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ORIGINAL ARTICLE
China’s Rise, Developmental Regionalism and East AsianCommunity Building: Cooperation Amid Disputes in the SouthChina Sea
Ling Wei1
Received: 8 February 2018 / Revised: 26 March 2018 / Accepted: 12 May 2018 / Published online: 30 July 2018
� Asiatic Research Institute 2018
Abstract Why the rapid rise of China coincides with
peace and cooperation in East Asia? The paper argues for a
distinctive form of regionalism practiced in East Asia,
which can be called developmental regionalism. It means
that regional processes are development-oriented and
development-focused, featuring pragmatism, flexibility and
developmental security. In development-oriented region-
alization, practices and institutions coevolve for progress.
Practices of developmental regionalism nurture the habit of
cooperation and promote community building. As the
growth engine in the region, China facilitates develop-
mental regionalism. The paper takes the South China Sea
disputes in the past few years as a case to illustrate how
conflicts were averted and cooperation maintained and
deepened between China and ASEAN and in East Asia
even in a most sensitive area of territorial disputes and in
the context of the dramatic change in regional power
structure with China’s rapid rise. In conclusion, the paper
also briefly discusses conditions and implications of
developmental regionalism in world politics.
Keywords China’s rise � Developmental regionalism �East Asian Community � South China Sea
1 Introduction: Rise of China Coincideswith Regional Integration in East Asia?
Why do states in East Asia1 accommodate China as it rises
rapidly to great power status? How come that East Asia has
witnessed parallel developments between the rapid rise of
China and regional integration with ASEAN at the insti-
tutional center in the past 20 years? East Asian regional
cooperation has prospered since its initiation after the 1997
Asian financial crisis. The region has enjoyed economic
dynamism and proliferation of multilateral cooperation
processes and mechanisms at various tracks in various
fields. In 2002, the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) Summit
adopted the proposal made by East Asian Vision Group
(EAVG) that the long-term goal of regional cooperation be
an East Asian community (EAVG 2001). In 2009, Japanese
Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama declared the great
importance his administration attached to Asian diplomacy
and put forward the initiative of an East Asian Community
based on the philosophy of ‘‘yu-ai’’ (Hatoyama 2009). In
2012, the APT Commemorative Summit adopted the pro-
posal made by East Asian Vision Group II (EAVG II) that
an East Asian Economic Community (EAEC) be realized
by 2020 as a main pillar for regional cooperation and
community building (EAVGII 2012). Some may argue that
the EAEC building is somewhat lacking momentum.
However, there is no denying that this is one significant
step forward toward East Asian community building.
China’s integration into the region started with the
establishment of dialog relations with ASEAN. Confronted
with the Asian financial crisis, China made valuable con-
tribution to the region by not devaluing RMB and hence& Ling Wei
1 China Foreign Affairs University, Xicheng District, Beijing,
China
1 ‘‘East Asia’’ discussed in this paper refers to 10 ASEAN countries
plus China, Japan and ROK (ASEAN Plus Three).
East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32
https://doi.org/10.1057/s42215-018-0002-8
facilitated the launching of region-wide integration under
the APT in 1997. From then on, China has also embarked
on a fast track of development toward great power status,
with GDP growing from USD$ 961.6 billion in 1997 to
USD$ 11.2 trillion in 2016, which ranked the second lar-
gest in the world only after that of the USA and made up
55.7% of the GDP total of the ASEAN Plus Three.2 China-
ASEAN dialog relationship is widely regarded as the most
comprehensive and fruitful among all ASEAN’s dialog
relationships despite the fact that China was a late comer to
ASEAN-led regional processes (Li 2017b). China was the
first major power outside ASEAN that acceded to the
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC),
the first to launch an FTA negotiation with ASEAN and the
first power outside ASEAN to express its willingness to
support a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia.
China has been fully integrated into the regional processes
with ASEAN Centrality and in ASEAN Way. In the last
few years, despite intensification of the disputes in the
South China Sea between China and some ASEAN clai-
mant states, regional cooperation continued to broaden and
deepen with, for instance, among others, the progress of the
negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP), the framework agreement reached for
the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea and the
establishment of Lancang-Mekong Cooperation
Mechanism.
All these developments seem to have contradicted the
conventional wisdom of world politics. Why has coopera-
tion been maintained and deepened in East Asia with
China’s phenomenal rise? For realists, China’s rise changes
regional power structure and inevitably leads to violent
power transition. For institutionalists, regional institutions
led by ASEAN are merely talk shops, not legally binding or
effective enough to produce and guarantee peace and
cooperation. For constructivists, ‘‘we-feeling’’ is yet in the
making and there is no cooperative culture based on
common identity in the region.
The paper argues for a distinctive form of regionalism
practiced in East Asia, which can be called developmental
regionalism. It means that regional processes are devel-
opment-oriented and development-focused, featuring
pragmatism, flexibility and developmental security.
Development defined in sustainable terms is the goal and
main content for regional processes, a strong adhesive and
shared understanding for community building. Pragmatism
means importance is attached to practical results and
benefits rather than any fixed ideology or model in regional
processes. Flexibility means flexible arrangements and
minimal institutionalism are usually preferred in regional
cooperation. Developmental security refers to a security
norm which sees development and security mutually rein-
forcing each other. In development-oriented regionaliza-
tion, practices and institutions coevolve for progress. As
China continues to rise rapidly and plays the role of growth
engine in the region, regional states which prioritize
development in their domestic politics tend to seek,
maintain and deepen cooperation with China, and accom-
modate China in regional processes. Such practices have
shaped developmental regionalism and in turn promoted
regional integration and community building in East Asia.
The paper takes the South China Sea disputes in the past
few years as a case to illustrate how conflicts have been
averted and cooperation maintained and deepened between
China and ASEAN and in East Asia even in a most sen-
sitive area of territorial disputes under developmental
regionalism. The paper concludes that developmental
regionalism has enabled cohesive and resilient regional
processes, nurtured the habit of cooperation and promoted
community building in East Asia. In the end, it also briefly
discusses necessary conditions, and the theoretical and
practical implications of developmental regionalism in
world politics.
2 Structures, Agents and Processes in RegionalIntegration
Existing literature on China’s rise and East Asian region-
alization roughly falls into the following three categories
with respective focuses on structures, agents and processes.
They fail either to predict about continuing peace and
cooperation in East Asia or to provide adequate or accurate
explanations about the impetus and dynamism of the pro-
cesses. The rapid growth of China is typically regarded
disruptive to regional order or simply reactive in the
actually two-way social construction in its engagement
with the region.
2.1 Structures and Power Rivalry
Mainstream international relations theories, neorealism,
neoliberal institutionalism and social constructivism are
basically structural theories (Qin and Wei 2008, 116).
Stability of international system is determined by the
structures of material capabilities (Waltz 1979), interna-
tional institutions (Keohane 1984) and international culture
(Wendt 1999), respectively. According to neorealists, the
growth of China’s material capabilities inevitably leads to
violent power rivalry and power transition (Organski 1980,
19), firstly within the region between China and Japan and
2 Calculated by the author with data from the World Bank and
ASEAN Secretariat, https://data.worldbank.org/country/china, http://
www.aseanstats.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/ASEAN-Statistical-
Leaflet-2017_Final.pdf, accessed 23/01/2018.
20 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32
then on a global scale between China and the USA
(Mearsheimer 2001, 2010). In recent years, dual structures
have emerged in East Asia, namely, the China-led eco-
nomic structure and the US-led security structure. The
strengthening of the dual structures increases uncertainty of
regional order and risks of conflicts in East Asia (Ikenberry
2016). Neoliberal institutionalism assumes that China’s
rise challenges the US-led international order based on
rules and norms despite the fact that China has benefited
enormously from this order since its integration into the
international system. It maintains that the US hegemony
will sustain as long as the US-led institutions continue to
strengthen and prevail (Ikenberry 2008). Hence, regional
stability relies very much on the strengthening of the US
institutional power, and the growth of China’s institutional
power is regarded as a fundamental challenge to US
regional hegemony (Ikenberry 2004). For social construc-
tivists, since there is too much diversity in the region and
states do not typically identify with each other or with the
USA (Katzenstein 2005), a cooperative or community
culture is yet in the making and cooperation is not guar-
anteed. Finally, the English school argues that international
society is norm-based. As China differs from the west in
values and ideology, it cannot be fully or peacefully inte-
grated into the international society based on western val-
ues and norms. As China rises, it will attempt to establish a
different normative order from that of the West, and hence,
China’s rise will not be peaceful (Buzan 2010). None of
these structural theories predicts China’s peaceful rise in
the region. However, in the past 20 years and more, not
only has the region been free from major conflict, but also
it has witnessed proliferation of cooperative institutions
and processes with a regional community as the long-term
goal.
2.2 Agents and Regional Order
Some scholars emphasize the agency of major actors in the
region in shaping regional order. For instance, Archaya
studies ASEAN agency in developing ASEAN Way and
building a security community in the Southeast Asia sub-
region (Acharya 2001). Although ASEAN has successfully
localized norms from the West (Acharya 2004), diffused
the ASEAN Way to a wider region (Acharya 1997) and
established ASEAN Centrality in institutional framework
of regional cooperation, ASEAN alone cannot guarantee
peace or cooperation in East Asia. Katzenstein and Mear-
sheimer argue for the agency of the USA in preserving
stability and order in East Asia, respectively, by estab-
lishing bilateral security alliance (Hemmer and Katzenstein
2002) and designating Japan as a core regional state
(Katzenstein 2005) and by playing offshore balancing
(Mearsheimer 2001). However, being static, such theories
fail to capture the dynamism of the East Asian cooperation
and neglect the agency of regional actors, especially
ASEAN and China. Kang argues for a hierarchic system
with Chinese preeminence in East Asia in history, in which
lesser states typically bandwagoned instead of balancing
China and the regional stability relied on the strength and
stability of China’s power (Kang 2005, 2007). However,
China as a civilization in process in history is not the
nation-state China of today. The ancient tributary system
contradicts the modern Westphalian system on the funda-
mental norm of sovereignty. Moreover, there is no band-
wagon observed in East Asia and middle and lesser powers
typically avoid choosing sides between major powers.
2.3 Processes and Socialization of Power
There has also been increasing literature on process-fo-
cused model of East Asian regionalism, which goes beyond
structures and agents and maintains that East Asian inte-
gration is process-driven, although the process is defined in
different terms. Some see the process as institutionaliza-
tion. They argue that the level of institutionalization of
regional cooperation in East Asia is rather low and the
process is not producing much substance (Searight 2005).
Distinctively different from European integration based on
treaties, East Asian regional process based on declarations
and statements is unlikely to realize the goal of a com-
munity. However, the ASEAN Way of minimum institu-
tionalization has been proven effective and successful in
maintaining peace and promoting cooperation in Southeast
Asia since the founding of ASEAN in 1967 and in inte-
grating major powers into East Asian cooperation since the
founding of the APT in 1997. Some see the process as
social construction, i.e., socialization of major powers and
the building of ‘‘we-feeling’’ (Qin and Wei 2008, 124).
Maintaining cooperative relations is the core and content of
the process, and the dynamism to keep the process going
(Wei 2016a, b, 39). However, the process defined as both
means and end still seems somewhat insufficient in solving
the puzzle of why states cooperate in the first place and
why keeping the cooperative process going is even more
important than realizing preset material goals.
In sum, existing literature on East Asian regionalism
fails either to predict or to provide satisfying explanation
for the parallel developments between the rise of China and
peace and cooperation in East Asia. A fundamental reason
for such failure or inadequacy is their neglect of a basic
factor in the local context in their pursuit of generality and
universality of their theories, that is, development.
East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 21
3 Background Knowledge, Practice and Habitas Basic Assumptions
This paper argues for a distinctive form of regionalism
practiced in East Asia, which can be called developmental
regionalism. It is based on the following assumptions about
background knowledge, practice and habit.
3.1 Background Knowledge
Locality and background knowledge matters. Locality
refers to the specific area where actors exist. It constitutes
part of the background knowledge of the actors. Partly tacit
and partly reflexive, background knowledge consists
mainly of ‘‘intersubjective expectations and dispositions.’’
It does not necessarily ‘‘create uniformity of a group,’’ but
organize ‘‘their differences around pervasive understanding
of reality’’(Adler and Pouliot 2011, 16). Most East Asian
countries had colonial or semicolonial experiences in
modern history and gained independence at the end of
World War II. The pervasive understanding of reality in the
region crystallizes into two fundamental norms, namely,
non-intervention and development. Non-intervention is a
dominant norm in the normative hierarchy of East Asia
(Acharya 2004, 239). Development, as late Chinese leader
Deng Xiaoping’s famous line goes, is of overriding
importance (Deng 1993, 377). And as Chinese President Xi
Jinping argues, development is the biggest security for
most Asian countries (Xi 2014).
3.2 Anchoring Practice
Background knowledge is embedded in practice, and the
anchoring practice in East Asian regional processes is the
practice of development. A practice is competent perfor-
mance, which tends to be patterned, socially significant and
recognizable (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 7). A fundamental
task and basic incentive to join regional process for most
East Asian countries is development. Development has
been the anchoring practice in East Asian regional pro-
cesses, which means that the practice of development has
not only rendered other practices in regionalization possi-
ble, but also embodied defining rules and principles for a
whole set of practices in interactions of states with each
other in the region, and provided the infrastructure for
states to go on and engage in other practices in regional
integration (Sending and Neumann 2011, 237). After
World War II, East Asia has witnessed waves of devel-
opments and rise led, respectively, by Japan in the 1960s,
the Four Little Dragons in the 1970s, and China from the
1980s onward. From 2006 to 2015, the combined GDP of
ASEAN countries rose by 66%, making ASEAN Economic
Community the third fastest growing economy in Asia only
after China and India, and the fifth largest economy in the
world (East–West Center 2017). Such growth could not
have been possible without the practice of development
being placed at the core of domestic and regional politics
for East Asian countries. Narrowing the development gap,
the key of the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (ASEAN
Secretariat 2007) is a core interest of ASEAN in ASEAN
Community building.
3.3 Logic of Habit
Logic of habit tends to be predominant in institutionalized
environment, which reduces uncertainty and prolongs sta-
bility and cooperation. Habits are automatic and unreflec-
tive reactions of actors to the world around them, including
perceptions, attitudes, emotions and practices. Acquired
from the social structures in which actors are situated, and
‘‘maintained through use, utility, the absence of challenges,
and the physiology of the brain,’’ habits are broken or
replaced only when actors become aware that ‘‘they are no
longer working, instrumentally, normatively, or function-
ally’’ (Hopf 2010, 540–544). There are different kinds of
logics, including logics of consequentialism, appropriate-
ness, affect, practice and habit. Institutionalized settings
and durable relationships are favorable conditions for the
logic of habit to work; and ‘‘even deliberate reflective
decisions are still made on the background of structured
habits’’ (Hopf 2010, 547). If states habitually cooperate
with each other in institutionalized environments, uncer-
tainty about each other’s intentions that conventional IR
theories assume will be significantly reduced, and coop-
eration is often taken for granted and likely to be sustained.
4 Developmental Regionalism and CommunityBuilding in East Asia
Development regionalism means regional actors interact
with each other to promote national and regional economic
growth and strength, and to improve people’s lives. It takes
development as its core and content, builds on cooperative
practices and aims at a sustainable regional community,
where habit of cooperation is nurtured and the logic of
habit works for coevolution between agents and structures,
and between institutions and practices (Fig. 1). Engaged in
the anchoring practice of developmental regionalism, states
in East Asia typically address security challenges and
disputes in consultative processes to maintian cooperation
and facilitate development.
22 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32
4.1 Developmental Regionalism in Contestation
As ‘‘a contested concept’’ (He 2017, 7), regionalism
invokes different understandings of and approaches to a
region and regional arrangements. According to Higgott,
they fall into four categories, namely, de facto regionalism,
de jure regionalism, instrumental regionalism and cognitive
regionalism, referring, respectively, to market-led eco-
nomic integration, state-led institutional cooperation,
common policy based on common interest, and shared
culture (Higgott 2007a, b, He 2017, 8). Hettne and
Soderbaum regard developmental regionalism as new
regionalism, referring to ‘‘concerted efforts from actors
(i.e. state, market and civil society) within a geographical
area to increase the economic development of the region as
a whole and to improve its position in the world economy’’
(Hettne and Soderbaum 1998, 19). Scholarly work on
regionalism in East Asia mostly deals with regional eco-
nomic cooperation and free trade arrangements (He 2017,
7). A few scholars have used the term ‘‘developmental
regionalism’’ to discuss East Asian regional processes.
Nesadurai puts forward the concept of ‘‘developmental
regionalism’’ as a way to incorporate domestic politics in
understanding the globalization–regionalism relationship.
Derived from the concept of ‘‘developmental state,’’
developmental regionalism is used to emphasize ‘‘state
intervention in markets to promote national development
agendas’’ (Nesadurai 2003, 235, 238). Dent points out the
‘‘strong ‘developmental’ characteristics of East Asia’s new
regionalism,’’ where regional cooperation and integration
activities ‘‘are particularly orientated to enhancing the
economic capacity and prospects of less developed coun-
tries with the view of strengthening their integration into
the regional economy, and thereby bringing greater
coherence to regional community building overall’’ (Dent
2008, 767). In Elumbre’s definition, developmental
regionalism in ASEAN integration is ‘‘strategic and pro-
gressive ideas aimed at the economic convergence of
member-states’’ (Elumbre 2014, 83).
‘‘Developmental regionalism’’ proposed in this paper is
different from the above-discussed regionalisms. First, it
follows analytical eclecticism (Sil and Katzenstein 2010,
441) by integrating elements from different theoretical
traditions to build complex arguments and provide prag-
matic solutions. Hence, ‘‘development’’ here is not just
about economic growth, but also carries political-security
significance and sociocultural values. When talking about
East Asian regionalism, people mainly refer to the APT,
which is ‘‘the first exclusive East Asian grouping’’ that has
been created (Dent 2008, 769) and the institutionalization
of East Asian regionalism (He 2017, 6). According to the
study of Asian Development Bank, East Asia encompass-
ing the APT countries has by far been the most integrated
part in Asia at both micro- and macro-level since the late
1990s (Dent 2008, 771–772). Despite different political
systems, almost all East Asian countries share ‘‘the basic
characteristics of elite governance political systems,’’
where the legitimacy of the regimes and stability of
domestic order rely very much on the material wealth
generated for citizens (Nesadurai 2003, 239). Therefore,
development carries vital political, security and social
significance.
Second, developmental regionalism puts emphasis on
state-led regional development processes. Domestic insti-
tutions and political practices play a significant role in
shaping the foreign policy preferences of a state (Mo-
ravcsik 1997). Since the launching of the APT, the regional
integration has been state-led and development-driven.
However, both features have remained understudied.
Besides economic growth promoted by states through
trade, FDI and manufacturing, development also has a very
strong indication of poverty alleviation and narrowing the
wealth gap at both domestic and regional levels. Devel-
opment, being the overriding priority for most East Asian
countries, has shaped their preferences in regional politics.
Developmental regionalism is consistent with ‘‘the region’s
mainstream economic ideologies,’’ the Japanese develop-
mentalism (Dent 2008, 780) at first and the Chinese
development
•pragma�sm•flexibility •developmental security
coopera�on
•prac�ces of and for developement
community
•habit of coopera�on
•coevolu�on
Fig. 1 Developmental regionalism
East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 23
developmentalism in sequence, aiming at realizing trans-
formative growth by institutions and policies in both
domestic and foreign contexts. Therefore, developmental
regionalism proposed in this paper emphasizes that devel-
opment is the driving force, the focus, the goal and the
main content of regional integration in East Asia.
Third, developmental regionalism indicates that ‘‘de-
velopment’’ is the underlying common value and norma-
tive base for regional integration. Development, being the
priority and fundamental challenge to most East Asian
countries, concerns domestic stability and political legiti-
macy. It has to be inclusive and sustainable. Narrowing the
development gap is imperative in both domestic and
regional contexts. National governments in East Asia have
to meet the growth demands of both states and individuals.
They also have to manage the balance between economic
development and ecological sustainability, and parallel
processes of industrialization and post-industrialization.
Hence, inclusive and sustainable development is the motive
and the biggest common ground in regional integration.
4.2 Pragmatism, Flexibility and Developmental
Security
Developmental regionalism in East Asia features pragma-
tism, flexibility and developmental security. The spirit of
pragmatism is probably best captured in Deng Xiaoping’s
famous line—‘‘It does not matter whether a cat is black or
white; if it catches mice, it is a good cat,’’ which is inter-
preted as ‘‘Results matter’’ by Mahbubani (2010, 37). The
ultimate goal and intended result of East Asian regional
processes is development, which is a lesson learned from
the region’s recent history of humiliation and colonization.
As Deng Xiaoping put it, ‘‘being backward invites invasion
and defeat’’.3 For China, to realize internal development, it
needs decades of peace and cooperation from the region,
which can be achieved by sharing its growth with its
neighbors. For other East Asian countries, though at dif-
ferent stages of development, they in general welcome
China’s rise as an economic opportunity. The proposal of
an East Asian community is pragmatic as it is expected to
bring both economic and political benefits to the region.
The economic benefit is significant particularly in terms of
sharing growth and narrowing the development gap. The
political benefit is to secure the gains and dividends from
closer cooperation and deeper integration.
Distinctively different from the EU model of regional
integration built on legally binding treaties, pragmatism in
East Asia is showcased by pragmatic institutionalism,
meaning relatively low level of institutionalization and
much room for flexibility and autonomy. It often consists
of politically attainable goals, practical agenda tailored to
the needs of members, decision-making by consensus
which aims at seeking and expanding common ground and
cares for the comfort level of concerned parties, and
pragmatic agreements where voluntary implementation can
be expected from all (Maric 2018). Contrary to the pre-
diction of neoliberal institutionalism, despite the lack of
legally binding power, the declarations, statements and
pragmatic agreements on which East Asian regional pro-
cesses are based do produce results. The success of the
APT process is due exactly to Asians’ pragmatism (Mah-
bubani 2010, 39). The proliferation of bilateral and regio-
nal FTAs since 1999 also demonstrates the pragmatic
feature of developmental regionalism in East Asia (Desker
2004, 3).
Flexibility means minimum institutionalism and flexible
practices in regional processes. Flexibility results from the
‘‘compressed development’’ of China and most East Asian
economies. As Tianbiao Zhu argues, the acceleration of
globalization since the 1980s has given rise to a new
development paradigm in East Asia—compressed devel-
opment, where ‘‘different stages and sequences of devel-
opment are collapsed into one single point in time’’ (Zhu
2012, 101–102). Late developing countries like China find
that they are fully integrated into regional and global
economy and engaged simultaneously in processes of
industrialization and deindustrialization, experiencing the
coevolution of traditional, modern and postmodern values
and practices. As states in compressed development are
confronted with multiple tasks and different challenges
from different developmental stages simultaneously, they
cannot exactly follow the examples of early developers in
institutionalization, standardization and rule-based
bureaucratic operations. They tend to make flexible adap-
tations, experiment and improvise rather than to go for the
preset goals. Hence, flexibility in policies and practices has
become a prominent feature of developmental regionalism
in East Asia, where states bend rules, adapt quickly to new
circumstances, and learn quickly to ‘‘deploy new tactics
and find practical solutions’’ when facing new challenges
(Zhu 2012, 105–106).
Developmental security refers to a security norm which
sees development and security mutually reinforcing each
other. Tønesson proposes ‘‘developmental peace’’ and
argues that the priority placed on economic development
by leaders of regional states is the key to the long peace in
East Asia where international war has been avoided for
well over three decades and unrivaled economic growth
has been witnessed. He also finds that there is a typical
pattern in their foreign policies when East Asian states
prioritize state-driven economic growth. They typically
strive to maintain external and internal stability, accom-
modate the USA, and adopt pragmatic policies toward their3 Quoted from Mahbubani (2010, 37).
24 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32
neighbors (Tønesson 2015, 10–13). Feiteng Zhong con-
ceptualizes ‘‘developmental security’’ to specifically refer
to China’s grand strategy as a rising power, and argues that
China should continue to actively maintain peaceful and
favorable external environment for economic growth even
after it rises to great power status (Zhong 2017, 10–11).
Different from the discussions in the above, ‘‘develop-
mental security’’ in this paper refers to a dominant norm
and belief in East Asia that security and development are
indispensable from each other. On the one hand, develop-
ment is promoted to preserve stability and peace. On the
other, stability provides necessary conditions for develop-
ment. Development is fundamental to a regional commu-
nity of common prosperity. Indeed, as East Asian
regionalization is crisis-driven—financial crisis in 1997,
the common security challenge which brought East Asian
countries together was challenge to sustainable growth and
development.
4.3 Practices of Development, Habit of Cooperation
and Community
East Asian regional cooperation has consisted mainly of
practices of development and for development. First,
institutionalization took place first and foremost in areas of
economic and functional cooperation, the most
notable among which include the Chiang Mai Initiative
Multilateralization (CMIM), the ASEAN Plus Three
Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), Asian Bond
Market Initiative (ABMI), ASEAN Plus Three Emergency
Rice Reserve Agreement, etc. Cooperation in political-se-
curity areas lags behind, not only because they are sensi-
tive, but also because there is a tacit understanding among
East Asian countries that the priority is development and
narrowing development gap is the key to regional com-
munity building. Second, connectivity has been a leading
project in regional integration in recent years with the
rational that it is a key step toward reducing development
gap and realizing regional community of ‘‘continued eco-
nomic growth’’ (ASEAN Secretariat 2010, 2016a). Initi-
ated by ASEAN, it has become a major area of cooperation
between ASEAN and its dialog partners with both signif-
icant institutional and financial support. Third, regional
FTA arrangements have made significant headways as
demonstrated by increasing bilateral FTAs, ‘‘ASEAN
Plus’’ FTAs, and the ongoing China-Japan-Korea Trilateral
FTA and RCEP negotiations. China-ASEAN FTA was the
first and a very smart move in ‘‘ASEAN Plus’’ FTA
arrangements, which enhanced regional peace by facili-
tating trade and sharing economic prosperity (Mahbubani
2010, 37). Intra-regional trade of APT has exceeded 50%,
with China being the No.1 or No.2 trading partner of all the
other 12 countries and home to most of the regional pro-
duction networks (Wong 2018).
As practices are repeated, patterned and competent
performances with social recognition, and the practices of
East Asian cooperation for development have reached
unprecedented width and depth in the past two decades,
cooperation for development is becoming a habit in
regional processes. First, cooperation for development has
become a diplomatic working routine4 as institutionaliza-
tion of regional processes enhances. For instance, all major
powers have sent and ambassadors and diplomatic missions
to ASEAN. And hence maintaining and promoting coop-
eration with ASEAN and supporting ASEAN-centered
regional cooperation have become their daily routine, and
probably the most important routine. Second, as regional
cooperation continues to broaden and deepen, not only the
number of stakeholders grows significantly, but also they
increasingly identify themselves with regional processes.
Third, practices embody social norms, which can be
stronger than legal norms (Percy 2007, 367). Cooperation
for development, through repeated practices, has become a
very strong social norm in East Asia, which is self-evident
with the remarkable progress made in regional integration
over the years.
Practices of cooperation of and for development in East
Asia lead to coevolution of agents and structures, and of
institutions and growth, which is part and parcel of regional
community building. Yuen Yuen Ang argues that suc-
cessful development is a coevolutionary process in which
markets and governments mutually adapt and that it
unfolds in a three-step sequence, weak institutions being
harnessed to build markets, emerging markets stimulating
strong institutions and strong institutions preserving mar-
kets (Ang 2016). Making a compelling case for China’s
rapid growth out of poverty, her argument actually applies
for most economies in East Asia and the growth of the
region as a whole. First, ‘‘weak institutions,’’ for instance,
the APT in 1997, are established to promote cooperation
for long-term peace and sustainable development. Second,
regional integration grows rapidly and stimulates stronger
institutions, for instance, the CMIM and the AMRO. Third,
strong institutions preserve regionalization process, for
instance, the adoption by the APT summits of the long-
term goal of building an East Asian community and the
recent goal of an EAEC by 2020. In development-oriented
regionalization, practices and institutions, states and
regional structures coevolve. Not only has the goal been set
to build a regional community, but also a community of
practice of cooperation of and for development has
4 For discussions of diplomatic working routine, see Neumann
(2007).
East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 25
emerged, which aspires and strives for long-term peace and
sustainable security.
5 Cooperation Amid Disputes in the South ChinaSea as a Test Case
The regional processes around the South China Sea issue
are taken as a case to test developmental regionalism
proposed by this paper. The reason to choose this case is
because a most unlikely case can provide more compelling
evidence than others when well established. The South
China Sea case is most unlikely because of the following
reasons. First, South China Sea has been regarded as a hot
spot for regional conflicts in the past few years. Second, it
involves the most sensitive hard security issue for East
Asian countries, territorial disputes. Third, it has become,
to some extent, an area for China-US power competition
and rivalry, concerning the reshaping of regional security
order. Regional states have been confronted with not only
intensified territorial disputes among themselves, but also
challenges of probable changes in regional power structure
and generally assumed ensuing instability. Under such
circumstances, did they maintain development-oriented
and development-focused regional cooperation for the
long-term goal of a regional community? The test will
focus on the interactions mainly between China and
ASEAN for two reasons. One is that the claimant states are
China and several ASEAN countries, and the Code of
Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) is being negotiated
between China and ASEAN. The other is that China and
ASEAN are the core of the economic APT (Wong 2018),
which is generally regarded as the foundation for an East
Asian community. ASEAN states are treated as both a
group and individual actors in this case.
5.1 Escalation of Tensions
Disputes in the South China Sea mainly focus on sover-
eignty and rights over the Nansha Islands and their sur-
rounding waters.5 A recent wave of claims and disputes
was triggered by the discovery of abundant oil and gas
reserves in the Nansha waters in the late 1960s and the
introduction of international arrangements concerning the
Exclusive Economic Zones or the continental shelf.6
Nonetheless, despite ‘‘a continuing tug-of-war’’ (Fu and
Wu 2016) over ‘‘territorial sovereignty and maritime rights
and interests’’,7 the general situation in the South China
Sea was under control from the late 1970s to the late 2000s,
as China gradually established and normalized its diplo-
matic relations with all countries in East Asia, became
ASEAN’s dialog partner and joined ASEAN-centered
regional processes.
Tensions started to build up in 2009, escalated since
2012 and took a turn to calming down in late 2016. The
tensions started with two main triggers. One is the official
deadline set by the UN Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf (CLCS) which requires states concerned
‘‘to submit claims over a continental shelf extending the
200 nautical miles from its territorial sea by 15 May 2009’’
(Fu and Wu 2016). The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia
and China subsequently made submissions to the CLCS.
And the other is Obama administration’s pivot to Asia
(Wei 2013). In 2010, Hilary Clinton stated at the ASEAN
Regional Forum that the USA ‘‘had a national interest’’ in
the South China Sea.8 Under such circumstances, disputes
in the South China Sea became intensified, complicated
and internationalized. In 2009, at least 5 confrontational
incidents took place between the US and Chinese ships in
the South China Sea (Fu and Wu 2016).
Tensions escalated in 2012. Besides increasing military
exercises and maritime border patrols, the following inci-
dents are worth mentioning. First is the Philippine–China
interaction over the Huangyan Island Incident. In May
2012, Aquino III signed an administrative order, renaming
the part of the South China Sea west to the Philippine
archipelago as ‘‘West Philippines Sea’’ (Philippines Presi-
dent’s Office 2012). As countermeasures, China sent
marine surveillance ship for long-term deployment in the
waters surrounding Huangyan Island, and put the Island
under its control. Second is the Vietnam–China interaction.
In June 2012, Vietnam adopted a Maritime Law to legalize
its territorial claims in the South China Sea. Upon the
adoption, China announced establishment of Sansha City
on Yongxing Island in the Xisha Islands with administra-
tive, jurisdictional and military arrangements (Fu and Wu
2016).
From 2013 to 2016, the disputes in the South China Sea
centered on the arbitration case, freedom of navigation,
island reclamation and so-called ‘‘militarization’’ (Wei
2016a, b). In 2013, the Philippines initiated arbitral pro-
ceedings against China at the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea, and China launched reclamation projects
on its controlled Nansha islands. In 2014, the standoff
between China and the Philippines over Ren’ai Shoal and
the China-Vietnam tensions over the drilling operation of5 For a brief review of the history of the arrangements and exercise of
sovereign rights over Nansha Islands from the colonial years to the
end of World War II, see Fu and Wu (2016).6 Such as the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
7 Term adopted from China’s official document, see Chinese Foreign
Ministry (2016b).8 Quoted from Firestein (2016).
26 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32
China’s HYSY 981 rig further deteriorated the situation. In
the meantime, the USA significantly intensified its
surveillance at the Nansha Islands and its surrounding
waters, and increased its military deployment in the region
and joint military exercises with some claimant states (Fu
and Wu 2016). In July 2016, China declared that the award
rendered by the Arbitral Tribunal in the South China Sea
arbitration established at the unilateral request of the
Philippines was ‘‘null and void,’’ and that China neither
accepted nor recognized it (Chinese Foreign Ministry
2016a). The tensions in the South China Sea mounted.
However, in late 2016, after newly elected Philippine
President Duterte took office, a dramatic turn was made in
Philippine policy toward China and the tensions over South
China Sea were gradually released. And such a turn toward
calming down the tensions and resolving the disputes was
consolidated when ASEAN-China Framework for the Code
of Conduct for the South China Sea was endorsed in
August 2017 (Storey 2017).
5.2 Cooperation Amid Disputes
Over the years, despite the tensions and disputes discussed
in the above, China-ASEAN cooperation has been main-
tained and deepened, demonstrating vitality and resilience.
The following is not going to deal with the low-hanging
fruit in trade and economic cooperation, but to focus on
more difficult issues like security norms and institutions,
the solidarity of the groupings, and the momentum of
regional cooperation at the time when interactions in the
South China Sea made a positive turn.
First, successive efforts and progress have been made
amid the disputes to build trust and confidence, and to
maintain stability in the South China Sea. In 1994, the
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was set up as an instru-
ment to practice ASEAN norm of cooperative security
(Acharya 2004) for regional stability, where South China
Sea became a major agenda in its preventive diplomacy
and China a very active participant. Even in the initial
years of ARF, China regularly stated its positions on the
South China Sea issue, including setting aside disputes, no
resort to force, acknowledgement of the concern about
freedom of navigation, and taking the U.N. Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as the basis for solution,
etc. (Foot 1998, 426–431). Progress at the ARF improved
mutual trust between China and other claimant states,
contributed to confidence building over the South China
Sea issue and the regional security at large, and to a great
extent created favorable conditions for future
achievements.
Alongside with the ARF, China and ASEAN countries
also dealt with the South China Sea issue at Senior Offi-
cials’ Meetings and multiple Track 1 and Track 1.5
meetings and dialogs. In 1998, the ASEAN Summit
adopted the Hanoi Plan of Action, proposing that efforts be
made to establish a regional code of conduct in the South
China Sea among the parties directly concerned, on which
China agreed in principle. In July 2002, in consideration of
different views on the binding powers and on areas to be
covered, Malaysia proposed to replace ‘‘the code of con-
duct’’ with a compromising and non-binding ‘‘declaration’’
(Fu and Wu 2016). After many rounds of difficult negoti-
ations, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the
South China Sea (DOC) was signed by ASEAN and China
in November 2002. Since then, the DOC has played a
significant role in building confidence, promoting cooper-
ation based on common interests and maintaining general
stability in the South China Sea. In 2003, China made
another significant step forward by acceding to the TAC
and elevating its dialog relations with ASEAN to strategic
partnership, furthering exercise of self-restraint with leg-
ally binding commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes.
Since 2002, ASEAN and China have been engaged in
negotiating the COC within the framework of compre-
hensively and effectively implementing the DOC. In 2011,
the Guidelines to Implement the DOC was adopted by
China and ASEAN. In 2012, ASEAN drafted and presented
to China a document containing the major elements of the
COC, and China expressed its willingness to start the COC
process. In 2013, the first China-ASEAN Senior Officials’
Meeting on the COC was convened in Suzhou, where all
agreed to ‘‘start the COC process on the principles of
observing consensus and adopting a gradual approach’’ (Li
2014). In 2014, China expressed its support for ‘‘dual-track
approach’’ proposed by Brunei, i.e., ‘‘relevant disputes
being addressed by countries directly concerned through
friendly consultations and negotiations and in a peaceful
way, and peace and stability in the South China Sea being
jointly maintained by China and ASEAN countries’’
(Chinese Foreign Ministry 2014). By August 2017, when
the Framework for the COC was endorsed, China and
ASEAN had 14 Senior Officials’ Meetings on the imple-
mentation of the DOC.
Second, cooperative process was kept going even in
most difficult times to maintain solidarity of regional
groupings and to institutionalize security and stability. In
2012, disputes in South China Sea escalated. ASEAN
found it difficult to reach consensus on the South China Sea
because not all members were claimant states. In June, the
ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting failed to produce joint
statement for the first time in its history, which was a shock
and heavy blow to ASEAN itself and to the region. Real-
izing the significance of ASEAN solidarity, ASEAN for-
eign ministers managed to build consensus and adopted
six-point principles on the South China Sea after intensive
shuttle diplomacy carried by Indonesian Foreign Minister
East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 27
Marty Natalegawa. ASEAN solidarity was eventually
safeguarded (Xinhua 2012). At the end of the year, the
APT summit adopted the Report of the EAVGII, which
studied the future direction of the APT and developed a
new vision for regional cooperation and community
building, of which the realization of an EAEC by 2020 was
the main pillar.
The years running up to the award of the arbitration case
initiated by the Philippines were extremely difficult for
regional cooperation. Especially, non-claimant states often
found themselves in a dilemma of having to taking sides.
Nonetheless, to maintain regional cooperative processes,
ASEAN, APT or EAS as groupings never took sides in
their official documents and settings. Moreover, efforts
were made in both Track 1 and Track 2 to focus on areas of
common interests and promote common development. For
instance, not only the official track II under the APT
framework, the Network of East Asian Think-tanks
(NEAT), continued joint study and pooled wisdom for
regional cooperation in functional and non-traditional
security areas, but also the Network of ASEAN-China
Think-tanks (NACT) and the Network of China-Japan-
ROK Trilateral Cooperation Think-tanks (NTCT) were
endorsed by national governments and established after the
NEAT model, respectively, in 2014 and in 2015 to promote
better mutual understanding, nurture trust and facilitate
cooperation in the region.9
China worked very hard to maintain its overall coop-
eration with ASEAN through both bilateral and multilateral
channels. On the one hand, China clarified its positions on
the South China Sea by issuing a series of position papers
and quietly adjusted its policies to demonstrate good will
for negotiation and peaceful resolution (Zhang 2016). On
the other hand, China worked with ASEAN to further
promote and institutionalize security cooperation. In 2013,
Chinese President Xi Jinping proposed building China-
ASEAN community of common destiny in Indonesia. In
2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang declared that China
would like to discuss the possibility of concluding a treaty
of good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation with
ASEAN, aiming at ‘‘providing an institutional framework
and legal guarantee for peaceful co-existence between the
two sides from generation to generation’’ (Xinhua 2014). In
2015, China-ASEAN Defense Ministers Informal Meeting
was held in Beijing for the first time. In 2016, ASEAN and
China held a commemorative summit, committed to
building a closer strategic partnership (ASEAN Secretariat
2016b). How China, ASEAN and regional countries
managed to keep cooperation on track under such trying
circumstances is illuminating.
Third, good momentum has been kept and new dyna-
mism injected into regional cooperation after the turn to
calming down was made over the South China Sea issue.
After the turnaround of China–Philippines relations in
October 2016, Philippine President Duterte made two visits
to China, attended the Belt and Road Forum for Interna-
tional Cooperation in Beijing, and reached important con-
sensus with Chinese leaders on properly handling the
maritime issues through friendly bilateral consultation and
strengthening cooperation in the South China Sea. The first
10 months of 2017 saw China become the Philippines’s
biggest trading partner (Li 2017a, b). In November 2017, a
China-Vietnam joint statement was issued, in which the
two sides pledged to strengthen their comprehensive
strategic cooperative partnership, agreed to jointly imple-
ment the five-year plan of bilateral economic and trade
cooperation, and promised to manage and control the dif-
ferences concerning maritime issues and refrain from tak-
ing actions to maintain peace and stability in the South
China Sea. The two sides agreed to strive for an early
conclusion of COC and a fundamental and long-term
solution of bilateral maritime disputes. The two sides also
decided to conduct joint inspection in waters outside the
Beibu Gulf and actively push forward joint development of
the area. In late 2017, on the occasion of the 20th APT
Commemorative Summit, the Manila Declaration was
adopted, reaffirming member states’ ‘‘commitment to fur-
ther strengthening and deepening the APT process which
plays a key role in regional community building efforts
with ASEAN as the driving force’’ (ASEAN 2017).
5.3 Maintenance of Regional Processes for Peace
and Prosperity
Why was cooperation maintained among East Asian
countries even in the most difficult time of the South China
Sea disputes? How come that bilateral and multilateral
cooperation has become even more robust after the
turnaround?
Duterte’s policy toward China is called by some ‘‘the
pivot to pragmatism’’ (Baviera 2017). In an interview with
the China Central Television, Duterte said he was not
breaking from the USA, but merely being ‘‘pragmatic,’’
and that there was no point of insisting on the ownership of
waters if it would not bring prosperity, but cost a world war
(CCTV 2016). Duterte has downplayed maritime disputes
to pursue close economic and political ties with China. His
strategy is to take full advantage of the economic benefits
from friendly relations with China and tackle non-tradi-
tional security challenge at home, such as drug abuse,
corruption and poverty, for sustainable growth. Many
9 China Foreign Affairs University is China’s focal point for NEAT,
NACT and NTCT. The author witnessed the establishment and
growth of the three regional track 2 groupings and participated in
almost all the major activities.
28 East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32
believe that Duterte made a smart move and that a mutually
acceptable resolution of South China Sea disputes is likely
to be followed by a boost in Chinese aid and infrastructure
investment, which the Philippine economy can use to
maintain its healthy growth momentum, especially when
the Philippines is regarded as a welcome partner in China-
initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Belt
and Road Initiative (Baviera 2017).
The pivot to pragmatism of the Philippines also helped
with the ASEAN solidarity and consensus on the South
China Sea. It had ‘‘spillover effect’’ on other claimant
states, reduced disagreements within ASEAN, declined
free-riding on the Philippines by some stakeholders in the
disputes and eased pressure on the Philippines (Baviera
2017). It was under such circumstances that ASEAN con-
sensus was developed and ASEAN and China agreed on a
framework for a Code of Conduct on the South China Sea.
It is, thus, fair to say that the pivot to pragmatism driven by
the strategic goal of development made a significant con-
tribution to producing peace and stability in the region.
The ‘‘dual-track approach’’ supported and advocated by
China, an important adjustment in China’s diplomacy in
the South China Sea, demonstrated both pragmatism and
flexibility. It broke the impasse over the issue and made
space for negotiation and progress. The approach was ini-
tiated by Brunei in 2014 and supported and advocated by
China, which indicated ASEAN ownership and ASEAN-
China cooperation even before its application. China’s
support and advocacy of the approach demonstrated flexi-
bility of China’ diplomacy, signaling a pragmatic turn from
total denial of discussions of South China Sea disputes on
any multilateral occasions to acknowledgement of the
necessity of such discussions under a specific multilateral
framework (Wu 2015). The approach on the one hand
enabled China to keep general consistency in its policy,
and on the other sought cooperation from the ASEAN. The
adoption of the ‘‘dual-track approach’’ helped further
establish the consensus that China–ASEAN relationship
was not all about the South China Sea, clarified the rights
and obligations of the claimant states and non-claimant
states, and hence to some extent prevented external inter-
vention and lifted non-claimant states from side-taking
dilemma. The ‘‘dual-track approach’’ actually prioritized
the maintenance of regional stability, encouraged bilateral
and multilateral cooperation in functional areas, and helped
pave the way for the turnabout of the situation. Such
important policy adjustment was made against the back-
drop that Chinese President Xi identified Southeast Asia as
a priority in China’s neighborhood diplomacy in late 2013
for its strategic bearing on creating favorable external
environment for China’s continued growth (Chinese For-
eign Ministry 2013).
Despite the complication, internationalization and
intensification of the disputes in the South China Sea from
2009 to 2016, regional cooperation continued to make
progress and achievements. An important reason is that
after years of practices of cooperation for common devel-
opment, it has become a habit and taken for granted by East
Asian states that eventually they have to seek common
ground, and manage to reach consensus and keep cooper-
ation going despite difficulties. It was because of such a
habit that ASEAN was shocked at the failure of producing
a joint statement after the 2012 foreign ministers meeting
and immediately shuttled diplomacy for common positions.
It was because of such a habit that functional cooperation
and institutionalization continued to develop in both China-
ASEAN and APT frameworks. Not a single official docu-
ment of the two mechanisms ever took sides concerning the
South China Sea disputes. Instead, China and ASEAN
endeavored, on the one hand, to fully implement the DOC
for functional and non-traditional security cooperation at
the sea, and on the other to facilitate the COC process.
Despite the disputes, China-ASEAN cooperation in general
has deepened and broadened. China has remained
ASEAN’s No.1 trading partner since 2009. Lancang-
Mekong cooperation mechanism involving China and five
ASEAN states was officially launched in 2016. The APT
embraced and adopted the goal of an EAEC by 2020.
In all the cooperation and disputes, coevolution between
structures and agents and between institutions and practices
took place. During the courses, almost all major powers
joined institutionalized East Asian processes, either
through the East Asia Summit or dialog relationship with
ASEAN, and some new arrangements were made or
negotiated in competition such as the Trans-Pacific
Strategic and Economic Partnership (TPP) and RCEP. The
South China Sea has become an arena for both cooperation
and competition, where related rules, norms and institu-
tions have been developed, which in turn guided practices
in sequence, for instance, the evolution of diplomatic
practices of individual states, the implementation process
of the DOC and the negotiating of the COC. Structures and
agents have evolved reciprocally with the processes.
Arguably, a regional community for cooperation is
emerging in East Asia, not one in which uniformity or
identification among members is in place, but one in which
members find cooperation a necessity, conflict undesirable
and development a common aspiration and joint endeavor.
6 Conclusion: Development Matters
The paper attempts to explain why China’s rise coincides
with East Asian regional peace and integration. Existing
literature tend to solve the puzzle with typical and abstract
East Asian Community Rev (2018) 1:19–32 29
IR concepts and instruments, but fail to capture the most
fundamental element in the coincidence, that is, develop-
ment. China does not rise alone. With East Asia being the
fastest growing region in the world since the late 1990s,
China has risen along with regional partners and in the
context of the rise of East Asia. Development must be a
key variable for regional evolution. Thus, the paper pro-
poses developmental regionalism. It places development at
its core, featuring pragmatism, flexibility and develop-
mental security. Regional processes are development-ori-
ented, development-driven and development-focused.
Cooperation of and for development is the anchoring
practice in regional processes, which require regional sta-
bility, determine regional agenda, help nurture habit of
cooperation, lead to coevolution of agents and structures,
and institutions and practices, and build a regional com-
munity in the long run. The paper uses the South China Sea
issue as a case to test the argument and proves that
developmental regionalism played a key role in maintain-
ing peace and cooperation amid disputes.
Developmental regionalism works, but not without
conditions. The most important and delicate is to get the
right understanding of development because it is a process
itself, a fluid concept. What kind of development by nature
and definition is really wanted by the region? Getting
development wrong may invite divisions, disputes and
conflicts. For instance, many believe that globalization
backfired because it caused inequitable development and
deepened social divisions. How to maintain steady growth
on the one hand and ensure inclusiveness and equal
development opportunities will remain a big challenge for
the region for a long time. Another condition concerns the
agents or agency. The growth engine or the major powers
in the region shall exercise self-restraint and always share
its development with regional partners. China’s rise to
great power status has to take place in a peaceful regional
context, which in turn depends to a great extent on the
agency of China—how it is going to exercise its increasing
power. The developmental agency of China and the insti-
tutional centrality of ASEAN in the region have to be well
coordinated and balanced. Finally, the US factor in regio-
nal processes toward peace and development is important.
Hence, open regionalism shall be observed for mutual
adaptation and coevolution of parallel and competing
regional institutions, agencies and processes.
Development matters to peace and security. However,
the IR study of development remains far from adequate in
both theoretical and empirical terms. While development
regionalism applies in East Asia, one cannot but wonder if
it works in other regions. An inquiry into this is become
increasingly significant as China is promoting the Belt and
Road initiative and developing partnerships with groupings
in Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa,
respectively. If developmental regionalism carries with it
conspicuous Chinese characteristics or oriental cultural
elements, then is it going to work in different regional or
cultural contexts? Developmental regionalism in compar-
ative perspective can enrich our general understanding
about world politics considerably.
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Dr. Ling Wei is Professor of International Studies, Director of the
Chinese Foreign Policy Studies Center at the China Foreign Affairs
University (CFAU). She was a Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar at
Cornell University (2012–13). Her research interests include interna-
tional relations theory and East Asian regionalism. She is China’s
Country Coordinator for NEAT (the Network of East Asian Think-
tanks), NACT (the Network of ASEAN-China Think-tanks), and
NTCT (the Network of Trilateral Cooperation Think-tanks). She is on
the editorial board of Foreign Affairs Review (Waijiao Pinglun) and
Southeast Asian Studies (Dongnanya Yanjiu). She holds a Ph.D in
international relations from CFAU.
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