chinese diplomacy in unpko

8/8/2019 Chinese Diplomacy in UNPKO

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Juan Pablo Domnguez

200795

Becoming the enemy

Chinas Role in the Peacekeeping Operations of the United Nations

I. Introduction

Chinas growth in terms of economics and international openness has set upon new

issues for defining its role in the international system. Its increasing political and militarystrength has set up beacons in the major capitals and international organizations. Chinese

rise has imposed new responsibilities to Beijing and the way it will embrace such tasks

are still a matter of debate between governments and academics.

Here we will concentrate on the role it has taken in the last 20 years regarding United

Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Furthermore, the purpose of this paper is to assess how

China has shifted its perception of UNPKO and, in this issue in particular, accepted its

role of World responsible power. It is in this way that we have divided this short paper

into five main sections being this introduction the first one. The second section is to

address the methodological aspect of the inquiry. Following we present a brief recount of

the historical background supporting Chinese perception of UNPKOs, focusing on the

Korean War and the Kuwait War. The fourth section analyses recent PKOs where China

has actively participated. Finally the last section is composed by a set of concluding

remarks.

II. Methodology

How can we grasp its intentions and perception of UNPKOs? In combination with its

explanation of vote, Chinas voting behavior on UNPKO can indicate its support for the

UN peacekeeping regime as a whole. The same is true for Beijings contribution of


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Chinese peacekeepers. Whether or not they are sent to a specific mission is solely

decided in the Chinese capital. While timing, mission requirements, and peacekeeping

capabilities play a crucial role in determining the ultimate force level provided by the

contributing country, it is always the country itself that has the final say on how many of

its peacekeepers will actually serve in the mission in question. Thus, the number of

Chinese peacekeepers contributed to specific missions does indicate Chinas commitment

to the UN peacekeeping regime itself.

These two indicators can only describe how, but cannot explain why, Chinas

participation has changed. In fact, the motives at the leadership level in Beijing are

difficult to identify due to the lack of constant and cross-time access to decision-makers

in the Chinese bureaucracy. Exploring Chinas motives for its participation in UNPKO

will therefore remain largely speculative and evidence anecdotal at best. This study will

not address this issue, but future research is needed.

III. From Korea to Kuwait

The first significant contact of the new China with the United Nations forces was

merely 9 months after its foundation and it was probably the worst beginning it could

ever have. Chinese Volunteers engaged the US led UN forces in North Korea in what

became the first military battle of the Cold War and aided its Communist Comrades in an

effort to respond to its security interests and as a way to oppose US actions in preventing

the liberation of Taiwan. As an obvious result, Chinas attitude towards the United

Nations and its Peacekeeping Operations was significantly impacted. As a consequence

of this traumatic experience, Beijing regarded all subsequent UN interventions as being

manipulated by the superpowers.

During the Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, China abstained in the vote on resolution 678

which authorized the use of force against Iraq (Staehle, 2006). Though, as stated before,

it consistently opposed the military measures, China did not claim that its abstention

carried a constitutional significance. Major-General Du Kuanyi, the head of the


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Delegation of the Peoples Republic of China to the United Nations Military Staff

Committee, attempted to provide an explanation for Chinas abstention. In his words

I believe you are al aware that China abstained in the vote on Resolution 678. The reason for our

abstention is that the resolution runs counter to Chinas consistent principled position of settling

international disputes by peaceful means. Nevertheless, it needs to be emphasized that although

China did not vote in favour of that resolution as far as the Gulf is concerned, China and other

members of the international community, including the United States, shared a common purpose,

that is, to bring the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait to an early end. It was for this reason that we did not

use our right of veto to prevent the adoption of this resolution.1

Following the Gulf crisis, China has abstained during the vote on resolutions related

to the employment of enforcement measures under Chapter VII2

. It did so in relation to

Libya (1992), Rwanda (1993), Haiti (1994) and Sudan (1996). According to scholars,

such behavior of abstaining despite announcing publicly its support might be explained

between the gains and losses of side-payments. In other words, China by supporting or

not interfering might win less pressure on human rights allegations and increase

preferential trade arrangements, and also because there appears to be a correlation

between good relations with leading States and economic growth. On November the 12th

of 1997, China voted in favor of a resolution adopted by the Council under Chapter VII

imposing restrictions on the travel of Iraqi officials. At this meeting the representative of

China stressed that his government opposed the use of force and explained that Chinas

affirmative vote on this matter did not imply any change in his governments position

on the question of sanctions.

1 An address by General Kuanyi to the seminar of the Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies in Ontario,

May 1991. Du Kuanyi (1991), A Chinese View of the Role of the United Nationsl in International

Security, in A. Morrison (ed.), Peacekeeping, Peacemaking or War: International Security Enforcement,

The Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, Ontario, p. 73.

2 This Chapter of the United Nations Charter refers to the actions with respect to the peace, breaches of the

peace, and acts of aggression. PKOs lie therefore within the jurisdiction of such articles.


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IV. Recent developments of China and UNPKOs

For the reasons we explained in section III, when New China joined the United

Nations in 1971 it refused to fund UN peacekeeping operations for over a decade and

remained wary of engaging in council discussions on the topic. After the Cold War,

Beijing decided to send small contingents of military engineers and observers to serve in

UN missions in Cambodia and Kuwait. But it would be another decade before China

began to expand significantly its participation in UN missions.

Chinese initial support for UN military deployment came at the hand of its

African allies. China by 2006 was the 13th-largest contributor of UN peacekeepers,

providing 1,648 troops, police and military observers to 10 nations, mostly in African

countries, including Congo, Liberia and southern Sudan. But its activities reach well

beyond Africa, Chinese riot police have been sent to Haiti to quell unrest.

Wang Guangya, China's UN ambassador, said that China is filling a vacuum left

by the West. "The major powers are withdrawing from the peacekeeping role," he said.

"That role is being played more by small countries. China felt it is the right time for us to

fill this vacuum. We want to play our role." (Xinhuanet, 2005)

China played a critical role in persuading the Sudanese government to allow an

expanded UN presence in the Darfur region (Lynch, 2006). During a UN Security

Council mission to the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, in June of 2005, it was the

Chinese Delegation who acted upon for the situation in Somalia and urged the Council to

support the deployment of peacekeepers. It marked a turning point for Beijing, the first

time it had taken the lead in the 15-nation council in promoting foreign intervention to

resolve a conflict thousands of miles from its own borders.

V. Conclusions

During the 1990s, China frequently expressed its uneasiness about UN

peacekeeping mandates, especially if they authorized the use of force or interfered in the


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domestic affairs of sovereign states. Obviously, China had shown little support for the

UN peacekeeping regime throughout the 1990s given its personal history against UN

forces in the Korean War. But now it seems as if a new trend in Chinese peacekeeping is

emerging. In recent years, Beijing began to deploy more Chinese peacekeepers abroad

than ever before despite the fact that the mandates of these UNPKO authorized the use of

force and interfered in the internal affairs of the host country. A change in its perception

in world affairs has happened; China has taken a new role. It has become what in the 50s

it would call a form of imperialism: it has become the enemy.


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Reference

Lynch, Colum (2006) China Filling Void Left by West in U.N. Peacekeeping;

Washington Post Staff Writer, Washington.

Osman, Mohamed A. (2002) The United Nations and Peace Enforcement London

School of Economics and Political Science, London.

Staehle, Stefan (2006) Chinas Participation in The United Nations Peacekeeping

Regime George Washington University, Washington.

China takes active part in UN peacekeeping operations 2005, Xinhuanet.

chinese diplomacy in unpko

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