china’s future nuclear force infrastructure

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CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE NOTIONAL BREAKOUT SCENARIO November 20-21, 2013 Mark A. Stokes East Asian Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures Workshop Stanford University

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Page 1: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

NOTIONAL BREAKOUT SCENARIO

November 20-21, 2013

Mark A. Stokes

East Asian Alternative Nuclear Weapons Futures Workshop Stanford University

Page 2: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

www.project2049.net

Overview

• Scenario Assumptions

• Baseline Force Structure

• Strategic Drivers and Operational Requirements

• Acquisition Management

• Warhead Engineering R&D and Production Infrastructure

• Notional Operational Infrastructure in Breakout Scenario

• Conclusions

Page 3: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Scenario Assumptions

• Current inventory of 250 nuclear warheads

• CMC entrusts Second Artillery Force as sole PLA warhead custodian

• Centralized storage and handling under Second Artillery central warhead storage and handling complex in central China (Base 22)

• Domestic political considerations are primary factors determining size of arsenal – security more important than operational effectiveness

• Concealment of actual warhead inventory size allows for minimal number

• Small number of warheads available under each of six corps-level missile base

• At least one warhead is programmed, produced, and supplied for each nuclear-capable missile

• Breakout scenario of 1500 warheads by 2025

• Parallel surge in production of missile systems and other delivery vehicles

• Expansion of CAEP industrial capacity

• No fissile material constraints

• Adjustments within a static PLA organizational structure

Page 4: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Policy Approval/Validation

CMC/Politburo

Force Planning and Operational/Technical

Requirements Development

•Second Artillery Headquarters Department •Second Artillery Equipment Department

Acquisition Management

GAD and Second Artillery Equipment Department

Engineering R&D and Manufacturing

CASC/CASIC

CAEP

Operational Infrastructure

Second Artillery Headquarters Department

Warhead/Missile Base

Pathway toward a PLA Nuclear Expansion

Page 5: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Second Artillery General Headquarters Organizational Structure

Headquarters Department • Chief of Staff

• Deputy Chiefs of Staff • Operations • Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance • Communications • Engineering

Political Department • Propaganda • Organization and Discipline • Cadre

Logistics Department • Transportation • Supplies and Fuel • Infrastructure/Barracks • Budget

Equipment Department • S&T Research • Special Equipment Management • Procurement • Equipment Research Academy

• At least five subordinate research institutes

Direct Reporting Regiments

• Geodesy • Strategic Communications • Logistics Depot • Missile Component Readiness • Solid Motor Readiness • Electronic Warfare • Special Vehicle Training • Intelligence

Commander

Wei Fenghe Zhang Haiyang

Political Commissar

Engineering Divisions • 308 Engineering Command • Engineering Technology Group

Presenter
Presentation Notes
General Jing Zhiyuan has commanded the Second Artillery since September 2004, when was also appointed to the Central Military Commission in September 2004. From 1993 to February 1999, Jing served as commander of the 52 Base and afterwards was promoted to Second Artillery chief of staff where he served until January 2003. In this position, he has hosted U.S. visitors to the Second Artillery headquarters, including Secretary of Defense Don Rumsfeld in 2005 and Senator Ike Skelton in 2007. Gen Zhang Haiming became PC in December 2009. He previously served as Chengdu Military Region Political Commissar. He is said to be the son of former PLA General, CMC member (1992-1997), and NDU President Zhang Zhen. Zhang Haiming was promoted to full general in July 2009.
Page 6: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

SECOND ARTILLERY COMMAND

Headquarters Department Political Department Logistics Department Equipment Department

Headquarters Department Headquarters Department Headquarters Department Headquarters Department

Political Department Political Department Political Department Political Department

Propaganda Department

Organization Department

Discipline and Inspection Department

Cadre Department

Operations Department

Military Affairs Department

Training Department

Intelligence Department

Engineering Department

Communications Department

Transportation Department

Materials Department

Supplies and Fuel Infrastructure Department

Infrastructure and Barracks Department

Health Department

General Planning Department

S&T Research Department

Special Equipment Management Department

Procurement Department

Second Artillery General Headquarters Organizational Structure

Page 7: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Baseline Nuclear Force Structure

Presenter
Presentation Notes
51 Base 96111 96113 96115 96117
Page 8: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

SECOND ARTILLERY BASE-LEVEL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Commander • Three Deputy Commanders

Political Commissar • Three Deputy Political Commissars

Launch Brigades

• Six launch battalions, two companies each • Communications Battalion • Technical Battalion • Site Management Battalion

Base-Level Support Units

• Training Regiment • Transportation Regiment • Warhead Regiment • Ground Equipment Repair Regiment • Communications Regiment • Missile Depot Regiment (selected)

Base Headquarters Staff

• Headquarters Department • Political Department • Logistics Department • Equipment Department

Taibai Central Warhead Storage Complex*

(22 Base)

• Warhead Inspection Brigade • Munitions Inspection Regiment • Warhead Storage Regiment • Transportation Regiment • Training Regiment • Repair Regiment • Communications Regiment

* Possible function as alternate national command center

Presenter
Presentation Notes
Commanders of 51 Base, 52 Base, 55 Base, and 56 Base carry a grade equivalent to a Group Army commander Commanders of 53 Base, 54 Base, and 22 Base carry a grade equal to a deputy Group Army commander
Page 9: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Central Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling Complex

Base 22 Baoji

(96401 Unit)

Unknown Institute (96412 Unit)

Equipment Inspection Institute

(96411 Unit)

Technical Service Regiment (96421 Unit)

Transportation Regiment

(96422 Unit)

Training Regiment (96423 Unit)

Vehicle Maintenance Regiment

(96424 Unit)

Communications Regiment

(96425 Unit)

Contingency Response Regiment

(96425 Unit)

Page 10: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Baseline Nuclear Force Structure

Base 51 • 806 Brigade (Hancheng; prob DF-31) • 810 Brigade (Jinzhou; poss mixed) • 816 Brigade (Tonghua; prob DF-21) • 822 Brigade (Laiwu; DF-21C)

Base 52 •807 Brigade (Chizhou; prob DF-21) •811 Brigade (Qimen; prob DF-21)

Base 53 • 802 Brigade (Jianshui; prob DF-21) • 808 Brigade (Yuxi; poss DF-31) • 8XX Brigade (Qingyuan; poss DF-21)

Base 54 •801 Brigade (Lingbao; prob DF-5B) •804 Brigade (Luanchuan; prob mixed) •813 Brigade (Nanyang; prob DF-31) •8XX Brigade (Xinyang; OT&E unit for new system

Base 55 •803 Brigade (Jingzhou; prob DF-5) •805 Brigade (Shaoyang; prob DF-31) •814 Brigade (Huitong; prob DF-4)

Base 56 • 809 Brigade (Datong; poss DF-31) • 812 Brigade (Tianshui; DF-31A) • 823 Brigade (Kurle; prob DF-21)

North Sea Fleet First Submarine Base

Two Type 094 (12 tubes each)

South Sea Fleet Second Submarine Base

Two Type 094 (12 tubes each)

Base 22 Central Warhead Depot Complex

? ?

Page 11: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

www.project2049.net

SECOND ARTILLERY INFRASTRUCTURE

Page 12: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

52 Base 96151 Unit

Huangshan, Anhui Province

Headquarters Department Political Department Logistics Department Equipment Department

818 Brigade 96169 Unit

Meizhou DF-11

819 Brigade 96162 Unit

Ganzhou DF-15

820 Brigade 96164 Unit

Jinhua DF-15

827 Brigade 96166 Unit

Shaoguan Poss DF-16

8XX Brigade 96170 Unit

Putian Poss DF-11A

96171 Unit Training

Quzhou, Zhejiang

96172 Unit Transportation Xiuning County

96173 Unit Warhead

Jingdezhen

Yong’an

96174 Unit Repair Factory Xiuning County

96175 Unit Communications

Huangshan

96176 Unit Missile Component Depot

Shangrao

815 Brigade 96165 Unit

Shangrao DF-15B

807 Brigade 96161 Unit Chizhou City

DF-21

811 Brigade 96163 Unit Qimen City

DF-21

817 Brigade 96167 Unit

Yong’an DF-11A

Missile Base Organization and Baseline Force Structure

Nuclear • Six launch battalions per brigade • Two launch companies per battalion (12 companies per brigade)

• One launcher assigned to each launch company • At least one missile/nuclear warhead programmed and available for each launcher

• At least 12 missiles and 12 nuclear warheads notionally programmed and available for each nuclear-capable brigade

Conventional • Six launch battalions under brigade • Two launch companies per battalion (12 companies per brigade)

• Three launchers per launch company • At least one missile/conventional warhead programmed and available for each launcher

• At least 36 missiles/conventional warheads notionally available per brigade • Reporting of 1000+ conventional SRBMs available for six brigades

Page 13: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Strategic Drivers and Operational Requirements Why Would the Politburo/CMC Want an Expanded Nuclear Force?

• Political “Rush to Parity?”

• Bureaucratic politics/military parochialism?

• Defense industry push?

• Threat perception, calculated deterrence/counter-coercion, and/or or doctrinal shift?

• Technology push?

Page 14: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Acquisition Management Who Would Be Responsible for Planning, Programming, and Equipping an Expanded

Force Structure?

• Second Artillery Equipment Department manages missile system acquisition programs based on broad CMC and General Armaments Department (GAD) policy guidance

• Five-seven research institutes under Second Artillery Equipment Research Academy responsible for conceptual design, program validation, proof of concept, etc

• Second Research Institute appears to be responsible for warhead-related electronic components and safety issues • New strategic planning office • Defense industry military representative system • Role of operational test and evaluation (OT&E) units

CASC First Academy Design Department •Large solid motors: CASC Fourth Academy •Nuclear Warhead: CAEP •Re-entry vehicle structures: CASC First Academy14th RI •Guidance, nav, control system: CASC First Academy 12th RI •Final Assembly: CASC First Academy 211 Factory

CASIC Fourth Academy Design Department • Medium-diameter solid motors: CASIC Sixth Academy or 066 Base • Nuclear Warhead: CAEP • Re-entry vehicle structures: CASC First Academy14th RI • Guidance, nav, control system: CASIC Fourth Academy 17th RI • Final Assembly: CASIC Fourth Academy 307 Factory

Defense Industrial Engineering R&D System

Page 15: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

• GAD oversees technology development and manages acquisition of nuclear warheads as a major missile sub-system

• GAD S&T Committee as senior CMC advisory group on defense technology • S&T Committee director carries grade equal to a military region leader • GAD S&T Committee Expert Working Groups:

• Nuclear weapons technology • Testing technology • Nuclear safety

•863 Program Expert Working Groups

• 863-804: Inertial Confinement Fusion

• GAD Services Department

• Second Artillery Bureau (Nuclear Technology Bureau)

• GAD 21 Base (63650 Unit; Malan Special Weapons Test Base)

• Northwest Institute of Nuclear Technology

Acquisition Management Who Would Be Responsible for Planning, Programming, and Equipping an Expanded

Force Structure?

Page 16: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

China’s Space And Missile Industrial Structure

Academies • Roughly analogous to a US corporate business division

Design departments

• Systems integration responsibilities Research institutes

• Sub-systems, sub-assemblies, components, and materials Factories

• Manufacturing and assembly

Page 17: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

NOTIONAL MRBM ACQUISITION AND DESIGN SYSTEM

CMC State Council

SASTIND/SASAC

Second Artillery Equipment Department

Equipment Research Academy • Costing Center • 1st Research Institute • 2nd Research Institute • 3rd Research Institute • 4th Research Institute

• Preliminary Research • Feasibility Studies • PA&E • Concept Validation • Tactical and Technical Outline [战术 技术指标] • Full Life Cycle Support Plan • R&D Conceptual Design • Program Management Office • Design Finalization

Industrial Representative Bureau

CASIC Fourth Academy

Program Manager Chief Designer

Structure

Propulsion

Post Boost Vehicle/ Warhead

Guidance/Control

Launcher

Manufacturing

Testing

4th Design Dept

CASIC Sixth Academy •or Ninth Academy Solid Motor

CASC First Academy 14th RI CAEP

CASIC Fourth Academy 17th RI • or CASC First Academy 12th RI

CASC First Academy 15th RI

307 Factory

4th Design Dept

Operational Test and Evaluation Unit 96219 Unit (Qingyuan, Guangdong Province)

•“Seed Unit” formed with initiation of R&D Engineering Phase •Linkage between warfighters, acquisition, and industry • First unit equipped (eg., 96219 Unit, Qingyuan)

GENERAL ARMAMENTS

DEPARTMENT

863 Program Expert Working Groups 863-7 and 863-8 领域

S&T Committee Expert Working Groups

Key National/Defense Labs

Gen

eral

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Pla

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R&D and Operational Testing 25 Base (Taiyuan)

Preliminary Research R&D Program Validation System R&D Design Finalization

China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation

Central Special Committee Design Finalization Committee

Page 18: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Party Committee

Institute of Fluid Physics First Institute

Institute of Nuclear Physics and Chemistry

Second Institute

Institute of Chemical Materials Third Institute

Institute of Integrated Engineering Fourth Institute

Institute of Electronic Engineering Fifth Institute

Institute of Machining Technology Sixth Institute

Sichuan Institute of Materials Processing

Seventh Institute

Laser Fusion Research Center Eighth Institute

Institute of Applied Electronics 10th Institute

CAEP Computing Center Southwest Computing Center

12th Institute

Institute of Applied Physics and Computational Mathematics

Ninth Institute

Shanghai Institute of Laser Plasma

11th Institute

• General Office • Integrated Planning Department • S&T Department • Personnel Training Department • People’s Armed Department • Propaganda Department • Technical Supervision Department

CHINA ACADEMY OF ENGINEERING PHYSICS Party Committee S&T Committee

• Engineering Department • Beijing Graduate Student Department • Material Department • Defense Conversion Department • Public Affairs Management Department • S&T Information Center

CMC State Council

Warhead Engineering R&D and Production Infrastructure

Military Representative Offices

Page 19: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Notional Operational Infrastructure in Breakout Scenario

• Expansion of operational infrastructure

• Current conventional force structure as model: three launchers per company

• Limited number of new brigades equipped with mobile MIRV’d ICBM

• Expansion and delegation of warhead storage and handling responsibilities to base level

• Base 22 as reserve depot • Expansion of missile (CASC/CASIC) and warhead (CAEP) final assembly plants (and supply chain)

• CASC 211 Factory/CASIC 307 Factory

• CAEP Sichuan Institute of Materials Processing (Seventh Institute/903 Factory)

• Larger arsenal = greater transparency?

Page 20: CHINA’S FUTURE NUCLEAR FORCE INFRASTRUCTURE

Conclusions/Other Considerations

Extended range dual capable ballistic and land attack cruise missiles

• Expanded range variants of DF-21C and/or new model

Navy and Air Force Nuclear Capabilities • Air- and possible sub-launched launched land attack cruise missiles • Type 094 sub and JL-2 SLBM: who controls the warheads? • Future PLA “Strategic Command?”

Increasingly complex missile defense countermeasures • On-board jammers • Hypersonic cruise vehicles • Reduced radar cross section • Maneuvering re-entry vehicles

Greater lethality • Fourth generation nuclear weapons • Tailored warheads for hard and/or deeply buried targets • High powered microwave or other radiofrequency warhead

Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) • Probable MIRV variant of silo-based DF-5 (DF-5B) • Possible new solid fueled, road mobile intercontinental ballistic missile