china’s grand strategy - australian naval...

CHINA’SGRANDSTRATEGYMaritimeDisputesinPerspective

SamGoldsmith

2October2016

©2016RedTeamResearch-AllRightsReserved

China’sGrandStrategy:MaritimeDisputesinPerspective

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TABLEOFCONTENTS

GLOSSARYOFACRONYMS&ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................4

EXECUTIVESUMMARY......................................................................................................................5

1.INTERNATIONALLAW...................................................................................................................7

2.CHINA’SMARITIMEDISPUTES......................................................................................................92.1SouthChinaSeaDispute.................................................................................................92.2EastChinaSeaDispute.................................................................................................152.3YellowSeaDispute.......................................................................................................202.4AssessmentsofChina’sMaritimeDisputes..................................................................22

3.CHINA’SSTRATEGICOBJECTIVES................................................................................................233.1RecentChineseHistory.................................................................................................233.2PrioritiesoftheChineseGovernment..........................................................................243.3AssessmentsofChina’sStrategicPriorities..................................................................31

4.CHINA’SEXTERNALACTIVITIES...................................................................................................324.1MaritimeDisputes.......................................................................................................324.2MilitaryModernisation.................................................................................................344.3CovertTechnologyAcquisitions...................................................................................404.4Propaganda...................................................................................................................434.5AssessmentsofChina’sExternalActivities...................................................................46

5.NARRATIVEEXPLAININGCHINA’SEXTERNALACTIVITIES...........................................................475.1NarrativeA:UnintendedConsequences......................................................................475.2NarrativeB:Status&Opportunism..............................................................................485.3NarrativeC:Hegemony................................................................................................495.4NarrativeD:MissionCreep...........................................................................................505.5AssessmentsofNarratives............................................................................................51

CONCLUDINGASSESSMENTS.........................................................................................................52


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TABLEOFTABLES

Table1.UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea.............................................................8Table2.SouthChinaSeaDispute:TimelineofMajorEvents.........................................................13Table3.EastChinaSeaDispute:TimelineofMajorEvents...........................................................18Table4.ThemesinChina’sStrategicPriorities...............................................................................24Table5.China’sHUMINTEspionage..............................................................................................42

TABLEOFFIGURES

Figure1.SouthChinaSeaCoverage...............................................................................................10Figure2.SouthChinaSeaDispute..................................................................................................12Figure3.EastChinaSeaCoverage..................................................................................................15 Figure4.EastChinaSeaDispute....................................................................................................17Figure5.YellowSeaCoverage........................................................................................................20Figure6.DeploymentofPLAArmyUnits.......................................................................................26Figure7.DeploymentofPLAUnits:NanjingProvince....................................................................28Figure8.DeploymentofPLAUnits:GuangzhouProvince..............................................................29Figure9.China’sFirstandSecondIslandChains............................................................................33Figure10.PLANuclearStrikeCapabilities......................................................................................37Figure11.PLAConventionalStrikeCapabilities.............................................................................38


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GLOSSARYOFACRONYMS&ABBREVIATIONSA2/AD:Anti-Access/Area-Denial

ADIZ:AirDefenceIdentificationZone

ASAT:AntiSatellite

ASBM:Anti-ShipBallisticMissile

BMD:BallisticMissileDefence

C4ISR:CommandControlCommunicationsComputersIntelligenceSurveillanceReconnaissance

CCP:ChineseCommunistParty

ECS:EastChinaSea

EEZ:ExclusiveEconomicZone

FOB:ForwardOperationsBase

HUMINT:HumanIntelligence

ICBM:IntercontinentalBallisticMissile

IRBM:IntermediateRangeBallisticMissile

ISR:IntelligenceSurveillanceReconnaissance

MIRV:MultipleIndependently-targetableRe-entryVehicles

MPS:MinistryofPublicSecurity

MRBM:MediumRangeBallisticMissile

MSS:MinistryofStateSecurity

PAP:People’sArmedPolice

PGM:PrecisionGuidedMunitions

PLA:People’sLiberationArmy

PLAA:PLAArmy

PLAAF:PLAAirForce

PLAN:PLANavy

PLARF:PLARocketForce

SAM:SurfacetoAirMissile

SATCOM:SatelliteCommunication

SATNAV:SatelliteNavigation

SCS:SouthChinaSea

SLBM:SubmarineLaunchedBallisticMissile

SSBN:nuclear-poweredballisticmissilesubmarine

SRBM:ShortRangeBallisticMissile

UNCLOS:UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSea


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EXECUTIVESUMMARY

TheChineseGovernmenthasextensivemaritimedisputeswithitsneighboursintheSouthChinaSea,EastChinaSeaandYellowSea,butalsowiththeinternationalcommunity.Allcountrieshaveasignificantstakeinthecontinuityofinternationallaw,theUnitedNationsConventionontheLawof the Sea (UNCLOS), that guarantees freedom of navigation in and over-flight to some of theworld’smostcriticalsea-lanes.ThecommontrendacrossallthreedisputesisthatChina’sclaimsbreach international law and the ChineseGovernment is aggressively asserting its ambit claimsthroughvariousactivities,designedspecificallytointimidateotherclaimantsintocapitulation.

TheChineseGovernment isengagedinfourtypesofexternalactivities. Firstly, it isengaging itsneighboursoverpolarisedmaritimedisputes in theSouthChinaSea,EastChinaSeaandYellowSea. Most participants dispute each other’s claims, however they all contest China’s ambitmaritimeclaimsthatexceeditslegalentitlementsunderUNCLOS.

Secondly, the Chinese Government is substantially and rapidly modernising all branches of itsarmedforces,thePeople’sLiberationArmy(PLA).ThePLAArmy,PLANavyandPLAAirForcehaveallreceivednewgenerationsofweapons,fromattackhelicoptersandships,tosubmarinesand5thgeneration stealth aircraft. The PLA Rocket Force has been outfittedwith new generations ofnuclear and conventional ballistic missiles, and is in the process of acquiring a ballistic missiledefence capability. All branches of the PLA are supported by joint enablers such as CommandControl Communications Computers Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (C4ISR) networks,augmentedbycommunicationsandnavigationsatelliteconstellations. Additionally,thePLAhasacquiredadvancedcapabilitiestoC4ISRnetworkstoadversaries.

Thirdly, the Chinese Government is actively sponsoring or exploiting mechanisms to covertlyacquire advanced technologies, as necessary to enable the PLA’s rapid military modernisation.Methodologiesincludelegalmeans,suchaspurchasingdual-usetechnologiesandjointventures,to illegalmeans, including reverse-engineering, cyberattacksand theuseofhuman intelligenceassetnetworks.

Fourthly,theChineseGovernmentisexpandingitspropagandacapabilitiesfromadomesticfocustoadomestic and international focus. Thepurposeof its internationalpropaganda is to shapeglobalpublicopinioninsupportoftheChineseGovernment’sobjectives.EthnicChinesepersonsthatholdcitizenshipinforeigncountriesaretheprincipaltarget.Theseindividualsaretargetedinorder to assist the Chinese Government in creating and sustaining networks of pro-Beijingsympathisersabroad,whocaninstigatepublicprotestsatBeijing’sbehest. TheendobjectiveofBeijing’sexternally subversiveactivities is toundermine thewillingnessand/orabilityof foreigngovernments to undertake diplomatic, political, economic or military activities that are notcongruentwiththeChineseGovernment’sinterests.

Across all four types of activities the ChineseGovernment has demonstrated: itswillingness todisregard international laws and behavioural norms, its willingness to use armed force, itsunwillingness to compromise, its willingness to justify all its controversial activities throughpropagandaand its activepreparations to fight amajorwar. Basedon theseobservations it is


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assessed with moderate to high confidence that China will be involved in a regional militaryconfrontationwiththeUnitedStatesoritsalliesatsomepointinthefuture.

In terms of the factors driving the Chinese Government’s external activities, this paper hasassessedfourpossiblenarratives:

• NarrativeA–UnintendedConsequences:China’sexternalactivitiesaretheunintendedconsequenceofChineseCommunistParty(CCP)propagandaandaspirationalChineseGovernmentpolicies.

• NarrativeB–StatusandOpportunism:China’sexternalactivitiesaretheresultoftheChineseGovernment’sopportunisticattemptstobuildChina’sstatusastheprincipalleaderofAsia.

• NarrativeC–Hegemony:China’sexternalactivitiesareintendedtodeliverregionalhegemonytotheChineseGovernment

• NarrativeD–MissionCreep:China’sexternalactivitiesaretheresultofprogressiveevolutionsintheChineseGovernment’sstrategicambitions,asChina’seconomicandmilitarypowerhasgrown.

The problem with Narrative A is that it does not explain why the Chinese Government hascontinued to escalate regional tensions when it could have taken at least some measures tomoderatehawkishelementsoftheChinesestate-media,bureaucracyandPLA.TheproblemwithNarrativeB is that itdoesnot fullyexplainwhythePLA isacquiringweapons thatappear tobedesigned toachieve regionalhegemony. In fact, thePLA’s conventionaldeep-strike capabilitiessuggeststhattheChineseGovernmentisattemptingtophysicallyisolateitsAsianneighboursfromtheUnitedStates,therebyforcingthemtoacceptChineseregionalleadershipatsomepointinthefuture.

Conversely,NarrativesCandDexplainall of theChineseGovernment’sexternal activities. Theonly difference is that Narrative C presumes that regional hegemony was always the ChineseGovernment’sstrategicambition,whereasNarrativeDpresumesthattheChineseGovernment’sapparent pursuit of regional hegemony is the result of successive evolutions in its strategicambitions.GiventhatonlyNarrativesCandDcanfullyexplaintheChineseGovernment’sexternalactivities, it isassessedwithhighconfidence thatNarrativeCorD represents the true strategicambitionsoftheChineseGovernment. Whichevernarrativeistrue,itappearsincreasinglylikelythatChinawill endup fighting ina futurearmedconflictwith itsneighboursand/or theUnitedStates.


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1.INTERNATIONALLAW

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the international lawgoverningmaritimeclaimsandboundaries. UNCLOSdemarcates threekeymaritimezones thatany coastal state can lay claim to. The innermost zone is the Territorial Sea followed by theContiguousZone,bothoftheselieinsidetheExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ).

Articles2and3giveeligiblecoastalstatessovereigntyovertheseasurface,seabedandairspaceouttoamaximumof12nauticalmilesfromthecoastallowwaterline(seeTable1).1ThisisreferredtoastheTerritorialSeaandcanbelegitimatelypolicedbythegoverningcoastalstate,asstipulatedbyArticle25.2

Article 33 gives eligible coastal states the right to police a Contiguous Zone not exceeding 24nauticalmilesfromthecoastallowwaterline(seeTable1).3Thesepowersenableacoastalstatetopreventand/orrespondtoinfringementsofitslawsandregulationswithinitsTerritorialSea.4

Article57specifiesthat200nauticalmilesfromthecoastallowwaterlineisthemaximumreachofanystatesEEZ(seeTable1).5AnEEZgivesapplicablecoastalstatestheexclusiverighttoexplore,exploitand/orpreservethenaturalresourcesofthedesignatedmaritimezone.6Watersbeyond200 nautical miles from the coastal low waterline are the “high seas”.7 UNCLOS makes itabundantlyclearinArticle89thatstatescannotclaimanyportionofthe“highseas”astheirownsovereignterritory(seeTable1).8

Inallcases,theshipsofanystatemaytransittheTerritorialSea,ContiguousZoneand/orEEZofacoastal state tovaryingdegrees. Articles17-19enableshipsofall states to transit throughanystatesterritorialsea,so longastheydonotthreatenthesecurityofthecoastalstate(seeTable1).9Articles58and87guaranteefreedomofnavigationandoverflightwithinEEZsandonthehighseas(seeTable1).10

Universalrespectfor,andthecontinuityofUNCLOS,isvitaltoensureglobaleconomicprosperityand global stability. As the world’s foremost maritime legal framework, UNCLOS governs therights,responsibilities,accessandprivilegesofallcountries.Thisisparticularlyimportantbecausewhen UNCLOS is universally respected it replaces adversarial territory disputes with commoninterests,andprovidesamechanismtopeacefully resolvemaritimedisputes. It is important tonote that ensuring unimpeded access to global sea-lanes is vital, since maritime commerceaccountsforaround90%ofallglobaltrade.11

The problem with allowing any disregard for UNCLOS, to go unanswered by the internationalcommunity,isthatitwouldbejustasdestabilisingastheUNSecretaryGeneralannouncing:‘theworld’s borders are now up for redistribution – stake your claims for a limited time only’. Theresultofeitherwouldmorethanlikelybetheoutbreakofarmedconflictsallovertheglobe.


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TABLE1.UNITEDNATIONSCONVENTIONONTHELAWOFTHESEAArticle Description

2&3 Giveseligiblecoastalstatessovereigntyovertheseasurface,seabedandairspaceouttoamaximumof12nauticalmilesfromthecoastallowwaterline.12

25 GivescoastalstatestherighttopolicetheirTerritorialSeas.13

33 GivescoastalstatestherighttopolicetheirContiguousZone’s,notexceeding24nauticalmilesfromthecoastallowwaterline.14

56 Authoriseseligiblecoastalstatesexclusiverightstoexplore,exploitand/orpreservethenaturalresourceswithintheirExclusiveEconomicZone’s(EEZ)15

57 Specifiesthat200nauticalmiles,fromthecoastallowwaterline,isthemaximumreachofanyEEZ.16

86 Definesthe‘highseas’asallwatersnotclassedasanEEZ,territorialsea,internalwatersorarchipelagicwaters.17

87

• GuaranteesallstatesfreedomofnavigationwithinandoverflightontheHighSeas• AuthorisesanynationontheHighSeas,coastalorland-locked,thefreedomto;

o Fisho Laysub-surfacecablesorpipelineso Constructartificialislandso Conductscientificresearch

• StipulatesthatstatesexercisinganyofthesefreedomsunderArticle87mustoccur“withdueregardfortheinterestsofotherstatesintheirexerciseofthefreedomofthehighseas”18

88 StipulatesthattheHighSeasmustbeusedforpeacefulpurposes.19

89 Specifiesthatnostatecanclaimanypartofthe‘highseas’asitsownsovereignterritory.20

279 Requiresstatestosettleanydisputesusing“peacefulmeans”.21

301 Specifiesthatallpartieswithdisputesshall“refrainfromanythreatoruseofforceagainsttheterritorialintegrityorpoliticalindependenceofanystate”.22


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2.CHINA’SMARITIMEDISPUTES

2.1SouthChinaSeaDispute

2.1.1SouthChinaSea:Backgrounder

The SouthChina Sea (SCS) is a significantmaritime zone that borderswithVietnam, China, thePhilippines, Brunei,Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Cambodia (see Figure 1). Much of thismaritimezoneisclassedas‘internationalwaters’,coveringaround3.5millionsquarekilometres,andcontainssomeoftheworld’sbusiestsea-lanes.23

An estimated $5 trillion USD of annual seaborne trade passes through the SCS, a figure thatrepresents around 30% of all global maritime trade.24 Furthermore, around 30% of all globalcrudeoiland50%ofallnaturalgastransitstheSCS.25Additionally,over80%ofJapanese,SouthKoreanandTaiwanesecrudeoilimportspassthroughtheSCS,meaningthatunimpededaccesstoSCSsea-lanesisvitalfortheeconomicprosperityofNortheastAsia.26

The SCS also contains an estimated 11 billion barrels of crude oil and 190 trillion cubic feet ofnatural gas.27 Curiously the Spratly and Parcel Islands, as frequently featured in SCS maritimedisputes, are assessed by the US Government to have minimal or no significant hydrocarbonreserves(oilandnaturalgas).28Infact,thevastmajorityofSCShydrocarbonreservesarelocatedintheuncontestedmaritimeterritoriesofVietnam,MalaysiaandBrunei.29


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FIGURE1.SOUTHCHINASEACOVERAGE

Source:UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgram30


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2.1.2SouthChinaSea:ConflictingMaritimeClaims

Several countries claim sovereignty over various parts of the SCS including: China, Taiwan,Vietnam,thePhilippines,Brunei,IndonesiaandMalaysia(seeFigure2).31However,ChinaistheonlypartythatclaimsalmosttheentireSCSasitsownsovereignterritory.32

China’sclaimsareinvalidunderinternationallawandbreachArticle57ofUNCLOS(seeTable1).33TheargumentarticulatedbytheChineseGovernmentisthatitsclaimsarehistoricalandpredateUNCLOS,thustheycontendthatChina’sclaimssupersedeUNCLOS.34

ThecentralproblemtotheSCSdisputeisthattheChineseGovernmentrefusestocompromise,aswouldbenecessary formeaningfuldiplomaticnegotiations.35 Instead, theChineseGovernmentillegallyclaims“indisputablesovereignty”overalmosttheentireSCSandstubbornlyrejectsmulti-lateral negotiations, with a preference for bilateral negotiations, so that it can induce and/orcoercetheopposingpartytoacceptChinesetermsofsurrender.36

The Chinese Government’s recalcitrant approach is based on the notion that China is growingmorepowerfulwitheachpassingdayandthatitsregionalneighbourswilleventuallycapitulatetoChinesedemands.37Ultimately,severaldecadesofdiplomaticnegotiationshavefailedtoresolvemaritimedisputesintheSCS,thuspointingtotheinherentlimitationsofdiplomaticnegotiations.


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FIGURE2.SOUTHCHINASEADISPUTE

Source:OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense38


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TABLE2.SOUTHCHINASEADISPUTE:TIMELINEOFMAJOREVENTSYear Activities

1914 AChinesecartographerdrawsamapdenotingChina’sU-shapedclaimtotheSCS.39

1948 RepublicofChinapublishesmapsclaimingtheSCSassovereignChineseterritory.40

1949 AftertheChineseRevolution,asledbyMaoZedong,thePeople’sRepublicofChinaretainsallpreviousSCSclaims.41

1974ChinafightsabriefarmedconflictwithVietnamovertheParcelIslands,resultinginthelossoffourChineseshipsand85ChineselivesplusoneVietnameseship,withthreeothersdamaged,andthelossof100Vietnameselives.42Vietnam’swithdrawalgivesChinaoccupationalcontroloftheParcelIslands.43

1988January1988:ChinesenavalforcesaredispatchedtoFieryCrossReefintheSpratlyIslands.44March1988:ChineseandVietnamesenavalforcesengage,resultinginthelossofoneChineselifeandtwoVietnamesevessels,plusonedamaged,and400+Vietnameselives.45Vietnam’swithdrawalfromtheSpratlyIslandsallowsChinatomilitarilyoccupyJohnsonSouthReefintheSpratlyIslands.46

1992 Thenon-democraticChineseNationalPeople’sCongresspassesthe‘LawofTerritorialSeaandContiguousZones’,thatclaimsalmosttheentireSCSassovereignChineseterritory.47

1995 ChinamilitarilyoccupiesMischiefReefintheSpratlyIslands.48

2002 Chinasignsanon-bindingtreatywiththeAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN),the“DeclarationontheConductofPartiesintheSouthChinaSea”.49

2003 October2003:ChinaandASEANsignthe“TreatyofAmityandCooperationinSoutheastAsia”.50

2005 ChinesenavalunitsexecutepatrolsoftheSCS.51

2007

April2007:ChinesenavalunitsdetainfourVietnamesefishingboatsforactivitiesinwatersaroundtheSpratlyIslands.52July2007:TheChineseNavyfiresliveammunitionatVietnamesefishingvessels.53December2007:TheChineseGovernmentannouncesitsintentiontoestablish‘SanshaCity’administration,responsibleforassertingChina’sSCSclaims.54

2008 TheChineseGovernmentauthorisesregularpatrolsoftheSCSbyChinaMarineSurveillance(CMS).55

2009 March2009:ChinesenavalvesselinterceptsaUSNavyshipintheSCS.56

2010 AChineseCMSshiptrainsitscannononanIndonesianpatrolvessel.57

2011May2011:AChineseCMSshipseversaVietnameseseismicsurveyship’scableintheSCS.58June2011:AChinesevesselobstructsthenavigationofaVietnameseresourceexplorationvessel.59

2012

April2012:ChineseCMSandPhilippineCoastGuardvesselsengageinastandoffnearScarboroughReefintheSpratlyIslands.60June2012:VietnampassesalawassertingitsterritorialclaimsovertheSpratlyIslandsandParcelIslands.61July2012:ChineseGovernmentdeclarestheestablishmentof‘SanshaCity’intheParcelIslands.62November2012:ChinaissuesnewpassportsdenotingtheSCSassovereignChineseterritory.63

2013

January2013:PhilippineschallengesChina’sSCSclaimsbeforethePermanentCourtofArbitrationintheHague.64February2013:ChineseGovernmentdeclaresthatitwillignoreanyfindingsbythePermanentCourtofArbitration.65May2013:ChinesenavyblocksattemptsbythePhilippinestoresupplyitsSecondThomasShoaloutpostintheSpratlyIslands.66October2013:ChinadispatchesCMSshipstoSouthLuconiaShoalintheSpratlyIslands.67November2013:China’sfirstaircraftcarrier,theLiaoning,undergoesseatrialsintheSCS.68ChineseMinistryofDefenseannouncesitsintentiontoestablishnewAirDefenceIdentificationZonesinthefuture.69December2013:ChinabeginsconstructingartificialislandsintheSCS.70ChinesenavalvesselobstructsthepathofaUSNavycruiseroperatingintheSCS.71


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2014

January2014:ChinesenavalforcesexecutedrillsnearJamesShoalintheSpratlyIslands.72May2014:ChinaplacesoilrigsnearTritonIslandintheParcelIslands,escortedbyChinesenavalandCMSunits.73ChinacommencesdrillingforpetroleumandnaturalgasintheParcelIslands.74On26MayaChinesefishingboatcollideswithaVietnamesefishingboat.75August2014:ChineseCMSunitsplacemarkersaroundReedBankintheSpratlyIslands.76ChinesejetfighterobstructstheflightpathofaUSNavypatrolaircraftovertheSCS.77ChinacompletesconstructionofitsSouthJohnsonReef,HughesReef,CuarteronReefandGavenReefartificialislandsintheSpratlyIslands.78December2014:ChineseGovernmentreleasesapaperassertingthatthePermanentCourtofArbitrationdoesnotpossesssufficientjurisdictiontohearthePhilippinescase.79VietnameseGovernmentrequeststhatthePermanentCourtofArbitrationtakeintoaccountitssubmissions.80

2015

January2015:VietnamesefishingvesselsareshadowedbyChinesemaritimeenforcementvessels.81July2015:AChineseshipcollideswithandsinksaVietnamesefishingboatneartheParcelIslands.82September2015:ChinacompletesconstructionofFieryCrossReef,SubiReefandMischiefReefartificialislandsintheSpratlyIslands.83

2016

June2016:ChineseGovernmentannouncesthatitmayleavethe1982UnitedNationsConventionontheLawoftheSeaifits“historicrights”arenotupheldbythePermanentCourtofArbitration.84July2016:PermanentCourtofArbitrationannouncesitsfindingsonthecaseasfiledinregardtoChina’sSCSclaims.85TheHaguefindsthatChina’sSCSclaims,asbasedon“historicrights”,areinvalidunderUNCLOSandthatUNCLOSsupersedesallofChina’sclaimed“historicrights”.86September2016:ChinaholdsjointnavalexercisesintheSCSwithRussia.87


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2.2EastChinaSeaDispute

2.2.1EastChinaSea:Backgrounder

TheEastChinaSea(ECS)isasignificantmaritimezonethatcoversapproximately770,000squarekilometres, borderingwith South Korea, Japan, Taiwan and China (see Figure 3).88 This zone iscriticalbecauseithousessea-lanescriticaltotheeconomiesofNortheastAsia,particularlySouthKorea and Japan. Approximately, 30% of global crude oil transits the SCS each year, of whichapproximately 15% continues through the ECS to South Korea.89 Additionally, around 50% ofglobalnaturalgastransitsthroughtheSCSannually,75%ofwhichgoesontoJapanthroughtheECSorwaterseastoftheRyukyuIslandchain.90

TheECS isassessedbytheUSGovernmenttocontainhydrocarbonreservesofupto100billionbarrels of crudeoil and seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas.91 This has becomea significantdriverofthepolarisedECSdispute,thatremainsunresolvedtothepresentday.

FIGURE3.EASTCHINASEACOVERAGE



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2.2.2EastChinaSea:ConflictingMaritimeClaims

TheECSinvolvesmultipleclaimants:Japan,China,SouthKoreaandTaiwan(seeFigure4).93TheoverlappingAirDefence Identification Zone’s (ADIZ) of all four countries illustrate thepolarisedand contested nature of this maritime space.94 Although the dispute is about the broadersovereigntyandeconomicexploitationrightsintheECS,ownershipoftheSenkakuIslands(DiaoyuinChinese)hasbecomeafocalpointfortheentireECSdispute(seeTable3).

Presently,theislandsareunderJapaneseadministrativecontrol,butareconcurrentlyclaimedassovereign territory by Japan, China and Taiwan.95 The islands themselves hold little economicvaluebutareprizedobjectivesbyeachclaimantfortworeasons.96

Firstly, the islands have become symbolic of the entire ECS dispute. If any claimant accededcontrol of the islands to either or both of the other parties, it would risk being viewed as therespectiveclaimantrelinquishingalltheirclaimstotheECS.

Secondly,theislandsarestrategicallylocatedandprovideidealbasingforforward-deployedradarand/orunderseasensorinstallations.97SuchinstallationswouldprovideJapan/China/TaiwanwithexpandedsituationalawarenesscapabilitiesoverthesurroundingECSmaritimespace.

TheChineseGovernmentcontestsJapan’sclaimovertheSenkakuIslandsonseveralgrounds. ItclaimsthattheislandswereChineseterritoryfromasearlyastheMingDynasty(1368-1644),thuspre-datingandtakingprecedenceoverJapan’sclaimthattheislandswere‘terranullius’in1885-1895(seeTable3). It isalsoworthnotingthatChina’sclaimthattheSenkaku Islandswerenot‘terranullius’remainsunverified.98

ChinafurtheradvocatesthattheSenkaku Islandswere illegallytransferredtotheadministrativecontroloftheUnitedStates,underthe1951SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty,andillegallytransferredtoJapanunderthe1971OkinawaReversionTreaty(seeTable3). TheChineseGovernmentalsopointsoutthatitwasnotasignatorytothe1951SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty,thusthetreatydoesnotapply.99WhatismostdisturbingistheChineseGovernment’sapparentwillingnesstotryandexpand its claims over the ECS, as demonstrated by the ADIZ that it unilaterally declared onNovember2013(seeTable3).

Historical animosities, nationalism and perceptions have thus far inhibited the delivery of apeacefulandlastingconclusiontotheECSdispute.Ultimately,decadesofdiplomacyhavefailedtosatisfactorilyresolvetheECSdispute.Thesewaters,alongwiththeislandsandenergyreservesthattheycontain,remaincontestedmorethanever.


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FIGURE4.EASTCHINASEADISPUTE



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TABLE3.EASTCHINASEADISPUTE:TIMELINEOFMAJOREVENTSYear Activities

1372ChinaclaimsthathistoricalrecordsfromtheMingDynasty(1368-1644)mentiontheSenkakuIslands.101Presently,theseclaimsareunverifiedandnoevidencehasproventhatChinapermanentlysettledorinstalledmilitaryfacilitiesontheSenkakuIslands.102

1556 ChinaclaimsthattheMingDynasty(1368-1644)includedtheSenkakuIslandsonitscoastaldefencemaps.103Presently,theseclaimsareunverified.104

1644+ ChinaclaimsthattheQingDynasty(1644-1911)placedtheSenkakuIslandsunderthejurisdictionofFormosa(Taiwan).105Presently,theseclaimsareunverified.106

1893 ChineseImperialDecreegrantsabusinessmanaccesstotheSenkakuIslandsforobtainingmedicinalherbs.107

1885 ImperialJapaneseGovernmentcommissionsanexpeditiontodetermineownershipoftheSenkakuIslands.108

1895January1895:SenkakuIslandsarefoundtolackbothhabitationandofficialownership.109TheislandsaredeclaredTerraNulliusandofficiallyincorporatedintoJapaneseterritory.110May1895:ChinasignstheTreatyofShimonosekiendingtheFirstSino-JapaneseWar.111ThetreatysurrenderssovereigntyoverTaiwan(Formosa)andallisletstoJapan,butdoesnotmentiontheSenkakuIslands.112

1920 May1920:TheConsuloftheRepublicofChinainNagasakidispatchesaletterstatingthattheRepublicofChinarecognisestheSenkakuIslandsaspartofOkinawa.113

1932 JapaneseGovernmentsellsfourofthefiveisletsintheSenkakuIslandgrouptoaJapanesebusinessman.114

1945 October1945:JapansurrendersTaiwan(Formosa)totheAlliedPowers,butthissurrenderdoesnotincludeorexplicitlymentiontheSenkakuIslands.115

1951September1951:Japansignsthe1951SanFranciscoPeaceTreaty,relinquishingallitsterritorialclaimstoTaiwan(Formosa),thePenghuIslands(Pescadores),theSpratlyandParcelIslands.116ThetreatyplacestheNanseiShotoIslands(RyukyuIslandChain)undertheadministrativecontroloftheUnitedStatesbutthetreatydoesnotmentiontheSenkakuIslands.117

1953 UnitedStatesdefinestheRyukyuIslandChaintoincludetheSenkakuIslands.118

1969 UnitedNationsCommitteeforCoordinationofJointProspectingforMineralResourcesinAsianOffshoreAreaspointstothepossibilityofsubstantialpetroleumand/ornaturalgasreservesinwatersneartheSenkakuIslands.119

1971 June1971:UnitedStatestransfersadministrativecontroloftheRyukyuIslandChainandSenkakuIslandstoJapanundertheOkinawaReversionTreaty(TreatyonReversiontoJapanoftheRyukyuandDaitoIslands).120

1978 DiplomatictalksbetweenChinaandJapanconcludewiththe‘PeaceandFriendshipTreatyof1978’.121BothChinaandJapanagreeonsettingasidemaritimedisputesovertheSenkakuIslandsandECSforfutureresolution.122

1995 ChinesecompaniesdiscoverpetroleumandnaturalgasdepositsintheOkinawatrough.123

1996 NihonSeinensha(JapaneseYouthFederation)makerepairstoanexistinglighthouseononeoftheSenkakuIslands.124

2003 October2003:ChinabeginsdrillingandextractingnaturalgasfromtheTianwaitianfieldnearJapan’sclaimline.JapancontendsthatChinaisdepletingtheirgasreservesfromtheChineseside.125

2004 September2004:AChinesenuclear-poweredsubmarineisdetectedinJapaneseterritorialwaters.126

2006 October2006:AChinesesubmarinesurfaceswithintorpedorangeoftheaircraftcarrierUSSKittyHawkoperatingininternationalwatersnearOkinawa.127

2008

June2008:JapanandChinaagreetoceaseunilateraldevelopmentandjointlydevelopfournaturalgasfieldsintheECS.128October2008:FourChinesevessels,includingaSovremennyClassdestroyer,sailthroughtheSeaofJapanandbackthroughtheRyukyuIslandsinthePacificOcean.129November2008:FourChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsandintothePacificOcean.130December2008:TwoChineseStateOceanicAdministrationshipsbreachJapan’sterritorialwatersaroundtheSenkakuIslands.131

2009January2009:JapanprotestsChina’sunilateralminingoftheTianwaitiannaturalgasfieldintheECS.132June2009:FiveChinesenavalvesselssailnortheastthroughtheRyukyuIslandsandintothePacificOcean.133


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2010

March2010:SixChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsandintothePacificOcean.134April2010:10ChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsandintothePacificOcean.135July2010:TwoChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.136September2010:TheChinesefishingtrawlerYuzheng201,ownedbytheChineseBureauofFisheries,collideswithJapaneseCoastGuardvesselsinwatersaroundtheSenkakuIslands.137TheChineseCaptainisarrestedbyJapaneseauthoritiesandtheChineseGovernmentrespondsbyceasingall‘rareearth’exportstoJapan.138

2011

March2011:AChineseStateOceanicAdministrationhelicopterfliesclosetoaJapanesedestroyerintheECS.139April2011:AChineseStateOceanicAdministrationhelicopterfliesclosetoaJapanesedestroyerintheECS.140June2011:11ChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.141November2011:SixChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.142

2012

February2012:FourChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.143TwoChineseStateOceanicAdministrationshipsinterferewithaJapaneseCoastGuardvesselconductingamarinesurveyinJapan’sExclusiveEconomicZone.144April2012:ThreeChinesevesselssaileastthroughtheOsumiStraitandintothePacificOcean.145AChineseStateOceanicAdministrationhelicopterfliesclosetoJapanesedestroyersintheECS.146GovernorofTokyoannouncesplanstopurchasethreeoffiveSenkakuIslandsfromprivateJapaneseowners.147May2012:FiveChinesenavalvessels,sailbetweenTaiwanandthePhilippinesintothePacificOcean.148June2012:ThreeChinesevesselssaileastthroughtheOsumiStraitandintothePacificOcean.149September2012:JapaneseGovernmentpurchasesthethreeSenkakuIslandsthattheGovernorofTokyohadexpressedintenttopurchaseinApril.150October2012:SevenChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.151SevenChinesenavalvesselssailnorthbetweentheRyukyuIslandsandTaiwan.152November2012:FourChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsandintothePacificOcean.153December2012:FourChinesenavalvessels,sailnortheastbetweentheRyukyuIslandsandTaiwan.154

2013

January2013:ChineseMinistryofDefensereleasesdetailsofitsregularairpatrolsovertheECS.155ThreeChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsandintothePacificOcean.156AChinesefrigatelocksitsfirecontrolradaronaJapanesedestroyerandhelicopterintheECS.157March2013:FourChinesenavalvesselssailbetweenTaiwanandthePhilippinesintothePacificOcean.158May2013:TwoChinesenavalvesselssailsoutheastbetweentheRyukyuIslandsandTaiwan.159ThreeChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.160June2013:TwoChinesevesselssailwestthroughtheOsumiStraitfromthePacificOcean.161August2013:TwoChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.162ThreeChinesevesselssaileastthroughtheOsumiStraitandintothePacificOcean.163October2013:FiveChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.164TwoChinesenavalvesselssailnortheastbetweentheRyukyuIslandsandTaiwan165November2013:ChinaunilaterallydeclaresanAirDefenseIdentificationZone(ADIZ)overtheECSandtheSenkakuIslands.166China’sADIZoverlapswiththedeclaredADIZsofJapan,SouthKoreaandTaiwan.167December2013:ThreeChinesenavalvessels,sailbetweenTaiwanandthePhilippinesintothePacificOcean.168

2014

April2014:Chinaandothercountries,includingtheUSandJapan,agreetoaCodeforUnplannedEncountersatSea,thatstipulatesrulesforhandlingunexpectedincidentsinvolvingaircraftandships.169March2014:ThreeChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.170FourChinesenavalvesselssailnortheastbetweentheRyukyuIslandsandTaiwan.171May2014:ChinesefightersflydangerouslyclosetoJapanMaritimeSelfDefenseForceaircraft.172TwoChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.173June2014:ChinesejetfightersflydangerouslyclosetoJapanAirSelfDefenseForceaircraft.174ThreeChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.175ThreeChinesevesselssailwestthroughtheOsumiStraitfromthePacificOcean.176December2014:FiveChinesevesselssaileastthroughtheOsumiStraitandintothePacificOcean.177

2015

February2015:TwoChinesenavalvesselssailthroughtheRyukyuIslandsintothePacificOcean.178March2015:TwoChinesenavalvesselssailsouthwestbetweentheJapanesehomeislandsandtheRyukyuIslandsintotheECS.179April2015:AttheUS-JapanSummit,PresidentObamaclarifiesthatArticle5oftheUS-JapanSecurityTreatyappliestoallJapaneseterritories,includingtheSenkakuIslands.180

2016 September2016:ChineseAirForceannouncesthecommencementofregularairpowerexercisesovertheEastChinaSea.181


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2.3YellowSeaDispute

2.3.1YellowSea:Backgrounder

TheYellowSeaisamaritimezonethatcoversapproximately400,000squarekilometres,borderingwithNorthKorea,SouthKoreaandChina.182

FIGURE5.YELLOWSEACOVERAGE



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2.3.2YellowSea:ConflictingMaritimeClaims

In theYellowSea,Chinahasbecome increasinglyassertivewith itsneighbourSouthKoreaovertitleownershipandresourceexploitationrights.184InDecember2015,SouthKoreannavalvesselsfiredwarningshotsataChinesepatrolboatthatintrudedintoSouthKoreanwaters.185Since2010,Chinese fishing vessels have increasingly engaged in illegal fishing in South Korean waters; asevidencedbyover2,200finesandthearrestof66Chinesefishermenin2013,upfromtwoarrestsin2010.186TheincreasingnumberofillegalChinesefishingexpeditionshasbeenpartlydrivenbyChina’sgrowingdemandforseafood.187NoticethatthepopulatedareasborderingtheYellowSeahouseapproximately600millionChinese,SouthKoreanandNorthKoreanpeople.188

However, the Chinese Government has demonstrated an increased appetite for demandinggreatermaritime territories at the expense of its neighbours. In December 2015, the ChineseGovernmentsuggestedthatthedisputedChineseandSouthKoreanEEZ’sshouldbesettledwithademarcation line closer toSouthKorean shores, thusat SouthKorea’sexpense.189 TheChineseGovernmentjustifiedthisclaimbasedonChina’slargersize,populationandcoastline.190Indeed,there is concernamongAmericanandAllieddefenceanalysts thatChina is attempting toexertincreasedcontrolovertheYellowSea,justasithasattemptedtodointheSCSandECS.191


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2.4AssessmentsofChina’sMaritimeDisputes

The Chinese Government has many unresolved maritime disputes with its neighbours in Asia.China’smaritimedisputesintheSCS,ECSandYellowSeaallbreachUNCLOS.ThecooperativeandflexibleparticipationoftheChineseGovernmentisessential ifallthreemaritimedisputesaretoberesolvedpeacefullyandinperpetuity.TheproblemisthattheChineseGovernmentrefusestoparticipate in any meaningful negotiations and stubbornly asserts demands like “indisputablesovereignty”. ThissuggeststhattheChineseGovernment isnot lookingtonegotiate,butratherescalatetensionsandintimidateitsneighbourstocapitulateandacceptChinesedemands.


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3.CHINA’SSTRATEGICOBJECTIVES

3.1RecentChineseHistory

Prior to the 19th century, Imperial Chinawas the principal hegemonic power in Asia.192 UnderImperial Chinese leadership, Asian states accepted the primacy of Imperial China in return forsecurity,alsoknownasthe‘TributarySystem’.193However,thissystemwasnotalwayspeaceful.Infact,ImperialChinesehistoryisfilledwithexamplesofmilitaryexpansionismandviolentactsofaggression thathave convenientlybeen re-labelledand/or recordedasactsof ‘reunification’.194Peaceful or not, the Tributary System bestowed Imperial China with immense prestige andinfluenceinAsia.195

The last 200 years of Chinese History has been riddled with infringements of China’s nationalsovereignty by external powers. These violations occurred from the 19th century onwards andhaveleftaninsecuritycomplexdeeplyembeddedwithintheChinesenationalpsyche.196

DuringtheFirstOpiumWar(1839-1842),theRoyalNavyexerciseditsnavalsupremacytoswiftlydefeatChinesenaval forces.197Thisconflict concludedwith theTreatyofNanjing thatmadeallsubjects of Western powers immune to Chinese legal codes and provided the framework forBritain to lawfully exploit China’s economic interests.198 During the Second OpiumWar (1856-1860), ImperialChinawasdefeatedbyBritainandFrance.199 Itwasduring thisconflict that theImperialSummerPalacewassystematicallyburnttoashes.200

Following the OpiumWars, China suffered two defeats by Japan; the First Sino-JapaneseWar(1894-1895) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945). 201 The latter is most vividlyrememberedas itclaimedmorethan20millionChinese livesandinvolvedatrociouswar-crimesagainst the civilian population. 202 In 1937, specific units of the Imperial Japanese militaryperpetratedtherape,murderandtortureofthousandsofciviliansinNanjing.203Additionally,asImperialJapaneseforceswithdrewfromChineseterritorytheyburiedlargestockpilesofchemicalweaponsthatareoccasionallyrediscoveredandinflictciviliancasualties.204

During the KoreanWar (1950-1953), American war planners ignored warnings by the ChineseGovernmentnottoallowUNforcestoapproachtheYaluRiver,thatinturntriggeredChina’sentryintotheKoreanpeninsulaconflict.205

The narrative of oppression by foreign powers is consistently regurgitated by the ChineseGovernment’s propaganda, from state controlledmedia to official statements and publications.However, when considering the impact of history on the contemporary Chinese Government’sactivities it is important toremembertwofactors. Firstly, theChineseGovernmenthasactivelyexploited itshistory throughnationalist propaganda, to sustainnational cohesion.206 Secondly,theChineseGovernment’shistoricalpropagandaconvenientlyignoresImperialChina’shistoryasaninternallyandexternallyaggressivepower,andspecificallyhowtheactivitiesofImperialChinaaffected its regionalneighbours.207Consequently, theChineseGovernment’spropaganda isnotanaccuraterecordofeventsbutratheraselectivepublicationoffactsengineeredtosupporttheChineseGovernment’sstrategicambitions.


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3.2PrioritiesoftheChineseGovernment

3.2.1StrategicPrioritiesoftheChineseGovernment

The Chinese Government has six strategic priorities: to sustain economic growth, to preservedomesticstability,topreservetheruleoftheChineseCommunistParty(CCP),tomaintainChina’ssovereignty and territorial integrity, to secure China’s status as a regional great power and tosecure China’s global interests.208 These six distinct priorities can be grouped into four corethemes:domesticstability,homelandsecurity,regionalsupremacyandglobalinfluence(seeTable4).

TABLE4.THEMESINCHINA’SSTRATEGICPRIORITIESTheme StrategicPriorities

DomesticStability• TosustainCCPrule• Tomaintaindomesticstability• Tosustaineconomicgrowth

HomelandSecurity • TodefendChina’ssovereigntyandterritorialintegrity

RegionalSupremacy • TorebuildChinaasAsia’spreeminentsuperpower

GlobalInfluence • ToprojectChinesepowerabroadinordertosecureChina’sinterests



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3.2.2ThemeI:DomesticStability

DomesticstabilityisacorepriorityfortheChineseGovernment,asreflectedbythedeploymentofChineseArmyunits.ThreeArmyGroupsofthePLAArmy(PLAA)aresituatedclosetoBeijing;the65thand38thGroupsarearound250kilometresfromBeijing,whilethe27thGroupisaround300kilometresfromBeijing(seeFigure6). The40thand26thPLAArmyGroup’sarealsolocatedjustshy of 500 kilometres fromBeijing (see Figure 6). Additional evidence pointing to the ChineseGovernment’s concern regarding domestic stability is the 1st PLAArmyGroup located less than250kilometres fromShanghai,anarea that isalsohometo thePLANavy (PLAN)EastSeaFleet(seeFigure6).Thisissupportedbythe15thPLAAAirborneCorps,plusoneairtransportunit,thatisjustover500kilometreswestofShanghai(seeFigures6&8).

AlthoughPLAAunitscanbedeployedinsupportofdomesticstability,theChineseGovernment’sprincipal domestic stability tools are the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the Ministry of PublicSecurity (MPS) and theMinistry of State Security (MSS).210 TheMSS is China’s domestic secretintelligence service that gathers information on threats to the Chinese regime.211 The MPS isChina’s national police force and the initial tool deployed for domestic stability missions, witharound1.9millionMPSofficersdeployedacrossChina.212ThePAPisaparamilitaryelementofthePLA,assignedtoreinforcethedomesticstabilityoftheChineseGovernment intimesofcrisisorcivilunrest.213

Recent events have reinforced the Chinese Government’s perceived need to remain vigilant inpreventing and supressing civil unrest.214 In July 2009, rioting in Urumqi, Xinjiang led to thedeploymentof1,000PAPofficers.215InSeptember2012,PAPunitsweredispatchedtosuppressariotataFoxconnfactorythatwassparkedbypoorpayandworkingconditions.216InJune2013,around1,000PAPofficersweredispatched tocounter riots inUrumqi,Xinjiang.217 In2014, theChineseGovernmentdeployedPAPunitstocountercivilunrest,asinstigatedbyself-immolationsprotestingChina’scontroloverTibet.218InMay2014,PAPunitsweredispatchedafteraterroristbombinginUrumqi,Xinjiang.2192014alsosawpro-democracyprotestsinHongKong.220


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FIGURE6.DEPLOYMENTOFPLAARMYUNITS



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3.2.3ThemeII:HomelandSecurity

ProtectingChina’ssovereignty isgenerallyreflectedbythedeploymentofPLANavy(PLAN),PLAAirForce(PLAAF)andPLARocketForce(PLARF)unitsacrosstheNanjingandGuangzhouProvinces(see Figures 7 & 8). Protecting China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity generally revolvesaroundtwocoremissionsforthePLA:preventingTaiwaneseindependence,bydenyingAmericanandAlliedforcesaccesstotheisland-nationduringacrisis,aswellasenforcingChina’sclaimsovertheECSandSCS.

InNanjing Province, themajority of PLAAF andPLANunits are based around Shanghai, locatedright on the ECS to enforce China’s maritime claims and to interdict SouthKorean/Japanese/Americannaval forces sailing to reinforceTaiwan (seeFigure7). Additionally,the area directly opposite Taiwan is home to a concentrated force of PLAA missile, artillery,infantryandarmouredunits,suggestingthattheywouldbedeployedduringaTaiwanconflict(seeFigure7).

InGuangzhouProvince,themajorityofPLANunitsaredeployedinoraroundHainanIsland,withmost of the PLAAF units deployed close to, or within striking distance of, China’s southerncoastlinethatborderswiththeSCS(seeFigure8).


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FIGURE7.DEPLOYMENTOFPLAUNITS:NANJINGPROVINCE



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FIGURE8.DEPLOYMENTOFPLAUNITS:GUANGZHOUPROVINCE



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3.2.4ThemeIII:RegionalSupremacy

China’s regional supremacy ambitions are reflected by the deployment of all PLAAF and PLANunits, as well as the dispersed deployment of PLARF units across the Nanjing and GuangzhouProvinces(seeFigures7&8).ThePLARFsupportstheChineseGovernment’sregionalambitionsas it operates China’s nuclear-tipped ballistic missile force, conventional ballistic missile force,conventionalanti-shipballisticmissileforceandlong-rangestrikemissileforce.224ThesemissilesgivethePLARFthecapabilitytostrikeatlandorseatargetsandatsignificantdistances,providingthePLARFwiththecapacitytosignificantlythreatenitsregionalneighbours.

3.2.5ThemeIV:GlobalInfluence

China’s global ambitions are not yet reflected by current PLA deployments, other than thestrategicreachofitslandandsea-basednucleardeterrent.225OnereasonisthatthePLANisstillintheprocessofexperimentingwithitsfirstaircraftcarriertheLiaoningandisyettocommissionmultipleaircraftcarriers,aswouldbeneededtosustainapermanentPLANpresenceindifferenttheatres.226

AnotherreasonisthatChinaisyettodevelopaglobalnetworkofForwardOperationsBases(FOB),aswouldberequiredtoprovidelogisticsandsustainmentsupporttoanyforward-deployedPLANunits.227 However, in 2015 the Chinese Government announced its intent to constructmilitarysupportfacilitiesintheRepublicofDjiboutithatsitsontheGulfofAden,withdirectaccesstothePersianGulf.228


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3.3AssessmentsofChina’sStrategicPriorities

The Chinese Government has selectively presented and exploited specific aspects of its historythroughitspropaganda.Althoughthefactsthemselvesaretrue,theCCPhasembellishedChinesehistoryandfocusseddomesticattentiononthemosttragiceventstogenerateferventnationalistsentiment, thereby underpinning national cohesion. Consequently, CCP propaganda is not anobjectiveinterpretationofhistoricalevents,butratherataintednarrativethatisamanifestationof the Chinese Governments strategic priorities. One of these strategic priorities is to sustainnational cohesion, as underpinned by a common narrative, thus misdirecting public attentionawayfromotherdomesticissuessuchashumanrightsabuses,thelackoffreedomsorcorruption.

Broadlyspeaking,theChineseGovernmenthassixstrategicprioritiesthatfallunderfourthemes:maintainingdomesticstability,protectingChinesesovereignty,establishingChinaastheregionalleaderinAsiaandexpandingChina’sinfluencearoundtheglobe.Althoughdomesticstabilityisaconcern for the ChineseGovernment, it has developed powerful capabilities to assure nationalcohesionandaggressivelycountercivilunrest.ThesecapabilitiesincludearadicalisedpopulationthathasbeenindoctrinatedwithdecadesofCCPpropaganda,augmentedbyvigilantstatesecurityservices that are reinforced by the PLA. These capabilities appear to provide the ChineseGovernmentwithasignificantamountofcertaintyinregardtoChina’sdomesticstability,enablingittofocusonotherobjectives.

Inpreviousdecades,Chinapossessedneither theeconomicor themilitarypower to assert anyformof regional hegemony, let aloneproject significant influence abroad. However,muchhaschangedsince2000. In2015,Chinawastheworld’s largesteconomywithaGDPPPPof$19.39trillion,andtheUnitedStatesasthesecondlargesteconomywithaGDPPPPof$17.95trillion.229China has also spent the better part of the last 16 yearsmodernising all branches of the PLA.GiventhesignificantstridesthatChinahasmadeinimprovingthePLA,itislikelythatthePLAnowpossessesmoderatecapabilitiestosecureChina’sinterestsfromforeigninterference.

InrecentyearstheChineseGovernmenthasbeguntofocusoutwards,suggestingashifttowardsitsthirdandfourthstrategicthemes(seeTable4). In futuredecades it isexpectedthatChina’scapability tomilitarily dominate the Asia-Pacific region will increase, along with its capacity toprojectsignificantinfluencearoundtheglobe.


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4.CHINA’SEXTERNALACTIVITIES

4.1MaritimeDisputes

China’sstrategicplansrequireittobecapableofdenyingexternalpowersfrominterferingwithitsinterestsduringperiodsofhostilities.230Credible scenarios includeoperations to isolateTaiwanfrom the United States and its Allies, or operations to enforce China’s claims over disputedterritories.231ThisisreflectedbytheChineseGovernment’s“nearseas”and“farseas”conceptofnationalsecurity,alsoknowasthefirstandsecondislandchains(seeFigure9).232NoticealsothatChina’s capacity to deny the first and/or second island chains to the United States would alsosecureChina’saccesstoresources,byallowingtheChineseGovernmenttocoerceitsneighboursintoacceptingChinesedemands.

Curiously, all of China’s currentmaritime disputes, across the Yellow Sea and ECS and SCS, fallwithin the ‘first island chain’ (see Figure 9). This suggests that China’s ‘second island chain’ ismorethanjustadefensivezonereservedforwartime,butratherasecondbatchoffutureChinesemaritimeclaims (seeFigure9). Notice thatChina isnotademocracy, thusChinese leaderscanplanwithamulti-decadehorizon.Consequently,theChineseGovernmentmayharbourplansforregionalhegemony,butisimplementingitsplansonamulti-decadetimescale.


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FIGURE9.CHINA’SFIRST&SECONDISLANDCHAINS



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4.2MilitaryModernisation

4.2.1Anti-Access/Area-DenialStrategy

ThePLAhasfourservicebranches:thePLA,PLAN,PLAAFandPLARF.Thesebranchesplantofightfuture wars by denying adversaries, particularly the United States, access to the WesternPacific.234ThisisreferredtoasChina’s“ActiveDefence”strategy,asoutlinedinChina’s2008and2010DefenceWhite Papers aswell as China’sNational Security Lawof 2015.235 To theUnitedStatesanditsAllies,“activedefence”ismostcommonlyreferredtoasChina’sAnti-Access/Area-Denial(A2/AD)strategy.236

China’sA2/ADstrategyadvocatestheuseofswiftandcoordinatedmilitaryoperationstoachieveadecisiveadvantageattheoutsetofhostilities.237However,Chinesemilitarydoctrinehasbeenassessedby theUSDepartmentofDefenseasemphasising“acommitmentnot toattackbut torespondaggressivelyonceanadversarydecidestoattack”.238Central toChina’sA2/ADstrategyareShashoujian (orassassin’smace)capabilities,andare intendedtoasymmetricallydegradeorbypass the technological superiority of the United States and Allied armed forces.239 Theseweaponsincludebutarenotlimitedtoseamines,torpedoes,cruisemissiles,ballisticmissilesandanti-radiationmissiles.240Theoperationalobjectiveof‘Shashoujian’capabilitiesistothreatenorneutraliseforward-deployedUnitedStatesAirForce(USAF)andUnitedStatesNavy(USN)assetsinthefirstandsecondislandchains,aswellasdenyadditionalUSforcesfromenteringorfreelymanoeuvringwithinthefirstandsecondislandchains(seeFigure9).241

4.2.2PLAArmy(PLAA)

ThePLAAhasundergonesignificantmodernisationprogramstoenableitscapacitytooperateinthe future land warfare environment. 242 Modernisation upgrades include the creation ofmechanised combat brigades, mobile infantry battalions, combined arms battalions and theintroduction of networked data-sharing capabilities.243 Capability upgrades have included theintroduction of new conventional and rocket artillery systems, new anti-vehicle and anti-airordnanceaswellastheintroductionofPLAArotary-wingaviationsystems.244

4.2.3PLAAirForce(PLAAF)

ThePLAAFcontainsaninventoryofaround6004thgenerationcombataircraft,includingtheJ-10that is China’s first domestically built 4th generation fighter, and the SU-35 imported fromRussia.245ThePLAAFisalsotesting5thgenerationstealthaircraft,theJ-20andJ-31.246ThePLAAFhasalsointroducedaredesignedvariantofitslegacyH-6long-rangebombers.247ThenewH-6Kiscapableofcarryinguptosixcruisemissilesorguidedbombsandnavalmines.248SupplementingthePLAAF’scapabilitiesareadvancedSurfacetoAirMissile(SAM)batteries,includingtheRussianS-300 and S-400 systems, the domestically producedCSA-9 aswell as the CSA-X19 system thatcouldbemodifiedforBallisticMissileDefence(BMD)missions.249


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4.2.4PLANavy(PLAN)

The PLAN has been extensively modernised and now possesses a total fleet of 300 vessels,including submarines, surface combatants, patrol boats and amphibious ships, plus one aircraftcarrier.250 Themodernelementsof thePLANundersea fleet include:12KiloClass conventionalsubmarines (Russia), 13 Type 039 conventional submarines, 13 Type 039A conventionalsubmarines plus two Type 093 nuclear-powered attack submarines.251 An additional four Type093 SSNs areplannedand can vertically launch theYJ-18 cruisemissile.252 It is also speculatedthat China may introduce a class of Type 095 nuclear-powered guided missile submarines.253Furthermore,thePLANsubmarineforceisaugmentedbyfourType094nuclear-poweredballisticmissile submarines (SSBN), providing theChineseGovernmentwith a sea-basednuclear secondstrikecapability.TheType094SSBNscarrytheJL-2SubmarineLaunchedBallisticMissile(SLBM)thathasarangeexceeding7,200kilometres(seeFigure10).254

Themodern elements of the PLAN surface combatant fleet include Type 052C and Type 052Dguidedmissiledestroyers,plusType054Aguidedmissilefrigates.InthenearfuturethePLANwillintroduceitsfirstguidedmissilecruiser,theType055.255ThePLANmajorsurfacecombatantsareaugmentedbyType056corvettesthatwillultimatelyreplacethelegacyType022guidedmissilepatrolboats.256

SupplementingthePLAN’ssurfacecombatantandunderseafleetsarethreeType071amphibiousassault ships plus China’s first aircraft carrier the Liaoning.257 In the next 15 years, the USDepartmentofDefenseassesses that thePLANwill introducenewgenerationsofmorecapableanddomesticallybuiltaircraftcarriers,capableoflaunchingaircraftviaacatapultandrecoveringaircraftusingarrestingwires.258


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4.2.5PLARocketForce(PLARF)

The PLARF, previously known as the ‘Second Artillery Force’, is responsible for providing theChineseGovernmentwithland-basednuclearandconventionalballisticmissiles,supplementedbyothertypesoflong-rangeoffensivemissileandBMDsystems.259ThePLARF’sland-basednucleardeterrentisbuiltaround75+silo-basedDF-5IntercontinentalBallisticMissile’s(ICBM)thathavearange of 13,000+ kilometres (see Figure 10).260 The DF-5B is a truck-mounted ICBM variantequippedwithMultipleIndependently-targetableRe-entryVehicle’s(MIRV),meaningthatasinglemissilecanstrikeatmultipletargets.261ThesemissilesaresupplementedbytheDF-31ICBMthatistruck-mountedandcanstrikeatrangesof7,200+kilometres.262TheDF-31AICBMvariantisalsotruck-mountedbuthasanextendedrangeof11,200+kilometres.263ThePLARFisalsoequippedwith the shorter-range DF-4 ICBM that has a range of 5,400+ kilometres.264 In the future thePLARFwillintroduceanewgenerationoftruck-mountedICBMscalledtheDF-41,andisexpectedtofeatureaMIRVcapability.265

ThePLARF’snuclearstrikecapability issupplementedby itsconventionalballisticmissilearsenal(see Figure 11). Recently, the PLARF introduced theDF-26 Intermediate Range BallisticMissile(IRBM)thatiscapableofcarryingconventionalornuclearpayloads,andstrikingatlandtargetsatrangesof3,000+kilometres.266IthasalsobeenspeculatedthattheDF-26couldbemodifiedintoanAnti-ShipBallisticMissile(ASBM)tostrikemovingshipsatsea.267

TheDF-21isaMediumRangeBallisticMissile(MRBM),capableofstrikinglandtargetsatrangesof1,500+ kilometres.268 The DF-21D variant is an ASBM that has a similar range but has beenmodifiedtostrikeatmovinghighvaluemaritimeassets,suchasaircraftcarriers.

Augmenting the PLARF’s inventory of conventional IRBMs, MRBMs and ASBMs is a significantforceofDF-16ShortRangeBallisticMissiles(SRBM).269Theseweaponscanstrikeatlandtargetsat distances exceeding 800 kilometres, making their application most likely during a potentialTaiwanconflict.270

ThePLARFisalsodevelopingBMDcapabilities,evidencedbyitssuccessfulinterceptofaballisticmissileinmid-courseflightinJanuary2013.271ChinaalreadypossessestheRussianS-300PMU1/2systemthatiscapableofinterceptingairtargets,butalsoballisticmissilesatrangesofupto1,000kilometres.272 The Chinese Government has also announced its intention to acquire the S-400missilesystemthatiscapableagainstlowradarcross-sectionaircraft,PrecisionGuidedMunitions(PGM)andMRBMs.273


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FIGURE10.PLANUCLEARSTRIKECAPABILITIES



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FIGURE11.PLACONVENTIONALSTRIKECAPABILITIES



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4.2.6JointEnablers

After observing the effectivenessofUS air operations during the1991GulfWar andOperationAllied Force in 1999, the Chinese Government became convinced that it needed to invest insurvivable Command Control Communications Computers Intelligence SurveillanceReconnaissance (C4ISR) infrastructure.276 Throughout the 2000s the PLA invested in nationalC4ISR infrastructure including fiber-optic,microwave relay and long-range high frequency radiotechnologies, supplementedbyhardenedunderground facilities.277 Thesehardenedanddeeplyburied facilities are designed to allow the Chinese national command hierarchy, logistic andstrategicassetstoremainoperational,evenafteranuclearstrike.278

Sincetheearly2000s,thePLAhasbeeninvesting insignificantspace-basedassets. Oneareaofinvestment has been in Satellite Communications (SATCOM). In 2002 theChineseGovernmentcontractedaFrenchcompany todelivera communications satellite, followedby thedeliveryoftwo Israeli military communications satellites in 2005. 279 In 2008, China launched its firstcommunicationsrelaysatellite,theTianlian-1.280ThiswasfollowedbynofewerthansixChinesecommunicationssatellitesbetween2010and2012.281

A second area of investment has been in the development of an independent global SatelliteNavigation(SATNAV)capability.In2006,ChinalaunchedthreenavigationsatellitesoftheBeidouIsatelliteconstellation.282By2012,ChinahadlaunchedtheBeidouIIconstellationof10satellites,providingtheChineseGovernmentwithregionalSATNAVcoverage.283 In2015,ChinabegantheprocessofexpandingtheBeidouIIconstellationto35satellites,withtheaimofprovidingglobalSATNAVcoverageby2020.284

A third area of Chinese space investment has been in the development of an IntelligenceSurveillanceReconnaissance(ISR)satellitenetwork.Intheearly2000s,Chinalauncheddozensofsatellitestoprovide itscivilianandmilitaryserviceswithoptical, infrared,multi-spectral imagingand synthetic aperture radar capabilities.285 For instance theYaogan,Haiyang-1B andHuanjingsatelliteconstellations286

4.2.7ServiceofDenialCapabilities

The Chinese Government has also been working on ways to deny adversaries access to theirrespective critical support services duringwartime. Anti-Satellite (ASAT) technologies are onepathway being explored by the PLA; designed to interfere with or neutralise an adversariescapability to leverage space-based assets for navigation or C4ISR.287 To date, the PLA hasexperimentedwith laser,microwaveand jammingtechnologies,aswellashard-killASATmissiletechnologies.288AnotherpathwaybeingexploredistheuseofcyberattackstointerferewithorneutraliseanadversariesC4ISRcapabilities.289


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4.3CovertTechnologyAcquisitions

4.3.1China’sSelf-SufficiencyObjective

The Chinese Government has an unquenchable thirst to acquire advanced technology, throughlegal, illegaland/orcovertmethodologies.290Thepurposeof thesetechnologyacquisitions is todevelop an indigenous Chinese defence industry that is capable of meeting all PLA capabilityrequirements, and producing technologically competitive products for sale in the global armsmarketplace.291UltimatelyalltechnologiesandsystemsacquiredbytheChineseGovernmentarechannelledintoChina’sdefenceindustries,inturnmodernisingthecapabilitiesofthePLA.

4.3.2ReverseEngineering

The Chinese Government acquires all advanced civilian and military technologies that it ispermitted to purchase. Ultimately, these technologies are reverse-engineered so that thefundamentalknowledgeenrichesthecapabilitiesofChina’sdefenceindustries.292Consequentlyasignificant portion of the PLA’s most advanced military systems are reverse engineered fromforeigntechnologysources.293

Russia has historically been China’s principal supplier of advanced combat aircraft, missiles,submarinesandsurfaceships.294RussiahasalsocollaboratedwithChinaon“technical,designandmaterialsupport”fornumerousmilitaryprojects.295However,asChinesedefenceindustrieshaveprogressivelyadvancedtheirknowledgeandexpertise,thevolumeofRussianmilitaryimportshasnoticeably declined.296 Despite its dedicated reverse-engineering programs, China still relies onRussiaforthesupplyofadvancedsystemsthatitisunabletosourcedomestically,suchastheS-400airdefencesystemandSU-35combataircraft.297

Russia has become increasingly aware of China’s illegal reverse engineering activities.Consequently, Russia refuses to sell its most advanced military systems and technologies toChina.298Forinstance,in2005Russiarefusedtodeliver34IL-76transportaircraftandfourIL-78aerial refueling tankers to China, sparked partially by concerns that they would be reverseengineeredtoaidChina’sindigenousaircraftindustries.299

4.3.3Dual-UseTechnologies

WhentheChineseGovernmentisunabletoacquiremilitarytechnologies,itoftenoptstoacquire‘dual-use’ technologies. For instance, theChineseGovernmenthasput significant emphasis onacquiringadvancedintegratedcircuits,radiation-hardenedsemi-conductorsandotherelectronicsthathaveawiderangeofapplications,fromguidedweaponstocombataircraftandwarships.300


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4.3.4JointVentures

Joint ventures are another way that the Chinese Government covertly acquires advancedtechnologies. Chinese companies, often with covert ties to the Chinese Government, engageforeigncompanieson jointventures.301 For instance, foreigncompanies could jointlydevelopasemiconductororintegratedcircuitproductionplantinChina,orcompaniescouldcollaborateontheresearchanddevelopmentofnewtechnologies.302Eitherway,theChineseGovernmenthasthe potential to access technologies that it would otherwise have been unable to purchasedirectly.303

4.3.5CyberAttacks

The Chinese Government also uses its extensive cyber warfare capabilities to illegally gainunauthorisedaccess to theclassified informationand sensitive technologiesofothernations.304Principally, the Chinese Government directs cyber attacks against the diplomatic, military anddefence industry sectors of the United States.305 However on multiple occasions the Chinesegovernmenthasemployedcyberattacksagainstother foreigngovernments, including IndiaandBelgium.306

4.3.6HumanIntelligence

The Chinese Government’s intelligence services are extensively engaged in illegally acquiringsensitivetechnologiesandclassifiedinformationfromoverseassources,throughtheexploitationofHumanIntelligence(HUMINT)assets(seeTable5).307TheseHUMINTassetstendtobeChinesenationals or ethnic Chinese persons naturalised as citizens of a foreign country or non-ethnicChineseindividualsthathavebeeninducedtocommittreason.308


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TABLE5.CHINA’SHUMINTESPIONAGEYear Activities

2007 ChiMak,anaturalisedUSCitizenandformeremployeeofaUSdefencecompany,isconvictedofrevealingTopSecretinformationontheUSNavy’ssubmarines,surfaceshipsandweaponstotheChineseGovernment.309

2009May:FormerUSPacificCommandliaisonofficerischargedwithillegallypassingclassifiedinformationtotheChineseGovernment.310July:ProfessorattheUniversityofTennesseeisconvictedofexportingclassifiedUSAirForcedatatoChineseNationals.311

2010

August:NoshirGowadia,anaturalisedUSCitizen,isconvictedofillegallyexportingTopSecretclassifiedinformationtotheChineseGovernment,includingintricatedetailsoftheB-2stealthbomber,andalsoofaidingtheChineseGovernmentdevelopastealthycruisemissile.312September:ChiTongKuok,aChinesenational,isconvictedofillegallyattemptingtoexportmilitaryencryptionandGPStechnologytoChina.313

2011 XianHongweiandLiLi,twoChinesenationals,areconvictedofillegallyattemptingtoacquiremilitary-graderadiation-hardenedmicrochipsforsatelliteapplications,onbehalfoftheChinaAerospaceandTechnologyCorporation.314

2012

July:ZhangZhaowei,anaturalisedCanadianCitizen,isindictedforattemptingtoillegallyacquireandexportmilitarygyroscopestoChina.315October:LuFutian,aChinesenational,isjailedafterillegallyexportingasensitivemicrowaveamplifiertoarecipientinChina.316December:YuanWanliandSongJiang,twoChinesenationals,areindictedforattemptingtoillegallyacquire‘dual-use’logicdevicesandexportthedevicestoChina.317

2013

March:LiuSixing,aChinesenational,isjailedforstealingthousandsofclassifiedfilesfromhisUSemployerconcerningthedesignandperformancespecificationsofguidedweapons,targetlocatorsandunmannedaerialvehicles.318May:MaLisong,aChinesenational,isconvictedofillegallyattemptingtoexportweapons-gradecarbonfibertoChina.319October:LiuYi,aChinesenational,isindictedfordisclosinginformationabouttechnologiesthatcouldbeappliedtoUSsubmarinesandfighteraircrafttotheChineseGovernment.320December:ZhangMingsuan,aChinesenational,isjailedforillegallyattemptingtoexportmilitary-gradecarbonfibertoChina.321

2014

July:CaiBo,aChinesenational,pleadsguiltyforattemptingtoillegallyexportmilitarysensorstoChina.322August:SuBin,aChinesenational,isindictedforinvolvementinaschemetostealclassifieddatafromUSDefencecontractorsontheC-17,F-22andF-35.323November:AChinesenationalworkingforaUSdefencecontractorisarrestedattemptingtoleavetheUnitedStateswithsensitiveequationsandtestresultsrelatingtoadvancedtitaniumasusedinUSmilitaryaircraft.324

2015 ZhangHao,aChinesenational,isindictedforstealingsoftware,designsandspecificationsforathin-filmbulkacousticresonator,andillegallyexportingthisinformationtoChina.325


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4.4Propaganda

4.4.1InformationWarfareoftheChineseGovernment

The Chinese Government extensively exploits carefully orchestrated propaganda to influencedomesticandinternationalaudiences.326Infact,theChineseGovernmentisacutelyawareofthepotential for propaganda, or what it calls ‘information warfare’, to shape the activities andresponses of external powers.327 These crafted messages can be disseminated using officialchannels, suchasChineseGovernmentpress releases,and/orsupplementarychannels includingChina’s state-controlled media, state-owned enterprises and national education system. ThepurposeofCCPpropaganda is tohighlight information that supports theChineseGovernment’sposition,while aggressivelydownplaying, dismissingor neutralising information that contradictstheChineseGovernment’sposition.

4.4.2DomesticPropaganda

TheChineseGovernmentmaintainsextensivedomesticpropagandacapabilities.CCPpropagandahasconsistentlyarticulatedanarrativeofeventsthatportraysitsactsofaggressionasdefensiveacts, even though China was the aggressor. For instance, CCP propaganda refers to China’sinvasionsofIndia(1962)andtheSovietUnion(1969)as“self-defencecounterattacks”.328

In2007,PLAstrategistsconsideredtheapplicationsforaninternationalpropagandacampaigntoredress offensive military operations against Taiwan as legitimate defensive operations underinternational law.329 The intent of such a campaignwould be to influence international publicopinion,inanattempttodelaythereactionsofUSandAlliedpowers.330

Another instance is the simmering anti-Japanese sentiment that the CCP has spent decadesfostering through the Chinese Government’s polemic and nationalist education curriculum. In1989, the CCP mandated that the national primary and secondary school curriculum wouldemphasise China’s history of suffering at the hands of ”imperialist” powers and the “heroicresistance” of the Chinese people.331 Other Chinese Government measures have included thecommissioning of movies focussed on the Nanjing Massacre, as well as the commissioning ofpublicmuseumsandwarmemorialsites.332

These examples of Chinese nationalism are by no means isolated incidents, but rather visibleelementsof theCCP’s ‘informationwarfare’masterplan;aimedatsupportingdomesticstabilityby fosteringnational cohesion. However, theCCP’s propagandahas arguablyhad theoppositeeffectsinceChinesepublicopinion,asmisinformedbydecadesofnationalistpropaganda,tendstoexpressoutragewhentheChineseGovernmenttakesanythinglessthanatotallyuncompromisingpositionondiplomaticmatters, such as the SCSor ECSdisputes.333 For example, in September2012PAPunitsweredeployed toquellanti-Japanesedemonstrations inmultiplecitiesover theSenkaku Islands dispute.334 As author Yinan He has observed, the CCP’s decades of nationalistpropagandahasbackfiredbypreventingtheChineseGovernmentfrompursuingmoremoderatepolicies.335


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4.4.3InternationalPropaganda

Externally, the Chinese Government has been expanding its propaganda reach to access bothethnicChineseandnon-ethnicChineseaudiencesaroundtheworld. Oneoutlet is the ‘People’sDaily’, that is the official news outlet of the CCP, and is available to international audiences.336RecentarticlesinthePeople’sDailyhaveconsistentlysupportedtheChineseGovernment’sstanceontheSCSdispute.

• 30June2016–People’sDaily:AnarticleaccusedtheworldofoverreactingtoaChinesenuclearsubmarinesrecentpassagethroughtheStraitofMalacca.337

• 20July2016–People’sDaily:AnarticlecriticisedthePermanentCourtofArbitration’srulingas“absurd”andasundermining“internationallaw”.338

• 19September2016–People’sDaily:AnarticlecriticisedtheJapaneseDefenseChief’sremarksaboutChina’sassertiveactivitiesintheSCS.339

• 20September2016–People’sDaily:AnarticleannouncedthatthePLA’smilitarycapabilitieswere“sufficienttodealwiththeSCSandtheDiaoyuIslandsissues”340

• 20September2016–People’sDaily:AnarticleannouncedthatjointChineseandRussianmilitaryforceshadengagedinexercisestoseizeislandsbyforce.341

Anotheroutlet isthe‘ChinaDaily’thathasnewsbranchesspecificallytargetingaudiences intheUnited States, Europe, Asia and Africa. The China Daily states on its ownwebsite that it wasfounded in 1981 with a target audience of “diplomats, representatives of internationalorganisations, transnational corporations, international media reporters and editors, as well asforeigntourists”.TheChinaDailyalsostatesthatitestablisheda“21stCenturyEnglishEducationMedia”in1993aimedatprimary,middleandtertiaryeducationstudents.342RecentarticlesintheChinaDailyalignwiththeChineseGovernment’spolicypositionontheSCSdispute.

• 9September2016–ChinaDaily:AnarticlequotedaChineseMinistryspokespersonasstating“ChinaopposesanyattemptbyforcesoutsidetheregiontostiruptroubleontheSouthChinaSeaissue”343

• 16September2016–ChinaDaily:AnarticlearguedthatjointChinese-RussiannavalexercisesintheSCSwere“regular”andnormal.344

• 19 September 2016 – China Daily: An article openly criticised remarks by Japan’s Defense Chief thatweremade in support of theUS FreedomofNavigationOperations. The article alsoquoted theChinese ForeignMinistryspokespersonwhosaid“Chinawillresolutelysafeguarditsterritorialsovereigntyandmaritimerightsandinterests”345

• 19 September 2016 – China Daily: An article reported that the joint Chinese-Russiannaval exercises endedwith“amissiontoseizeanisland”346

Collectively these articles demonstrate that the Chinese Government has used its internationalpropaganda todownplay significantevents, likeaChinesenuclear submarine transiting throughtheStraitofMalacca,whilstarticulatingthinlyveiledthreatsandcriticisinganyoppositiontotheChineseGovernment’sinterests.

The Chinese Government’s objective of developing an international propaganda program is toinfluence global public opinion, thereby undermining the willingness and ability of foreigngovernments to take policy positions or approve activities that are contrary to the ChineseGovernment’s interests. This international propaganda is aimed at influencing ethnic Chinese


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communities thatpossess citizenshipandvoting rights in foreigncountries, likeAustraliaor theUnitedStates.

In conjunctionwith event sponsorship via its embassies/consulates, the ChineseGovernment isable to develop networks of pro-Beijing sympathises to stage public protests in support of theChinese Government’s interests.347 For instance, on 21 July 2016 it was reported that ChinesecommunitygroupswereplanningtopubliclyprotestthePermanentCourtofArbitration’sverdicton theSCS inMelbourne.348 If suchacapabilitywasextensivelyestablished inAustralia,by theChinese Government, it would pose a serious threat to Australia’s National Security byunderminingthewillingnessand/orabilityofAustralianpoliticianstodefendAustralia’sNationalInterests.


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4.5AssessmentsoftheChina’sExternalActivities

TherearefourprincipalelementsoftheChineseGovernment’sexternalactivities.Firstly,China’sambit maritime claims that are disputed by China’s regional neighbours, as well as theinternational community. Secondly, the rapid military modernisation of the PLA. Thirdly, theChineseGovernment’scovertacquisitionofadvancedforeigntechnologies.Fourthly,theChineseGovernment’scapabilitytocraftanddisseminatepropaganda,withtheintentofshapingdomesticandinternationalpublicopinioninsupportoftheChineseGovernment’sobjectives.

The following observations have been made regarding the Chinese Government’s externalactivities:

• Disregardforinternationallawsandnorms:ThisisevidencedbyChina’sambitmaritimeclaimsthatbreachUNCLOSaswellasitsuseofunethicalmethodologiesforacquiringadvancedtechnologies

• Unwillingness to peacefully resolve disputes: the Chinese Government has demonstrated its consistentrefusaltoresolvemaritimedisputespeacefullyandinaccordancewithinternationallaw

• Justifiesitsactivitieswithpropaganda:theChineseGovernmenthasconsistentlyusedpropagandatojustifyitsdisregardforinternationallawsandnorms.Forinstance,theChineseGovernment’sclaimof“indisputablesovereignty”overtheSCS.

• Demonstrated its willingness to use armed force: the Chinese Government has demonstrated increasedwillingness to deploy PLA assets for increasingly hostile activities. For instance, in January 2013 a PLANfrigatelockeditsfirecontrolradaronaJapanesenavaldestroyerandhelicopterintheECS.

• Preparationsforwar:theChineseGovernment’smilitarymodernisationprogramssuggestthatitispreparingtofightafuturehigh-intensitywaragainstfirst-rateadversaries

Basedontheseobservationsitisassessedwithmoderatetohighconfidencethat,irrespectiveofthe factors driving the Chinese Government’s external activities, armed hostilities are likely tobreakoutinfuturedecadesbetweenChinaandotherAsia-Pacificpowers.


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5.NARRATIVESEXPLAININGCHINA’SEXTERNALACTIVITIES

5.1NarrativeA:UnintendedConsequences

5.1.1NarrativeA

It is possible that China’s activities are the unintended consequence of successive ChineseGovernment’saspirationalpoliciesandhawkishpropaganda.AspirationalpoliciesincludeChina’sclaimsovertheSCSthatweredrawnupintheearly20thcentury.WhencombinedwithdecadesofCCPpropaganda, theresulthasbeena radicalisedChinesepublic, statebureaucracyandPLAthatdemandhard-lineactionsbytheChineseGovernment.

5.1.2Analysis:A

Narrative A explains the Chinese Government’s assertive approach to resolving its maritimedisputes. It also explains the PLA’s military modernisation and covert technology acquisitionprograms,sincesuchactivitiesarerequiredtoenabletheChineseGovernment’sabilitytodeliverresultsinlinewithChinesepublicsentiment.

However,NarrativeAdoesnotexplainwhytheChineseGovernmenthasnotmadeanypublicorsubtle measures to de-escalate tensions. Measures could have included a reduction ofinflammatorylanguageandconceptsinChinesehistorytextbooksandamoderationof languageusedbytheChinesestate-media,statebureaucracyandPLA. Additionally,NarrativeAdoesnotexplain why the Chinese Government has escalated regional tensions through its activities,includingtheconstructionofartificialislandsintheSCSoritsunilateraldeclarationofanADIZovertheECS.

Infact,theChineseGovernmenthashadmanyopportunitiestobeginthegenerationalprocessofdeescalatingtensions,butinsteadhaspersistedinescalatingtensions.ThisstronglysuggeststhatNarrativeAisnomorethanapartialexplanationfortheChineseGovernment’sexternalactivities.


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5.2NarrativeB:Status&Opportunism

5.2.1Narrative:B

TheChineseGovernmenthassetitsobjectivesonregainingChina’sstatusastheprincipalleaderinAsia.ItisalsopossiblethattheChineseGovernmenthasassessedthatUSPresidentObamaisreluctanttoauthorisemilitaryoperationstodirectlyconfrontChinaintheSCSorECS.Asaresult,theChineseGovernmenthasassessedthatithasarelativelyshortwindowofopportunity,beforethe2016USPresidentialElections,toadvanceChina’sclaimsovertheECSandSCS,thuselevatingChina’s status in Asia. Themethodology of choice for China’s expansionist activities is ‘salami-slicing’; to advance China’s interests through systematic activities that are unlikely to trigger amilitaryresponsefromtheUSanditsAllies.349

5.2.2Analysis:B

NarrativeBexplainstheChineseGovernment’sterritorialandpropagandaactivities,astheyhelpsustaintheChinesepublic’sdemandforanexpansionofChinesesovereignty.ThePLA’smilitarymodernisationcanbeexplainedbyaperceivedneedtoreinforceChina’sassertiveactivitiesintheSCS and ECS with robust military capabilities, thus deterring intervention by external powers.Furthermore, the Chinese Government’s drive to surreptitiously acquire advanced foreigntechnologysupportsNarrativeB,inthatsuchtechnologiesarerequiredtosustainthePLA’srapidmilitarymodernisation.

However,therangeofChina’sconventionalDF-21DASBM(1500+km)andDF-26IRBM(3000+km)ordnance, aswell as its first and second islandchainA2/ADstrategy, suggests that theChineseGovernmentisaimingformuchmorethanstatusrecognition.NoticethattheDF-26IRBMcouldbeadaptedintoanASBM,sincethePLAclaimstohavealreadydevelopedthistechnologyfortheDF-21D.AcredibleASBMwitharangeof3000+kilometreswouldallowtheChineseGovernmentto threaten shipping deep into theWestern Pacific and potentially isolate all of Asia from theUnited States. If true, this would suggest that the Chinese Government is aiming for regionalhegemonyratherthanstatusastheprincipalleaderofAsia.

Thatsaid, it isalsopossible that theChineseGovernmentviews itsextensiveA2/ADdeep-strikecapabilitiesaspivotaltoregainingChina’sstatusastheleaderofAsia,byisolatingitsneighboursfromtheUnitedStatesandforcingthemtoacceptChineseregionalleadership.


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5.3NarrativeC:Hegemony

5.3.1Narrative:C

It ispossiblethattheChineseGovernment isahegemonicpower inthemaking,andhasalwaysintendedonevictingtheUnitedStatesfromtheWesternPacific,soastomilitarilydominateAsia.FormerChinese leaderDengXiaopingoncesaid“standfirmly,hideourcapabilitiesandbideourtime”.350Additionally, the2010USQuadrennialDefenseReviewstated: “Chinahas sharedonlylimited information about the pace, scope, and ultimate aims of its military modernizationprograms, raisinganumberof legitimatequestionsregarding its long- term intentions”.351Bothstatements,butthestatementbyDengXiaopinginparticular,implythattheChineseGovernmenthasengagedinamulti-decadestrategicplantobecometheprincipalhegemonicpowerinAsia.

5.3.2Analysis:C

Interestinglyenough,thestatementbyDengXiaoping,“standfirmly,hideourcapabilitiesandbideour time” appears to accurately reflect China’s activities. Between 1960 and1996 theChineseGovernmentengagedinfairlyaggressiveactivitieswithitsneighbours.Ineachcase,theChineseGovernment and PLA concealed their intent to engage in hostile military operations throughextensive deception. 352 This deception was highly successful and in all cases the ChineseGovernment’sintendedvictimswerecaughtentirelybysurprise.353

• 1962ChinadeployedPLAforcestoinvadethesovereignterritoryofIndia354

• 1969ChinadeployedPLAforcestoinvadethesovereignterritoryoftheSovietUnion355

• 1979ChinadeployedPLAforcestoinvadethesovereignterritoryofVietnam356

• 1995ChinadeployedPLAforcesforamphibiousexercisesandlivemissilefiringstocoerceandintimidatetheTaiwanesepublicinthelead-uptothe1996TaiwanesePresidentialElection.357

The 1995-1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis culminated with the deployment of two US Navy aircraftcarrierstrikegroupstotheTaiwanStrait.358Althoughthecrisisendedwithoutfurtherescalation,the Chinese Government learnt that it would need to prevent US forces from intervening if itwantedtopursueanyofitsmorecontentiousstrategicambitions.359Forthenext5-10yearstheChinese Government significantly reduced tensionswith its neighbours. However, by themid-2000sthePLAhadmadesignificantheadwaytowardsmodernizing itsservicebranches,andtheChineseGovernment began to reassert its strategic interests inAsia, particularly overmaritimedisputes in theSCSandECS (seeTables2&3). TheChineseGovernment’shistoryofbehaviorindicatesastrongcorrelationbetweenitsassertivenessandthestrengthofthePLA.Inturn,thisimpliesthatasthePLAbecomesmorepowerfulandcapableinfuturedecades,thattheChineseGovernmentislikelytobecomeincreasinglyassertive.

ItisalsoimportanttonotethatalloftheChineseGovernment’sexternalactivities,frommaritimedisputes topropaganda,canbe fullyexplainedby theChineseGovernmentplanning tobecomethesolehegemoninAsia(NarrativeC).


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5.4NarrativeD:MissionCreep

5.4.1Narrative:D

It is also possible that the Chinese Government and its multi-decade strategic ambitions haveevolvedovertimetoreflectChina’sgrowingeconomicandmilitarypower. Indeed,theChineseGovernmentcouldhave initiallybeenthevictimof itsownnationalistpropaganda,withvariousdomesticpressures forcing it to takehard-linepositions. Whencombinedwith theopportunitypresented by the potential perceived weakness of the Obama Administration, and a deeply-entrencheddesireforChinatoregainitsstatusastheprincipalleaderofAsia,theresulthasbeenseveralyearsofaggressiveactivitiesbytheChineseGovernment.Inturn,thishasgivenChinatheappearanceofitasahegemonicpowerinthemaking.

5.4.2Analysis:D

Notice that Narrative D, accounts for Narratives A, B and C, making it by far the mostcomprehensiveexplanationoftheChineseGovernment’sexternalactivities.


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5.5AssessmentsofNarratives

Narrative’s A and B only provide a partial explanation for the Chinese Government’s externalactivities. In contrast,Narrative’s C andD are able to explain all of the ChineseGovernment’sexternalactivities.ThedifferenceisthatNarrativeCassumesthatregionalhegemonywasalwaystheChineseGovernment’sstrategicambition,whereasNarrativeDexplainsChina’sapparentdrivetowardsregionalhegemonyasanevolutionoftheChineseGovernment’sstrategicambitions.

A regional armed conflict between China and theUnited States, aswould likely be required toattainregionalhegemony,wouldinflictimmenseharmontheglobaleconomyandriskescalationintoamajorpowernuclearconfrontation.TheChineseGovernmentisawareofthis,asevidencedby its ‘salami slicing’ strategy that is designed to advance its interestswhile avoiding amilitaryresponsefromtheUnitedStatesanditsAllies.360

ItisassessedwithhighconfidencethatNarrativesCandDprovidethemostaccurateexplanationsfor theChineseGovernment’sstrategicambitions. Whichevernarrative is true, itwouldappearthatwithoutsignificantremedialaction,aregionalarmedconflictbetweenChinaandtheUnitedStatesplusitsAlliesgrowsincreasinglylikely.


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CONCLUDINGASSESSMENTS

TheChineseGovernmenthasunresolvedmaritimedisputeswithitsrespectiveneighboursintheSCS, ECS and Yellow Sea. All of China’s maritime claims are ambit and breach China’s legalentitlementsunderinternationallaw.TheChineseGovernmentstubbornlyrefusestoparticipatein meaningful diplomatic negotiations or compromise, as would be necessary for diplomaticnegotiationstodeliversignificantandlastingresults. IndeedtheChineseGovernmentcontinuestoassertunreasonabledemandslike“indisputablesovereignty”.ItisthereforeassessedthattheChinese Government has no intention of diplomatically resolving its maritime disputes in anequitablemanner,butratherintendstoleverageitseconomicandmilitaryresourcestoforcerivalclaimantstoacceptChinesedemands.

TheChineseGovernmentisengagedinfourprincipaltypesofexternalactivities:regionalmaritimedisputes, military modernisation programs, covert technology acquisitions and propaganda.AcrossallfouractivitiestheChineseGovernmenthasdemonstrated:itiswillingtodisregardlong-standinginternationallawsandbehaviouralnorms,itiswillingtousearmedforce,itisnotwillingtocompromise,itappearstobeactivelypreparingforamajorwaranditiswillingtojustifyallitscontroversial activities with propaganda. Based on these observations it is assessed withmoderate to high confidence that China will be involved in a future regional conflict with theUnitedStatesanditsAllies.

In terms of the factors driving the Chinese Government’s external activities, this paper hasassessedfourpossiblenarratives:

• NarrativeA–UnintendedConsequences:China’sexternalactivitiesaretheunintendedconsequenceofCCPpropagandaandaspirationalChineseGovernmentpolicies.

• NarrativeB–StatusandOpportunism:China’sexternalactivitiesaretheresultoftheChineseGovernment’sopportunisticattempttoreacquireChina’sstatusastheprincipalleaderofAsia.

• NarrativeC–Hegemony:China’sexternalactivitiesareintendedtodeliverregionalhegemonytotheChineseGovernment

• NarrativeD–MissionCreep:China’sexternalactivitiesaretheresultofprogressiveevolutionsintheChineseGovernment’sstrategicambitions,asChina’seconomicandmilitarypowerhasgrown

TheproblemwithNarrativesAandBisthattheyareunabletofullyaccountforalloftheChineseGovernment’sexternal activities. Conversely,NarrativesCandDaccount for all of theChineseGovernment’s external activities. It is assessed with high confidence that Narratives C or DrepresentthetruestrategicambitionsoftheChineseGovernment.


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ENDNOTES

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