china's military industrial complex

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China's Military Industrial Complex: Its Approach to the Acquisition of Modern MilitaryTechnologyAuthor(s): Joseph P. GallagherSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 9 (Sep., 1987), pp. 991-1002Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644649.

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2/13

CHINA'S

MILITARY

NDUSTRIAL

COMPLEX

Its Approach to the Acquisition of

Modern Military Technology

Joseph

P.

Gallagher

China has

begun

a

new attempt

at

military moderniza-

tion. The latest movement to strengthen the Chinese military, articulated

by

Zhou Enlai in

the early

1970s as a

key element of the

Four

Moderniza-

tions, took

on

a new impetus after the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese conflict. This

was the first

major battle the People's Liberation Army (PLA)

had

partici-

pated

in

since the conflict with India in 1962, and it convinced China's

leadership that more than ideology was needed to defend China'sinterests.

Although China's incursion into Vietnam achieved the political goal of

diverting

Vietnam's attention from

Kampuchea to the Sino-Vietnamese

border,

it also

demonstrated the many weaknesses that had evolved

from

ignoring the needs of the military during the Cultural Revolution. As a

result Deng Xioaping, addressing the PLA in September 1981,

called on

the

Chinese

military

to build

a

powerful, modern,

and

regularized

revolu-

tionary armed force and, on the basis of our steadily expandingeconomy,

[to] improve the army's weapons

and

equipment and speed up

the

modern-

ization of

our

national defense. ' Significantly, Deng used

the term mod-

ernization to

mean the

upgrading

of

weapons

and

equipment.

This narrow

Chinese

usage

of

the term military modernization will be used

in this arti-

cle;

it

does not

encompass

other movements such

as reform

and

regulariza-

tion of

the military.

Major Joseph

P.

Gallagher

is

a China

foreign

area officer

in the

United States

Army.

He

was Assistant

Army

Attache

in

Beijing

in

1984-1986

and

presently

is

assigned to Army Staff Headquarters, Washington, D.C. The views expressed are the

author's and do not necessarily reflect those of the Department of Defense.

?

1987

by

The

Regents

of the

University

of

California

1.

Deng

Xiaoping, The

Selected Works of

Deng Xiaoping

(Beijing: Foreign

Language

Press, 1984), p. 373.

991

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3/13

992 ASIAN

SURVEY,

VOL.

XXVII,NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 987

Since coming

to

power

in

1949,

the

Chinese Communists

have done

much to lay the basis

for

modernizing

their

military. Of particular note

has been the establishment of

China's

military-industrial

complex,

a vast

system of defense industries and military organizations dedicated to the

production of

military equipment. It is this

complex that

directs Beijing's

seemingly

cohesive

approach

to the

acquisition

of

military technology.

However, an examination of China's

military-industrial

complex reveals

that

it

is ill-suited to the task of

absorbing modern

military technology.

Unless China's defense sector

changes

its

organization and

approach to the

acquisition

of

technology,

China

may

once

again

fail

to

modernize

its mili-

tary.

The basic problem centers on the relationshipof tactics and technology

and the issue of which of

these two factors

should drive China's

search

for

modern weapon

systems. Put

in

other

words, the question

is, who deter-

mines

the

direction

of

China's quest

for

modern military

technology, its

soldiers or its

technicians?

To

answer

this

question,

I

will

examine four

factors: the

organization of

China's

defense sector, the

process for acquir-

ing military

technology,

China's

present

modernization

policy, and

the

lack of a force

development

concept.

An analysis of the first three factors demonstrates that technicians are

controlling

China's

acquisition

of modern

military

technology,

and the

fourth

factor-creation

of

a

cohesive

force development concept-is

thereby being

inhibited.

Force

development

planning,

a critical

element

in

the

acquisition

of

highly sophisticated

military

technology,

insures that

weapons

are

designed

and

produced

which

can be

operated, maintained,

and

supplied

by existing military

units. Without

such

a

concept China

may

be

acquiring military

technology

that

will

produce weapon systems

the PLA is ill-equipped to support and use. As a result, an expensively

E

acquired

military technology

could well

have little

significant

effect

on the

PLA's

ability

to

defend China

and,

in

the

long term,

cause

China's leader-

ship

to

conclude, incorrectly,

that

self-reliance

is less

expensive and just

as

effective as

acquiring foreign

technology.

Organization

of

the Defense

Sector

China's

military-industrial

complex

has

three distinct elements-the Peo-

ple's Liberation Army, the defense industries, and the organization that

links

the first

two,

the

National Defense Science Technology

and Industry

Commission

(NDSTIC).

The

PLA

is the

ultimate end-user

of

the

defense

industries'

products.

At

the

highest

level

the

PLA

is

divided

into

three

coequal

departments,

the

General

Political

Department

(GPD),

the Gen-

eral Staff

Department

(GSD),

and

the

General

Logistics

Department



4/13

JOSEPH

P.

GALLAGHER 993

(GLD).

The

GPD, which is responsible

for

propaganda,

ideological work,

and personnel management, is not directly involved

in the procurement of

defense equipment.

The

GSD, the staff

that

directs

the operational forces,

is responsible for the coordinated purchase of materials for the PLA. The

GLD

is

responsible

for

the storage, disbursement,

maintenance, and

transportation of military material, 2

and it also

manages

a number

of fac-

tories

that are

identified

as

numbered

PLA

factories. These

factories,

which

are not

involved

in

the

production

of

major weapon systems, mainly

produce quartermastergoods (clothing, food, etc.) and repair parts. The

establishment of these factories stems from the PLA's historic reliance on

self-sufficiency. During the 1930s and 1940s, the

PLA

produced many of

its quartermastergoods and relied on captured weapons to bolster its fight-

ing capabilities.

After coming to power

in

1949, the Chinese government

began restoring

captured

defense factories and

it

established machine building industries.3

Significantly, these

industries

were not placed under

the control of the

PLA but

rather were responsive to the State Council. These machine

building industries have evolved into six ministries that make up the pro-

duction element of the defense

sector

and are known collectively

as

the

defense industrial ministries. The six are the Ministry of Nuclear Indus-

try,

which

produces

nuclear

weapons; the Ministry

of Aviation

Industry,

which produces aircraft;

the

Ministry of

Electronics Industry, which pro-

duces electronics

systems;

the

Ministry

of

Ordnance Industry, which pro-

duces munitions and

armaments;

the China

State

Shipbuilding

Corporation,

which

produces ships; and

the

Ministry of Space (Astronau-

tics) Industry,

which

produces

ballistic

missiles and

space systems.

The term defense industrial ministry is misleading,

since

these minis-

tries

also

produce goods

for the

civilian

sector. For

example,

a

major

cus-

tomer

of

the

Ministry

of Aviation is China's civil

airline,

CAAC.

In

the

past, many factories

of the defense

industrial

ministries, particularly

those

in

the

Ministry

of Ordnance

Industry, produced

only defense goods.

But

because

of

the

present emphasis

on

combining

military

and civilian ef-

forts, 4 many

of

these factories are

now

using

otherwise-idle

production

lines

to

make

goods such

as

fans, bicycles, mopeds,

etc.

For

example,

one

such Ordnance

Industry factory

has

changed

sole

production

of

products

for

military

use into simultaneous

production

of

products

for

both

military

2.

The

Organization of China's Defense

System,

China

Tech, June, 10, 1985,

p.

1.

3. Ibid.

4.

Sun

Lin,

Shanghai Transfers Military

Technology to Civilian

Sector,

Jiefang

Ribao,

February

1,

1986, p.1,

in Joint Publications

Research Service

(JPRS),

China

Report,

no.

31,

April

21, 1986,

p. 55.



5/13

994

ASIAN SURVEY,

VOL.

XXVII,

NO.

9,

SEPTEMBER 987

and civilian

use. 5

This movement

to make the defense sector serve the

civil sector does

not

indicate a shift of

priorities

or

a

movement

away

from

the PLA, but

is

merely

a more efficient use of the defense

sector.

These two elements of the defense sector-the PLA and the defense in-

dustrial

ministries-are

supervised by separate

organizations.

The PLA

is

led by the

Central Military

Commission and

the

ministries

are

supervised

by the State

Council.6 The

link between the two

is

the Minister of

Na-

tional Defense, a

member

of both bodies. He serves as

a

coequal

member

in

the

Central Military Commission

with

senior PLA

leaders,

including

the heads

of each of

the

three

PLA

Departments,

and

as

a

fellow minister

with the chiefs

of the defense industrial

ministries

in

the State Council.7

He has no direct control over either the ministries or the PLA, but serves

as

a

link

between

them. To assist

him in this

capacity

is the

NDSTIC,

the

third element

in

the defense

complex,

over

which

he has direct

supervisory

control.

The NDSTIC, which

as a state commission

is

responsive

to the

State

Council and as

a

military organization

is

led

by

the Central

Military

Com-

mission,

is

theoretically

a

neutral arbiter between the

PLA

and the defense

industrial ministries.

The members

of

the NDSTIC are uniformed officers

of the PLA, a status that gives them the appearanceof alignment with the

operational

forces.

In

reality, they

tend to

represent

the

ministries' views

more than those of the

PLA, as these officers are lifelong technicians with

little or no military operational experience,

who in their careers often

move between

NDSTIC and the defense industrial ministries. Three strik-

ing examples are Xie

Guang, a vice

minister

of

NDSTIC, who was a mem-

ber of

the

Ministry of Aviation

before

joining

the

commission;

the

present

Minister of Ordnance Industries, Zhou Jiahua,

who was

a

former vice

min-

ister of NDSTIC; and

Wu Shaozu, the political commissar of NDSTIC,

who

previously

worked

in

the

Ministry

of

Nuclear

Industry.8

Staffing

NDSTIC

with

technicians

in

uniform

may appear

to be the most efficient

method

of

controlling

the military-industrial complex,

but it inhibits the

PLA from developing a comprehensive force

development concept.

A recent evolution

in

the

organization

of

China's

defense sector has

been the

creation

of

commercial companies that represent the

PLA,

NDSTIC,

and

the

defense

industrial ministries. As

China

instituted its

5. Ordnance Ministry,

Heilongjiang

Sign Cooperation Agreement,

Heilongjiang

Provin-

cial Service (Harbin), January 7, 1986,

in

JPRS, China Report, no. 25, March 12, 1986, p.

46.

6. The Organization

of

China's Defense System, p.1-2.

7. PLA Restructuring and Leadership Reshuffle,

China Tech 1, July 10, 1985, pp.2-3.

8. Meetings and

interviews with

Wu

Shaozu, Xie

Guang,

and

Zhou Jiahua

in

Beijing,

1985-1986.



6/13

JOSEPH

P.

GALLAGHER

995

open

door policy, each

element of the defense sector recognized the advan-

tage of

establishing

commercial entities to deal with foreigners.

These

companies offer a familiar

setting for officials of

foreign companies who

are

uncomfortable dealing with major governmental bureaucracies, and they

establish a convenient

front for the Chinese,

keeping foreigners away from

the

power center of each

ministry. These commercial companies,

outlined

in

Figure 1, are subofficesof

the bureaucracythey represent.9 As such,

the

relationship and interests of

these companies are a

reflection of the inter-

ests

of

their

parent organizations.

Poly Technologies' major

business

is

purchasing major end items of

equipment for the

GSD; Xinxing purchases

or sells

quartermaster parts

produced

in

the

GLD's factories; and

NORINCO does an import/export business for the Ministry of Ordnance

Industry.

The

organizational key

to

the military-industrial

complex

is

held by

the

Minister of

National Defense, who is

in

a position to

integrate the

various

views

of

the three

elements

of

the defense sector to insure that the PLA's

requirements

are

being satisfied. Such an office requires

a person with ex-

tensive

military experience

since the

organizational alliance of NDSTIC

and

the

defense industrial ministries tends to favor

the latter's viewpoints.

In fact, the procedures by which military technology is acquiredreinforce

this

tendency.

The

AcquisitionProcess

The

preceding organizational overview demonstrates that China does

not

have a monolithic defense

sector. Since the

PLA

does not have direct con-

trol over

the major defense

industries,

it must

pass

its

production require-

ments

on

to them

through

the NDSTIC. The

requirements

for

defense

equipment are formulated within an office of the PLA's General Staff De-

partment,

the

Equipment

Bureau.

The

Equipment

Bureau acts

as the

pur-

chaser

of

major

defense items

for the

PLA,

collating

and

prioritizing

all

the

requirements

of

PLA

subordinate

organizations.

Once the

defense in-

dustries

produce

and deliver the

required items,

the

Equipment

Bureau

assigns

the GLD the task of

accounting

for

and

supplying

these items to

subordinate units.

9. Sze A-lan and Zhang Si-wei, High Technology Acquisition

Procedures in the People's

Republic of China (Hong Kong: Conmilit Press, 1985). This

information also appeared n an

article by G.

G.

Connor, Defence Procurement Procedures

in the People's Republic of

China. Jane's Defence Weekly, August 3, 1985, p. 219 (Conmilit is a Hong Kong-based

organization with ties to NDSTIC. Through its publications, primarily

China

Tech,

Conmilit

provides information on China's defense acquisition procedures.)



7/13

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8/13

JOSEPHP.

GALLAGHER 997

When a dispute arises between the PLA and the defense industrial min-

istries over issues such as the type of weapon to be produced, the price of

equipment,

or

the necessity of meeting a production quota, NDSTIC re-

solves the problem. However, since the members of NDSTIC are mainly

technicians who are

unfamiliar with the demands of the operating forces,

they

tend to be

sympathetic

with

the

ministries'

arguments. One

PLA Air

Force officer explained that NDSTIC's close relationship with the defense

industries accords

with

China's national policy

of

modernizing the indus-

trial sector first. The

officer fully expected that

the NDSTIC

would favor

the industries'

viewpoint

in

disputes between

the Air

Force and

the

indus-

tries,

but

in

any conflict with a customer outside the defense sector,

NDSTIC would always argue for defense needs. He went on to explain

that

in

a dispute between the Air Force and the Ministry of Aviation

In-

dustry

over

delivery

dates

or

prices

of

aircraft,

NDSTIC

probably would

defend the

Ministry

of Aviation's

arguments. However,

in

a conflict

over

production quotas of aircraft

for

the

PLA Air

Force or CAAC, the

NDSTIC

would

argue

for the Air

Force.'0

In

acquiring new technology

from

abroad, a

difference exists

between

the interests of the PLA

and the defense

industries. The

Equipment

Bu-

reau of the PLA is primarily concerned with purchasing end items of

equipment

for direct

military

use.

For

example,

in

1984

it

purchased

24

Blackhawk

helicopters

from

Sikorsky.

In

contrast,

the defense industries

are interested in

purchasing technology.

Economic

constraints and an em-

phasis

on

self-reliance favor

their

position.

As

stated by

Minister of Na-

tional Defense

Zhang Aiping, introducing

advanced

foreign technology

is

not

just

our

purpose

but

is

a means

to

improve

our

technological

level and

production capacity. Our purpose is to improve our ability to carry out

self-reliance.

Clearly Zhang Aiping

believes that the

process

for

acquiring technology

should be driven

by

the needs of the defense industries.

Accordingly,

the

majority

of the commercial

companies

involved

in

the process

of

acquiring

technology

are associated with the defense industries.

As

shown

in

Figure

1,

the

production element of

the

defense

sector

is represented by

nine

dif-

ferent

commercial

companies, counting

the two

NDSTIC

companies.

The

only organization

that

represents

the PLA

in

gathering

information about

new weapon systems is Poly Technologies. The method

of

acquiring

infor-

10. PLA Air Force officer assigned to the Science and Technology Section of

Air

Force

headquarters. Interview in Beijing, July 1985.

11. Zhang Aiping, Strengthen Leadership and Do a Better Job

in

Importing Technol-

ogy, Red Flag, no. 24, December 16, 1985, pp. 4-9, in JPRS, China Report, no. 3,

February

5, 1986, p. 7.



9/13

998 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL.

XXVII,

NO.

9,

SEPTEMBER

987

mation is

important

since the PLA and the defense industrial

ministries

have different reasons for

acquiring military

technology.

The

ministries

tend to seek out

technology that will

directly

affect indus-

trial modernizationand help them compete in the international arms mar-

ket. A

prime example was the

announcement

that

the

Ministry

of

Ordnance

Industries, through

NORINCO,

had

signed

an

agreement

with

Vickers

to produce an armored vehicle for

export, a vehicle the PLA

had

not

yet decided

to

purchase.'2

The PLA's

ability

to

influence the process

is

limited since

it is

a captive customer of

a state-run

socialist system, un-

able to turn to

an

alternate market. On the

other

hand,

the

defense

indus-

trial ministries

are

concerned

with

the desires of

international customers

whose foreign currency is worth more than the local currency of the PLA.

As a

result, the defense

industries

and

the

PLA

may

not

agree on the

type

of

technology that

must

be

purchased.

In

addition, the defense

industries are much

better equipped to

argue for

their

priorities

than the PLA.

The

experts

on

technology work

for the

defense industrial ministries. The

Ministry

of

Ordnance Industry

alone

has

more than

350

engineers working

in 10

research

institutes whose

pri-

mary task is

to research

technological requirements

for

their mission ar-

eas.

13

The officers of the PLA may know about the operational

parameters

of new

weapon

systems,

but

they

are not

qualified to debate

the

technical minutia

of

design and construction. This

handicap is critical in

discussions

among

the defense industrial

ministries,

the

PLA, and the

ND-

STIC on

which

technology

is

to

be

purchased,

particularly

since national

policy reinforces

the ministries'

viewpoints.

National Policy

The defense industrialministries argue their positions for the purchase of a

particular technology

confident that

national

policy supports them.

China's de

facto

leader,

Deng Xiaoping,

articulated the

national

policy

when

he

said

defense

modernization can be

achieved

only

when it is

based

on the

development

of the

country's

industry

and

agriculture

as

a

whole. 14

To

PLA

Chief

of Staff

Yang Dezhi,

this meant that

the

PLA

should

rely

on

the

development

of the

national

economy and science and

12.

NORINCO Vickers Joint

Venture Product

in

JPRS,

China

Report,

no. 38, May 14,

1986, p. 56.

13. The

Military Budget System in the

PRC, China

Tech,

no.

1, June

10, 1985, p. 2.

14.

Quoted in Yang

Dezhi,

A

Strategic Decision on

Strengthening the

Building of our

Army in the

New Period,

Red Flag, August 1, 1985,

pp.3-7,

in

JPRS, China

Report, no. 20,

September 17, 1985, p. 4.



10/13

JOSEPH

P. GALLAGHER 999

technology to change the backwardness of our weaponry.

5

The

defense

industrial ministries, therefore, can argue that the technology they wish to

purchase will upgrade their industries and directly assist economic mod-

ernization. This is an argument that the Equipment Bureau will find diffi-

cult to refute

if

it wishes to

press

for the

purchase

of a different

technology.

The present national policy that favors economic construction over de-

fense

modernization ensures that

a minimum of state funds is

spent

on

defense modernization. Yang

Dezhi

willingly

admits

that

China's econ-

omy

is still

relatively

backward

.

.

.

[and

the

state]

is not

in

a

position

to

put

more

money into

the

development

of

national defense. However,

he

goes

on to

argue that

China

should spend

more

money

on

the develop-

ment of urgently needed weapons. The chief of staff proposed that the

funds

for

the

development

of

weapons

be

obtained

by cutting

the number

of

our

soldiers, eliminating

obsolete and backward

equipment, reducing

expenses

for

food, clothing, and daily expenses

of

personnel

as

well

as

for

the maintenance of

equipment. 16

Fan

Gongsong,

a PLA

official, stated

the same

argument, only

in more

specific terms

than

his

chief

of

staff. Fan

wrote that

present

defense

spending

is

equivalent

to a

military per capita

expenditure

of

4,000 yuan (approximately US$1,300).

He

argued

that this

per capita expenditure should be increased, not by increasing overall de-

fense spending, but by reducing the size of the PLA. He stated that if

funds saved

through troop

reductions were used

in

our national economic

building, [it] would

be

extremely beneficial to quickening

the

implementa-

tion of our four

modernizations.

7

In effect,

Fan

is arguing that

the PLA

make

do with less operational funds

in

order that more defense

funds

can

be furnished to the defense industrial ministries.

Force Development

Because of the factors

just described,

the

PLA

enters

negotiations

with the

defense industrial ministries and NDSTIC

at a

serious

disadvantage.

NDSTIC's inclination to be

sympathetic

with the defense industries'

posi-

tion

is

reinforced

by

national

policy

and

the industries'

superior knowledge

of the

technology

under discussion.

As a

result,

NDSTIC will favor

purchasing technology sought by

the defense industries.

Consequently,

defense

industry priorities

drive the

quest

for modern

military technology,

a fact

that inhibits the creation of a force

development plan.

15.

Ibid.

16.

Ibid.

17. Fan

Gongsong, The National Defense

Population Ratio and Military Streamlining,

Shehui Kexue, no.

8, August 15, 1985, pp. 49-52,

in

JPRS, China Report, no. 112,

November

4, 1986, p.

52.



11/13

1000 ASIAN SURVEY,VOL.XXVII, NO. 9, SEPTEMBER 987

A cohesive force development plan requires close coordination between

operating units

and

industry.

Detailed

requirements

need to be formulated

by the operators, requirements that

take into account the level of educa-

tion of the soldiers who will use the weapon, the type of organization that

will field the weapon, and the

unit's

capability

to maintain

and support

the

weapon.

The

existence

of a

force

development concept requires operators

who have an

understanding

of

technological capabilities

and

limitations,

and technicians who understand

the

operator's environment and require-

ments. The lack of such

a

concept

is

not noticeable when introducing sim-

ple weapons such as

a

new bayonet, but force development

is

critical

to

the

successful fielding

of

a

sophisticated weapon,

such

as a missile.

Without

such a concept weapons can be produced that are of little value once they

are supplied to units

in

the

field.

There is little indication that such

a

concept exists

in

China's

military-industrial complex.

In more than

30

presentations by,

and

discussions

with Western

defense

firms held

in

Beijing

in

1984-86, which

I

attended, the operational forces

and the GSD were

represented by

less

than

5%

of

the Chinese

present.

Over

95%

of

those

who

attended

were from the defense industries and

NDSTIC. The Chinese demonstrated little interest

in

the briefingson op-

erational reasons for developing the weapon systems, but asked many

knowledgeable questions on the technical aspects of the systems. When

reminded that discussions of supportability and training were essential to

successful

transfer

of a

military technology,

the Chinese either

ignored the

remarks or answered that such aspects would be considered only after pro-

duction was

successfully

started.

Since

1984,

NDSTIC has

been

negotiating

with the U.S.

Department

of

Defense for the

purchase

of

technology

to set

up large-caliberartillery fuse

and detonator

plants

and the

coproduction

of

improved-TOW antitank

guided missiles.18 These and other negotiations with foreign firms for the

purchase

of

military technology

are driven

by

defense

industry priorities,

not the PLA's. Undoubtedly the purchase of modern military technology

will

fulfill

a

general requirement

of

the PLA; China's army certainly has a

need for an antitank guided missile to contend with Soviet armored forces.

But the

PLA

should determine which antitank guided missile will best suit

its forces, rather than let the industries' requirementsdictate the choice.

For

example,

the U.S.

Army

fields several

generations

of

antitank

weap-

ons, each new generation a technological improvement over its predeces-

sor. The

defense industries

wish

to

purchase

the

technology

to

produce

the

latest

generation,

a

natural

inclination

since their

motivation

is

to

up-

18.

Edward Ross, The Military Balance

in

the Taiwan

Strait,

Martin

L.

Lasater, ed.,

The Two Chinas

(Washington,

D.C.:

The Heritage

Foundation, 1986).



12/13

JOSEPHP. GALLAGHER 1001

date factories with

the

most

modern technology and production equip-

ment. However, the PLA may be able to more effectively use an older

generation

or

modified antitank guided missile. More to the point, the

Western firmsthat are transferringthe technology may be able to alter the

weapon system

to

better suit

the

logistic

and

operating

units of

the PLA.

Such a

determination cannot

be

made since the

PLA

does not participate

in

discussions with Western firms nor, apparently, do PLA officers see the

need to join such discussions since they are not acquainted with the opera-

tional

capabilities

and

limitations of modern

technology.

Conclusion

The nascent dilemma in China's approach to acquiring military technol-

ogy

is its

tendency

to

reinforce

the PLA's

lack

of

familiarity

with

technol-

ogy. Organizationally

NDSTIC is

supposed

to

represent

the views of the

PLA, and thus members of the GSD stay away from critical discussions on

technology.

The

process

for

acquiring technology handicaps

the

PLA's

ability to gather information, and therefore the

PLA

must rely on

NDSTIC's

judgment.

National

policy,

which

gives priority

to industrial

modernization, bolsters the already close relationship between NDSTIC

and the defense industrial ministries. These factors constrain PLA partici-

pation

in

the

acquisition

of

technology and prevent

China's

soldiers

from

learning

that

they

have a

critical role to

play, thus inhibiting

the creation

of

a

force

development concept.

China's

present approach

to the

acquisition

of

technology

creates two

interrelated

problems.

The

first,

a near-term

problem,

is

that the defense

industries

may produce

a

weapon system that the

PLA

is

incapable

of us-

ing effectively.

After

expending

a

great

deal

of time, effort, and resources,

the defense sector may find itself with a technology that has not signifi-

cantly

increased

its

ability

to defend China.

The

second,

a

long-term

and

more substantial

problem,

is the effect that a failure of

military

moderniza-

tion

will have on

national

policy.

Defense

Minister

Zhang Aiping

com-

mented that a

technology exporting country

transfers

to

other countries

only

...

the

parts

of

the

manufacturing technology

which are difficult

to

keep secret, retaining

the secret

parts

of the

technology exported.

9

China's

leadership may

conclude

incorrectly

that

foreign

firms have with-

held

key ingredients

of

technology and

call for

increased self-reliance,

thus

closing

the

recently opened

door

to

the West.

The

future success

of

China's

acquisition

of modern

military technology

will

depend largely

on the PLA's

ability

to become

familiar

with

modern

19. Zhang Aiping, Strengthen Leadership, p. 9.



13/13

1002

ASIAN SURVEY,VOL.XXVII,NO.

9, SEPTEMBER 987

technology,

and

ultimately

to determine the

type

of

technology

to be

purchased.

At

present,

defense

organization

and

modernization policy

relegates the

PLA to the

position

of a

captive customer

who, knowing little

about the product he is being sold other than that it is modern, has put his

trust

in

the

judgment

of

the

producers

to

satisfy

his needs. Future

ap-

pointments,

or

lack thereof,

of PLA

officers with operational experience to

NDSTIC and

to the

position of that organization's

ultimate boss,

the Min-

ister of National Defense, should give some indication of the PLA's deter-

mination to become more involved and to direct the

acquisition process.

china's military industrial complex

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