chinese bandits night movement and tracking techniques

8/9/2019 Chinese Bandits Night Movement and Tracking Techniques

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Night Movement and Tracking Techniques along the Northern Border of

Cambodia by RANGER Jerry Conners, Chinese Bandit 13...Spring 1966 DOD/

MACV/OP-35 directed Long-Range Reconnaissance Operations

The Chinese Bandits had been performing extended patrolling operations

since their arrival in Vietnam in the fall of 1965 and our SOP's,including mission preparations, had become routine as our teamwork

constantly improved. Warning and operations orders were routinely

given, however only some priority pre-insertion rehearsals, refreshertraining and other preparations were performed and were primarily

focused on suspected enemy and indigenous population location reports,

area studies, route navigation and night movement techniques.

The tentative routes had been planned for night-only movement that

would take place primarily along the ridgeline border of Cambodia or

Laos and Vietnam with several routes extending eastward into small

valleys and the adjacent hilltops. Contrary to policy, the routes andother critical control points were plotted in black pencil directly

onto the topographic maps that we would be carrying. Small penlightflashlights having a red tinted lens were carried by all team members

and would be used to read and analyze the maps during periods of

darkness when necessary.

A small wooded area was located near our Mustang LZ at An Khe where we

were billeted in tents. This tree area was used to conduct rehearsals

and other refresher patrol training exercises.

For a few hours on the day and night prior to the long-range

reconnaissance mission, the Chinese Bandit LRRP team conducted

refresher drills to improve our track perception skills of on trailand off trail terrain. The drill that was the most beneficial required

each man to assume the front leaning rest position with their arms and

hands extended in a manner which formed a small square opening betweenboth hands when the thumb tips met and were held perpendicular to the

main body axis while the other fingers were oriented parallel. After

examining the area between the hands for one minute, each person wouldmark the limits of the square while kneeling on one knee after

removing the small green colored Memorandum booklet and short wood

lead pencil from their breast pocket and attempt to sketch what was

observed in the square solely relying on their memory of what wasobserved. We would critique each individual sketch and strived to

detect any missing details that were observed but not sketched. During

those drills that were conducted in darkness, the prone positioned was

omitted but the hand orientation used to delineate the square areathat was observed while kneeling where the penlight flashlight was

used to illuminate the area being evaluated and sketched.


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I had been shown this drill as a child while training with German Boy

Scouts during a scout jamboree held in the black forest and hadobserved for ten years that everyone subjected to the sketching drill

improved to detect more details with practice. Most persons failed to

detect a majority of the clearly delineated details within the area

being observed during their first attempts. Even relativelyundisturbed flat and seemingly feature-less terrain typically

contained large amounts of information that was detected and sketched

only after practicing in a variety of terrain, light and weatherconditions. Indentations, scratches, texture, colors, moisture

content, plant, animal and microbial matter, rain drops, etc. were

only observed and sketched with practice.

In my patrol cap I carried a flexible 12-inch straight edge fabricated

from a 2-inch wide strip of thin sheet metal that had issued

luminescent taped fixed to one side. The tape was the same material

that was used for the markers sewn on the back of our patrol caps.Several others carried the same device that was used to detect depth

changes during light and darkness when the straight edge was placedhorizontal along the surface being evaluated. During darkness the

faint shadows created by the luminescence revealed details that the

brighter red light did not and any variation in depth below the

straight edge was more evident. Black permanent ink was used to marktwelve inches with halve and quarter inch increments. The scale was

used to measure the dimensions of tracks and various items, including

wildlife droppings and spent ammunition casings. Longer measurements,such as the distance between tracks, was measured using the

luminescent notches made on a walking stick inlaid with foxfire and

notched carvings.

The captured NVA rucksack that I carried had several modifications

that included extending the pack straps to provide a more comfortable

fit and enhanced ease of movement; and a section of a shelter half wassewn on the upper frame of the pack forming a cape which was large

enough to extend over my head and provide a tent above any trail that

was being examined during the darkness when lighting was used. Thisprocedure provided concealment of the lighting and improved the

lighting control that was needed to create the shadowing required to

detect details. A local Vietnamese tailor whose shop was located near

the newly established "Sin City" at An Khe had made the packmodifications. He made several other items for the Chinese Bandits

including the special 40mm bandoleers.

Since our arrival in country, I had many opportunities to examine thetrails and off trail areas where while kneeling over the site being

examined, the rucksack would be allowed to slide forward to the back


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of my head, allowing me to easily grab the cape and pull it over my

head and cover the trail. I would then remove my patrol cap and theluminescent straight edge and penlight. The luminescent tabs on the

back of the cap were also used to create faint shadows when needed.

Night movement required excellent night vision that demanded a dietcontaining beta-carotene and Vitamin A. We were concerned that the

single LRRP dehydrated ration that we consumed every other day might

not provide sufficient amounts of nutrients to optimize night visionand we augmented our diet with the consumption of a variety of green

grasses. The soft stems that were pulled from the nodes were the only

part of the plant eaten. Although, no tests were performed to confirmthe night vision value of the grass consumption, we did not experience

night blindness or noticeable night vision decreases after prolonged

patrolling. The soft grass stems did not cause observed digestive

problems and were filling. One 'Jungle Chocolate' candy bar was also

consumed daily by each man and the wild fruits were frequently foundin the mountainous areas along the border. Extreme dysentery and bouts

with malaria adversely effected night vision performance. Every effortwas made for every man to remain in the field and complete the long-

range reconnaissance missions along the border; however, men weakened

by disease or other debilitating did not perform tracking and other

critical duties. On only one occasion was one of the LRRP team membersevacuated. Louis Tyler had lost consciousness and we were unable to

control the fever that was the result of malaria. He was evacuated by

helicopter from a small clearing in the forest that required modifyingour route plans and increased the likelihood of our being detected.

Tyler's night vision had severely diminished earlier and he was unable

to track but merely follow closely behind another patrol member.

At least six weeks was routinely required for an individual's body toadjust to the environments of SE Asia and for the initial effects of

amebic dysentery and malaria to subside. However, disease and illness

was expected to flare up at intervals where persons were expected tofunction marginally. The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team was comprised of

individuals that did not exhibit strong reactions to the diseases

experienced in SE Asia. Malaria tolerance in the local population waswell documented and it was believed that some otherwise healthy

American troops exhibited this same tolerance.

Alcohol also diminishes night vision performance and a policy of notdrinking alcoholic beverages three days prior to patrols was adopted.

Smoking was believed to also have an adverse impact on night vision

but was primarily prohibited for reasons related to general health and

decreases to the sense of smell. Alcohol and tobacco consumptionrestrictions were not adhered to by half of the LRRP team members. I

regret not enforcing these rules and at the time only chose to lead by


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example.

Chewing tobacco was not done during patrols. Spitting along the route

would have made it easier to be followed. Our military issued jungle

boots and use of walking sticks left distinctive markings that were

easily followed unless individual patrol members exercised thenecessary precautions. On trail movement was not routinely permitted

when the trail surface was easily marked as was the case in soft or

muddy conditions. Many areas along our route such conditions wereencountered and provided the opportunity for the NVA to leave tracks

whereas we did not. During the spring and early summer of 1966, we did

not detect any efforts by the NVA to minimize making tracks on trailsbut made use of camouflage during movement and in their bivouac sites.

It is also my belief that their tracking techniques were not

exhaustive and unless obvious telltale signs were left, the NVA would

not detect our presence nor be successful in their attempts to locate

us.

Camouflage sticks were never carried and not used since it wasbelieved that prolonged contact with the skin caused infantigo-like

infections and the odor masked the natural smells of the environment.

Some team members did carry red, black and yellow pastel sticks that

were intended to be applied as war paint. Although we had opted tocarrying limited weapons and equipment, many of us would not abandon

the pastel sticks that had no intended use on a reconnaissance

operation where contact was to be avoided at all cost. One of SLAMarshall's books contains a reference to the fact that the Chinese

Bandits did not wear camouflage 'paint'. Jungle 'rot' sores were

prevented only from frequent stream crossing baths and a constant

effort to keep clean using only the available abundance of freshwater. Several photos were taken while in the rear areas that depict

members wearing camouflage paste, however, the material was always

removed to prevent the infections.

Prior to occupying our observation sites during the last several hours

of night movement, the LRRP team moved only off trail to minimizebeing followed; however since anyone following the team for any period

of time would have easily concluded that we were following the ridge

line trail along the border. This was one of the reasons that we

occasionally changed directions and moved into the valleys andoccupied hilltop observation points east of the border.

I did carry a set of tight fitting black tennis shoes that had the

flat and featureless soles that were commonly worn by most NVA. Thelarger length of the shoe did not allow indiscriminate movement but

did optimize my 'counter tracking' efforts. We did request and the


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military did produce military boots with NVA shoe and human print

soles. We did not receive these boots in 1966 but I have read of theirlater use in Vietnam and have received personal correspondence from

some of those that used them indicating that the boot design was not

without its own problems. Another thing that I would have changed in

our Chinese Bandit LRRP Team uniform was the use of an NVA-like tennisshoe. It is also my understanding that some LRRP teams later wore such

tennis shoes. During my Special Forces training prior to my assignment

to the Chinese Bandits, I had been briefed on the frequent TDY uniformof many Special Forces teams operating in foreign countries that

consisted of dark sweat shirts, blue Levis and local tennis shoes. I

regret not adopting the use of a local tennis shoes SOP, albeitlocating a sizes of the normal American foot size took a concentrated

effort.

The Chinese Bandits wore a mixture of uniforms including standard

issue jungle fatigues, WWII vintage M42 jungle camouflage fatigueswith the metal thirteen star buttons, and tiger fatigues. I normally

wore one of my father's M42 jungle camouflage fatigues. I had broughttwo pairs to Vietnam in 1965 and preferred the jacket having the

"JUSMAAG" scroll patch on the upper left arm. Both pairs were treated

with the stock water repellant that was issued to all companies but

rarely used. SSG Robert Grimes preferred and only wore tiger fatigueson long-range reconnaissance operations. The remainder of the team

normally wore the standard jungle fatigues and jungle boots; however

several of the shorter members wore various items of captured NVAclothing on occasion.

The small black leeches seem to prefer attaching to the skin in areas

where clothing covered the body. I also carried and frequently wore apair of issued khaki combat swimming trunks and would don the shorts

and remove my shirt when leech infested areas were encountered. The

tennis shoes and 'shorts only' dress would have appeared similar tothat worn by indigenous personnel who occasionally hunted in the

mountains and when observed for a distance had the advantage of

appearing non-military. It was not uncommon on long-rangereconnaissance operations for me to remain in this form of casual

dress for many days. The long-range reconnaissance patrols that we

performed in the spring and early summer were not conducted under the

monsoon rains and the shorts and tennis shoes were adequate andprovided an optimized indigenous appearance. However, I did not

recommend this uniform during NATO debriefings and took efforts to

conceal that it was a sometimes-preferred means of dressing,

especially in the damp 'triple canopy' mountainous terrain whereleeches were often encountered. Since our movements were conducted

primarily during hours of darkness, a level of tolerance was required


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for the mosquitoes. To my knowledge no other LRRP team members wore

shorts during the operations along the border; however, they wouldhave been permitted to do so and observed me wearing them during our

daily reassemblies. I also regret not formally recommending this

indigenous uniform for use in the central highlands during the dry

season.

Night movement that incorporated tracking and counter-tracking

objectives was the norm and sustaining a 3 km per hour movement ratewas easily accomplished in the mountainous regions of the Central

Highlands. We were lightly equipped and capable of moving during

darkness 25 miles daily; however, the assigned mission areas oftenpermitted moving at much slower rates and allowed for a more thorough

search. Small active infrared observation devices were carried and

used to examine trails for evidence of tracks and longer distance

monitoring. The range of the IR light source was limited to about 50

yards that minimized its long-range applications; however, theopportunity to observe the night activity of animals, including

insects, snakes and large mammals was enhanced and aided in keepingthe user alert and interested in the nighttime surroundings. Many

experiments were conducted using the small device in conjunction with

the other luminescent tools to examine and evaluate the trail for

tracks and other markings. The IR light source was removed from the IRmonitoring unit and placed at different angles to provide detection of

depressions or other trail disturbances and was beneficial in

analyzing any nighttime situation.

In practice, our night movement normally involved evaluation of NVA

tracks only at locations where tracks were anticipated. Trail

junctions and routes near stream crossings and along muddy sections ofthe trail and all approaches into our daily observation positions were

routinely examined whereas the majority of the route was not examined.

Rest halts were never conducted but any possible sight, sound or smellthat might indicate NVA contact was investigated which included

examining the trail for tracks. It was not uncommon to hear the

distinctive singsong voices in the distance and the smell of smoke andother human activity odors during our nighttime movements. Each

discovery was evaluated from a distance and recorded in our Memorandum

booklets and often plotted on the topographic maps.

In the spring and summer of 1966, we did not observe or anticipate the

NVA to booby trap or establish ambush sites in the area that they

considered as 'no man's' land and the sole domain of the NVA. We took

no precautions to detect mines or any other devices along the trailother than normal visual scanning that was often afforded during

periods when star and moon light penetrated the trees and during our


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day light scouting in the areas near our assigned day time occupied

observation points. It was also observed and widely reported that theNVA noise and light discipline was poor in all areas along the border.

The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team had experienced a detect first success

since early January and no information had been obtained that movement

along the northern borders of Cambodia and southern Laos wouldencounter an increased level of NVA alertness or an improvement in

their noise and light discipline.

Suspected regimental size CPs were plotted on the aerial photographs

that we were provided during the early planning stages of each LRRP

mission and updated with daily reconnaissance flights including thatperformed my the LRRP team leaders using OH-13 aircraft. Each trail

leading into the suspected NVA sites was thoroughly evaluated for

evidence of enemy usage.

One of the most important mission preparations was the conduct of athorough map study by each individual team member and construction of

the 'sand table'. Each person was required to 'spider overlay' theirindividual topographic maps where a red colored lead pencil was used

to trace down each ridgeline and finger to the intercept with the

valley floor and a blue or green colored lead pencil was used to trace

up the smaller valleys until intercepting the hilltops of the areathat encompassing the first days movement after insertion. As this

process was completed, the topographic map became a spider-like

network of red and blue lines that gradual became denser. This sameexercise was conducted to some degree during the daytime prior to each

day's night movement. The procedure assisted in visualizing the

terrain in three dimensions and forced focus on the terrain along our

intended routes. The subsequent daily routes were only partiallydelineated with the red ridgeline and valley traces.

Once each individual had satisfactorily completed their spideroverlays, some members created a 'sand table' of the entire route. The

table was created directly on the cleared ground near our tents at An

Khe and consisted of one-foot equals two kilometers scaled squaresthat contained mounded dirt to outline the hilltops and valleys. The

vertical scale was exaggerated but done in a manner that 'line of

sight' could be visualized. Each observation and assembly point,

including emergency escape assembly points, preplanned fire target andthe expected NVA regimental CPs were marked using items cut out of

paper. The table was large and did not contain the topographic detail

of our spider overlay topographic maps. Mastery of topographic maps

and terrain association was essential and required of each long-rangereconnaissance patrol member and taught to all members of the entire

Chinese Bandit Recon Platoon. Any Chinese Bandit that did not


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demonstrate the ability to 3D visualize topographic maps in the spider

overlay and sand table exercises was not permitted to conduct long-ranger reconnaissance or combat operations. In addition, each man was

expected to know the meaning of every mark and label on the

topographic maps in use.

No 'pace-counts' were performed during night movement and persons were

expected to have memorized the topography and other critical

information of the entire day route prior to departing each day.

Stevens, my RTO was also expected to be aware of his actual coordinate

position, at all times, within six digits WITHOUT consulting histopographic maps. Stevens conducted map checks at all high and low

ground points. He mastered this skill after only two months of effort

and could call for a fire mission or provide approximate coordinates

in the event of an emergency in a matter of seconds. He was the only

person expected to be making map checks on a regular basis and no onewas in a position to discuss their map location with him, including

myself. When unexpected enemy or other critical sites were located,the positions were posted on each man's topographic map. It was

interesting to compare these plots with those of the other team

members during the occupation of our daily observation positions. Any

errors in plotting were resolved and corrected on each man'stopographic map. No actual overlays were used but all notes and plots

were made directly onto each man's map, although the procedure was in

contradiction with normal security procedures, we did so to easemovement and minimize what was carried. The reconsolidated maps and

notes that were submitted after each operation were placed over new

maps and overlay paper was used during after action debriefings. The

actual green Memorandum books and topographic maps were NOT submittedfor examination and some of these documents survive today.

I sent one Memorandum book home to my father and younger brother that

contained sections describing me following wild or escaped elephantsfor a day in addition to the other information that I recorded.

Again, these protocols were add odds with what was expected but the

information was normally used and shared with the entire ChineseBandit Recon Platoon and the information was deemed beneficial enough

to warrant deviation from normal policy. I have no doubt that

intelligence specialists will find fault with what we did. We deviated

from dress uniform, communications and intelligence reporting andpolicies. Sometimes to achieve what was required in the most optimized

manner, and at other times motivated only by our own zeal regarding

collecting intelligence information at close quarters with the NVA.

Everyone understood the strategic and tactical importance of not beingdetected or leaving evidence behind that would alert the NVA to our

operating in the area. Any increased vigilance on the part of the NVA


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operating along the border would have made ground reconnaissance

operations significantly more difficult and dangerous. Although wewere confident that we would not be discovered, three response plans

were developed in the event the Chinese Bandit LRRP team was detected

or suspected of being detected by the NVA or any other indigenous

personnel.

In the event of detection resulting in the exchange of fire, our sole

strategy was to immediately break contact and run rapidly to pre-designated assembly points that were located along the route. In the

event that we did not successfully transmit our daily surveillance

report and the report received by the overhead airborne Air Forceaircraft, then a search and recovery operation was to be launched

immediately in the area between our last reported position and the

next scheduled reporting point. The search area was to be expanded to

all areas along the route until the Chinese Bandit LRRP team was

recovered or until the decision was made to abort the search andrecovery efforts. Each man carried a VS-17 panel and signal mirror

that would allow for the marking of extraction sites near each pre-designated assembly point. Breaking contact did not emphasize keeping

the six team together but an 'every man for himself' approach. The

LRRP team was normally spread over a distance of several miles. The

team carried only one radio and the operator followed the LRRP Teamleader and maintained a line of sight distance from him or closer as

the situation required. The radio operator also responsible for

initiating calls for fire support and maintained a constant awarenessof the adjacent pre-planned fire missions that would be provided

solely by aerial fire support. In the event of an attack, the radio

operator would call for fire support while running to break contact

and the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team leader was to make every effort tojoin his radio operator and move together towards the pre-designated

assembly of their choice. All other team members normally were

extended beyond line of sight distances and any effort at regroupingwould have decreased the flexibility needed when evading any pursuing

NVA troops.

In any situation where we were detected by the NVA or indigenous

personnel but not fired upon or being pursued by them, then an effort

was to be made to assemble the team and move together and coordinate

for an extraction of the team. In either the detection scenarios, itwas important for team members to assess any heard rifle or other

small arms firing to determine if the firing was that of the NVA and

if the fire was directed at one or more of the Chinese Bandits. Since

the NVA were using some US and other foreign weapons during thisperiod of the Vietnam War, merely hearing the sound of small arms fire

and determining the weapons type by sound did not provide confirmation


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of detection or engagement. Although it was observed that the NVA

rarely discharged weapons unless in an actual engagement, it wasimportant that any Chinese Bandit LRRP Team member not assume that

other members were engaged merely by the sound of weapons fire in the

vicinity of the patrols route. We had the opportunity to make use of

Air Force emergency radios that could have been carried by each memberof the LRRP Team. We failed to take advantage of these radios that

would have provided improved communications to coordinate the

decisions for aborting missions and inter-team coordinations duringcritical situations.

It was believed that the threat of our detection was greatest byindigenous persons and not the NVA. Generally, the local population

knew the area better and often hunted on and off trail areas. The

discovery of off trail disturbances and any discarded items,

intentional or otherwise, that we made during our movements could be

expected to have been made by anyone moving and slowly stalking prey.We made many inquiries to determine if the local population were using

the trails and hunting and gathering crops in the mountainous areasalong the border and were informed that such activities were rare now

with the large presence of NVA and Saigon backed forces frequenting

the region. Our patrolling confirmed this assessment, however, we

remained vigilant and concerned that any disturbances or debris leftbehind would be discovered by the local hunters and those collecting

food from abandoned slash and burn fields and our presence reported to

the NVA.

In 1965 and 1966, many of the local population where still hunting and

carrying homemade crossbows and arrows; rifles made from steel pipe

using a threaded cap at one end and a hole drilled near the rearhaving a spring loaded hinge which detonated a toy pistol cap... the

pipe was normally mounted to a carved wooden stock and secured by

wire; and vintage Japanese and other bolt action rifles and pistols.Boys and men of all ages actively hunted and fished in areas near any

hamlet unless military units, any military unit, were operating in the

area. The threat of booby traps was not yet a widespread problem andthese local area hunters would reenter their hunting areas when the

military units were believed to have departed. They wore a variety of

clothing and were often barefoot. The older men often hunted large

game, including elephants, barking deer, anteaters, and gibbons andmonkeys. Monkey blood and whiskey was a ceremonial drink amongst many

of the upland high peoples. One hunting technique involved occupying

positions, often in trees, near watering areas, and shooting the

animals at close range. Another method specific to gibbon huntinginvolved slow cross-county movement where gibbons were heard in the

high trees and then shooting a female gibbon which was carrying her


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baby. The dead female was used for food and source of blood and the

baby gibbon sold in the market place and often shipped to largercities and abroad to traders and zoos. Locals also placed fish traps

in the larger streams and rivers and frequently traveled to these

locations and removed any fish that had been captured. These locations

were especially well traveled and recorded on our maps as possiblecontact sites with the local populations.

These indigenous hunters were our greatest threat, not the NVA, andunless counter tracking methods were used and used well, then we would

be detected or evidence of our being in the area detected after our

extraction.

Fortunately I had hunted with the hill tribes of SE Asia prior to my

assignment to the Chinese Bandits and my focus always including the

effort to locate the local hunters, who were encountered on occasion

and our detection by them was thought to have been avoided. I believedat the time and now that any special operations-like teams should

spend a minimum of one month hunting with local populations in thearea of operations or an adjacent country with a nearly identical

environment immediately prior to conducting any long-range

reconnaissance operations in a hostile area.

Waste disposal was stressed and necessary to minimize detection. Our

waste disposal and minimization protocols included the following:

We consumed the wax paper wrapper of the 'jungle chocolate bars';

We only carried the dehydrated food portion of LRP ration and retained

the plastic wrapper that was later used to package any itemscollected. The plastic bags were licked clean and filled with stream

water again and drank to recover any nutrients;

We only carried one white plastic spoon that doubled as a vertical

half rhombic antenna insulator (this antenna was for emergency use

only)...airborne aircraft were on station above during scheduledtransmissions...if the spoon broke than the parts were carried;

We carried only one toothbrush that was used often without paste or

other cleaner. It was a common practice for persons to often keep the

toothbrush in their mouths even after the sweet flavor of the pastewas gone;

No soap or other personal hygiene items were carried or used. We

regularly rinsed daily during the stream crossings and routes werepartially selected to provide this opportunity;


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Mosquito repellant was carried by some members but not permitted for

use unless 'approved'...the small black leeches were often left inplace...many deviated from this policy;

No extra clothing (many deviated from this policy also)...including

dry socks, combat swimming trunks, tennis shoes, and distinctiveheadgear. We stayed wet after rains and streams crossings;

No toilet paper was carried and wiping was done with vegetation or thebare hand which typically required scheduling immediately prior to

stream crossings to allow for washing up. Feces were buried carefully

off trail and with the assumption would be uncovered by animals. Withthe minimal amount of food that we were able to carry and consume,

bowel movements were not common or were the growth of body hair;

Urination was performed also off trail on forest litter and along the

sides of already saturated tree trunks;

Trail blazing debris in mountains along the Laos and CambodiaBorders was done using foxfire branches which were replenished at

night and placed on the ground along the right side of the trail using

four symbols (STOP...link up; DANGER LEFT; DANGER RIGHT; and DANGER

AHEAD). The last man in the formation recovered the foxfire that wasgiven to the lead person during each morning assembly at the

designated observation points;

Foraged food waste such as fish bones of rotted fish removed from

stream traps were placed in pockets until dry and then 'chewed'; fruit

pits were 'sucked on'...savored like the wrappings of the 'jungle

chocolate bar' wrappers and eventually buried in the same manner asfeces; the wild limes that were consumed skin and all as were the

other food found around abandoned slash and burn areas;

Rifles, pistols, knives and machetes were cleaned with soap and water

prior to missions and shaken in the water at stream crossings and a

new round was chambered daily. Ammunition was not oiled but wiped downwhen initially transferred to magazines in base camp. We did not

experience weapons malfunctions during test firings before and after

operations;

If the 101st Recondo emergency soap dish wrapped to our LBE was opened

to administer morphine or other drugs or to perform suturing, then the

contents were resealed and rewrapped with the old tape. The tape was

good for reuse if the effort was made to keep it untangled whileremoving or at least good enough until the mission was completed;

All LRRP personnel were to be non-smokers and or chewers since both


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diminish the sense of smell. Many deviated from this policy but NOT

when on LRRP operations and therefore waste disposal for these itemswas not a factor;

During 1965 and early 1966 drug use was not prevalent and NO Chinese

Bandit LRRP Team members were pot heads or had smoked POT or usedother drugs; therefore no disposal issues regarding drug use were

necessary.

There were other waste disposal procedures and many were very detailed

and constantly evolving. The topics included sharpening pencils, etc.

It was a mistake to wear anything other than clothing that resembledthe NVA or the indigenous populations, however, each of us wore

uniforms that were preferred and reflected sentiments rather than

optimized for the terrain, weather and enemy situation. I regret not

studying more carefully the enemy and local attire, and then

specifying a uniform that was more appropriate. In the case of the dryseason along the border in 1965 and early 1966 that uniform would have

included combat swimming trucks, that have the large leg openingswhich provided ease of movement and good air circulation and tennis

shoes that had soles identical to that worn by some of the NVA and

local population. We did request and the military did produce a jungle

boot having human footprint and NVA soles. The boots were notavailable until after the Chinese Bandits were disbanded and I have

been informed that some special operations teams did use them and

found them inadequate for a number of reasons.

A third and not well developed or approved escape protocol was

discussed amongst team members that considered escape routes through

Laos and Cambodia to the safe refuge afforded by Thailand which waslocated approximately 250 kilometers from the tri-border area where

the Chinese Bandit LRRP operations were performed. Operating along the

border line afforded escape routes in both directions and the decisionwas made that each LRRP Team member had the discretion to use the best

terrain during their escape efforts and that cross border maneuvering

was not prohibited. When patrolling along the actual border, fiftypercent of the terrain that afforded the best escape route was located

beyond the border of South Vietnam. Each team member carried a portion

of a 'one over the world' scale topographic map that encompassed the

tri-border area of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos that also included thearea extending to the border of Thailand. Area and other order of

battle information were requested for both sides of the border and

this information contained the same degree of detail. We had been

provided road maps of the same regions that depicted the generalgeography, including cities and land usage. Copies of these maps were

not carried during operations along the border but were studied to


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evaluate the feasibility and potential routes of escape that would

provide adequate concealment for night movement and possible foragingopportunities. We did seek approval for this cross border escape

option but each man knew that it was an option if the approved escape

protocols were deemed more dangerous. If this option had been executed

during the later days of any long-range reconnaissance mission, thenour carried food supply would have been depleted and therefore,

foraging near hamlets and fields that were encountered would have

taken place. Night cross-country routes in heavily forested areas weredeemed safer than any movement near occupied hamlets and villages.

Dogs, pigs and other domestic animals were typically alert at night

and any disturbances would have been investigated, therefore, the planwas to proceed without attempts to gather foods and maintain a minimum

25 kilometer per day rate of movement when enroute towards Thailand.

It would not have been difficult and the option was viable.

The escape plan options permitted the team to focus on locating the

enemy and performing the evaluations that were feasible from adistance and maintaining such distance that minimized any chance

encounters with the NVA or being detected.

The Chinese Bandit LRRP Team used foxfire, an aid to night tracking

and trail marking extensively in the spring and summer of 1966.

Foxfire covered branches were placed along side of trails to provideinformation to following team members and to provide additional

nighttime illumination. The branches were collected by the last man of

the patrol and redistributed when the team reassembled during thedaily occupation of the observation assembly areas.

Constant efforts were made to identify the plants and animals of the

Central Highlands and the understanding provided immeasurablebenefits. Leaves from the several trees that provided the most common

encountered edible wild fruits were collected and provided to

intelligence staff on completion of previous patrols and we wereinformed of the name of the tree, where the trees were expected to

grow and some information that confirmed the edibility and nutritional

value of the fruits that augmented our diet.

Spider webs were especially interesting to team members and when it

was observed that certain species of web tending spiders erected their

webs at different times of night and in different types of habitat andat different heights above the trail surface, several us made the

effort to evaluate web encounters as an indicator of recent trail

activity. The webs were often easy to detect in certain nighttime

light conditions and any disturbed or damaged web was reason tosuspect the presence of something that recently passed along the

trail. It was also observed that some species of spiders erected their


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webs early in the evening and removed them early in the morning. Any

disturbance of these webs was a good indication that the damage hadoccurred during the same night when they were encountered. We later

made requests for more information of the spider web building

activities but were not provided any follow-up information on the

subject.

Many suspected animal nighttime sounds were investigated. Moving files

of ants often created a noise that was suspected to be the sound of acrawling snake. Each suspected 'crawling' snake investigation resulted

in the discovery of insects moving in a file formation. Many snakes

were encountered but few at night and they were never found by anysound that was made but solely by visual detection. The large black

jungle forest scorpion also was solely detected by visual sightings.

Our knowledge of the preferred habitat of mosquitoes and the small

black land leeches enabled us to avoid them to some extent. When they

were encountered we typically deviated from our intended route andoccupation sites to escape them. Drier and areas having more air

movement were areas preferred for movement and observation points.However, frequent encounters with mosquitoes and leeches could not be

avoided and mosquito repellent was used against both of these pests,

despite our internal policy not to do so.

The repellent greatly reduced the sense of smell of anyone using the

liquid and every effort was made to restrict the use of the repellent

and stream crossings provided the opportunity to bath and wash awaythe liquid and smell of it. We had decided that the repellent would

not be carried on the LRRP operations along the border; however,

several persons did not comply with this requirement and we all shared

the repellent when invested with the leeches.

Soap, toothpaste and other lotions were also not carried or used by

any Chinese Bandit LRRP team member. Toothbrushes were carried andused often. Gun solvents and weapons cleaning equipment was not

carried either. We relied solely on frequent stream crossings to clean

our bodies, uniforms and equipment, including shaking the riflesvigorously in the water. All equipment including weapons had been

washed with soap and water since November 1965 and little oils or

solvents could be detected on them. Our ammunition was not washed but

wiped dry of any oils. The M16 rifles only required re-chambering around each day to remain functional and prevent jamming. In the few

situations when we did fire our weapons no misfires had occurred

during the long-range reconnaissance operations that were only

scheduled for a two-week period. Test firing in base camp or duringpatrols that were deemed 'secured' did not result in weapon

malfunctions. I later opted to carry my personal Browning Hi-Power M35


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pistol with only one fully loaded magazine. The pistol was carried in

a brown issued shoulder holster. It was cumbersome to carry a M16rifle that was the LRRP teams designated personal weapon and the

walking stick that I used. The rifles were typically carried at the

'Ranger carry' with slings removed and silenced with duct tape

wrappings and strips of camouflage fabric. While moving at night withthe rifle it was necessary to store the walking stick between my

harness straps near my waist and could do so only in vegetation that

provided a four-foot wide ease of movement. The foxfire inlayed stickwas used primarily for trail signaling at night and carrying the

Browning pistol provided improved ease of movement. The pistol had a

blue finish and would easily rust without daily cleaning with solventsand oils. I decided to not clean the pistol and intended to rub off

any rusting using 'elbow grease' only. The pistol was purchased as a

used weapon and was in excellent condition but was rusted and pitted

after only one week of patrolling and attempting to rub off the rust

that began accumulating immediately after washing the pistol in hotwater and soap at base camp. The Browning was left in the rear for the

remainder of my tour and I carried a cleaned with water and sand onlyissued M1911A1 during subsequent patrolling. A new round was chambered

in the .45 caliber pistol each morning and did not malfunction when

test fired or during target practice. I can still remember the smell

of the odors of gun solvents, oils and insecticides that permeated thetents at base camp. Other than our own sweat and the odor of our food,

the Chinese Bandit LRRP Team smelled of the surrounding mountainous

jungle.

The importance of not using any substance that would decrease our

sense of smell was emphasized daily when the odor of smoke and animals

and people that were encountered were detected from distances thatrequired training, experience and vigilance.

Bandit LRRP team members were instructed to moisten their nose hairusing fresh water to enhance their sense of smell and were required to

practice 'sniffing the air' which required shifting the head and

seeking out air movements that were expected due to the prevailingwind and air movements created by topography and moving water.

Heightening the sense of smell, hearing and vision was always

practiced when we 'lay dogged' after insertions and during the

frequent encounters with variations in vegetation, weather, topologyor light conditions.

Not being detected and detecting required our constant efforts at

improvement.

chinese bandits night movement and tracking techniques

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