china (development and governance) || china’s “new deal” in xinjiang and its challenges

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b1462 China: Development and Governance 8 October 2012 1:27 PM

9China’s “New Deal” in Xinjiang

and its ChallengesSHAN Wei and WENG Cuifen*

About one year after the deadly ethnic conflicts in Xinjiang, the Chinese leaders unveiled a new policy package and vowed to bring lasting stability to this restive region through “leapfrog development.”

The Xinjiang Work Conference, a joint conference of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) central committee and the State Council, China’s Cabinet, was held in Beijing from 17 to 19 May 2010 to promote a new deal in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, the country’s far west frontier. The new deal outlined a blueprint for Xinjiang’s development until 2020 whereby the government will pour hundreds of billions of yuan to accomplish the plan.

This conference was in response to the July 2009 deadly riots in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi between mainly Muslim Uyghurs and members of China’s dominant Han group. The riots resulted in about 1,700 people injured and at least 197 killed, the worst in the country in decades. The bloodshed revealed tensions between Uyghurs and Han Chinese in the region as well as the dilemmas of the CCP’s ethnic policy.

China’s current ethnic policy is based on the system of regional autonomy of ethnic minorities. In the autonomous areas, ethnic minorities enjoy a number of favourable policies, including a special quota system in political representation (i.e. more seats in people’s congress and government), education (i.e. priority in secondary school and college admission), family planning (i.e. more than one child) and legal issues (i.e. lenient treatment in law enforcement).1 Most of these preferential policies are guaranteed by the Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law that was promulgated in 1984.

* SHAN Wei is Research Fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. WENG Cuifen is Research Assistant at the same institute.1 Shan W and Chen G, “China’s Flawed Policy in Xinjiang and its Dilemmas”, EAI Background Brief, 463, 13 July 2009.

b1462_Ch-09.indd 71b1462_Ch-09.indd 71 10/8/2012 1:28:10 PM10/8/2012 1:28:10 PM

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72 China: Development and Governance


While these preferential policies are supposed to benefit ethnic minorities and win their support for the regime, the policies in Xinjiang have been beset by several problems. The first problem is economic inequality between Han Chinese and minorities. After a series of riots involving Uyghur separatist and Islamic extremist organisations in the 1980s and 1990s, the Chinese government has adopted a policy of “stability above all else” in Xinjiang. Hence, economic development is of secondary importance in the region.

Yet in the past decades, the government has continued to invest heavily in infrastructure and heavy industries in Xinjiang. The region’s GDP growth since 2003 (except 2009) has been higher than that of China as a whole.2 But this growth has failed to close income gaps across ethnicities.

Since the late 1970s, minority employees have to account for at least 60% of the workforce at local state-owned enterprises (SOEs).3 However, many local SOEs have gone bankrupt in the recent decade, leading to a great number of laid-off minority employees. Now most enterprises are privately owned and not bound by official regulations. Private owners in Xinjiang are inclined to hire Han Chinese workers instead of local Uyghurs who are disadvantaged in language and technical skills.4

In the 1980s and 1990s, the Xinjiang government emphasised the development of the northern part of the region which had a better industrial foundation. As the majority of Muslim Uyghurs reside in southern Xinjiang, this geographically imbalanced development has made the Uyghur people even more disadvantaged in welfare.

To reduce this north-south economic gap, Beijing has encouraged large SOEs to invest in southern Xinjiang since the late 1990s. The introduction of large companies, most of which are energy tycoons like PetroChina and Sinopec, however, only serves to increase economic inequality between Han Chinese and Uyghurs and between Xinjiang and other provinces. These state companies prefer to hire Han workers for their technical skills. They do not need to pay income tax to the Xinjiang government as they are registered in Beijing and their oil and gas pipeline subsidiaries are registered in Shanghai.5

China’s preferential policies in Xinjiang have also sharpened the ethnic divide, distributing benefits according to people’s ethnic status. These have only heightened the ethnic consciousness of the minorities and discouraged the development of a Chinese identity. Hence, the system of regional autonomy of ethnic minorities, to a certain degree, goes against the principles of national integration.6

The third problem in Xinjiang is caused by the CCP’s restrictive religious policy. The CCP’s atheist ideology is essentially anti-religion. The perception of Party leaders that religious organisations are often involved in separatist activities has strengthened their anti-religion attitudes. Even though the government has relaxed its control in the past decade, its religious policy remains too restrictive. Such policy has offended many Muslims and has led to grievances within the Uyghur community.7

Planning a Major Policy Change

From 22 to 25 August 2009, about one month after the tragic violence, Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Xinjiang and made a speech to local officials. In the speech he asserted that “the fundamental

2 Please see Appendix 1.3 The government enforced the Three-60% (“san ge 60%”) policy in Xinjiang, namely, ethnic minorities should constitute 60% of students in local schools, 60% of employees in local enterprises and 60% of soldiers in local enlistment.4 Zhou J, “Review of the Xinjiang Riot,” Zhengming, September 2009.5 Hille, K, “Ethnic Groups United in Hostility towards Leaders,” Financial Time Chinese, 8 September 2009. As SOEs send most of the natural gas explored in Xinjiang to the coastal cities, Xinjiang itself suffers from a shortage of natural gas. Every day, buses, taxis and cars form an approximately 500-metre long queue at a natural gas station between Urumqi and Kashgar. The prices of petrol and gas in this area are the highest in China. Most households in Xinjiang use wood and coal for heating due to the shortage of natural gas. The general public in Xinjiang thus feels exploited.6 Ma R, “A New Way to Understand Ethnic Relations: ‘De-politicization’ of Minority Issues.” Journal of Peking University, vol. 41, no. 6, pp. 122–33.7 “Wary of Islam, China Tightens a Vise of Rules,” The New York Times, 18 October 2008.


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China’s “New Deal” in Xinjiang and its Challenges 73


way to resolve the Xinjiang problem is to expedite development in Xinjiang.”8 This conveyed a clear message that Beijing was going to change the stability-first policy and sort out a development plan for Xinjiang.

In November 2009, three investigation teams were sent to Xinjiang to collect first-hand data regarding social and economic situations, religions and political stability.9

The teams visited every prefecture of Xinjiang and talked with local officials in numerous bureaus and local people from different ethnic groups. The final reports were compiled by the State Commission of Development and Reform and submitted to the State Council. These reports were mainly about boosting economic growth in Xinjiang and achieving lasting stability.

In late March 2010, Party and governmental leaders of 19 affluent provinces and cities were called to Beijing to attend a conference on providing assistance to Xinjiang’s development.10 Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang addressed the meeting. Under a “pairing assistance” model arranged in this conference, the 19 provinces and cities were each required to help support the development of different areas in Xinjiang by providing human resources, technology, management and funds. Shanghai, for instance, was mainly to assist Bachu, Shache, Zepu and Yechang counties in the Kashgar prefecture.11

In a Politburo meeting on 23 April 2010, senior leaders decided to hold a national work conference on Xinjiang issues in May 2010 to establish strategic plans to “leapfrog development” and achieve “long-term stability”. Attendees agreed that Xinjiang has an “extraordinarily important strategic status” in the Party’s national development blueprint. Thus development would set the foundation for solutions to all problems in this area. As such, the Party was prepared to devote all its muscles to accelerating the pace of development.12

Personnel Change: From “Stability” to “Development”

Beijing then made a personnel change to further prepare for the policy changes. Xinjiang party secretary, Wang Lequan (also a Politburo member), was replaced by Zhang Chunxian, then party chief of Hunan province.

Born in Shandong, Wang built up his portfolio in Shandong as its vice governor within the party-governmental system in 1989. In April 1991, he was sent to Xinjiang and assumed the office of vice governor. In 1995, he was appointed party secretary and became the highest-ranking figure in this troubled frontier region.

Having spent almost two decades in Xinjiang, Wang was known for his hard-liner stance. When he began his career in Xinjiang, the local people were terror-stricken by a series of bomb attacks and bloodshed.13 He promoted the stability-first policy and enforced it with an iron hand. Wang

8 Xinhua News Agency, “Hu Jintao Made an Important Speech to Cadres of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region,” 25 August 2009. At <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-08/25/content_11942627_2.htm> (accessed May 2010).9 Central News Agency, “The CCP Is Making New Policy on Xinjiang Development.” 19 November 2009. The name list of the team leaders showed the importance the CCP attached to this investigation tour. Liu Yunshan, Politburo member and head of the Central Party Propaganda Department, leads the team surveying culture and education issues. Ma Kai, secretary general of the State Council, leads the team focussing on social and economic development. And Du Qinglin, head of the Central Party United Front Work Department, leads teams investigating ethnicity, religions, social stability, and party organisational building. Members of the teams were from almost all the central party departments and central governmental ministries.10 Xinhua News Agency, “The National Conference on “Pairing Assistance” in Xinjiang’s Development was Held in Beijing.” 30 March 2010. At <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-03/30/c_128713.htm> (accessed May 2010).11 Please see Appendix 2 for a full list of the 19 provinces and cities.12 International News Online (Guoji Zaixian), “The CCP Politburo Held Meeting to Stabilize Xinjiang.” At <http://gb.cri.cn/27824/2010/04/23/5005s2828148.htm> (accessed May 2010).13 Including 1990, riots in Baren township; 1992, bomb attacks in buses in Urumqi; 1993, series of explosion in multiple cities; 1996 to 1997, series of murder of governmental officials and pro-government religious leaders; 1997, riots in Yining; series of bomb attacks in Urumqi.


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successfully frustrated a number of Islamic extremist and Uyghur separatist organisations and largely maintained social stability in this restive area until 2008. His image as a ruthless hard-liner won him the nickname of “secretary of stability” (wending shuji). For his achievements, in 2002, Beijing offered Wang a seat in the Politburo, which made him one of the most powerful provincial leaders in the nation.

As Beijing had decided to give priority to economic development and depart from the formula of “stability above all else,” it was time for Wang to resign.14 His successor, Zhang Chunxian, has a more diverse resume than Wang. Zhang was once a soldier, an engineer, a manager of state-owned enterprises and minister of transport, and has been party secretary of Hunan province since 2005.

It is believed that Zhang is a relative soft-liner and a moderate. His amiable and responsive style to journalists makes him popular.15 The Hong Kong media once voted him the “most open-minded party secretary.”16 Based on his experience in state companies and economic-related ministries, people expect Zhang to promote a development-centred and soft-line policy.17

Three weeks after the new party secretary started his job, internet services in Xinjiang, shut down since the riots in July 2009, were finally restored. Zhang argued that unimpeded internet access was important for economic development in Xinjiang. Observers believe that he was trying to bring new thoughts to this troubled region and preparing for a new start.18

The New Policies

The new policy package was finally unveiled in the Xinjiang Work Conference from 17 to 19 May 2010. The attendee list of the conference was quite impressive: the Party’s General Secretary and State President Hu Jintao; Premier Wen Jiabao; Vice President Xi Jinping, who is widely believed to be the heir apparent to Hu; Executive Vice Premier Li Keqiang, the supposed successor to Wen; and the other members of the Politburo Standing Committee, all other vice premiers, Politburo members, as well as all the relevant cabinet ministers, provincial leaders, state-owned enterprises leaders, military leaders and chiefs of the armed police. In total there were 359 persons in attendance.

According to the official Xinhua Agency, the conference decided to take a balanced approach between stability and development in Xinjiang, giving more priority to development. The objective of policies was to “leapfrog development” and achieve “long-term stability.” A consensus among leaders was that the “major contradiction” in Xinjiang was between the growing material and cultural demands of the people and the low level of social and economic development. Thus, to resolve this contradiction, the focus of the government in the region had to be on economic development.19

President Hu stipulated that by 2015, per capita GDP in Xinjiang should catch up with the country’s average level and the residents’ income and their access to basic public services should be on par with those of the country’s western provinces. During this period, “marked” improvement must be achieved in the region’s infrastructure, self-development capacity, ethnic unity and social stability.

Xinjiang should also become a “moderately prosperous society” (xiaokang shehui) in all aspects by 2020. It should improve people’s living standards and build an eco-friendly environment, as well as ensure ethnic unity, social stability and security.

14 Fairclough, G, “Xinjiang Official Removed in China”, Wall Street Journal, 26 April 2010.15 Hille, K, “Beijing Displaces Head of Restive Region”, Financial Times Chinese, 26 April 2010. 16 Wang W, “Behind the Leadership Change in Xinjiang: A New Stage of Governance”, China News Net, 29 April 2010. 17 Voice of America, “Xi Jinping’s Praise of Zhang Chunxian”, 25 April 2010. At <http://www.tycool.com/2010/04/25/00051.html> (accessed May 2010).18 Baifeng, “New Secretary Zhang Chunxian Brought Internet Feast to Xinjiang”, Huasheng Online, 17 May 2010. At <http://opinion.voc.com.cn/article/201005/201005171650567197.html> (accessed May 2010).19 “The Xinjiang Work Conference was Held, Hu and Wen Made Important Speeches”, Xinhua News Agency, 20 May 2010.


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To achieve these goals, priority would be given to improving the livelihoods of all ethnic groups. Previous government investment had mostly gone to infrastructure or heavy industries, which had not only benefited local ethnic minorities very little, but also actually widened the income gap between the Han and other groups.

In his speech, Hu required central fiscal investment and aid from other provinces to be spent on the livelihoods of various ethnic groups. Resource tax reforms and resource development should be directly linked to the welfare of the local people. More efforts were thus needed to create more job opportunities and vocational training for all ethnic groups.

The development plan also put the spotlight on the southern part of Xinjiang. Most industries and investment are concentrated in the northern part of the region, where most Han Chinese live, where as most Uyghurs live in the south, such as in Kashgar and Hotian. Regional inequality had widened income gaps across groups. Chinese leaders decided to fix the problem with fiscal and financial measures.

A three-pronged approach has been adopted to support Xinjiang. First, Beijing will dramatically increase government investment in the region. Premier Wen Jiabao told the meeting that the fixed asset investment for the region in the next Five-Year Programme beginning in 2011 would be more than double the amount in the current plan,20 which means investments from 2011 through 2015 could run to two trillion yuan.21

The 19 provinces and cities that joined the “pairing assistance” programme were required to grant 0.3% to 0.6% of their annual budget to Xinjiang every year. This grant would amount to more than 10 billion yuan in 2011 and would steadily increase in the following 10 years.

In addition, joint-equity commercial banks, foreign banks and banks of various kinds are encouraged to open outlets and branches in remote areas, mostly in southern Xinjiang, and provide more loans to local people and enterprises.22

Second, the current tax system would be changed in favour of Xinjiang. The most striking reform was to change the way natural resources including oil and gas were taxed from a quantity-based to price-based levy. Xinjiang is the home to 15% of China’s proven oil reserves and 22% of total proven reserves of natural gas.23 As oil and gas are taxed according to the volume of output, Xinjiang has yet to benefit from the increase in prices in the international market.

With the new resource taxation, this autonomous region may receive 8 to 10 billion yuan of additional fiscal revenue annually.24 An official from PetroChina, the largest oil producer in the region, said that the new tax system would result in a dramatic increase in company costs. If the tax rate is put at 5%, PetroChina would have to pay a tax of about six times more.25

Enterprises in less developed southern Xinjiang would enjoy a favourable “two-year exemption and three-year reduction” (liangmian san jian ban) tax policy, which previously only applied to foreign-invested companies. In the first two years after the enterprise begins to make a profit, it would be completely exempted from income tax; in the following three years, it would be allowed a 50% reduction.26

20 Buckley, C, “ China in Growth Push for Restive Xinjiang Region”, 20 May 2010. At <http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-48662420100520?sp=true> (accessed May 2010).21 Wang Y, et al. “China to Double Xinjiang Spending to Boost Stability”, Bloomberg, 21 May 2010. At <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2010-05-21/china-to-double-xinjiang-spending-to-boost-stability-update1-.html> (accessed May 2010).22 “Hundreds of Billion Yuan Will Be Invested in Xinjiang”, Hong Kong Wen Wui Po, 18 May 2010.23 Wang et al., op. cit. 24 “Oil and Gas Taxed on Price, Local Fiscal Revenue Increases 10 Billion,” Economic News Daily (meiri jingji xinwen), 21 May 2010.25 “Resources Tax Reform Given the ‘Go’”, Global Times, 21 May 2010. At <http://business.globaltimes.cn/china-economy/2010-05/534302.html> (accessed May 2010).26 Qin F, “Over Two Trillion Yuan will Rush into Xinjiang in the Next Five Years”, China News Net, 21 May 2010.


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Finally, a new Special Economic Zone will be established in Kashgar, the hub in south Xinjiang where 90% of its residents are Uyghurs. In addition, Alataw Port and Korgas Port, China’s important gateways to Kazakhstan, would become special zones for cross-border trade.

The Special Economic Zone usually enjoys preferential policies in industries, taxation, finance, land use and trade, which are especially conducive to doing business. In the 1980s and 1990s, Special Economic Zones such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Pudong were engines of China’s economic miracle. Observers anticipate Kashgar and those border free trade zones to play the same role in Xinjiang’s growth.27

Although priority was given to economic development, maintaining stability and fighting against ethnic separatism remain crucial to Xinjiang. While the conference did not sort out details about how to “firmly oppose and fight against ethnic separatist forces,”28 there are signs indicating that Beijing is ready to use force to crack down on separatists.

Four senior military generals sat in the conference, conveying clearly the message that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) backed the Xinjiang development plan and any separatist attempts might face coercive actions. The four generals were Chen Bingde, Li Jinai, Liao Xilong and Chang Wanquan, heads of the four general headquarters/departments of the PLA, as well as members of the Central Military Commission.29

Three days after the conference, an anti-riot special police unit was established in Urumqi. Named as the “Flying Tiger Commando”, this unit is to deal with emergencies such as terrorist attacks, hostage-taking and violent riots in cities.30 With more and more such special units in Xinjiang, the government is now able to react quickly and effectively to street violence like the riots in July 2009.

Internal and External Challenges

What is clear is that Chinese leaders see the solution to the Xinjiang problem as one of “supplying creature comforts”. They showed great confidence in economic development as the solution to the issue. If the region can develop fast enough, they assume Uyghurs will accept Chinese rule and their dissatisfactions will disappear.

In the short and medium term, this economic therapy may prove effective as the livelihoods of ethnic minorities and public services are being improved. Minority people may generally become less likely to support Islamic extremism or terrorist attacks.

Yet there are foreseeable challenges to the development process. Economic modernisation will bring a lot of rural residents into cities. Urban settings will put formerly isolated populations into contact with others, with migrant workers easily developing ethnic networks of information, jobs, and housing.31 These new migrants usually come with unrealistically high expectations. They are likely to be frustrated and become particularly hostile to some cultural aspects of modernisation, and are therefore “ripe for radicalisation.”32 For instance, many rioters in the

27 “Kashgar is about to Establish an Economic Special Zone”, 21st Century Business Herald, 19 May 2010. At <http://money.163.com/10/0519/01/670Q885400253B0H_2.html> (accessed May 2010).28 “The Xinjiang Work Conference was Held, Hu and Wen Made Important Speeches”, Xinhua News Agency, 20 May 2010.29 Chen Bingde is chief of the General Staff Headquarters; Li Jinai is director of the General Political Department; Liao Xilong is director of the General Logistics Department; and Chang Wanquan is director of the General Armament Department. Comparing the Xinjiang conference with the Tibet Work Conference held in January, 2010, another top level meeting addressing Tibet’s development plan, the lists of participants are roughly the same, except for the absence of the four senior military leaders at the Tibet Conference.30 “Flying Tiger Commando Established in Urumqi to Against Terrorism and Riots”, Xinjiang Daily, 23 May 2010.31 Olzak, S, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization”, Annual Review of Sociology, 9, 1983, p. 367.32 Richardson, JM and S Sen, “Ethnic Conflict and Economic Development: A Policy Oriented Analysis”, Ethnic Studies Report, January 1997.


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Urumqi violence were newly urbanised youth from rural areas in south Xinjiang. The ethnic conflict provided them with an opportunity to vent their grievances resulting from economic growth.33

In the long run, Chinese leaders may have to face other challenges. People who are economically better off and better educated are more likely to pay attention to their own history, culture, languages, and religions and hence are more likely to strengthen their ethnic identity.

The new plan largely ignores the issue of religion. In Hu’s speech, there is only one sentence related to this issue — “fully implement the Party’s ethnic policy and religion policy, fully strengthen and improve propaganda and ideological work …”34 There is no sign that the existing religious policy will be changed.35 In December 2011, the municipal government of Yining (a city in northern Xinjiang) launched a campaign in its residential communities to “dilute the religious consciousness and to advocate civilised and healthy life”.36 The government tried to forbid Muslim apparel and veils. This campaign was a miniature of the offensive religious policy in Xinjiang.

It would seem that the CCP leadership has yet to figure out a new way to handle religious issues. But this is a challenge they cannot evade. Heavy-handed restrictions on Islam have radicalised many Muslim Uyghurs37 who join underground Koran study groups, where the imams teach the divine scripts as well as political blueprints for an independent East Turkestan. The CCP in turn takes it as a justification for more harsh control over religion. To achieve “lasting stability” in Xinjiang, Beijing may need to break this vicious circle and find a way to accommodate religion in its system.

It is also unclear how Beijing would establish a national Chinese identity among the Muslim Uyghurs, Buddhist Tibetans and some other groups to achieve national integration. Hu called for comprehensive education on ethnic unity in order to help local people identify with the “great motherland, the Chinese nation, Chinese culture and a socialist development path with Chinese characteristics.” On the other hand, he said that the Party will stick to the existing system of regional autonomy for ethnic minorities, a system that has politically sharpened ethnic divisions and weakened the Chinese identity. Promoting integration among various ethnic groups based on the existing system remains a question.

In February 2012, Zhu Weiqun, associate head of the Central Department of United Front of CCP, published an article arguing that it may be advisable to remove ethnicities from the official identity card, to allow different ethnicities in the same school and to avoid establishing new autonomous regions for minorities.38 This may be a sign of future policy change. The implications of such policies are still not clear.

Challenges may also come externally. Xinjiang will remain as an issue between China and the United States, although it may not be as controversial as the Tibet problem. While the Obama administration’s response towards the Xinjiang riots was cautious, the United States still puts its

33 Kato, Y, “The Next Step of China’s Ethnic Policy”. Financial Times Chinese, 24 July 2009.34 “The Xinjiang Work Conference was Held, Hu and Wen Made Important Speeches”, Xinhua News Agency, 20 May 2010. 35 In a comparative case, an official statement at the fourth Tibet Work Conference in 2001 claimed “protecting freedom of religious belief and legal religious activities … actively guiding Tibetan Buddhism to be adapted into the socialist society.” (Xinhua News Agency, “The Fourth Tibet Work Conference.”) In the fifth Tibet Work Conference, the “freedom of religion” was dropped. Please see Xinhua News Agency, “The Fourth Tibet Work Conference.” At <http://tibet.news.cn/misc/2008-10/18/content_14671439.htm> (accessed May 2010) and Xinhua News Agency, “The CCP Center and the State Council Held the Fifth Tibet Work Conference.” <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-01/22/content_12858927.htm> (accessed May 2010).36 “Yining of Xinjiang Attempts to Dilute the Religious Consciousness.” BBC Chinese Web, 15 December 2011. At <http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/chinese_news/2011/12/111215_china_uighurs.shtml> (accessed May 2010).37 “Wary of Islam, China Tightens a Vise of Rules”, The New York Times, 18 October 2008.38 Zhu W, “Reflections on Current Ethnic Issues”, 15 February 2012, People’s Daily Web. At <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64093/64102/17122242.html> (accessed May 2010).


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weight behind certain overseas Uyghur movements. Uyghur American Association and the World Uyghur Congress, two major Uyghur organisations in the western world, receive financial support from the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), an American organisation financed by the US Congress.39 The United States also brought up Xinjiang as an issue of concern in its human rights talks with Chinese officials in May 2010.40

Turkey is another country that has vested interests in the Xinjiang issue due to its cultural and linguistic linkages with Uyghurs. In spite of this, Turkey is making efforts to strengthen its trade ties with China. In June 2009, Turkish President Abdullah Gul visited China with 120 Turkish businessmen. Till then, the total trade volume between the two countries was over US$17 billion.41 Nevertheless, Turkey had the strongest reaction to the Xinjiang incident.42

Turkey by itself may not constitute a major challenge to China. But it has significant impact on the Turkic, also Islamic states in Central Asia, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.43 Any imprudent move in Xinjiang, if being interpreted as anti-Turkic or anti-Islamic, might spark off chained reactions in those countries and further complicate the Xinjiang issue.

Appendix 1

39 “Rebiya’s Funding Sources: US-Based National Endowment for Democracy Proactively Offers Funds”, 13 July 2009. At <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6699468.html> (accessed May 2010).40 “China Hopes Development Solves Region’s Tensions”, AP, 20 May 2010. At <http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gSjMTGA_93sjHUt2y3ACaI8ak7vQD9FQJUE02> (accessed May 2010).41 Ayparlar, BD, “Turkish PM Erdogan: ‘Incidents at Xinjiang are almost Genocide’”, Journal of Turkish Weekly, 11 July 2009.42 Turkey requested to submit the Uyghur issue to the UN Security Council, in which it was a non-permanent member in 2009–2010. “Xinjiang: Erdogan Expresses Uneasiness Over Incidents”, Journal of Turkish Weekly, 8 July 2009.43 “Russia Warns Turkey not to Design ‘Union of Central Asian Turkic States’”, China News Net, 2 February 2000. At <http://news.sina.com.cn/world/2000-2-2/58846.html> (accessed May 2010).

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Figure A.1 GDP Growth Comparison between Xinjiang and China since 2000 (%)

Sources: Data for 2000–2009 were calculated based on statistics retrieved from China’s National Bureau of Statistics. China’s national annual GDP growth rate in 2010 was retrieved from the World Bank database, and Xinjiang’s annual growth rate of gross regional product was cited from this website <http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/difang/henan/201102/20110207403778.html?2667190221=151279585> (accessed 6 July 2012).


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Appendix 2

Table A.1 The “Pairing Assistance” Programme for Xinjiang

Provinces/Cities Providing Support to Xinjiang Prefectures and Counties in Xinjiang Receiving Support

Beijing Hotan prefecture: Hotan city, Hotan county, Moyu (Karakax) county, Lop countyXinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) 14th Agricultural Division

Shanghai Kashgar prefecture: Bachu county, Shache (Yarkant) county, Zepu (Poskam) county, Yecheng (Kargilik) county

Guangdong Kashgar prefecture: Shufu county, Jiashi countyTumshuq city (XPCC Third Agricultural Division)

Shenzhen Kashgar prefecture: Kashi city, Taxkorgan Tajik autonomous county

Tianjin Hotan prefecture: Minfeng county, Chira county, Keriye county

Liaoning Tacheng prefecture

Zhejiang Aksu prefecture, Aral (XPCC First Agricultural Division)

Jilin Altay prefecture: Altay city, Habahe county, Burqin county, Jeminay county

Jiangxi Kizilsu Kirghiz autonomous prefecture: Akto county

Helongjiang Altay prefecture: Fuhai county, Fuyun county, Qinggil countyXPCC 10th Agricultural Division

Anhui Hotan prefecture: Pishan county

Hebei Bayin’gholin Mongol autonomous prefecture, XPCC Second Agricultural Division

Shanxi Wujiaqu city (XPCC Sixth Agricultural Division), Changji Hui autonomous prefecture: Fukang city

Henan Hamiprefecture, XPCC 13th Agricultural Division

Jiangsu Kizilsu Kirghiz autonomous prefecture: Artux city, Ulugqat countyIli Kazakh autonomous prefecture: Huocheng county, 66 Regiment of XPCC Fourth Agricultural Division, Yining county, Qapqal Xibe autonomous county

Fujian Changji Hui autonomous prefecture: Changji city, Manas county, Hutubi county,Qitai county, Jimsar county, Mori Kazakh autonomous county

Shandong Kashgar prefecture: Shule county, Yengisar county, Makit county, Yopurga county

Hubei Börtala Mongol autonomous prefecture: Bole city, Jinghe county, Wenquan countyXPCC Fifth Agricultural Division

Hunan Turpan prefecture

Source: “The List of Provinces and Cities ‘Pairing’ Assisting Xinjiang.” People’s Daily Online. At <http://minzu.people.com.cn/GB/166030/188109/11580975.html> (accessed May 2010).


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china (development and governance) || china’s “new deal” in xinjiang and its challenges

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