china disadvantage supplement - hss 2013

8/13/2019 China Disadvantage Supplement - HSS 2013

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Increase in US influence in Latin America directly trades off with ChineseinfluenceEllis 12Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with external actors, includingChina, Russia, and Iran. holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics. May 2012- TheInter-American Dialogue - ―The United States, ¶ Latin America and China: ¶ A ―Triangular Relationship‖?‖http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf

At the political level, US engagement with Latin American ¶ countries has impacted the ability of thePRC to develop ¶ military and other ties in the region. Although journalistic ¶ and academic accounts oftensuggest that the 19th century ¶ Monroe Doctrine continues to be pursued by contemporary ¶ US policymakers, with a presumeddesire to ―keep China out‖ ¶ of the region,26 official US policy has repeatedly met Chinese ¶ initiatives in the hemisphere with a

cautiously welcoming tone.27 Nonetheless, Latin America‘s own leadership has ¶ responded to Chineseinitiatives with a view of how engagement with China could damage its relationship withthe United ¶ States. Colombia‘s close relationship with the United States , for ¶ example, madethe military leadership of the country reluctant ¶ to procure major military items from thePRC.28¶ The same logic has also applied to countries such as ¶ Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia, for whom embracing the ¶ PRC

politically and economically signaled displeasure with ¶ the United States. The degree to which a ―bad‖relationship ¶ with the United States has propelled a ―positive‖ relationship with China

has increasingly gone beyond symbolism. The desire of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez to ¶ diversifyaway from Venezuelan dependence on the United ¶ States as the nation‘s primary oil export market, for example, opened the door

for massive loan-backed Chinese ¶ construction projects, the purchase of Chinese commercial goods and greatly expandedparticipation by Chinese ¶ oil companies.29 US refusal to sell F-16 fighter aircraft and ¶ components to Venezuela in 2006 promptedVenezuela to ¶ engage with China, and other countries, to procure military ¶ hardware. Similarly, Bolivia purchased Chinese K-8safter ¶ the United States blocked it from acquiring a comparable ¶ aircraft from the Czech Republic.30

China‘s influence in Latin America is key to their soft power Malik, 06 – PhD in International Relations (Mohan, "China's Growing Involvement in Latin America," 6/12,http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/[email protected])

China's forays into Latin America are part of its grand strategy to acquire"comprehensive national power " to become a "global great power that is second to none." Aiming to secure access

to the continent's vast natural resources and markets, China is forging deep economic, political and military tieswith most of the Latin American and Caribbean countries. There is more to China's LatinAmerican activism than just fuel for an economic juggernaut. China now provides amajor source of leverage against the United States for some Latin American and Caribbean

countries. As in many other parts of the developing world, China is redrawing geopolitical alliances inways that help propel China's rise as a global superpower . Beijing's courtship of Latin Americancountries to support its plan to subdue Taiwan and enlist them to join a countervailing coalition against U.S. global power under therubric of strengthening economic interdependence and globalization has begun to attract attention in Washington. Nonetheless,Beijing's relations with the region are neither too cozy nor frictionless. For Latin America and the Caribbean countries, China is anenviable competitor and rival, potential investor, customer, economic partner, a great power friend and counterweight to the UnitedStates, and, above all, a global power, much like the United States, that needs to be handled with care. As in Asia and Africa,

China is rapidly expanding its economic and diplomatic presence in Latin America -- a

region the United States has long considered inside its sphere of influence. China's interest in Latin America is

http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/[email protected]

http://uyghuramerican.org/old/articles/300/1/[email protected]



driven by its desire to secure reliable sources of energy and raw materials for itscontinued economic expansion, compete with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition, pursuedefense and intelligence opportunities to define limits to U.S. power in its own backyard,and to showcase China's emergence as a truly global great power at par with the UnitedStates. In Latin America, China is viewed differently in different countries. Some Latin American countries see China's staggeringeconomic development as a panacea or bonanza (Argentina, Peru, and Chile view China as an insatiable buyer of commodities and

an engine of their economic growth); others see it as a threat (Mexico, Brazil, and the Central American republics fear losing jobsand investment); and a third group of countries consider China their ideological ally (Bolivia, Cuba, and Venezuela). While China'sgrowing presence and interests have changed the regional dynamics, it still cannot replace the United States as a primarybenefactor of Latin America. Chinese investment in the region is US$8 billion, compared with $300 billion by U.S. companies, andU.S.-Latin America trade is ten times greater than China-Latin America trade. Nonetheless, China is the new kid on the block that

everyone wants to be friendly with, and Beijing cannot resist the temptation to exploit resentment ofWashington's domineering presence in the region to its own advantage. For Washington,China's forays into the region have significant political, security and economicimplications because Beijing's grand strategy has made Latin America and Africa a frontline

in its pursuit of global influence . China's Grand Strategy: Placing Latin America in the Proper Context China's

activities in Latin America are part and parcel of its long-term grand strategy. The key elements of Beijing's grand strategy can beidentified as follows: Focus on "comprehensive national power" essential to achieving the status of a "global great power that issecond to none" by 2049; Seek energy security and gain access to natural resources, raw materials and overseas markets tosustain China's economic expansion; Pursue the "three Ms": military build-up (including military presence along the vital sea lanes of

communication and maritime chokepoints), multilateralism, and multipolarity so as to counter the containment of China's regionaland global aspirations by the United States and its friends and allies; Build a network of Beijing's friends andallies through China's "soft power" and diplomatic charm offensive, trade and economicdependencies via closer economic integration (free trade agreements), and mutual security pacts, intelligencecooperation and arms sales.

Chinese international influence is an existential impact – it controls everyscenario for extinctionZhang 2012 (Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. ―The Rise of China‘s Political

Softpower ‖ 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content_26421330.htm)

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be

attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties,including widespread poverty , international conflict , the clash of civilizations and

environmental protection . Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisivelyaddress these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progressin conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated globaleconomic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resourcesin developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in

poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. Incontrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfairinternational order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. Thisextensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace

In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has produced a

more turbulent world, as the increased risk of terrorism threatens global security . Incontrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinesesystem argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both thesymptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Westerncountries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizationscoexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard

University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for"being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and



learn from each other . This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's alsothe reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance inregards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their peopleare the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for theemission of greenhouse gases . Although Europeans and Americans have a strongawareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagantlifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but someeffective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model

The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with theabove four issues grows as China becomes stronger . China's experiences in eliminating poverty,prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight andsense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new

trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political softpower , which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developingcountries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continueto surprise the world.



Uniqueness



Cuba



General Influence

China is working closely with Cuba now- just met with Cuba‘s VP Xinhuanet 6/18/13 Sponsored by the Xinhua News Agency, Xinhuanet is an important central news service-oriented website, an important information organ of the central government, and an important platform for building upChina's online international communication capacity. ―Chinese President meets Cuban VP on strongerties‖http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/19/c_124874409.htm- SJH

BEIJING, June 18 (Xinhua) -- Chinese President Xi Jinping on Tuesday met with Miguel Diaz-Canel, Cuban firstvice-president of the councils of state and ministers. Xi asked Diaz-Canel to convey his greetings to Cuban President Raul

Castro and former leader Fidel Castro. Xi reviewed the growth of China-Cuba relations since the twocountries forged diplomatic relations in 1960, particularly the increasingly maturerelations and robust cooperation since the beginning of the 21st century. TheCommunist Party of China (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish its friendship withCuba. It would like to maintain bilateral high-level exchange of visits, increase party-to-party exchange and experience sharing on state governance, enhance political trust,deepen mutual understanding, expand pragmatic cooperation and promote their own

development and common prosperity, Xi said. China would like to work more closely withCuba on international and regional issues and promote fairness and justice of theinternational community, Xi said. Xi said he witnessed vigor and potential of the Latin America and Caribbean region

during his visit earlier this month. China would like a good partnership with Latin American andCaribbean countries, featuring political trust, economic cooperation and cultural mutuallearning, Xi said. The Chinese leader called for stronger cooperation between China and Latin America through a

comprehensive cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum at the core. China appreciatesCuba's efforts to promoting China-Latin America relations and expects growth ofrelations during Cuba's role as the rotating chair of Community of Latin American andCaribbean states. Diaz-Canel conveyed the greetings of Cuban President Raul Castro and former leader Fidel Castro to Xi.

Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importance on building ties with China, pledging toenhance high-level visits and communication, expand mutually-beneficial cooperation

and seek growth of ties between the two countries and relations between China and LatinAmerica. Diaz-Canel will conclude his three-day China visit on Wednesday.

China is beating out US for Cuban influenceBoston Globe 13 (―Cuba‘s reforms pave way for new US policy, too.‖ Bostonglobe.com 9 February 13. Web.)

http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2013/02/09/cuba-reform-create-opportunity-drag-policy-into-century/xER2NTTXGsxdLej0miHwFM/story.html

Direct relations would also further US national security and environmental interests; asCuba opens up, other countries will sweep in to seek influence, as China has alreadydone. Especially as Cuba increasingly promotes offshore drilling and other maritime exploration, the UnitedStates must improve communication with Havana. Currently, even though the United Statesand Cuba are separated by a narrow channel, the two countries have no bilateral

communications to ensure safety standards for their mutual protection from oil spills.

China maintains high influence in the squoMFA 6/18/13 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA orMFA) of the Government of the People's Republic of China is an executive agency responsible for foreign relationsbetween the People's Republic of China and other countries in the world ―President Xi Jinping Meets with MiguelDiaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and First Vice President of the Council of Ministersof the Republic of Cuba, Stressing to Push China-Cuba, China-Latin America Relations for Greater Development‖http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1051842.shtml) SJH



http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1051842.shtml

http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1051842.shtml





On June 18, 2013, President Xi Jinping met with Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, First Vice President of the Council of State and FirstVice President of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, at the Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping asked Diaz-Canel to

convey his sincere greetings to President Raul Castro of Cuba and Fidel Castro. Xi Jinping said that China and Cuba havealways understood and supported each other since the establishment of diplomaticrelationship. In the new century, the China-Cuba relationship has been increasinglymature with more content of cooperation and strong vitality. The Communist Party ofChina (CPC) and the Chinese government cherish the traditional friendship with Cubaand is willing to work with the Cuban side to maintain high-level exchanges, tostrengthen party-to-party exchanges and to share the experiences of state governance,to enhance political mutual trust, to build up consensus, to deepen mutualunderstanding, to expand practical cooperation and to boost development and commonprosperity in the two countries. China is willing to coordinate and cooperate closely with Cuba on international andregional affairs and to make positive contributions to enhancing the influence of developing countries and promoting fairness and

justice of the international community. Xi Jinping said, I paid a visit recently to three Latin American and Caribbean countries. I was

deeply impressed by the vigour and potential of development of the Latin American and Caribbean region. China is ready tobe a good partner of Latin American and Caribbean countries, with political mutualrespect and trust, complementary and mutual benefit in economy and trade, andexchanges in culture. China is willing to work with Latin American and Caribbean countries to establish an overall China-Latin America cooperation mechanism with China-Latin American Cooperation Forum as the core to push forward mutuallybeneficial and friendly cooperation between China and Latin America at a higher level. China appreciates the positive efforts ofCuba to promote the overall China-Latin America cooperation and is looking forward to greater development of China-Latin Americarelations while Cuba holding the rotating presidency of Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Diaz-Canel conveyed

the greetings of President Raul Castro and Fidel Castro to Xi Jinping. Diaz-Canel said Cuba places great importanceon Cuba-China relations and is willing to work with China to strengthen high-level visitsand communication, to expand friendly and mutually-beneficial cooperation and to pushfor greater development of relationship between the two countries and relations betweenChina and Latin America.



Trade Influence

Cuba and China deepening trade tiesHavanaTimes 12 (―Cuba and China strengthening trade relations.‖ HavanaTimes.com. 27 September 2012. Web.)

The 25th Meeting of the Cuba-China Intergovernmental Commission on Economic and Trade Relations took placeyesterday in Havana, where both countries expressed their willingness to deepen ties. Accordingto the Prensa Latina news agency, talks gave priority to issues such as the provision of spareparts for automotive equipment on the island, as well as China‘s participation in theisland‘s program for the development of renewable energy. On the Chinese side, CommerceMinister Chen Deming said that sugar, nickel and biotechnology are the main items exported to his country fromCuba. Cuban President Raul Castro visited the Asian giant this past July, at which timeimportant agreements were signed in the areas of health, information technology,banking, agriculture and customs. At the end of the first half of this year, trade between the twocountries exceeded $870 million, making China the second largest trading partnerglobally with the Island for the eighth consecutive year .

China building Cuban merchant fleet in the squo- boosts influenceCAN 7/11/13 ( Cuban News Agency This page offers users news social, economic, political, sports and culturaldevelopments that take place in Cuba and in third world nations) ‗Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier‖http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/0711Ninth%20Chinese.htm-SJH

Cuba Receives Ninth Chinese Bulk Carrier HAVANA, Cuba, July 11 (acn) Cuba received in the Chinese city ofShanghai the ninth of 10 bulk carriers as part of a contract with the shipyards of thatAsian port to develop the island‘s merchant fleet. Cuban News Agency Gertrudis is the name of the boat,which was received by Cuban authorities during a ceremony at the shipyard located on Conngming Island, in Shanghai. Executiveswith China‘s National Machinery Import and Export Corporation and with the Trade Minister attended the ceremony. Cuba‘scommercial attaché in China, Tania Velazquez, was present at the shipyard along representatives of the ACEMEX Company,

engineers and technicians, who supervised the construction of boat. Shanghai shipyard president Ma Shixiongdescribed as fruitful the current collaboration between China and Cuba and he stressedhis company‘s commitment to keep strengthening such links, which were established 50years ago at the diplomatic level. Tania Velazquez recalled the historic friendly andcooperation relations between Beijing and Havana and she noted that the construction of these boats is the

result of those bonds. Sources with the Cuban embassy in China stressed the strategicimportance of these boats for Cuba, and the current bilateral economic and commercialrelations.

China is boosting Cuban influence in the squo- just supplied them withtech. infrastructureNelson 7-13 , Ana, who teaches New Media and Development Communication at Columbia's School ofInternational and Public Affairs ―China influence in Cuba‖ http://laredcuana.blogspot.com/ SJH

Jennifer Hernandez of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at theUniversity of Miami has posted a note on her research on Chinese TechnologyCompanies in Cuba. She notes that "through bilateral trade agreements, China has beenexpanding its sphere of influence," and looks at the activities of two large Chinesetelecommunication equipment companies, Huawei and ZTE. Much of her emphasis is on surveillance and she

concludes that "China‘s transfer of technology to Cuba does not necessarily benefit Cubans. Instead China seems to beequipping the island‘s information technology infrastructure with systems that can potentially spy onCubans." Internet surveilance is pretty well taken for granted in Cuba and China, and it is deplorable, but I wonder about the upside.

http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/0711Ninth%20Chinese.htm-

http://laredcuana.blogspot.com/



http://www.cubanews.ain.cu/2013/0711Ninth%20Chinese.htm-



Chinese control of telecommunications in Cuba grants regional influenceand espionage opportunitiesHernandez, 13 (Jennifer, research Assistant at the Institute for Cuban & Cuban-American Studies, Universityof Miami, ―Chinese Technology Companies in Cuba,‖ Cuba Transition Project, Issue 186, March 13, 2013, online,

http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm, accessed 7/16/13) PE Both Chinese companies have commercial presence in Cuba and actively participate inconferences organized by the Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC). Among these conferences are theXIV Edition of ―Converging Technologies: Integration and Independence‖ held in Havana in 2011, where Huawei was

one of the sponsors, and the V International Symposium of Telecommunications, where both Huawei and ZTECorporation actively participated. (10) Ramiro Valdes, Cuba‘s Vice-President, Communist party member and formerMinister of Information and Communication, position he held until 2011, is an avid supporter of restriction andcensorship of information technologies. It is not a coincidence that Ramiro Valdes promotes thecommercialization and application of Chinese software and equipment that can be used to

monitor and be remotely accessed. Cuba and China have been two amorous friends since the 1960‘swhen Cuba became the first country in the Caribbean and Latin America to normalize relations with the Asian nation.Since that time, both countries have promoted communist ideology and have cooperated and coordinated with eachother at multilateral organizations and on the issue of human rights. China‘s transfer of technology to Cuba does notnecessarily benefit Cubans. Instead China seems to be equipping the island‘s information technology infrastructurewith systems that can potentially spy on Cubans. Perhaps, the People‘s Republic of China is also equipping an

anti-American leadership with sophisticated communication and network technology capable ofcyber espionage 90 miles from our shores.

http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue186.htm




US Losing Influence

US influence in Cuba is decreasingLlana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City forseven years. Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan―50 Years after

Cuba Missile Crisis, US Influence in Hemisphere is Waning.‖ Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.)http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning

It was not only the containment of communism that drove US attempts to oust FidelCastro from the helm of Cuba in the early 1960s, says Mr. Brenner. The US was alsoconcerned about Latin American countries emulating Cuba, particularly its geopoliticalstance in the cold war, and thus undermining American leadership in the WesternHemisphere. Some 50 years later, the US faces the same situation, just a more moderniteration. ―What the US feared the most in 1962 has come to pass,‖ says Brenner, who wrote "Sad and Luminous

Days: Cuba's Struggle with the Superpowers after the Missile Crisis." ―We were concerned about oursphere of influence that we had taken for granted.… [Today] we cannot dominate thisregion anymore. They do not look to us for leadership. Countries look within the region,and to some extent to Cuba still.‖

US is losing Cuban influence to ChinaLlana 12 (Sara Miller Llana, European Bureau Chief for Christian Science Monitor, covered Latin America in Mexico City forseven years. Masters in journalism from Columbia University and a BA in history from the University of Michigan―50 Years afterCuba Missile Crisis, US Influence in Hemisphere is Waning.‖ Christian Science Monitor 14 October 2012. Web.)http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning

After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the US turned its attention from Latin America as itfocused on terrorism and threats from the Middle East. At the same time, over the pastdecade Latin American democracy has flourished and the global economy shifted, withLatin America no longer looking just north to the US for leadership and investment, butto India, China, and Russia. China surpassed the US as Brazil‘s biggest trading partner in 2009.

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning

http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/2012/1014/50-years-after-Cuba-missile-crisis-US-influence-in-hemisphere-waning



Cuba/U.S. Relations Low

Cuba/U.S. Relations are low – history of isolation, Alan Gross incident, anddiscontent with Obama

Hanson and Lee, 13 (director of policy and outreach at One Acre Fund and Senior Production Editor on theCouncil on Foreign Relations, ―U.S.-Cuba Relations,‖ January 31, 2013, Online, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113, accessed 7/16/13) PEWhat is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations?¶ They are virtually nonexistent. There is a U.S. mission in

Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government. Since 1961, the officialU.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged: economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. TheGeorge W. Bush administration strongly enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans withimmediate family in Cuba could visit once every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances toCuba were reduced from $3,000 to just $300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of thesepolicies. He went further in 2011 to undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowingU.S. citizens to send remittances to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religiouspurposes.¶ Congress amended the trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States toCuba. In 2008, U.S. companies exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the islandnation, according to the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in

2012. Total agricultural exports since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, andTexas have all brokered agricultural deals with Cuba in recent years.¶ Tension between Cuba and theUnited States flared in December 2009 with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor whotraveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange Internet access for its Jewish community.Cuban authorities alleged Gross was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAID-sponsored"democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently sentenced to fifteen years in prison. ¶ Despite initial

optimism over Obama's election, Cuban politicians and citizens are less hopeful of apositive relationship developing between the two countries. Raúl and Fidel Castro have bothcriticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Raúl Castroaccused the United States of "givingnew breath to open and undercover subversion against Cuba."

http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113



http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103030021


http://www.reuters.com/article/internalReutersGenNews/idUSTRE51A8GL20090211

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/02/22/cuba-usa-food-idUSN1E81L00S20120222



http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/world/americas/31cuba.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1%20%20%28

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iAmsicW8N2RLyDMGseghZNrEpiNgD9CNDPIO0

http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5iAmsicW8N2RLyDMGseghZNrEpiNgD9CNDPIO0

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/world/americas/31cuba.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1%20%20%28




http://www.reuters.com/article/internalReutersGenNews/idUSTRE51A8GL20090211







A2: Cuba is Independent

Cuba can be controlled, but only by China – multiple political weaknessesWerlau, 96 (New Jersey –based consultant and executive director of the nonprofit Cuba Archive, ―FOREIGN

INVESTMENT IN CUBA: THE LIMITS OF COMMERCIAL ENGAGEMENT,‖ page 493 -194, ASCE Cuba, Online,http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf, accessed 7/17/13) PE

Because in Cuba power is strongly centralized and forcefully exercised, and decision-making is very

vertical, market forces, which operate spontaneously and in a decentralized manner, are inherentlyconstrained. This negates the main theoretical argument for engagement and renders itessentially flawed at the core. Foreign investment in Cuba is, in essence, hostage to the prevailing dialectic. A recent analysis onChina concludes that economic engagement has also failed to bring about political moderation and a modicum of pluralism therebecause the three elements that would foster reform—the rule of law, political accountability and a free press—challenge the

security of the regime and are, thus, banned. A prominent scholar on Asia declares: ―If China is permitted to merely pickand choose which aspects of integration it finds palatable, and to resist those that push change in the

direction of moderation and plualism, them the time scale required by economic engagement will stretch towardinfinity.‖229 The same selective approach to capitalist mechanisms is the one applied by the Cubanleadership, and it has been effective. A systematically repressive apparatus appears to have tremendous impact

on the feasibility and timing of political change regardless of economic reform. The Cuban people simply do not possess the meansto exercise self-determination. When the leadership is committed to survival at all costs, regimelegitimization is not the issue; the issue is capacity to exercise control. Because perception drives soft power, thenature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailingideology. The ―Bolivarian socialist‖ regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade againstWestern ―imperialism,‖ while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important

investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism.¶ The core of Chinese soft power inLatin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its

sustained high rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous businessopportunities in the future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally.

http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf

http://www.ascecuba.org/publications/proceedings/volume6/pdfs/57Werlau.fm.pdf



Mexico



General Influence

Chinese Influence Spreads to MexicoXinhua 13 ( ―The Encirclement Gathers Pace: China Enters Into a ―Strategic Partnership‖ With Mexico,‖

People's Daily Online, http://www.trevorloudon.com/2013/06/the-encirclement-gathers-pace-china-enters-into-a-strategic-partneship-with-mexico/).From the Communist Party of China website: MEXICO CITY – Chinese President Xi Jinping and hisMexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgrade the bilateralrelationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived in Mexico City

earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to ahigher level, and held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidentsagreed that strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves thefundamental interests of the two countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity andcooperation among developing countries. Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realisticrequirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the

Mexico-China ties indicates that bilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work withChina to constantly improve cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common

development, he said. The two heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic

partnership by working jointly in the following four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view theirrelations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improve political mutual trust.

The two countries will accommodate each other‘s concerns, and show mutual understanding andsupport on issues concerning each other‘s core interests . China and Mexico will maintainexchanges between high-level leaders, political parties and legislatures, give full play tothe existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on eachother‘s development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperationin accordance with their development strategies, and agree to increase mutualinvestment in key areas such as energy, mining, infrastructure and high technology. In

order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports from Mexico, whileMexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable

conditions for Chinese investors. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich culturaltraditions, China and Mexico will improve cultural exchanges. Both countries willencourage more exchanges between art troupes, promote tourism and strengthencommunication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build aChinese cultural center in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, andMexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as well. Fourthly, China and Mexicowill improve multilateral coordination based on their common interests andresponsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain closecommunication and coordination on global economic governance, energy security, foodsafety and climate change. They will help developing countries gain a bigger voice in the international community, and

safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developing nations. China and Mexico support theestablishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperation

between China and Latin America at a higher level. After their talks, Xi and Pena Nieto signed a jointstatement between the two countries, witnessed the signing of a host of agreements and jointly met the press. Pena Nieto said atthe ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations.

As two emerging powers, Mexico and China are each other‘s important strategic cooperativepartners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side toachieve common development, the Mexican president said. China is ready to work with Mexico toconstantly enrich the content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutuallybeneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xi said



his visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhance friendship. ―I believe with our joint efforts,

China-Mexico relations will enter a new stage,‖ he said.

China and Mexico are upgrading relations nowXinhua 13 (Xinhua News Agency is the official press agency of the People's Republic of China and the biggest

center for collecting information and press conferences in China. ―China, Mexico upgrade bilateral relationship‖, June5, 2013, http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-06/05/content_29033628.htm)

Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Pena Nieto Tuesday announced to upgradethe bilateral relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The Chinese president arrived inMexico City earlier in the day for a three-day state visit aimed at lifting the China-Mexico strategic partnership to a higher level, and

held talks with Pena Nieto on bilateral cooperation. During the talks, the two presidents agreed that

strengthening the China-Mexico long-term friendly cooperation serves the fundamental interests of the two

countries and two peoples, and helps promote unity and cooperation among developing countries.Xi said the decision to upgrade the bilateral relationship is a realistic requirement, and it also sets a clear target for the development

of bilateral relations. Pena Nieto, for his part, said the upgrade of the Mexico-China ties indicates thatbilateral cooperation has entered a new stage. The Mexican side is ready to work with China to constantlyimprove cooperation at higher levels and through more effective mechanisms so as to achieve common development, he said. Thetwo heads of state agreed to push forward the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership by working jointly in the following

four aspects. Firstly, the two sides will view their relations from a strategic and long-term perspective and improvepolitical mutual trust. The two countries will accommodate each other's concerns, and show mutual understanding andsupport on issues concerning each other's core interests. China and Mexico will maintain exchanges between high-level leaders,political parties and legislatures, give full play to the existing consultation and dialogue mechanisms, and improve coordination on

each other's development strategies. Secondly, the two sides will improve practical cooperation in accordance with their

development strategies, and agree to increase mutual investment in key areas such as energy, mining,infrastructure and high technology. In order to promote trade balance, China supports the increase of imports fromMexico, while Mexico welcomes Chinese enterprises to invest here and promises to create favorable conditions for Chineseinvestors. The two countries will also maintain exchanges and learn from each other in such areas as poverty reduction,

environmental protection and urbanization. Thirdly, as two major countries with rich cultural traditions, China and Mexicowill improve cultural exchanges. Both countries will encourage more exchanges between art troupes, promotetourism and strengthen communication among students, academics, journalists and athletes. China will build a Chinese culturalcenter in Mexico City, the first in Latin America and the Caribbean, and Mexico will establish a Mexican cultural center in Beijing as

well. Fourthly, China and Mexico will improve multilateral coordination based on their common

interests and responsibilities on major international issues. The two countries will maintain close communication andcoordination on global economic governance, energy security, food safety and climate change. They will help developing countriesgain a bigger voice in the international community, and safeguard the common interests of the two countries and the developingnations. China and Mexico support the establishment of the China-Latin America forum and promote the overall cooperationbetween China and Latin America at a higher level.

Mexico wants closer trade ties to ChinaMallen 6-28 (Patricia Rey, covers Latin America for the Internation Business Times, former employee BBC

America in New York, La República in Lima, La2 TV in Madrid and the UN in Brussels, ―Latin America IncreasesRelations With China: What Does That Mean For the U.S.?,‖ 2013, International Business Times,http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981)

Even more significant was Xi‘s visit to Mexico. President Enrique Peña Nieto welcomed his

Chinese counterpart, whom he had visited in Beijing in April, and made his intentions clear: Mexico wantscloser trade relations with China, with whom it has a gap of $45 billion in export andimport -- an important development considering that Mexico is, for now, America'sbiggest trade partner in the world. Biden‘s visit was not as successful . His meeting in Trinidad and

Tobago was called ―brutal and tense‖ by Persad-Bissessar, and Colombian journalist Andrés Oppenheimerdeemed the trip a sympathy visit after Secretary John Kerry called Latin America―Washington‘s backyard‖ in a much-berated slip last April. While Biden had pleasant meetings in Rioand Bogotá, no agreements were signed during his trip.

http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-06/05/content_29033628.htm

http://www.china.org.cn/world/2013-06/05/content_29033628.htm



Economic Influence

China increased influence in Xi‘s recent tour – plus, economic relations arezero-sum

Funaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, ―Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin America,‖ Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-battles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PEChinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas toposition China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives inMexico Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto areexpected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but alsocompetitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy

strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinese goodsthat are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muñoz Armenta, political scienceprofessor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) indiplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal." When it comes to economicinfluence, China may be gaining the upper hand in Latin America.

China Is increasing influence in Mexico NowEconomist 6/13(Economist, The Economist is an English-language weekly news and international affairspublication owned by The Economist Newspaper Ltd. and edited in offices in London, t targets highly educatedreaders and claims an audience containing many influential executives and policy-makers. , ―Why has Chinasnubbed Cuba and Venezuela?‖http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3)SJH

Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama‘s ―pivot‖ to Asia by showing that China is developing its ownsphere of influence in America‘s backyard. China‘s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention

than its dealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a Chinaexpert at Mexico‘s National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean

were collectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investmentbetween 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China has provided

more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visitsto Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts in terms of the type ofeconomic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hooveredup the region‘s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials,particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with itsmanufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing,have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign directinvestment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports.

China Values Sino Influence in Mexico-Trying to improve themCastillo 13 (E. Eduardo, Spanish News Editor, ―Leaders of Mexico, China promise broadened relations, move

toward more balanced trade,‖ THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, JUNE 4, 2013,http://www.timescolonist.com/cmlink/gmg/canadian-press/business/leaders-of-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced-trade-1.312535/)

MEXICO CITY - The presidents of China and Mexico agreed Tuesday to broaden relationsbetween their countries and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market toimports of Mexican tequila and pork. After meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto

said they are transforming the relationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-battles-us-influence-latin-ame



http://www.timescolonist.com/cmlink/gmg/canadian-press/business/leaders-of-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced-trade-1.312535/








move toward balancing their trade, which now is heavily in favour of China. The leaders signed

a dozen memorandums of understanding and co-operation agreements in areas including energy, mining,education and infrastructure. "Today, we are giving way to a new relationship, a new phase of the relationship," Pena

Nieto said in a joint statement. Xi said China wanted better relations with Mexico, which he called"a great friend and a great partner in the Latin American region."

Sino-Mexican Trade Increasing due to spread of InfluenceFox News Latino 13 (―China's President Wants To Open The Floodgates Of Trade With Mexico,‖ FOX

News Network, LLC, June 02, 2013, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/china-president-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/#ixzz2ZKRH6wpO)

Beteta noted that China imports three-quarters of the oil it consumes. "China needs to guarantee oil for itscitizens' cars, but also obviously for its economy as a whole, which has a high energyintensity, and Mexico is an oil power ," he said. At the same time, Pena Nieto's government has said that it willsoon present an energy reform bill to allow greater national and international investment in its oil sector. It hasn't revealed the details

of the initiative, but Beteta said it "has awakened the appetite of many people." State oil company PetroleosMexicanos, or Pemex, already has taken small steps to increase its relationship withChina, which until recently had been minimal. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude that Pemex produces

a day, about 1.2 mill ion are exported. Energy ministry figures show that 75 percent of these exports go to the United States andabout 7 percent to the "Far East." It does not specify how much each specific country in that region receives. In April, duringPena Nieto's visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinesecompany, agreeing to ship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec. Mexico

may have other goods and investment opportunities to offer as well. "China is the principal consumer of coal,gas, oil, of secondary industries like cement, steel, concrete," said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of the

Center for Business with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. "Evidently (China) is looking tosatisfy their market needs."

Chinese-Mexican relations are increasing – new deal with PemexGlobalpost 13 (Globalpost, an online US news company that f ocuses on international news. ―Pemex and

Sinopec agree to boost Mexican oil exports to China‖, April 6, 2013,

http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/agencia-efe/130406/pemex-and-sinopec-agree-boost-mexican-oil-exports-china)

The Mexican oil company Pemex signed Saturday on the southern Chinese island of Hainan an accord with thesecond largest oil company of China, Sinopec, to strengthen trade relations between the two

firms and promote a larger volume of crude exports to the Asian giant, the second largest petroleum

importer in the world. The accord was signed by the director general of Pemex, Emilio Lozoya, and the president of the

XinXing Cathay International Group, a subsidiary of Sinopec, Sha Ming, in the presence of Mexican President

Enrique Peña Nieto. The pact marks the de facto opening of trade relations between the twogiants, something of particular interest to the world's second economy because of its need for alternative sources of supply.

The agreement was signed shortly after Peña Nieto met with the new president of China, XiJinping, during the Boao Forum on economic issues. The Mexican leader is one of the first Latin American heads of state tomeet with the new Chinese president, along with Peruvian President Ollanta Humala. The Boao Forum, an economic summit that

has been called the "Asian Davos," began its 2013 meeting Saturday in China with a marked Latin American character, thanks tothe presence as speakers of the presidents of Peru, Ollanta Humala, and of Mexico, Enrique Peña Nieto.

China is just beginning a strategic economic partner relationship withMexicoAssociated Press 6/4/2013 (Associated Press is a multi-national non-profit news agency, ―Leaders of

Mexico, China promise broadened relations, move toward more balanced trade‖, Associated Press,http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/04/leaders-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced/)

http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/money/2013/06/02/china-president-wants-to-open-floodgates-trade-with-mexico/#ixzz2ZKRH6wpO


http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/06/04/leaders-mexico-china-promise-broadened-relations-move-toward-more-balanced/








The presidents of China and Mexico have agreed to broaden relations between their countries

and expand trade ties, including opening the Chinese market to imports of Mexican tequila and pork. After

meeting privately, China's Xi Jinping and Mexico's Enrique Pena Nieto say they are transforming theirrelationship into a "strategic partnership" and taking steps to move toward balancingtheir trade, which now is heavily in favor of China. The leaders on Tuesday signed a dozen

memorandums of understanding and cooperation agreements in areas including energy,mining, education and infrastructure.

China expanding influence in Mexico - PEMEXReuters 13 (―The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America.‖ Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.)

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW

China has particular interest in Mexico, the region‘s second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with

Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with MexicoCity — investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reformsthat would open the oil industry to foreign investment. There are obstacles ahead. One irritation thatPresident Enrique Peña Nieto shared with Xi is that though Mexico posted a trade surplus with its global partners, it ran a big deficitwith China.

China expanding influence in MexicoUSA Today 13 (―President Xi uses trip to strengthen China‘s influence.‖ USA Today 6 June 2013. Web.)

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/ EW In Mexico, President Enrique Pena Nieto and business leaders met with Chinese delegatesto determine ways to reduce Mexico's large trade deficit while strengthening trade links.Mexican officials said while $57 billion of Mexico's imports — 15% — came from China last year, Mexico only exported $5.7 billion

— 1.5% — to China. "The bottom line is everybody is looking for export markets," said Chapman

University economist Esmael Adibi, director of the A. Gary Anderson Center for Economic Research in Orange, Calif. "They'reasking, 'Where are the markets that are not fully utilized?' and they're putting their effortsthere."

China and Mexico forming stronger trade ties – opens nation up to moreinfluence from ChinaNYT 13 (―Chinese President Makes Bridge-Building trip to Mexico.‖ New York Times 4 June 2013. Web.)

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0 EW

Analysts will be watching the trip closely for signs that Mexico and China are takingsteps toward changing their frosty relationship. Mexico‘s government would like tonarrow its large trade gap with China. Last year, Mexico imported $57 billion in goods from China and sent back

only $5.7 billion in products, according to Mexico‘s Ministry of Economy. The two countries announced a seriesof agreements late Tuesday covering energy, trade and education. ―We agree on the importance of

balancing our trade and investment relationship,‖ Mr. Peña Nieto said, noting promises from China to start by

accepting more tequila and pork imports.

China and Mexico trading raw materials now – builds influenceKnowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. ―China‘s President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking EconomicTies.‖ World Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html

Upon his arrival, Xi said that he wanted to help with Mexico‘s huge trade deficit . This means oil,which China needs to fuel its economy and the cars of its middle class. ―Access to strategic rawmaterials is key to understanding the dynamic of relations with China,‖ said Hugo Beteta, director for

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/world/americas/xi-makes-bridge-building-trip-to-mexico.html?_r=0

http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/06/06/presidential-china-summit-sunnylands/2397129/




Mexico and Central America of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean. ―Clearly there is aninterest by China in Mexican oil.‖ ―China is the principal consumer of coal, gas, oil, ofsecondary industries like cement, steel, concrete,‖ said Juan Carlos Rivera, director of Mexico‘s Center for Business

with Asia at the private Monterrey Technological Institute. ―Evidently (China) is looking to satisfy their marketneeds.‖

China‘s has influence in Mexico – PemexKnowland 13 (Don Knowland, writer for WSWS. ―China‘s President Visits Mexico and Central America Seeking EconomicTies.‖ World Socialist Website 10 June 2013. Web.) http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html Not coincidentally, Xi‘s visit to Mexico comes just as the Mexican government is bent onopening up the state oil company Petroleos Mexicanos, or Pemex, to private and foreigninvestment in order to stem decreasing production by funding deepwater drilling. Peña Nieto will soon present an energy

reform bill to the Mexican Congress allowing that. Of the roughly 2.5 million barrels of crude a day thatPemex presently produces, about 1.2 million are exported. Some 75 percent of those exports go to the

US, but only 7 percent to the Far East, including China. China is looking for much more. During Peña Nieto‘s April

visit to China, Pemex signed its first long-term contract with a Chinese company, agreeing toship 30,000 barrels a day to the state oil company Sinopec.

http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2013/06/10/xime-j10.html





China-Mexico Relations

Pena Nieto Resets China-Mexico RelationsZhang 13 (Tao, staffwriter Caoxin, 4-26-13, Caoxin Online, ―Building Bridges‖, http://english.caixin.com/2013-04-26/100521052.html)

Mexico's new president, Enrique Pena Nieto, wants to redefine bilateral relations with China. In a

trip to the southern province of Hainan in early April, four months after he took office, the 47-year-old Pena Nieto met with

the head of China's new leadership, Xi Jinping; announced the establishment of a government agency to handle trade with

China; and repeatedly sent the message that the two economies can complement eachother, rather than compete. "I've come to reaffirm, and to also confirm very clearly, theinterest Mexico has to expand its relationship with China," Pena Nieto said in an exclusiveinterview with Caixin on April 6. Sino-Mexican economic relations have long been tense. Both are major suppliers of manufacturedgoods, especially to the United States. Mexico was the last country to sign a bilateral deal with China in 2001 to pave the latter'sway into the World Trade Organization, and it has launched several WTO complaints against Chinese exports. Mexico's trade deficitwith China is the largest among its trade partners.

Past Issues Don‘t Matter—New Chapter in Mexico-China Relations

GbTimes 13 (gb Times, 6-6-13, GbTimes, ―China, Mexico seek strategic partnership, end to trade issues‖http://gbtimes.com/focus/politics/news/china-mexico-seek-strategic-partnership-end-trade-issues#sthash.tVMHq3TW.dpuf)

China and Mexico signed deals on Tuesday to step up Mexico's exports to China, as the two emerging economies seekto 'relaunch' ties that have been dogged by trade imbalances and rivalry in international markets. Following a meeting

between visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart Enrique Peña‖ Nieto in Mexico City, the twocountries agreed to upgrade their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership and signed a series of agreements. New contact with the region, so full of hope and dynamism, makes me convinced Latin Americahas unbeatable conditions favoring its development - Xi Jinping The deals enable Mexico to export pork and tequila to the Chinese

market after years of negotiation, and Mr Xi announced that China also plans to sign contracts topurchase Mexican products worth an additional $1 billion. "New contact with the region, so full of hopeand dynamism, makes me convinced Latin America has unbeatable conditions favoring its development," the Chinese leader toldMexico's Senate on the second day of his visit. China's investment in and pursuit of raw materials and oil in Latin America is incontrast to its relationship with Mexico, which has competing with China in the US market in sectors such as manufactured goods.

The two countries also agreed to move to balance Mexico's trade deficit with China.

Mexico and China Deepening Relations NowXinhua 13 (Xinhua News, 6-5-2013, Xinhuanet, ―China, Mexico upgrade relationship to comprehensive strategic partnership‖,

http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-06/05/c_132431199_2.htm)

Pena Nieto said at the ceremony that China has become a major global economic engine and an important balancing power in international relations.

As two emerging powers, Mexico and China are each other's important strategic cooperativepartners, and the Mexican side is ready to forge closer ties with the Chinese side to achievecommon development, the Mexican president said. Pena Nieto believed Xi's visit willadvance bilateral cooperation into a new stage and promote bilateral ties to a higher level. Xi,for his part, said the Chinese and Mexican peoples feel close to each other, as the two countries are both ancient civilizations and have a glorioushistory of fighting bravely for national independence and liberation. Since the two sides established diplomatic ties in 1972, China and Mexico haveachieved rapid development of friendly cooperation in all fields, shown mutual understanding and support to each other, and maintained close

cooperation in international affairs, Xi said, adding that they are good friends and good partners. The Chinese president noted that China and Mexicoare faced with the common task of developing economy and improving people's livelihood. China is ready to work with Mexico to constantly enrich the

content of bilateral strategic partnership, promote mutually beneficial cooperation and contribute to world peace, stability and prosperity, he said. Xisaid his visit to Mexico aims to deepen mutual trust, expand cooperation and enhancefriendship. "I believe with our joint efforts, China-Mexico relations will enter a newstage," he said. Xi, accompanied by Pena Nieto, then inspected Mexico's guard of honor. Members of the Mexican cabinet and mili taryleaders also attended the welcoming ceremony.



Economic Cooperation Means Closer Mexico-China Relations NowNewsAsia 13 (NewsAsia, 6-5-2013, Channel NewsAsia, ―China, Mexico presidents agree on 'strategic' partnership‖,

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/china-mexico-presidents/698924.html)

MEXICO CITY: Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Mexican counterpart vowed to work jointly toaccess international markets, like the lucrative US market, as part of a new strategic partnership. Xi

on Wednesday begins his second day of a three-day visit to the Latin American economic powerhouse, which will include a speechbefore Mexico's congress. Xi arrived in Mexico after visiting Costa Rica, and after meeting Caribbean leaders in Trinidad andTobago. On Friday Xi travels to the United States for a much-anticipated weekend summit with US President Barack Obama.

China has in recent years aggressively pushed trade and investment ties with the developing

world, particularly Africa and Latin America, to secure raw materials to fuel its economic growth and wield greater geopolitical

influence in relation to the United States. On Tuesday Xi and Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto pledged toenhance diplomatic and trade ties between the two countries, and to smooth over theirlong-standing rivalry on exporting products to the United States. "We expect to broadeninvestments of Chinese capital in our country," Pena Nieto told reporters late Tuesday, a movethat will create more jobs and make Mexico "an important platform for exports to the countries with which we have free tradeagreements." Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), along with the United States and

Canada. Xi in turn praised the "comprehensive strategic partnership" between the twocountries. In a joint statement Mexico and China agreed to increase talks at various

government levels "to deepen mutual trust and conduct bilateral dialogues on strategicissues," Chinese state news service Xinhua reported. Closer ties include more coordination in forumslike the United Nations and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping,Xinhua said.



Venezuela



General Influence

China will keep up relations with MaduroMinistry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, 4-16(Governmental organization in charge of cataloguing foreign affairs, ―President Xi Jinping Congratulates Maduro onPresidential Election Win,‖ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, 2013,http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t1032740.shtml)

On April 15, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a congratulatory message to NicolasMaduro on his winning the Venezuelan presidency. In his message, Xi said with the jointefforts of the leaders of both sides, China-Venezuela relations have been developingremarkably since the two countries forged strategic partnership of common developmentin 2001. "China and Venezuela have become good friends of mutual trust and goodpartners of close cooperation," he said. Xi stressed the great importance he attached todeveloping ties with Venezuela, adding China is willing to join hands with Venezuela tocarry forward bilateral ties into the future and open up new prospects for the relations.

Despite risks, China won‘t abandon ties Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former China Analyst for US government, ―What Chavez Taught China,‖ Inter -American Dialogue, 1-18,http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/)

Though more aware of country-specific risk, China is unlikely to abandon its deals andstrategic agreements with Venezuela and other ‗risky‘ nations in the region. China‘s leaders insteadare genuinely committed to expanding relations throughout Latin America in comingyears, including investment and lending in a wider variety of sectors. Recent agreementswith the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC), Community of LatinAmerican and Caribbean States (CELAC), and the Inter-American Development Bank

(IDB) suggest as much. The region as a whole is looking east for economic opportunity.A new Venezuelan leadership—whether ‗chavista‘ or not—would be likely to do thesame. China‘s strategic partnerships with Venezuela and other countries will remain intact. Its foreign policyapparatus is looking to forge stronger and longer-term friendships, and its firms willcontinue to engage the region based on a combination of Chinese domestic interestsand profit-driven motives. But the trend is toward comprehensive risk assessment and a more cautious, research-

based, and well-informed approach to the region. Latin America should expect ever more methodicalengagement from China.

Without US aid, Maduro increases Chinese tiesNegroponte, 4-16 (Diana Villiers, senior fellow with the Latin American Initiative under Foreign Policy at

Brookings, former trade lawyer and professor of history, ―Maduro As President of Venezuela: What to Expect,‖Brookings Institute, 2013, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/04/16-venezuela-maduro-negroponte)

With oil production down from 3.3 million barrels per day (mbd) to 2.4 mbd and a $42.5 billion debt to the China Development Bank

(CDB), Maduro will face a shortage of cash. He can persuade Venezuelans that they should tighten their belts and

endure a period of austerity, but that could provoke protest from the very constituency who supported his election. He couldapproach the multilateral banks, but Chavez rejected these institutions as being tools ofthe U.S. ―empire.‖ Maduro‘s supporters in Cuba are reliant on the continued provision of 90,000 barrels per day of subsidized oil

to the island, preventing him from drawing down that account to sell the oil on the open market. Maduro has twooptions: seek a further loan from CDB, similar to the $12 billion that Chavez obtained in



June 2011, or renegotiate the repayment terms on the current Chinese loans. (Currently 21percent of Venezuela‘s debt goes to Chinese institutions.) The Chinese government response is critical. Discussions with officialsfrom the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences at the Inter-American Dialogue in Washington in late March revealed that continued

Venezuelan oil production and political stability are necessary for the Chinese authorities. Since 2007, the ChineseNational Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC)have gained large stakes in Venezuela‘s oil industry after Exxon Mobil and

ConocoPhillips abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization. If continued oil supplies and political

stability are important to the Chinese government, its institutions may agree to renegotiate the loan terms. However, extended repayment schedules will probably come with the condition thatmore effective management be put in place at Venezuela‘s national oil company (PDVSA)as well as the housing and agricultural projects financed by CDB. That means additionalChinese personnel operating within Venezuelan projects.



Economic Influence

China expanding influence in Venezuela now – strong oil partnershipLaguna and Cunningham 7-2-13 (Francisco and Jennie Linder. Francisco is the owner of Translegal LLC.Francisco assists clients with every aspect of international commerce, including compliance with regulatory issues, obtaining

required licenses and permits, establishing subsidiaries / representative offices. He has a JD from the University of Arizona and aBA in English from UC Berkeley. Jennie Linder Cunningham is a partner at Translegal LLC. ―China‘s Economic Influence in Latin America.‖ Translegalllc.com. 2 July 2013. Web.) http://translegalllc.wordpress.com/2013/07/02/chinas-economic-influence-in-latin-america/

Chinese national oil companies (NOCs) have invested heavily in Venezuela, often following a―loans-for-oil‖ deal pattern. Reports indicate that the Chinese Development Bank (CDB) has nowbecome the country‘s primary foreign source of financing. China currently reports 230,000 barrels

imported per day, although official PDVSA (Venezuela‘s state oil company) reports ~ 319,000exported barrels. This discrepancy indicates that China is not only importing oil from Latin Americafor domestic ―energy security‖, but that Chinese NOCs are simultaneously reselling their―equity oil‖ on the global market. With an almost 100,000 barrel-per-day disparity, it appears that ChineseNOCs (which are heavily state-supported) have entered the international oil trade, not

just the import business.

China‘s influence on Venezuela is growing and sustainable The Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. ―Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?‖ The Economist

6 June 2013. Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 The short answer is: for simplicity‘s sake. Visits to Cuba and Venezuela might well have raiseddistracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in Southern California on June 7th, andneither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left offthe itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as China‘s is that if you giveyour friends the cold shoulder, you can always mollify them with money. That may be why, on

June 6th, Venezuela‘s oil minister announced that he had secured an extra $4 billion fromChina to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite in thesame league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning toinvest in Cuban golf courses, the island‘s latest fad.

China is expanding influence – foreign investment and manufacturedgoodsThe Economist 13 (H.T. Writer for The Economist. ―Why has China Snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?‖ The Economist

6 June 2013. Web.) http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3 However, as our story on Mr Xi‘s visit to Latin America points out, he may have had other reasons for pickingthe destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to Mr Obama‘s ―pivot‖ toAsia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America‘s

backyard. China‘s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than itsdealings with Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a

China expert at Mexico‘s National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean werecollectively the second largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment between2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher of Boston University says China hasprovided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sorts

in terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up

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the region‘s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials,particularly from Brazil, Chile and Venezuela, while flooding the region with itsmanufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-cost manufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts foronly about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and it exports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports

China has major influence opportunity – Venezuelan debtMarquez 13 (Humberto Marquez, Journalist at IPS specialising in international news. He worked for 15 years with AgenceFrance-Presse (AFP), 10 as assignment editor in Caracas, covering Venezuela, the Caribbean and the Guyanas. ―China Maps outVenezuela‘s Valuable Mining Resources.‖ Inter Press Service 28 February 2013. Web.) http://www.ipsnews.net/2013/02/china-maps-out-venezuelas-valuable-mining-resources/

The prospecting agreement is part of a growing alliance between the two countries,which has turned Venezuela into a major source of petroleum for China, while the Asiangiant is meeting the South American country‘s growing need for credit to finance itsconstant outflow of public funds. Venezuela exports over 600,000 barrels of crude oil aday to China, according to Ramírez, although other sources put the figure at half that much. Beijing, in turn,has granted Caracas more than 38 billions dollars in credits, and at the same time itparticipates in energy and construction projects.

China is main source for Venezuelan oil funds, cheap interest rates make itattractive to VenezuelaDevereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine, formerCNN International Reporter, ―China Bankrolling Chavez‘s Re -election Bid With Loans,‖ 9-26, Bloomberg magazine,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-re-election-bid-with-oil-loans.html)

One vehicle for the lending is a joint fund to finance infrastructure projects set up in 2007 by

CDB and Venezuela‘s Bank for Social & Economic Development. To date, China has contributed $16 billion,while Venezuela has committed half that amount, according to the Venezuelangovernment. Separately Chavez also secured a $20 billion loan from CDB in 2010, half of which

is payable in U.S. dollars and half in renminbi. Chavez said this month that he‘s seeking a third credit line. ―We‘rethinking about 2013,‖ he told reporters Sept. 11. ―I sent Hu Jintao a letter and the teams are already working on it,‖ he said, referring

to the Chinese president. Venezuela pays off the loans with oil, the amount of which fluctuatesdepending on the price of crude. Currently debt- servicing consumes about 200,000barrels of the 640,000 a day that Venezuela sends China, Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said Sept. 25, or

about 9 percent of production. Venezuela relies on oil for 95 percent of its exports and half ofpublic spending. The savings for Venezuela are significant. As a result of Chavez‘s nationalization drive and inflation that has remained above 18 percent since 2007, thecountry‘s borrowing costs have soared to the highest among major emerging markets.The extra yield investors demand to own Venezuelan dollar debt rather than U.S. Treasuries widened 5 basis points, or 0.05percentage point, to 987 at 10 a.m. in Caracas, according to JPMorgan Chase & Co.‘s EMBI Global index. Cheap Credit

Venezuela pays no more than 6 percent interest on its loans from China compared with12 percent it pays for bonds issued in capital markets, Ramirez told El Nacional in an interview published

Sept. 19. Ramirez‘s office didn‘t immediately respond to a request to confirm his comments as reported by El Nacional. Thelower cost has allowed Chavez to avoid tapping global investors. While the governmentand state oil company Petroleos de Venezuela SA sold a record $17.5 billion of dollar-denominated debt in 2011, so far this year PDVSA has issued just $3 billion.

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A2: Chavez Death Changed Everything

No change in relations post-ChavezMyers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former China Analyst for US government, ―Chinese Press on Chavez‘s Death,‖ China -Latin America Blog, Inter-American Dialogue,3-14, http://www.fletcherforum.org/2013/01/18/myers/)

The following news stories, assembled by former Dialoguer Peng Ruijie, were published in the Chinesepress following Hugo Chavez's death on March 5th. Although the reports offer a variety ofperspectives on Chavez, most conclude that little will change with respect to the China-Venezuela relationship. According to most, the results of upcoming elections in Venezuela will have littleeffect on China's various agreements and lending arrangements in Venezuela. Xinhua News -

查韦斯离世可能产生的影响 Predicts stability in Venezuela because of Chavez‘s appointment ofMaduro. States that Maduro has a 60 percent chance of winning in the upcoming elections. Chinese Academy ofSocial Sciences researcher, Xu Shicheng, notes that even if Capriles wins the election, there will be somecontinuity in terms of social policy and that Capriles might even try to lead other leftist countries in the region. Xu goes on to say that

a Maduro or Capriles government will still maintain good relations with China and will honor

Chinese agreements in such areas as energy, infrastructure and finance. The reportconcludes that the political transition will have little effect on China-Venezuela relations.



General



Political Relations

Latin America wants China now because they‘re looking to counterbalancethe U.S.

Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, ―Chinese SoftPower in Latin America,‖ China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PEBrazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Hu Jintao celebrate at closing of investment

and trade seminar. Hopes for the PRC to Serve as a Counterweight to the United States and

Western Institutions. China‘s historical status as a ―leader of the developing world‖ positionsit as the natural ally of the new generation of Latin American populist leaders, such as HugoChávez, Rafael Correa, and Evo Morales. During his first trip to Beijing after being elected president, for example,Morales proclaimed himself to be a ―great admirer of Mao,‖ while Chávez has exclaimedthat Mao and South American revolutionary icon Simón Bolívar would have been ―great friends.‖

While these leaders may primarily be seeking Chinese investments and commodity purchases, the position ofthe PRC as a geopolitical ―alternative‖ to the United States shapes the way that they court

the Chinese. In permitting such hopes, the PRC has, to date, been careful not to associate itself directly with theanti-U.S. activities or rhetoric of these regimes, so as not to damage its strategically important relationship with theUnited States and the West. Nonetheless, the relationship cannot avoid some flavor of the relationships between theSoviet Union and its Latin American client states during the Cold War. Bolivia turned to China to purchase K –8combat aircraft, for example, after the United States blocked its ability to procure aircraft from the Czech Republic.

China‘s expanding political relations Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, ―China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,‖ Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3 -19, page 3-4, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE

At the same time, economic relations go substantially beyond trade, and are also perhaps morevisibly characterised by the often successful attempts of Chinese state-owned corporations (such as PetroChina and

Sinopec) to acquire shares in Latin American oil and mineral commodities exploration companies. On thepolitical side, Beijing‘s involvement in the Western hemisphere has materialised in theestablishment of socalled ―strategic partnerships‖ with several states in the region; China‘s trainingof increasing numbers of Latin American military personnel; and attempts to expand the ties ofthe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with political parties across the continent. These examples ofthe intensifying Sino-Latin American links seemingly support a neorealist perspective according to which Beijing usestrade, investment, development aid and diplomacy in an attempt to balance the regional and global dominance of theUnited States and other OECD nations. Li (2008: 195) argues that China is taking advantage of a powervacuum in the region that was created by the United States‘ and Russia‘s declining interest inLatin America.

Uniqueness – China is increasing influence in Latin America – recent tripprovesFunaro, 13 (Breaking News writer in Los Angeles, ―Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin

America,‖ Global Post, June 4, 2013 13:51, Online, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-mexico-china-battles-us-influence-latin-ame, accessed 7/17/13) PE Chinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas toposition China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region. Xi arrives inMexico Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto are expected to discusstheir economic ties. The two nations are economic partners but also competitors, particularly when it comes to

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exports to the United States. Mexico and China both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itselfhas been flooded with cheap Chinese goods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" forMexico, Aldo Muñoz Armenta, political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USAToday. "It's not the healthiest (relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal."

When it comes to economic influence, China may be gaining the upper hand in LatinAmerica. China is increasing its funding to the region just as the US has been coming under

pressure to cut aid and investment. "If I‘m a Latin American leader, I‘m very happy because I now have morechips to play with," Kevin Gallagher, author of the 2010 book "The Dragon in the Room," about China‘s inroads inLatin America, told Bloomberg. "The onus is on the US to come up with a more flexible, attractive offer but that‘s not

so easy because it doesn‘t have the deep pockets like it used to." Latin America's growing economymakes for an attractive investment. The International Monetary Fund forecasts the region‘s economies willexpand 3.4 percent this year, almost three times the pace of growth in the developed world. Xi's tour of Trinidad,Costa Rica and Mexico are setting the stage for his visit to California later this week, which will be his first face-to-face talks with Obama since taking office. That Xi's Latin America trip came so early into his presidency is a confidentapproach that shows little concern for American reaction, Evan Ellis, a professor at the National Defense University inWashington told Bloomberg. "In the past Chinese presidents were very deferential to the US., always

making reference to Washington‘s backyard," Ellis said. " You don‘t hear any of that from Xi‘steam, though you don‘t find any threatening r hetoric either."



Economic Relations

China & Latin American economies are become dependent on one anotherSchmidt & Nicholson 10 (Susan & Tara, Susan Schmidt is a partner at the law firm Manatt, Phelps &Phillips and Managing Director at ManattJones Global Strategies. Tara Nicholson is an intern with ManattJonesGlobal Strategies and a candidate for a dual MA/MBA degree from the Johns Hopkins School of AdvancedInternational Studies and The Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania, ―China‘s Relationship with Latin America in Perspective,‖ Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP April 18, 2010,www.manatt.com/Articles/China%E2%80%99s_Relationship_with_Latin_America_in_Perspective.aspx#sthash.uZO1xhJ1.dpuf)

China‘s relations with Latin America are driven by the joint desire for mutually beneficialeconomic relations and a multi-polar world. The country‘s increasing presence in Latin America isneither a panacea for the region‘s economic challenges nor a substitute for its historical economic relationships.

Although China is laying the groundwork to expand its influence in Latin America, that

influence will primarily serve China‘s own commercial interests. China‘s largely economicfocus in Latin America is evident by contrasting the breath and depth of China‘s interests and relations inSoutheast Asia.

The opportunity for Latin America then lies in making China‘s interests a part of long -term economic strategy in the region. Long-term country attempts to turn China‘sprimarily economic interests into political tools are likely to be unsuccessful. Regionalgrowth and diversification will not be achieved misunderstanding China‘s primarilyeconomic interests. The challenge is to transform the opportunity provided by a more diversetrade and economic relationship into domestic benefits and sustained growth anddevelopment. That will be accomplished only with perspective on an increasingly multilateraleconomic structure.

China‘s influence in Latin America is growing Sarmiento-Saher 13 (Sebastian Sarmiento-Saher is an editorial assistant for The Diplomat. ―China and Latin

America: Big Business and Big competition.‖ The Diplomat 14 March 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/china-and-latin-america-big-business-and-big-competition/EW

According to Barbara Stallings, Chinese exports to Latin America grew substantially from U.S. $6.9 billionin 2000 to U.S. $69.7 billion in 2008; while LAC exports to China increased from U.S. $5.3 billion in 2000 to U.S. $70.3 bill ion in

2008. However, despite these dramatic increases of 910 percent and 1,226 percent, the United States and the EU arestill ahead of China in terms of trade flows with Latin America. China is quickly catchingup to many of LAC‘s traditional trading partners, however. Already China‘s tradenumbers with LAC have surpassed those of Japan, the previously dominant Asiantrading partner for Latin America. What is most significant about these developments overall is howrapidly Chinese businesses and organizations have expanded their activity in the region – a trend thatcontinues to grow.

Uniqueness – More evidence – multiple warrantsDarlington, 12 (Shasta, international correspondent for CNN based in Brazil, ―China-Latam economic tiestightening,‖ ―Latam‖ is not my typo, that‘s totes on CNN, November 19, 2012, Online,http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/18/business/china-latam-ties, accessed 7/17/13) PEThe rise of China in Latin America, long considered the United States' "backyard," took many bysurprise. Now, its economic influence in the region is only expected to grow. For the past

decade China has fueled high growth in major commodity producing countries like Brazil,

Chile, Argentina and Peru with its appetite for raw materials such as iron ore, soybeans and copper. In fact, Chinareplaced the United States as the top trading partner in Brazil and Chile and is on the way to doing so in

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many others countries in Latin America. That relationship made China popular with many

countries weary of trying to get their goods onto American and European shelves. But whenglobal demand for Chinese goods dried up in 2008 and 2009, the relationship with Latin America evolved. "Chinafigured out that Latin America could be a very good alternative market for its surplus," said Roberto Dumas Damas, aprofessor at Sao Paulo's INSPER business school. The flood of cheap exports from China sparked a backlash frommany of the hardest-hit industries, but overall, the trade relationship still tips in Latin America's favor. Brazil's tradesurplus with China, for example, was $11.5 billion in 2011. China followed up not only with cheap exports

of its goods, but hefty investments in Latin America to make it easier to reach the region's growingmiddle class consumers. "There were two waves of foreign direct investment," Dumas said. "First to guaranteeaccess to raw materials, like land for soybeans and iron ore plants." "In the second wave," he added.

"Companies want to explore the region's consumer markets." He pointed to plans by Chinese carmakersChery and JAC carmakers to build automobiles in South America. According to China's Ministry of Commerce,Chinese foreign investment in Latin America jumped to $10.5 billion in 2010 from $7.3 billion in 2009.



U.S. Inf Low

U.S. influence low – Snowden affairRiechmann, 13 (Deb, Associated Press, ―Edward Snowden Affair Dampens U.S. -Latin America Ties,‖

Huffington Post, Online, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/edward-snowden-us_n_3591560.html, accessed7/18/13) PE

America is pivoting to Asia, focused on the Mideast, yet the "backyard," as Secretary of State John Kerry oncereferred to Latin America, is sprouting angry weeds as the scandal involving intelligence leaker

Edward Snowden lays bare already thorny U.S. relations with Latin America. Taking theopportunity to snub their noses at the U.S., Venezuela, Bolivia and Nicaragua have already saidthey'd be willing to grant asylum for Snowden, who is wanted on espionage charges in the United Statesfor revealing the scope of National Security Agency surveillance programs that spy on Americans and foreigners.Ecuador has said it would consider any request from him. Relations between the US and these countries werealready testy, but the Snowden affair also stunned the Obama administration's effort to improveties with friendlier nations in the region like Mexico and Brazil. Snowden hasn't been the only recent setback.

Leaders in the region harshly criticized the U.S. earlier this week when a newspaper in Brazil, which wasprivy to some documents released by Snowden, reported that a U.S. spy program was widely targeting data in emailsand telephone calls across Latin America. That revelation came just days after an uproar in Latin America over the

rerouting of Bolivian President Evo Morales' plane over Europe amid suspicions, later proven untrue, that Snowdenwas aboard. And all this comes right after President Barack Obama, Vice President Joe Biden and Kerry

have all made recent treks to the region to bolster U.S. engagement in Latin America.

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http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/13/edward-snowden-us_n_3591560.html



A2: Obama Tour

Obama‘s tour isn‘t a non-unique – Obama‘s still perceived as abandoningLatin America to China

Dosch and Goodman, 12 (Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, ―China and Latin America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,‖ Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3-19, page 8,Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PE Obama‘s Latin America tour of 2011 cannot cover for the fact that the Chinese presence inLatin America is not a high priority for Washington; China‘s relations with the regionhave remained a minor issue because they lack sufficient strategic and political importance forthe United States. Washington‘s perception might change soon, though, as there are already a number of factors

that it is starting to become concerned about. The US is mostly interested in supporting liberal and

economic orders and deepening economic integration between itself and Latin American countries. With regard tothese core interests, the US is closely observing Sino-Latin American relations to understand whether China isdisrupting the existing patterns of bi- and multilateralism. For the time being, however, China is not a firmlyestablished power in Latin America, and Beijing‘s rise on the continent is a relatively recent

phenomenon.





A2: China Trade Low

It doesn‘t matter if Chinese trade with Latin America is low, influence isbased on perception of the future

Ellis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, ―Chinese SoftPower in Latin America,‖ China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/17/13) PEIn general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of the United States, leadinganalysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on

those factors that are the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world‘s youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespread use of the English language in business and technology, or thenumber of elites who have learned their professions in U.S. institutions.¶ It is also important to clarify that softpower is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective

reality. Although China‘s current trade with and investment position in Latin America are

still limited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the

current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the

future.¶ Because perception drives soft power, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America isshaped by its particular situation, hopes, fears, and prevailing ideology. The ―Bolivarian socialist‖ regime of HugoChávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally in its crusade against Western ―imperialism,‖ while countries suchas Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditional terms as an important investor and trading partnerwithin the context of global free market capitalism.¶ The core of Chinese soft power in Latin America,as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustained high

rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities inthe future, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be d ivided into sevenareas:■ hopes for future access to Chinese markets ■ hopes for future Chinese investment ■ influence of Chineseentities and infrastructure in Latin America ■ hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States andWestern institutions ■ China as a development model ■ affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic ■ China as ―thewave of the future.‖ In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC can be identified as operating through distinctsets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and the generalpopulation.

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A2: Biden Visit

Biden‘s visit wasn‘t enough – multiple warrantsEllis, 13 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with external actors, including

China, Russia, and Iran, ―China‘s New Backyard,‖ Foreign Policy, June 6, 2013,Onlinehttp://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/06/06/china_s_new_backyard_latin_america, accessed 7/19/13) PEIn late May of this year, when U.S. Vice President Joe Biden went to Latin America for a three-day, three-

country tour, Beijing was hot on his heels. Chinese President Xi Jinping arrived in Trinidad and Tobago just

days after Biden left: Whereas Trinidad and Tobago's prime minister , Kamla Persad-Bissessar,

characterized her discussions with Biden as "at times brutal," Xi's stop in Trinidad and Tobago

included the unveiling of a children's hospital funded with $150 million from the Chinese government,discussion of energy projects, and meetings with seven Caribbean heads of state. Xi's itinerary took him to CostaRica and Mexico on June 4 to 6, but his shadow followed Biden all the way to Brazil. In Rio de Janeiro, Bidenreferred to a new "strategic partnership" between the United States and Brazil, yet hiswords' impact was undercut by the strategic partnership that Brazil has had with Chinasince 1993 and the much-publicized fact that China overtook the United States as Brazil's largest trading partner

in 2009 (trade between China and Brazil exceeded $75 billion in 2012). It's not an accident that Brazilian PresidentDilma Rousseff made a state visit to China in April 2011, prior to paying one to the United States.



Links



General



Generic

US still has dog in fight over Latin America, increased imports, economicdependency

Sol M. Linowitz Forum ‘12 (Bi-annual forum to discuss western hemispheric political conditions, hostedby Inter-American Dialogue and affiliates Genaro Arriagada, former minister of the presidency of Chile andambassador of Chile to the United States, chairman of the Board of Radio Cooperativa and national director of the―NO‖ Campaign; Sergio Bitar, former Chilean minister of public works under President Michelle Bachelet from 2008 to2010, minister of education, minister of mining, a senator, president of the Party for Democracy (PPD) on twooccasions, and author of numerous books about Chilean politics and international relations; Nora Lustig, formervisiting Shapiro professor of international affairs at George Washington University, president and professor of theDepartment of Economics of the Universidad de las Americas in Mexico, and professor at the Center of EconomicStudies at the Colegio de Mexico; Margaret Myers, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-AmericanDialogue, Former China Analyst for US government; Manuel Orozco, chair of US Foreign Service Institute‘s divisionon Central America and the Caribbean, senior researcher at the Institute for the Study of International Migration atGeorgetown University, adjunct professor at the School for International Service at American University; ―Remakingthe Relationship: The United States and Latin America,‖ Inter-American Dialogue, April,http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

US economic preeminence in Latin America has, however, waned in recent years . Just adecade ago, 55 percent of the region‘s imports originated in the United States . Today, the United States supplies less than one-

third of Latin America‘s imports . China and Europe have made huge inroads . China‘s share of trade in

Brazil, Chile, and Peru has surpassed that of the United States; it is a close second in Argentina and Colombia .

Furthermore, Latin American nations now trade much more among themselves . Argentina,

for example, may soon replace the United States as Brazil‘s second lar gest trading partner, just behind China . Still, thesechanges must be put in perspective . Even as the US share of the Latin American markethas diminished, its exports to the region have been rising at an impressive pace . Theyhave more than doubled since 2000, growing an average of nearly 9 percent a year, 2percent higher than US exports worldwide . US trade should expand even faster in thecoming period as Latin America‘s growth continues to be strong . But the United Stateswill have to work harder and harder to compete for the region‘s markets and resources .

While Latin America has been diversifying its international economic ties, the region‘s expanding economieshave become more critical to US economic growth and stability . Today the United Statesexports more to Latin America than it does to Europe; twice as much to Mexico than itdoes to China; and more to Chile and Colombia than it does to Russia.

Chinese view Latin American investment as key to their global standingTrinh et al, 06 – Senior Economist (Tamara, Silja Voss, Researcher, Steffen Dyck, "China's commodity hunger:Implications for Africa and Latin America" Deutsche Bank Research)

B. Africa and Latin America have become destinations for Chinese investment Even if the spotlight

has been on the massive inflows of foreign investment money into China in recent years, China is increasinglyinvesting abroad as well. We estimate the stock of Chinese overseas direct investment (ODI) to have totalled USD 44-50 bn

at the end of 2005. While the largest part of these flows remains within Asia (60% of flows in 2005, 73% of the stock as of end-2005,see chart 23), China has been increasingly investing in other regions as well, including Latin America and more recently also

Africa. However, the high share of Asia is likely biased by the phenomenon of round-tripping through Hong Kong9which wouldexplain its dominant position in the ODI statistics (see table 24)10.Chinese ODI to Latin America and Africa only makes up 2% and

1% (the latter excluding round-tripping11), respectively, of the total, but China has stepped up its investment in the

two regions recently (see boxes). In the last few years Chinese government officials have made high profiletrips to both Latin America and Africa, announcing extensive investment plans. During his trip to Latin

America in late 2004, Hu Jintao announced that China would invest up to USD 100 bn in Latin America over the next ten

years. We therefore think that ODI flows could increase substantially over the next few years, as



China tries to secure more and more resources in an environment of rising commodityprices. In fact, in a survey about their ODI intentions in the next 2-5 years, Chinese firms indicated that the share of ODI flowinginto Africa and Latin America could increase to about 15% and 11%, respectively, of the total (see chart 25).12While many of theinvestment projects in both Africa and Latin America are carried out by Chinese state-owned enterprises, private companies alsoincreasingly invest abroad.13 The Chinese government has created a framework in the form of its ―Go-out‖ or ―Going Global‖strategy, which centres on active government support and encouragement for domestic firms to pursue investments abroad.Chinese firms have taken up the call: AnUNCTAD report lists five Chinese (state-owned) transnational corporations (TNC) amongthe top 50 non-financial TNCs from developing economies14(see table 26). Some 700 Chinese companies are active in Africa

alone.15Three main goals have been mentioned as driving Chinese outward direct investment: 1.

Economic rationale : Improving energy security and securing access to resources,markets, and strategic assets.16 Strategic assets in this context refer to management skills, brands or distributionnetworks. Access to markets includes setting up production sites in countries with favoured access to major markets (e.g. access to

the US market from Mexico via NAFTA, or from African countries via the African Growth and Opportunity Act). 2. Political

intentions : Official recognition as a ―market economy‖ from its trading partners and

adherence to the ―One-China‖ principle.173. Strategic goals : Supporting China‘s emergenceas a major global power . Concomitant with its economic success China wants to beaccepted as an important international player . Closer external trade ties can be leveragedtowards reaching this goal. Moreover, China supports the idea of a multi-polar world to counter American hegemony.



Econ

We have a link to their econ advantage – maintaining financial weakness inAmerica gives China the edge in control of Latin America

Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., ARC Future Fellow and professor at the University of Sydney in the Department ofSociology and Social Policy, ―China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba‖, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs,41, 1, 155-179, page 156, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed 7/16/13) PE

At a 2009 symposium on security in Washington DC, a foreign policy specialist from a prominent US think tank took

the stage with a Chinese official to debate China‘s deepening ties with Latin America. The specialist askedwhether China is willing to ―come to the table‖ with the United States to promote democratic development in theregion. The Chinese official‘s reply was revealing: ―We are interested in trade, and not in politics.‖ Talking past – rather than with – each other, the officials revealed a disjuncture of US and Chinese approaches to internationalaffairs, in particular concerning the role of the state in shaping the course of economic cooperation. Exchanges likethese suggest that calls for China to unilaterally adapt to prevailing conventions of governance are unrealistic, andthat Chinese attempts to rhetorically divorce trade from politics are equally so. They also suggest the need forcompromise on both sides of the Pacific as China assumes a more prominent role in world affairs. Financialinstability in the United States and Europe has intensified China‘s engagement with

developing countries. Sino-Latin American trade skyrocketed from 10 billion USD in 2000to 183 billion USD in 2011, and China‘s priorities in the region are clear: Tap new sources offoodstuffs and energy to sustain domestic growth, and open new markets for Chinese manufactured

products. Literature on the resulting trans-Pacific relationships focuses mainly on the economic and strategic

implications of this process, drawing predictable conclusions. Chinese publications, generally penned by governmentofficials, emphasise the economic benefits of their country‘s demand for the region‘s primary products, evinced byLatin America‘s impressive performance during the global financial crisis (GFC) (Jiang 2005, 2009; Sun 2011). Latin

American publications reflect the region‘s historical anxieties about 1) overdependence on resource exports, 2)declining manufacturing sectors, and 3) Dutch disease (IADB 2010; ECLAC 2010; Dussel Peters 2005, 2010). Policybriefs and analyses from the United States exhibit both concerns about the economic sustainability of

Chinese operations in Latin America and anxiety about foreign interference in a region traditionallysubsumed by US hegemony (Arnson and Davidow 2011; Ellis 2009; Gallagher and Porzecanski 2010).







Econ Engagement

Economic engagement pushes out ChinaDowd 2012 (Alan. Senior Analyst at the American Security Council. ―Countering China's Reach in Latin

America‖ 2012. http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas)

Second, the U.S. must stop taking the Western Hemisphere for granted, and instead must

reengage in its own neighborhood economically, politically and militarily .¶ ¶ That meansno more allowing trade deals—and the partners counting on them—to languish. Plans for a hemispheric free tradezone have faltered and foundered. The trade-expansion agreements with Panama and Colombia were left in limbo for years, before

President Obama finally signed them into law in 2011.¶ ¶ Reengagement means reviving U.S. diplomacy .

The Wall Street Journal reports that due to political wrangling in Washington, the State Department position focused on the WesternHemisphere has been staffed by an interim for nearly a year, while six Western Hemisphere ambassadorial posts (Uruguay,

Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Barbados) remain empty. Reengagement means reversingplans to slash defense spending. The Joint Forces Command noted in 2008 that China has ―a deeprespect for U.S. military power.‖ We cannot overstate how important this has been to keeping the peace. But with the United States in the midst of massive military

retrenchment, one wonders how long that reservoir of respect will last.¶ ¶ Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties . A good model to follow might be what‘s happening in China‘s backyard. Todeter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all acrossthe Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it‘s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember

that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border thePacific. Given Beijing‘s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners onthe Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacificregion.



Inaction Link

Chinese Influence Based on US Inaction – plan is an attempt to push chinaout.

Cerna 11 (Michael, writer China Research Center, 4-15-2011, ―China‘s Growing Presence in Latin America‖, web)

In March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama met with leaders and officials in Brazil, Chile and El Salvador. Mr. Obama made thisvisit amid growing Chinese power in the region. The trip marked the first time President Obama had visited Latin America sincebecoming President. By comparison, at this point in Hu Jintao‘s presidency, the Chinese president already had visited fourcountries, including Brazil, where he signed 39 bilateral agreements and announced $100 billion in investments. While Mr. Obamawas well-received during his trip, the most common response in those countries was that the trip was symbolic but not verysubstantive. Obama‘s visit did not reflect any shift in policy. Many of the major statements these countries hoped for (such as a call

for Brazil‘s permanent place on the U.N. Security Council), in f act, were not made. Mr. Obama admitted on his trip: ―Therehave been times when the United States took this region for granted,‖ according to the Latin

American Herald Tribune. Those times are not yet in the distant past and there are fears this administration ismaking mistakes similar to ones in the past. After promising during his 2000 election campaign to correct Washington‘s indiff erence

to Latin America, George W. Bush was accused of turning his back on the region in favor ofmore pressing issues in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The President showed no

concern for a growing Chinese influence in the hemisphere, and China put both feetinside before anyone in Washington seemed to realize the door was open. This was amove China had planned during the administration of George H.W. Bush.



Indirect Issues

China views even indirect issues as zero-sum with the U.SPerlez 12

Jane, Lieberthal, Kenneth, Jane Perlez is the chief diplomatic correspondent for the Beijingbureau of the New York Timse, Kenneth Lieberthal is the director of the John L. Thorton Centerfor China Studies at Brookings, ―Chinese Influence Offers Rare Glimpse of U.S-China Frictions‖,The New York Times, April 2, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html

In the face of China‘s strengths, and worries that the United States will be displaced from itspremier position in the world, Washington is engaged in activities including stepped-up spying

by American planes and ships along China‘s borders that anger the Chinese, particularly its military, Mr. Wangwrites. Promotion of human rights in China by American-supported nongovernmental organizations is viewed as aneffort to ―Westernize‖ the country and undermine the Communist Party, a stance the party will not stand for, he says.That China is increasingly confident that it will prevail in the long run against the United States is backed, in part, byMr. Lieberthal‘s appraisal of American policy toward China. Mr. Lieberthal cites findings from American

intelligence based on internal discussions among crucial Chinese officials that theseofficials assume ―very much a zero-sum approach‖ when discussing issues directly andindirectly related to United States-China relations. Because these are privilegedcommunications not intended for public consumption, American officials interpret them to be―particularly revealing of China‘s ‗real‘ objectives,‖ he writes. In turn, American law enforcement

officials see an alarming increase in Chinese counterespionage and cyberattacks againstthe United States that they have concluded are directed by the Chinese authorities to gatherinformation of national interest.

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/03/world/asia/chinese-insider-offers-rare-glimpse-of-us-china-frictions.html







Oil Link

China needs Latin America to maintain oil demandsXiaoxia, 13 (Wang, Department of Economics, Tsinghua University, Translated by Laura Lin, ―In America‘s

Backyard: China in Latin America,‖ Economic Observer Online, April 27, 2013, Online,

http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml, accessed 7/17/13) PEAmong the numerous needs of China, the demand for oil has always been the most powerful driving force. In the past 30 years, China has consumed one-third of the world's new oil production and become theworld's second-largest oil importer. More than half of China's oil demand depends on imports,which increases the instability of its energy security. Diversification is inevitable. In this

context, Latin America and its huge reserves and production capacity naturally became adestination for China. China must better protect its energy supply, and can't just play the simple

role of consumer. It must also help solidify the important links of the petroleum industry supply

chain. Indeed, the China National Petroleum Corporation frequently appears in Latin American countries,

and China‘s investment and trade in the Latin American countries are also focused on its

energy sector.

Oil is a zero-sum game- uniquely true in the context of China and Latin AmericaLuft, 2006 (Gal, PhD and Co-Director for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security ―Challenge or

Opportunity? China‘s Role in Latin America‖, United States Government Printing Office,http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm)

China's pursuit of Latin American oil will only make matters worse. With half of its oilimports coming from the Western Hemisphere and with oil imports in the United Statesprojected to surge 60 percent during the next two decades, the United States cannotafford to lose chunks of Western hemispheric crude. Every barrel of oil China buys in theAmericas means one less barrel of Western hemispheric oil available to the United States market. This meansthat China will have to--the United States will have to look for this oil elsewhere, and that will be particularly in the MiddleEast, which is contrary to President Bush's pledge to make the United States less dependent on, ̀ `places that don't particularly likeus.'' So when it comes to oil, Mr. Chairman, this is a zero-sum game.

http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-109shrg28258/html/CHRG-109shrg28258.htm

http://www.eeo.com.cn/ens/2013/0507/243704.shtml



Perception

Perception key- China will base its action towards Latin America based off of its ability tomaintain accessEllis, 2011 (R. Evan, Associate professor with the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies―Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study‖, NDU Press, Issue 60, 1 st Quarter,http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf)//VP

It is also important to clarify that soft power is based on perceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily onobjective reality. Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are still limitedcompared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based not so much on the current size of thoseactivities, but rather on hopes or fears in the region of what it could be in the future. Because perception drives softpower, the nature of the PRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes,fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as a powerful ally inits crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more traditionalterms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core of Chinese softpower in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespread perception that the PRC, because of its sustainedhigh rates of economic growth and technology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in thefuture, and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: hopes forfuture access to Chinese markets hopes for future Chinese investment influence of Chinese entities and infrastructure in Latin

America hopes for the PRC to serve as a counterweight to the United States and Western institutions China as adevelopment model affinity for Chinese culture and work ethic China as "the wave of the future." In each of these cases, the soft power of the PRC canbe identified as operating through distinct sets of actors: the political leadership of countries, the business community, students and youth, and thegeneral population.

Perception is keyFerchen, 2013 (Matt, Specializes China‘s Political-Economic Relations with Emerging Economies ―China‘s

Latin American Interests‖, 4/6, http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests/a7av)

While overall the United States remains the region‘s main trade and investment partner, the perception that China‘sstar is rising and America‘s is falling means the United States must reengage the regionboth economically and politically in a way that is seen as contributing to rather thaninhibiting Latin American economic and political development. And even if the idea of a China Model

or Beijing Consensus remains vague and open to various interpretations, the idea that China itself presents a successful model of

development, and is a major new trade and investment partner for the region, exposes the need for theUnited States to rethink its own approach toward both economic and political development issues in Latin America and elsewhere.

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/06/china-s-latin-american-interests/a7av





Cuba



Embargo

We have a specific link – eliminating or lessening the Embargo brings LatinAmerica back to the U.S.‘s court

Goodman, 9 (Joshua, Assistant Professor of Public Policy at Harvard, ―Latin America to Push Obama on CubaEmbargo at Summit,‖ April 13, 2009 15:07, Online,http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk, accessed 7/17/13) PEThen Barack Obama arrives at the fifth Summit of the Americas this week, Cuba will be at the heart of theU.S. relationship with the rest of the hemisphere, exactly as it has been for half a century.¶ WhileLatin American leaders split on many issues, they agree that Obama should lift the 47-year-old

U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. From Venezuelan socialist Hugo Chavez to Mexico‘s pro-business FelipeCalderon, leaders view a change in policy toward Cuba as a starting point for reviving U.S. relations with the region,which are at their lowest point in two decades.¶ Obama, born six months before President John F. Kennedy imposedthe embargo, isn‘t prepared to support ending it. Instead, he‘ll seek to satisfy the leaders at the April 17 -19 summit inPort of Spain, Trinidad and Tobago, with less ambitious steps disclosed by the administration today -- repealingrestrictions on family visits and remittances imposed by former President George W. Bush.¶ That would mesh with hisstated goal of changing the perception of ―U.S. arrogance‖ that he attributed to his predecessor in his sole policy

speech on the region last May.¶ ―All of Latin America and the Caribbean are awaiting a change in

policy toward Cuba,‖ Jose Miguel Insulza, Secretary General of the Washington-based Organization of American States, said in an interview. ―They value what Obama has promised, but they want more.‖¶ The policychanges unveiled today also include an expanded list of items that can be shipped to the island, and a plan to allowU.S. telecommunications companies to apply for licenses in Cuba.¶ Symbolically Important¶ Cuba, the only country

in the hemisphere excluded from the 34-nation summit, is symbolically important to the region‘sleaders, many of whom entered politics under military regimes and looked to Cuba and its longtime leader FidelCastro, 82, for inspiration and support. Even though most countries shun the communist policies of Castro and hisbrother, now-President Raul Castro, the U.S. alone in the hemisphere rejects diplomatic and trade relations with theisland.¶ ―Cuba represents a 50-year policy failure in Latin America and that‘s why it‘s so important forObama to address it now,‖ says Wayne Smith, a senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington,who headed the State Department‘s Cuba interest section in Havana from 1979 -1982. ―Unless Obama wants to bebooed off the stage, he better come with fresh ideas.‖¶ The U.S. president, 47, thinks it would be ―unfortunate‖ if Cubais the principal theme at the summit and would prefer the session focus instead on the economy, poverty and theenvironment, says Jeffrey Davidow, the White House‘s top adviser for the meeting. Obama also understands that hecan‘t control the discussion and intends to deal with the other leaders as partners, Davidow told reporters on April

U.S. is losing influence to China because of the Cuban embargo – 2012summit provesCawthorne and Ellsworth, 12 (Andrew, British journalist who has worked for Reuters since 1992 onvarious assignments in Latin America, Africa, Europe and the Middle East, Brian, Personal Property lawyer at Alstonand Bird LLP, ―Latin America rebels against Obama over Cuba,‖ Reuters, Sun Apr 15, 2012 10:13pm, Online,http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summit-idUSBRE83D0E220120416, accessed 7/18/13) PEUnprecedented Latin American opposition to US sanctions on Cuba left President Barack

Obama isolated at a summit on Sunday and illustrated Washington's declining influence in a regionbeing aggressively courted by China. Unlike the rock-star status he enjoyed at the 2009 Summit of the

Americas after taking office, Obama has had a bruising time at the two-day meeting in Colombia of some 30 heads ofstate. Brazil and others have bashed Obama over US monetary policy and he has been on the

defensive over Cuba and calls to legalize drugs. Due to the hostile US and Canadian line on communist-run Cuba,the heads of state failed to produce a final declaration as the summit fizzled out on Sunday afternoon. ―There was nodeclaration because there was no consensus,‖ said Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos. He bristled atsuggestions the summit had been a failure, however, saying the exchange of different views was a sign of democratichealth. For the first time, conservative-led US allies like Mexico and Colombia are throwing their weight behind thetraditional demand of leftist governments that Cuba be invited to the next Summit of the Americas. Cuba was kickedout of the Organization of American States (OAS) a few years after Fidel Castro's 1959 revolution and has been keptout of its summits due mainly to US opposition. But Latin American leaders are increasingly militant in

http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0_zyWMi297I&refer=uk

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summit-idUSBRE83D0E220120416

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/16/us-americas-summit-idUSBRE83D0E220120416

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opposing both Cuba's exclusion and the 50-year-old US trade embargo on the Caribbean island. ―The isolation, the embargo, the indifference, looking the other way, have been ineffective,‖ Santos said. ―I hopeCuba is at the next summit in three years.‖ Santos, a major US ally in the region who has relied on Washington forfinancial and military help to fight guerrillas and drug traffickers, has become vocal about Cuba 's inclusion eventhough he also advocates for democratic reform by Havana. In an ironic twist to the debate, US Secretary of StateHillary Clinton went dancing in the early hours of Sunday at a Cartagena bar called Cafe Havana, where Cubanmusic is played. Argentine President Cristina Fernandez, who has insisted without success that Washington

recognize its claim to the Falkland Islands controlled by Britain, was one of several presidents who left the summitwell before its official closure. She missed a verbal gaffe by Obama, who referred to the ―Maldives‖ instead of the―Malvinas‖ when using the name Latin Americans give to the disputed islands. The leftist ALBA bloc of nations --including Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua and some Caribbean nations - said they will not attend futuresummits without Cuba's presence. ―It's not a favor anyone would be doing to Cuba. It's a rightthey've had taken away from them,‖ Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega said from Managua.

Lifting the embargo puts the U.S. back in the leadGoodman, 13 (Josh, Professor of Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, ―Obama Can

Bend Cuba Embargo to Help Open Economy, Groups Say,‖ Bloomberg Business News, Feb 20, 2013 6:21, Online,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cuba-embargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html, accessed 7/18/13) PENow, in a second term, and with private business expanding in Cuba, Obama has a freer hand to

do more, said Sabatini. An exception to the embargo allowing U.S. businesses and consumers to trade with non-stateenterprises in Cuba would be small in scale though help empower a growing, viable constituency for change on theisland, he said. Since his brother Fidel started handing over power in 2006, Castro has relaxed state control of theeconomy in the biggest economic overhaul since the 1959 revolution. To provide jobs for the 1 million state workersbeing laid off, the government began allowing the buying and selling of homes and the creation of farming co-operatives and other private businesses. The latest sign of change are new rules that took effect in January allowingmost Cubans to bypass requirements they obtain an exit visa or invitation from abroad to leave the island. Castro inDecember said that he hopes that productivity gains will boost economic growth this year to at least 3.7 percent.Gross domestic product expanded 3.1 percent in 2012. The Washington-based Cuba Study Group urges Obamato gain even more leverage by getting Congress to repeal the so-called Helms-Burton act of

1996 and other legislation that conditions the easing of sanctions on regime change. Any move to ease thefive-decade-old embargo would probably encounter anti-Castro resistance in Florida, one of the biggestprizes in recent presidential elections, and opposition from key lawmakers including Senator Robert Menendez, theDemocratic chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. A bill introduced by Representative Jose Serrano,

a New York Democrat, in the 112th Congress to dismantle the web of legislation governing relationswith Cuba since as early as the 1960s received no co-sponsors.

Ending the Embargo lets the U.S. compete with China – loweringrestrictions isn‘t enough Goodes, 9 (Jeff, Lt. Col. in the U.S. military, military fellows program, ―Marine colonel: Drop the Cuba embargo,‖

Friday, October 23, 2009, Foreign Policy, Online,http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo, accessed 7/18/13) PEThe Obama administration's decision to extend the U.S. economic trade embargo on Cuba for an

additional year is detrimental to our national and regional security and further emboldens our economic, military,

and infrastructure rivals. What is most perplexing is the fact that earlier this summer the Obama administration

decided to relax some of the regulations regarding personal travel and personal money transfers from

Cuban-Americans to their relatives in Cuba, as well as telecommunication exchanges between private U.S. andstate-run Cuban companies: all are steps in the right direction for U.S. interests - but are not enough.While these relaxed restrictions are certainly a step forward in normalizing relations, these steps do notoutweigh the heavy diplomatic, information, and economic influence of Brazil, Venezuela, Nicaragua,China, Russia, India, and Iran, all of whom support the Cuban government and all of whom seek to be peercompetitors with the United States.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-20/obama-should-bend-cuba-embargo-to-buoy-free-markets-reports-say.html


http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo

http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/23/marine_colonel_drop_the_cuba_embargo





General

Cuba is strategically important for China – political symbol of influence.Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at theUniversity of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study of

Contrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January,usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)

In terms of economic openness and political ideology Mexico and Cuba are at opposite ends of the spectrum. Nevertheless, forChina both hold high strategic value. Examining China‘s relations with Mexico and Cuba opens ananalytic window into the way that bilateral commercial, cultural, and diplomaticcooperation programs have adapted to distinct local conditions. Based on interviews and observations gatheredduring three years in Cuba, ten months in China, and eight months in Mexico, this Pacific Rim Report outlines some of the positiveand negative local responses that intensifying engagement with China has produced. It also suggests that China has effectivelytailored bilateral programs to local environments to advance common economic, political, and cultural objectives.China‘s economicimpact across Latin America has been uneven. Its demand for energy resources has driven up commodity prices, benefitingexporters such as Argentina and Brazil (soy), Chile (copper), Peru (iron, fishmeal), and Venezuela (crude oil) (Jiang 2005, Zweigand Jianhai 2005). Nevertheless, as the case studies of José Luis León Manríquez (2006) show, the exports of Mexico and thecountries of Central America consist primarily of manufactured products and textiles, resulting in seemingly insurmountablecompetition from a tidal wave of legal and illicit Chinese imports. Romer Cornejo (2005) suggests that this regional variation results

in part from the structural adjustments of the public and private sectors pursued by Latin American countries to facilitate cooperationwith China. To examine this issue in depth, in 2006 the Red de Estudios de América Latina y el Caribe sobre Asia del Pacífico (Latin

American and Caribbean Study Network on Asia and the Pacific, or REDEALAP) of the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB)brought together scholars from IADB member countries to debate the effectiveness and future trajectory of structural adjustments inorder to deepen cooperation with China in areas ranging from fiscal integration into regional trade blocks to natural disaster relief(REDEALAP 2006). A recent book from the OECD (Santiso 2007) argues that although China‘s emergence represents a valuableopportunity for Latin America to develop alternative economic partnerships that reduce dependence on the United States andEurope, resource exports to China could gradually push the region into a ‗raw materials corner‘. Similarly, a book from the Inter-

American Development Bank entitled, The Emergence of China: Opportunities and Challenges for Latin America and the Caribbean,argues that to avoid future dependence on primary resource exports, Latin American governments should adopt long-termstrategies that position their countries as service providers for the expanding Chinese middle class, particularly in the tourism andeducation sectors (Devlin et al. 2006). The authors signal that to climb the industrial value chain in this way will require a greatercoordinating role for Latin American governments, since development strategies guided by the market alone, adopted in part as abacklash to previous import substitution strategies, will naturally favor short-term growth through commodity export.One summary ofChina‘s relations with six Latin American countries (Jorge I. Domínguez et al., 2006) juxtaposes political cooperation with tradepatterns. The study argues that although economic considerations are paramount, Cuba, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have tovarying degrees used China to balance U.S. influence in the region. Varying degrees of alarm about this prospect are expressed inthe publications of research institutions and think tanks associated with the U.S. military and government (CLATF 2006:2, Eisenman2006, Lam 2004, Mrozinski 2002). Indeed, the ‗triangular‘ relationship between China, Latin America, and the United States is

emerging as a prominent topic of debate (e.g. Arnson et al. 2007). China‘s multiple objectives in Latin Americaare evident in the diversity of its activities in Cuba and Mexico. Although Cuba harbors some economic value for China through oil exploration, nickel extraction, biomedical collaboration, and electronics

sales and manufacturing, its appeal is mainly political. Diplomatic links with Cuba promoteChina‘s image as a ‗non-aligned‘ protagonist of ‗South-South‘ cooperation, providingideological common ground with the eight mineral-rich countries that make up LatinAmerica‘s ‗New Left‘. Mexico, by contrast, offers China more conventional economic incentives such as a market forChinese consumer products, a manufacturing base with geographic and legal access to North American markets, and the prospectof potentially massive investment in the oil sector. The following sections discuss the challenges and opportunities that China hasbrought to Mexico and Cuba, and the steps taken by both governments to respond effectively.

Influence in Cuba key to China‘s overall Latin American agenda.Hearn 2009 (Adrian, Senior Research Fellow at the University of Sydney. Kiriyama Research Fellow at theUniversity of San Francisco Center for the Pacific Rim "China's relations with Mexico and Cuba: A Study ofContrasts" Pacific Rim Report No 52, January,usf.usfca.edu/pac_rim/new/research/pacrimreport/pacrimreport52.html)

China is Cuba‘s second largest trading partner after Venezuela, with 2.7 billion dollars in bilateral trade

reported for 2007 (Cubaencuentro 2008). This trade is more valuable to Cuba than to China, thoughthis could change if Chinese oil, nickel, and electronics manufacturing operations in



Cuba expand. Furthermore, for the eight resource-rich countries that comprise LatinAmerica‘s ―New Left‖, Cuba is a unique ideological symbol of resistance to U.S. hegemony.

For China, whose pursuit of Latin American natural resources is at least as voracious as that of

the United States, cooperation with Cuba, strongly supported by Raúl Castro, decreases the danger ofbeing perceived in the region as an external—potentially imperialistic—threat to economicsovereignty.



Medical Tech

Cuba and China‘s medical tech partnership is a part of a larger bi-nationalagreement

Whitney, 2012 (W.T, Writer for the People‘s Wor ld magazine on Latin American Issues,―People‘s World‖ March 5th, 2012, web)

The present era of cooperation began in Nov. 2004, when Chinese President Hu Jintao brought 200

businesspersons and investors to Cuba. He ended up signing a 16-point bi-national agreementcovering bio-technical, higher education, telecommunications, nickel extractioninitiatives, and more, with China providing favorable credit terms. Follow-up took place in Havana in 2009, as

national assembly presidents of the two nations agreed on new financial and commercial

arrangements, and prepared for Cuban port, radio and television, and bulk transport modernization. In Dec.2011, Cuban Council of State Vice-Minister Ricardo Cabrisas, meeting in China with the inter-

governmental Cuba-China Commission, signed updates and reported on the 6th Cuban Communist Party

Congress of that year. Bilateral trade rose from $590 million in 2004 to $1.8 billion in 2010.China became Cuba's second largest trading partner, exceeded only by Venezuela. Chinese trade with Latin

America overall has increased 42 percent over five years. China has supplied Cuba with domestic electricalappliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far), locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cubaprovides sugar, rum, cigars, high technology medications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs forsteel production. China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oil deposits offCuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platform arrived recently from China. Cuba's

Molecular Immunology Center (MIC) recently announced that the anti-lung cancer vaccine CimaVax-

EGF, made by the Cuban-Chinese Biotech Pharmaceutical Ltd (BPL) Company, wouldundergo trials in China. MIC head Augustin Lage visited China in February to assess use of Nimotuzumab monoclonal antibody, a BPL product directed at several human several cancers.

Cuban Biotechnology is a key growing interest for China

Meacham 2012 (Karen, director of educational outreach and dean of the Abshire-InamoriLeadership Academy at CSIS, where she designs and implements the Center‘s executiveeducation, leadership, and training activities. She also directs the CSIS Seven RevolutionsProject, an ongoing research effort to identify and analyze global strategic trends looking out to2030. Chinese Investments in the Cuban Biotech Industry, CSIS, Print)

Although China‘s investment portfolio in Latin America is highly concentrated in energy and raw materials, advanced technology and biotechnology specifically have stimulated interest and serve as catalysts for astronger relationship between China and Cuba. This growing partnership has openedsignificant Asian markets to Cuba. For China, the partnership offers access to Cuban biotechnology

expertise and a presence in the Western Hemisphere just 90 miles off the coast of the United States Cuba‘s strengthin biotechnology stems from a long history of investment in its own nation ‘s health, scientific, and medical researchand delivery. As a result, Cuba boasts some of the best health indicators of any country in the developing world. Itsinfant mortality rate is lower than that of the United States and several other large industrialized nations, Cuba hasmade considerable advances in biotechnology, including the development of the world‘s first vaccine for meningitis13 has developed a pesticide for dengue carrying mosquitoes and is an exporter of one of the most effective hepatitis13 vaccines in the region. Cuba is working to market its expertise and products on the global market and as anexample, is advancing its TheraClM hR3 anticancer therapy through a joint venture with Germany. During the pasttwo decades an economic partnership between China and Cuba has developed. According toCuba‘s National Office of Statistics, trade in goods to China in 2007 was roughly $2.7 billion. Though hard to

measure, this number has been boosted by expanded Chinese investments in the Cubanbiotechnology industry. Since 2000, several successful Chinese-Cuban biotech



pharmaceutical companies have emerged. Biotech cooperation between China and Cuba began in

earnest in 2004 when Chinese and Cuban officials signed a memorandum of biotechnologicalcooperation during Chinese president Hu Jintao‘s visit to Havana. The goal of the memorandum was toamplify cooperation and deepen the economic and commercial ties between the twocountries. Following the agreement, in 2005, the first joint Chinese-Cuban biotech entity, Biotech Pharmaceutical,set up a plant in Beijing. Biotech Pharmaceutical was created with the specific purpose of bringing Cuban research

and pharmaceuticals to China and began by making monoclonal antibodies to treat Chinese cancer patients. Since2006, China and Cuba have created two new biotechnology firms: ChangHeber Pharmaceuticals, which producesinterferon and other compounds; and, most recently. Beijing Neurotechnology Limited,which will develop, produce,and commercialize neurotechnological products. China‘s recent economic growth and increasing global

power have cast a new light on this relationship, Beijing‘s interest in Cuba has produced morefrequent highIevel meetings; rapidly expanding levels of economic cooperation; and numerous exchanges in theareas of science, technology, and defense. Chinese investment in the Cuban biotechnologyindustry specifically has opened many doors to the global market for Cuba and is expectedto continue to grow.



Oil

China assisting Cuba in supplying key rig components, indicates interestin oil

Jeff Franks (Staff writer, journalist), 1-19-12, Reuters, ―Oil rig arrives for Cuba offshore exploration work,‖http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/19/us-cuba-oil-rig-idUSTRE80I1WV20120119The rig, known as Scarabeo 9, could be seen as it sailed slowly westward, miles off the north coast and

Havana's famed Malecon seaside boulevard. Its arrival went mostly unnoticed by people in thecapital, but it was a long-awaited and landmark day for the island's oil industry, which believes the

platform will tap into rich oil fields in Cuba's part of the Gulf of Mexico. Starting next week, Spanish oil giant

Repsol YPF, working in partnership with Norway's Statoil and ONGC Videsh, a unit of India's Oil and Natural Gas

Corp, is expected to drill at least two wells in Cuban waters about 70 miles from theFlorida Keys. Malaysia's Petronas, in partnership with Russia's Gazprom Neft, will also drill a well using theScarabeo 9. The rig has been contracted from its owner Saipem, a unit of Italian oil company Eni. All the wells will bein water at least a mile deep, like that of the BP well that blew out and spilled millions of gallons of oil in the U.S. partof the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. Cuba has said it may have 20 billion barrels of oil in its parts of the Gulf, but the U.S.Geological Survey has estimated about 5 billion. Repsol drilled the only previous offshore well in Cuba in 2004 and

said it found oil, but said it was not "commercial." It has been trying for several years to bring another rig for moredrilling, a task that was complicated by the longstanding U.S. trade embargo against Cuba and the limits it places onthe amount of U.S. technology that can be used. The Scarabeo 9, a semi-submersible rig that floats on four giant

pontoon legs and has living quarters for more than 200 crewmembers, was built in China, then sent toSingapore in late 2010 for completion.

China‘s intent to drill confirmed by exploratory drilling Investors.com (Business magazine and advisory), 4-11-12, Investor‘s Business Daily, ―While We Dither On Oil, It'sDrill, Beijing, Drill,‖ http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/041112-607461-china-seeks-canadian-cuban-oil.htm?p=fullEnergy Policy: A Chinese oil company is now the world's top producer . While we sleep and watch

pump prices rise, China, India and even Cuba seek supplies the world over , including drilling off theFlorida coast. Global demand for oil is rising, as is its global price, as energy-hungryeconomies such as China, India and Brazil scour the earth for oil they know will be the energy of thepresent for some time to come. Even those lacking their own technology are asking others to help them get more. Forthem, there is no such thing as "peak oil." The U.S., however, stands alone as the only major country not activelyseeking new supplies. Less than two years after the Deepwater Horizon explosion of a single rig virtually shut downour efforts in the Gulf of Mexico, a Chinese rig built for a Spanish company, Repsol, has begunexploratory drilling for oil off Cuba as close as 50 miles to Key West, Fla. The Scarabeo 9 rig will drill ata depth of 6,000 feet underwater. The 2010 Deepwater Horizon spill happened at a shallower depth of 5,500feet. The U.S. Geological Survey recently estimated the North Cuban Basin contains as much as 9 billion barrels ofoil and 22 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Other estimates range from 5 billion to 20 billion barrels. Pools of oil andnatural gas tend not to obey lines drawn on a map. It is certain that at least some of Cuba's wells will be tapping oilpools that straddle the boundary separating our zone from theirs, meaning Havana will be getting oil that should beours. Countries like China clearly don't see oil as an energy source of the past. China andIndia provided a combined $24 billion in oil industry subsidies in 2010, according to the

International Energy Agency. The figure dwarfs the $4 billion in industry incentives thatPresident Obama is seeking to end.

China enabled by Cuba to drill in restricted areas, indicates intent tocompete

Aaron Sharockman (Deputy government and politics editor, writer/editor for PolitiFact.com, Times staff writer),

4-4-10, Tampa Bay Times, ―PolitiFact: Stearns' claim about Chinese oil drilling in Gulf of Mexico is half true,‖



http://www.tampabay.com/news/politics/stateroundup/politifact-stearns-claim-about-chinese-oil-drilling-in-gulf-of-mexico-is/1085129"Cuba wants to let the Chinese drill in some of the very parts of the gulf that Americanproducers are currently forbidden to touch, as close as 45 miles off the Florida coast," Stearns, R-Ocala, says on his campaign Web site. Stearns' point — that if Cuba is going to drill anyway, why shouldn't we? — isobvious. But are his facts right? First, some background. In 1977, Cuba and the United States negotiated maritimeboundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the waters south of the Florida Keys, called the Florida Straits, according to the

U.S. Department of State. The boundaries, called Exclusive Economic Zones, give countries special rights ofexploration and marine usage. Mexico, Cuba and the United States have EEZs in the gulf, and Cuba and the UnitedStates control the Florida Straits. When it comes to oil, Cuba decides who drills in its EEZ and oil that may come fromit — and the United States controls who can drill in its territory. The United States currently bans drillingin much of the eastern Gulf of Mexico (including waters within 234 miles of Tampa Bay),and all of its portion of the Florida Straits. But last week, President Barack Obamaproposed to open new areas to oil and gas exploration along the eastern seaboard south of NewJersey and in the eastern Gulf of Mexico within 125 miles of Florida's coast. U.S. drilling would still be banned in theFlorida Straits. . Now onto Cuba, the heart of Stearns' claim. Cuba's maritime boundary in the FloridaStraits extends to within 45 miles of the Keys, as Stearns suggests. Cuba has no drillingmoratorium. Its EEZ is broken down into 59 areas. In 2002, Cuba's state-run oil company, Cubapetroleo, startedleasing individual areas to foreign oil companies in both the Florida Straits and the Gulf of Mexico for exploration. So

far, Cuba has leased 15 of the 59 areas, said Jorge Pinon, a former oil executive with Shell and Amoco who is anexpert on Cuba's energy sector and a former energy fellow with the University of Miami's Center for HemisphericPolicy. The waters closest to the United States have not yet been leased. Who holds therights to the areas? Oil and gas companies based in Spain, Norway, India, Malaysia, Venezuela, Vietnam and

Brazil. But not China. China has an onshore, land-based lease in Cuba but not an offshorelease, Pinon said.

Chinese industrial oil initiatives key in CubaCuban Research Institute, 05-26-09, Commissioned report for the CubaInfo Series, ―Cuba and China:

Lessons and Opportunities for the United States,‖ http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdfChinese enterprises have developed a broad range of industrial initiatives in Cuba.

Agricultural cooperation has focused on the production of rice, soy, sorghum, and maize, and Cuba exports 400,000

tonnes of raw sugar annually to China. Scientific exchange has developed in earthquake detection, solar energyresearch, cancer treatment, and vaccine production. In 2004, Hu Jintao pledged to invest $500 million in Cuba‘snickel sector, and although Venezuela emerged as the leading financier of the Las Camariocas ferro-nickel plant,China has since consumed 20,000 tons of the resource (Cheng 2009:1). The Chinese oil companySinopec has teamed up with Cuba‘s CUPET to develop onshore operations in Pinar delRio (CRS 2008:24), while the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is negotiatingexploration of Cuban deposits in the Gulf of Mexico. In 2007, 10,000 Chinese tourists visited Cuba,and as discussed below, electronics manufacturing and transport infrastructure have emerged as key areas ofexpansion. China often pays for developing country natural resources with trade credits, construction equipment,infrastructure upgrading, and technical training rather than hard currency (Robles 2005).

Chinese oil refurbishments of Cuban refineries trade offReuters, 06-05-11, NewsMax.com, ―China to Refurbish Cuban Oil Refinery,‖

http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/cubanrefinery-china-partnership/2011/06/05/id/398888China signed a letter of intent to refurbish a Cuban oil refinery and agreed to give newcredit and start drawing up a five-year cooperation plan between the two communist-run

countries in accords signed Sunday during a visit by Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping. Theagreement on the refinery was the first official word on a project first reported by Reutersin November that is expected to cost $6 billion and would be a significant step forward in budding

Cuba-Chinese economic relations. The signing of the accords followed talks between Xi and CubanPresident Raul Castro on Xi's second day in Cuba after arriving Saturday from Italy. XI is widely expected tosucceed Chinese President Hu Jintao in 2013. Few details about the credit and other agreements were available.



China is Cuba's second largest trading partner, behind Venezuela, with trade last yeartotaling $1.83 billion, according to official Chinese news agency Xinhua. The refinery letter of intent isan agreement among Cuvenpetrol, which is a joint venture between Cuba and Venezuela,China National Petroleum Corp's Huanqiu Contracting and Engineering unit and the Italianunit of French oilfield service company Technip to finalize a contract to expand and improve a Soviet era refinery inCienfuegos on Cuba's southern coast. The plan would expand the refinery's capacity to 150,000 barrels per day,

from 65,000, and is a key part of Cuba's plans to develop its still untapped oil fields in theGulf of Mexico.

Scarabeo 9 indicates dependent partnership between China and CubaW.T. Whitney Jr (Cuba solidarity activist and member of Veterans for Peace), 03-05-12, People‘s World,

―Cuba reaffirms ties with China,‖ http://www.peoplesworld.org/cuba-reaffirms-ties-with-china/China has supplied Cuba with domestic electrical appliances, medical and electronic equipment, buses (8000 so far),locomotives, and bicycle-making machines. Cuba provides sugar, rum, cigars, high technologymedications and vaccines, and 14 percent of the nickel China needs for steel production.China's Sinopec oil corporation has assumed a lead role in exploring underwater oildeposits off Cuba's northern coast. Sinopec's massive Scarabeo 9 drilling platformarrived recently from China.

Sinopec and Cupet are mutually dependent, key operation to mining Cubanresources

Alexander Wöstmann (Author, GasAndOil.com writer, founder, CEO), 3-16-04, GasAndOil.com, ―Sinopec and

Cupet to explore oil blocks in Cuba,‖http://www.gasandoil.com/news/ms_america/d7c92d068a2d16b0faaa819123514b2dChina Petrochemical Corp., or Sinopec, has signed a memorandum of understandingwith Cuba's national oil company, Cuba Petroleo, or Cupet, to explore four oil blocks in Cuba,a Sinopec official said. The MoU will allow Sinopec to conduct geological studies of the four Cuban

blocks over six months beginning mid-March, which could lead to the signing of a productionsharing contract between the two companies, he said. "We will do a survey on these blocks first andthen decide if we will enter into a PSC," he said, adding the blocks are likely to contain mostly crude oil, as opposedto natural gas. The MoU marks the first attempt by Sinopec, China's second largest oil andgas company, to enter oil and gas exploration and production in Cuba.



Now Key

We have a ―now is key‖ booster – Chinese influence is solidifying itself inCuba through long-term policy planning

Hearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University ofSydney, ―China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba‖, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155 -179,page 171, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed7/16/13) PERecent changes in Cuba indicate that even in a country at diplomatic odds with the United

States, Chinese initiatives are not inimical to mainstream principles of development and governance.Long-term market expansion, coordinated industrial sectors, and state oversight ofprivate initiative are goals that drive the engineers and policy advisers behind Sino-Cuban projects.These goals also resemble the principles advocated by Latin American, European, and US officials in the wake of theGFC. The Cuban reforms formalised by the 2011 Communist Party Congress will support a further convergence ofpositions, as they propose a more balanced mix of state and market forces. Although Sino-Cuban initiatives aremanaged under the banner of state-to-state cooperation, Chinese support for Cuba‘s liberalisation agenda isprompting the Western hemisphere‘s only communist nation toward alignment with international norms.





Mexico



Agriculture

China investing in Mexican agriculture nowSun, 2013 (Hongbo, ―A New Stage of Interaction‖ MERL Research / Technical Staff Senior Principal Member Research Staff Ph.D., Chongqing UniversityChina Daily, 6/6/2013, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013xivisit/2013-06/06/content_16573253.htm)

China and Mexico will work together to safeguard each other's national interests and the interests of developing countries. PresidentXi Jinping's visit to Mexico shows the new Chinese leadership's support for Mexico's development and their will to expand and

deepen cooperation. On Tuesday, Xi and his Mexican counterpart, Enrique Pena Nieto, pledgedthey will enhance political dialogue on bilateral, regional and global issues so as toconsolidate the China-Mexico comprehensive strategic partnership. Since diplomatic tieswere established 40 years ago, bilateral relations have developed rapidly. Confucius said, at 40one should be free of doubts, and China-Mexico ties have matured and are now robust, featuring mutual respect and mutual benefit.

And with Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party returning to power, China-Mexico relations can open a new chapter in theirlongstanding friendship. Mexico established diplomatic relations with China in 1972. At the 26th session of the UN General

Assembly, seven Latin American and Caribbean countries, including Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Cuba voted that thegovernment of the People's Republic of China was the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations. In the 1970sand 1980s, China and Mexico cooperated in the international community supporting South-South cooperation in a bid to promote

the establishment of a new international political and economic order. In 2003, the two countries forged astrategic partnership, expanding their friendly exchanges and cooperation in variousfields. Both China and Mexico are emerging economies with increasingly close bilateral economic and trade relations and thetwo countries' influence on the global governance reform is irreplaceable. China is Mexico's second-largest trading partner, whileMexico is China's second-largest trading partner in Latin America. The two countries should take more political initiative and makepragmatic policy efforts to push relations to a new level. On issues concerning each other's core national interests, the two countriesshould enhance mutual understanding and properly handle their differences. And partisan politics in Mexico should not be allowedto have an adverse impact on the bilateral relationship. What concerns Mexico most is how to narrow the huge trade deficit withChina. The trade imbalance is an indisputable fact mainly due to the differences in the two countries' economic structures. To solvethe problem, the two sides should adopt a constructive attitude, put more political resources into their economic cooperationmechanism and improve the quality, level and sustainability of their economic and trade cooperation. Economic and tradecooperation is high on Mexico's agenda and the Mexican business community is eager to gain more market access to China, whichis considering expanding imports of Mexico's competitive products, such as agricultural, livestock and fishery products. The twocountries can also expand mutual investment. According to Chinese official statistics, at the end of 2011, China's investment in

Mexico was only $264 million, which is less than its investment in some other Latin American countries. With regard to

their economic and trade cooperation mechanism, the two countries can try to set up aChina-Mexico cooperation fund to facilitate financing for mutual investment and trade.Mexico has great demand for investment in transportation, agriculture, communication networks and other

areas, and China hopes to expand direct investment in Mexico, which will create employmentopportunities for local people. The two sides can also consider starting a feasibility study on building a free trade area. Meanwhile,the Mexican government is actively promoting energy reform and the prospects for energy cooperation are bright. The two countriesshould also strengthen consultation and safeguard each other's national interests and the common interests of developing countriesin the fields of finance, trade and climate change under the framework of multilateral mechanisms such as the United Nations, theG20, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum. They should also expand people-to-people exchanges and strengthencultural and educational exchanges and contacts. Mexico has the most Confucius Institutes in Latin America and the National

Autonomous University of Mexico has set up the Mexican Center in China. Cultural and academic exchanges between China andMexico are frequent and the two sides may consider expanding the number of exchange students. In addition, the two countriesshould also strengthen public diplomacy to deliver a real and vivid national image to each other's people. Finally, relations betweenthe two countries must take into account the United States. Because of the complex and asymmetrical interdependence betweenMexico and the US, developing relations with the US is the top priority in Mexico's diplomacy. However, it is definitely not a zero-sum game, and the three countries can explore potential areas for future cooperation.

China already invested in Mexico AgricultureWatts, 2013 (Elleka, Editorial Assistant at The Diplomat ―Chinese Firms Go Global‖ The Diplomat, May 31, 2013, http://thediplomat.com/china-power/chinese-farms-go-global/)

Already, as China has developed more of its land, concerns have developed overwhether enough arable land will be available to produce enough food to feed its massivepopulation. This problem has serious implications. As Katherine Morton, a specialist on

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Chinese environmental governance, notes: ―Ten percent of the Chinese population isestimated to be undernourished, the rural labor force is declining, and agriculturalproductivity is increasingly vulnerable to climate change, natural disasters and watershortages.‖ She goes on to explain, ―For planning purposes, China must have at least 120 million hectares of arable land to produce enough

food to meet future demands. But around two-thirds of available land in China is now classified aseither bar ren or low in agricultural potential…‖ Despite its long-standing policy of being agriculturally self-sufficient, the

Chinese government has tried to cope with rising food insecurity by encouragingoverseas investment in agricultural farms around the world, including in Mexico, Cuba, Russia, Kazakhstan,Cameroon, Uganda, Tanzania, Laos, the Philippines, and Australia. A 2012 report from the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD)examined China‘s domestic and global agricultural investment st rategies, and found that China is becoming increasingly dependent on agriculturalimports. Indeed, the IISD report notes that soybeans have become China‘s main imports, accounting for 38 percent of total agr icultural imports, whileother major agricultural imports include cotton (9 percent), and palm oil (8 percent). The majority of these imports come from Asia, North and South America, and Africa. Some Chinese farmers, like Zhu Zhangjin, believe this new trend of outsourcing will help strengthen food safety standards andimprove quality, while lowering production costs and increasing profit margins. Zhu has followed other individual farmers, agribusiness corporations,and governments by buying huge tracts of land in countries like Brazil and Australia. While outsourcing agriculture has its benefits, as evident from thesheer number of countries pursuing this avenue, there are also many potential problems with t ransnational land investments. For the investor, thesechallenges include having to secure large plots of land in order to achieve economies of scales, high transportation costs, political unrest in recipientstates, and hostility and resentment from local populations. Chinese investors have been no exception as they have encountered increasing hostilityfrom local populations in purchasing land in areas like South America and Africa, including the charge that this new wave of outsourcing is theequivalent of ―neocolonialism.‖ These allegations are inaccurate though, since neocolonialism involves a relationship whereby a state‘s policy isinfluenced by the political, military, or economic leverage it exercises over an external actor. In the case of agricultural outsourcing, there is no loss ofsovereignty in recipient countries – even if trade patterns resemble those in colonial times. As Deborah Brautigam, an expert on China-African relationsand Director of the International Development Program at John Hopkin‘s SAIS, explained in a recent interview with The Diploma t, observers accusingChina of neocolonialism are using an ―oversimplified idea of ‗neocolonialism‘ – i.e. that China exports manufactured goods and imports raw materials.

This structure of trade is accurate – but it‘s a very narrow definition. Colonialism is about domination and political control, occupation and military force.This is hardly true of China in Africa.‖ Furthermore, charging China with neocolonialism absolves the governments in recipient countries of all blame. As Brautigam adds, ―I think those who use this term fail to appreciate that African economies are already structured as raw material exporters. It is upto Africans themselves to develop other kinds of attractive export products.‖ Indeed, countries like Brazil have found ways to resist eager Chineseinvestment in its arable land by strengthening regulations on foreigners purchasing land. If other countries are opposed to the increasing attention theyare receiving from international land investors, they too can pass laws to keep investors in check and focus on developing other export industries.Nonetheless, China has been proactive in devising ways to ensure that local populations benefit from its investment policies. As the IISD report citedabove notes, ―Acquiring farmland is one of the investment strategies that China is pursuing. But it is part of a much broader strategy that includes jointventures with local governments or local companies and contracts with local farmers.‖ Locals are often able to benefit from the investment bycontinuing to work on the farms rather than being replaced by Chinese labor that is imported for specific projects. Furthermore, in many countriesChinese investment in land leads to sharp rises in its productivity due to the importation of modern technology and additional investments in keyirrigation infrastructure. In some cases, Chinese investment in other types of infrastructure l ike roads and ports can expand these benefits to other localindustries. Nevertheless, local grievances need to be considered and addressed when companies, states, and individuals invest in countries with rich,arable land. For instance, local fa rmers need to be fairly compensated if they are asked to move off land that is being used for t ransnational landinvestments. As mentioned above, local farmers should be given the option of continuing to work the land, and local food security should beguaranteed before any of the harvest is exported to other countries. In adopting these methods, investors can avoid charges o f neocolonialism and theaccompanying local hostility that puts investments at risk.

China greatly values investment in Mexican AgricultureChinese Ministry of Agriculture, 2012 (―Niu Dun Co-chairs 5th China-Mexico Agricultural WorkingGroup meeting‖ April 5, 2012 http://english.agri.gov.cn/ic/ao/201304/t20130412_19396.htm)

China and Mexico held the 5th Agricultural Working Group (AWG) Meeting of China-Mexico Inter-governmental Standing Committee in Beijing on April 5, 2012. Vice Minister NiuDun and Dr. Pedro Brajcich Gallegos, Director General of the Mexican National Institute of Forestry, Agriculture, and LivestockResearch (INIFAP) of the Secretariat of Agriculture, Livestock, Rural Development, Fisheries and Food (SAGAR) led theirrespective agricultural delegations to attend the Meeting. Initiated in 2004, the Inter-governmental Standing Committee aims at

guiding and coordinating bilateral cooperation and reducing conflicts over trade and investment. Both sides reviewedand evaluated the progress in agricultural cooperation between China and Mexico. Bothagreed that, with joint efforts, China-Mexico agricultural cooperation witnessed increasing number

of mutual visits, smooth agricultural S&T exchange, and agricultural trade growth. Both sides recognized that in terms offuture agricultural development and market demand, there is still greater potential for further cooperation. To this end, both sidesexpressed their willingness to make concerted efforts to tap cooperation potential based on mutual benefits and win-win outcomes.

Both sides briefed their achievements in recent years, development plans for the yearsahead and related agricultural policies. Both were of the view that the exchange ofagricultural development and related policies is beneficial to drawing on advantagesfrom each other and boosting agricultural development. Both agreed to facilitate thesigning of Memorandum of Understanding on Agricultural Science and TechnologyCooperation between INIFAP and the Chinese Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS).

http://english.agri.gov.cn/ic/ao/201304/t20130412_19396.htm






The Memorandum aims to strengthen exchange and cooperation in the fields of prevention and control of animal and plant diseasesand plant pests, climate change adaptation and agricultural bio-technology, germplasm exchange of corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco

and other crops, as well as to hold the second Sino-Mexico Forum on Agricultural Science and Technology. The Meetingalso reached consensus on an early signing of Agreement on Fishery Cooperation, inter alia

to intensify cooperation in marine fishing, aquaculture, introduction of new species and fishery stock enhancement. Otherissues discussed at the Meeting included creating favorable conditions for investment, granting

appropriate

preferential policies, and providing necessary service

and facilitation

measuresso as to

encourage

and support eligible enterprises from both sides into agricultural trade and investment.



Drugs

China supports Mexican trade, empirically provenDavid Gibson (Former legislative aide to a state senator, staff writer for Examiner), 9-2-11, Examiner.com,―Chinese companies supporting Mexican drug cartels,‖ http://www.examiner.com/article/chinese -companies-supporting-mexican-drug-cartelsOn Thursday, the U.S. Customs and Border Protection Agency announced the seizure of 520pounds of methylamine hydrochloride, the chief chemical component used in producingmethamphetamine. The shipment which was found at an air cargo facility at Los AngelesInternational Airport originated in China and was headed to Mexico. A Drug Enforcement Agency

official told Fox News that the amount of chemicals seized could have produced 330 pounds ofmethamphetamine, with a street value worth as much as $16 million. This shipment was only the latestof its kind to have been sent from China in support of Mexico‘s drug trade . -In August 2011, ashipment of gamma-Butyrolactone, the chief component used in manufacturing gamma-Hydroxybutrate, or the date-rape drug. -In February 2011, Mexican authorities seized over 23 tons of ethyl phenylacetate, which is also used inthe manufacture of methamphetamine. The drug component was discovered at the Pacific port of Manzanillo. -In

April 2010, Mexican officials seized 80 tons of phenylacetic acid and its derivatives shipped from Shanghai, China.Imports of ethyl phenylacetate require authorization from the country‘s health ministry, so the

shipments are intentionally mislabeled before leaving China. Last year, an anonymous U.S. officialtold Reuters that between October and November 2010, Mexican authorities seized 818 tons of chemicals used inmaking crystal meth. Due to rampant corruption among port officials, the cartels are allowed to receivelarge shipments of the chemicals from China which are transported to meth labs throughoutMexico. The chemicals are used in a production process known as phenyl-2-propanone (P2P method), and costmuch less than pseudoephedrine, thus increasing the cartels‘ profits. In 2009 alone, the Mexican police and military

found 215 meth labs, a 400 percent increase of the labs discovered in 2008. 90 percent of themethamphetamine sold in the U.S. is brought into this country from Mexico and distributed byseveral street gangs such as the notoriously violent MS-13.

Experts support theory of Chinese involvement in Mexican meth trade‘ Kari Huus (Reporter, staff writer for MSNBC, Newsweek writer, foreign/domestic policy journalist), 9-18-06, NBCNews, ―Crystal cartels alter face of U.S. meth epidemic,‖ http://www.nbcnews.com/id/14817871/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/crystal-cartels-alter-face-us-meth-epidemic/#.Ueh3Go2yCn9Recognizing the new international threat, Washington is taking legislative and diplomatic initiatives to ensurecooperation from the global players in the meth trade — manufacturing centers like Mexico and theworld's biggest producers of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, China, India and Germany. Atthe United Nations, the U.S. pushed through a resolution that calls on countries to submit a yearly estimate of theirlegitimate need for the chemicals and to provide information on all exports -- both bulk shipments and those ofpharmaceutical preparations. Previously those ingredients were uncontrolled, a gaping loophole in

regulations that allowed millions of tablets containing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine to be sold onthe black market. Under the Combat Methamphetamine act, the State Department also is required to certify thatthe biggest exporters and importers of the chemicals cooperate with the United States, with the threat of withdrawalof foreign aid hanging over those that do not. The U.S. initiative is working to a degree. The DEA says the U.S. hasseen increasing cooperation from Mexico, China, India and Germany in sharing intelligence and conducting jointenforcement operations. The urgency of the mission is clear because they too are witnessing a rising tide of meth

abuse, the DEA says. But political will doesn't always translate into control over agile drug trafficking organizations.―We're seeing ephedrine shipped from India and China to South Africa and then from there to South and Central

America,‖ DEA administrator Karen Tandy said in a recent speech in Canada. ―Chinese ephedrine is being

diverted through Cairo on its way to Mexico. And ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are

being diverted in other African countries including Angola, the Democratic Republic of

Congo, Kenya and Mozambique.‖



DEA findings indicate China is providing drug precursors to MexicoDavid W. Koop (Huffington Post staff writer), 12-14-09, Huffington Post World, ―Pseudoephedrine Crackdown

Forces Mexican Meth Cartels To Go Back To Basics,‖ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/14/pseudoephedrine -crackdown_n_390894.html#"We are starting to see a rise in chemicals that are easier to get ," said U.S. Drug Enforcement

Administration spokeswoman Dawn Dearden. Preisler, who works at an electroplating factory and has been arrested

twice in the U.S. for his work with methamphetamine, says he isn't surprised traffickers have turned to P2P."P2P is old school," he said. "Hell, I used to cook by that route circa 1980." The fight has come full circle. In the1980s, the U.S. government severely restricted access to P2P seeking to curtail methamphetamine production. Methmakers shifted to ephedrine, which could be found in common cold remedies. When authorities crackeddown on ephedrine, they switched to pseudoephedrine, the active ingredient in Sudafed and other

decongestants. When U.S. authorities regulated bulk sales of the ephedrines ,meth production shifted toMexico, where, at the time, gangs could get their hands on mammoth quantities ofpseudoephedrine imported from China and India. Mexico was soon supplying up to 80

percent of the drug sold in the U.S ., and American authorities were calling meth the No. 2 drug threat to

society after cocaine. Once Mexico restricted imports and sales of pseudoephedrine, thecartels took a hit. The volume of methamphetamine seized in the United States fell 34 percent, from 7.1 tons in2006 to 4.7 tons in 2007, according to the U.S. National Drug Intelligence Center. It also said it observed decreased

drug purity. Dearden says DEA agents found the price of meth increased. Experts say a crackdown on phenylaceticacid would likely just push traffickers to other chemicals. "People forget that these are synthetically made drugs, andwe haven't even seen the end of all the possible recipes," said Ralph A. Weisheit, an Illinois State Universityprofessor who wrote "Methamphetamine: Its History, Pharmacology and Treatment."



General

Mexico is key to China‘s sphere of influence Brandt et al, 2012 (Jon Brandt American University School of International Science Derek Hottle Nicole

Adams Nav Aujla Christina Dinh Kirsten Kaufman Devin Kleinfield-Hayes Wanlin Ren Andrew, ―Chinese Engagement

in Latin America and the Caribbean: Implications for US Foreign Policy‖, Decemberhttp://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf)

The PRC‘s military interests in LAC are closely aligned with its commercial objectives. Bilateral security

ties build political goodwill with regional players, thus reducing the likelihood of actions against Chinese exports and investments.57 China‘s

economic priorities are seen in its ―official system of cataloguing states as

cooperative, friendlycooperative or strategic partners—with the implication that this has for the allocation of economic resources.‖58

China‘s four ―strategic partner s‖ in Latin America - Argentina, Mexico , Brazil and Venezuela – serve as important

trading partners and commodity suppliers. China‘s strategic posture in the Western

Hemisphere is consistent with its publically stated national security priorities. The PRC‘s 2010 national

defense white paper emphasizes a defensive Chinese military strategy, focusing on strengthening international military relations and countering foreigninterference in domestic affairs. The paper highlights Chinese concerns about international military competition in the areas of missile defense,

cyberspace, outer space, and the polar regions, while simultaneously insisting the PRC does not seek confrontation or global hegemony. WhileChina‘s ties with LAC reflect a growing desire to protect economic and security interests,

the PRC is promoting cooperation which reflects ― mutual trust and benefit,‖ not offensive

measures that would directly threaten the United States. A number of high-level defense visits have occurred between China and LatinAmerican nations.59 While these interactions have not resulted in groundbreaking bilateral strategic initiatives, they serve asconfidence building measures and provide openings for arms transactions.606

US-Mexico Relations Check Chinese InfluenceArizona Daily Star 12, (Arizona Daily Star, 9/14/2012, ―Fox says US-Mexico ties deter China's influence‖, web)

Former Mexican President Vicente Fox said the United States has to bolster ties withMexico - including recognizing the benefits of migrant labor - or get used to the idea of China setting theinternational agenda on its own terms. "The threat is this so-called power shift from the Westto the East," he told a press conference Thursday at an economic development event organized by the city of Peoria. "Thosenations on the East are getting ready and prepared to lead," Fox explained, saying there are forecasts showing the Chineseeconomy will be larger than that of the United States within a dozen years. "And that means a very important question to all of us:

Under what principles are those leading nations (going to) be exercising their leadership?" Fox said. His point: The U.S.would be better off dealing with Mexico and other Latin American countries than perhapsthose with different worldviews. "We have our values in the West that we share," Fox said. "So we all on this

continent, especially North America, must get ready to meet that challenge." That means bolstering theeconomies of the United States and Mexico, he said. If the West wants to keep its edge, Fox said, there needsto be a recognition that Mexicans in the United States, legally or not, contribute to the economy of both countries. And that, he said,will require resolving the issue of who can come to this country and under what circumstances.

Plan reduces the attention deficit – pushes out ChinaMartinez 13 (Guillermo I, writer South Florida Sun-Sentinel, 5-23-13, South Florida Sun-Sentinel, ―America losing influence

throughout Latin America‖, web)

Mexico counted on American intelligence assistance and money to fight the drug cartelsuntil Obama's visit to Enrique Peña Nieto, recently elected president. The communique at the end of the meeting

talked about new economic cooperation between the two nations and how together they would fight the drug cartels. Nothighlighted was the Mexican-imposed position that the United States agents would no

http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf

http://www.american.edu/sis/usfp/upload/Chinese-Engagement-in-LAC-AU_US-Congress-FINAL.pdf



longer be welcome in their country and that the cooperation would be respectful of their sovereign rights. PeñaNieto, the candidate of the PRI (Institutional Revolutionary Party) wanted a different approach to the war on drugs; one that would

mitigate the violence that had killed thousands of Mexicans in the last decade. Finally, China has helped change theequation. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall, for several years the United States was theonly super power . When American presidents spoke, the world listened. Now China offers both a challengeto the United States, as a second super power, and has become an alternative economic

trading partner for countries throughout the world. Still, it is inconceivable that Americanmedia and officials pay so little attention to the region. Maybe those around President Obama have nottold him that Iran has close ties with Argentina, Cuba and Venezuela. Certainly the administration must know Cuba and Venezuelaare so close that many critics of President Nicolás Maduro are now saying Cubans are helping to keep him in power. They talk, onlypart in jest, that there is a new country in the region called Cubazuela – the alliance between Cuba's Raúl Castro and Maduro'ssupporters is so close. It is true all have heard the main culprit of the drug trade in the world is American and European

consumption. Yet the United States has waged war on the producers and importers, and not on the consumers at home.Seldom has Latin America been further from American influence. Many of the leftists'

presidents in the region consider the United States their enemy. Others maintain cordial, or even friendlyrelations with Washington, but are quick to negotiate economic deals with China.



Oil

China is investing in PEMEX now – plan pushes them out. Yang 13 (Yang Jingjie is a reporter for Global Times. Global Times a daily Chinese tabloid focusing oninternational issues. ―Increase in Mexican oil exports indicates thawing ties‖, Global Times, April 9, 2013,

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/773515.shtml#.Ueht4I1OSSo)

Observers say Mexican state oil company Pemex's decision to significantly boost oil exports to China

will help optimize the imbalanced bilateral trade structure and indicates thawing ties following theirleadership transitions. On the sidelines of the Boao Forum for Asia on Saturday, Pemex Chief Executive Emilio Lozoyasaid the company would begin increasing exports to China by 30,000 barrels a day starting this month, according to a two-yearagreement between Pemex and China's Sinopec, Reuters reported. The level of exports to China could increase over time as partof the agreement, he added. Mexico, the seventh largest oil producer in the world, exports nearly 80 percent of its oil to the US andonly some 50,000 barrels to China each month, according to China Radio International. Lin Boqiang, director of the China Center for

Energy Economics Research at Xiamen University, told the Global Times that the increase stemmed from China'spotential for growth in demand, against the backdrop of shrinking US imports as a resultof its shale boom. A report released by OPEC last week expected China to overtake the USas the world's largest oil importer by 2014. This would also diversify China's sources of oil imports, "as only

about 9 percent of the imports came from Latin America last year," Lin added. Data from the China Petroleum and ChemicalIndustry Federation showed last year nearly half of China's oil imports came from the Middle East. Yang Zhimin, aresearcher with the Institute of Latin American Studies at the Chinese Academy of SocialSciences, told the Global Times that the supply of oil is not solely decided by market demands, given its strategic

nature. "We can't rule out the possibility of US influence in Mexico's decision, but thecurrent president Enrique Pena Nieto won't follow the US as closely as his predecessordid." Pena Nieto, who is from the center-left Institutional Revolutionary Party, last year replaced rightist Felipe Calderon aspresident. Yang noted that the visit by Pena Nieto, which was paid just weeks after Xi became president, was a move aimed atmending bilateral ties. His predecessor Calderon met the Dalai Lama in 2011, drawing discontent and objection from Beijing. Yangsaid the new oil deal would also help narrow the bilateral trade imbalance. Mexico said its trade deficit with China reached $51.2billion in 2012.

Chinese pursuit for oil takes from US production – denying China risks

anti-US cooperationPierson 9 (David Pierson is a reporter for the LATimes. He is based in Beijing and covers the Chinese economy.―China's push for oil in Gulf of Mexico puts U.S. in awkward spot‖, LATimes, October 22, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/22/business/fi-china-oil22

A Chinese company's gambit to drill for oil in U.S. territory demonstrates China'sdetermination to lock up the raw materials it needs to sustain its rapid growth, wherever those resources

lie. The state-owned China National Offshore Oil Corp., or CNOOC, reportedly is negotiating the purchase ofleases owned by the Norwegian StatoilHydro in U.S. waters in the Gulf of Mexico, the sourceof about a quarter of U.S. crude oil production. China's push to enter U.S. turf comes four years afterCNOOC's $18.5-billion bid to buy Unocal Corp. was scuttled by Congress on national security grounds. The El Segundo oil firmeventually merged with Chevron Corp. of San Ramon. Whether CNOOC's second attempt to lock up U.S. petroleum assets will

trigger a similar political backlash remains to be seen. The sour U.S. economy and the need for Washington andBeijing to cooperate on potentially larger issues could mute any outcry. The U.S. could also find itdifficult to rebuff China when it has long welcomed other foreign investment in the gulf. Inaddition to StatoilHydro, foreign oil companies with stakes in deep-water projects there include Spain's Repsol, France's Total,Brazil's Petrobras, British oil giant BP and the Dutch-British multinational Shell. The U.S. risks undercutting its foreign policy goals

as well. Concern is growing over China's aggressive investment in oil-rich nations with anti-U.S. regimes, including Iran and Sudan. Denying China a shot at drilling in U.S. waters would onlyencourage Beijing to make deals in volatile regions given that new oil reserves in stable, democratic

nations are getting harder to find. "China doesn't have a lot of alternatives," said Ben Simpfendorfer, chief China

economist for Royal Bank of Scotland. "They're very late to the game."



China views Pemex as way to increase relations – lowers trade gapJohnson 13 (Tim Johnson, the Mexico bureau chief for McClatchy Newspapers. ―China‘s Xi splashes cash,

deals on leisurely trip to woo Mexico‖, McClatchy News Service, June 5, 2013,

http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2013/06/05/193101/chinas-xi-splashes-cash-deals.html#.Uehqko1OSSo) China‘s leader is a guest who brings lots of gifts and lingers. President Xi Jinping, on the second day of an unhurried three-dayvisit to Mexico, spoke to the nation‘s Senate Wednesday afternoon, then left for City Hall and prepared to visit the nation‘s most

renowned Mayan pyramid before heading on to California later in the week. Throughout his activities, Xi emphasized thatChina is upgrading its relations with Latin America, and Mexico in particular. Xi openedhis nation‘s wallet to prove it, splashing out $1 billion in credit to Petroleos Mexicanos, the state oil giant,

and pledging $1 billion in trade deals. He also vowed to strengthen cultural and educational ties, offering 300scholarships for Mexican students to study in China and announcing the opening of China‘s first cultural center in Latin America.Other accords promised cooperation in renewable energy, disease control and promotion of tourism. Xi‘s presence marked the first

official state visit of President Enrique Pena Nieto‘s six-month-old government, which hailed it as giving―new impetus‖ to ties between the two nations after passing through a cool phase. Appearing before

lawmakers, the 59-year-old Xi highlighted that he and Pena Nieto had upgraded ties to what he called a―comprehensive strategic partnership.‖ ―By doing this, we send a strong message to the international communitythat China and Mexico will form a common front to face various challenges in the future,‖ Xi said. ―The relationship between Chinaand the region is now at an important stage of accelerated development,‖ Xi said. Xi did not spell out what commercial deals were inthe offing, but the announcement appeared intended to lessen frictions over a wide trade deficit. Local news accounts said Chinesefirms are interested in building ports, highways and pipelines. Mexico is China‘s second-largest trade partner in Latin America. Buteven as total trade has risen sixfold, to more than $36 billion in 2012, a trade gap is yawning. For every $9 in goods that China sellsto Mexico, Mexico only sells $1 in goods back. China said it had agreed to permit imports of Mexican pork and tequila, and to ―abigger presence of Mexican products in China.‖ ―China is not looking for a trade surplus,‖ Xi told lawmakers. ―On the contrary…it is

ready to actively increase the import of Mexican products.‖ China also sees crude oil purchases from Mexicoas a way to ameliorate the trade gap. Mexico agreed in April to provide China with 30,000 barrels a day of crudeoil. Both Xi and Pena Nieto offered effusive words at a joint appearance, followed by a banquet Tuesday evening. The Mexicanleader described Mexico and China as ―two countries on the rise‖ that are ―strategic allies,‖ while Xi noted that both are descendedfr om ―millenary civilizations.‖ Banners of China‘s red flag with five gold stars festooned poles along the capital‘s main boulevard,Paseo de la Reforma. The visit marked a warming of relations that were chilled under two previous Mexican presidents, both ofwhom met with the Dalai Lama, spiritual leader of the Tibetan minority in China, who Beijing brands as an incorrigible separatist. Ina 33-point joint statement released Tuesday night, Mexico pledged not to interfere in China‘s affairs regarding its ―inal ienable‖ region

of Tibet and its claims on Taiwan, the independently governed island off its shores. On the sprawling Tibetan Plateau, 118 ethnicTibetans, many of them monks or nuns, have set themselves on fire since 2009 to protest Chinese rule. Xi‘s visit to Mexico drewwide coverage in media on the Chinese mainland, and is likely to boost tourism interest in Mexico, especially after Xi and his wife,Peng Liyuan, a renowned singer, tour the Mayan pyramids at Chichen Itza on the Yucatan Peninsula on Thursday. Growingnumbers of Chinese are traveling outside the mainland, but of the 93 million who did so last year, only 47,810 came to Mexico. The

joint statement said the two countries would work to promote reciprocal tourism and develop direct airline connections, both forpassengers and freight, by a Chinese airline. Xi pledged to lawmakers that ―there will be more Chinese tourists at the temples of themoon and sun‖ at the pre- Aztec Teotihuacan ruins near the capital, and more ―at Chichen Itza and on the beaches of Acapulco.‖

Xi‘s visit came amid a growing courtship of Latin America by the United States andChina, the world‘s No. 1 and 2 economies, respectively, as both nations seek to boost trade with a region that the United Nations says has l ifted 58 million people from poverty in the past decade. President Barack Obama visited Mexicoand Costa Rica last month, and Vice President Joe Biden just returned from Colombia, Trinidad and Brazil. In a column printed inthe Wall Street Journal Wednesday, Biden wrote ―the Obama administration has launched the most sustained period of U.S.engagement with the Americas in a long, long time.‖



Transport Infrastructure

China likely to invest in Mexican InfrastructureUniversia 2013 (Knowledge @ Wharton; online resource publication that offers the latest business insights, and

information and interviews with business leaders, members of Gumtree, and presidents of various universities; “NAFTA’s

‘Uninvited Guest’: Why China’s Path to U.S. manufacturing Runs Through Mexico”; Article contains interview from Kevin

Gallagher, associate professor of International relations at Boston University, 3-20-2013,

http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english)

Gallagher predicts that the next wave of Chinese exports to Mexico may well includefinished vehicles, but he argues that those Chinese-built cars are more likely to be assembled inMexico than in the U.S. “There will be Chinese automotive manufacturing plants in Mexico before there are any such plants in the U.S.

because the costs are lower [in Mexico], and it is harder to operate a plant in the U.S., where there are so many regulations .” Nevertheless,

Gallagher worries about whether Mexico‘s transportation infrastructure is up to the taskof handling huge, additional volumes of goods made within the country‘s ownborders. To overcome the significant gaps in Mexico‘s industrial and transportationinfrastructure, Gallagher suggests that Mexico approach the China Development

Bank for loans that would be used to construct and expand Mexican seaports and high-speed highways. That way, Mexico could smoothly accommodate additional volumes of imported Chinese raw materials and

components that would flow from the decision by Chinese firms to build automotive plants inside Mexico.

China looking to invest in Mexican infrastructureRegenstreif 2013 (Gary Regenstreif; news editor for Thomson Reuters; ―The looming U.S.-China rivalry overLatin America‖; Reuters; 6-12-13; http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/)

China has particular interest in Mexico, the region‘s second-largest market. Beijing has been competing with

Mexico to supply the U.S. market with manufactured goods. But China is now looking to work with MexicoCity — investing in infrastructure, mining and energy because of the expected reforms

that would open the oil industry to foreign investment.

http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english





http://www.wharton.universia.net/index.cfm?fa=viewArticle&id=2324&language=english



Venezuela



Drugs

Anti-Drug Cooperation Seen as First Step to Mend RelationsCordoba and Munoz 13 (JOSÉ DE CÓRDOBA and SARA MUÑOZ, Latin America news reporters for Wall StreetJournal,

―Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties‖, 1/9/13, web,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)

But both sides have cautiously reached out to each other since then. During their talk in November, Mr.Maduro was interested in the possibility of exchanging ambassadors again, U.S. officials say. Mr. Maduro said this month that the

contacts had been made "with the authorization" of Mr. Chávez. For its part, the U.S. prefers to move slowly. Before

restoring ambassadors, it would like to see Venezuelan instances of cooperation, U.S. officials say.

They say they would like to beef up the number of antidrug agents in the country as a firststep. "It is just going to take two to tango," Ms. Nuland said.

US Sees Drug Cooperation as First step in RelationsKappa 13 (Bradley, 1/9/2013, writer, Associated Press, ―US seeking renewed Venezuela ties after Chavez‖, web)

Washington‘s goal is a pragmatic relationship with Chavez‘s successors, even as the two

countries will likely have much to continue disagreeing over . The approach is somewhat akin to the onePresident Barack Obama adopted with Russia after taking office four years ago, hoping to eliminatethe distrust that built up during George W. Bush‘s presidency by re-establishing cooperation on issuessuch as Afghanistan and nuclear non-proliferation, while acknowledging that Moscow and Washington won‘t necessarily agree ondemocracy and the rule of law. The ―reset‖ in ties with the Kremlin has stalled amid sharp U.S.-Russian disputes over missile

defense plans and Syria‘s civil war, but the administration still fiercely defends its merits. With Venezuela, the U.S. ishoping to start with stronger counter-narcotics coordination, a challenge given that the Venezuelangovernment includes officials subject to U.S. drug ―kingpin‖ sanctions. Other American priorities include energy cooperation andstronger enforcement of sanctions against Iran. The U.S. also fears Iranian efforts to use Venezuela as a base for terrorist or otheractivity in the Western Hemisphere against American interests.

Counternarcotics Represent Key Area of China-Venezuela Cooperation

Daniel 10, (Frank, staff writer Reuters, 3-13-2010, Reuters, ―China delivers Venezuela jets for anti-drugs fight‖, web)

Venezuela on Saturday tested six training and light attack jets bought from China for defense and

anti-drugs flights in a deal that dodges an embargo banning sales of U.S. weapons parts to

oil exporter Venezuela. President Hugo Chavez ordered a total of 18 K-8 jets built by China after a plan

to buy similar jets from Brazil's Embraer fell through, apparently because they include U.S. electrical systems. "Thank you,China. The empire wanted to leave us unarmed. Socialist China, revolutionary Chinaappeared and here are our K-8 planes," he said during a televised display of the jets' capabilities.Officials at the ceremony said the versatile jets will be used to train pilots and intercept drug traffickers who use Venezuela as a stopoff point to take Colombian cocaine to the United States, Europe and Africa.

New Regime Makes Cooperation LikelyCordoba and Munoz 13 (JOSÉ and SARA, ―Venezuela, U.S. Start Talks to Mend Ties‖, Latin America newsreporters for Wall Street Journal, 1/9/13, web,http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324581504578235911777903292.html)

Both sides remain deeply suspicious of the other . Many Republicans in Congress are opposed to trying to forge anew relationship with the Venezuelan government. On the Venezuelan side, Mr. Maduro or any other potential successor to Mr. Chávez is likely to try

to claim the populist's revolutionary mantle and mimic his anti-U.S. rhetoric. But Mr. Maduro's pragmatism and his severalyears of experience on the international stage as the government's foreign minister could make him morewilling to open diplomatic channels privately, say experts and observers. "It will be very slow, very difficult, but I think

Maduro would be inclined to open up a little bit," said Michael Shifter, president of the Inter-



American Dialogue, a Washington think tank. Mr. Shifter said the subjects of drug-trafficking and terrorism remain "very

sensitive, delicate issues, and there is a lot of mistrust that isn't going to be easily overcome." greater cooperation between the two countries could

come from the private sector. With Venezuela's oil production in decline, giving the government lesspower to spend its way out of a likely recession, successors may be more willing toreopen its border once again to U.S. investment than it was under Mr. Chávez, who expandedstate control over parts of the oil sector.



General

Venezuela is under China‘s Sphere of influence now – plan impedes that.Noriega 2010 (Roger, Former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs and a former U.Sambassador to the Organization of the United States, Chávez and China: Challenging U.S. Interests ―America

Enterprise Institute‖, http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/chvez-and-china-challenging-us-interests/)

Under the cloak of Washington's indifference, Venezuelan dictator Hugo Chávez ismaking steady progress in cementing strategic relations with China, which is eager toeclipse U.S. presence in a key, mineral-rich South American economy. Russia is a source ofweapons and foreign policy clout, Iran is abetting Chávez's shadowy nuclear program, and Cuba is managing asystem of internal control and repression in Venezuela. Together with China's capital, in the form of loans andinvestments, this cadre of hostile powers has selfish motives and ruthless methods for keeping Chávez in power.China has funneled money and expertise into Venezuela's oil industry and taken anauthoritative role in improving the country's manufacturing sector and finances. With so much to gain in trade and oil,China will strive to keep Chávez in power. The United States can no longer afford to practice wishful thinking butmust recognize the threat growing in Venezuela. Key points in this Outlook: China's growing economic role

in Venezuela is a direct result of Hugo Chávez's systematic drive to supplant U.S. influence and impose a socialist system on his country. U.S. oil producers and manufacturers stand to losetheir market share in Venezuela and may soon see new competitors with Chinesebacking emerge there. The United States must abandon its policy of inaction and recognize the foreign-backed threat growing under Chávez in Venezuela. In the last six years, the People's Republic of

China (PRC) has increased its presence in Venezuela's oil industry dramatically, filling a voidas Chávez muscles out U.S. and even local expertise. More recently, China has also been providing financialsupport as Chávez grapples with fiscal chaos of his own making and looks to ramp up domestic spending on the eveof September's National Assembly elections. U.S. diplomats are loath to speak out against Chávez's antidemocratic,anti-U.S. agenda; however, in July a State Department spokesperson broke this eerie silence tosay that "we want to continue our mutually beneficial energy relationship" withVenezuela.[1] Washington's wishful thinking and passive policy are no match forChávez's tireless campaign to convert Venezuela into a bulwark for U.S. enemies.

Lack of US demand drives Venezuela to ChinaAgence France-Presse ‘13 (Largest French newspaper , publishes in English, ―Venezuela Looks

Beyond US to China As a Customer,‖ Rappler Beta, 3 -15, http://www.rappler.com/world/23924-venezuela-united-states-china-oil)

CARACAS, Venezuela - Woe is Venezuela, sitting atop the world's largest oil reserves.Production is down and its top customer, the United States, is buying less. So herecomes China to the rescue, among others, as Venezuela seeks to diversify its markets. Underthe late Hugo Chavez, Washington and Caracas had a difficult diplomatic relationship, and

they have had no ambassadors in each other's capital since 2010. But oil makes the world go round and a

buck is a buck, so pragmatism prevailed. The US remained the main destination forVenezuelan oil. But those exports have dropped, from 1.38 million barrels in 2007 to906,000 in 2012, according to figures from the US Energy Department. That poses a problem for Venezuela.The United States pays cash, unlike countries of the Caribbean and South America whichimport Venezuelan crude under preferential terms or even trade oil for services like doctorsand teachers, said analyst Diego Gonzalez. The US is importing less from Venezuela because it wants to diversify its vendorportfolio, said Rafael Quiroz, former director of the state oil company PDVSA. In 2012, Venezuelan exports to the US dropped 11%to $37.4 billion, amid higher prices for Venezuelan crude and derivatives, according to Venamcham, the Venezuelan-AmericanChamber of Commerce. The United States is seeking energy efficiency in consumption and has promoted investment andtechnology in non-conventional oil fields. It will achieve energy independence in around 2020, when it will be the world's top oil

http://www.aei.org/article/foreign-and-defense-policy/regional/asia/chvez-and-china-challenging-us-interests/







producer, says the International Energy Agency (IEA). "It is not easy to substitute a client like the UnitedStates for any old client," said Gonzalez, president of the Center of Energy Orientation. What is harder is to haveVenezuelan crude keep going to Venezuelan Citgo refineries in the US, as they do not exist in other countries. "That is hard to

transfer," said Gonzalez. Then there's China, with its booming energy demand. Venezuela hasdeveloped serious economic and political cooperation with the Asian giant. Since 2008exports of oil to China have doubled to 640,000 barrels a day. Of that, 264,000 are to pay

off loans totaling $30 billion that Beijing made to Caracas in recent years.



Loans

Loans are a tool the Chinese use to gain influence in Venezuela – plantrades off

Devereux 12, (Charlie, Economy and Government journalist based Caracas for Bloomberg magazine, formerCNN International Reporter, ―China Bankrolling Chavez‘s Re -election Bid With Loans,‖ 9-26, Bloomberg magazine,http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-25/china-bankrolling-chavez-s-re-election-bid-with-oil-loans.html)

Winning Twice The loans give the Chinese influence over Chavez, who regularly speaks of recovering

Venezuela‘s sovereignty after decades of subjugation to the U.S. ―empire.‖ In addition to securing large deliveries of oil, much ofthe money lent to Venezuela returns in the form of contracts to Chinese state-runcompanies whose global expansion is also being financed by the Beijing-based CDB, theworld‘s biggest policy lender . Among the beneficiaries are China Petrochemical Corpand the country‘s biggest oil and gas producer, China National Petroleum Corp. Bothgained stakes in Venezuela‘s oil industry after Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM) andConocoPhillips (COP) abandoned the country under the threat of nationalization.

―Venezuela‘s oil is at the service of China,‖ Chavez, 58, said in February 2009 at a meeting in Caracas with a

delegation of Chinese businessmen led by Vice President Xi Jinping.



Oil

Chavez‘s oil policies are continuing, shying away from the US in favor ofChina

Wallis 13 (Daniel Wallis, Senior Correspondent for Reuters. Daniel used to work for The Times newspaper andPA News agency in London before joining Reuters in 2003. Since then he has reported on political, general andeconomic news from across east Africa, Iraq and Latin America. ―Venezuela's post -Chavez oil policy to focus onChina, Russia‖ Reuters, Mar 15, 2013, http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315)

Venezuela's post-Chavez oil policy will increasingly focus on deals with China and Russia ifacting President Nicolas Maduro wins an April 14 election to continue his late boss's socialist programs. During his 14 years inpower, Hugo Chavez nationalized most of the OPEC nation's oil industry with the aim of putting its crude reserves - the biggest inthe world - at the service of his power base, Venezuela's poor majority. Turning away from the United States, the traditional topbuyer of Venezuelan oil, Chavez also sharply increased fuel sales to China and turned Beijing into his government's biggest source

of foreign funding. "We are not going to change one iota of the fundamental themes ofPresident Chavez's policies," Energy Minister Rafael Ramirez said in a recent interview with a local

TV station. "We have a very important strategic relationship with China, which we're going to

continue deepening and cultivating. It's the same with our cooperation with Russia ... Chavez's policiesare more alive than ever, and we will push ahead with them." Maduro, the late president's preferredsuccessor, faces Henrique Capriles, governor of Miranda state, in the forthcoming election. The vote was called after Chavez's

death last week following a two-year battle with cancer. If Maduro wins, he can be expected to increase oilsales to political allies at the expense of the United States, while taking on more debt from thosepartners. Venezuela is sending China about 430,000 barrels per day (bpd) of crude and products, up from just a few thousand bpd

in 2005, in repayment of loans totaling $36 billion. The biggest Chinese energy company, China National PetroleumCorp (CNPC), is a key part of Venezuela's efforts to tap its enormous Orinoco extra heavy crude belt, one of the planet's largest

hydrocarbon reserves. CNPC has joined with state oil company PDVSA in a joint venture in theOrinoco called Petrourica that is expected to begin producing within weeks. A PDVSA project with a Russian consortium,Petromiranda, began pumping there last year.

China benefits from Latin American regimes opposed to the US such asVenezuelaEllis 10 (R. Evan Ellis is an Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for HemisphericDefense Studies at the National Defense University. ―Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study‖, August 9,2010, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)

The rise of China is intimately tied to the global economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each

of which is highly dependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRC leadership seethe country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability of the regime,threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit that cooperation or blockglobal institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In Latin America, China'sattainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptance into the IADB in 2009 were

efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them from being used "against"Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Ricato secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practical effect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block

(the Free Trade Area of the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged. Finally, the PRC benefits fromthe challenges posed to the dominance of the United States in the region by regimes such asVenezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and its trade and investment with those regimes help to keep them economically viable.Nonetheless, as mentioned above, the PRC is careful to avoid association with the anti-U.S. rhetoric and projects of those regimes,which could damage its more strategically important relationship with the United States.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/15/venezuela-election-oil-idUSL1N0C69N220130315



http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html






China is increasing competition against the US in Latin American – specifically in Venezuelan oilBajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Master‘s degree in International Relations at the London School of Economics and

completed his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan University and the Universityof Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint King‘s-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund hisdoctoral studies. ―CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA‖, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21,

2005,http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)

Latin America is fast emerging as the major stage of competition for oil and gas resources among the global powers. The

region, which has traditionally come under the U.S. ―sphere of influence,‖ caught the attention of Chinafollowing the significant growth potential of its energy resources. Latin America is estimated to hold

13.5 percent of the world‘s proven oil reserves but accounts for only 6 percent of total output. Although China hastapped energy resources in Venezuela, Columbia, Ecuador and Peru, and has begun to tap Argentina and

Bolivia, there still exists significant room for expansion, especially given that China still depends on the

Middle East for 60 percent of its oil imports and wishes to further diversify. China‘s domestic energy needs andregional developments in the Asia Pacific region are likely to fuel Beijing‘s desire to access LatinAmerican energy resources. China, which has been a net oil importer since 1993, is the world's number two oil

consumer after the U.S., importing one third of its crude oil consumption. In the presence of sporadic power shortages, growing carownership, cross-country air travel, and the importance of energy to maintain China‘s burgeoning growth rates, pressure is mountingon China to access energy resources on the world stage. Furthermore, China‘s limited progress in accessing local energy resources due to poor relations with neighboring states (witness the Sino-Japanese dispute over the energy-rich East China Sea, the disputedstatus of the Spratly and Paracel islands and growing political instabilities in Central Asia) have forced China to search for energy

further afield. However, China's growing presence on the international energy stage couldultimately bring it into confrontation with the world's largest energy consumer, the U.S. Nowhere is theSino-U.S. energy competition more evident than in the United States‘ backyard. Thecompetition for energy resources in Latin America is unlikely to be confined to the economic sphere as seen by developments inother regions where China is attempting to access energy resources. For example, China‘s military cooperation with Myanmar,Sudan and the Central Asian republics cannot be separated from its attempts to access energy resources in these states. While not

a zero-sum game, growing interlinkages and interdependence between China and Latin America is likely tocome at the cost of the United States‘ relations with its neighbors, which will onlyundermine U.S. ability to access the region‘s energy resources. This will force the U.S. to rely on

energy resources from more remote and less stable regions, such as West Africa, the Caspian and the Middle East.Entering the U.S. ―Sphere of Influence‖ As the world‘s number five crude exporter with the largest proven oil reserves in the Western hemisphere, Venezuela isemerging as a major prize in the competition for energy resources in Latin America. While Venezuela

sells 60 percent of its crude oil exports to the U.S. and is the United States‘ f ourth largest oil supplier, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez is attempting to reduce his country‘s dependence on the U.S.market. President Chavez has stated that "We have been producing and exporting oil for morethan 100 years but they have been years of dependence on the United States. Now we are free and wemake our resources available to the great country of China." [1] Easier said than done, as China‘srefineries will have to be refitted to process Venezuela‘s heavy crude oil. Furthermore, transporting energy resources fromVenezuela and Argentina is particularly difficult given that both states are on South America‘s Atlantic coast although there havebeen discussions to overcome this by constructing a pipeline from the Atlantic to the Pacific through Panama. [2] Nevertheless,

China has made significant inroads in accessing Venezuela‘s energy resources. DuringVenezuelan President Hugo Chavez's visit to Beijing in December and Chinese Vice President Zeng Qinghong's visit to Venezuela

in January 2005, China committed to develop Venezuela‘s energy infrastructure by investing $350 million in 15 oil fields, $60 millionin a gas project as well as upgrading the country‘s railway and refinery infrastructure. In exchange, China will get 100,000 barrels ofoil a day, 3 million tones of fuel oil a year and 1.8 million tones of Orimulsion, an alternative boiler fuel from Venezuela. ChinaNational Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) has also been given significant oil and gas development opportunities in Venezuelaincluding the fields at Zumano in eastern Venezuela, which has an estimated 400 million barrels of oil.

LA countries exporting oil to China over US – gain leverageBajpaee 5 (Chietigj Bajpaee, Master‘s degree in International Relations at the London School of Economics andcompleted his Undergraduate studies in Economics and Political Science at Wesleyan University and the University



of Oxford. Chietigj has been awarded the Joint King‘s-National University of Singapore PhD studentship to fund hisdoctoral studies. ―CHINESE ENERGY STRATEGY IN LATIN AMERICA‖, The Jamestown Foundation, June 21,2005,http://www.jamestown.org/latinamerica/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=3870&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=239&no_cache=1#.Uebqy41OSSq)

China's growing energy interests in the Americas have been accompanied by a growing

involvement in the region's security. In October, in its first military deployment to Latin America, China sent a UNpeacekeeping contingent to Haiti comprising 140 Chinese policemen with plans to deploy an additional 125 personnel. Ironically,Haiti is one of only 25 states that recognize Taiwan rather than China. Recently, the issue of extending the mandate of the 6,000-strong UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), which is due to expire in June, has come under pressure from Sino-Taiwanese frictions. While UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and the interim government of Haiti have asked that the mandate beextended by one year in order to oversee the municipal, legislative and Presidential elections to be held later this year, China ispushing for only a six month extension due to a scheduled visit by interim Haitian President Alexendre Boniface to Taiwan in July.

While having to accept the humiliation of aiding a state that engages in relations with Taiwan‘s ―secessionist‖ forces, China hasgarnered the goodwill of Latin American states, which will come in handy whennegotiating energy and other deals. The U.S. is looking on with caution as Chinaencroaches upon a region that has traditionally been a major supplier of energyresources. Venezuela and Canada together provide the U.S. with a third of its energy imports. For every barrel of oilthat China purchases from Latin America there is potentially one less barrel available forthe U.S. Furthermore, as the American states reduce their reliance on the U.S. oil market,they will have greater political leverage over the U.S. on contentious issues such as

Canadian trade disputes with the U.S. over lumber and beef, and tensions over human rights abuses inVenezuela.

Venezuela hopes to increase oil exports to China, tradeoffs with USimportsRatliff 6 (William Ratliff, research fellow and curator of Americas Collection at Stanford University's HooverInstitution, specializing in Latin America, China, and U.S. foreign policy. ―Pragmatism Over Ideology: China‘sRelations with Venezuela‖, The Jamestown Foundation, March 15, 2006,http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=31481&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1#.Uebtgo1OSSo

Chavez seeks a special relationship so that China can replace the United States asVenezuela‘s chief foreign client, Burgos adds, enabling him to toss the U.S. out of Venezuelain the context of his continent-wide ―Bolivarian revolution.‖ At present, the United States imports about15% of its foreign oil from Venezuela. Late in 2005, Chavez noted that so long as the United States does not try to invadeVenezuela and overthrow him, oil will continue to flow north (ABC Nightline, September 16). In the end, however, this self-styledsuccessor to Fidel Castro seems to think Venezuela must break all economic dependence on the United States, and even a Fudan(Shanghai) University specialist sees Chavez using oil as ―a diplomatic weapon‖ (China Daily, November 22). In early February

2006 Rafael Ramirez, the president of Venezuela‘s state-run oil company Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA),

reviewed Venezuela‘s oil-related relations with China in a Caracas interview, saying ―we are hoping to send

300,000 bpd to [China] very soon‖ (Xinhua, February 9). This would be double the current amount, most of which goesinto asphalt. (Much of what China buys now is orimulsion, a low-grade, dirty fuel oil made by PDVSA from the heavy oil of the

Orinoco Tarbelt.) Venezuela‘s ultimate goal is to provide 15-20% of China‘s oil import needs.Much of that might have to come from what the United States now receives, for Chinese and

foreign sources fear that production is falling, not rising, in Venezuela.

China lacks oil security – US dominance gets in the wayPeterson 7 (Keith Alan, Lieutenant Commander in the United States Navy. ―IMPLICATIONS OF CHINA‘S GROWINGDEMAND FOR OIL: A CASE STUDY IN VENEZUELA‖, December 2007, 07Dec_Peterson.pdf)

As one energy expert states, ―petroleum has proven to be the most versatile fuel source everdiscovered, situated at the core of the modern industrial economy.‖66 Beijing certainly understandsthis and is striving to secure enough of this precious resource to meet current and future



needs. China is now the second largest energy-consumer in the world after the United States.67 China became anet petroleum importer in 1993 and net energy importer in 1996.68 Unlike the United States and other developednations, China lacks sufficient long-term relationships with energy exporters to guaranteean uninterrupted supply. This leaves Beijing in a tenuous position of securing newinternational oil sources to meet future demands in a market that is dominated by theUnited States.



Relations Link

US-Venezuela rift allows China to step inLuft ‘05 (Dr. Gal, Executive Director at the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, ―Challenge or Opportunity:

China‘s Role in Latin America,‖ Speech before senate foreign relations committee, 9-20,http://www.setamericafree.org/SenateForeignRelationsSept202005.pdf) Last but not least is Venezuela, U.S.'fourth largest oil supplier. Since April 2002, U.S. relations with Venezuelahave become increasingly acrimonious. Venezuela‘s President Hugo Chavez warned the U.S. against any

interference with Venezuela‘s internal affairs threatening that Venezuela ―has enough allies on this continent to start3 a 100-yearwar," and that "U.S. citizens could forget about ever getting Venezuelan oil." This threat is not being ignored. Secretary of StateCondoleezza Rice remarked in her confirmation hearing that two of her chief worries with regards to Venezuela are U.S.

dependence on Venezuelan oil and whether Chavez will continue to supply it. The fissure in the relations enablesChina to step in and reduce Venezuela‘s dependence on selling oil to the U.S., whichcurrently buys 60% of Venezuela‘s crude. A series of oil agreements signed in early 2005allow Chinese companies to explore for oil and gas and set up refineries in Venezuela.Venezuela‘s state run oil company PDVSA opened a marketing office in Beijing and has atarget of selling to China 300,000 barrels per day by 2012. But for now Venezuela‘s oil exports to China

are much more limited. The majority of Venezuela's exports to China as of now consist of Orimulsion, a boiler fuel alternative whichis burned by power plants to generate electricity. China‘s refineries are not equipped to refine Venezuela‘s crude. Geography is alsoa constraint. Venezuela has no access to the Pacific shore and the Panama Canal cannot accommodate the biggest tankers. Atanker trip from Venezuela to China takes 45 days. But China and Venezuela are trying to resolve these problems. In July 2004Venezuela signed a contract with Colombia to build a crude oil pipeline connecting its oil fields with a port on Colombia's Pacificcoast sparing Chinese tankers the need to traverse the Panama Canal. This could reduce the travel time by half.



Internal Links



Influence Tradeoff I/Ls

Chinese and Western Engagement Mutually Trade offEllis 13 (Evan, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an analyst ofLatin American economic, political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with

China and other extraregional actors, including India, Russia and Iran, 6-7-13, Manzella Report, ―U.S.-ChinaCompetition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America‖, web)

In Latin America, while many governments and private interests have benefitted from the PRC‘s entryinto the region, that same engagement has indirectly undermined a range of U.S. policyobjectives there, including the promotion of democracy, human rights, free trade, and the respect for contracts and rule oflaw. Although the PRC has been careful not to associate itself with the ―anti-imperialistic‖ rhetoric of the Bolivarian Alliance for the

Americas (ALBA), efforts by China Development Bank and the International Commerce Bank ofChina to expand lending has been complimented by the interest within ALBA nations tofree themselves from the constraints of borrowing from Western financial institutions. The

resulting $50 billion loaned to Ecuador and Venezuela since 2007 has proved an importantsource of liquidity for those regimes, that have enabled them to sustain anti-Westernpolicies and promote groups sympathetic to their cause throughout the region. Similarly, the willingness of Chinesecompanies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others to invest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier forthose regimes to nationalize industries and otherwise displace undesired ―Western‖corporations. Indeed, so long as ALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRC‘sindifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to ever less democratic practices, including the

suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents. Beyond ALBA, Chinese money and markets haveundercut the U.S. policy agenda across the region in areas such as financial accountability, human rights,and corruption. Argentina was able to remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of i tsmassive export-oriented soy industry, which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.

China gaining soft power from Latin America now, specifically Cuba andVenezuela

Castillo 9 (Antonio Castillo is a Senior Lecturer & Program Director At RMIT ―China in Latin America‖http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/) SJH

China's growing influence on international affairs is nowhere more evident than in LatinAmerica, a region pejoratively regarded as the 'backyard' of the United States. Latin America and the Caribbeanare the next stop in China‘s global expansion, and the first-ever Chinese white paper forthis region, released on 4 November, 2008, doesn‘t leave any doubt about China‘sintentions. Latin America has ‗abundant natural resources, a good base for economicand social growth and tremendous development potential,‘ the document says. In the November -December 2008 issue of The Diplomat, Peter Hartcher wrote of China emerging from the current financial crisis as ‗a more credibleand respected international leader‘. This is precisely China‘s image in Latin America. China is not only regarded as an alternative tothe US hegemony in the region, but it is also seen as a good and credible partner. According to the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes

Project, China enjoys a positive image among Latin American countries. China‘s aim in Latin America

these days differs dramatically from the 1960s, when the Maoist revolution was the main exporting commodity into Latin America.‗Chinese policy towards Latin America today is highly pragmatic rather than ideologicallydriven,‘ Professor Gonzalo Paz, a China-Latin American expert at George Washington University told The Diplomat. ProfessorPaz said this is a ‗new development paradigm that seems to be attractive to Latin American countries.‘ A sign of this new paradigmis the growing and wider range of bilateral agreements China has signed with Latin American countries, from education to tourism;from aviation to natural resources exploitation. The trade between China and Latin America has jumped from US$10 billion in 2000to US$102.6 billion in 2007, and Beijing has committed to increase its direct investment by around US$50 billion over the next few

years. Due to its export boom and favourable terms of trade, Latin America enjoys a healthy surplus. The Chinesediplomatic model – soft power, multipolar and non-interference – is considered as a realalternative to the US political and economic influence in the region. ‗South-south cooperation‘,

http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/

http://thediplomat.com/2009/06/18/china-in-latin-america/



‗strategic partnership of common development‘ or ‗common understanding‘ is the narrative used by Chinese leaders to frame theSino-Latin American relationship. This has been the narrative used by the considerable number of high-ranking Chinese officialswho have become frequent visitors to the region, including President Hu Jintao, who has visited Latin America three times in lessthan five years. This says a lot. Dr Adrian Hearn, a China-Latin American Researcher at the University of Sydney and author of theforthcoming book, China and Latin America: The Social Foundations of a Global Alliance, said China‘s soft power, technologytransfer and integrated development had been the key to this link. ‗The soft power exercised by Beijing relies heavily on the Chinese

communities that began flourishing in the late 19th and early 20th centuries,‘ Hearn said. The first Chinese immigrantsin Latin America arrived in Cuba in 1847 and since then have formed well-establishedChinatowns in the majority of Latin American countries. Hearn suggests, ‗Chinatowns are keyto the soft power exercised by China in the region.‘ This is especially the case in Cuba,Mexico, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama, countries with the largest number of Chineseimmigrants. ‗Chinatown‘s leaders play a central role in making connections and buildingpartnerships. China leverages ethnic locals, technology transfer, development Hearn highlights the northern Mexican city ofMexicali, the heart of the Mexican Chinese community. ‗Here Chinatown leaders have been luring Chinese investors to get involvedin the development of the frontera del silicio [silicon border] – a high-tech park for the production of semiconductors and otherelectrical products.‘ This is very much part of the Chinese growth model of building a series of industrial hubs. Technology transferis the second way the Sino-Latin American relationship is developing and, according to Dr Hearn, ‗this is. different to the UnitedStates and Europe.‘ Venezuela is one of the largest producers of oil in the world and had previously been reliant on technicians fromthe US company Chevron for drilling. China, however, is happily teaching Venezuelans how to do it themselves. China hasimplemented a lengthy training programme that has allowed Venezuelans to learn how to make drills – something that they havebeen doing since 2008,‘ says Hearn. And technology transfer is exactly what Latin American countries need desperately to improvetheir economies. Integrated development is the third way China has been able to forge relationships with Latin American countries.

For example, Cuban workers trained by Chinese technicians are manufacturing a wide range of electrical goods, from televisions toelectrical fans. These are moved to the ports by a transport system designed and developed by Chinese experts. The Cuban docks – from where the goods will be shipped to China – are no longer inefficient facilities. Chinese investors have transformed them into

world-class ports. Dr Hearn argues that soft power, integrated development and technology transferhave a political edge: ‗It is a way not to upset the US. You can build cooperation with a country and never express a

political ideology or affinity – and this is what China is doing in the case of Cuba and Venezuela.‘

China Influence Displaces US political leverageHilton 13 (Isabel, former Latin America editor of The Independent newspaper and editor ofwww.chinadialogue.net, a non-profit Chinese/English platform for environmental and climate change news andanalysis, 2-2013, The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, ―China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge?‖,web)

The availability of Chinese funds changes the Latin American political and sociallandscape in a number of ways. The Pacific nations of Peru, Chile, Panama and Mexico seek Chinese money for marketreasons unconnected with a political project, since these countries are building societies that are more consonant with U.S. than

Chinese values. In other cases, however, the availability of Chinese funds signals a loss ofpolitical leverage for the United States and permits the survival of anti-U.S. governments – in Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, for instance – that wish to pursue more radical political and social models.

China threatened by US stealing cooperation opportunitiesEllis 2011(R. Evan Ellis; Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at

the National Defense University; “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study”; Joint Force Quarterly; January 2011;

http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)

Blocking the Consolidation of U.S. Influence in the Region and Its Institutions. The rise of China is intimately tied to theglobal economy through trade, financial, and information flows, each of which is highlydependent on global institutions and cooperation. Because of this, some within the PRCleadership see the country's sustained growth and development, and thus the stability ofthe regime, threatened if an actor such as the United States is able to limit thatcooperation or block global institutions from supporting Chinese interests. In LatinAmerica, China's attainment of observer status in the OAS in 2004 and its acceptanceinto the IADB in 2009 were efforts to obtain a seat at the table in key regional institutions, and to keep them





from being used "against" Chinese interests. In addition, the PRC has leveraged hopes of access

to Chinese markets by Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica to secure bilateral free trade agreements, whose practicaleffect is to move Latin America away from a U.S.-dominated trading block (the Free Trade Area of

the Americas) in which the PRC would have been disadvantaged.

Chinese Influence is a Direct Result of US Diplomatic AbsenceMallen 13 (Patricia Rey, writer Bloomberg, 6-28-13, Bloomberg, ―Latin America Increases Relations With China: What Does

That Mean For The US?‖, web)

China has had its sights on Latin America for the past decade and is now positioningitself as a competitive trade partner in the region. The populous, rapidly developing Asian nation covets oil,soybeans and gold, of which Latin America has plenty, and has been slowly but steadily increasing its presence and its trade with

several countries there. The U.S., whose history of blocking outside political influence in LatinAmerica going back to the Monroe Doctrine, has been directing its attention elsewhere, asMichael Cerna of the China Research Center observed. ―[The U.S.'] attention of late has been focused on Iraq and Afghanistan, and

Latin America fell lower and lower on America‘s list of priorities . China has been all toowilling to fill any void,‖ Cerna said. Between 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-waytrade with Latin America by 660 percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total expor ts. China‘sshare of the region‘s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent.



LA Key to China Soft Power

Chinese influence in Latin America is key to Chinese soft power- Itprovides a basis of understanding between countries.

Ellis 2008 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis is a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation withthe Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with externalactors, including China, Russia, and Iran.‖ Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study‖http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html-SJH

This article examines Chinese soft power in the specific context of Latin America. The United States has long exercised significant

influence in the region, while the PRC has historically been relatively absent. Nonetheless, in recent years, China'seconomic footprint in Latin America, and its attempts to engage the region politically,culturally, and otherwise, has expanded enormously. Understanding the nature andlimits of PRC soft power in Latin America casts light on Chinese soft power in other partsof the world as well. The Nature of Chinese Soft Power In general, the bases of Chinese soft power differ from those of theUnited States, leading analysts to underestimate that power when they compare the PRC to the United States on those factors thatare the sources of U.S. influence, such as the affinity of the world's youth for American music, media, and lifestyle, the widespreaduse of the English language in business and technology, or the number of elites who have learned their professions in U.S.

institutions. Chinese President Hu Jintao and Cuban President Raul Castro watch signing of treaties in Havana after Hu signeddozens of trade and investment deals with Cuba It is also important to clarify that soft power is based onperceptions and emotion (that is, inferences), and not necessarily on objective reality.Although China's current trade with and investment position in Latin America are stilllimited compared to those of the United States,3 its influence in the region is based notso much on the current size of those activities, but rather on hopes or fears in the regionof what it could be in the future. Because perception drives soft power, the nature of thePRC impact on each country in Latin America is shaped by its particular situation, hopes,fears, and prevailing ideology. The "Bolivarian socialist" regime of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela sees China as apowerful ally in its crusade against Western "imperialism," while countries such as Peru, Chile, and Colombia view the PRC in more

traditional terms as an important investor and trading partner within the context of global free market capitalism. The core ofChinese soft power in Latin America, as in the rest of the world, is the widespreadperception that the PRC, because of its sustained high rates of economic growth andtechnology development, will present tremendous business opportunities in the future,and will be a power to be reckoned with globally. In general, this perception can be divided into seven areas: Hopes for Future Access to Chinese Markets. Despite China's impressive rates of sustained growth, only a small fraction of itspopulation of 1.3 billion is part of the "modern" economy with the resources that allow them to purchase Western goods. Estimatesof the size of the Chinese middle class range from 100 million to 150 million people, depending on the income threshold used,although the number continues to expand rapidly.4 While selling to Chinese markets is a difficult and expensive proposition, thesheer number of potential consumers inspires great aspirations among Latin American businesspeople, students, and governmentofficials. The Ecuadorian banana magnate Segundo Wong, for example, reportedly stated that if each Chinese would eat just oneEcuadorian banana per week, Ecuador would be a wealthy country. Similar expressions can be found in many other Latin Americancountries as well. In the commodities sector, Latin American exports have expanded dramatically in recent years, including Chileancopper, Brazilian iron, and Venezuelan petroleum. In Argentina, Chinese demand gave rise to an entire new export-oriented soyindustry where none previously existed. During the 2009 global recession, Chinese demand for commodities, based in part on amassive Chinese stimulus package oriented toward building infrastructure, was perceived as critical for extractive industriesthroughout Latin America, as demand from traditional export markets such as the United States and Europe fell off. Beyondcommodities, certain internationally recognized Latin American brands, such as José Cuervo, Café Britt, Bimbo, Modelo, Pollo

Campero, and Jamaican Blue Mountain coffee, sell to the new Chinese middle class, which is open to leveraging its new wealth to"sample" the culture and cuisine of the rest of the world. Unfortunately, most products that Latin America has available to export,including light manufactures and traditional products such as coffee and tropical fruits, are relatively uncompetitive in China andsubject to multiple formal and informal barriers to entry. Despite the rift between hopes and reality, the influence of China in thisarena can be measured in terms of the multitude of business owners who are willing to invest millions of dollars and countless hoursof their time and operate in China at a loss for years, based on the belief that the future of their corporations depends onsuccessfully positioning themselves within the emerging Chinese market. The hopes of selling products to China have also exerteda powerful impact on political leaders seeking to advance the development of their nations. Chilean presidents Ricardo Lagos andMichelle Bachelet, for example, made Sino-Chilean trade relations the cornerstone of Chile's economic policy, signing the first free-trade pact between the PRC and a Latin American nation in November 2005. Peruvian president Alan Garcia made similar efforts toshowcase that nation as a bridge to China when it hosted the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in November 2008.Governments in the region have also invested significant sums of money in the China-related activities of trade promotion

http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html-

http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html-



organizations such as APEX (Brazil), ProChile, ProComer (Costa Rica), Fundación Exportar (Argentina), and CORPEI (Ecuador),among others, as well as representative offices in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and other Chinese cities, with the objective ofhelping their nationals to place products in those countries. Latin American leaders, from presidents to mayors, lead delegations tothe PRC and fund elaborate pavilions in Chinese culture and trade shows such as the Canton Trade Fair and the Shanghai WorldExpo in an effort to help their countries' businesses sell products in the PRC. Hopes for Future Chinese Investment. China'scombination of massive sustained trade surpluses and high internal savings rates gives the PRC significant resources that many inLatin America hope will be invested in their countries. Chinese president Hu Jintao helped to generate widespread awareness of thepossibility of Chinese investment in the region during his trip to five Latin American countries in 2004, specifically mentioning tens of

billions of dollars in possible investment projects. A public controversy over whether his use of the figure $100 billion was actuallyreferring to trade or investment has only called more attention in Latin America to China as a potential source of funds. Although the

expected Chinese investment was initially slow to materialize, today, thanks to China's growing familiarity withdoing business in Latin America, and its enormous financial reserves (including aforeign currency surplus that had reached $2.5 trillion by mid-20105), the PRC has begunto loan, or invest, tens of billions of dollars in the region, including in high-profile deals such as: $28 billion in loans to Venezuela; $16.3 billion commitment to develop the Junin-4 oil block in Venezuela's Orinoco oil belt$10 billion to Argentina to modernize its rail system; $3.1 billion to purchase the Argentine petroleum company Bridas $1 billionadvance payment to Ecuador for petroleum, and another $1.7 billion for a hydroelectric project, with negotiations under way for $3billion to $5 billion in additional investments more than $4.4 billion in commitments to develop Peruvian mines, including Toromocho,Rio Blanco, Galleno, and Marcona $5 billion steel plant in the Brazilian port of Açu, and another $3.1 billion to purchase a stake inBrazilian offshore oil blocks from the Norwegian company Statoil; a $10 billion loan to Brazil's Petrobras for the development of itsoffshore oil reserves; and $1.7 billion to purchase seven Brazilian power companies. For Latin America, the timing of the arrival ofthe Chinese capital magnified its impact, with major deals ramping up in 2009, at a time when many traditional funding sources inthe region were frozen because of the global financial crisis. Moreover, as Sergio Gabrielli, president of the Brazilian national oil

company Petrobras has commented, China is able to negotiate large deals, integrating government and private sector activities inways that U.S. investors cannot.6 Influence of Chinese Entities and Infrastructure in Latin America.Although the presence of Chinese corporations and workers in Latin America pales bycomparison to that of the United States, it is growing and exerting an increasing weightin select countries.

Chinese soft power is contingent on having influence in Latin AmericaWiest 11 (Nailene Chou teaches financial journalism at the School of Journalism and Communication, TsinghuaUniversity ―Soft Power and China's Story in Latin America‖ Caixin Online 11.09.2011 http://english.caixin.com/2011 -11-09/100324170.html)

The Spanish expression "cuento chino," or "Chinese story" is a synonym for "tall tale." It's a fitting expression for our times, since China's size,

population and spectacular economic achievements of late have inspired grand fantasies across Latin America.¶ Barely a decade ago, China was the world's seventh-largest economy. Now, by the reckoning of the International Monetary Fund, China willovertake the United States and become the world's largest economy in 2016.¶ No wonder the developing

world is held in thrall. There's likewise a prevailing readiness to accept and emulate China, which inturn has given China a golden opportunity to extend its cultural soft power abroad. Indeed,

promoting soft power overseas was a policy goal recently declared by the Chinesegovernment. The initiative recognizes that a nation's success on the world stage, as Harvard University's Joseph Nye once said, "depends not

only on whose army wins, but also on whose story wins."¶ Yes, the story is important. Now, China needs a convincing narrative.¶ The China-Latin America attraction is easy to understand. China provides a growth model as acounterweight to the United States. Latin American countries have tried one failed development model after another only tofind themselves, unlike the dynamic economies of East Asia stuck in a slow-growth rut.¶ State-led import substitution policies mired these countries inself-imposed isolation and inefficiencies. Neoliberal policies in line with the Washington Consensus led to dependency on fickle capital inflow.¶ China'seconomic success, achieved via controlled economic liberalization and by expanding technical capacities in order to attract f oreign investment, offers aviable alternative.¶ In the second half of the 20th century, Mao Zedong's doctrine of guerrilla warfare – which once shone like a beacon guiding ferventrevolutionaries in South America – faded into the Andean jungles. But since launching its capitalist transformation, China has avoided ideologicalexports. It carefully keeps a safe distance from leftist politics in Venezuela and Bolivia, while adhering to mercantilist policies: Doing business forbusiness' sake.¶ Latin American countries that today count China as their No. 1 trading partner, such as Brazil, Chile and Peru, have benefitedenormously as Chinese commodity purchases boosted export revenues and helped them weather the 2008 financial crisis. In contrast, countries overlydependent on the United States, such as Mexico, were hurt more than others during that recent downturn. With the U.S. economy in recession, cash-rich China is now in a unique position to invest in capital-intensive projects.¶ "Cuento chino" is more relevant than ever this year amid buzz over anUS$ 8 billion railroad project scheduled to link two Colombian cities: the port of Cartagena on the Caribbean Sea, and Buenaventura on the PacificOcean. This would be an engineering feat that arguably only the Chinese could accomplish: A 220-kilometer railway across floodplains and threemountain ranges, and through a region marred by drug-trafficking violence.¶ The rail project's plans sparked wild speculation about China's intent andwhat some said was an unabashed incursion into America's backyard. The story got more intriguing when the railway started being called a "canalseco," or "dry canal," by those who guessed ships would be ferried on railroad cars from sea to sea.¶ Infatuation with China, however, can quickly turnto antipathy. An economic powerhouse China may be, but it can hardly be called a gentle giant. It's actually a voracious monster, gobbling crude oil,minerals and natural resources, wreaking havoc on the environment, blithely emitting unacceptable amounts of the carbon dioxide that causes global



warming.¶ China as "la fabrica del mundo" – the factory of the world – arouses fear and resentment, as more than 90 percent of Latin Americanmanufacturing exports are threatened by Chinese competition. No wonder some 60 percent of all anti -dumping cases launched against China at the

World Trade Organization were filed by Latin American countries.¶ Latin America's perceptions of China are stilllargely shaped by international media. The Chinese government's soft-power Confucius Institutes, i f managed well, couldbring greater understanding of China.¶ A Colombian woman I recently met said she is keen to learn the Chinese language but confesses she's moredrawn to Tibetan Buddhism than the moral teachings of that ancient sage, Confucius. In predominantly Catholic countries, China as an atheist country

does not go down very well.¶ Bonding China and Latin America calls for a narrative that resonates. For

a country of 1.3 billion people with a per capita GDP no higher than Colombia or Peru's, China has shared experiences and futurehopes to tell to other emerging economies. Finding the right story will be crucial for softpower policy to succeed. Otherwise, the game will be lost even before it begins.

LA is key to soft powerGill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor atthe John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, ―Sources and Limits ofChinese 'Soft Power'‖, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13)

Farther abroad, Beijing's soft-power influence is felt in the Middle East, Latin America and Africa.The BBC poll found that of seven countries in these regions, six have either a majority (Lebanon, South Africa, Chileand Brazil) or a plurality (Argentina and Mexico) favouring Chinese influence in the world. It is particularly interesting

that China receives favourable ratings from countries in Latin America whosemanufacturing sectors face significant competition from China. When asked about China's

economic influence, 54% of Mexicans surveyed see it as positive, and only 18% have a negative view. Theexistence of like-minded states in these regions and the attractiveness of China'sdevelopment model have facilitated Beijing's quest for market, natural resources andpolitical influence. Under President Lula, Brazil has agreed to recognise China as a 'market economy', whichwould make it harder to impose penalties on China for dumping exports. Ideological sympathies were reported to playan important role in forging Brazil's policy toward China.35 In Iran, two of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei'sforeign-policy advisers are big champions of the Chinese model - former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati and hisformer deputy, Abbas Maleki.56 With their blessings, Iran looks to steadily increase its linkages with countries to itseast, such as China and India.57

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf





Zero – Sum

Latin American countries treat U.S./China influence as zero-sumDosch and Goodman, 12 (Jörn, Professor of International Relations and Deputy Head of School(Research) at Monash University, Professor of Chinese Politics at the University of Sydney, ―China and Latin

America: Complementarity, Competition, and Globalization,‖ Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 1/2012: 3 -19, page11-12, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/493/491, accessed 7/18/13) PEOverall, there can be little doubt that particularly some of the leftwing – and as it seems, by default, more Washington-critical – Latin American governments perceive a partnership with Beijing as a welcome

means of soft-balancing or hedging against traditional US hegemony in the region. While LatinAmerican governments may rightly complain about both a frequent lack of serious attention onthe part of the United States and the latter‘s rather narrowly defined national security interests in its relations withits hemispheric neighbours, why should they be interested in replacing a decades-long dependency on the UnitedStates by a new dependency on China? Is there any convincing economic reason for Latin American countries to playthe China card in an attempt to balance against the United States? China is an increasingly important

factor in Latin America, but it is one among many. David Shambaugh (2008) accurately stresses that Latin American countries ―embrace China as part of their new multidirectional diplomacy‖. Multidirectional is the key wordhere. All Latin American governments have diversified their foreign relations. Their main interest is

moderating US hegemony, not substituting it. As part of this strategy and particularly in times of economic

hardship such as in the wake of the global economic crisis of 2008 –09, every trade and investment opportunity iswelcome. States in the era of globalisation are best described as rational opportunity maximisers. This applies to Latin

America as much as to East Asia; it is true for Vietnam or South Korea in the same way as for Peru or Mexico. The

result of opportunity-maximising in Asia –Latin America relations is a growing and fast-tightening (but not yet deeplyinstitutionalised) trans- Pacific network comprising trade, investment, political and even security links in both bilateraland (increasingly) multilateral contexts. China is a founding member of the Forum for East Asia –Latin AmericaCooperation (FEALAC), a permanent observer at the Organization of American States (OAS) and has expanded itsdiplomatic ties to the Group of Rio, the Andean Community, and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

China US Relations are Zero SumMenendez 13 (Fernando Menéndez, an economist and principal of Cordoba Group International LLC, 3-28-13, China USFocus, ―The Counterbalance in America‘s Backyard‖, web)

From the perspective of Latin America‘s foreign policy makers, China is undeniably a welcomeeconomic, and potentially political, counterbalance to the U.S., especially given the objectives of some Latin

American countries. Despite its preoccupation with the Middle East and its recent economic troubles, the U.S. remains a

predominant actor in the region, and only the presence of a country capable of projecting superioreconomic and political power could significantly shift the balance of forces away fromthe current hegemon. Moreover, unlike the former Soviet Union – once described as a third world country with nuclear

weapons – China has the economic resources to create an alternative locus of financing,trade and development. China‘s foreign policy has long sought stable and positive relations with the U.S. in order toensure optimal conditions for domestic economic growth. Economic considerations often proved paramount to its foreign policy,

avoiding tensions where possible. Nevertheless, as China projects itself in the Americas, conflicts withthe United States are likely. As the U.S. loses market share, faces higher costs for raw

materials, as American investors find fewer opportunities, and especially if

Latin Americannations try to entangle China in regional tensions, U.S. political and military moves in East Asia may raise

China‘s cost of doing business in the Americas. Similarly, perceived or actual ties between some Chinesecompanies and the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA) will undoubtedly raise concerns fromAmerica‘s national security apparatus.



Latin American influence is a zero sum gameKreps and Flores-Macias 13 (Sarah E. Kreps, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University andGustavo A. Flores-Macías, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University. ―No Strings Attached? Evaluating China‘sTrade Relations Abroad.‖ The Diplomat 17 May 2013. Web.) http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/ EW

To be sure, China may not have a purposeful plan to bring their trade partners into alignment

on foreign policy questions. Even if unintentional, however, this ― gravitational effect ‖ has asound economic basis. Developing countries in Africa and Latin America are comparatively much more dependent onChina than China is on these countries. In a ten year period, for example, Sudan‘s trade with China rose from 1 to 10% of its GrossDomestic Product. That pattern is even starker in a country like Angola, for which trade with China represented 25% of its GDP in

2006. While China certainly needs access to the resources in these countries, the individual countries are farless important to China than China is to these countries. The asymmetry in needs gives

China a bargaining advantage that translates into foreign policy outcomes even if not by explicitdesign. Whether by design or not, the convergence with China‘s foreign policy goals isimportant on at least two levels. First, developing countries in Africa and Latin America may be lulledby the prospect of partnering with a country such as China that does not have an explicitpolitical agenda, as did the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, but this appears to be anillusion. Whether this reaches the level of ―new colonialism‖ as former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton referred to it remains to beseen, but the economic asymmetries that undergird the relationship make that prospect more likely.A second set of implications

deals with the United States. During the same period in which China‘s trade with Africa and LatinAmerica and foreign policy convergence have increased, the United States and Chinahave actually diverged in their overall UNGA voting behavior . This suggests something ofa zero sum dynamic in which China‘s growing trade relations make it easier to attractallies in international forums while US influence is diminishing. Taken together, these trendscall for greater engagement on behalf of the United States in the developing world. Sincethe September 2001 attacks, Washington has dealt with Africa and Latin America throughbenign neglect and shifted its attention elsewhere. If foreign policy alignment does follow from tightercommercial relations, the US ought to reinvigorate its trade and diplomatic agenda as an important means of projecting influenceabroad.

http://thediplomat.com/china-power/no-strings-attached-evaluating-chinas-trade-relations-abroad/







A2: Africa Resources Sufficient

China needs Latin American resourcesCaspary 8 (Georg, advisor to the governments of Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Honduras, Guatemala and Bolivia,―China Eyes Latin American Commodities,‖ Yale Global Online, Online, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-eyes-latin-american-commodities, accessed 7/16/13) PELatin America is increasingly attractive as a source for large emerging economies withrising commodity import needs. The recent large find of oil and gas in Brazilian waters has only added to thatattraction.¶ Thus, with their large reserves of commodities, especially non-renewable resources in high demand fromthe global market, Latin American countries should be in the catbird‘s seat, calling shots and setting prices. Yet,despite the allure of the region for resource-hungry emerging economies like China, the cards are not necessarilystacked in Latin America‘s favor. Unless the region develops policies of sustainable development and transparent

transactions, the advantages it enjoys from its riches could prove to be limited.¶ Latin America produces 47percent of the world‘s soybean crop, 40 percent of copper and 9.3 percent of its crude oil – and in five years Brazilian oil will add to that. China needs an increasing amount of such commodities

both as inputs in its fast industrialization process and for private consumption, given thenation‘s rapidly rising living standards. Its commodity imports are set to rise at lower double -digit rates until at least2020. Annual average oil and copper import growth rates have recently been 10 times higher

than average import growth rates for the rest of the world.

African resources aren‘t enough – China needs raw materials and exportmarkets in Latin AmericaValencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, ―US and

China: The Fight for Latin America,‖ World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Onlinehttp://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE

During the first weekend of June, U.S. President Barack Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping met in California todiscuss cyber espionage and territorial claims in the Pacific Rim. While tension on these topics has hogged theheadlines, the fight for influence in another area could be even more important—LatinAmerica. Other emerging markets in Africa, where China has an overwhelming influence due

to foreign direct investment in mining and oil, also offer economic opportunities, but Latin Americahas an abundance of natural resources, greater purchasing power, and geographicproximity to the United States, which has long considered Latin America as its ―backyard.‖

http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/china-eyes-latin-american-commodities



http://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america






A2: U.S./China Don‘t Compete

The U.S. and China inevitably compete – they‘ve got eyes on the sameprize

Regenstreif, 13 (Gary, Editor of special projects at Reuters, ―The looming U.S.-China rivalry over Latin America,‖ Reuters, JUNE 12, 2013, Online, http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/, accessed 7/18-13) PEThough the U.S. and Chinese presidents heralded a ―new model‖ of cooperation at their

weekend summit, a growing competition looks more likely. The whirlwind of activity before PresidentBarack Obama met with President Xi Jinping in the California desert revealed that Beijing and Washington‘ssights are set on a similar prize — and face differing challenges to attain it. Their focus is Latin Americaand the prize is increased trade and investment opportunities in a region where economic reforms havepulled millions out of poverty and into the middle class. Latin America is rich in the commodities and energy that bothChina and the United States need, largely stable politically and eager to do deals. Consider the travelitinerary: Obama visited Mexico and Costa Rica last month. Vice President Joe Biden recently went toColombia, Trinidad and Tobago and Brazil. Chile‘s president paid Obama a visit last week, Peru‘s leader arrived

Tuesday and Brazil‘s is due in October. Meanwhile, just after Biden left Trinidad, Xi arrived, part of a tour that also

took him to Costa Rica and Mexico to promote trade and cooperation. Both U.S. and Chineseofficials, however, are finding a more self-confident Latin America, able to leverage its new strength to forge betteragreements and find multiple trading partners. That will likely force Washington to work harder to maintain its leadingtrade position against China — which has money to burn in the region. ―There is a more energetic [U.S.] tone, a moreoptimistic mood about economic agenda in second term than [the] first time,‖ Michael Shifter, president of the Inter - American Dialogue, a Washington policy group, told me. ―There‘s something happening in the regionand the U.S. wants to be part of it. Whether there‘s a well-thought-out vision or policy remains a question.But there is more of an affirmation of the region and a willingness to engage.‖







A2: China Hurts LA Econ

China doesn‘t hurt Latin America because they want to import differentthings, instead it provides them with new markets

Chen and Chen, 13 (Kayla, intern at VOX Global, Xiangming, founding Dean and Director of the Center forUrban and Global Studies and Paul Raether Distinguished Professor of Global Urban Studies and Sociology at TrinityCollege in Hartford, ―China And Latin America: Connected And Competing – Analysis,‖ Eurasia Review, June 17,2013, Online, http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-and-latin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/, accessed 7/17/13) PEChina‘s stronger economic ties with Latin America are generating concerns in some LatinAmerican countries that the Asian superpower is quickly outcompeting them. In the short term

though, China‘s demand for raw materials helps to raise direct exports from Latin America.Since Latin American countries and China have different export structures, the former isnot as threatened by China‘s rapid market penetration as assumed, with the clear exception of Mexico. According to Kevin Gallagher, a specialist on international economic development, ―Mexico is the only country inLatin America whose comparative advantage has been moving in the same direction as the comparative advantageof [India and China],‖ and faces strong commercial competition.11 Interestingly though, the head -to-headeconomic competition between China and Mexico has shifted around to either‘s favor in turns.

http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-and-latin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/

http://www.eurasiareview.com/17062013-china-and-latin-america-connected-and-competing-analysis/



Impact



Soft Power



China Soft Power Up

Chinese soft power increasing nowJaime A. Florcruz (Beijing Bureau Chief and correspondent at CNN, Newsweek reporter, TIME magazine writer),

3- 30-12, CNN, ―China works hard to project soft power,‖ http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/florcruz-china-soft-power)

After investing tens of billions of dollars in Southeast Asia, China has now decided thatits vaunted economic power , which has bought it significant influence with regionalgovernments, is not enough. Beijing now wants to be loved, too. In this brave new world of Chinesediplomacy, language and culture -- and, yes, pop songs -- are playing a major role in Beijing‘s quest to be understoodand, if all go well, win the affection of Southeast Asia's 600 million people. Its uncharted territory for a governmentthat until recently appeared to care very little about how it was perceived outside of China. "The Chinesegovernment is paying much more attention to public diplomacy than before," said Yang

Baoyun, a Southeast Asia expert at Peking University in Beijing. "The government has realized thatpeople are important, and that cultural exchange can supplement traditional diplomacy." On Nov. 18-20, Cambodia will host Barack Obama, Wen Jiabao, and other world leaders at the ASEAN Summit. As

the United States pivots from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and re-engages with the 10 countries of ASEAN, the Association of South East Asian Nations, much of the focus at the summit will be on Washington's ability to revive itsflagging diplomatic influence. But in the contest for public opinion, which the United States is accustomed to leadingwithout challenge, the landscape is shifting. The Chinese government, with the help of large

companies and thousands of young language teachers willing to relocate overseas, has launched anambitious cultural diplomacy effort designed to clean up its image, which has been soiled by anumber of high-profile scandals in the region, including investment projects that have resulted in land grabbing andenvironmental damage. To counter these negative perceptions, Beijing has overseen an explosion oflanguage schools, exchange programs, bookstores, and cultural corners. The effortbegan in earnest in 2004 when Hanban, an organization that falls under the Ministry of Education, beganestablishing Confucius Institutes at universities around the world.

Chinese soft power increasing in Latin America – cultural exchangesFarnsworth, 12 (Eric, vice president of the Council of the Americas and Americas Society, ―Memo to

Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,‖ Americas Quarterly, Summer 2012, Online,http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth, accessed 7/19/13) PEThis will be an increasingly important issue because China is laying the groundwork for a long-termrelationship. Its toolkit goes beyond commercial engagement. It includes studentexchanges and the export of Chinese language studies through the Confucius Institutes, which have

spread like kudzu across Latin America since the first institute was opened in South Korea in 2004. There isnothing inappropriate or frightening about student exchanges or language study. Indeed, U.S. and European

officials understand that these initiatives are unrivaled instruments of soft power. Theyintroduce students to another culture and, presumably, provide them at an early age with positiveimpressions of the host nation. As well, mastery of another language can lock in futurepatterns of trade and investment, travel and tourism, research and scientific exchanges, and

eventually, government-to-government relationships.

http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/30/world/asia/florcruz-china-soft-power







A2: Culture blocks Soft Power

Nye is wrong – china‘s economic soft power is working in the nations itneeds to work in

Dynon 13Nicholas a Macquarie University Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), International Communication and is coordinator of theLine 21 project Academic and former diplomat with a research focus on country and regime branding andcontemporary propaganda media. ―Success of China's soft power campaign can't be gauged by rich countries‖Global Times 7-7-2013 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794405.shtml#.Uelff43VCSo SCTM

US political scientist Joseph Nye claims that the leaders of China and Russia just don't get hisconcept of "soft power." ¶ In an article published in Foreign Policy in April, he reminds us that soft powersprings from individuals, the private sector and civil society. China and Russia, Professor Nye points out, "make themistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power."¶ Clearly there is dissonance between Nye'ssoft power and the strategies followed by Beijing and Moscow in their respective pursuits of it. But are they all talkingabout the same "soft power?"¶ Hong Kong University's David Bandurski, charting the appearance of the term "softpower" in Chinese print publications from 1998 to 2008, has identified massive growth in the importance of theconcept. ¶ Usage of "soft power" in Chinese newspapers grew from a negligible number of appearances in 2003 to

around 7,500 in 2008. ¶ A closer look suggests that China's increasing interest in soft power has less todo with Nye than it does with an ongoing focus on the unprecedented growth of its own nationalpower and the need to measure it, assess it and control its implications.¶ Usage of the term"comprehensive national power" (CNP) first appeared in the mid-1980s, when it was suggested by some Chinesescholars considering various national power equations as methods for analyzing the international balance of power. ¶

Huang Shuofeng of China's Academy of Military Science, a founder of the CNP concept, writes that the CNP "refersto the combination of all the powers possessed by a country for the survival and development of a sovereign state,including material and ideational ethos, and international influence as well." ¶ As Deng Xiaoping once stated, "inmeasuring a country's national power, one must look at it comprehensively and from all sides."¶ As part of the CNPequation, the soft power concept, rendered in Chinese as ruanshili, has evolved in Chinese discourse into a range ofconcepts quite distinct from that envisaged by Joseph Nye. ¶ As Nye has pointed out, polls show that opinions

of China's influence are positive in Africa and Latin America, but not so much in the developed

world. ¶ China's approach to soft power doesn't resonate as much with the rich nations of the world as it does

with much of the developing world where Beijing's traditional non-alignment and aid work has

had positive reputational results.¶ Similarly, as the same international polls indicate, China's reputation athome far exceeds its reputation within the developed world. ¶ An emergent China is unsurprisingly perceived far morepositively by its own population relative to how it is perceived by publics in Europe, North America and developedEast Asia. ¶ Beijing's idea of soft power appears to be working relatively well across large

tracts of the developing world for whom its emerging success shines as a relevant alternative to Westernmodels. ¶ Beijing's "internal" soft power also appears to be doing nicely in articulatingChina's national power ascendancy to its own increasingly globalized population. ¶ Andwhile many Western policymakers and media commentators pen a pervasive narrative of concern in relation toChina's rise, how much of the rest of the world is actually listening?¶ Does Nye's comment that China doesn't quite get his version of soft power really matter? Probably not. They have their own.

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794405.shtml#.Uelff43VCSo

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/794405.shtml#.Uelff43VCSo



Asia Stability Mpx

Chinese soft power is key to Asian trade and interdependence – that‘s keyto regional stability

Garrison 5 (Jean, Director of Global & Area Studies Program at the University of Wyoming, Spring 05, ―China'sprudent cultivation of "soft" power and implications for U.S. policy in East Asia‖, Asian Affairs: An American Review,32.1, Academic OneFile)

China's patience, confidence, and rising economic power translate into a growing pool of"soft" power, giving China increasing influence in East Asia and the global economic system.(1) China's policy approach represents the sophisticated neomercantilist view that globalization has altered the waynations compete for power. China acknowledges that acceding to international and regional rules-basedorganizations and agreements has become a sovereignty-enhancing mechanism rather than a limit to its autonomy.In the near future China will primarily follow agreed-upon international practices, although it is increasingly moving inposition to directly shape the system itself. China's growing soft power is not inherently a threat to U.S. interests, buthow the United States responds to this change in the coming years will shape prospects for future stability in East

Asia and the global economic system. China's "Good Neighbor" Diplomacy A few years ago China's dominance offoreign direct investment (FDI) in the East Asian region, speedy regional economic growth, and military spendingincreases were cast in zero-sum terms in East Asia, emphasizing the dangers associated with China's growingshadow. (2) Cognizant of this apprehension, China launched an aggressive campaign to alleviate those fears byestablishing closer political, economical, and cultural ties with its neighbors. Tangible examples of China's newdiplomacy include bilateral efforts along various fronts in the 1990s when it settled long-term border conflicts withRussia and Vietnam, adopted a pragmatic approach to settle disputes over the Paracel, Spratly, and SenkakuIslands, and aided its neighbors during the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis. Seeking a Free Trade Agreement (FTA)with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has become a cornerstone of China's most recent efforts topromote the benign view of its rise. At the October 2003 ASEAN Summit, China continued FTA negotiations andbroadened the dialogue to promote peace and security through China's accession to the Treaty of Amity andCooperation (TAC)--the first of its kind that China has signed with a regional grouping. China also proposed using the

ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to form a conference to increase communication among Asian militaries. Although the ARF largely remains a confidence-building mechanism rather than a means of preventive diplomacy, it servesChina's goal to reassure other countries in the region as to its peaceful intentions. China has seized the politicalinitiative from the Japanese who, in response, launched bilateral free-trade talks of its own and acceded to the TAC(Korea has made similar moves for FTAs with Singapore and Japan). China has broadened its efforts by seeking

FTAs, outside the ASEAN structure, with Australia and New Zealand. A possible FTA with India has been discussedas well. The prominent exception to China's savvy diplomatic initiatives is its relationship with Taiwan. The dangerouszero-sum nature of China's rhetoric surrounding Taiwan's recent election demonstrates the continuing sensit ivity ofthe issue in Chinese politics. However, because maintaining the cross-strait status quo is necessary for continuedstability and economic growth, China has reason to opt for patience. Beijing's logical policy will be to maintain thestatus quo. China's Lure and Growing East Asian Economic Interdependence East Asian states and Taiwanrecognize that economically, China has become the new game in town. Asian trade isflourishing due to China's huge market for industrial components, raw materials, food,and other consumer products. A close relationship has developed between China'simport growth and increasing exports to other Asian countries. In contrast, Japan is nowrecovering from a decade-long decline and its current recovery appears dependent on China. In 2003, growth of totalexports of China's trading partners stemmed from exports to the People's Republic of China (PRC): almost a one-third increase for each of Japan and Korea's totals and a 68-percent increase for Taiwan, according to U.S.government reports. A large percentage of the trade with Japan, Korea, and Taiwan is in the form of components

destined for export to other markets as finished products--commonly, shipments to the United States. States inthe East Asian region recognize the need to take advantage of their closeness to Chinato become an active supplier of fuel or intermediate goods in China's export engine. Thistrend is reflected in the increasing two-way trade between ASEAN countries and China since 1990--which ASEANreports to be an average increase of 20 percent annually, while ASEAN-Japan trade is on the decline. In addition,China's willingness to tolerate trade deficits with regional states (such as the $14.8-billion trade deficit with Japan,$23 billion deficit with Korea, $16.4 billion deficit with ASEAN states, and $40 billion deficit with Taiwan in 2003according to Chinese Customs statistics) adds to the interdependence, with China at the center. East Asianinvestment patterns further strengthen regional interdependence. First, East Asian states



invest heavily in China. China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) reports that 61 percent of China's FDIinflows in 2002 originated in Asia, with Hong Kong leading at 34 percent with the remainder of the figure attributed toJapan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Macau, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, and Indonesia. Second, China hasalso begun to encourage outward FDI into East Asia through its "Go Forth" policy. According to an United NationsConference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report, China's overall investment in ASEAN countries grew from$400 million in the 1980s to $2.9 billion in 2002. The investment is heavily resource-based, with oil and gas in

Australia, Indonesia, and Thailand, although Chinese manufacturing is poised to expand its investment. For example,

Thailand seeks an opportunity for direct investment from China with the idea that Chinese companies may aim toescape regulatory barriers, overcapacity at home, and even higher land and labor costs in China by relocating toThailand. As regional fears have calmed, a sense of common purpose has emerged.Growing economic interdependence with China provides new incentives for states in theEast Asian region to promote a stable framework for bilateral relations to maintainprosperity. Japan focuses on strengthening China's regional economic ties for development to prevent a pattern

of power projection in the region. For other countries, the more formal stake in China's futuredevelopment, such as ASEAN's FTA negotiations with China and Japan, gives themleverage in negotiations with both countries and "power of say" in the region'sdevelopment. Even the Taiwan issue potentially reinforces the status quo. East Asiancountries generally value stable economic ties over Taiwan's independence and registerlittle enthusiasm over Taiwan's quest for freedom.

Nuclear warDibb, 01 – emeritus professor of strategic and defence studies at The Australian National University (Paul, Winter.―Strategic Trends: Asia at a Crossroads.‖ Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, Issue 1. Ebsco.)

The areas of maximum danger and instability in the world today are in Asia, followed by the Middle

East and parts of the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation in Asia is more uncertain and potentially threatening than anywhere in Europe. Unlike in Europe, it is possible to envisage war in Asia involvingthe major powers: remnants of Cold War ideological confrontation still exist across the Taiwan Straitsand on the Korean Peninsula; India and Pakistan have nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, and these two countries are more confrontational than at any time since the early

1970s; in Southeast Asia, Indonesia--which is the world's fourth-largest country--faces a highly uncertain future that could lead to its breakup. The Asia-Pacificregion spends more on defense (about $150 billion a year) than any other part of the world except the United

States and Nato Europe. China and Japan are amongst the top four or five global military spenders. Asia also has more nuclear powersthan any other region of the world. Asia's security is at a crossroads: the region could goin the direction of peace and cooperation, or it could slide into confrontation and militaryconflict. There are positive tendencies, including the resurgence of economic growth and the spread of democracy, which would encourage an optimistic view. Butthere are a number of negative tendencies that must be of serious concern. There are deep-seatedhistorical, territorial, ideological, and religious differences in Asia. Also, the region has nohistory of successful multilateral security cooperation or arms control. Such multilateral institutions as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the ASEAN Regional Forum have shown themselves to be ineffective when confronted with major crises.



China Rise Mpx

China soft power is key to their overall powerGill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor atthe John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, ―Sources and Limits of

Chinese 'Soft Power'‖, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13)

Analysis and debate concerning China's rise is focused almost entirely on the economicand military aspects of its growing power.1 Yet 'soft' sources of power - including culture,political ideology and diplomacy - are increasingly recognised as essential componentsof Great Power status. It seems odd that the subject of soft power is either missing from discussions of China,

or misapplied. While China is constrained in many ways in the exercise of such power, its soft-powerresources are considerable and demand scrutiny.

That‘s key to the global economy and stability – the impact is nuclear warBuzan 4 (Barry, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science,

2004, ―Does China Matter? A Reassessment‖, New York, Questia, p. 145 -147)

The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of amajor power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a

general rule, the status of great power , and more so superpower, requires not only that the stateconcerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediateregion, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The US clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole,and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and itsdesperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it thegreat-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach

itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind ofgeopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus

depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able toreassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - getting most or all of itsneighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But ifChina inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India,and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will bediminished. Since the US is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is atodds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In

their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region thereare several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. Theimportance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In

the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become thecentral hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the US. It projects an acceptablepolitical and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of somecombination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Itseconomy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it isacknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up asimilar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the US, and China is able to use the regional institutions created

by ASEAN rather as the US uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear toantagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a largerglobal role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds inpositioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' statusalong with the US and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear






in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the US deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japanand possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with US support.Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both thestatus and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of

conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on theglobal stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material

forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquirehegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce US-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine thefactors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relationswith its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the US and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of itsinternal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by twovariables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because itsdevelopment runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threateningforce in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative

(because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development faltersand it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to theglobal stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond

to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that abreakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmentaltroubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider

economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major politicalcollapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failednuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benignand malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, ashappened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence waswhat underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.



Immigration Mpx

China soft power is key to attract foreign studentsGill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor atthe John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, ―Sources and Limits of


Foreign student enrolment has also seen dramatic growth. Within a decade, total enrolment ofinternational students in China (excluding those from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau) increasedthreefold to no,844.6 Over 75% of students are from Asia, with South Korea and Japan consistently sending themost.7 A growing number of students, though, are from Southeast Asia, a region that accommodates the majority ofoverseas Chinese and has a centuries-old history of Chinese-language education. Students from Vietnam, forexample, have increased more than sixfold over the past six years.8 While a major influx of international students inChina is driven by the country's booming economy, this dramatic growth in foreign enrolments also

reflects China's role as the cultural magnet of Asia. According to the Ministry of Education, overthree-quarters of foreign students went to China to study academic disciplines of generalcultural concern (Chinese language, arts, history, philosophy and traditional Chinese medicine).9

That‘s key to China-EU relationsXinhua 13 (China.org, 5/1/13, ―Chinese gov't to support international students‖,

http://www.china.org.cn/china/2013-05/01/content_28704250.htm, acc. 7/19/13)

The Chinese government will support about 50,000 international students in China in 2015, and

the country will become the largest Asian destination for such students in 2020, high-level Chinese officialssaid on April 25. About 320,000 overseas students came to China in 2012, the majority from South Korea and the United States,said Liu Jinghui, secretary-general of the China Scholarship Council. Last year, the ministry implemented the 12th Five-Year Plan(2011-15) for the education sector, she said. According to the plan, in 2015, the number of international students in China supportedby the government's scholarship program will reach 50,000. While Europe has become the second-largest destination for Chinesestudents abroad, "only about 35,000 students came from EU member states to study in China last year, so we will promote China'seducation system in Europe now," Liu said. Du Yubo, vice-minister of education, said that by 2020, about 500,000 international

students will be in China, enabling the country to become the largest Asian destination for international students. China and

the European Union will deepen education and exchange cooperation this year, said Europeancommission and Chinese government officials at the first meeting of the EU-China Higher Education Platform for Cooperation and

Exchanges, which was held on Thursday in Brussels. "We should learn from each other's strong points,and boost cooperation in various areas," Du said. In 2013, the Chinese government will provide 1,087

scholarships to 27 EU countries, the ministry said. "The Chinese government has been payingclose attention to cooperation projects between China and Europe. Our cooperation hasa long history, a lot of achievements and potential," said Jan Truszczynski, director general for Education,Training, Culture and Youth of the European Commission. China has established 105 Confucius Institutes in about 20 EU member

states, and joined hands with the European Commission to set up three programs in three Chinese universities. For instance, theEU has injected 17 million euros ($22.16 million) to establish the China-EU School of Law withthe China University of Political Science and Law, one of the top law schools in the country.

China-EU relations are key to solve climate changeBalme 9 (Richard, Centre for European Studies and Tsinghua University, School of Public Policy andManagement, June 2009, ―Global Warming Politics: the EU, China and Climate Change‖, http://sciencespo -globalgovernance.net/node/23, acc. 7/18/13)

The European Union (EU) and China were to a large extent at the core of the process wherebyclimate change became a prominent issue in international relations. Supported by thesensitivity of European public opinion on environmental issue, its preference formultilateralism, and by its own policy expertise, the EU was from the onset very active in






promoting international agreements on climate. As the United States eventually failed to ratifythe Kyoto protocol signed by the Clinton Administration, and remained reluctant to negotiations on climate under Georges

Bush presidencies, the EU was able to assume leadership among developed countries on theissue. As evidence about human influence on climate change accumulated, the tension between energy-intensive modes of

development and the capacity to mitigate climate change also became more apparent. As the most populated andfastest growing economy of developing countries, China‘s environmental policy and

attitude with regard to climate change regime became increasingly scrutinized. Its record offirst CO2 emitter surpassing the USA for the first time in 2008 was widely noticed, and China is frequently vilainized for its dirty

growth model and its global consequences. China nevertheless developed a significant policy to addressclimate and energy issues over the recent years. To a large extent, the limited stepsaccomplished so far at the global level in climate change policy largely relied on theconvergence of policies and cooperation programs between the EU and China.

Warming is an existential riskMazo 10 – PhD in Paleoclimatology from UCLA Jeffrey Mazo, Managing Editor, Survival and Research Fellow forEnvironmental Security and Science Policy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 3-2010,―Climate Conflict: How global warming threatens security and what to do about it,‖ pg. 122

The best estimates for global warming to the end of the century range from 2.5-4.~C above pre-industrial levels,depending on the scenario. Even in the best-case scenario, the low end of the likely range is 1.goC, and in the worst'business as usual' projections, which actual emissions have been matching, the range of likely warming runs from3.1--7.1°C. Even keeping emissions at constant 2000 levels (which have already been exceeded), global temperaturewould still be expected to reach 1.2°C (O'9""1.5°C)above pre-industrial levels by the end of the century." Withoutearly and severe reductions in emissions, the effects of climate change in the secondhalf of the twenty-first century are likely to be catastrophic for the stability and security of countries

in the developing world - not to mention the associated human tragedy. Climate change could evenundermine the strength and stability of emerging and advanced economies, beyond theknock-on effects on security of widespread state failure and collapse in developingcountries.' And although they have been condemned as melodramatic and alarmist, many informed observers

believe that unmitigated climate change beyond the end of the century could pose an existentialthreat to civilisation." What is certain is that there is no precedent in human experience forsuch rapid change or such climatic conditions, and even in the best case adaptation to

these extremes would mean profound social, cultural and political changes.



North Korea Mpx

Chinese soft power is key to prevent North Korean proliferation andconflict

Pei 3 (Minxin, The Financial Times, 3/12/03, ―A Docile China is Bad for Global Peace‖, Carnegie Endowment,http://carnegieendowment.org/2003/03/12/docile-china-is-bad-for-global-peace/2vyo, acc. 7/19/13)

This question may strike many in Beijing as absurd. Keeping a low international profile, maintaining astable relationship with the US and capitalising on globalisation to spur economicgrowth have served the country well. Why change? Indeed, few would dispute that, onbalance, Beijing's foreign policy has demonstrated increasing maturity andsophistication. Yet, China's handling of the crises in Iraq and North Korea also shows therisks and costs of passivity. It is time the leadership re-evaluated the geopoliticalassumptions underlying Chinese foreign policy. In the crises in Iraq and North Korea, thedesire to keep a low profile has led China to adopt a more ambiguous stance and losewhatever influence it may have had in shaping their resolution. Unlike Russia, which has taken a

more proactive approach, China has been missing in action. Its position on the use of force

against Iraq is unclear. Its declared goal of keeping nuclear weapons out of the Koreanpeninsula has not been accompanied by visible diplomatic measures. Inaction becomesharder to defend when one considers what is at stake for China. Its immediate economicinterests in Iraq are modest. But because of its growing dependence on Middle Eastern

oil, which accounts for 60 per cent of imports, it may better serve its interests by getting moreactively involved and taking a clear stand. Quiescence risks marginalisation. In dealingwith an unfolding nuclear confrontation in North Korea, Beijing's inaction hasdisappointed its friends and irked Washington. Although it does not have to toe the US line toward

Pyongyang, China needs to come up with an alternative to Washington's policy of nonegotiation. If it allows the crisis to spiral out of control, it could be dragged into anuclear maelstrom with devastating consequences for peace and prosperity in theregion. In a world where the threats from rogue states and international terrorism are at

least as dangerous as rivalry among major powers, Beijing can better defend its interestsby modifying its diplomatic strategy. While it should continue a policy of co-operationwith the US, it must use its growing influence to assume a more active role in theinternational community. This may require Beijing to break some old habits, such as its aversion tosubstantial participation in peacekeeping missions, reluctance to increase its financial contributions to the UnitedNations, and abdication of any leadership role in multilateral organisations. Chinese leadership will benecessary above all in reshaping its own volatile neighbourhood. To be sure, its initiative to

establish a free-trade zone with the Association of South-East Asian Nations is a good start. But Beijing can domuch more to allay the fears of its neighbours about China's growing power. This mayrequire it to adopt a new two-pronged regional strategy. First, China should use its cloutto push for regional integration and co-operation. On the top of this agenda should beexpanded regional free trade. Despite Tokyo's lukewarm response to Beijing's proposal for a Japan-China-

Asean free trade agreement, China should continue to push this initiative. Second, Beijing needs to mend its frayedties with Tokyo, where sinophobia is at a feverish level. To reassure Japan, China must be more transparent about itsmilitary modernisation, stop using Japan's war guilt as a diplomatic tool, and start treating it as a full co-equal partnerin maintaining peace and prosperity in East Asia. A genuine Sino-Japanese reconciliation is the requisite for regionalcollective security. No doubt, this may seem an ambitious agenda for China's new foreign policy team. It also goesagainst ingrained thinking in Beijing's diplomatic strategy. But if Chinese leaders do not seize the currentopportunity to reshape their regional environment, others will do it for them - and notnecessarily to their liking.



North Korean conflict escalates and goes nuclearHayes & Hamel-Green, 10 – Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for Security and SustainableDevelopment, AND Executive Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Education and Human Development act Victoria University(1/5/10, Executive Dean at Victoria, ―The Path Not Taken, the Way Stil l Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsulaand Northeast Asia,‖ http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)

The international community is increasingly aware that cooperative diplomacy is the most productive way to tackle the multiple, interconnected global challenges facing

humanity, not least of which is the increasing proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. Korea and Northeast Asia areinstances where risks of nuclear proliferation and actual nuclear use arguably haveincreased in recent years. This negative trend is a product of continued US nuclear threat projection against the DPRK as part of a general program ofcoercive diplomacy in this region, North Korea‘s nuclear weapons programme, the breakdown in the Chinese-hosted Six Party Talks towards the end of the Bush Administration, regional concerns over China‘s increasing military power, and concerns within some quarters in regional states (Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) about whether US

extended deterrence (―nuclear umbrella‖) afforded under bilateral security treaties can be relied upon for protection. The consequences of failingto address the proliferation threat posed by the North Korea developments, and relatedpolitical and economic issues, are serious, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the wholeinternational community. At worst, there is the possibility of nuclear attack1, whether byintention, miscalculation, or merely accident , leading to the resumption of Korean Warhostilities. On the Korean Peninsula itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North

Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. Even a limited

nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions. But the catastrophewithin the region would not be the only outcome. New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly thanglobal warming. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2(by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to

32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to adecrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg‘s view: That is not global winter,

but the nuclear darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature than at any time duringthe last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the

continents would also follow…The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grainproduction than 5% and it will continue for many years...hundreds of millions of peoplewill die from hunger …To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into thestratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth‘s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not

the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwindradiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions

of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the globaleconomy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financialcrisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear

weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be manyunanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequentnuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including possible loss-of-control overfissile material or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reactionaffects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but aglobal one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf





Resources Mpx

China soft power is key to their resource access – that‘s key to economicgrowthHunter 9 (Alan, Professor and Director of the Centre for Peace and Reconciliation Studies at CoventryUniversity, ―Soft Power: China on the Global Stage‖, Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 2,http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/content/2/3/373.full.pdf, acc. 7/19/13)

Competition for resources is now a key issue for all major powers. As the largest in population among alldeveloping countries, and with the fastest growing manufacturing base, China‘s need fornatural resources is truly enormous. One analyst recently showed that among 10 countries withpopulations of over 100 million, China is second from bottom as regards indigenous natural resources: only Japan isworse off. As population growth puts even more pressure on resources, effective politicalhandling of resource issues is thus essential, because shortages could threaten thefuture of the country. Maintaining stable resource supplies, therefore, is a factor crucialto determining whether or not China can continue its development trajectory in the 21st

century.23 The West now fears competition from China for access to global resources,particularly oil and gas.24 Henry Kissinger has mooted competition over hydrocarbon resources in comingyears as the most likely cause of international conflict.25 As Hu Jintao showed at an Asian summit in 2005, Beijingleaders are also well aware of the issue. Hu stated that achieving balanced and orderly growth through properhandling of the energy issue is a Chinese priority: China would focus on energy conservation and effective use ofresources, as well as fresh exploration and new imports. But to satisfy its demand for oil and other resources Chinamust explore many different options on every continent.26 The government announced in 2002 a new policyencouraging its three major national oil corporations to ‗go out‘ (zouchuqu) and ensure secure overseas energysupplies: through direct purchases, exploring and drilling programmes, constructing refineries, and buildingpipelines.27 The Chinese oil demand between 1993 and 2002 grew by almost 90%, and now stands at around 6million barrels a day, some 40% of which has to be imported. Conversely, about 40% of oildemand growth worldwidefrom 2000 to 2004 is attributable to China.28 In November 2004, Chinese President Hu signed 39 commercialagreements with Latin American countries; investments in Argentina alone amounted to US$ 20 billion. On a latervisit in 2005, Vice-President Zeng signed a key agreement with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez on oil and gasexplorations; China also announced it would extend favourable trade credits to Cuba. By 2005, China had offeredmore than US $ 50 billion of investment to countries within the US ‗backyard‘, and has pursued a similar strategy insub-Saharan African countries. Chinese businesses are participant in many projects, including major infrastructuredevelopment; corporations also invest heavily in oil production, notably in the Sudan, Angola, and Nigeria.29 Anonline newspaper report in December 2005 evidenced the fierce competition between China and the USA for African‗black gold‘.30 China‘s potential competition with the USA in West Asia and North Africacould be an even more sensitive issue than that in Latin America and East Asia. ‗Thepotentially explosive combination of a China less willing to passively accept USleadership and the prospect of competition between China and other states for controlover vital energy resources poses particularly critical challenges to U.S. interests in theMiddle East.‘31 Frequent high-level exchange visits between Beijing and West Asian leaders endorse economicties. Altogether, reflecting the title of a recent study, China is a future hegemon whose rise inevitably engenders newtransnational dynamics. We have therefor e explored China‘s need to avoid military conflict, itsmassive economic development, and its need to secure resources as important contextsfor Chinese soft power in the 21st century.32 The author believes that the climate change is anotherfactor which will become even more urgent and prominent in the immediate future.

Resources and growth are key to CCP stabilityZweig and Jianhai, 05 (David, director of the Center on China's Transnational Relations at the Hong KongUniversity of Science and Technology, and Bi, post-doctoral fellow at the Center, Foreign Affairs, ―China‘s GlobalHunt for Energy‖, September/October, proquest)



An unprecedented need for resources is now driving China's foreign policy. A boomingdomestic economy, rapid urbanization, increased export processing, and the Chinese people's voracious appetite for cars areincreasing the country's demand for oil and natural gas, industrial and construction materials, foreign capital and technology. Twentyyears ago, China was East Asia's largest oil exporter. Now it is the world's second-largest importer; last year, it alone accounted for31 percent of global growth in oil demand. Now that China is the workshop of the world, its hunger for electricity and industrialresources has soared. China's combined share of the world's consumption of aluminum, copper, nickel, and iron ore more thandoubled within only ten years, from 7 percent in 1990 to 15 percent in 2000; it has now reached about 20 percent and is likely todouble again by the end of the decade. Despite calls by Prime Minister Wen Jiabao and other politicians to cut consumption of

energy and other resources, there is little sign of this appetite abating. Justin Yifu Lin, director of the China Center for EconomicResearch at Peking University, in Beijing, says the country's economy could grow at 9 percent per year for the next 20 years. These

new needs already have serious implications for China's foreign policy. Beijing's access to foreign resources isnecessary both for continued economic growth and, because growth is the cornerstoneof China's social stability, for the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Since China remains arelatively centralized, government-driven economy, Beijing has been able to adapt its foreign policy to its domestic developmentstrategy. Traditional institutions, such as the Foreign Affairs Leading Small Group of the CCP, are still making the key decisions, buta more pluralistic environment is emerging and allowing business leaders to help shape foreign policy. The China Institute forInternational Studies, a government think tank, holds numerous conferences bringing together academics and leaders in business,the military, and the government to devise strategies for the top rung of the Communist Party.

Regime instability causes lashout and nuclear warRenxing, 05 (Sen, staff writer, The Epoch Times, (a privately owned Falon-Gong linked newspaper) August 3,

2005, ―CCP Gambles Insanely to Avoid Death‖ http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html)

Since the Party‘s life is ―above all else,‖ it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to theuse of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to postpone its life. TheCCP, that disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, coupledwith seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. The ―speech,‖ free of all disguises, letsthe public see the CCP for what it really is: with evil filling its every cell, the CCP intends to fight all of mankind in its desperateattempt to cling to life. And that is the theme of the ―speech.‖ The theme is murderous and utterly evil. We did witness in Chinabeggars who demanded money from people by threatening to stab themselves with knives or prick their throats on long nails. Butwe have never, until now, seen a rogue who blackmails the world to die with it by wielding biological, chemical, and nuclear

weapons. Anyhow, the bloody confession affirmed the CCP‘s bloodiness: a monstrous murderer, who has killed 80 million

Chinese people, now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.

http://www.theepochtimes.com/news/5-8-3/30931.html





Taiwan Independence Mpx

China soft power key to prevent Taiwanese independenceGill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor atthe John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, ―Sources and Limits of


A most intriguing example of China's soft power can be seen in its relations with Taiwan. In2005, China launched a charm offensive against the politicians and people in the island by inviting opposition partyleaders to visit the main-land, extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese studying at mainland universities, and, througha zero-tariff policy on imports of Taiwan's fruit, offering export incentive perks to farmers in the south of Taiwan(traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). This 'hearts-and-minds' policy not only aims toreduce the perception of military threat from China, but also gives the Chinesegovernment leverage to exercise influence in Taiwan's political culture and society, and

politically marginalise Taiwan's independence-oriented president, Chen Shui-bian. In part as a resultof Beijing's manoeuvres in recent years - and Chen's increasingly frustrated but worrisome responses - thepossibility for Taiwan independence seems more distant and difficult. Chen Shiubian hasincreasingly alienated American supporters in Washington who do not appreciate what they see as his provocative

political stance on cross-Strait issues. In the meantime, some 1 million, or about 5%, of the Taiwan population livesand works in China, and Taiwan business has invested more than sioobn on the mainland. To be sure, some ofChina's influence over Taiwan is not so 'soft' at all: its military build-up along the Taiwan Strait, including thedeployment of more than 700 ballistic missiles targeting the island, is a coercive threat aimed at thwartingindependence moves by Taiwan. On the other hand, the Taiwan legislature's inability or unwillingness

since 2001 to appropriate funding to purchase some $18bn worth of weapons offered by Washington -

a seemingly wise course in the face of China's growing military clout - is another indication of themainland's ability to shape policy decisions on Taiwan in its favour. Beijing's influence still fallsfar short of achieving reunification with Taiwan. Indeed, the vast majority of Taiwan's citizens prefer a status quowhich neither invites Chinese coercion (or worse) nor requires unification with the Communist mainland. But acombination of Beijing's soft- and hard-power instruments in recent years appears to havestemmed the political fortunes of the pro-independence movement in Taiwan for the timebeing.

The impact is China/Taiwan war which goes nuclearO‘Hanlon adjunct professor at John Hopkins and lecturer at Princeton and Bush, 07 [Michael, ―A war like no other: the truth

about China's challenge to America‖, p. google books]

War between China and Taiwan is a distinct possibility. Such a war could easily drag inthe United States, pitting the worlds only superpower against its main rising power and

thus leading to the first serious conflict in history between nuclear weapons states . Itseems inconceivable, in this day and age, that the United States and China could really wind up in war.Their mutual interests in cooperating are so strong, their economies are so intertwined,the dangers of war are so enormous, and the number of other problems for them toworry about is so great that it would seem the height of foolishness for the two hugepowers ever to come to blows. There is much truth to this, Indeed, as we have argued in chapter three, most of the reasons whvChina and the United States could theoretically fight do not in the end hold water . But the Taiwan

problem is different . Not only does it involve a third actor over which neither Beijing nor Washington has control.

Not only does it involve a territory that China sees as an integral part of its own nationand that the United States sees as a long-standing, stalwart, and democratic friend. In addition, theway that a China-Taiwan crisis could begin and escalate would hold the inherentpotential for escalation to direct superpower war . This chapter explains whv. The- next chapters get into the dynamics of what






could happen if that war began, how it might be terminated before getting extremely serious—but also why it could be tough to control. The overall message is sobering.

Even if the chances of war between the United States and China are less than 25 percent— indeed, even if

they are less than 10 percent—they are far from zero. And given the enormous

consequences of any such war, in terms ol immediate danger as well as last ing effects on the international system, every effort must be

made to prevent it . World War I did not seem very likely to most world leaders in 1912 or 1913 either; certainly a

horrible four-year struggle, followed two decades later by an even worse world war , was not predicted. Wemust avoid dire mistakes of that era and take seriously the possibility of a war that, even if unlikely already,

must be rendered more unlikely still. In short, the reasons whv that war could occur, are as follows: First. Chinareally does consider Taiwan its own, and even as i t has arguably adopted a more subtle and sophisticated approach to the Taiwan challenge in

recent years, it has explicitly kept the threat of force on the table.1 Second, Chinas militarycapabilities are growing last even as Taiwan's begin to stagnate, meaning that Beijing could sense an opportunity—if it can keep the United States out of

the light Third, Taiwan could push the sovereignty' issue in away that China interprets as thepursuit of full independence. While China would probably be wrong in reaching any such con- clusion,

perceptions could matter more than reality in such a situation . Fourth, while Washington's commitment to Taiwan

is long- standing, it is also somewhat ambiguous, so leaders in China might convince themselves that the United States real!)' would sit out a China-Taiwan war.



Economy Mpx



1nc

China Sphere of Influence in Latin America critical to Chinese growthEllis 11(Evan, a professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, ―Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study‖ NDU press. 1st quarter 2011http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdfSCTM)

Access to Latin American Markets. Latin American markets are becoming increasingly valuable forChinese companies because they allow the PRC to expand and diversify its export baseat a time when economic growth is slowing in traditional markets such as the United States and Europe. Theregion has also proven an effective market for Chinese efforts to sell more sophisticated,higher value added products in sectors seen as strategic, such as automobiles,appliances, computers and telecommunication equipment, and aircraft. In expanding

access for its products through free trade accords with countries such as Chile, Peru, and Costa Rica, and penetrating marketsin Latin American countries with existing manufacturing sectors such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, the PRC has oftenhad to overcome resistance by organized and often politically well-connected established interests in those nations. In doing so,

the hopes of access to Chinese markets and investments among key groups of

businesspeople and government officials in those nations have played a key role in thepolitical will to overcome the resistance. In Venezuela, it was said that the prior Chinese ambassador toVenezuela, Zheng Tuo, was one of the few people in the country who could call President Chávez on the telephone and get aninstant response if an issue arose regarding a Chinese company.¶ Protection of Chinese Investments in and Trade Flows from the

Region. At times, China has applied more explicit pressures to induce Latin America to keepits markets open to Chinese goods. It has specifically protested measures by the Argentine and Mexicangovernments that it has seen as protectionist: and, in the case of Argentina, as informal retaliation, China began enforcing alongstanding phytosanitary regulation, causing almost $2 billion in lost soy exports and other damages for Argentina.14

http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf

http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/images/jfq-60/JFQ60_85-91_Ellis.pdf



Now Key For China Econ

China is at a crtical transition point, they need long-term sustained growthto keep up the world economy

Xinhua July 15,2013―Three international organizations: China's economy has reached critical period of transition‖ Xinhua http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-has-reached-critical-period-of-transition.html SCTM

Xinhua Beijing, July 15 (Xinhua) (Reporter Hanjie An Bei) 15, National Bureau of Statistics released the first half of China's economygrew 7.6 percent, the Xinhua News Agency reporters Di Yishi and Jian Lianxian interviewed the IMF [microblogging], the AsianDevelopment Bank, World Bank [microblogging] three international institutions relevant experts.¶ Look growth: Economic growth of7.6% in the world what it means?¶ 'The U.S. economy is expected to grow 1.7 percent this year, the euro zone average negativegrowth, Japan may reach 2%, Russia is expected to increase 2% ......' In the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Research

Department chief economist Olivier Blanchard Seoul seems that China's current economic growth isundoubtedly a major highlight of the global economy.¶ 'The economic growth of 7.6% in line withexpectations.' Asian Development Bank Resident Representative Zhuang Jian, senior economist, told reporters that although the

year in the second quarter, China's economic growth slowed down continuously reproduced, but the decline is ¶

Around the world, the world economy is still slow growth, and presented 'three-speed'

growth pattern: China to lead the emerging market countries continue to maintain the 'fastest growing legion' advantage, theU.S. economy is steadily recovering, the vast majority of European countries are still struggling with difficult times.¶ At the same

time, China, Brazil, India and other emerging economies, growth is slowing collective confirmsan important signal: After years of rapid growth, the emerging economies are gradually enteringthe 'deceleration zone.'¶ Blanchard also noted that China's economic growth slowdown. Few days ago,IMF updated forecasts for the global economy of the agency predicted that China's economic growth this year of 7.8%, comparedwith April predictive value of cut 0.3 percentage points . 'China is becoming an economic slowdown affecting the global economy isone of the three new risks.' Blanchard said.¶ On Risk: China should avoid pursuing short-term economic growth superficial¶ NationalBureau of Statistics data show that the first half of the investment in China's economic growth is still the largest engine, contributionto GDP ratio reached 53.9%.¶ Blanchard said that a large investment in China's economic growth, but a lot of investment from the

shadow banking, which makes the Chinese macro-control policy-makers face a dilemma: If you continueto maintain high investment, it will exacerbate overcapacity and credit risk, but if thetightening credit control investment will result in slowdown in economic growth.¶ 'China

should pay more attention to the quality of investment, to avoid the pursuit of short-termeconomic growth superficial.' Zhuang Jian said.¶ Zhuang Jian pointed out that the investment plays an important rolein developing countries, China's current development is inseparable from the support of investment, but the investment structureand quality is very important.¶ 'If there is insufficient economic structure adjustment and upgrading of industrial structure, continue toincrease investment will only make the problem more severe overcapacity will further exacerbate the local debt and credit risks.' He

said.¶ In this regard, Blanchard believes that although China's economy is still at risk, but the macro-control policymakers, there is still enough space for policy control to prevent rapid decline in economic growth.¶ Seeking good way: China's

economy has slowed down to a critical period of structural adjustment¶ In a globalizedworld, China's economy can achieve sustained and healthy development of the globaleconomy is essential.¶ Blanchard noted that the global economy to achieve sustainable and balanced development, the

major economies are facing the task of structural adjustment reforms. For China, a policy to focus on improvinggrowth potential and increase spending on economic growth driven role. 'If say when theopportunity to achieve this transformation, it may be right now. '¶ 'China's economy continues toyears of rapid growth, has been the need to slow down to adjust the structure to the way a critical stage.' Zhuang Jian pointed out

the factors supporting China's economic growth is changing, China urgently looking for a new economicgrowth point, and widespread Consensus is to slow down the growth rate, in both the economic growth, more emphasis onimproving the quality and efficiency of economic growth.

Chinese Economic collapse causes warKaminski 7 (Antoni Z., Professor – Institute of Political Studies, ―World Order: The Mechanics of Threats

(Central European Perspective)‖, Polish Quarterly of International Affairs, 1, p. 58)

http://www.best-news.us/news-4907485-Three-international-organizations:-China-39s-economy-has-reached-critical-period-of-transition.html









As already argued, the economic advance of China has taken place with relatively few corresponding changes in the politicalsystem, although the operation of political and economic institutions has seen some major changes. Still, tools are missing thatwould allow the establishment of political and legal foundations for the modem economy, or they are too weak. The tools areefficient public administration, the rule of law, clearly defined ownership rights, efficient banking system, etc. For these reasons,

many experts fear an economic crisis in China. Considering the importance of the state for the development of the

global economy, the crisis would have serious global repercussions. Its political ramifications could be no lessdramatic owing to the special position the military occupies in the Chinese political system, and the existence of many potential

vexed issues in East Asia (disputes over islands in the China Sea and the Pacific). A potential hotbed of conflict isalso Taiwan's status. Economic recession and the related destabilization of internal policies could lead toa political, or even military crisis. The likelihood of the global escalation of the conflict is high,as the interests of Russia, China, Japan, Australia and, first and foremost, the US clashin the region.



China Key to Global Econ

Chinese slowdown is bringing down economies all over the worldAFP 13 (―Chinese slowdown casts shadow over world economy‖ Jul 17, 2013

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.htmlSCTM)

LONDON: China's slowdown cast a shadow over Europe and Asia on Tuesday, sparkingquestions over Beijing's ability to avoid a hard landing that would wreak havoc on theworld economy, analysts said.¶ The nation's powerhouse economy slowed to 7.5-per-cent growth in the second quarter,

down from 7.7 per cent in the previous three months, official data showed Monday.¶ "China is a key downside risk tothe global economy. Recent data does suggest that the economy is sluggish," VTB Capital economist Neil MacKinnon told

AFP.¶ "In addition, the authorities are concerned about the rapid rate of credit expansion and theimpact it might have on inflation. This rules out any near-term monetary or fiscal stimulus."¶ New evidenceemerged Tuesday of the impact of slowing Chinese growth in Europe, which is still strugglingto recover from the eurozone's long-running sovereign debt crisis.¶ Investors inGermany, Europe's biggest economy, turned gloomy this month on fears over fallingexports to China, in a stark illustration of the new globalised power of the Asian nation's industry and consumers.¶

Germany's investor confidence index, calculated by ZEW economic institute, fell by 2.2 points to 36.3 points in July. Thatdisappointed analysts' forecasts for an increase to 40 points.¶ "New dark clouds have started to black out growth prospects of theGerman economy," said ING DiBa economist Carsten Brzeski.¶ "These clouds are not coming from the South but from the East.The stuttering and now slowing Chinese economy is a clear cause of concern (and) could become a new risk factor for the Germaneconomic outlook."¶ China is now the fifth most important single export market for German companies and accounts for some sixper cent of total exports.¶ The Asian Development Bank meanwhile warned Tuesday that China's slowing growth was weakening

momentum and trimmed its outlook for developing Asia this year to 6.3 per cent, from 6.6 per cent.¶ The sluggishnesscomes as "China is attempting to rebalance its economy away from investment towards amore consumer-driven economy," said Currencies Direct analyst Alistair Cotton.¶ But this rebalancing would presentgrowth opportunities for the West, he noted.¶ "The big winners, should they crack the market, will be consumer companies withstrong brand identity," he said.¶ "The losers are likely to be the countries supplying the raw materials for Chinese investment,conversely the ones that were doing so well in the last decade."¶ Daiwa Capital Markets economist Chris Scicluna added thatmarkets were eager to see an "orderly" Chinese slowdown that would not disrupt the world economy.¶ "China's support for globaldemand has been welcome over the past couple of years as the West has had to work off the excesses of the pre-Lehman era,"Scicluna told AFP, in reference to US bank Lehman Brothers whose collapse in 2008 triggered a global slump.¶ "A slowing ofChina's growth, over the medium term, to a sub-7.0-per-cent rate was always inevitable as the economy matured.¶ "The mainconcern is that the authorities there can engineer an orderly slowdown -- ie. one that does not see growth plummet sub-5.0 per centand lead to financial and social crisis."¶ Gekko Markets analyst Anita Paluch added that the West had relied on booming China tohelp overcome a fierce recession which followed the global financial crisis.¶ "Slower growth will have impact on those countries whohave strong trade links with China -- like Australia, Brazil and (the) South East Asia region -- as demand will fall," Paluch said.¶

China is vital for the smooth functioning of global economies because the Asian powerhouse nation isa major consumer of commodities, like crude oil, steel, and copper, and of manufactured products like cars and airplanes.¶ At thesame time, China is also widely regarded as the workshop of the world, and its vast factories benefit from low labour costs and highvolume production.¶ But the International Monetary Fund cut its global economic growth forecast last week, citing the increased"possibility of a longer growth slowdown" in emerging market economies like China.¶ Scicluna added Tuesday that all nationsaround the world needed to return to "appropriate" levels of growth to create a balanced global economy.¶ "Over the long run wewould hope to have all economies running at their potential," he told AFP.¶ "It will, however, be a long time before Europe's

economies have returned to that position. My big fear is a very abrupt Chinese slowdown with disorderly consequences."¶ But dueto the poor quality of Chinese economic data and lack of information about risks in theChinese banking sector, "it is difficult to gauge with any confidence the probability of

that happening," he said.

Banking crisis in China creates collapse if growth isn‘t sustainedFisher June 20 2013Max Fisher is the Post's foreign affairs blogger. Before joining the Post, he edited international coverage forTheAtlantic.com. ―China‘s economy is freezing up. How freaked out should we be?‖ The Washington Post June 20 2013 http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-up-how-freaked-out-should-we-be/ SCTM

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.html

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/06/20/chinas-economy-is-freezing-up-how-freaked-out-should-we-be/




http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/business/international/chinese-slowdown-casts/746714.html



Thursday was a very bad day for China‘s economy, the world‘s second-largest and a crucial pillar of the globaleconomy, with credit markets freezing up in an unnerving parallel to the first days of theU.S. financial collapse. The question of how bad depends on whom you talk to, how much faith you have in Chineseleaders and, unfortunately, several factors that are largely unknowable. But we do know two things. First, Chinese leaders appear tobe causing this problem deliberately, likely to try to avert a much worse problem. And, second, if this continues and even it works, it

could see China‘s economy finally cool after years of breakneck growth, with serious

repercussions for the rest of us.¶ Things got so bad that the Bank of China has been fighting rumors all day that it

defaulted on its loans; if true, this would risk bank runs and more defaults, not unlike the first days of the U.S. financial collapse.There‘s no indication that the rumors are true, and no one is running on China‘s banks. But the fact that the trouble has even gotten

to this point is a sign of how potentially serious this could be.¶ Here‘s what has happened: China‘s credit market hasbeen in a bubble for years, with too much lending and borrowing, similar to what happened in the United States during

the financial crisis. All that lending helps grow the economy until, one day, the bubble bursts,and it all comes crashing down, as happened the United States. China‘s economic growth has beenslowing, making a similar a crisis more likely. Chinese leaders seem to be trying to prevent a disaster bybasically popping the bubble, a kind of controlled mini-collapse meant to avoid The Big One.¶ In a real, uncontrolled credit crisis likethe U.S. financial meltdown, credit suddenly freezes up, particularly between banks, meaning that the daily loans banks were relyingon to do business are suddenly no longer affordable. Banks with too many unsafe loans suddenly owe more money than they can

get their hands on, sometimes leading them to default or even collapse. And that means that it suddenly becomesmuch tougher for everyone else – companies that want to build new factories, familiesthat went to buy a home – to borrow money. That‘s an uncontrolled credit crisis, and a number of China-

watchers have been worried that China, in its pursuit of constant breakneck growth, could be headed for one.¶ China‘s central bank,which is likely to tamp down all that unsafe lending and over-borrowing before it leads to a crash, appears to have forced an artificialcredit crisis. (It tested a more modest version just two weeks ago.) It looks like the People‘s Bank of China has already tightenedcredit considerably, making it suddenly very difficult for banks to borrow money. Something called the seven-day bond repurchaserate, which indicates ―liquidity‖ or the ease of borrowing money, shot way up to triple what it was two weeks ago.¶ This pair of charts,from the economics site Zero Hedge, shows the eerie parallels between today‘s freeze-up in the Chinese interbank lending marketand what happened in the United States when Lehman Brothers collapsed, setting off a global crisis that we‘re still recovering from:¶ That second chart shows something called the TED spread, a key indicator of credit risk and how easy it is for U.S. banks to lend toone another.¶ Money markets in China have also skyrocketed to what the Financial Times‘ David Keohane called ―silly levels.‖ Thischart, via Keohane and Reuters‘ Jamie McGeever, shows the money market rates way, way, way beyond any high of the last fiveyears:¶ Here‘s where things get a little confusing. Bloomberg News reported Thursday evening Beijing time that, as panic movedthrough the Chinese financial system, the country‘s central bank stepped in and offered $8.2 billion in ―relief‖ to the Industrial andCommercial Bank of China, which just happens to be both state-owned and the largest bank in the world. What does this mean?Maybe that Chinese leaders got cold feet and are trying to walk back the self-imposed crunch, maybe that China‘s largest bankmanaged to negotiate some preferential treatment, maybe that leaders are worried their most important bank might actually be lesshealthy than they thought and want to protect it from default. Or maybe this is just part of the process of easing down the markets.But then the Chinese Web portal Sina announced that the reports were false (thanks to Bill Bishop for this link), adding someunnecessary confusion and uncertainty to an already volatile situation.¶ So what happens next? There are four categories ofoutcome. The first is that Chinese leaders back off on the credit crunch and nothing happens, in which case they‘ll probably just trythe strategy again later. The second is that they press on and it works miraculously, cleaning out the financial system withoutcausing too much pain. The third is that this spirals out of control, maybe because Beijing underestimated the risk or acted too late,potentially sending the global economy lurching once more. The fourth, and probably most likely, is that this works but is painful,averting catastrophe but slowing the Chinese economy after 20 years of miraculous growth.¶ China-watchers, who tend to varywidely in their assessments of the country‘s economic health, seem to be converging on that fourth scenario, of a painful butnecessary slowdown. Nomura, a Japanese investment bank, recently issued a note (via the Financial Times) addressing fears thatChina could face a financial collapse. Their less-than-comforting caveat: ―This is a tricky issue, as the definition of ‗financial crisis‘can differ among investors.‖ The bank predict that China will not slip into a full-on crisis, citing Beijing‘s control over the financial

system and unwillingness to let it go under. But the Japanese bank warned: ―Nonetheless, we expect a painfuldeleveraging process in the next few months. Some defaults will likely occur in themanufacturing industry and in non-bank financial institutions.‖ If that happens, China‘sgrowth would slow even more. HSBC just cut their prediction for Chinese GDP growth rate from 8.4 percent in 2014to 7.4 percent, still high but a major drop that could plunge farther. This would be difficult for China, which has built its economy –

and political stability – on keeping high economic growth. Recall that the U.S. f inancial collapse was disastrous for America‘salready unhealthy economic sectors: city budgets, real estate, news media. Something similar could happen in China, which is also

facing a massive property bubble. All of this could also be dire for the rest of the world, which isheavily linked to China‘s economy and is still struggling to recover from the U.S. andEuropean crises



China Econ Turns LA Econ

Chinese investment and involvement stabilize Latin American economies – most recent economic downturn proves

Arnson and Davidow, 11 (Cynthia J., director of the Latin American Program at the Woodrow WilsonInternational Center for Scholars, Jeffery, career foreign service officer from the U.S. state of Virginia. Davidow hasserved as a member of the Senior Foreign Service, as well as having been the U.S. Ambassador to Zambia,Venezuela, and Mexico, ―China, Latin America, and the United States,‖ Woodrow Wilson Inter national Center forScholars Institute of the Americas Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, January 2011, page 7, Online,http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf, accessed 7/18/13) PEIn a keynote address, Enrique García, president and CEO of the Corporación Andina de Fomento (CAF), a Latin

American development bank, indicated that despite the economic downturn in 2009, the global economiccrisis has not obstructed Latin America‘s path to sustained economic growth, macroeconomic

stability, and positive external balances. On average, the region was projected to grow by 4.5 percent in2010, and in certain countries, by as much as 7 [to] –8 percent. This success is partially due to the implementation ofconservative fiscal and monetary policies, continued central bank independence, and strict financial regulations.Strong regional growth rates and resilience in the face of the crisis can also be attributed to the favorable terms of trade between Latin America‘s resource rich countries and China.

Chinese trade with Latin America is a positive force – creates sustainablegrowth in Latin AmericaGallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the GlobalEconomic Governance Initiative, ―Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon,‖ TheGuardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PEFirst, the positive side. Chinese trade and investment is partly a blessing for Latin Americabecause it diversifies the sources of finance – finance that for too long has relied on thewest. The US and European economies have been anaemic since 2008, and trade with China has tuggedLatin American growth rates to impressive levels. Every 1% increase in Chinese growth is correlated

with a 1.2% increase in Latin American growth. Chinese finance is more in tune with what LatinAmerican nations want, rather than with what western development experts say they"need". Whereas the US and international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and IMF tend tofinance in line with the latest development fads such as trade liberalisation and micro-anti-poverty programmes,Chinese loans tend to go into energy and infrastructure projects in a region that has an annual

infrastructure gap of $260bn. Neither do Chinese loans come with the harsh strings attached to IFIfinance. The IFIs are notorious for their "conditionalities" that make borrowers sign up to austerity and structuraladjustment programmes that have had questionable outcomes on growth and equality in the region.

http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf

http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon




http://www.cudi.mx/noticias/2011/LAP_120810_Triangle_rpt_21.pdf



China Relations



Relations Internal

Regional competition in Latin America kills US-China RelationsZweig, 10 – Director of the Center on China‘s Transnational Relations and a Chair Professor in the Division of

Social Science (David, ―China‘s ―Energy Rise‖, The U.S., And The New Geopolitics Of Energy‖, Hong Kong

University of Science and Technology, April)

America‘s bilateral policy may be better coordinated. The Strategic Dialogues will give America a clearervoice when it speaks to the Chinese. But the target of this dialogue must not be only to promote U.S. interests, but to find ways to

help China adapt to the world and help China‘s energy and environmental sector. But there are numerous voices inthe U.S. that wish to inflate the China threat. For them, China‘s global energy dependence is a godsend, an

excellent mechanism for limiting China‘s rise and challenge to the U.S. But there are also ears in China that thriveon expressions of American concerns about China‘s rise. Mistrust of America runssurprisingly deep within the Chinese bureaucracy; since most Chinese are Realists andbelievers of conspiracy theories, they expect the U.S. to try to stop their rise and see itdoing so, even when it is not. And while American concerns about China cannot, nor should not be silenced, theymust not drive America‘s China policy. The message must be clear: the U.S. welcomes a rising China that brings solutions to thebilateral, triangular and global problems. Finally, if the hypothesis is correct, that America is a si lent and often invisible player

triangularizing China‘s bilateral ties, then many issues could be best discussed within a triangularformat, such as a Sino-American-African dialogue or a Sino-American-Latin America one.While the U.S. may hesitate to join such discussions, as they give credence andlegitimacy to China‘s engagement in regions from which the U.S. would have preferred toexclude them, such dialogue with a rising China is necessary. Many of the meetingscould be ―track-two,‖ bringing influential academics and middle level policy makerstogether to discuss how China‘s rise in a par ticular region can be best managed toinsure a ―win-win‖ scenario. Conferences in the West on these issues tend to be run bythe U.S. congressional committees and reflect the concerns of a declining hegemon. Nodoubt, both sides will hesitate to put their cards on the table. But the first step is to get people to recognize that U.S.-China

interdependence occurs at the global level, and that regional competition poses a serious threat to thebilateral relationship. Only then can the potentially negative implications of Sino-American triangularization be bettermanaged.

US presence in Latin America kills US-China relationsHilton, 13 (Isabel, Latin America correspondent ―China in Latin America: Hegemonic Challenge?‖, 2/20,

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf)

The United States is Latin America‘s traditional hegemonic power, but China‘s influencein the region is large and growing. How far does China‘s presence in the U.S. backyard represent a hegemonic

challenge? China is important in the region as a buyer of Latin American resources, primarilyfrom four countries, an important investor and an exporter of manufactured goods. The impact of China‘s activities varies in degreefrom country to country. In several countries local manufacturing has suffered from cheaper Chinese imports; several countries

have benefited from Chinese demand for resources, others from large investments, and China is having an importantimpact on the region‘s infrastructure. The risks to the region include resource curse, distorted development and

environmental degradation due to a lowering of environmental and social standards. Despite its significant economic presence,China has been careful to keep a low political and diplomatic profile to avoid antagonising the U.S. andto maintain a benign environment for its economic activities. Chinese support, however ,

has been important for partners, such as Cuba and Venezuela, that do not enjoy goodrelations with the U.S. So far the two powers have sought cooperation rather thanconfrontation, but rising tensions with U.S. allies Japan and Vietnam could have repercussionsin Latin America if China feels the U.S. is becoming too assertive in its own East Asianbackyard.

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/26ff1a0cc3c0b6d5692c8afbc054aad9.pdf



Infringements on Chinese sphere of influence spillover to preventcooperation – kills relationsHills & Blair 7 (Carla A. & Dennis c., Carla A. Hills is chairman and chief executive officer of Hills & Company,International Consultants, which advises companies on global trade and investment issues. Ambassador Hills servedas U.S. trade representative (1989-93) in the first Bush administration and as secretary of the U.S. Department ofHousing and Urban Development in the Ford administration. Prior, she was assistant attorney general, heading the

civil division of the U.S. Department of Justice. She currently serves on the board of Gilead Sciences, Inc. and on theinternational boards of J.P. Morgan Chase, Rolls Royce, and the Coca-Cola Company. She also serves as co-chairof the Inter-American Dialogue and the Advisory Board of Center for Strategic & International Studies, chair of theNational Committee on US-China Relations, and member of the executive committee of the Peterson Institute forInternational Economics and of the Trilateral Commission. Ambassador Hills is a member of the President's Councilon International Activities at Yale University and of the board of trustees of the International Crisis Group., and DennisC. Blair, Former Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Command, April 2007, U.S.-China Relations: An Affirmative

Agenda, A Responsible Course, Council on Foreign Relations Press, http://www.cfr.org/china/us-china-relations/p12985)

No relationship will be as important to the twenty-first century as the one between theUnited States, the world‘s great power, and China, the world‘s rising power . China‘sdevelopment is directly transforming the lives of one-fifth of the world‘s population, and is otherwise influencingbillions more. China‘s rapid economic growth, expanding regional and global influence, continued military

modernization, and uneven human rights record are also shifting the geopolitical terrain and contributing touncertainty about China‘s future course. After thirty-five years of ―engagement,‖ the United States and China have arelationship that was truly unimaginable two generations ago. At the same time, there are some Americans whobelieve that China‘s strategic interests are incompatible with those of the United States. The Council on ForeignRelations established an Independent Task Force to take stock of the changes under wayin China today and to evaluate what these changes mean for China and for the U.S.-China relationship. Based on its careful assessment of the developments in the country and China ‘s likely

future trajectory, the Task Force recommends that the United States pursue a strategyfocused on the integration of China into the global community and finds that such anapproach will best encourage China to act in a way consistent with U.S. interests andinternational norms. The Task Force concludes with a series of recommendations aimedto reinforce recent efforts to deepen U.S.-China cooperation . The overall message is that while the

United States should not turn a blind eye to the economic, political, and securitychallenges posed by China‘s rise and should be clear that any aggressive behavior on

China‘s part would be met with strong opposition, U.S. strategy toward China must

focus on creating and taking advantage of opportunities to build on common interests

in the region and as regards a number of global concerns.

http://www.cfr.org/china/us-china-relations/p12985






War Mpx Boosters

US-Chinese political tensions already high-Cool War to comeFeldman 13 (Noah, professor of constitutional and international law at Harvard and the author of five books.bachelor's degree from Harvard, a law degree from Yale and a doctorate in Islamic thought from Oxford, where hewas a Rhodes scholar. He clerked for Justice David Souter on the Supreme Court. As an adviser to the CoalitionProvisional Authority in Iraq, he contributed to the creation of the country's new constitution. He lives in Cambridge,Mass., and is a senior fellow of the Society of Fellows at Harvard., ―The Coming Cool War With China,‖BLOOMBERG L.P, June 2, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html)

Ahead of the first summit meeting between U.S. President Barack Obama and President Xi Jinping of China on June 7, the

two nations are on the brink of geopolitical conflict. As its officials acknowledge, China is a classicrising power, poised to challenge U.S. dominance. In historical terms, the sole globalsuperpower never gives up without a fight. ―China‘s peaceful rise‖ was a useful slogan, while it lasted, forChina‘s leaders. ―America‘s peaceful decline‖ will get no one elected, whether Democrat or Republican. Geopolitics is almost always

a zero-sum game. If China can copy or work around U.S. missile defenses, fighter jets anddrones, the U.S.‘s global position will be eroded -- and the gains will go directly to China.

US already anticipated, but not inevitable-War preparations being madenowPeck 12 (Michael, is Games Editor at Foreign Policy Magazine and a writer for Training & Simulation Journal atDefense News, ―Wargaming A U.S.-China War,‖ Gawker Media 2013, 9/3/12, http://kotaku.com/5939729/wargaming-a-us+china-war)

As if the U.S. and China don't have enough problems, now they're eyeing each other like two high school jocks competing to be Big Alpha Male on Campus. Oh, they're not exactly enemies. Actually,they're kind of friendly with each other. One loans the other money, and the other uses that money to buy cigarettes from the first

guy. But beneath the bromance, both are steeling themselves for a rumble to decide who'sthe biggest, baddest dude at Pacific Ocean High. This has prompted the U.S. to change its strategic focus.Post-1945, America's main concern was stopping a Soviet tank blitz of Western Europe. Then for the last decade, we have been

obsessed with the Global War on Terror (though Terror has yet to surrender). Now the Pentagon is preparing for a

confrontation in the Pacific. The question boils down to who is allowed to play in China's backyard. A quick glance at amap shows that the Western Pacific is a lot closer to Bejiing than Los Angeles. But the U.S. has allies over there: Japan, the

Philippines, Vietnam (who'd have believed it?), and the biggest flashpoint of all, Taiwan. China regards Taiwan as arenegade republic that must be reclaimed for the Fatherland, while the other nationsclaim resource-rich waters and islands that resource-hungry China also calls its own.Considering that China versus its neighbors, with the possible exception of Japan, is likeMike Tyson versus Tiny Tim, America is the only power that can stand up to the biggestkid in the neighborhood. It's not a question of altruism. The U.S. has its interests. Sodoes China. Much mayhem may ensue. The new U.S. doctrine—the guiding principles ofhow the U.S. would fight—are embodied in a new concept called Air-Sea Battle. As the namesuggests, Air-Sea Battle envisions a Pacific war as a contest of ships and aircraft, which is logical: until they build a Star Trektransporter or a 6,000-mile San Francisco-Shanghai bridge, tank divisions and infantry battalions are useless in a trans-oceanic warwithout sea and air transportation to move them to where they're going. This is good news for swabbies and zoomies: the War on

Terror has mostly been an Army/Marine/Special Forces war, with the Air Force and Navy as supporting players (Air -Sea Battle alsohappens to be great timing as the services compete for shares of a shrinking defense budget). For its part, China has vastly

increased its defense spending, including advanced jets, missiles, subs, and even a pathetic ex-Soviet carrier. Air-SeaBattle—and a U.S.-China War —would be primarily a missile war. China would use its vastarsenal, including carrier-killing ballistic missiles originally designed to carry nukes, totarget the platforms that project U.S. power: airbases in Taiwan, Japan, and islands suchas Diego Garcia and Guam, as well as the mobile airbases that are the U.S. Navy'saircraft carriers. If China can neutralize American airpower, it will render American ground and sea forces (except for subs)impotent, and then Beijing can go about its business as it invades Taiwan or the Spratly Islands. Under Air-Sea Battle, America

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html

http://kotaku.com/5939729/wargaming-a-us+china-war





http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/the-coming-cool-war-with-china.html



would use its own missiles to destroy China's sensor network; if China can't detect the carriers in the wide-open ocean, it can't shootat them. Then American forces would destroy own China's missile forces, and then... who knows how this war would end.

The US & China already have a potential war scenarioSaunders 13 (Doug, well -known British-Canadian journalist and author, and columnist for the Globe and Mail,a Canadian national newspaper based in Toronto, Canada, international-affairs columnist, and a long-serving foreigncorrespondent formerly based in London and Los Angeles. His journalism has won the National Newspaper Award,Canada's counterpart to the U.S. Pulitzer Prize, on five occasions. In 2006 and in 2013, he was honored as the bestcolumnist in Canada. One of the five finalists for the 2011 Lionel Gelber Prize honouring the world's best book oninternational affairs, and for the Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing., ―Why are the U.S. and Chinapreparing for war with one another?‖ The Globe and Mail Inc., July 12, 2013,http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/us-and-china-smile-for-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/)

Both the Pentagon and the People‘s Liberation Army are arming for an all-out war andpursuing enormously expensive master strategies that assume that such a war willoccur. In the case of the United States, this appears to be taking place without any authorization or approval from the White

House or Congress. The Pentagon is now basing its global strategy on a detailed plan known asthe AirSea Battle concept, in which the U.S. Army and Air Force defend the presence of320,000 U.S. troops in the area by readying themselves for a full-scale land and air

assault on China in the event of a threat in the South China Sea or its surroundings. In adetailed analysis paper in this summer‘s issue of the Yale Journal of International Affairs, the famed sociologist and military-policyexpert Amitai Etzioni asks, ―Who authorized preparations for war with China?‖ His answer is stark: Mr. Obama has spoken of a―pivot to Asia,‖ but there has been no political intent or desire to have such an active military confrontation with China – in fact, thepolitics and diplomacy have been moving in the opposite direction. ―The United States is preparing for a war with China, amomentous decision that so far has failed to receive a thorough review from elected officials, namely the White House andCongress,‖ Prof. Etzioni writes. ―In the public sphere there was no debate – led by either think tanks or public intellectuals – like thatwhich is ongoing over whether or not to use the military option against Iran‘s nuclear program, or the debate surrounding the 2009surge of troops in Afghanistan.‖ But the AirSea Battle plan has far more expensive and dangerous implications. ―The imagined resultof ASB is the ability to end a conflict with China in much the same way the United States ended WWII: The U.S. military defeatsChina and dictates the surrender terms.‖ This is a drastic change from Cold War approaches, where nuclear -scale conflict was

carefully avoided. The plan scares the heck out of many military figures. ―AirSea Battle is demonizing China,‖ James

Cartwright, the former vice-chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned last year. ―That‘s not in anybody‘sinterest.‖ A Marine Corps assessment warned that the concept is ―preposterously expensive to build inpeace time‖ and, if used as intended, would ―cause incalculable human and economic

destruction,‖ in good part because it makes escalation to nuclear war far more likely. Andthe Chinese have responded in kind: ―If the U.S. military develops AirSea Battle to deal with the [People‘s Liberation Army],‖ Col.Gauyue Fan warned, ―the PLA will be forced to develop anti- AirSea Battle.‖ And that is now taking place. Soon after assuming

power last year, Mr. Xi abandoned his predecessor‘s commitment to ―peaceful rise,‖ took directcommand of the Central Military Commission and commanded the military to focus on―real combat‖ and ―fighting and winning wars.‖ As Jeremy Page of The Wall Street Journal noted recently,

Mr. Xi has rehabilitated a group of ultra-hawkish generals and military advisers who haveadvocated a military strategy based on preparing for direct confrontation with the UnitedStates. He has particularly embraced Col. Liu Mingfu, whose calls for direct China-U.S. military competition had led his books tobe banned, but are now back on the bookstore shelves in droves. Also widely published now is air force Col. Dai Xu, who wrote lastyear, according to Reuters, that China‘s neighbours are ―running dogs of the United States in Asia‖ and ―we only need to kill one,and it will immediately bring the others to heel.‖

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/us-and-china-smile-for-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/

http://www.theglobeandmail.com/commentary/us-and-china-smile-for-cameras-prepare-for-war/article13196146/



Brink

Sino-American Relations are on the brink, infringements on SOI push itover.

Rudd 13 (Kevin, Australian politician who has been the Prime Minister of Australia and the Leader of the LaborParty since 27 June 2013. He was previously Prime Minister from 2007 to 2010, and Labor Leader from 2006 to2010. He is the first former Prime Minister to return to the office since Robert Menzies in 1949, and only the secondLabor Prime Minister to do so, ―A subtle defrosting in China‘s chilly war with America‖, THE FINANCIAL TIMES LTD2013, June 10, 2013, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/594776d2-d1ba-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ZJU1aaCD)

In Beijing analysts still struggle to define the precise state of the China-US relationship. As

one said to me recently: ―Bu shi rezhan, bu shi lengzhan; er shi liangzhan.‖ Or, in the Queen‘s English: ―It‘s not a hot war,it‘s not a cold war; it‘s more like a chilly war .‖ The problem for leaders, diplomats andanalysts is that the relationship defies simple definition. Variants range from ―strategicengagement‖, ―strategic co-operation‖ and ―strategic competition‖ to ―China as aresponsible global stakeholder.‖ The problem with these ideas is that they mean very little to the Chinese. The

phrase that hits home in both capitals these days is ―

strategic trust deficit‖ – a gap between China and theUS which, if left unchecked, could destabilise the entire Asia-Pacific region. Such adeficit is potentially disastrous for both parties. We see it in the world of cyber espionageand cyber warfare; in escalating tensions in the East and South China Seas, wherehundreds of naval and air assets are deployed; in escalating tensions on the Koreanpeninsula; and in the UN Security Council stalemate over Syria. That is why the working summit

between presidents Barack Obama of the US and Xi Jinping of China at the weekend was so important. There had been nohigh-level political mechanism for the two sides to manage these and other apparentlyintractable challenges facing the regional and global order. With this summit, with more to follow, we at

last have the capacity to build such a mechanism. The fact is, unless the Chinese president himself(simultaneously chairman of the Central Military Commission and general secretary ofthe Communist party) engages personally in negotiations with his US counterpart,China‘s political system is geared to the defence of the status quo. In the US, thesecretaries both of state and defence are able to make some strategic calls innegotiations. But their Chinese counterparts are not even among the 250 most seniorofficials in the party hierarchy. Only the president, in consultation with the other sixmembers of the Politburo Standing Committee, can make the genuinely big calls. Despiteopposition in both capitals, both presidents decided to depart from the diplomatic conventions that have governed relations for thepast 40 years and convened a working summit, free of the pomp normally associated with state visits. This is a success in its ownright. More importantly, both camps are privately delighted by the tone, depth and content of this first engagement, with neitherexpecting a laundry list of deliverables. Nobody present saw this as the ―cyber summit‖ described in the US media. So, what are theoutcomes? First, the agreement to establish a regular military-to-military dialogue is critical. It could contribute to rules of the road oncyber security; crisis management for the Korean peninsula; the management of incidents at sea and in the air as well as creating amechanism to develop basic confidence and security-building measures for the region. Second, the summit represented the firstsystematic engagement and calibration between the two nations on the future of North Korea, including their reported publiccommitment to prevent Pyongyang acquiring nuclear weapons. Third, there was agreement on climate change, perhaps reflectingthe start of a commitment to make the global rules-based order more effective. No one should expect Chinese policy to changequickly. Much could go wrong. But, without a programme of working bilateral summitry, there is little prospect of getting much ofstrategic importance right. After 20 years of drift in the relationship – following the elimination of the Soviet threat, which for theprevious 20 years provided the underlying rationale for co-operation – this meeting could mark the start of a new period of detente.We were headed towards strategic competition – or worse. We may now have the capacity to build sufficient trust in the relationship,creating a framework to manage the growing complexity of bilateral, regional and global challenges the nations face. It could evenlead to what Mr Xi himself described as ―a new model of great power relations‖ for the future, one that does not mindlessly replicatethe bloody history of the rise and fall of great powers in centuries past.

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/594776d2-d1ba-11e2-9336-00144feab7de.html#axzz2ZJU1aaCD






Africa Mpx

US-China Cooperation Key to Saving the African Economy, Infrastructure,Society and Politics

He 13 (Wenping, a senior fellow with the Chahar Institute and a professor and director of the African StudiesSection of the Institute of West Asian & African Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS)., ―An ImportantStep Forward: China-US Cooperation in Africa,‖ China-United States Exchange Foundation, July 17, 2013,http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/an-important-step-forward-china-us-cooperation-in-africa/)

In the past few months, Africa has welcomed two leaders from the first and the secondbiggest economies in the world. After Chinese President Xi Jinping visited South Africa,Tanzania and the Republic of Congo in late March, US President Barack Obama alsovisited Senegal, South Africa and Tanzania in late June. And, whether by coincidence or bycareful arrangement, the two leaders visited exactly the same number of African countries with exactly the samecombination of English-speaking and French-speaking citizenry. This all reflects a high degree of consistency. People are

wondering whether it is because ―great minds thin alike‖, or whether Obama's goal in Africa is tocounter China. As a matter of fact, the common feature of the two leaders‘ visits is that both

China and the US have realized the great development potential of the African continent.However the difference is that China realized this potential and the historic chance forstrengthening China-Africa ties much earlier than that of the US. Actually, Africa hasbeen high on China‘s diplomatic agenda in the most recent decade. As earlier as 2000, Chinaestablished the Forum for China- Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). Along with the release of the first White Paper on China‘s AfricaPolicy in January 2006 and the first China-Africa Summit in early November 2006, which brought more than 40 African heads ofstate to Beijing, Chinese high-level officials including President Xi Jinping, his predecessor Hu Jintao, former Premier Wen Jiabao,

other cabinet members and members of the Political Bureau have all been frequent visitors to Africa. As a result, tradebetween China and Africa has soared in the last decade, reaching a record high of over$200 billion in 2011 from a mere $ 10.5 billion in 2000, leading China to surpass theUnited States and to become Africa‘s biggest trading partner since 2009. On the contrary, the

US has long regarded Africa as a hopeless continent full of problems such as conflict,disease and famine,. Being the very first African-American President in the US and having Kenyan family roots, PresidentObama seems to have had no time for Africa during his first term in office, and spent only 20 hours in Ghana in 2009, which resultedin deep disappointment and dissatisfaction throughout Africa. Partly due to his election campaign‘s need for wooing African- American voters for his second term, and the intention to pacify the increasing criticism of ―losing Africa‖, and perhaps also due toavoid being labeled as an African-American President who unfortunately has had "the least interest in Africa", President Obamaunveiled a new strategy towards sub-Saharan Africa in June 2012. The new strategy sets forth four strategic objectives in Africa,namely: strengthening democratic institutions, spurring economic growth and strengthening trade and investment, advancing peaceand security, and promoting opportunity and development. The U.S. now believes that ―Africa‘s economies are among the fastest growing in the world, with technological change sweeping across the continent and offering tremendous opportunities in banking,medicine, politics, and business.‖ With the change in mindset about Africa‘s rise and the motivation of catching up with China‘s pacein Africa, President Obama recently announced a $7 billion power initiative over five years to double access to power in sub-Saharan Africa, and also pledged to host a US- Africa Summit next year in the United States. To a large extent, the US‘ new focuson Africa‘s infrastructure and establishment of a US-Afr ica Summit have been inspired by the FOCAC and China‘s extensive

engagement in Africa‘s infrastructure industry. Clearly, the US and China‘s approach of engaging withAfrica is indeed quite different, but Obama‘s characterization of US interactions withAfrica including goals of social and political development, whereas China more narrowlyfocuses on commercial benefits is false. Actually, it is no need to mention that one of the focus of Obama‘s trip

in Africa was to appeal and push American enterprises to ―do business in Africa‖ and tofirmly grasp the potential of Africa‘s rising. As for China‘s engagement in Africa, it iscertainly too simple and too one-sided to say that China-Africa relations is mainly forcommercial benefits. Apart from building many infrastructure projects such as dams,ports, railways and stadiums, China has also engaged in education and health areas,such as providing scholarships, technical training and malaria treatment. And even theeconomic interaction has also laid a solid foundation for social and politicaldevelopment. However, it should be pointed out that the US and China do have a big difference in

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/an-important-step-forward-china-us-cooperation-in-africa/

http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/an-important-step-forward-china-us-cooperation-in-africa/



military engagement and security interactions,. To uphold and abide by its ―non-interference policy‖, China‘sinvolvement in Af rica‘s security issues has long been limited to taking part in the UN multi-national peacekeeping forces for missionsin Africa, rather than setting up military bases and taking military actions like the US has been doing on the Continent. Since the USestablished the US Africa Command in 2007, i t has accelerated its pace of gathering information, setting up military and drone

bases and directly participating in attacking extremist forces and terrorism in Africa. This has generated unease andworries from African countries and African people. It is also worthwhile to point out thatObama‘s speech about China and other emerging countries‘ entry into Africa is quite

encouraging and can be seen as an important step forward for future US-Chinacooperation in Africa. This is quite unlike his former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who made accusations againstChina's so-called "new colonialism" during her visit to Zambia in June 2011, and then criticized China‘s development and investmentmodel in Africa as ―extracting value rather than adding value‖. President Obama made clear during his Africa trip that he sees no

threat by the growing trade and investment in Africa by emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil and Turkey, etc. InObama‘s words, ―I don‘t feel threatened by it (China‘s entry in Africa). I feel it‘s a goodthing. The more investment in Africa, the more the world‘s least-developed continent canbe integrated into the global economy‖.



Laundry List Mpx

US China relations are key to solve extinction – conflict, economiccollapse, and multiple trans-national threats become inevitable withoutcooperationCohen 9 (William S. Cohen is chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group, a strategic business consulting firmbased in Washington, D.C. Secretary Cohen served as U.S. secretary of defense, Maurice R. Greenberg is chairmanand CEO of C.V. Starr & Co., Inc. Mr. Greenberg retired four years ago as chairman and CEO of AmericanInternational Group (AIG) after more than 40 years of leadership, creating the largest insurance company in history,―Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,‖http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309_mcgiffert_uschinasmartpower_web.pdf)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has thepotential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any otherbilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-Chinadiplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong

and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S.and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations willdetermine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges:global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, andterrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructivedirection possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no majorglobal challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation. The uncertainty of that futuretrajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many expertsand policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategiccompetitor —deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international

political influence alike— analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic,international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth

and social stability.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertakenas a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power indeveloping countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-powertools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competitionbetween the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries tostrengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policydecisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by thechoices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turnare shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other willpursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges areincreasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by therapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and

via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. An economic downturn in onecountry can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another . These challenges canno longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the nationalinterest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set ofconsiderations than it did in the past As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote itsnational interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it purebenevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (andothers) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around theworld in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global



good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in theabsence of U.S. leadership. Despite historical, cultural, and political differences between theUnited States and China, Beijing's newfound ability, owing to its recent economicsuccesses, to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between thetwo countries. Today there is increasing recognition that no major global challenge can beaddressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of —and

cooperation between—the United States and China. The United States and China—theworlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident inthe midst of the current global financial crisis. Weak demand in both the United States and China,previously the twin engines of global growth, has contributed to the global economic downturn and threatens to ignitesimmering trade tensions between the two countries. Nowhere is the interconnectedness of the United States andChina more clear than in international finance. China has $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominated foreign exchange reserves and is the world's largest holder —by far —of U.S. governmentdebt. Former treasury secretary Henry M. Paulson and others have suggested that the structural imbalances createdby this dynamic fueled the current economic crisis. Yet. China will almost certainly be called on to purchase the lion'sshare of new U.S. debt instruments issued in connection with the U.S. stimulus and recovery package. Secretary ofState Hillary Rodham Clinton's February 23.2009, reassurance to Beijing that U.S. markets remain safe and her callfor continued Chinese investment in the U.S. bond market as a means to help both countries, and the world, emergefrom global recession underscored the shared interest—and central role—that both countries have in turning aroundthe global economy quickly. Although China's considerable holdings of U.S. debt have been seen as a troubling

problem, they are now being perceived as a necessary part of a global solution. Similarly, as the worlds twolargest emitters of greenhouse gases, China and the United States share not only thecollateral damage of energy-inefficient economic growth, but a primary responsibility toshape any ultimate global solutions to climate change. To date, cooperation has beenelusive, owing as much to Washington's reluctance as to Beijing's intransigence.Painting China as the environmental bogeyman as an excuse for foot-dragging inpolicymaking is no longer an option; for its part, China, as the world's top polluter, mustcease playing the developing-economy card. Yet energy security and climate change remain an area ofgenuine opportunity for joint achievement. Indeed, U.S.-China cooperation in this field is a sine qua non of anyresponse to the energy and climate challenges. The sheer size of the Chinese economy means thatcollaboration with the United States could set the de facto global standards for etficiencyand emissions in key economic sectors such as industry and transportation. Climate change also

provides an area for cooperation in previously uncharted policy waters, as in emerging Arctic navigational and energyexploration opportunities. Washington and Beijing also share a deep and urgent interest in international peace andstability. The resumption of U.S.-China military contacts is a positive development. As twonuclear powers with worldwide economic and strategic interests, both countries want tominimize instability and enhance maritime security, as seen by parallel antipiracy missions in thewaters otT Somalia. Joint efforts in support of United Nations peacekeeping, nonproliferation, and counterterrorismoffer critical areas for bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Certainly, regional and global securityinstitutions such as the Six-Party Talks concerning North Korea or the UN SecurityCouncil require the active engagement of both Washington and Beijing. Even more broadly,

crisis management in geographic regions of mutual strategic interest like the Koreanpeninsula, Iran, or Burma require much more Sino-U.S. communication if the twocountries are to avoid miscalculation and maximize opportunities to minimize human sutfering. Increasing

the number of mid-level military-to-military exchanges would help in this regard. The United States and Chinacould do more to cooperate on law enforcement to combat drug trafficking andorganized crime in Western China. Afghanistan is competing with Burma as the main provider of narcotics

to China; Washington could use its influence with the International Security AssistanceForce in Kabul to develop a joint antinarcotics program. This could potentially buildnetworks and joint capabilities that might be useful for U.S.-China cooperation on theissue of Pakistan. In addition, Washington should also encourage NATO-China cooperationalong the Afghan border. Collaborating under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

(SCO) might provide an additional framework for Beijing and Washington to address



Central Asian security issues in a cooperative manner . 1he SCO, which includes Pakistan as anobserver and will convene a multinational conference on Afghanistan in March 2009, has long made curbingnarcoterrorism in Afghanistan a priority. In addition, the VS. Drug Enforcement Agency and the Chinese Anti-Narcotics Bureau should expand cooperation on interdiction and prosecution of heroin and meth traffickers. To besure, there are a number of areas of serious divergence between Washington andBeijing. This should surprise no one. The United States has disagreements with even its allies. Two large

powers with vastly dilferent histories, cultures, and political systems are bound to havechallenges. History has shown, however, that the most effective way of addressingissues is for the U.S. and Chinese governments to engage in quiet diplomacy rather thanpublic recrimination. In the U.S.-China context, there is often little to be gained—and much to be lost in terms of trustand respect—by a polarizing debate. Any differences, moreover, must not necessarily impedeSino-U.S. cooperation when both sides share strong mutual interests. I;. Scott Fitzgerald wrotethat "the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposed ideas in the mind at the same time, and stillretain the ability to function."3 Effective policy toward China by the United States, and vice versa,will require this kind of dual-minded intelligence. Moreover, working together on areas of mutual andglobal interest will help promote strategic trust between China and the United States, facilitating possible cooperationin other areas. Even limited cooperation on specific areas will help construct additionalmechanisms for bilateral communication on issues of irreconcilable disagreement. In fact,many of the toughest challenges in U.S.-China relations in recent years have been the result of unforeseen events,

such as the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in May 1999 and the EP-3 reconnaissanceplane collision in April 2001. Building trust and finding workable solutions to tough problems isthe premise behind the Obama administrations foreign policy of smart power , as articulatedby Secretary of State Clinton. Smart power is based on, as Secretary Clinton outlined in her confirmation hearing, thefundamental belief that 'We must use... the full range of tools at our disposal—diplomatic, economic, military, politicaland cultural—picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation."' As the CS1S Commission on SmartPower noted in November 2007, "Smart Power is neither hard nor soft—it is the skillfulcombination of bothIt is an approach that underscores the necessity of a strong military, but also investsheavily in alliances, partnerships and institutions at all levels... .°5 As such, smart power necessarily mandates amajor investment in a U.S.-China partnership on key issues. 'The concept enjoys broad support among the Chineseand American people and, by promoting the global good, it reaps concrete results around the world. There should beno expectation that Washington and Beijing will or should agree on all, or even most, questions. But the Americanand Chinese people should expect their leaders to come together on those vital issues that require their cooperation.U.S.-China partnership, though not inevitable, is indispensable.



War Mpx

China war escalates – draws in other countriesHunkovic, American Military University, 09 [Lee J, 2009, ―The Chinese-Taiwanese Conflict Possible Futures of a

Confrontation between China, Taiwan and the United States of America‖, http://www.lamp-method.org/eCommons/Hunkovic.pdf]

A war between China, Taiwan and the United States has the potential to escalate into a nuclearconflict and a third world war, therefore, many countries other than the primary actors couldbe affected by such a conflict, including Japan, both Koreas, Russia, Australia, India and GreatBritain, if they were drawn into the war, as well as all other countries in the world that participate in the global economy, in which the United

States and China are the two most dominant members. If China were able to successfully annex Taiwan, the possibility existsthat they could then plan to attack Japan and begin a policy of aggressive expansionism in East and Southeast Asia, as well as the Pacific and even into India, which could in

turn create an international standoff and deployment of military forces to contain the threat. In any case, if China and the United Statesengage in a full-scale conflict, there are few countries in the world that will not beeconomically and/or militarily affected by it. However, China, Taiwan and United States are the primary actors in this scenario, whoseactions will determine its eventual outcome, therefore, other countries will not be considered in this study.



Warming Mpx

US-China Cooperation Key to EnvironmentCohen 9 (William S., ―The World Depends on U.S.-China Cooperation,‖ Dow Jones & Company, Inc., U.S.

defense secretary from 1997-2001, is chairman of The Cohen Group, a global business consulting firm., April 23,2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html)

Recent events confirm that we're living in a new world of disorder. North Korea tested a missile that could reach the U.S., and isthreatening to resume its nuclear-weapons program; the Taliban is using drug money to destabilize Afghanistan and turn that

country back into a terrorist safe haven; the financial crisis has sparked a global recession; and unchecked greenhousegas emissions are transforming the global climate. These disparate challenges share one thing in common:

They cannot be addressed successfully without cooperation between the U.S. and China.The most immediate opportunity for cooperation is in confronting the internationalfinancial crisis. China currently holds $2 trillion worth of largely U.S. dollar-denominatedforeign exchange reserves, and it is by far the world's largest holder of U.S. governmentdebt. As the Obama administration increases that debt to finance its economic stimulus plan, China will almost certainly be calledupon to purchase the lion's share of new U.S. debt instruments. China also has an interest in working with the U.S. to ensure thoseefforts succeed, because it depends on economic growth in the U.S. (still its largest single trading partner) to ensure stability at

home. There is a compelling need to create a new dialogue on finance and economics. This conversation began with PresidentBarack Obama and Chinese President Hu Jintao's discussions at the G-20 summit this month in London. Meetings between U.S.and Chinese leaders have been dubbed the "G-2" by some to reflect the crucial role of economic negotiations between our twocountries. This first meeting between the two men, and the agreement reached by world leaders at the close of the summit, mark apositive beginning to the effort to harmonize our financial management and banking regulatory practices, and explore ways to

expand bilateral trade opportunities in areas such as energy and environmental technologies. The U.S. and China arethe world's two largest emitters of greenhouse gases. This means that our nations havethe opportunity, and the primary responsibility, for shaping the global response toclimate change. To date, both sides have used each other as an excuse for inaction. Thismust end. The Obama administration has made it clear that it will work hard on energyand environmental issues within our bilateral relations. China and the U.S. together havethe power to set the de facto global standard for energy efficiency and emissions control.To do so, we should jointly promote the development and transfer of clean energytechnology between our countries, initiate bilateral projects on energy and climateissues, and develop common principles to drive the multilateral negotiations on a newinternational climate-change agreement.

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124044163563445423.html



Impact Turn Shield



No SOI Good Turn

No negative impact to China influenceXiaoxia 13 (Wang, staff writer and economic observer at Worldcrunch. ―In America‘s Backyard: China‘s Rising Influence in

Latin America.‖ Worldcrunch. 6 May 2013 http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-

influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/)

China's involvement in the Latin American continent doesn‘t constitute a threat to theUnited States, but brings benefits. It is precisely because China has reached "loans-for-oil" swapagreements with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and other countries that it brings much-needed

funds to these oil-producing countries in South America. Not only have these funds been used in thefield of oil production, but they have also safeguarded the energy supply of the UnitedStates, as well as stabilized these countries' livelihood -- and to a certain extent reducedthe impact of illegal immigration and the drug trade on the U.S. For South America, China and the

United States, this is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple choice of mutual benefits and synergies. Even if Chinahas become the Latin American economy‘s new upstart, it is still not in a position tochallenge the strong and diverse influence that the United States has accumulated over

two centuries in the region.

China doesn‘t pose a threat Hanna, 2012 (Don, Managing director of Global Liquid Markets Research at Fortress InvestmentGroup ―Does China represent an economic and political threat to the U.S. in the Western Hemisphere?‖ January 11,2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254)

China‘s emergence as a global economic force, surpassing in many ways the political influence the country

wielded in the 1950s and 1960s, is a development with profound and multifaceted implications forthe Western Hemisphere—implications that aren‘t sensibly encapsulated in terms like―threat‖ or ―opportunity.‖ The important issue for the people of the Western Hemisphere is to understand the nature of thoseimplications and to respond in a fashion that magnifies the gains for the region from China‘s astonishing emergence.

Demonizing (or sanctifying) China is not a sensible response. One crucial aspect tounderstand about China‘s emergence is that it is not an emergence, but a reemergence .Prior to Europe‘s industrial revolution, global income was distributed largely on the basis of population because technology—and

hence labor productivity—didn‘t differ much. China‘s reemergence, then, owes much to its ability to put inplace policies that have allowed it to catch up with frontiers of technology and improvedproductivity. Learning which elements of China‘s success can be replicated should be a welcome spur todevelopment in the Western Hemisphere . Another crucial aspect of China is its sheer size—with all the

demands that creates on resources and the environment. Higher terms of trade for commodities—a boon to the region‘s commodityproducers—owe much to the surge in China‘s economy. At the same time, China‘s surging greenhouse gas emissions, among thehighest in the world, highlight the urgency of a coherent, global program to control such emissions. China‘s sheer size, though,

makes it more likely that the country will realize that its own actions will matter in solving this global problem. The WesternHemisphere needs to contribute to the fashioning of global institutions that canaccommodate China‘s reemergence, providing an opportunity for China to share in the

burdens of global macroeconomic, political and environmental stability that come withits resurgence.

http://www.worldcrunch.com/china-2.0/in-america-039-s-backyard-china-039-s-rising-influence-in-latin-america/foreign-policy-trade-economy-investments-energy/c9s11647/


http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254

http://www.americasquarterly.org/node/3254





A2: Heg Turn

Chinese regional presence doesn't challenge US regional security or hegemonyEllis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies atthe National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business,

and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011,http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)

Since the granting of port concessions in Panama to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa in 1999, Chinesemilitary engagement with Latin America has been one of the most broadly discussed, but misunderstood,dimensions of PRC activities in the region.2 The PRC‘s military initiatives in Latin America are arguably not thelargest or most strategically significant part of its rapidly expanding interactions with the region.

Nor do they visibly threaten the United States or undermine pro-Western regimes in the samefashion as Soviet military engagement with Latin America during the Cold War . The initiatives,however, are significant and growing, and continue to be a key to the evaluation by U.S. decisionmakers as to whether the Chinesepresence in Latin America constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.

China will not harm regional US interests

Ellis, 2011 Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies atthe National Defense University. (R. Evan, "China-Latin America Military Engagement: Good Will, Good Business,and Strategic Position," National Defense University, August 25, 2011,http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)

In general, as this section has suggested, the course taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin America in the medium or long term is likely to differ significantly from that witnessed with respect toSoviet military activities in the region during the Cold War. In general, the PRC is more likely torefrain from overtly provocative activities, such as the establishment of bases with a significantChinese presence, overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow a regime, unilateralmilitary intervention in the region in a contested leadership situation, or participation in anti-USmilitary alliances.

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1077)






A2: LA SOI Causes War

China won‘t go to war with the US – rise is peacefulJenkins, 10 - Professor of International Development at the University of East Anglia (Rhys, ―China‘s GlobalExpansion and Latin America‖, Cambridge Journals, 2010,

http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)//KGChina‘s main objectives in Latin America are to obtain secure sources of raw materials andmarket access for its manufactured goods. It therefore has an interest in continuing economic andpolitical stability in the region, and would not want to undermine this through a confrontation withthe United States. Populist nationalism in Latin America, although historically directed against the United States,could also adversely aff ect Chinese interests in the region. The Chinese ambassador to Ecuador, for example,expressed concerns over the implications for his country‘s oil interests of institutional uncertainties created by therevision of the country‘s constitution and bilateral investment agreements.66 Another factor that influences China‘s

policy towards the region is a recognition that its relationship with the United States is much moreimportant to it than its relations with Latin America or any individual Latin American country,both economically and politically.67 As a result, China‘s policy towards the region has been

pragmatic rather than ideological . Far from allying itself strategically with left-wing or populist

governments in the region, the Chinese government has consistently tried to maintain good relationswith both right-wing military regimes in the past and democratically elected governments ofdiff erent political hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identified closely with the anti-US rhetoricadopted by President Cha´vez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations with countries with which ithas important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. It also recognises the value of developingrelationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being too closely associated with a particularregime which may not remain in power.



Affirmative



General



Uniqueness

Non-unique: China not projected to gain influence in Latin AmericaAzpuru and Zechmeister 13 (Dinorah, associate professor of political science at Wichita State University and amember of the Scientific Support Group of the AmericasBarometer. Elizabeth, associate professor of political science and Associate

Director of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. ―Latin Americans‘ Perception of the UnitedStates and China.‖ 24 June 2013. Web.) http://www.americasquarterly.org/latin-americans-perceptions-united-states-and-china

The U.S. profile in the region remains comparatively strong in general, particularly among countries geographically close to the

United States. But what is the Latin American public‘s expectation of future U.S. influence?

Figure 3 presents, on the left, responses to a question asking which country currently has the most influence in the region. Fortypercent selected the United States. But the right of the figure shows that only 30 percent of respondents believe the

U.S. will be the dominant power in the future. Interestingly, the difference in response rates in regard toChina‘s current and future influence is only marginal (3.5 percentage points), whichindicates that important segments of the public perceive other Latin American countries

(e.g., Brazil) and non-Latin American countries (e.g., Japan) as likely contenders for keyinfluence in the future.

Non-unique – China‘s trade with Latin America is a quarter of the U.S.‘s andnot with topic countriesO'Neil, 12 (Shannon K., Senior fellow for Latin America Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, anonpartisan foreign-policy think tank and membership organization, ―China‘s Economic Role in Latin America,‖Council of Foreign Relations, October 26, 2012, Online, http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/, accessed 7/17/13) PEThere is much talk of China‘s escalating economic influence in Latin America. But it‘sworth looking at what has (and hasn‘t) actually happened in the three main ways that China interacts withthe region‘s economies: trade, foreign direct investment (FDI), and loans (from state -owned banks). Trade is the mostvisible and important connection. Over the last several years, goods flowing back and forth have increased

some 30 percent per year, bringing today‘s total to roughly US$250 billion. This trade leans in China‘s favor,with a deficit (nearly all with Mexico) of nearly US$100 billion [dollars]. While sizable numbers, this is still

just a quarter of Latin America‘s trade with the United States. And it appears to be levelingoff, suggesting that China won‘t overtake the United States as the region‘s primary trading partner

anytime soon. This trade is also quite concentrated. Exports to China come primarily from Brazil,Chile, Peru, and Argentina, and are mainly raw materials (copper, iron ore, lead, tin, soya, and sugar). Of thegoods China sends east nearly half go to Mexico—a mix of consumer goods and capital goods (equipment forproduction). Trade with China has expanded dramatically over the past decade. But it is worth remembering that itboth started from a low base and is unevenly distributed—affecting a few countries significantly and others very little.

Non-unique – Despite gains in China/Latin America trade, the U.S. is still farmore involved in regional tradeMallén, 13 (two BAs from Universidad Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and ModernLanguages, and an MA in International Reporting from CUNY Graduate School of Journalism, ―Latin America

Increases Relations With China: What Does That Mean For The US?,‖ International Business Times, June 28 20139:53 PM, Online, http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981, accessed 7/17/13) PEBetween 2000 and 2009, China increased its two-way trade with Latin America by 660percent, from $13 billion at the beginning of the 21st century to more than $120 billion nine years later. Latin American exports to China reached $41.3 billion, almost 7 percent of the region's total exports. China‘s share of theregion‘s trade was less than 10 percent in 2000; by 2009, the number had jumped to 12 percent. As impressiveas that growth is, the numbers still pale in comparison to the U.S.' stats in its commercial

relationship with Latin America. The U.S. still holds more than half of the total trade, adding up to

http://www.americasquarterly.org/latin-americans-perceptions-united-states-and-china



http://blogs.cfr.org/oneil/2012/10/26/chinas-economic-role-in-latin-america/


http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981

http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-america-increases-relations-china-what-does-mean-us-1317981






$560 billion [dollars] in 2008. Notably, though, America‘s trade participation in Latin America has remainedstatic, while China is closing the gap more and more each year -- having already surpassed the U.S. in somecountries, including powerhouse Brazil.

Obama‘s recent tour proves non-unique – the U.S. isn‘t done yet

American University, 13 (Jun 10, 2013, ―U.S.-China: Competing over Central America and theCaribbean?,‖ Center for Latin American and Latino Studies, American University, Online,http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-the-caribbean/, accessed 7/18/13) PEThe recent visits to Central America, Mexico, and the Caribbean by Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S.

President Obama (and Vice President Biden to Trinidad and Tobago) suggest a handoff fromWashington to Beijing of the role as the region‘s sugar-daddy, but not a strategic shift ininfluence. The presidents‘ visits were similar in their innocuous itineraries. Both got pompous welcomes; met

with ―real‖ citizens (Xi ate empanaditas de chiverre with a coffee farmer); and praised the bilateralrelationships. Both held sub-regional summits – Obama in San José and Xi in Port of Spain. Bothrepackaged ongoing or recently negotiated projects as new ―accords.‖ Obama pledged another$150 million [dollars] a year for funding the Central America Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), partof the strategy started under President Bush to counter the drug trade and related threats. Xi got headlines in CostaRica for providing more than $1.5 billion for refinery and road projects and to purchase replacement taxis and buses

from Chinese manufacturers. Significantly, China is also building Costa Rica‘s new National Police Academy – thesort of project Washington used to thrive on.

US perception in LA higher than China now – perceived as better forengagementDyer July 18, 2013Zachary The University of Texas at Austin M.A., Latin American Studies, Energy Policy Activities and Societies:Institute for Latin American Studies Student Association, President (2011) ―U.S. image remains favorable acrossLatin America‖ Tico Times Thursday, http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013 SCTMThe United States' public image greatly improved in Brazil and Mexico in the last year , and

many surveyed said that U.S. ties were still more important than those with China.¶ US-Chineseinfluence¶ Latin American respondents said that the United States exerted greater influence over their countries than the Chinese

but viewed Chinese acts more positively. Courtesy Pew Research Center ¶ Recent allegations that the UnitedStates National Security Agency may have been spying on several Latin American countries has donelittle to improve the U.S.‘s image abroad, but a new report from the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project

shows that Uncle Sam has retained a favorable public image across the region.¶ U.S. publicimage is especially strong in El Salvador (79 percent), Brazil (73 percent), Chile (68 percent) and Mexico (66 percent). Braziliansand Mexicans in particular saw a notable spike in their favorable view of the United States.¶ Argentina remains the Latin Americancountry with the lowest approval of the U.S., coming in at 41 percent. The report noted, however, that while a majority of Argentinessurveyed did not have a favorable view of the superpower, the 41 percent is a large improvement over the 16 percent approvalrating recorded in 2007.¶ Costa Rica was not surveyed for this report.¶ Young college-educated people in particular reported afavorable view of the U.S. In Argentina, for example, people aged 18-29 had a 49 percent favorable impression of the U.S. versus

only 32 percent approval for people older than 50.¶ Latin America is no longer the United States‘ backyard, but the U.S.remains more influential than China in the region. All countries surveyed except

Venezuela opined that the United States had a ―great deal‖ or ―fair‖ amount of influenceover their country and their economy compared to China.¶ While the U.S. may have more impact,respondents said that China‘s influence was seen more positively than the United States. Venezuela, Argentina, Chile and Boliviawere among those that saw Chinese influence in a rosy light.¶ During Chinese President Xi Jingping‘s visit to Costa Rica in June,both countries‘ leaders signed nearly $2 billion in trade and infrastructure projects, including the scuttled Moín refinery expansionproject. ¶ Since Costa Rica switched its recognition to mainland China over Taiwan in 2007, the world‘s second-largest economyhas gifted the country a new $100 million stadium and $25 million towards the construction of a National Police academy.¶

Popularity contests aside, most Latin Americans surveyed said that the U.S. was the moreimportant country to have strong ties with.¶ Research for the 2013 Spring Pew Global Attitudes Survey wasbased on telephone and face-to-face interviews under the supervision of the Princeton Survey Research Associates International.Click here for a full breakdown of method by country.

http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-the-caribbean/

http://www.ticotimes.net/More-news/News-Briefs/U.S.-image-remains-favorable-across-Latin-America_Thursday-July-18-2013





http://aulablog.net/2013/06/10/u-s-china-competing-over-central-america-and-the-caribbean/



Balance Thumper

Non-unique – Chinese engagement isn‘t perceived as balanced – doesn‘tincrease relationsMyers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, ―China's engagement with Latin America: More of the

same?,‖ Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latin-america-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PEI would argue, however, that deepening cooperation between China and Latin America is notindicative of a balancing of relations or of genuinely horizontal engagement. In many cases, the

cooperation itself is limited, or is merely a short-term effort to secure access to newtechnologies or scientific methods. In other cases, cooperative engagement should bethought of not as a leveling of the playing field, but as an element of China‘s ever -evolving economic

statecraft. China‘s cooperative endeavors in Latin America and elsewhere are often seen asintervention in the affairs of China‘s commercial actors to ensure a degree of ―mutual benefit‖ in overseasdealings. Mutual benefit, a guiding principle of China‘s external engagement philosophy, is thought to secure accessto and postive relationships with countries and markets in the region.

Plus, Chinese academic literature provesMyers, 12 (Margret, Program director at the Dialogue, ―China's engagement with Latin America: More of the

same?,‖ Opeal, April 10, 2012, Online, http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latin-america-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123, accessed 7/19/13) PEChina‘s academic literature on Latin America further illuminates its dominant view toward

Latin America. Of the existing Chinese-language literature on the China-Latin America relationship, the vastmajority seeks to derive jiaoxun or ―lessons‖ from Latin America‘s failed experiments ineconomic and social development. These ―lessons‖ frequently are taught in China‘s top universities, where

students encounter numerous charts documenting China‘s and Latin America‘s divergentpaths toward economic development. The economic demise of Latin America – often linked to import

substitution and/or failed neo-liberal policy -- is explained alongside China‘s post-1979 growth miracle.Only one widely-published Chinese-language article looks to Latin America (and Brazil, in particular) for a viable

development model. The article,lingyizhongjueqi, or ―Another kind of rise,‖ considers Brazil‘s approaches to dealingwith rampant inflation and social inequality over the past three decades, suggesting that China might benefit fromsimilar reforms.

http://www.opeal.net/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=10729:chinas-engagement-with-latin-america-more-of-the-same?&Itemid=123







Thumper

Sino-Latin American relations face challenges in futureDominguez ‘06 (Jorge I., Antonio Madero Professor for the Study of Mexico, vice provost of internationalaffairs, special advisor for international studies to the dean of the faculty of arts and sciences, and chairman of theHarvard Academy for International and Area Studies at Harvard University, ―China‘s Relations With Latin America:Shared Gains, Asymmetric Hopes,‖ Inter -American Dialogue, June,http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/china.pdf)

Chinese academics also call attention to four problems in Sino-Latin American relations,

though they stress that the reasons for convergence outweigh those for divergence. First, there is increasedindustrial competition, especially in textiles, where China has been hit by large anti-dumping duties. One reason for its insistence in being recognized as a ―market economy‖ is to limit the imposition of such

penalties. Second, China supports regional integration in Latin America and with the UnitedStates but worries about the use of trade barriers against outside countries such asChina. Third, there are few cultural contacts between China and Latin America and few ofeach other‘s peoples speak the other‘s language; both sides suffer from information deficits regarding theother. Finally, Chinese academics fear that Taiwan may make diplomatic gains.



Link Answers

No link – Latin America will be controlled by neither the U.S. or ChinaValencia, 13 (Robert, New York-based political analyst and a contributing writer for Global Voices, ―US and

China: The Fight for Latin America,‖ World Policy, June 24, 2013 - 6:46am, Onlinehttp://www.worldpolicy.org/blog/2013/06/24/us-and-china-fight-latin-america, accessed 7/17/13) PE Both the United States and China use infrastructure investment, diplomacy, and trade asleverage, but Latin America wants to be seen as a socioeconomic partner, not a subordinate.The Pacific Alliance, for example, hopes to become a powerful bloc that can stand up to theworld‘s two super powers. Comprised of Colombia, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and possibly soonPanama, the Pacific Alliance is a new economic bloc that seeks economic integration oriented toward Asia-Pacificmarkets. Additionally, the Pacific Alliance can become a springboard for other Latin American

nations with a Pacific shore to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a proposed free-trade agreementamong Asia-Pacific, Mexico, Peru, Chile, Canada, and the United States. Being part of the Pacific Alliance issignificant, because for countries like Costa Rica, it would otherwise be an unlikely candidate for the TPP. Takentogether, the Pacific Alliance‘s GDP totals $3 trillion, making it easier to integrate itself to the TPP and for it to fightfor better terms. The United States will still hold the lion‘s share of the TPP with an economy that hovers around

$13 trillion—but an alliance worth $3 trillion will give it more leverage than it would otherwise have.The battle forinfluence in Latin America may have the effect of pushing the countries closer together,

allowing them to stand up to both the United States and China.

No link – Brazil is keyBen-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin America, butUS influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online,http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-but-us-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PEThis new reality also demands a different type of diplomacy - one that recognises thediverse interests of the continent. For example, an emerging power such as Brazil wants more respecton the world stage. Obama blundered when he dismissed a 2010 deal on Iran's nuclearprogram mediated by Brazil and Turkey (despite having earlier endorsed the talks). Other

countries might benefit from US efforts to promote democracy and socioeconomic ties, as Obama's recent trips toMexico and Costa Rica show. Trade relations provide another all-important lever . PresidentSebastian Pinera of Chile visited the White House earlier this week to discuss, among other things, the Trans-PacificPartnership (TPP), an ambitious trade agreement that might encompass New Zealand, Singapore, Australia, Mexico,Canada, and Japan. President Ollanta Humala of Peru is expected in the White House next week, while VicePresident Joe Biden is scheduled to visit Latin America soon after.

No competition for Latin America, China won‘t challenge US Global Times 2013 (Global Times-Agencies; daily Chinese newspaper focusing on global issues; “China, US not

competing over Latin America: expert”; The Global Times; 5-31-2013;

http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.Ueh3dNKyDMU)

Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson

Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in Latin America by giving playto their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of American Studies at the

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders

chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence

in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphere of influence in a certain

area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that

it is a good thing for Latin America.


http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-but-us-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003







US faces more challenges in obtaining influenceReuters 13 (―The looming US-China rivalry over Latin America.‖ Reuters 12 June 2013. Web.)

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2013/06/12/the-looming-u-s-china-rivalry-over-latin-america/ EW

The challenges facing Beijing and Washington lie in how each approaches the region.

Washington confronts lingering resentment about its historic regional interference,stretching back to the 1823 Monroe Doctrine, and its continuing desire to mix business with policy — which

muddies its approach to trade and investment. Washington‘s domestic problems, its pivot to Asia and ahost of global crises, also serve as distractions that could keep its actions in LatinAmerica from matching its words — as has happened before. China, meanwhile, is largely viewedin the region as unencumbered by ideology. It approaches opportunities almost exclusively on commercialterms there.

US will struggle to keep up with China – financial strugglesMallen 13 (Patricia Rey Mallen, covers Latin America for the International Business Times, Patricia holds two BAs fromUniversidad Complutense de Madrid, in Media & Film Studies and Modern Languages, and an MA in International Reporting fromCUNY Graduate School of Journalism. ―Latin Lovers: China And U.S. Both Vying To Increase Influence And Trade In Latin America, Caribbean.‖ International Business Times 30 May 2013. Web.) http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-

increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean-1284839EW China's designs on Latin America have long been apparent, with imports to the Asiangiant surging from $3.9 billion in 2000 to $86 billion in 2011, as calculated by the Inter-American

Development Bank. Now, China seeks to start buying massive amounts of soy beans, copper andiron ore from Latin nations, reports the South China Morning Post. The U.S., on the other hand, whichhas had deep involvement in many Latin American nations for the past two centuries,has nonetheless been less than consistent in its recent trade policies, said Boston University

economist Kevin Gallagher, who has written about China's incursions in the region. ―The onus is on the U.S. to comeup with a more flexible, attractive offer, but that‘s not so easy because it doesn‘t have thedeep pockets like it used to,‖ he told Bloomberg.

Chinese industries beating out the USEllis 13 (Evan Ellis, professor at the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, D.C., is an analyst of Latin American economic, political and security issues, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with China and other extraregional actors. ―U.S.-China Competition Heats Up as Chinese President Xi Tours Latin America.‖ The Manzella Report 7June 2013. Web.) http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america EW Similarly, the willingness of Chinese companies such as CNPC, Huawei, ZTE, and others toinvest in Venezuela and Ecuador has made it easier for those regimes to nationalizeindustries and otherwise displace undesired ―Western‖ corporations. Indeed, so long asALBA governments have not taken action against Chinese business interests, the PRC‘sindifference to their political systems has cleared the way for their devolution to everless democratic practices, including the suppression of press freedoms and the prosecution of dissidents. Beyond

ALBA, Chinese money and markets have undercut the U.S. policy agenda across the regionin areas such as financial accountability, human rights, and corruption. Argentina was able to

remain financially solvent in the years following its 2001 debt default, in part, because of its massive export-oriented soy industry,which sells 75 percent of its output to the PRC.

Chinese relations with Latin American are neither a threat nor zero-sum – multiple warrantsJiang 11 (Jiang Shixue is a professor at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and Vice President of Chinese Association of Latin American Studies. ―The U.S. Factor in Sino-Latin American Relations‖, China & US Focus,November 3, 2011, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/the-u-s-worry-factor-in-sino-latin-american-relations/)


http://www.ibtimes.com/latin-lovers-china-us-both-vying-increase-influence-trade-latin-america-caribbean-1284839



http://www.manzellareport.com/index.php/world/687-u-s-china-competition-heats-up-as-chinese-president-xi-tours-latin-america









The U.S. concerns are unnecessary and unfounded. First, both China and Latin Americahave been opening to the outside world. In the age of globalization, both should cooperate to promote South-

South collaboration. As a matter of fact, further cooperation between China and Latin America willbenefit regional peace and development in the Asia-Pacific and Latin America. This outcome would

certainly be welcomed by the United States. Second, it is well-known that Latin America has been

implementing reforms and opening to the outside world for almost two decades. It endeavors to attract more foreigninvestment and liberalize the market to stimulate growth. As a result, China is only one of theeconomic partners Latin America has been trying to cooperate with. Third, China‘srelations with Latin America are for economic purposes, not for political outcomes to beused against the U.S. China well understands that Latin America is the backyard of the United States, so there is no need

for it to challenge American influence. Fourth, China‘s cooperation with Latin America in military andsecurity fields is not targeting any third party and it is hardly a secret issue. China‘s first policypaper on Latin America, published in November 2008, openly set aside one section to deal with the issue. It said: ―The Chinese sidewill actively carry out military exchanges and defense dialogue and cooperation with Latin American and Caribbean countries.Mutual visits by defense and military officials of the two sides, as well as personnel exchanges, will be enhanced.‖ Moreover,China‘s military relations with Latin America are undertaken according to the following principles: 1) to gain better understanding ofthe Latin American military; 2) to improve professional expertise by learning from each other; 3) never target any third party; and 4)never harm regional and hemispheric stability. These principles are not counter to U.S. national interest and dominance in the

western hemisphere. Finally, China does not wish to be used as a ―card‖ against the United

States. It has no enthusiasm for getting entangled in the problems of U.S.-Latin Americanrelations. It is encouraging to see that in the U.S. there are other voices commenting about Sino-Latin American relations. Forinstance, Manuel Rocha, former U.S. ambassador to Bolivia, also said, ―Were it not for China, Latin America would probably be showing a much more lackluster [economic] performance.‖ In testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, in June 2008, Daniel P. Erikson, then a senior researcher at the Inter-American

Dialogue, pointed out that ―while China‘s expansion into Latin America may imply a potential loss for some U.S. business sectors, itis important to note that trade is not a zero sum game. To the extent that China‘s involvement is sparkingeconomic growth in Latin America, it may contribute to economic stability and well-being in a manner that suits the U.S. desire to

see a prosperous and healthy neighborhood.‖ Erikson added, ―China‘s engagement in Latin America is notyet a major concern for the United States, and there are few signs of any real frictions between the two countries

on that score.‖ So, President Monroe does not need to roll over in his grave.

No trade-off; China treading carefully, values US too muchJenkins ‗10 (Rhys, Professor of Development Economics, University of East Anglia, research focus ondevelopment in Latin America, MA from University of Cambridge, Doctorate of Philosophy from the University ofSussex, ―China‘s Global Expansion and Latin America,‖ Cambridge University Press,http://www.plataformademocratica.org/Publicacoes/21792.pdf)

Another factor that influences China‘s policy towards the region is a recognition that itsrelationship with the United States is much more important to it than its relations withLatin America or any individual Latin American country, both economically andpolitically. 67 As a result, China‘s policy towards the region has been pragmatic rather than ideological. Far from allyingitself strategically with left-wing or populist governments in the region, the Chinesegovernment has consistently tried to maintain good relations with both right-wingmilitary regimes in the past and democratically elected governments of di erent political

hues more recently. China has not been keen to be identified closely with the anti-US rhetoricadopted by President Cha´vez in Venezuela and has given more attention to its relations withcountries with which it has important economic links, such as Brazil, Argentina andChile. It also recognises the value of developing relationships with countries that will last in the longer term, and not being tooclosely associated with a particular regime which may not remain in power.



Uniqueness overwhelms the link – Chinese military engagementguarantees strong ties – this is their authorEllis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with external actors, includingChina, Russia, and Iran, ―China–Latin America Military Engagement,‖ API International, February 2012, page 2,Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-2/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed

7/19/13) PEFor the PRC, military engagement is one tool, among many, for building political good-willand leverage in a country, in order to make it more likely that the regime will not oppose the

entry of Chinese products or act against its investments. Military activities are useful in this

context because the armed forces remain an important political actor in most Latin Americancountries, although thinking of the military as a political instrument is also consistent withboth Chinese communist and pre-communist philosophy. Knowing and being on good terms with themilitary leadership of a Latin American country helps the Chinese to understand the overall

political dynamic of that country, anticipate actions that could be taken against PRC commercial interests,

influence the political leadership through military friends where necessary, and anticipate or avoidactions that could be taken by the armed forces in the political arena that could impact Chineseinterests.

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Link Turn

Chinese soft-power benefits from US economic engagement – multiplewarrants

Ellis 12 (Dr. R. Evan Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics and is an Associate Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies. ―The United States,Latin America and China: A ―Triangular Relationship‖?‖ Inter-American Dialogue, May 2012,http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD8661_China_Triangular0424v2e-may.pdf)

In economic terms, the attractiveness of the US market and trade agreements between the United States andLatin American countries condition where in the region Chinese investors calculate itprofitable to go. Chinese auto companies and other manufacturers investing in the Mexican maquiladora sector, forexample, have been motivated in part by interest in exporting Chinese firms‘ products to the US market under provisions of

NAFTA.22 The possibility of countries in Latin America serving as export platforms forChinese goods into the United States has also been mentioned in the context of the US-ColombiaTrade Promotion Agreement and in the process of negotiating and securing approval for the Central America Free Trade Agreement(CAFTA-DR).23 In a more diffuse fashion, because of the close economic relationship between the United States and Latin

America, US consumption and business activity that indirectly benefits Latin America

enables the region to purchase Chinese products. At the level of the commercial enterprise, exports to theUnited States from the region may include goods sourced in China by Latin American manufacturers. At the personal level, some ofthe corporate earnings and salaries from these companies naturally go to the purchase of goods from the PRC, among othersources. Beyond corporations, although not traditionally considered in such terms, a portion of the approximately $50 billion inremittances sent annually to families in Latin America by immigrants living in the United States24 ultimately enables the purchase of

Chinese goods in the region. The ability of the United States to serve as a market and a source of investmentfor Latin America has influenced the region‘s receptivity toward the PRC. The initial openness ofthe region to promises of investment and trade by Chinese President Hu Jintao came just after Latin America reached a historic low

with regard to flows of investment from the United States and other sources.25 The 2007-2009 global financialcrisis, which significantly impaired US purchases of Latin American exports and US credit to the region, strengthened theperceived importance of the PRC for Latin American governments, and Chinese commoditypurchases and investments emerged as one of the key factors helping these governments weather the crisis. Nonetheless, as notedearlier, while the PRC has occupied an important symbolic role as the largest and most visible source of new capital and markets, it

has not been the only player to which Latin America has looked as the region seeks to engage globally. Attention also has

been given to India and other emerging markets of Asia, as well as traditional players, such as the EuropeanUnion, and actors such as Russia and Iran.

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A2: Zero Sum

U.S. and Chinese influence aren‘t zero sum – recent visits proveGT, 13 (Global Times- Agencies, ―China, US not competing over Latin America: expert,‖ 2013-5-31 1:13:01 ,Online, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/785721.shtml#.UebisNJtN2w, accessed 7/17/13) PEChinese President Xi Jinping heads to Latin America and the Caribbean on Friday, in a state visit aiming at promotingChina's cooperation with the region. Xi's visit to Trinidad and Tobago, Costa Rica and Mexico fol lows his first foreigntrip to Russia and three countries in Africa, Tanzania, South Africa and Republic of Congo, shortly after taking officein March. While Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the sameday, as he leaves Brazil Friday. Some media reports described "dueling visits" by Chinese and USleaders, and said that the "competition between the world's two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is

on display." Both the US and China deny they are competing with each other. Chinese foreign ministry

spokesperson Hong Lei said last week that the two countries can "carry out cooperation in LatinAmerica by giving play to their respective advantages." Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of

American Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that thetwo leaders chose to visit Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge USinfluence in the area. "It's not like in the 19th century when countries divided their sphereof influence in a certain area. China and the US' involvement in Latin America is not a zero-sum game," Tao said, explaining that it is a good thing for Latin America. Chinese and US leaders visit Latin

America out of their respective strategic needs, Tao said. All countries need to interact and cooperatewith other countries, and visits of such high-level are usually arranged long time before they starts, Tao said.China has embarked on a diplomatic drive since completing its once-in-a-decade leadership transition with ChinesePremier Li Keqiang also visiting India, Pakistan, Switzerland and Germany, and several high-level visitors to Beijing.

After visiting Mexico, Xi travels to the US for his first summit with President Barack Obama on June 7 to 8 inCalifornia.

Influence not zero-sum, competition for influence normalZhou 11(Jianghou Zhou, Associate Professor of Asian Languages and Cultures, PhD, Baylor University ―US-China RivalryStill a mismatch‖ April 14, 2011 http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD14Ad01.html)

China's soft power does not hurt global interests .There is a view that soft power is becoming more important to a country'scomprehensive power in international society, while hard power is becoming somewhatless important. [13] Since the 1990s, China has achieved impressive gains in using soft power through implementing its "smiling" foreignpolicy, providing scholarships for foreign students in Chinese studies, financially aiding many countries, playing critical roles in many internationalorganizations and meetings, and hosting the Summer Olympic Games in 2008. Joshua Kurlantzick believes one of reasons for China's success is thatChina is using soft power to appeal to other countries and position itself as a model of social and economic success. As a result, China is winningfriends and influencing people around the world almost as fast as the United States is doing the opposite. Chinese government spending on education

is still low. In addition, overwhelming evidence suggests that Chinese traditional culture is waning on the mainland. The CCP hasrecently attempted to revive Confucianism to help in developing harmonious society, but the result of this effort is uncertain. It will take a long time for the West to accept Chinese culture. While China's trade surplus exceeded $21 billion in

2010, its cultural trade deficit is growing. According to a China Daily report in 2006, the ratio of China'simports of cultural products to its exports was 10:1, and is believed to be much higher

today. This reflects that the influence of Chinese culture in the West is very limited. Moreimportantly, the CCP has not solved the puzzle of how to integrate its political system, one of the most important aspects of soft power, into the current

mainstream of the global order . The US is worried about China's expansion in Africa and Latin America. Infact, China's policies toward Africa and Latin America obviously are more economicallydriven than cultural or political. The relationship between the two countries in LatinAmerica and Africa in particular is not zero-sum. China is acting similarly in Europe, the Chinese government haspromised to help helping Spain and other European Union countries deal with their financial crisis and to regain market confidence. Ideologically andpolitically, the world today is still pretty much dominated by Western ideas and values. Most of the accepted "cosmopolitan values" originated in theWest, such as human rights and democracy. According to Joseph Nye, despite China's efforts to enhance its soft power, the US remains dominant inall soft power categories. In terms of soft power influence, China is still no match for the US. And there is no telling how and when China will catch up

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with, let alone surpass, the US in this regard. Non-democratic China can peacefully co-exist with US. Generally, Westernsocieties view the political system in China as directly contradicting the core values of the West and see no fundamental way for the two sides to co-exist, because they assume that a democratic government would inevitably runs in conflict with a non-democratic one. However, this is amisconception. A democratic government does not necessarily make peace with another democratic one. For example, there are many conflictsbetween the US and other democracies. On the other hand, a democracy could make friends with a non-democracy, such as the US and Saudi Arabia.So there is no reason why US could not co-exist with China, non-democratic as it may be for the time being. To be sure, different nations have different

national interests; and every nation puts its national interests as top priority. Conflicts of interest between differentnations are very normal.

The U.S. doesn‘t crowd out China – countries became dependent on Chinawithout having to push the U.S. outCastaneda, 11 (Sebastian, graduate student at the University of Hong Kong and a contributor to ForeignPolicy in Focus, ―South America awake to risks of China ties,‖ Asia Times, Apr 21, 2011, Online,http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/MD21Ad01.html, accessed 7/19/13) PEIn the wake of US President Barack Obama's recent tour of Latin America, media reports and commentatorsclaimed that China has been economically outmuscling the United States in the region. The reality,

however, is that Beijing's economic presence has not come at the expense of the United

States. Although Washington still maintains an overwhelming edge, its influence is decreasing. This decline will beexacerbated by Obama's focus on boosting US exports to the region rather than importing more of Latin America's

manufactured goods. True, China has become a key trading partner in Latin America during the last decade. Sino-Latin American trade has risen from US$12 billion in 2000 to more than $140 billion today (though the region's tradedeficit also rose from $950 million to $32 billion in 2009). Nevertheless, China's relations with LatinAmerica need qualifying. In 2008, 90% of the region's exports to China originated in four South Americancountries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru). The disparity of trade with China explains to some extent the differentgrowth patterns within subregions in Latin America. In 2010, Central America's economy grew by 4.9% while South

America's expanded by 6.6%. The current trade dynamic between China and South America is becominga relationship of economic dependence that benefits Beijing. China is the largest export market forBrazil and Chile, and comes in second with Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela. Most exports consist ofcommodities such as iron ore, copper, copper ores and concentrates, and soya derivatives. In turn, up to 92% ofLatin America's manufactured exports compete directly or indirectly with China's products, which ultimately results indeindustrialization for Latin America. In 2010, Brazil lost approximately 70,000 jobs in the manufacturingsector and $10 billion in income.

Economics is not zero-sumFeinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and Professor ofInternational Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in theUniversity of California, San Diego. ―CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENTINTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?‖ Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

In China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America: Opportunity or Threat?, the various contributors—World Bankeconomists and consultants, including renowned specialists in international trade—come down solidly onthe side of opportunity. This is not surprising: in the neoclassical (or neoliberal) paradigm dating back to

Adam Smith and David Ricardo, and widely accepted among trained economists, market-generatedeconomic exchanges typically produce mutually beneficial gains, and any losers can becompensated from the resulting surplus. In contrast to the security games realists imagine, in which there are

triumphant winners and vanquished losers, economics is not a zero-sum game! In the arena of trade, theexpanding Chinese economy is creating both direct and indirect gains for Latin America: directgains as China sucks in massive quantities of raw materials (e.g., iron ore, copper, petroleum, soybeans and other grains) andindirect gains from the rising price of natural resources (commodities in which Latin America and especially South America have a

comparative advantage) and from spillovers in third markets (e.g., demand from China bolster s theU.S. economy, which in turn can purchase more Latin American products at higher prices). Some of the empirical methodsused in China’s and India’s Challenge to Latin America are nevertheless imperfect: trade data are somewhat outdated andinsufficiently disaggregated to drill down to the level of particular products; there are possibly problems of endogeneity bias andreverse causality (as noted in the footnotes to page 32); and some trade models employ dangerously simplifying assumptions.


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However, the evidence is overwhelming that a burgeoning Chinese economy has givenLatin America a measurable boost.

Lack of cultural influence causes decrease of soft power and not zero sumNye 2012 (Joseph S. Nye Jr; University Distinguished Service Professor at Harvard University and author of “The Future

of Power”; “Why China Is Weak on Soft Power”; New York Times; 1-17-12; http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/opinion/why-china-is-weak-on-soft-power.html?_r=0)

As Han Han, a novelist and popular blogger, argued in December, “the restriction on cultural activities

makes it impossible for China to influence literature and cinema on a global basis or for us culturati to

raise our heads up proud.” The development of soft power need not be a zero sum game. All countries

can gain from finding attraction in one anothers’ cultures. But for China to succeed, it will need to

unleash the talents of its civil society. Unfortunately, that does not seem about to happen soon.

China and US not competing for Latin AmericaChina Media 13 (―China, US not competing over Latin America: expert.‖ China Media 31 May 2013. Web.)

http://www.chinamedia.com/2013/05/31/china-us-not-competing-over-latin-america-expert/ EWWhile Xi kicks off his visit, US Vice President Joe Biden is concluding his Latin America visit on the same day, as he leaves Brazil

Friday. Some media reports described ―dueling visits‖ by Chinese and US leaders, and said that

the ―competition between the world‘s two biggest economies for influence in Latin America is on display.‖ Both the US andChina deny they are competing with each other . Chinese foreign ministry spokespersonHong Lei said last week that the two countries can ―carry out cooperation in LatinAmerica by giving play to their respective advantages.‖ Tao Wenzhao, a fellow of the Institute of AmericanStudies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that it is a coincidence that the two leaders chose to visit

Latin America at a similar time, and that China has no intention to challenge US influence in the area.

China doesn‘t want to compete with the United StatesCarlson 13 (Benjamin Carlson, GlobalPost‘s senior correspondent covering China. ―Chinese insider: ‗China‘s rise is not

America‘s demise.‘‖ Global Post 25 January 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-

pacific/china/130124/china-japan-tensions-Senkaku-Islands-conflict-zone-ruan-zongze EW Online, nationalism is even more strident. One Chinese web user mocked the ―Japanese dogs [who] once again

go to their daddy for support.‖ In Japan, commenters joked ―Now that the US is really involved, China is scared out of its mind,‖

according to a translation by Tea Leaf Nation, an online magazine about China. Remarking on the United States,Ruan said Beijing has no reason or desire for conflict with America. "We do not want azero-sum game," he said. "We don‘t want to say that China‘s rise is the demise of the UnitedStates.‖

http://www.chinamedia.com/2013/05/31/china-us-not-competing-over-latin-america-expert/

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Soft Power Low

No Chinese Soft Power- Only an illusion quickly shattered by repressionMinas 2010 (Stephen, Master of International Relations from the London School of Economics, research associate with the Foreign

Policy Centre, London, “The Hard Truth About China’s Soft Power” November 24, 2010, http://www.abc.net.au/unleashed/41252.html)

The recently finished Shanghai World Expo was China‘s second coming out party, so-called, in three years. Like the BeijingOlympics before it, it went off without a hitch. Like the Olympics, it was widely declared a success. And it was. As an expo – a big,

public event. But some had grander hopes for the Expo – namely, that it would ‗showcaseChina‘s soft power‘. Prior to the Expo opening, Jin Canrong of Renmin University‘s School of International Studiespredicted: ‗The message will remain one of how China's rise is characterised by soft power‘. ‗The Expo is a very safe way for [thegovernment] to show China's soft power‘, concurred Ding Xueling of the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. As it

happened, the events that swirled around the Expo‘s closing weeks showcased somethingquite else: Why China doesn‘t have much soft power and why the West, broadly defined,still has it in spades. Harvard University‘s Joseph Nye coined the term ‗soft power‘. He defines it as ‗the ability to obtain

the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than using the carrots and sticks of payment or coercion‘. For nations,according to Nye, soft power rests on culture, values and policies. It is therefore difficultto manufacture. Which brings us to China‘s problem. Take Shanghai itself – the city not the Expo

site. It is a tableau of Western soft power. Young men while away evenings in Westernbars, playing not majiang but pool. Young women self-consciously answer ‗Hello‘ when their phone rings, before launching intoChinese. Expensively dressed Chinese drink at the French-themed Bar Rouge, perched high above the grand, colonial-era Bund.During Halloween, skeletons, vampires and witches lurch merrily out of the darkness. The release of the iPad prompted scenes ofpublic jubilation. And those people wearing Manchester United and Liverpool football shirts are not expats but locals. It‘s to the greatcredit of Shanghai‘s government and people that the city‘s Western heritage has been preserved and enhanced. It gives Shanghai

much of its character and marks it out from the megacities rising up around it. But Western soft power undoubtedlyremains on show in mainland China‘s greatest city. East of the Huangpu River, at the main Expo site, thelimits of China‘s commitment to even pursue a soft power strategy eventually became clear .In September the Japanese government detained a Chinese fishing captain and a heated row over the disputed Diaoyu or Senkaku

islands flared up. Among its various responses, China revoked an invitation to 1,000 Japanese youthsissued by Premier Wen Jiabao to visit the Expo. If the Expo was meant to ‗showcaseChina‘s soft power‘, the cancelled invitation did the exact opposite. The young Japanese were

finally re-invited after Japan released the Chinese fisherman.

Even more telling is that, as the Expo came to an end,

the standout soft power play came not from China but from the Nobel Committee. Itawarded the Nobel Prize for Peace to Liu Xiaobo, a jailed critic of China‘s government. President Barack Obama reacted by urging China to release his fellow Nobel Laureate ‗as soon as possible‘. ‗Political reform [in

China] has not kept pace‘, the president said. ‗The basic human rights of every man, woman and child must be respected‘. Thiswas a pure exercise in soft power. The Nobel Committee cannot coerce. It can only attract. It does so through its

prestige and through the common recognition that it stands for certain principles. What happened next? A media blackoutpunctuated by official criticism of Liu and the Nobel Committee. A celebratory dinner abruptly brokenup, with Liu‘s friends and comrades hauled off to the slammer. The newly minted Nobel Laureate‘s wife put under house arrest, her

phone line cut. And now, reports of Liu‘s supporters prevented from leaving the country. Behaviour like this throttlesthe development of Chinese soft power – values, culture and policies that can attract. And

the Nobel reaction is hardly an isolated event. China is still a nation where typing any ofthe forbidden words into a search engine causes the internet to reset (‗The site could be

temporarily unavailable or too busy‘, Firefox artlessly suggests). And yet China has a lively Twitter conversation – evidence for thetruism that bad laws tend to be flouted and invite derision and contempt. China‘s leadership did not want the Nobel Committee‘scriticism. In 2008, it did not want Kevin Rudd‘s. Australia‘s then prime minister addressed students at China‘s top university, Peking.Speaking in excellent Chinese, Rudd presented himself as a zhengyou, which Rudd defined as a friend ‗who offers unflinchingadvice‘. Rudd raised the ‗significant human rights problem in Tibet‘ and urged China to do more on climate change. Of course, nonation wants foreign criticism. But ignoring it is not always the best course. Jerome Cohen, another zhengyou and the doyen ofChinese law studies at New York University, puts it bluntly: ‗Until the party leaders are persuaded to [embrace] the rule of law, Chinawill not have soft power‘. Some will disagree that China lacks soft power. They might point to China‘s increasing influence inemerging economies. And it‘s true, governments and businesses in Africa, South America and all parts of Asia are trading with

China in increasing volumes. But how many of their elites would consider sending their kids touniversity in China ahead of the US or Europe? How many of their workers dream of

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migrating to China to start a new life? How many of their consumers watch Chinese TVshows and use iconic Chinese brands every day? How many nations are influenced by China through

attraction not payment or coercion? China has a long way to go before it develops soft power assets that can significantly augment its foreign policy. But the good news for China is that the biggest obstacles are not inherent but amatter of choice.

China soft power in rapid decline now all around the worldShambaugh 13David, a professor of political science and international affairs at the George Washington University and anonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is the author of ''China Goes Global: The Partial Power.''―FallingOut of Love With China‖ The New York Times March 19, 2013 Lexis SCTM

Washington¶ NOW that China is becoming a world power, it is beginning to recognize the

importance of its global image and the need to enhance its ''soft power .'' It is tracking public opinion pollsworldwide and investing huge amounts into expanding its global cultural footprint, ''external propaganda work'' and public diplomacy.

Unfortunately for China, that's not enough.¶ While pockets of positive views regarding China canbe found around the world, public opinion surveys from the Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project and the

BBC reveal that China's image ranges between mixed and poor. And the negative view is expanding: for

almost a decade, European public opinion toward China has been the most negative in the world, butthat is now matched in America and Asia.¶ There are likewise increasing signs of strainwith Russia: on the surface, there is considerable harmony of worldviews and interests, but underneath lielingering historical suspicions, growing trade frictions, problems stemming from Russia's militarysales to China, immigration controversies and nascent strategic competition in Central Asia.¶

China's reputation has also deteriorated in the Middle East and among the Arab League due to thecountry's support for the Syrian and Iranian regimes as well as its persecution of Muslim minorities in far western China, a policy that

has also sullied its image in Central Asia.¶ Even in Africa -- where relations remain positive on the whole -- China'simage has deteriorated over the past three years as a result of the flood of Chinese entrepreneurs, itsrapacious extraction of oil and other raw materials, aid projects that seem to benefit Chinese construction

companies as much as recipient countries and support for unsavory governments. A similar downturn is apparent inLatin America for the same reasons.¶ Finally, China's most important relationship -- with the United States -- is alsotroubled. It is now a combination of tight interdependence, occasional cooperation, growing competition and deepening distrust.

Alt cause to soft power – Chinese support for dictatorsGill and Huang 6 (Bates, Freeman Chair in China Studies at CSIS, and Yanzhong, Assistant Professor atthe John C. Whitehead School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Summer 2006, ―Sources and Limits ofChinese 'Soft Power'‖, http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060605_gill_huang_iiss.pdf, acc. 7/18/13)

The lack of meaningful political reform, coupled with Beijing's friendship with dictators in thedeveloping world, creates a legitimacy problem. As Nye has pointed out, states most likely to projectsoft power in an information age are those whose dominant ideas are closer to global norms, which now emphasiseliberalism, pluralism and autonomy.76 Beijing seems to express few qualms about cutting politicaland economic deals with corrupt and even brutal, dictators. In July 2005, Beijing lavished honourson Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe (a disciple of the 'Beijing Consensus'), at a time when UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan spoke of Mugabe's 'catastrophic injustice' in implementing his urban eviction programme.77Beijing's close economic and political ties with such regimes help keep dictatorshipsafloat and blunt international pressures for any meaningful economic and politicalchange. In 2004, China also helped deflect US and other Western efforts to take tougher steps against Sudan,which supplies nearly 5% of China's oil but has a notorious human-rights record, especially in its Darfur region.78China's close economic and political relations with Iran will also come under greaterscrutiny as the international community seeks to stem Tehran's nuclear ambitions. In

justifying its activities in Africa, the Chinese government insists 'business is business'.79 Yet coddling dictatorscan antagonise democratic oppositions and may bode ill for sustaining Beijing's






influence in those countries. The opposition Movement for Democratic Change in Zimbabwe, for example, has

made it clear that if it came to power it would not honour any loan repayments or deals signed by Mugabe.80 To theextent that soft power rests on legitimacy, China must also take growing internationalcommitment to human rights into account or else undermine its international standing at atime it is trying to portray a more benign image. Not coincidentally the only three countries with aplurality viewing Chinese influence as negative (Germany the United States and Poland) are liberal democracies.

Moreover, legitimacy concerns undermine China's claim to moral high ground even at atime of overall decline in US soft power .81 In a Pew Global Attitudes Survey in 2005, more than 12% ofthe people queried in West European countries see the United States as the major power most likely to come to theaid of people threatened by genocide. No more than 3% said they would turn to China.82

Internet Censorship blocks China‘s Soft Power Keck 2013 (Zachary Keck; assistant director of The Diplomat, international current affairs for Asia-Pacific region;―Destined to Fail: China‘s Soft Power Push‖; The Diplomat; 1-7-13; http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/4/)

Yet even as China inaugurated its first organization dedicated to enhancing Beijing’s soft power, a

number of disparate events in China were illustrating why the CCP’s charm offensive is doomed to fail.

For example, in recent weeks the Chinese government has redoubled its efforts to censor the internet.After social media users in China exposed a series of scandals involving low-level government officials,

the CCP adopted new regulations that require internet service providers to quickly delete “illegal” posts

and turn over the evidence to government officials. Additionally, after trying to require citizens to use

their real names on social media sites likeWeibo, the new regulations require citizens to use their real

identities when signing up with an internet provider. More secretly, according to many inside China,

authorities have been strengthening the great firewall to prevent users from employing various

methods in order to gain access to a growing number of sites that are banned.

http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/4/






Soft Power Fails

China doesn‘t understand soft power well enough to use it effectively – itssocial not governmental

Nye 13JOSEPH S. NYE Dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University ―What China and RussiaDon't Get About Soft Power‖ Foreign Policy APRIL 29, 2013http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?page=0,1SCTM

In his new book, China Goes Global, George Washington University's David Shambaugh shows how China has spentbillions of dollars on a charm offensive to increase its soft power . Chinese aid programs to Africa and

Latin America are not limited by the institutional or human rights concerns that constrain Western aid. The Chinese styleemphasizes high-profile gestures. But for all its efforts, China has earned a limited returnon its investment. Polls show that opinions of China's influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, but

predominantly negative in the United States, Europe, as well as India, Japan and South Korea. Even China's soft-powertriumphs, such as the 2008 Beijing Olympics, have quickly turned stale. Not long after the last international athletes

had departed, China's domestic crackdown on human rights activists undercut its soft powergains. Again in 2009, the Shanghai Expo was a great success, but it was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate LiuXiaobo and screens were dominated by scenes of an empty chair at the Oslo ceremonies. Putin might likewise count on a soft

power boost from the Sochi Olympics, but if he continues to repress dissent, he, too, is likely to step on his own message.¶ Chinaand Russia make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of softpower. In today's world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Governmentpropaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda. For all the efforts to turn Xinhua and ChinaCentral Television into competitors to CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for brittle propaganda. As theEconomist noted about China, "the party has not bought into Mr. Nye's view that soft power springs largely from individuals, theprivate sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom it thinks might have global

appeal." But soft power doesn't work that way. As Pang Zhongying of Renmin University put it, it highlights "apoverty of thought" among Chinese leaders.¶ The development of soft power need not be a zero-sum game. All countries can gain

from finding each other attractive. But for China and Russia to succeed, they will need to match words and

deeds in their policies, be self-critical, and unleash the full talents of their civil societies. Unfortunately,

that is not about to happen soon.

Too many cultural and economic differences – this is their authorEllis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, ―Chinese SoftPower in Latin America,‖ China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PEThe growth and exercise of soft power by the People‘s Republic of China have limits that areimportant to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those l imits are not the same as the limits to U.S.soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from the significant gapbetween the two cultures, the associated diff iculty in learning each other‘s culture and language, a lack ofunderstanding of each side by the other, and a pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese withinLatin America generally. The cultural gap between China and Latin America touches upon many areas,

from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin American exports such ascoffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business and administrative dealings,

which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where the PRC has operated in Latin America.

One of the most significant barriers between the PRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relativelysignificant portion of Latin Americans have some ability in English, very few speak or readChinese, and even fewer Chinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 AlthoughChinese-language programs are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learningMandarin and the Chinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the two cultures.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?page=0,1

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/04/29/what_china_and_russia_don_t_get_about_soft_power?page=0,1



Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledge regarding LatinAmerica. Apart from major governmental institutes—such as the China Academy of Social Sciences, whichcurrently has the world‘s largest Latin America studies program—and truly multinational Chinese corporations—suchas Hong Kong –based Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE—thegeneral knowledge of the region among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restrictingthe ability of the PRC to develop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhapsmost importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians to reach out to Latin

America, they are too frequently perceived as ―not one of us‖—a reality reflected even in Chinesecommunities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical roots in many Latin American citiessuch as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistent mistrust, even where both

sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin American businesspeople commonly express misgivings,

suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive and manipulative in business dealings, or conceal

hidden agendas behind their expressions of friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin Americaare often seen as poor corporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own

nationals, treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. Inthe arena of China –Latin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin American military officersparticipating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by their colleagues in ways that officers participating inexchange programs in the United States are not.

Economic leverage doesn‘t translate into soft power Pew, 13 (Pew Research Center, ―America‘s Global Image Remains More Positive than China‘s,‖ Global Attitudes

Project, Online, http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-positive-than-chinas/, accessed 7/18/13) PEPublics around the world believe the global balance of power is shifting. China‘s economic power is on therise, and many think it will eventually supplant the Un ited States as the world‘s dominant superpower. However ,China‘s increasing power has not led to more positive ratings for the People‘s Republic. Overall, theU.S. enjoys a stronger global image than China. Across the nations surveyed, a median of 63% express afavorable opinion of the U.S., compared with 50% for China. Globally, people are more likely to consider the U.S. apartner to their country than to see China in this way, although relatively few think of either nation as an enemy.America is also seen as somewhat more willing than China to consider other countries‘interests. Still, both of these world powers are widely viewed as acting unilaterally in international affairs.

Chinese culture projection doesn‘t help their position in Latin AmericaEllis, 13 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, Ph.D. in political science with a specialization in comparative politics, ―Chinese SoftPower in Latin America,‖ China Culture, 2013-07-16, Online, http://www.chinaculture.org/info/2013-07/16/content_468445.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PE Despite PRC ―marketing efforts,‖ by contrast to the global impact of U.S. culture, Chinese culture is

arguably one of the PRC‘s weakest levers of sof t power in Latin America, with interest inChinese culture arguably reflecting, more than driving, China‘s influence in the region. Although some

Chinese culture is reaching the Latin American mainstream, perceptions of it in Latin America are generally

limited and superficial, sometimes based on media reports or experiences with ethnic Chinese living in those

countries. Such perceptions are often mixed, including respect for the Chinese work ethic, a sense of

mystery regarding Chinese culture, and often a sense of mistrust arising from the perceiveddifferentness of that culture and commercial competition from Chinese products.

Sino-Latin America relations fail; Cultural and language barriers, poorcorporate citizenship by ChineseEllis 2011 (R. Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, and an author and researcher on topic of Latin America‘s relations with externalactors, Ph.D in Political Science, ―Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study,‖ National Defense UniversityPress, January, http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)

http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-positive-than-chinas/

http://www.pewglobal.org/2013/07/18/americas-global-image-remains-more-positive-than-chinas/



The growth and exercise of soft power by the People's Republic of China have limits thatare important to recognize. As with the sources of Chinese soft power, those limits are not the same as the limits to

U.S. soft power. Limits to Chinese soft power in Latin America principally arise from thesignificant gap between the two cultures, the associated difficulty in learning eachother's culture and language, a lack of understanding of each side by the other, and a

pervasive sense of mistrust of the Chinese within Latin America generally. The cultural gapbetween China and Latin America touches upon many areas, from differing consumer preferences limiting the appeal of Latin

American exports such as coffee and beef, to different attitudes toward authority in business andadministrative dealings, which contribute to labor problems and other difficulties where thePRC has operated in Latin America. One of the most significant barriers between thePRC and Latin America is language. Whereas a relatively significant portion of LatinAmericans have some ability in English, very few speak or read Chinese, and even fewerChinese can communicate in Spanish, although the number is growing.16 Although Chinese-language programs

are proliferating in Latin America, the difficulty of and time required for learning Mandarin and theChinese character set are a powerful impediment to the growth of ties between the twocultures. Compounding the language barrier is a relative lack of Chinese knowledgeregarding Latin America. Apart from major governmental institutes—such as the China Academy of Social Sciences,which currently has the world's largest Latin America studies program—and truly multinational Chinese corporations—such as Hong

Kong –based Hutchison Whampoa, China Shipping, China Overseas Shipping, Huawei, and ZTE—the general knowledge of theregion among Chinese businesspeople and government functionaries is limited, restricting the ability of the PRC todevelop broad and sophisticated programs to advance its objectives in the region. Perhaps

most importantly, despite the best efforts of Chinese businesspeople and politicians toreach out to Latin America, they are too frequently perceived as "not one of us"—a reality

reflected even in Chinese communities, which often remain only partly integrated, despite deep historical

roots in many Latin American cities such as Lima and Guayaquil. Such distance often translates into a persistentmistrust, even where both sides perceive benefits from cooperation. Latin Americanbusinesspeople commonly express misgivings, suggesting that the Chinese are aggressive andmanipulative in business dealings, or conceal hidden agendas behind their expressionsof friendship and goodwill. Chinese companies in Latin America are often seen as poorcorporate citizens, reserving the best jobs and subcontracts for their own nationals,

treating workers harshly, and maintaining poor relations with the local community. In thearena of China –Latin America military exchanges, it is interesting to note that Latin Americanmilitary officers participating in such programs are often jokingly stigmatized by theircolleagues in ways that officers participating in exchange programs in the United Statesare not.

China Soft power is infective and failsDeLisle 2010 (Jacques deLisle is the director of the Asia Program at FPRI, the Stephen A. Cozen Professor ofLaw and professor of political science, University of Pennsylvania. “Soft Power in a Hard Place: China, Taiwan,Cross-Strait Relations and U.S. Policy” https://www.fpri.org/docs/delisle.chinataiwan_1.pdf) SJH

In much of the developing world, the apparent love affair with China likely remains shallow and

fragile. The ambiguous and much-debated China Model or Bei jing Consensus is only superficially understood anddisappointments that would accompany attempted implementation have not yet been encountered. The embrace of China mayprove little more than an implicit quid pro quo for diplomatic support, modest development assistance and foreign investment. Theseare not the most pure or robust forms of softpower. In some cases and on some accounts, they do not even count as soft power.With China‘s growing economic presence—concentrated in extractive industries, low-end service sectors, and manufactured

exports—come looming and already-materializing risks to China‘s image in Africa, Latin America and elsewhere. Complaintsof labor abuses, neocolonialism, environmental degradation and hollowing out of labor-intensive local economic sectors have already begun to surface. Nearer China‘s periphery, economic

integrationdriven bandwagoning with China is easily exaggerated. As more careful analyses have pointed out,

https://www.fpri.org/docs/delisle.chinataiwan_1.pdf

https://www.fpri.org/docs/delisle.chinataiwan_1.pdf



East and Southeast Asian states are wary of China, remain more attracted to U.S. valuesthan PRC ones, and have combined growing links to China with recommitments to ties with the United States throughstrategies that can be variously—if not wholly satisfactorily—characterized as balancing, double-bandwagoning or hedging.64Throughout much of the non-Western world, seeming Sinophilia is to some extent super-ficial and self -indulgent tweaking of a solesuperpower that is seen as havingbeen on a binge of neglect and abuse. According to major global public opinion surveys andinfluential Chinese scholars‘ own estimates, China has scored only limited successes and still badly trails the United States in soft

power.65 Second, as we have seen, China‘s soft power resources are plagued by internal

contradictions. To build and emphasize some dimensions is to undermine others. Playing up residual communism cannarrow the relevance and appeal of the China Model. Trumpeting strong commitments to sovereignty can raise doubts—especiallywhen Taiwan is the issue or when Beijing backs pariah regimes—about Beijing‘s claims to be a benevolent, peace-seeking and

responsible power. And so on. Third, key types of Chinese soft power resources remain thin. Asmany analysts at home and abroad have noted, China‘s political institutions and officialvalues do not enjoy broad appeal, nor does China‘s record on socialequity, theenvironment, international human rights and other matters.66 The international relevance, content andeven existence of a China Model for development are as much foci of debate as they are rich sources of soft power that can alter

foreigners‘ attitudes and preferences in ways that serve Chinese interests. China‘s soft power remains heavilystatist, lacking the popular culture, commercial and civil society dimensions that providemuch of the might of American soft power .67A slowing of China‘s growth rate or rise in its perceived collateral

costs is far from unimaginable and would dim the luster of the China Model. Even continued success could sapsoft power as a more prosperous China would become, like Taiwan, seemingly less

relevant to the developing world. Fourth, China may suffer from a particularlypronounced case of the general problem that soft power resources can be difficult todeploy, especially to achieve affirmative (as opposed to defensive) policy aims. Theattractive force of a China Model of development or vigorous defenses of sovereignty ortraditional Chinese culture do not translate neatly or more than very indirectly intosupport in the international system for likely PRC policy agendas that go beyonddefusing fears of a rising China.68 Many of China‘s high-profile soft power -buildinginternational activities have been pro-status quo (for example, supporting a state-centricinternational system and a relatively liberal international economic order and largelyaccepting thenDeputy Secretary of State Zoellick‘s call on China to be a ‗‗responsiblestakeholder‘‘) or have served values that are more like the United States‘ than the PRC‘s(in the case of humanitarian and democracy-promotion agendas associated with UN

peacekeeping operations and other PRC moves to engage with the international humanrights regime).69 Seemingly more revisionist efforts (mostly on economic issues andespecially with the advent of the 2008 global financial crisis) so far have been, variously,rhetorical, vague, tentative and not very influential. Especially in the closing years of the twenty-first

century‘s first decade, China has given reason to doubt its will or ability to stick to a line that willmaximize its soft power. Some of what Beijing says and does is bad for China‘s soft-power influence with key international constituencies. Examples include: newly haughty(if, on the merits, plausible) lectures about the shortcomings of American-stylecapitalism and Washington‘s regulatory regime; proud and sometimes stridentnationalism at the 2008 Beijing Olympics and in response to perceived provocationsfrom alleged foreign-backed separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang; high-profile actionsagainst pro-democracy, pro-human rights and pro-civil liberties elements; declarations

that Western-style democracy is not appropriate for China; and prominent statementsimplying or asserting that theworld needs to learn to deal with China on Chinese terms.



Entanglement Mpx Turn

Turn – Chinese involvement in Latin America means they get drawn in toLatin America conflicts – means Sino/U.S. war

Ellis, 12 (Evan, professor of national security studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the Center forHemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America‘s relationships with external actors, includingChina, Russia, and Iran, ―China–Latin America Military Engagement,‖ API International, February 2012, page 4,Online, http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2012/2012-2/2012_2_05_ellis_s_eng.pdf, accessed7/19/13) PEChinese decision-makers, as others around the world, recognize the implications of the emergence

of the PRC as a principal global actor, including the possibility that it may have to one day

fight a major war involving not only Asia, but other theaters of operations in which it hasinterests, or where it might wish to hold its would-be adversary at risk. While there is nothing to suggest that the PRCdesires or anticipates such a struggle in the short term, it is reasonable to anticipate that its military strategicthinkers are preparing for the possibility. To this end, China‘s military ties in Latin Americaafford geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of US forces,

creating diversionary crises or conducting disruption operations in close proximity to the United

States.



A2: China modeled Mpxs

China is only a trading partner, not a model – nations don‘t follow itspolicies

Ford 11Peter is The Christian Science Monitor‘s Beijing Bureau Chief and was educated in England and graduated fromDurham University with an honors degree in Politics and Sociology ―The rise of an economic superpower: What doesChina want?‖ The Christian Science Monitor November 5, 2011 Lexis SCTM

With the United States it's cultural and political - the two countries share many interests that China doesn't," such as the promotionof human rights, democracy, and transparent governance, he adds.¶ Indeed, for a government that says it is generally content withthe current world order, Beijing is on unusually good terms with regimes cast out by that order, such as those ruling Iran, North

Korea, Sudan, Burma (Myanmar), and Zimbabwe.¶ "By making friends with dictators, China challenges the [global]democratic system and works at cross purposes to the international mainstream," complains Mao Yushi, a well-known reformer who has mentored many of China's leading economists.¶ This does not inspireconfidence in Western capitals but is less of an issue in developing countries, whose own experience with Western governments -

under their rule or trading with them - has often left them feeling seriously hard done by.¶ China has feweropportunities to exert international political influence commensurate with its economic clout. That'spartly

because few governments around the world, and even fewer electorates,

regard China's repressive,authoritarian one-party system as a model to be admired or imitated, regardless of itseconomic achievements.¶ Though China's readiness "to voice different opinions from the only country in the world thathas had a say up until now ... is attractive to other nations," says Gong Wenxiang, a professor at Peking University's Journalism

School. "I can't see people being happy with a very strong power often supporting dictators. That is not a positiveimage."¶ "China is a power in terms of its resources, but it's not a power in terms of itsappeal," adds David Shambaugh, director of the China Policy program at George Washington University. Deficient in soft power, "it's not a model, not a magnet others want to follow."¶ Nor does Beijing show much signat the moment of seeking to push any particular model of governance or political mind-set, which is music to the ears of men like Mr. Mende, the Congolese communications minister. "We don't believe in that trend ofWestern powers mixing with internal affairs of countries," he says. "We don't like people giving us orders. China is more aboutrespecting the self-determination of their partner."¶ That hands-off approach also steers the country clear of alliances that mightenmesh Beijing in the costly defense of other people's interests. Even those Pakistani officials who would like to play Beijing offagainst Washington recall that not once has Beijing stepped in to help Pakistan in any of its wars with India, all of which Pakistan

lost.¶ "China wants to make the deals but not to shoulder responsibilities," says Zhu, the PekingUniversity international relations scholar. "We are far from ready, psychologically, to make ourselves a dependable power."¶ Thegovernment's recent white paper acknowledged as much: "For China, the most populous developing country, to run itself well is themost important fulfillment of its international responsibility."¶ Recent events in Libya illustrate how far China is from playing acreative international diplomatic role. Throughout the crisis, Beijing was a passive, reactive bystander, going along with Westernintervention. But, focused on protecting its oil interests above all else, it was the last major power to recognize the new Libyangovernment. That cautious attitude was on display again last week in China's reluctance to contribute as heavily to the eurozone's

bailout fund as European leaders had hoped it would. China was not, after all, going to save the world.¶ "China's diplomacyis cost-benefit-oriented, not dealing in terms of global public goods," argues Professor

Shambaugh. "It's a very self-interested country, looking after themselves."¶ One result of that attitude? "China is rising, but we

are a lonely rising power ," says Zhu. "The US has alliances; no one is an ally of China's."



A2: US China Relations Mpx

Other Asian player put pressure on US, China to maintain relations for sakeof their own dependencies

Fingar ‘11 (Thomas, inaugural Oksenberg-Rohlen Distinguished Fellow in the Freeman Spogli Institute forInternational Studies at Stanford University, former chairman of the National Intelligence Council, former Researchdirector of the Office of Analysis for East Asia and the Pacific, Ph.D. in Political Science from Stanford University,―Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and theImplications for Future Power Configurations,‖ Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation,http://www.mansfieldfdn.org/backup/pubs/pub_pdfs/One%20Step%20Fingar.pdf)

The United States and China have an additional incentive to cooperate and avoidantagonistic behavior in Northeast Asia, namely, the strong desire of others in the regionto escape having to make either/or choices about alignment. Other states want to maintain goodrelations with both and to avoid jeopardizing the dependent dimensions of their relationships with both China and the U.S. Thus,

for example, Japan and the ROK do not want to put their economic dependence on Chinaat risk by having to side with the U.S. against China. They also want to avoid jeopardizingthe security benefits they derive from U.S. extended deterrence by having to tilt towardChina in order to protect their economic stakes. Moreover, in a region where balance of power thinking is

endemic, all prefer the benefits they think they derive from their relationships with both ofthe major players. This is strikingly different than the situation during the Cold War when all willingly practiced what Maodescribed as ―leaning to one side.‖ No one wants to draw a line through the region with adversaries grouped on either side.

Preferences of and pressure from others in the region will reinforce already strongdesires in Washington and Beijing to avoid confrontation.



A2: Heg Mpx

There‘s no internal link to heg – their argument relies on outdated views ofinternational relations

Ben-Ami, 13 (Shlomo, former Israeli diplomat, politician and historian, China muscles in on Latin America, butUS influence remains strong, The Australian, June 08, 2013 12:00AM, Online,http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/world-commentary/china-muscles-in-on-latin-america-but-us-influence-remains-strong/story-e6frg6ux-1226659433003, accessed 7/17/13) PEYet it would be a mistake to regard Latin America's broadening international relations asmarking the end of US preeminence. Unlike in the bygone era of superpowers and captive nations,American influence can no longer be defined by the ability to install and depose leadersfrom the US embassy. To believe otherwise is to ignore how international politics haschanged over the last quarter-century.







A2: US-Sino War Mpx

No US-Sino warFeinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and Professor ofInternational Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in theUniversity of California, San Diego. ―CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENTINTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?‖ Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

Some realists posit that conflict, even of a violent nature, is unavoidable between rising anddeclining powers, citing as examples the twentieth century wars between Germany and the Allied powers, and betweenChina and Japan. The transfer of dominance from Great Britain to the United States was more peaceful but facilitated by commonpolitical institutions and similar visions of the desirable international order, and by a demographic overlap that is largely absent from

U.S.-China relations. Jack S. Levy argues that traditional power-transition theorists speak of a single,

hierarchical, international system and neglect key issues in global regional interactions. Specifically, heasks, Will China compromise core strategic interests of the United States at the regional level, including in the Western

Hemisphere? The simple fact of geographic distance eases the dangers that China might

pose to the interests of the United States or, for that matter, of Latin America. Further, as the liberalinstitutionalist G. John Ikenberry suggests: ―The United States is a different type of hegemonicpower than past leading states—and the order it has built is different than the orders of the past. Itis a wider and deeper political order than the orders of the past.‖ In this more optimistic view, China will surely seek a greater voice

in global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization; but so long as thereigning powers are flexible and accommodate legitimate Chinese interests, tensions

stemming from China‘s rise can be managed, and China can be integrated into the existingworld system as a ―responsible stakeholder,‖ in the words of former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State RobertZoellick. Ultimately, human agency matters: How will individual leaders in Beijing, Washington, Brasília, and other Latin Americanand world capitals interpret their own long-term interests, and how will they reconcile them with the interests of others? Will theyimagine zero-sum games and thereby deepen the challenges to security inherent in an anarchic international system, or will theyseek to avoid mutually destructive conflicts by adjusting to new power relations and by strengthening consensual internationalnorms?







China SOI Bad

Chinese engagement threatens environmentally sensitive areas – Plus,Chinese standards aren‘t adequate

Gallagher, 13 (Kevin, professor of international relations at Boston University where he co-directs the GlobalEconomic Governance Initiative, ―Latin America playing a risky game by welcoming in the Chinese dragon,‖ TheGuardian, Thursday 30 May 2013, Online, http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/may/30/latin-america-risky-chinese-dragon, accessed 7/18/13) PE Producing natural resource-based commodities also brings major environmental risk. Many

of China's iron, soy and copper projects are found in Latin America's mostenvironmentally sensitive areas. In areas such as the Amazon and the Andean highlands,conflict over natural resources, property rights and sustainable livelihoods have been rife for decades. In our report,we find that Chinese banks actually operate under a set of environmental guidelines that surpass those of theirwestern counterparts when at China's stage of development. Nevertheless, those guidelines are not on par with 21stcentury standards for development banking. Stronger standards should be in place at a time whenenvironmental concerns are at an all-time high.







Cuba



Non-Unique

Non-unique – The U.S. increased agricultural and medical exports to Cuba – should have triggered the link

Hearn 9 (Dr. Adrian H. , author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the Universityof Sydney, ―Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States,‖ The Cuban Research Institute atFlorida International University, June 2009, online, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf, accessed 7/16/13) PE

As U.S. firms weather the recession and adapt to a global economic environment skeptical of short-term investments,partnerships with Cuba could offer some stable and constructive solutions. In March 2009 the

Obama administration approved wider legal channels for U.S. agricultural and medicalexports to Cuba under the Omnibus Appropriations Measure (P.L. 111-8), providing a foundation for futureindustrial engagement. Likely next steps could include the authorization of trade in farm equipment, medicalapparatus, and telecommunications products, niches that have already benefited from Chinese trade credits. Suchsteps would permit U.S. firms to compete and collaborate with Chinese counterparts in Cuba,and as indicated by several recent legislative proposals in Congress, would advance U.S.strategic interests if extended to the oil sector.

Non-unique – China‘s influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low – snubs inrecent visitsH.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, ―Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?,‖ Jun

6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PEXi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as China‘s president, from May 31st to June

6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijing‘s strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba andVenezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintaodid on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad andTobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico(pictured)—two countries that are at least as much a part of America‘s orb it as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the

―Beijing Consensus‖. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chineselargesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in Marchof Hugo Chávez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicity‘s sake. Visits toCuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in SouthernCalifornia on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off theitinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as China‘s is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, youcan always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuela‘s oil minister announced that he hadsecured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite inthe same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning toinvest in Cuban golf courses, the island‘s latest fad. However, as our story on Mr Xi‘s visit to Latin America points out,he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to MrObama‘s ―pivot‖ to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America‘s backyard.

China‘s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealingswith Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico‘s

National Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient ofChinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher ofBoston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and theInter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sortsin terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up theregion‘s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile andVenezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-costmanufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and itexports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy priceshave raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico andCosta Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States.

http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf


http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3






This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probablynot: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it doessuggest that China‘s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves to

be the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their

behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.



A2: Cuba Models China

Cuba won‘t use the Chinese model – it‘s too wary of foreign controlHearn, 12 (Adrian H., author and research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University ofSydney, ―China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba‖, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41, 1, 155 -179,page 168-168, January 2012, Online, http://journals.sub.uni-hamburg.de/giga/jcca/article/viewFile/498/496, accessed7/16/13) PE Cuban leaders have rejected the notion that they intend to follow a ―China model‖ of

development. A historically accrued wariness of excessive foreign influence has long coloured the

character of the island‘s international engagement, and relations with China appear to be noexception. Spanish colonialism in the nineteenth century, along with US domination in the first half of the twentieth

century and Soviet micromanagement in the second half each provoked strong nationalistic responses. Cubalearned from the Cold War that it was poorly served by Soviet-style centralised bureaucratic structures, anadmission made by Fidel Castro himself (1988). In the wake of the Soviet collapse, the Cuban government began toexperiment with decentralisation, manifested in the constitutional reforms of 1992, which facilitated the division of Havana into 93 (subsequently 105) Popular Councils, and the passage of Decree Law 143, which allowed localmanagement of Havana‘s historic centre, the country‘s most dynamic economic zone. While the ―revitalisation‖ of OldHavana under the Office of the Historian of the City was a considerable success, the broader push for

decentralisation exhibited more ambivalent results. The liberalisation of resources and the devolution of executivecapacities did not keep pace with local plans, and overly China, Global Governance and the Future of Cuba 169 rigidstructures of monitoring and compliance diminished local creativity (Fernández Soriano 1999).





A2: Oil Link

Chinese drilling co-op with Cuba is a mythPolitico, 06-12-08, Politico Live, ―Report: No Chinese offshore drilling near Cuba,‖

http://www.politico.com/blogs/thecrypt/0608/Report_Chinese_arent_drilling_near_Cuba.htmlThe GOP is in the midst of a coordinated effort to slam Democrats for a seemingly outrageous contradiction: WhileDemocrats—with the help of Florida Republicans—block oil drilling off the Florida shore, China isdoing just that a mere 60 miles off the coast of Cuba. Vice President Dick Cheney, House MinorityLeader John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Minority Whip Roy Blunt (R-Mo.) have all raised the specter of Chinese drilling offCuba‘s coast. In a recent speech, Cheney quoted a column by George Will, who wrote last week that "drillingis under way 60 miles off Florida. The drilling is being done by China, in cooperation withCuba, which is drilling closer to South Florida than U.S. companies are." The truth of that claim, however, is

seriously in doubt. Democrats today pointed to a February 29, 2008 Congressional ResearchService that found ―[w]hile there has been some concern about China‘s potentialinvolvement in offshore deepwater oil projects, to date its involvement in Cuba‘s oilsector has been focused on onshore oil extraction in Pinar del Rio province through itsstate-run China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec).‖ Sen. Mel Martinez, a Florida

Republican, took to the Senate floor Wednesday and called the alleged Cuba drilling ―akin to urbanlegend.‖



A2: Embargo Link

There‘s no link – ending the embargo doesn‘t mean increased trade withthe U.S.

Suchlicki, 13 (Jaime, Distinguished Professor and Director, Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies,University of Miami, author of multiple books on Cuba and Mexico, ―What If...the U.S. Ended the Cuba Travel Banand the Embargo?,‖ An Information Service of the Cuba Transition Project, Issue 185, February 26, 2013, Online,http://ctp.iccas.miami.edu/FOCUS_Web/Issue185.htm, accessed 7/18/13) PEIf the embargo is lifted, limited trade with, and investments in Cuba would develop. Yet there aresignificant implications. Trade - All trade with Cuba is done with state owned businesses. Since Cuba has very littlecredit and is a major debtor nation, the U.S. and its businesses would have to provide credits to Cuban enterprises.There is a long history of Cuba defaulting on loans. - Cuba is not likely to buy a substantial amount ofproducts in the U.S. In the past few years, Cuba purchased several hundred million dollars of food in the U.S.

That amount is now down to $170 million per year. Cuba can buy in any other country and it is notlikely to abandon its relationship with China, Russia, Venezuela, and Iran to become a major

trading partner of the U.S. - Cuba has very little to sell in the U.S. Nickel, one of Cuba's major

exports, is controlled by the Canadians and exported primarily to Canada. Cuba has decimated its sugar

industry and there is no appetite in the U.S. for more sugar. Cigars and rum are important Cuban exports. Yet, cigarproduction is mostly committed to the European market. Cuban rum could become an importantexport, competing with Puerto Rican and other Caribbean rums.





Mexico



Non-Unique

China will have less influence in Mexico – unhealthy trade partnershipFunaro 13 (Kaitlin Funaro is a GlobalPost breaking news writer. ―Xi flies to Mexico as China battles US for influence in Latin

America.‖ Global Post 3 June 2013. Web.) http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/asia-pacific/china/130604/xi-flies-

mexico-china-battles-us-influence-latin-ameEWChinese President Xi Jinping is making the most of his four-country tour of the Americas toposition China as a competitor to the US and Taiwan's economic influence in the region.

Xi arrives in Mexico Tuesday for a three-day visit in which he and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nietoare expected to discuss their economic ties. The two nations are economic partners butalso competitors, particularly when it comes to exports to the United States. Mexico and China

both enjoy strong exports to the American market but Mexico itself has been flooded with cheap Chinesegoods that are displacing domestic goods. "China is a complicated case" for Mexico, Aldo Muñoz Armenta,

political science professor at the Autonomous University of Mexico State told USA Today. " It's not the healthiest(relationship) in diplomatic terms because the balance of trade has been so unequal."








Venezuela



Uniqueness

Non-unique – China‘s influence with Cuba and Venezuals is low – snubs inrecent visits

H.T., 13 (Writer for the Economist based in Mexico City, ―Why has China snubbed Cuba and Venezuela?,‖ Jun6th 2013, 23:50, Online, http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2013/06/economist-explains-3, accessed 7/17/13) PEXi Jinping's first visit to Latin America and the Caribbean as China‘s president, from May 31st to June

6th, took him tantalisingly close to Beijing‘s strongest ideological allies in the region, Cuba andVenezuela. Yet he steered clear of both of them. Instead of visiting Cuba, as his predecessor Hu Jintaodid on his first presidential trip to the region, Mr Xi stopped off in an English-speaking Caribbean nation, Trinidad andTobago, which (as if to rub it in) is only a short hop from Caracas. He then travelled to Costa Rica and Mexico(pictured)—two countries that are at least as much a part of America‘s orbit as Cuba and Venezuela are part of the

―Beijing Consensus‖. Why this snub to two friendly nations that have been lavished with Chinese

largesse in recent years, especially at a time when both are struggling to come to terms with the death in Marchof Hugo Chávez, the Cuba- and China-loving Venezuelan leader? The short answer is: for simplicity‘s sake. Visits toCuba and Venezuela might well have raised distracting questions when Mr Xi meets Barack Obama in SouthernCalifornia on June 7th, and neither socialist government was likely to express publicly any offence at being left off the

itinerary. The beauty of having a chequebook as thick as China‘s is that if you give your friends the cold shoulder, youcan always mollify them with money. That may be why, on June 6th, Venezuela‘s oil minister announced that he hadsecured an extra $4 billion from China to drill for oil, in addition to $35 billion already provided by Beijing. Not quite inthe same league, but significant nonetheless, the Havana Times reported this week that China was also planning toinvest in Cuban golf courses, the island‘s latest fad. However, as our story on Mr Xi‘s visit to Latin America points out,he may have had other reasons for picking the destinations that he did. Firstly, he may be trying to respond to MrObama‘s ―pivot‖ to Asia by showing that China is developing its own sphere of influence in America‘s backyard.

China‘s business relationship with Latin America gets less attention than its dealingswith Africa, but in terms of investment, it is much bigger. According to Enrique Dussel, a China expert at Mexico‘sNational Autonomous University, Latin America and the Caribbean were collectively the second largest recipient ofChinese foreign direct investment between 2000-2011, after Hong Kong. In terms of funding, Kevin Gallagher ofBoston University says China has provided more loans to Latin America since 2005 than the World Bank and theInter-American Development Bank combined. The visits to Mexico and Costa Rica may also represent a pivot of sortsin terms of the type of economic relationship China has with Latin America. Up until now, China has hoovered up the

region‘s commodities, importing soya, copper, iron, oil and other raw materials, particularly from Brazil, Chile andVenezuela, while flooding the region with its manufactured goods. But its relations with Mexico, a rival in low-costmanufacturing, have been frosty: China accounts for only about 0.05% of Mexican foreign direct investment, and itexports ten times as much to Mexico as it imports. But as wages in China have increased and high energy priceshave raised the cost of shipping goods from China to America, Beijing may be looking for bases such as Mexico andCosta Rica where it can relocate Chinese factories and benefit from free-trade agreements with the United States.This idea thrills the Mexican government, but does it pose an immediate threat to Venezuela and Cuba? Probablynot: China will continue to need their staunch ideological support over issues like Taiwan, for one thing. But it doessuggest that China‘s economic interest in the region is broadening, especially along the Pacific coast. If that proves tobe the case, Cuba and Venezuela, deprived of the charismatic Chávez to court Beijing on their

behalf, will have to work hard to stay relevant.

Chinese investment in Venezuelan oil has been modest at best

Feinberg 11 (Richard Feinberg, Ph.D. from Stanford University for international economics and Professor ofInternational Political Economy for the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies in theUniversity of California, San Diego. ―CHINA, LATIN AMERICA, AND THE UNITED STATES: CONGRUENTINTERESTS OR TECTONIC TURBULENCE?‖ Latin American Studies Association, 2011, http://lasa-2.univ.pitt.edu/LARR/prot/fulltext/vol46no2/Feinberg_215-224_46-2.pdf)

China also has an obvious interest in Venezuelan oil, and Chávez has visited China six times in his

drive to win Chinese investment and energy purchases, and thereby create a soft balance to U.S. power. Yet by all

accounts (i.e., Ellis and Halper), Beijing has been cautious in building relations with the volatile









Venezuelan caudillo. Chinese investment in Venezuela‘s energy sector remains modest,and its purchases of Venezuelan crude continue to fall well below the ambitious goals set byChávez. As Luisa Palacios points out in her essay in China’s Expansion into the Western Hemisphere, there are

technical obstacles: Venezuelan heavy crude is incompatible with existing Chinese refineries,whereas geographic proximity to the United States makes it the more natural market forVenezuelan oil: travel time by tanker to the U.S. Gulf Coast is only five days, compared to forty days to reach

China. Moreover, there is some evidence that China wants to avoid becoming embroiled inVenezuela-U.S. tensions and considers the confrontational Chávez something of a risky bet. Overall, Palacios

concludes that, although Chinese natural resource companies are slowly gaining a footholdin Latin America as part of their global drive to diversify their energy portfolios, the region is not poisedto become a significant supplier of oil to China.



Relations Unsustainable

China-Venezuelan relations failure inevitable without Chavez.Myers, 2013 (Margaret, Director, China and Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue, Former China Analyst for US government, ―Perspective on the Future of China-Venezuela Relations,‖ Inter -American Dialogue,March 22, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3266)

According to Matt Ferchen, however, the strength of the China-Venezuela ―strategic partnership‖ willlikely be tested in the coming years. China is unprepared for the possibility of significantpolitical and economic instability in Venezuela, he added, and is fearful of losing itspreferred status in a post-Chávez government. Ferchen agreed that economic complementarityexists between China and Venezuela, and will play a role in future engagement, but suggested that theextent of future cooperation between China and Venezuela will depend upon economicand political developments in the South American nation. Andrés Rojas Jiménez explained that

China‘s loans have done little to strengthen Venezuela‘s economy. Following thecreation of the China-Venezuela Joint Fund, oil exports to China jumped from 95,000 bpd in 2007 to 460,000

bpd in 2012. But Venezuela‘s external debt also increased considerably. In 2012, Chinese

loans accounted for 25 percent of Venezuela‘s total external debt. Venezuela is alsoincreasingly dependent upon oil exports for economic growth; exports of non-traditional goods are at

the same levels as a decade ago. PdVSA, furthermore, has consistently fallen short of the eventual800,000 bpd promised to China. Chinese entities recently criticized Venezuela for delayson certain projects, including some in the Orinoco.

china disadvantage supplement - hss 2013

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