheli � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 123

RegionalismEdward D. Mansfield and Etel Solingen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 145

The Prosecution of Human Rights ViolationsMelissa Nobles � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 165

Christian DemocracyStathis N. Kalyvas and Kees van Kersbergen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 183

Political Theory of Empire and ImperialismJennifer Pitts � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 211

The U.S. Decennial Census: Politics and Political ScienceKenneth Prewitt � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 237

Reflections on Ethnographic Work in Political ScienceLisa Wedeen � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 255

Treaty Compliance and ViolationBeth Simmons � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 273

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Legislative ObstructionismGregory J. Wawro and Eric Schickler � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 297

The Geographic Distribution of Political PreferencesJonathan Rodden � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 321

The Politics of Inequality in America: A Political Economy FrameworkLawrence R. Jacobs and Joe Soss � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 341

The Immutability of Categories and the Reshaping of Southern PoliticsJ. Morgan Kousser � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 365

Indigenous Peoples’ Politics in Latin AmericaDonna Lee Van Cott � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 385

Representation and Accountability in CitiesJessica Trounstine � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 407

Public Opinion on Gender Issues: The Politics of Equity and RolesNancy Burns and Katherine Gallagher � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 425

Immigration and Social Policy in the United StatesRodney E. Hero � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 445

The Rise and Routinization of Social Capital, 1988–2008Michael Woolcock � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 469

Origins and Persistence of Economic InequalityCarles Boix � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 489

Parliamentary Control of Coalition GovernmentsKaare Strøm, Wolfgang C. Muller, and Daniel Markham Smith � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 517

Indexes

Cumulative Index of Contributing Authors, Volumes 9–13 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 537

Cumulative Index of Chapter Titles, Volumes 9–13 � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � � 539

Errata

An online log of corrections to Annual Review of Political Science articles may be foundat http://polisci.annualreviews.org/

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