Child Abuse Review Vol . 4 : 356-364 (1995)

Child AbuseFatalities and theMedia: Lessons froma Case Study'

Chris GoddardMax LiddellDepartment of Social Work and HumanServicesMonash UniversityClayton, VictoriaAustralia 3068

* Parts ofthis paper were presented at the Second National Congress ofthe BritishAssociation for the Study and Prevention ofChild Abuse and Neglect, `Working inPartnership', University of Bristol, 5-8 July, 1994 and at the Tenth InternationalCongress on Child Abuse and Neglect, `Creating a Caring Society: AWorld-WideChallenge', Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 10-13 September, 1994 .t The Australian term `de facto' is the equivalent of the English word `cohabitee'.

CCC0952-9136/95/SI0356-09 Accepted 24 July 1995©1995 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The role of the media in influencing child protection policy is exploredby examination of the death of one child, Daniel Valerio, in Victoria,Australia . Daniel, 2 years old, died at the hands of his mother's defactot barely five months after he (Paul Aiton) moved in with Daniel'smother, Cheryl Butcher. A series of reports to protective serviceshighlighting multiple and severe bruising to Daniel were made ; Daniel'spostmortem revealed 104 bruises on his body. Although 21professionals were involved in the case, tragedy was not averted; infact, it was an electrician rather than trained professionals whorecognized the obvious abuse. A series of inquiries into the caseensued ; these were not immediately reported by the media, but pressattention to the case intensified gradually. This led to a successfulthough paradoxical campaign by one newspaper, the MelbourneHerald Sun, to introduce the mandatory reporting of child abuse byhealth and welfare professionals . The paradox is that those peoplewho needed to know of the case to protect Daniel knew about it beforehis death . This article analyses the campaign, highlights the factorswhich led to its success and provides succinct advice to professionalson the use of the media.

KEY WORDS : child protection ; child deaths ; inquiries ; media

T he relationship between child abuse and the media hasbeen a close one . It was media attention to Kempe's

(Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller and Silver,1962) work that allowed his research to be granted theseminal status it is now accorded, largely ignoring, as Howitt(1992) has noted, the earlier work of radiologists and socialworkers .

Child abuse fatalities, in Britain in particular, have beensubject to intense media scrutiny . Media interest in socialwork is said to have commenced with the death of Maria

Colwell (Franklin and Parton, 1991) . The subsequent publicinquiry led to Maria's social worker being `vilified' in thepress (Corby, 1993) . According to Parton (1991), mediareaction to child protection then declined for a period butwas reawakened by the inquiry into the death of JasmineBeckford in the mid-1980s . The names of the individualchildren have been described as a `litany engraved on theminds of British social workers' (Goddard and Tucci, 1991),and the media have placed much of the blame for the deathsof particular children on social workers (Munro, 1994) .Media interest in other child protection `scandals' has

extended beyond fatalities to include events such as those inCleveland and Orkney, and similar media coverage has beennoted in other countries, for example in the Netherlands(Edwards and Lohman, 1994) . There has also been analysisof the coverage of the James Bulger case, unfavourablycomparing the responses of the British press with those ofthe Norwegian media (Franklin and Larsen, 1995) . Mediareporting of child abuse and child protection issues haslargely been examined through the lens of the `moral panic'initially described by Cohen (1972) in his analysis of themedia fascination with mods and rockers in 1960s Britain.This paper examines the death of one child, Daniel

Valerio, in Victoria, Australia, and the coverage of themurder trial by one newspaper . The case study is used bothto describe the manner in which the media can `create' newsas well as to demonstrate that media coverage in such casesneed not focus exclusively on the mistakes of individuals .The paper argues that those concerned with child protectionmust look beyond `moral panic theory' and should attempt toestablish a more active partnership with the media . Thepaper concludes by outlining briefly some techniques toassist in that process .

Synopsis of the Case: The Story of Daniel Valerio

The following account of Daniel Valerio's life is taken fromthe protective services internal inquiry report (CommunityServices Victoria, 1991), the report of the coronial inquest(State Coroner Victoria, 1994) and the media (Tippet, 1993) .

Daniel was born in April 1988 to Michael Valerio and CherylButcher . Daniel was Cheryl's fourth child, her second byMichael Valerio . After Cheryl Butcher's relationship withMichael Valerio ended (in October 1989), Cheryl met PaulAiton in February 1990, and he soon moved into her home onthe outskirts of Melbourne . This, to quote the newspapers, was

when Daniel Valerio's `fatal nightmare began' (Tippet, 1993).Daniel was at this stage almost 2 years of age. Barely 5 monthsafter Paul Aiton moved into the house, Daniel Valerio wasdead .

Soon after Aiton joined the household, neighbours becameworried when they noticed substantial bruising on Daniel . Ananonymous call was made to the protective services . A succes-sion of doctors, in a series of consultations, saw a growingcatalogue of injuries . Daniel was admitted to hospital for a fewdays, butthe paediatrician failed to identify the injuries as childabuse or to report his suspicions to protective services .A week after Daniel's discharge from hospital, another

anonymous referral was made to protective services . Short-staffed, protective services passed the referral on to the police .The police were to claim later that a fax containing vitalinformation never arrived .

At the time that Daniel's death occurred (1990), Victoria hada unique system of child protection called the `dual tracksystem' under which both police and protective services wereauthorized to receive reports of child abuse. In effect, an under-resourced and poorly managed protective services referred tothe police any cases to which they could not respond. Thesystem was widely known to be working badly, had been con-demned in a judicial inquiry and had also beenheavily critizedin the media (Goddard, 1990) .A third referral was made directly to the police, about Daniel,

by an electrician working at the house where Daniel lived. Hereported the boy's condition to the police in the following terms:

`Daniel shocked me because he had been bashed about thehead and had bruises on his arms and legs . One eye wasclosed and the other was almost closed . He could barely see.He had swellings on the cheeks and on the jaw bones.'

(Tippet, 1993)

The police visited that afternoon, apparently in response tothe first call to protective services a week earlier. Daniel was notthere but his brother Benjamin (aged almost 4) was present.Police observed bruising to Benjamin's face, arm and legs .Benjamin told the police that some of the bruising was causedby a fall, some caused by being hit with a stick by Paul Aiton andsome caused by being slapped by his mother . The boy producedfor the police the stick that he claimed Paul Aiton used .

Later that same afternoon, Daniel's mother Cheryl tookDaniel to her GP, who recorded bruising to Daniel's head,trunk andabdomen. In the early evening, the police undertook asecond visit to the home when Daniel was present. Theyrecorded that Daniel had bruising to the head, back, chest, groinand legs . The mother and her de facto reported that they were`baffled' concerning the cause (State Coroner Victoria, 1994).

Daniel was not removed from home by the police, but thenext day (August 31, 1990) he was taken to be examined by thepolice surgeon. Hismother told the police surgeon that the boyswere clumsy and that Daniel bruised easily . She also alleged thatBenjamin, Daniel's brother, was rough with him. The policesurgeon took photographs of the boys but failed to do a skeletal

X-ray survey . He appeared to be uncertain as to the cause of theinjuries, and Daniel and his brother were returned home onceagain.

Five days later, on September 5, Cheryl Butcher took Danielto the GP, complaining that he was vomiting continually. TheGP found no obvious cause for the vomiting and did notconnect it with abuse, but recorded multiple bruising toDaniel's head, trunk and abdomen. On September 6, CherylButcher took Daniel to the GP again . Daniel presented withcontinuing vomiting, a tender stomach, raised temperature anddiarrhoea. The diagnosis was gastroenteritis. On September 7,his mother took him to the GP again. On September 8, Danieldied.Thepostmortem revealed 104 bruises, distributed all over his

body . Healing fractures were found in both collar bones.Internally, the most severe injuries were in the abdomen, akin inseverity to those seen in road trauma victims (State CoronerVictoria, 1994). These injuries led to severe haemorrhagingwhich caused Daniel's death . Some abdominal trauma hadoccurred more than 24 hours prior to death.

The Media Campaign

It can be seen, even from this brief account, that this is thetype of child abuse tragedy that the media relish . This storycontained elements attractive to news journalists: a protec-tive service that failed to respond but which passed messagesto the police that never arrived; procedures that were notfollowed; 21 professionals who could not recognize childabuse, even severe, apparently obvious child abuse; anelectrician who immediately recognized abuse when highlytrained and highly paid professionals did not; and a childwho reported abuse and provided the weapon used .

Daniel's death received no media coverage at the time, asis usually the case. Just over a year later, in November 1991,the internal protective services inquiry report was leaked to anewspaper some 4 months after the report had been com-pleted . The report (as is usual in such cases) made a numberof procedural recommendations and the media coveragecriticized the services and professionals involved . Almost ayear later again (in October 1992) there was further mediacoverage when the jury in Paul Aiton's trial formurder failedto reach a verdict and a new trial was ordered.The media coverage we analyse below focused on Aiton's

second trial for murder in early 1993 . It was this mediacoverage that resulted in the introduction of mandatoryreporting, a significant change in child protection policy(Goddard and Liddell, 1993).

This media campaign was unprecedented in its intensity.There are a number of features that merit examination:

1 . The campaign was run by one newspaper, the Herald Sun(owned by Rupert Murdoch) . It is at the quality end of thetabloid market, bearing little resemblance to The Sun in theUK. It is, in fact, closer perhaps to the Daily Mail (althoughdirect comparisons are difficult) and much of its Europeancoverage, for example, is taken from the Daily Telegraph.

2. The Herald Sun used photographs of Daniel Valerio to greateffect . The photos were taken by the police surgeon when heexamined Daniel just days before he died . These photos lentparticular poignancy to the campaign . Indeed, it is question-able whether there would have been a campaign if they hadnot been available . One particular photograph, of Danielhalf-smiling in spite of his bruised and battered face, hasbecome a symbol that has been used subsequently for otherchild abuse stories .

3. The Herald Sun gave their campaign a clear title, `Save OurChildren', that conveyed a clear call to action .

4. The campaign-and we believe that this was crucial-hadone goal and one goal only, the introduction of mandatoryreporting of child abuse by designated professionals . Ironi-cally, it is hard to see how mandatory reporting by itselfcould have changed the outcome in Daniel's case . He was,after all, known to both police and protective services whenhe was killed .

5 . The newspaper demonstrated very clearly the power of themedia to create news. When there were no developments,the paper used headlines on the front page, such as 'Daniel-How You Can Help' and 'Daniel-Your Letters' that indi-cated material on other pages inside the paper.

6. Each day the paper carried a proforma letter demandingmandatory reporting . Readers were urged to sign this andsend it to the Minister for Community Services, or drop theletter into the newsagents to be forwarded . The paper, inother words, gave everyone a potential part to play in the callfor action .

7. The paper also `created' news by organizing a publicmeeting. This meeting was chaired by the presenter ofMelbourne's most popular radio show. This, together withthe fact that almost a thousand people attended the meeting,ensured that radio, TV and other papers covered the story .Three days after this public meeting the Governmentchanged its mind and introduced mandatory reporting.

8. The Herald Sun used its resources to bolster the campaign .The State Government policy was opposed to mandatoryreporting but many of the ministers (including the Premier)were on record as supporting mandatory reporting whenthey were previously in opposition . A little research soonuncovered powerful quotes, including one by the Premier,who had complained previously that `children will sufferbecause politicians have failed them'.

9 . Finally, as the campaign grew, it became impossible for theother media to ignore it . Such cases develop a momentum of

their own-an eminent Australian writer was employed tocover the murder trial and the coroner's inquest opened withmore than 20 journalists present. When one paper devotes somuch space, time and effort to a story it is extremely difficultfor the other media to ignore it .

Towards a Partnership with the Media

It is easy to criticize media coverage of cases such as DanielValerio's . The dominant academic analyses tend to rely onCohen's (1972) `moral panic' approach . Franklin and Parton(1991), in their review of the media's descriptions ofCleveland and other child abuse cases in the UK, make anumber of criticisms, claiming among other things thatevents are sensationalized and trivialized, vital issues aremisrepresented and scapegoats are sought .Some of these criticisms can be levelled at the media

coverage described above . There was, however, a great dealthat was wrong with the way that Daniel's needs wereresponded to by the child protection system, in Victoria, bothat a systems level and at an individual level . The coroner'sreport, for example, found that the police surgeon contrib-uted to Daniel's death (State Coroner Victoria, 1994) .Crime news will always be `prime news' (McGregor,

1993) and child abuse will continue to provide the popular`running stories' (Fry, 1991) that the media enjoy. Suchstories provide journalists with a series of opportunities tobecome familiar with the events . Daniel Valerio, it will beremembered, was born in 1988 and died in 1990, but therepercussions of his death lasted longer than his life . Theprotective services inquiry took place in 1991, the firstmurder trial in 1992, the retrial in 1993, the coronial inquestlater in 1993, with the coroner's report handed down early in1994 .Child abuse is political and media coverage cannot be

avoided . When things go wrong, as they can on occasions,the temptation to introduce `legislation by tabloid' (Franklinand Lavery, 1989) may be hard to resist . Given that policyand practice will be influenced by the media, those con-cerned with child protection need to make greater efforts touse the media constructively .There are a number of ways that we can do this . The

following represent some of the techniques that the authors(one of whom has worked as a freelance journalist as well as achild protection worker and academic) have used.

1 . We must make the effort to get to know the journalists whousually cover child abuse cases and child protection issues .

One way of doing this is to telephone them when they havewritten a piece, congratulating them if appropriate orpresenting alternative views if you believe it is necessary todo so .

2. Understand and use the rules. If you want comments toremain `off the record', say so at the outset . If a journalistbreaches this rule, or behaves in any other way that youbelieve to be unethical, complain forcefully to those who arein a position to correct this behaviour, for example thepaper's editor or publisher, or the Press ComplaintsCommision.

3. Even if your employment forbids direct communication withthe media, it is still possible to provide background materialfor journalists, for example by sending them articles that youbelieve are important . It is also important to ensure thatsomeone in your agency, professional association or peakbody is maintaining regular and constructive contact withthe media if you are not allowed to do so .

4. Encourage other professionals to write letters to the editorfor publication, praising journalists who cover childprotection issues constructively and criticizing those whoare inaccurate or irresponsible .

5. Write articles for the newspaper (or, if this is not possible,encourage those who can to do so) . Comment, or opinionand analysis pieces, and feature articles are always needed bythe newspapers . We cannot pretend to have analysed theBritish media coverage of child protection exhaustively, butwe have not seen any commentary pieces by managers oracademics. We would argue that directors of social services,or their deputies, should be writing such pieces regularly .The child protection agenda, rightly or wrongly, has beenheavily influenced over the last 20 years in the UK by thebroad media. Those with knowledge of child protectionpractice, research and policy must engage in that debate inthe mass media .

Conclusion

Many professionals disagreed with the campaign chosen bythe Herald Sun in response to the death of Daniel Valerio.We argue, however, that it provides a powerful case study inhow the media can react to events such as child abusefatalities . Rather than concentrate exclusively on the real orimagined faults of the individuals involved in Daniel's case,the Herald Sun attempted to use the case for what it saw asconstructive ends .

In Australia, Armytage and Reeves (1992) have forcefullyargued that accountability in child protection services willalways be demanded, and public (as well as, implicitly,media) scrutiny is unavoidable. A partnership of equalswith many sections of the media will always be impossible .

A more active partnership, however, is essential if appro-priate goals are to be set and complex issues are to beresponsibly debated. The alternative, as Armytage andReeves (1992) point out, is even worse: a public that showslittle or no concern for the abused child or those who workin child protection services .

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