choice’architecture’and’ smartphone’privacy:’...adverse’selecaon’in’app’markets’...

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Choice Architecture and Smartphone Privacy: There’s A Price for That Serge Egelman Adrienne Porter Felt David Wagner UC Berkeley 1

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Page 1: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Choice  Architecture  and  Smartphone  Privacy:  There’s  A  Price  for  That  

Serge  Egelman  Adrienne  Porter  Felt  David  Wagner  

UC  Berkeley   1  

Page 2: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Adverse  selecAon  in  app  markets  

Example:  SMS  – 73%  of  malware  uses  SMS  capability  – 3%  of  legiAmate  applicaAons  use  it   SMS  capability  signals  potenAal  malware  

Advice:  “Don’t  use  apps  that  require  SMS”  

Is  it  possible  to  follow  this  advice?  

2  

∴ ∴

A.  P.  Felt,  M.  FiniOer,  E.  Chin,  S.  Hanna,  and  D.  Wagner.  A  Survey  of  Mobile  Malware  in  The  Wild.  ACM  Workshop  on  Security  and  Privacy  in  Mobile  Devices  (SPSM)  2011.  

Page 3: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

EXAMPLE:  INSTALLATION  

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Page 4: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  1:  Search  

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Page 5: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  2:  Select  applicaAon  

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Page 6: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  3:  View  descripAon  

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Page 7: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  4:  View  permissions  

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Page 8: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  5:  View  permissions…sAll  

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Services that cost you money Send SMS messages

Page 9: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  6:  Go  back  

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Page 10: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  7:  Go  back  

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Page 11: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  8:  Select  applicaAon  

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Page 12: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  9:  View  descripAon  

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Page 13: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

Step  10:  View  permissions  

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Android  permissions  

Users  don’t  noAce  permissions  – Online  survey:  •  17.5%  claimed  to  look  at  permissions  

– Laboratory  experiment:  •  17%  looked  at  permissions  during  installaAon  •  42%  completely  unaware  permissions  existed  

A.  P.  Felt,  E.  Ha,  S.  Egelman,  A.  Haney,  E.  Chin,  and  D.  Wagner.  Android  Permissions:  User  ACenDon,  Comprehension,  and  Behavior.  In  Proceedings  of  the  2012  Symposium  on  Usable  Privacy  and  Security  (SOUPS).   14  

Page 15: Choice’Architecture’and’ Smartphone’Privacy:’...Adverse’selecAon’in’app’markets’ Example:’SMS’ – 73%’of’malware’uses’SMS’capability’ – 3%’of’legiAmate’applicaons’use’it!SMS

What  permissions  do  users  actually  care  about?  

How  does  choice  architecture  impact  user  preference?    

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What  do  users  actually  care  about?  

Android  currently  has  124  different  permissions    Only  locaAon  has  been  extensively  studied    LocaAon  represents  1%  of  the  permission  space  

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Experiment  1:  an  upper  bound  

When  choice  is  made  “obvious,”  will  users  indicate  a  willingness  to  pay  more  to  disclose  less  data?    Web-­‐based  survey  of  483  U.S.  residents    Recruited  from  Mechanical  Turk    Asked  to  select  app  most  willing  to  purchase  

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Methodology  

Controlled  for  price  and  permissions:        Counter-­‐balanced:  – Names  – DescripAons  –  Icons  –  Screenshots  

$0.49   $0.99   $1.49   $1.99  

Internet  LocaAon  (GPS)  Record  Audio  

Internet  Record  Audio  

Internet  LocaAon  (GPS)  

Internet    

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Hypotheses  

H0:  Each  price/privacy  variant  will  be  chosen  with  equal  probability    H1:  Price-­‐sensiDve  parDcipants  will  choose  the  least-­‐expensive  opDon    H2:  Privacy-­‐sensiDve  parDcipants  will  choose  the  high-­‐privacy  opDon  (i.e.,  most  expensive)  

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Results  

H0  is  rejected:  χ2=102.9,  p<0.0005  

120  74   77  

212  

0  

50  

100  

150  

200  

250  

$1.99     $1.49     $0.99     $0.49    

Decreasing  privacy   21  

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Exit  survey  

Rate  the  following  influencing  factors:  – Number  of  downloads  –  Icon  –  Size  of  app  –  Permissions  requested  – DescripAon  – Name  of  app  –  RaAng/Reviews  –  Familiarity  with  app  –  Cost  – Manufacturer  of  app  

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Exit  survey  

CorrelaAon  between  stated  price  sensiAvity  and  price  of  app  selected:  r=-­‐0.39,  p<0.0005    CorrelaAon  between  stated  privacy  sensiAvity  and  price  of  app  selected:  r=0.33,  p<0.004    $1.99   $1.49   $0.99   $0.49  

1.  Permissions  (46%)  2.  DescripAon  (23%)  3.  Icon  (9%)  

1.  DescripAon  (41%)  2.  Permissions  (18%)  3.  Cost  (16%)  

1.  Cost  (33%)  2.  DescripAon  (15%)  3.  Icon  (14%)  

1.  Cost  (62%)  2.  DescripAon  (15%)  3.  RaAngs  (6%)  

120   74   77   212  

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Summary  

ParAcipants  less  concerned  with  price  were  willing  to  consider  other  differences  (e.g.,  privacy)    …but  this  represents  an  idealized  version  of  the  Market,  where  side-­‐by-­‐side  comparisons  occur  

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Experiment  2:  app  valuaAon  

When  presented  with  a  single  app,  how  do  permission  requests  impact  users’  valuaAons?    Posed  as  an  app  developer  soliciAng  users  for  a  private  beta.    Willingness  to  pay  experiment  modeled  aOer  Danezis  et  al.  

25  G.  Danezis,  S.  Lewis,  and  R.  Anderson.    How  much  is  locaAon  privacy  worth?    In  online  proceedings  of  the  Workshop  on  the  Economics  of  InformaAon  Security  (WEIS),  2005.  

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Methodology  

Single  app  presented  with  price  ($0.99)  – Permission  requests  were  randomized:  

     How  much  compensaAon  needed  to  install/use?  – Reverse  Vickrey  aucAon  

Suggested  retail  price?  

26  

1   2   3   4   5  

Internet    

Internet  Contacts  

Internet  LocaAon  (GPS)  

Internet  Photos  

Internet  Contacts  LocaAon  (GPS)  Photos  

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Results  

353  Android-­‐using  parAcipants  Bids  changed  only  with  respect  to  contacts:          Permissions  had  no  observable  effect  on  suggested  prices  – Strong  anchoring  effect   28  

β   t   Significance  

(Constant)  Contacts  LocaAon  Photos  

 0.168  0.011  -­‐0.027  

7.435  3.104  0.215  -­‐0.494  

p<0.001  p<0.002  p<0.830  p<0.622  

F3=3.294,  p<0.021  

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Concern  with  permissions  

Exit  survey  asked  about  factors  considered  – Cost  was  consistently  first,  regardless  of  permissions  requested  

– Permissions  were  more  likely  to  be  considered  amongst  those  viewing  request  for  all  four  than  those  only  viewing  request  for  Internet  access  (U=6227,  p<0.015)  •  However,  moved  from  4th  to  5th  

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Summary  

When  architecture  supported  side-­‐by-­‐side  comparisons,  25%  stated  willingness  to  pay  $1.50  over  $0.49  base  price  for  fewer  permissions.    When  valuaAng  a  single  app,  permissions  are  unlikely  to  be  considered.    RelaAvely  speaking,  users  unconcerned  with  locaAon.  

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Caveats  

ApplicaAon-­‐specific  vs.  funcAon-­‐specific  searches    Stated  willingness,  rather  than  observaAon  of  completed  transacAons    Results  are  upper  bounds  

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Caveats  

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Moving  forward  

Architecture  should  support  comparison  shopping  based  on  concerning  permissions    …and  not  bother  users  with  requests  for  unconcerning  ones    InstallaAon  is  not  the  most  appropriate  Ame  to  make  most  permission  requests  

33  A.  P.  Felt,  S.  Egelman,  M.  FiniOer,  D.  Akhawe,  and  D.  Wagner.  How  to  Ask  for  Permissions.  In  Proceedings  of  the  USENIX  Workshop  on  Hot  Topics  in  Security  (HotSec),  2012.