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R DICAL BEH AVIORISM: THE PHILOSOPHY AND

THE SCIENCE

MECCA CH ES

uthors oo perative Inc., PublishersBOSTON



DICAL BEHAVIORISMTHE PHI LOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCECopyright© 1994 by Mecca Chiesa

All rights reser ed No portion of this book may bereproduced, by any process or technique, withoutthe express written consent of the publisher, exceptin the case of brief quotations embodied in criticalarticles or reviews

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 93 73792

ISBN: 0 962331 1 4-7

Authors Cooperative, Inc , PublishersP. O. Box 53Boston,M 02199

Printed in the United States of America

i"

To my parents

Catherine and Mario Chiesa



Preface

manuscr p W hou h s cons s en suppor and en hus asm, sdoub ha h s pro ec would have been comple ed, and I am s ncere yra e l o h m Andrew Belsey n roduced me o he fasc na ons of heph osophy of sc ence and has he ped o clar many ofhe ph osoph calssues d scussed n h s book Marc Richelle of he Un vers y of L e e,

Be um, o ered encoura n and he p commen s on he doc orahes s from wh ch h s book s der ved The n uence ofB F Sk nner sscho arsh p w be ev den hrou hou In add on, he scho ar y worksof Ph H ne ne, V cki Lee, Jack Marr, Murray S dman, and LaurenceSm h con r bu ed subs an al y o my apprec a on ofph losoph ca andsc en c ssues n rad cal behav or sm and psycholo y as a who e I amadd ona y ra e l o Murray S dman for h s en hus asm for h sprojec and for h s pa en and care l ed n My co lea ue, SandyHobbs of he Un vers y of Pa sley, and Ph l El o ad an commen eon several chap ers, and I be eve hose chap ers are now c earer as aresu Harry Ch esa ave me o proofread and M ke Harr es, ye a a n,urned h deous y clumsy sen ences n o reco n zable En l sh

A shor er work ex rac n hemes from e book can be found n hespec al ed on ofheAmerican Psychologis o B F Sk nner s feand work (November, 1 992)

On Refe ences

Many ofB F Sk nner s papers are now pub shed n col ec ed works Forexample,Cumula ive Record: A Sec ion of Papers(Sk nner, 1972)con a ns papers da n back o 1 931 So ha he reader s ab e o p aceSk nner s work n a h s or ca as we l as ph losoph cal con ex , he papersreferred o nCumula ive Recordare also ven he r or nal da e andhe r or na reference, al hou h quo a ons and pa e numbers are akenfrom Cumu ive RecordOne examp e s Sk nner (1950/1972) wh chrefers oAre Theories of Lea ing Necessa ?Quo a ons from h s paperare aken fromCumu ive Recordand pa e numbers refer o ha workBu he reader w l a so no e ha he paper was or nal y pub shed n

v

Preface

1950 and w ll be ab e o place he ar umen s here n n he r h s or calcon ex , n re a on o psycholo cal deba es of ha me

O her works, such as Erns Mach sThe Science ofMechanicsand Dav dHume sEnquiries,carry he or na da e of pub ca on for he samereason In cases where a paper or o her work s separa ed from s orpub ca on da e by only a few years, has been deemed unnecessarve he or na publ ca on da e



Chapter 1

Introduction

P ofound changes have ta en lace th oughout the h loso hy ofsc ence s nce the tu n of the centu y, when hys cs was th own ntotu mo l by ev dence that the nc les ofN ewton an sc ence ev ouslythought to be un ve sal t uths could not be a l ed to ce ta n ty es ofhys cal henomena he h loso he s of the V enna C cle (Log cal

Pos t v sts) attem ted a og am of de n ng the l m ts of sc ent cex lanat on and el m nat ng meta hys cs f om such ex lanat ons Mo elately, theo sts l e Kuhn ( 962) and La atos (see La atos and Musg ave970) have swe t away o ula not ons of absolutes and ult mate t uthsn sc ence by o nt ng out that even n the ocess of val dat ng sc ent cnowledge the e s a measu e of a b t a y dec s on ma ng S nce Kuhnand La atos, t s no longe feas ble to a gue that he wo ld s just sobecause sc ence cla ms t to be, and the oss b l ty of u e obse vat on(obse vat on nde endent of theo y, un nfo med by bac g oundassum t ons) has s m la ly d o ed out ofthe ma nst eam of acce tableo n on (fo exam le, see Hanson, 958)

he d elo ment of the soc al sc ences has hel ed gene ate newns ghts and c t ques n the h loso hy of sc ence Indeed, homasKuhn ac nowledged that h s conce t of the a ad gm a ose a tly out ofuzzlementove the numbe and extent of the ove t d sag eementsbetween soc al sc ent sts about the natu e of leg t mate sc ent c oblems and methods (Kuhn, 962, v ) when measu ed aga nst theelat ve cohes on ofthe h loso h cal and methodolog cal unde nn ngs onatu al sc ence At the end of the 20th centu y, h loso he s andsc ent sts cont nue to debate the m l cat ons of new v ews of sc enceandof new v ews of natu e g ven by contem o a y sc ence he m act

of such debates s neatly ca tu ed n the wo ds of Steve Woolga whe

1



C a terdevoted to S inner s phi osophy of science and remains speci c to theorigina research uestion a reassessment of the a iance bet eenbehaviorism and ogica positivism

though not venturing far beyond the bounds set by the originaresearch uestion, Smith presents a we documented case against in ingbehaviorism too c ose y with ogica positivism His wor shou d na ydispense with this o en cited and erroneous reference But Smithhimse f ma es a in which, though it is common throughout suchiterature, may ser e to perpetuate yet another error the notion that aphi osophica continuity is to be found among various strands ofbehaviorism though he c ari es some of the distinctions betweendi erent behavioral traditions in his chapter on S nner s psycho ogy ofscience, this approach is discussed in a wor tracing strands of behaviorism through To man and Hu before reaching the S innerian stancey reader wou d be forgiven for assuming some ind of continuity in

these app oaches, but under c ose examination the S innerian positionwi show ndamental divergences from ear ier behav ora positionsT ese di ergences resu t in a who y distinct view of the subject matterand ead to di erent sets ofscienti c uestions That this position comesunder the behaviorist heading at a wi eventua y be shown to be anaccident of histo y

A broader treatment ofthe re ation between the S innerian system andother app oaches in contemporary psycho ogy is given by Lee ( 988)Lee argues that, contra y to popu ar interpretation, contemporary

psycho ogy is characterized by an under ying input output formu ationofbehavior and that (again, contra y to popu ar interpretation) S inner'sradica behaviorism ho ds the promise ofmoving psycho ogy beyond thismechanistic framewor Lee s wor shou d so he p dispense witherroneous interpretations of radica behaviorism, but there remains aneed to distinguish this position from other behaviora trends and toarticu ate its phi osophy of science in a sing e wor so that its distinctiveness from other behaviora traditions, as we as from other areas ofcontemporary psycho ogy, may be understood Furthermore, c ari ingS nner s phi osophy of science wi he p p ace radica behaviorism in its

proper position in re ation to the new wor d view debate, for dispensing

10

Introduction

witherroneous interpretations (as Smith and Lee have done) wi aparticipantsin the debate a better understanding ofradica behaviorism sre ation to both the o d and the new wor d view given by science init wi a ow other readers to assess the scienti c c aims made by behana ysts in theiraboratory procedures and in the app ication of thescience in the wide range of settings they share with other psycho

Rec ing E o s: Behavio ism, Mechanism, D alis

The rst and most ubi uitous error to be tac ed p aces radica behaiorism in the tradition of S R or inpu output psycho ogy This erassumes that the term Behaviorism refers to a uni ed approach wvarious adherents subscribe to the same de nition of the subject mof psycho ogy, to the same phi osophy of science, to the same viewthebehavingperson, and to the same form of data interpretation S innand radica behaviorism are fre uent y umped together under the sheading as Pav ov, Watson, To man, Hu , Thorndi e, Spence, Guthand others, and subjected to the same critical ana ysis as these gures as if they shared a common phi oso hica and theoreticheritage

It has a ready been noted that Smith s ( 986) inc usion of S i nephi osophica position in a wor tracing strands of behaviorism throTo man and Hu may he p to perpetuate the view that the S innersystem is continuous with these other behaviora trends (although Shimse frecognizes the distinctions) Mac enzie (1977), inBehaviorismand the Limits of Scient c Metho discusses the Skinnerian system a ongwith other behaviora accounts and app ies broad y the same criti uradicabehaviorism as to other inds of behaviorism Mahoney ( 98a so a ied radica behaviorism to other behaviora traditions by deing S inner as having had a "preoccu ation with input output nctions (Mahoney, 989 p 373) In the same paper, Mahoney mathe connection more subt y by imp ying that a criti ue of Pav ovconditioning a so functions as a criti ue of S innerian psycho ogy notes, "Respected scientists have] cha enged or re sed rad cal beha

1 1



Cha tcc unts f e ning (M h ney 989, p 37 ) nd cites seve p pe ss ex mples By citing the p pePavlovian condi oning: I no whayouhink i is (Resc 988) he imp ies th t ch enge t v vi ncc unts f le ning must s be ch enge t Skinne n cc untsEven the m st supe ci e ding f Skinne 's w k il ust tes th t hissystem di e s in imp t nt scienti c nd phil s phic w ys f mv v's but M h ney's sse ti n nd subsequent efe ence imp y thepp siteThe sec nd e this b k wi l ep i is the ch ge th t dic

beh vi ism p vides mech nistic cc unt f hum n beh vi ndbel ngs t the d w d view fNewt ni n science This ch ge c mesf m within the psych l gic l lite tu e nd f m p ticip nts in thedeb te c nce ning the implic ti ns f the new w d view given bym de n physics

Skinne i n phil s phy h s been linked t the t diti n fNewt ni nscience in seve pl ces nd it is c imed th t dic l beh vi ism bel ngst w d view nd scienti c p ctice th t is n w utd ted M ne( 989), f ex mp e st tes "The Newt ni n ("bil i d b l ) f m fdete minism s st ident y emul ted by th d x beh vi ists w s b nd ned by m st physic l scientists in the dec des f l wing the 927C penh gen Inte p et ti n f Qu ntum Mech nics (M h ney 989,p 373) M h ney st gues th t dic beh vi ism is c mmitted tNewt ni n c us ti n which l ws him t sse t th t since this view fc us ti n is n ch nistic dic beh vi ism h s "is ted itse f f mnd c me] t l g behind ch nging pe spectives n the n tu e ndp ctice f ptim scienti c inqui y (M h ney 989, p 373) If theSkinne i n system is indeed c mmitted t c us ti n in the Newt ni nsense then M h ney's sse ti n m y we l be justi ed C i ing thef m f c us ti n dv c ted by dic beh vi ism wi l h weve sh wth t M h ney's inte p et ti n fits c us m de (Newt ni n c us ti n)is in ccu te nd his subsequent sse ti n th t dic beh vi ism "l gsbehind ch nging pe spectives is the ef e ls in ccu te

M c e d ( 970) s links Skinne 's dic l beh vi ism t theNewt ni n scienti c t diti n M c e d's gument p ceeds in thef l wing w y:

Introduction

Newt ni n science w s the inspi ti n f g up fphil s phe s "wh we e wi ing t p y with the ide th tthe e lm f n tu l w might enc mp ss the phen men f hum n ment ity ;

J hn L cke bec me the sp kespe s n f the"Newt ni n c ncepti n fm n when he gued th t itw s p ssib e t h ve science f mind n g us t thescience f physic l n tu e "This inv ved the ssumpti n f men alelements n g us t physic p ticlesnd the ssumpti n th t t exp in nything c mp ex ist b e k it d wn int its e ements

L cke's success s ttempted t dem nst te "h w lthe c mp exities f hum n expe ience nd beh vi c nbe educed t c bin ti ns f ment beh vie ements (N te th t with ut w ning the te ms f thisdiscussi n e exp nded f m simp y "hum n ment lity nd "ment e ements t " l the c mp exities fhum n expe ience nd beh vi );

The "Newt ni n c ncepti n fmind w s el b tedin B it in by the B itish Ass ci ti nists i Ge m ny byWundt Helmh ltz nd the s in Russi by thev vi ns nd in the United St tes by J hn B W ts n

" nd his f iends ( 970, pp 209, 2 0)

In t cing the in uence f Newt ni n science this w y nd byexp nding his te min gy t inc ude n t n y ment l but s expe i-enti nd beh vi elements M c e d m n ges t ink Skinne t thec ncept f Newt ni n science c nc uding th t "The m st b il i ntc ntemp y ep esent tive fthe Newt ni n d ct ine f m n is in mypini n B F Skinne (M c e d 970, p 2 0) He imp ies ike

M h ney th t the Skinne i n phi s phy f science is utm ded inel ti n t c ntemp y physics: "It is inte esting t n te th t ng ethe physic sciences p dded by Einstein nd the s h ve given up the ement istic ex n ti n fphysic n tu e we sti h ve psych gists



ha twho insis ha a psychological exp ana ion mus involve he reduc iono he complex o he simp e Macleod 970, p 2 0) Prec sely whaMacleod means by e emen aris ic exp ana ion is no c ear bu presum-ab y i re ers o his previous asser ion ha a science o ind concernedwi h men alelemen s ana ogous o physica par icles was a goa forLocke and his successors I his is he case Mac eod is c aiming habehavior ana y ic accoun s are analogous o accoun s of physica phenomena couched in erms of in erac ing physica par ic es Again hisc aim wi be shown o be erroneous

Bo h Macleod and Mahoney charge radical behaviorism wi h aggingbehind" con emporary viewso science and ofc inging o anachronismsThis argumen concerning new ando d wor d v iews has been moshoroughy ar icu a ed by Merchan (1982)and Capra(1983), bo h ow hom a so rea e radical behaviorism o he nowou moded New onianmechanis ic) world viewThey argue ha New onian science drew primari y on he machine

me aphor o na ural phenomena a model ha o ershadowed an olderorganic· view o na ure and derived i s power from he success ofseven een h cen ury indus ria iza ion Merchan describes machines ass ruc ura mode s or wes ern on o ogy and epis emo ogy Merchan982) and e abora es hus:

The imagery iconography and i erary me aphor associa ed wi h machines ex ended he experiences o every-day i e o he realm ofhe imagina ion where machinesbecame symbo s for he ordering o life i se f Ou osuch symbo ic universes evo ve concep ua universes asnew de ni ions ofrea i y rep ace he o d he machineand c ock increased heir symbo ic power as roo me a-phors in response o socie y s changing needs wan sand purposes he symbo ic orce of he organism dec ined in p ausibi i y and he organic concep ual framework under en a ndamen a ransforma ion Theimagesand symbo s associa ed wi h he machines o

Introduction

everyday ife helped o media e he ransi ion be eenframeworks p 227)

Capra also argues ha an o der organic view ofna ure gave way underhe in uence o he machine me aphor culmina ing in a wor d viewrefers o as The New onian World Machine Capra 983,p 37)The no ion of an organic living and spiri ua universewas rep aced byha of he world as a machine and he wor d machine became dominan me aphor of he modern era This developmen was brouabou by revolu ionary changes in physics and as ronomy culminin he achievemen s ofCopernicus Ga i eo and New on Capra 983,p 38) New onian science i is argued gave us a view of na ure as a machine opera ing in much he same way as he emerging indusmachines o ha age Modern physics however reasser s he orgme aphor a me aphor ha speaks of na ure as an in errela ed whoFur hermore modern physics cha enges he no ion of he scien isobjec ive observer since he scien is oo is invo ved in he in erions o he subjec ma er The mechanis ic world view ha hdomina ed he physica sciences and he social sciences whichargued ake heir cue rom physical science) has passed i s zeni h givingway under he pressure of modern scien i c da a o an orgaworldview

Merchan and Capra bo h rela e Skinnerian phi osophy o he o d adying mechanis ic wor d view Merchan argues A emp s o redhuman behavior o s a is ica probabili ies and o condi ion i by spsychological echniques as hose developed by B F Skinnemanifes a ions of he pervasiveness of he mechanis ic mode o houdeveloped by he seven een h cen ury scien is s Merchan 982, 292) And o Skinner s approach Capra s a es This hen is New onpsycho ogy par exce lence a psycho ogy wi hou consciousnessredu ces a behavior o mechanis ic sequences of condi ioned respo sand asser s ha he on y scien i c unders anding o human na ure is oha remains wi hin he ramework o c assica physics a

biology behavioris s s ill adhere o he mechanis ic paradigm a

5



Cha ter

o en defend t s the on y sc ent c ppro ch to psycho ogy thus cle r yl m t ng sc ence to the c ss c l Newton n fr mework (C pr1983, p 181)

M c eod Merch nt nd C pr c l for the dopt on o new org n cconcept on ofn ture to rep ce the Newton n mech n st c concept onE ch nterprets r d c beh v or sm s n ex mple of n ppro ch npsycho ogy underp nned by t e Newton n world v ew In c l ng for new concept on new underly ng met phor the o der mode s c ted s root c use of m ny current buses of peop e nd of n ture. The oldmet phor must go t s rgued nd w th t must go the sc ences wh chdopt th t met phor nclud ng r d c l beh v or smAg n, t w ll bedemonstr ted here th t nterpret t ons of r d c l

beh v orsm wh ch l y th t ph osophy to Newton n sc ence nd to mech n st c ccount of beh v or re m spl ced. T ey ttr bute h stor cn u ence to the wrongsc ent c tr d t on nd toget er m ss the

d st nct on betw een Newton n c us t on nd the c us l mode tht s theb s s of r d c beh v or sm. Ths error of nterpret t on dopts thep ev ous error th t Beh v or sm refersto un ed ppro ch w th npsy cho ogy nd ssumes th t the mech nst c ccounts g ven by otherstr nds of beh v or sm so ch r cter ze r d c beh v or st ccountsB l rd b l c us t on s very much p rt ofmodern psychology but notof beh v or n ys s

The th rd m or error th t w be rep red ttr butes h stor cn uence to Desc rtes nd mp es th t r d c l beh v or sm cceptsC rtes n m nd/body du ty but gnores the m nd or consc ousnessspect of th t du ty Th s s nked to the rst nd second errorsment oned nd re es on t em be ng true If r d c beh v or sm sph osoph c l y comp t ble w th other str nds of beh v or sm then t sdu st c s nce other beh v or tr d t ons ccept m nd/body sep r t ons n n t l ssumpt on Furthermore f r d c beh v or sm belongs to mech n st c wor d v ew nd o ers mech n st c ccount of hum nbeh v or then t s C rtes n n the sense th t Desc rtes s g ven s oneof the m or n uences on mech n st c th nk ng

Merch nt nd C pr c te both Desc rtes nd Newton s the pr m rymovers of mech n st c th nk ng n sc ence nd n the rger world v ew

16

Introduction

g ven by the old sc ence wh e M honey rgues th t Desc rtes "ho drevered pl ce n the h story of beh v or sm (M honey 1989, p1373)Accord ng to M honey t w s Desc rtes who form l zed the m nd/bodu l smof Greek ph losophy nd t w s h s "mech n st c theory obod lyct on (M honey 1989, p 1373) nd h s nt c p t onof there ex rc th t "won h m respect mong 20th century beh v or st(M honey 1989, p 1373) It s n th s context th t M honey refersSkinner s be ng preoccup ed w th " nput output nct ons (M honey1989, p 1373)

hen he sserts th t Desc rtes "ho ds revered p ce n the h story obeh v or sm M honey refers to R chl n s ( 1970)In oduc ion o Mode Behaviorisms source. On ex m n ng th s source t turns out th tchl n refers to Desc rtes nd to h s mech n c l theory s h stor cn uence on the development of psycho ogyas a who He rgues th tDesc rtes h mse f w s s much n uenced by the dom n nt theolog cnterpret t ons n h s t me s modern psychology s n uenced bdu l st c th nk ng Desc rtes undertook the study ofbeh v or w th n thetheolog c l terms nd ssumpt ons of h s own t me d v d ng beh v onto volunt ry nd nvo unt ry re lms nd thus reso v ng the prob em ofree w ll. Desc rtes' d st nct on surv ves n much of contemporth nk ng bout hum n beh v or nd t s th s po nt R ch n emph s zesn h s out ne of the C rtes n n uence on psychology when he note"The du l sm of Desc rtes' psychology s the fe ture th t s essent our underst nd ng of the h story of psycho ogy (R ch n 1970, p 7R ch n does not c te Desc rtes s n n uence on the deve opment obeh v or sm spec c y but on the deve opment of psycho ogy swhole Desc rtes' m nd/body du sm cont nues to nform much ocontempor ry psycho ogy but not Sk nner n psycho ogy

Other errors re to be cl r ed n th s book Sk nner's pos t on oob ect v ty for ex mple on the re t on between observer nd obser ew l become cle r The nterre t on between sc ent st nd subject m ttnd contro l ng v r b es of the beh v or ofsc ent sts w l be shown to ben mport nt fe ture of the th nk ng of r d c beh v or sts who do notsep r te obser er/observed or knower/known n the tr d t on w ySc ent c beh v or n the r d c beh v or st formu t on s s much

1



Chapter 1

description is discussed Then, the chapter moves on to consider how theconcept ofcausation in science has moved away from popular notions ofcause as force, and ausa re ations as sequential chains, o nctionalre ations and causal webs or networks The substitution of function forcause is elaborated here Mechanistic accounts of behavior are re ated inthis chapter to the chain metaphor of causation Radica behaviorism'scausa mode is traced to the phi osophy of Ernst Mach as well as to theDar inian princip e of se ection on variation It is argued that much ofcontempor ry psychology neglects personal history because of a commitment to mechanistic, contiguous causation.

Chapter 6 (Inte retive Techniques and Exp nato Theories) dea s with the concepts of description, exp anation, and theory Ernst Mach'sin uence on Skinner's phi osophy of science is at its most evident hereA distinction between description and exp anation is traced to Mach'sdispute with theories invoking hypothetica constructs not contained indata, a dispute that took p ace in the 9th century and was kn wn as the"atomic debate A heuristics, such theori s have a place in Mach'sphilosophy of science. They become problematic, however, whenelevated to the status of explanation Further, they belong to a view ofnatural phenomena that Mach consistent y opposed: a wor d asmachine view Skinner was less amenable than Mach to hypotheticaentities, but was as consistent as Mach in his opposition to mechanistictheories, theories that require links in a causal chain to mediate bet eennctiona ly re ated events

Chapter 7 (Mechanistic Thinking in Psycholo) looks at selectedsystemsin contemporary psychology to illustrate Mach's and Skinner'sscienti c and phi osophica concerns about theoretica constructs notderived from data Such constructs tend to divert attention from thephenomena they were invented to account for, with their structure andnction becoming a focus of inquiry Re ying on the chain metaphor of

causation, they encourage a mechanistic view of the subject matterbehaving organisms This chapter i ustrates the re evance to 20thcentury psycho ogy of Mach' s 19th century views on interpretation and

20

Introduction

causa modes in physics, and demonstrates that Skinner's concernremain relevant to psychology today

Chapter 8(Behaviorism and dical Behaviorism) compares the workof key gures cited as behaviorists in the psycho ogical literature. Thicomparison demonstrates crucia di erences between Skinner's scien-ti c framework and those of Pav ov, Watson, Tolman, and Hull In itsearliest days, radical behaviorism moved beyond the mechanisti,mediational framework established by To man and Hu l. Contemporary experimental psychology, however, continues to question andexplain its subject matter according to this framework. In this sensemuch of today's psycho ogy is behavioral. Behaviorism marks a chaptin psychology's history rather than an essential methodo ogical ophilosophical unity; it is a historical rather than a philosophica markeIts continued use as a abel for one of psychology's "major approachesobscures the fact that psychology sti l re ies on an ear y behaviora inpuoutput formu ation, while radical behaviorism has moved beyond thisformulation and relies on an integrative, re ationa framework

Chapter 9( Concluding Remarksreturns brie y to the new wor d viewdebate and points out similarities bet een the concerns of Capra andSkinner Capra cal s for the relationa approach to be adopted bydiscip ines that have traditionally mode led themselves a er physicsciting mechanistic science as a source of contemporary prob ems Hadvocates turning to "ways of knowing other than science as a means odea ing with these problems. Skinner argued that human behavior is thsource ofcontemporary problems, inc uding the behavior ofpeople whouse and abuse science Science is our strength; it has led to the al eviatiof much suffering, famine, and il ness Rather than turning away fromscience, its methods should be used to confront the source of theproblem, human behavior Mechanistic science, however, oers no wayfor ard because the constructs with which it purports to explainbehavior are inte a , unobservable, and usua ly hypothetical. Suchconstructs cannot be used to e ect change A science concerned withhow organisms interact with their environment, with functional

21



Cha

la ions b n b havio an h con x in which i occu s, p ovi sp ac ical m ans fo analyzing an changing b havio Examining sci ncas i is p ac ic in psychology mons a s ha h la ional f amwo k of a ical b havio ism o s possibili i s fo chang unma ch byh m chanis ic app oach.

Chapter 2

Ordinary Language and Science

Th la ion b w n o ina y languag an sci nc ui s sp cialconsi a ion in h b havio al sci nc s Sci n i c isciplin s i n i asubj c ma an sc ib la ions n p oc ss s occu ing among i scons i u n s wi h h i own languag an minology Pa of h woof sci n is s is o i n i as p cis ly as possibl h m aning of ms ino o facili a communica ion wi hin h i isciplin Na u is

ivi an classi acco ing o som sys m o o an s u iun i n h a ings: physics, ch mis y, biology, m chanics, asonomy, an so on In som l s, sci n i c languag consis s pa ly o

a symbol sys m such as ma h ma ics o h l m n an compounsymbols of ch mis y In o h l s, sci n i c ms a iv f omou v y ay languag , wi h wo s ca lly n o avoi confusionsabou h pa of na u o in of p oc ss b ing iscuss

Much of v y ay languag is al a y consi o b sc ip iv ofb havio W com o h sci nc of b havio al a y shap by ouv bal communi y o sc ib b havio in o ina y languag ms ha

o n lack h accu acy ofni ion cha ac is ic ofa sci n i c accounO ina y v bal b havio p c s sci n i c v bal b havio , an o ina y languag ms p ovi a y ma conc p ual classi ca ions hagui an i c h sci n i c inv s iga ion of b havio Ou v y aylanguag con ains p sci n i c assump ions an classi ca ions ha mo may no b us l fo a sci n i c analysis of b havio

impo an pa of h philosophy of sci nc ha is a ical b havio ism is conc n wi h h la ion b n o ina y languag msha a consi o b sc ip iv of b havio an h way hos msin u nc h sci n i c s u y of b havio Ra ical b havio is s vi w as

unwis h p ac ic of a op ing o ina y languag ms unc i ically,

3



Chapter 2

Anasis of Psychological Terms(Skinner, 1945/1972b) is entirely con-cerned with this same problem and when he asked in another paper,Aretheories of a ing necessa ( 950/1972b), he was careful to speciwhat was meant b the word, theory, for the purpose f that argumentIn Schedules ofRein rcement(1957), Ferster and Skinner clari ed keyterms in behavior analysis by providing a useful glossary

Other workers in the eld are equa ly concerned with terminologicalprecision A C Catania sLea ing, now in its third edition (1992),carries etymologica notes at the beginning of each chapter. In Catania sview: Consistencies in vocabulary are essentia to technical treatments,but the language must also grow and adapt to new ndings and newperspectives We must use our language of behavior with care, butperhaps we will be less likely to become rigid about it if we knowsomething of its origins" (Catania, 1992, p xiv)The Behavior Ana stpublishes articles of genera interest in the eld of radical behaviorismand regularly contains a section,On Terms,wherein contributorsattempt to clari contexts appropriate to the use of key terms Someexam les are:When we Speak ofKnowing(Hineline, 1983);StimulusCon ol Terminolo (Deitz& Mallone, 1985);A Ru r the Use of theTerm Rule Governed Behavior"(Brownstein& Shull, 1985);ObserverDr : A Dr ing D nition (Smith, 1986); andMisdescribingthe Ca eau:A Pe xing Plurali (Gleeson& Latta , 1987)

Skinner (1985) examined theReport ofthe Research Bri ng Panel onCogni ive Science andArt cial Inteigence(Estes et a , 1983) and foundthat report lacking in de nitions of key terms such as intelligence, mind,mental operations, imagination, reasoning, induction, understanding,thinking, and the like He concluded by accusing cognitive scientists ofrel xing standards of de nition and logical thinking and releasing aood of speculation characteristic of metaphysics, literature, and dailytercourse, perhaps suitable enough for such purposes but inimical to

science" (Skinner, 985, p 300) A later paper came to the sameconcl sion that the words people use in describing how they feel or whatthey are thinking are part of a living language that can be used withoutembarrassment by cognitive psychologists and behavior analysts alike in

26

Ordinary Lang e and Science

their daily lives But these words cannot be used in their science(Skinner, 1989, p 18)

t is clear that radical behaviorists take a keen interest in the relatiobet een ordinary language and science But their concerns are notcon ned to de nitions and proper usage De nitions may turn out to bethe least of the problems inherent in taking ordinary language intoscience The use of key terms can o en be stipulated for the purpose oresearch or philosophica discussion, as when Skinner clearly de ned huse of the terms behavior and theory for the purpose of his argumentOther problems in the relation bet een ordinary language and scienceare obscured by the ubiquity of language and buried so deeply withilinguistic practices that only the most care l ana ysis can bring them tolight Radical behaviorists are concerned with the controlling in uenceof severa features of ordinary language, features that guide the behavioof scientists toward views of their subject matter and toward forms ointerpretation that are at odds with a scienti c analysis The remainderof this chapter will discuss three features of ordinary language that arproblematic for scienti c psychology

The rst problem is that along with ordinary language, we inheritconceptual systems involving ways of thinking about people and thebehavior that are not based on scienti c ana ysis and that encouragecertain kinds ofquestions and theoretical interpretations ofbehavior notnecessitated by scienti c data The second problem is inherent in thestructure of ndo European languages, speci cally in the syntactic

requirementofproviding agents for actions The third problem concernsthe practice of accounting for action in di erent directiona modes(either from person to behavior or from environment to behav or)depending on whether the account is of our own or of someone e 'sbehavior,and depending on the extent to which people respond i ividua lyor collectively to environmental events This problem speci -ca ly a ects radical behaviorists because their accounts are structu edinadirectiona mode that violates cultura practice It will becomeear tha

these three features of ordinary language exert a power l contrin u ence on the behavior of scientists



Cha terConcept al Systems and O dina y ang age

R dic beh viorism s concern wi h erminologic l precision nd i srejec ionof uncri ic l ccep nce or us ge of he vern cul r is essen i llyc p ured in n e r y p ss ge of Skinner s "The impor n objec ion ohe vern cul r in he descrip ion of beh vior is h m ny of i s ermsimp y concep u schemes I do no me n h science of beh vior is odispense wi h concep u l scheme bu h i mus no ke over wi houc re l consider ion he schemes which under ie popul r speechSkinner 1938, p 7 Words re he medium hrough which beh vior l

scien is s express re ions; hey re he "c lcu us of beh vior l scienceHine ine 980 p 72 Unfor un ely his c culus w s no deve o ed

speci c lly for i s purpose in he s me w y s he c cu us of physics ndis herefore no s cle r cu or un mbiguous This c cu us h s beeninheri ed ken ou of he re ms of everyd y discourse nd mo ed in ohe l bor ory I s erms guide he inves ig ion of beh vior bu lsodescribe he produc s of hose inves ig ions I is no surprise hcon sions nd in ccur cies rise from his du nc ioning R dic lbeh vioris s wi h heir concern for scien i c issues h ve o be w ry lesheir c lcu us r ise " he ghos s of de d sys ems Skinner 1938, p 5)

Mind in nguage We inheri concep u l sys em in he l ngu ge ofmind or men life h su uses everyd y discourse When we m ke no e o ourselves o remember some hing we s y we wil be r i in mind;when we c nno remember some hing we e sily refer o h ving men lb ock Ifwe h ve puzzled nd worried over problem we wil e l friend"i h s been on my mind ; we o er person wo or more l ern ives ndsk hem o m ke up heir mind Ins ruc ing someone o be c reful wem y s y "mind how you go nd if we w n o pu someone e se were rying o pu heir ind res or simply e ing hem "never mindIn everyd y discourse s Skinner s id hese expressions re unproblem icnd m y be used comfor bly by l kinds of psychologis s Bu if wemove his erm mind nd i s re ed concep u l sys em from our

everyd y discourse o he l bor ory hen ry o se rch for he mind we

8


be r hings in or he mind h is pu res or he mind we h veh dsome hing on we run in o he logic l prob em of rying o submiscien i c n lys s erm h h s no physic l or sp i referen

Skinner o ered solu ion o his ogic l prob em "We c n see how word is used nd wh peop e seem o be s ying when hey use Skinner 1989 p 17) In o her words when we ex minehe nguageof min we nd h we c n e sily dispense wi h he concep of mindwi hou dispensing wi h me ning For ex mple he bove phr sinvo ving he concep of mind m y be r nsl ed in he following w y

MENT ISTICSTATEMENT

I will be r i in mindI h ve men l blockI h s been on my mind

M ke up your mind

Mind howyou goI h s pu my mind res

Nevermind

T ANSL TION

I will remember his in he ureI c nno remember hisI h ve been hinking bou his grede s emen bou beh vior);

This h s been worrying me s emen bou fee ings)

M ke decision; choose one of heseop ions

Ac c re ly; w ch your s epI c n s op worrying bou his

no herreference o fee ings)Do no worry; s op worrying; i isno impor n

In e ch ins nce no me ning is los nd in e ch he r nsl ion is closeo beh vior in h he s emen s rel e o remembering hinkingchoosing nd feeling Ex mining he l ngu ge of mind in his wbrings us c oser o beh vior l processes h wecansubmi o scien i cn lysis The concep u sys em inheri ed in he l ngu ge of minddiver s en ion from hese beh vior processes by imp ying mephy sic or men p ne h is no suscep ible o direc scien i cre men

2



Cha ter tool whe equi ed The metapho of sto age a d et ieval has beediscussed above, a d a the questio may be added he e about its usei elatio to la guage, that is to say, about the suggesti that la guageis sto ed, et ieved, a d used as a tool

Co side a a alogy bet ee the la guage of wo ds a d what is oftecalled the la guage of da ce We a e said to sto e wo ds, et ieve them,a d use them to co vey mea i g I a da ce co text, we ca comfo tablytalk about the la guage of da ce co veyi g mea i g to a audie ce Askilled w ite , public speake , o lectu e sha es seve al cha acte isticswith a skilled da ce Each is a pe fo me , highly t ai ed ove seve alyea s to behave i a pa ticula way Ba i g physical disability, eve yo eis capable of da ci g a d speaki g to some deg ee o othe I eachi sta ce, the level ofskill a d subtlety will de e d la gely o t ai i ga dthe la guage ca eithe be pe fo med o w itte The a alogy is use lbecause it highlights the way we a e di ected to study o e ki d ofla guage, the la guage of wo ds, by the way we ge e ally t l about itWe would ot comfo tably ta k about the acquisitio of a ce as thoughit we e a e tity take i a d possessed; we would mo e easily efe to thet ai i g of a da ce Neithe would we efe to sto age a d et ieval:whe e does the da ce sto e a pi ouette, fo example, o a a abesque?a abesque is otinthe da ce at a y time The pi ouette, the a abesque,come i to bei g i pe fo ma ce These moveme ts a e ot do ma t,late t, sto ed i side the da ce awaiti g ecall They a e t a sie t eve tsexisti g i the mome ts of thei pe fo ma ce

We a e also likely to say that a da cepe rms a pi ouette i p efe e cetousesa pi ouette, which helps to illust ate Ski e s a gume t that: Wehave o mo e easo to say that a ma uses the wo d wate i aski g foa d i k tha to say that he uses a each' i taki g the o e ed glass(Ski e , 957, p 7). The way we ta kabout the la guage ofwo ds eedsca eful co side atio befo e we allow its co ceptual scheme to di ect ouscie ti c i qui ies

The la guages of mi d, lea i g, a d la guage illust ate some of thedi culties i he e t i taki g o di a y, eve yday vocabula y as thesta ti g poi t of a scie ti c a a ysis of behavio Ve bal behavio

p ecedes scie ti c behavio a d wo ds the efo e ca y with them

32

Ordinary anguage and Science

p escie ti c co ceptual systems a d metapho s that ca block o hi dea alysis by guidi g scie tists towa d i te al, i accessible p ope ties o ga isms a d away f om mo e accessible p ope ties amely, elatiobetwee behavio a d the co text i which it occu s

Grammar and the Syntax of ction

Co ceptual systems a e ot the o ly co t olli g va iables co cea ed o di a y la guage Othe va iables a e embedded, i a se se, modeeply tha the co ceptual systems discussed above Othe aspeco di a y la guage also e cou age a pa ticula way of looki g at thi ki g about behavio , a d a e eve mo e obscu e tha the co ceptuasystems of mi d, lea i g, o la guage because they comp ise the syof ou la guage

Hi eli e ( 980) a gues that E glish g amma a d sy t x imposeco st ai ts o the way we view the subject matte of psycholoco st ai ts that a e li guistic as opposed to logica (Hi eli e, 980,p 80). He ide ti es two li guistic co st ai ts that guide scie tiststowa d a pa ticula way of deali g with behavio The st lies i failu e of the E glish la guage to mai tai a st ict disti ctio bet eeve bs (wo ds that de ote t a sie t eve ts) a d ou s (wo ds that de otethi gs o ob ects that e du e a d have a ki d of pe ma e ce) Theseco d is the ea impossibility of speaki g of actio i the E glisla guage without efe e ce to a age t

Gramma ical ca ego es.I his a ysis of i guistic co st ai ts, Hi eli ed aws o the compa ative li guistics ofBe ami Lee Who f (see ho f,956). fo med by his compa iso s of g amma a d sy tax i E glish

a d seve al me ica I dia la guages, ho f a gued i LanageThough and Reali that Weste scie ce dissects the physica wo lalo g li es laid dow by its la guage St uctu es a d p ocesses a e give to Weste scie ce by the physical wo ld but a e to some exa eady p ese t i its la guage He a gued that speake s ofla guages wdi e e t ki ds of g amma s a e led to dissect the wo ld alo g di e e

33



C a t

ines: "Formulation of ideas is not an independent pro ess stri t yrationa in the o d sense but is part of a parti ular grammar and di ersfrom slight y to great y between di erent grammars We disse t naturea ong lines aid down by our native anguage (Whor 956, p 2 3).

horf e amined the distin tion between nouns and verbs in the

English language and found that the traditional distin tion bet een"doing (or "happening ) words and "thing words is not well maintained in pra i e and that many words whi h should properly be in verbform be ause they des ribe transient events are in fa t in noun formSimilarly some words denoting stable and long asting events whi hbe ause of those properties should be lassed as nouns are found to beverbs:

Ifit be said that "strike turn run a e verbs be ause theydenote temporary or short lasting events i e a tionswhy then is " st a noun? It is a so a temporary eventhy are " ightning spark wave eddy pulsation lamestorm phase y le spasm noise emotion nouns?Th If" d "h ey are temporary events man an ouse arenouns be ause they are long lasting and stable eventsi e things what then are "keep adhere e tend proje tontinue persist grow dwell and so on doing amongthe verbs? (Whorf 956, p 2 5).

Like s ienti ategories grammati al ategories are not handed to us bynature: "It wil be found that it is not possible to de ne event obje tthing relation and so on from nature but that to de ne them alwaysinvolves a ir uitous return to the grammati al ategories of the de ner'sanguage (Whorf 956, p 2 5). Grammati al ategories of otheranguages su h as Hopi and Nootka e press obje ts transien e andduration in di erent ways from English Hopi for e ample has a assof events roughly orresponding to our verbs that are grouped byduration ype ightning wave lame meteor pu of smoke pulsation whi h in English are more like nouns

3


This grammati a tenden y to e press in noun form events thaproper y verbs guides psy hologists away from the studyof what peop edo (pro esses verbs) toward the study of stru tures denoted by thforms Peop e remember think talk see hear and fee all vWhen these a tions are transformed into nouns memory thou

language sensation emotion as is ommon inthe English anguagethen s ientists are en ouraged to ook for the things denoted bnouns In this way inspired by grammati a form psy ho ogy bethe study of stru tures (nouns) that are assumed to have some ofpermanen e rather than the study of ongoing pro esses or a tiv

Agents r ac ons Another inguisti onstraint that Hine ine drawfrom horf is the synta ti requirement of providing subje ts for veor as Hine ine puts it: "the near impossibility when speaking Ene pressing a tion without imputing an agent of the a tion (Hine98 , p 8 ). To satis the requirements of Eng ish grammar our vmust have substantives they must have agents that perform

des ribed by the verb For e amp e "there is rain wou d be an ualthough more a urate way of des ribing what is going on when"it is raining ; for in ogi al terms what is ra ning? The answerraining or water is raining from the sky The requirement of ana linguisti rather than a ogi a requirement In his study of theanguage horf ( 956) found that:

Hopi an and does have verbs without subje ts a fa twhi h may give that tongue potentialities probab ynever to be deve oped as a logi al system for understanding some aspe ts of the universe Undoubtedly moderns ien e strongly re e ting western Indo Europeantongues often does as we all do sees a tions and for eswhere it sometimes might be better to see states On theother hand "state is a noun and as su h it enjoys thesuperior prestige traditiona y atta hing to the subje t or

35



Chapter 2

in uence provides a means to counter control by a lowing us to see theconstraints it p aces upon us and by presenting possibilities or change.Changing the words in which we talk about behavior will guidebehavioral science in a di erent and perhaps more use ul direction

Directional Tk

In addition to t heway s ordinary langu age in luences our think ngabou tand investig ating behav ior , rea ders and isteners ma y be discom or ted by w hat Hine ine (1980) calls the "distinct diaect o radica behaviorism.There ar e many examples in the dia ect of ra dica beha viorism of w ha tseem tobe u nnecessariy conv o ut ed expr essions or qu itesimpleevents. Hineline not esthat the seeming y simple expression, "Know ingtha t we ca n predict tu re events, weact accordingly, becomes a t f rst g ance a

more conv o ut ed expr ession w hen tra ns at ed into radica behaviorist ter minolog y:"Predict abi iy of events, apa rt from t he events t hemselv es,is a v aria b e t hat a ec ts our beha vior (Hineline, 1980 p 7 1) A nd t hesimplephra se, "The child lea rns to ca tch someone's eye when eedingassistance or a ttent ion, becomes in the radical behaviorist's dia ect, "Eye-conta ct becomes both a reinforcer and a discriminat ive eventsetting the occasions on w hich the child's behav ior is likely to bereinforced by another per son (Hineline, 1980 p. 71) In each example,note tha t the beha v ioral dialect avoids the di c u lties involved in ter mslike knowing and learning and concentrates on simpler functionalrelations bet ween discr iminative stimuli, setting conditions, and rein-forcement. Ironica ly, the seemingly more convo u t ed sentence actual yexpresses simper relations than those invo ved in t he concept ua systems inherent in the lang u age of "knowing and "learning. The phrases thatseem so comp icated in comparison to our everyday expressions, areinact less prob ematic in terms o their conceptual systems.

Another di erence bet een ordinary language and the anguage obehavior ana ysis has to do with the tendency to alter the directiona ity

40


implied in accounts o behavior depending on whether the interption is o our own or o someone else's behavior Again, Hineline 1992) was the frst to point out this di erence as well as its controvariables.

First, he notes that interpretations and exp anations o behaviort o characteristics; bipolari y and directiona ity, with orms ike ato action, cause to e ect, independent to dependent variab e Seconnotes that psychologica accounts occur in two basic modes: pbased or environment based n the ormer mode, the direction isperson (or some dispositiona aspect o the person) to behavior:

Person > BehaviorIn the latter mode, the direction is rom some aspect o the environto behavior:

E nvir onm en t > BehaviorHine ine's analysis draws on the work o attribution theorists examp e, Jones and Nisbett, 1971; Storms, 1973) who ound thdirection o action in interpretations or exp anations o behavior daccording to the location o the person giving the account. hereaccount is given o the behavior o another person, the typica direo action is rom person to behavior; an obser er tends to exp ainbehavior oanother person by al uding to internal characteristics o other person as in some way causa . This tendency has become k

as the " ndamenta attribution error (Ross, 1977) When describtheir own behavior-when the obse er and obser ed are one personthedirectional mode is pica y rom environment to behavior. Peoordinarily interpret their own behavior in terms o events or e ec s iexterna context and interpret the behavior o others in termcharacteristicsor events internal to the person:

Interpre ng the Behavor of Others

Person > Behavior

41



In e re ng One' Own Behavior

Environmen > Behavior

Cha ter

Radical behavioris s in erpre he behavior ofo hers using he direc ionalmode normally reser ed for accoun ing for one s own behavior and soreverse his en ency:

In erpre ing he Behavior o/ O hersbehavior ana ic accoun


such, behavior ana y ic accoun s vio a e a cu ura norm This,Hine ine argues, may con ribu e subs an ia ly o c ashes be ween behavior analysis and o her viewpoin s in psychology (Hine ne, 199

Hine ine ma es a r her poin in his ana ysis ofdirec ional modes andhe dis inc iveness of behavior analy ic accoun s A ribu ion h oris shave a so described circums ances ha occasion a swi ch of direc ionamode from environmen based o person based, even when he in erpre er of ac ion is bo h observer and observed (when a person in erpre shis or her own behavior Hine ine i lus ra es his by comparing wopassages, one ha main ains he cu ural y pical pa ern and one hareverses i : have carried ou an e ensive se of observa ions, wi hmyse f as sub ec , and have discovered ha wine is s ronger han beerBased on a comparab e se of obser a ions, have discovered ha ammore a ergic o u ips han o roses Here an observer in erpre s his orher own behavior, bu he direc iona mode swi ches from environmenbased for he rs observa ion o person based for he second obser a ionEach observa ion refers o he suscep ibili y of he person o someenvironmen al even , and i urns ou ha he swi ch is occasioned by hee en o which an e ec applies o many peop e or o isola ed individua s(Hineline, 990 here si ua iona even s a ec peop e simi ar y,direc iona i y is environmen based:

2


ne is s ronger han beer"


here no everyone is simi ar y a ec ed, where a response o si ua ionaeven s is more individual, direc iona i y is person based:

' am more allergic o l s han o roses"

erson > Behavior

Reversing direc iona i y il us ra es he conven ion: have carried oan e ensive se of obser a ions, wi h myse f as sub ec , and havediscovered ha am more easily in o ica ed by wine han by beer Baon a simi ar se of obser a ions, I have discovered ha ulips are moa lergenic han roses Hine ine direc s us o consider how such s amen s migh be received am more easily in o ica ed by wine han beer (a person based in erpre a ion of a genera effec is i e y o bdismissed as an unin eres ing s a emen since h re a ive po ency owine and beer is well nown and everyone is simi arly affec ed Tobser a ion, ulips are more allergenic han roses, an environmenbased in erpre a ionof an individua e ec , is i ely o be pro es ed forprecise yhe reason ha i is an individua effec and should no begeneralized seems ha where people are equally a ec ed, he direional mode in ordinary parlance is environmen based, bu whepeople are no equally affec ed, he direc ional mode is person baseBehavior ana y ic accoun s a so vio a e his cu ural norm byreferring

o he behavior of individua s in he mode ordinarily reser ed foins ances in which everyone is rea ed as being ali e Behavior anale perimen s as we l as educa iona and herapeu ic in erven ions concera e on individuals ra her han on groups, bu in erpre ive accoun s he S innerian radi ion are couched in a language pa ern ha suggesha individuals are ali e or are equ ly a ec ed ine ine 1990 1992

3



Cha t r ugge ha hi viola ion of a cul ural norm may al o cau e di comforby hrea ening he individuali y of he reader or li ener.

Apar from gramma ical and yn ac ic con rain hen behavioranaly mu al o be concerned o no e ha he direc ional mode in heirin erpre a ion of behavior run coun er o cul ural norm . Similarly

o her radi ion in p ychology hould al o be concerned wi h deeproo ed language pa ern ha inform and guide way of hinking andalkingabou behavior wi h he variable governing he direc ionalmodeof heir own accoun and wi h he po ibili y ha vernacularlanguage pa ern may al o in uence heir re pon e o radical behavioriaccoun .

rdinary language i no neu ral wi h re pec o he ub ec ma er ofbehavioral cience and he cien i i no exemp from he in uence haordinary language exer on concep ualiz io of behavior and onin erpre ive form . rdinary language erm and heir co ep ual y

em nc ion no imply a in erpre a ion of he ubjec ma er bu al oa guide o he way he ubjec ma er willbe rea ed. The concep ualem nheren in he language of mind learning and language i elf

lead o a view ha he impor an rela ion be ween organi andenvironmen ake place he organi m. Apar from he e concep ualy em lingui ic con rain al o draw cience oward he udy ofnoun ( hing ruc ure ) and away from he udy of verb (ac ivi ieproce e pa ern ). ur way of alking abou he direc ion of ac ionappear o be in uenced bo h by he loca ion of he in erpre er and byhe locu of variabili y a fea ure ha e behavior analy ic in erpre a-ion apar from he cul ural norm and ha may cau e di comfor o hereader or li ener.Much more can be aid abou he rela ion be ween ordinary language

and cience. Much more be aid becau e iflanguage con inue obe he calculu ofbehavioral cience i prac i ioner need o under andi limi and con rain a well a he way i guide heir own behavioroward par icular view of heir ub ec ma er and ar icular form ofin erpre a ion.

Chapter 3

Science: Aims and Methods

Chap er no ed ha al hough p ychology i uni ed by a commi meo cien i c me hod i ubdi cipline are no all commi ed o he amkind of cience. Me hod and he general heore ical framework agawhich a a are in erpre ed vary be ween ub di cipline . Behavior ani i di inc from much of con emporary experimen al p ychologyha i philo ophical background radical behaviori m promo ecien i c me hod ha i induc ive ra her han hypo he ico deduc iveThe con emporary li era ure of main ream experimen al p ycholgive li le recogni ion o he fac ha here i more han one way

legi ima ely doing cience. Me hodology i ric ly pre cribed wi hinhypo he ico deduc ive radi ion (or he me hod of hypo he i a ial o known) loo ely adop ing he logic of fal i ca ion and empha iza i ical analy i of da a a a way of con rolling for variabili y

behavior. The e pre crip ion and heir ra ionale are pre en ed ucce ivegenera ion of uden o a o eem he only legi ima eme hod of cien i c inquiry.

Chap er 1 al o no ed ha Skinner did no ub cribe o he view hcience i a raigh forward and ric ly logical pur ui arguing in eha ome very impor an a pec of he cien i c proce do no lenhem elve o formal rea men . In hi experience cience i rarelyformal proce ha hi orian and me hodologi claim and i onimperfec ly de cribed by he ep by ep logic of he hypo he icdeduc ive approach.

Radicalbehaviori me hodology belong o a philo ophy of cienradi ion ha doe no recognize he me hod ofhypo he i a an e en ialrequiremen of cien i c inquiry. Me hodology i dic a ed by a numbofconcern and in he ca e of radical behaviori m i largely dic a e

5



Chapter3

Regard ess of the rea wor d accuracy of any statement in the argument, the conc usion is ogica y va id in re ation to the premises.Veri ing that A ice does have factor in her b oodstream (obser ing thededuced consequence) does not, however, veri the initia premise thatasthma is caused by factor in the b oodstream.

Consider an examp e from psycho ogy: a theoretica account ofmemory states that human memory is comprised of two stores, shortterm and ong term. This is an initia premise. A second premise mightbe that the short term store has a maximum capacity of nine items.Together, these premises predict that under conditions of immediaterec of items on a ist, most peop e wi not be ab e to recal more thannine items.

Premise:Human memory is made up ofa short term store and a ong term store.

Premise:The short term store has a m ximum capacity of nine i ems.

onc usion:Peop e wi not be ab e to reca more than nine items from a ongerist short y a er presentation of that ist

If the prediction is con rmed (which it is ike y to be), the demonstration that most peop e cannot remember more than nine items from aonger ist is not a demonstration that memory is made up ofa short termand a ong term store. that can be known from con rming aprediction is that under a given set of conditions event C wi occur. Ifa researcher conc udes from the demonstration of C that thereforeX istrue, this reverses the direction of va idation and is an examp e of thefa acy of a rming the consequent. In deductive ogic, premises va idatea conc usion, but a conc usion does not va idate premises.

Nonoccurrence of the predicted event and consequences ofthe theorynecessari y entai s the fa sity of the theory or of one or more of thestatements that comprise the theory. IfAlice does not have factor in herb oodstream, the rst premise is fa se; if peop e reca more than nineitems from a onger ist, then at east the premise re ating to s o term

50

Scie nce: Aims ad Metods

emory's capacity is fa se. In these circu stances, the experimenterust either reject the theory because it cannot account for the data orust modi the theory in some way that wi ead to further experimenta testing.

One of the consequences of this enduring prob em, wide yrecognizedin phi osophy of science iterature but rare y considered in psycho ogy,issimp y that no amount of con rming instances of a theory tested thisway can con rm its accuracy, but one discon rming instance guaranteesthe fa sity of the who e or some of its parts. This method is asymmetricain the sense that a theory can be shown to be fa se but not to be true. Thus,a theory is on y as good as the number of times it has withstoodfa si cation and can on y be he d tentative y. Exp anations of eventsgenerated by hypothetico deduction stand on y as ong as a particu artheory withstands fa si cation.

Johnston and Pennypacker (1980) pointed out a practica di cu tyspeci c to behaviora and socia sciences, which is that the met od ofhypothesis requires for its success a c ear correspondence betweentheoretica e ements and empirica measures invo ved in testing andveri ing the theory s consequences. Psycho ogy's theoretica base, incontrast to that of the physica sciences, retains categories that arethemse vesthe subject of continua debate and disagreement. Categoriesike emotion, arousal, persona ity, memory, schemata, motivation,inte igence, stress, and many others comprising the discip ine of psycho ogy are at best vague in their de nitiona and mensura out ines andtherefore ack the predictive capabi ity of theoretical categories inphysica sciences. The theoretica base informing, for examp e, phys cs,chemistry,and the bio ogica sciences consists of more c ear y de nedconceptua e ements and re ative y precise measurement techniques.These, to the extent of their coherence and precision, a ow empiricaoutcomes to be compared to theoretica e ements. Background know -edge in these sciences is extensive, so that outcomes are predicted froman a ready we founded data base. Psycho ogy's data base in comparisonis inexact, ac ing the conceptua c arity of these other sciences that havesuccess y emp oyed hypothetico deduction. At present, we cannot

51



Cha t rdraw o we l es ab s ed be av ora pr c ples w e same prec s o aso er a ural sc e ces o pred c w a s ou d occur a exper me

a prac ca evel, rad cal be av or s s are co cer ed a s me ode a s was age of bo e or a d da a Da a e d o be co s deredvaluable o y f ey co form o pred c o s, f resu s are pos vefavor of pred c o s If ey do o co form, a d a eory s rejec ed oru dergoesex e s ve mod ca o , e ose da a so care ly co lec ed e researc pro ess ave le or o mea g or value o e

exper me er: "T e work g ypo es s of exper me s des g ed oco rm pred c o s ake e ge eral form, e x occurs, y w l occur 'Qu e o e y fa s o occur, a d le o e s ake of w a occurreds ead o s o &Pe ypacker, 1980, p 3 ) To e rad ca be avor s seems was e o expe d me a d e ergy o researc suc away a some da a w l ur ou o be use ess S ma (1960) argues are a ve y e s k ow abou be av or a d erefore al da a are so ese se s g ca , o e s a s ca se se of a erm bu e se sea ey ell us some g more abou be av or: " e s g ca da aave o ye ur ed up e abora ory T ere s a wea ofbe av oralp e ome a s o be broug u der exper me a co rol for moreprec se s udy a d a a ys s T a s, per aps, w y ega ve resul s seemwas eful (S dma , 960, p 9)

Rad ca be av or s s o e a ma y face s of be av or are s l ou ders ood a d e process of da a col ec o a d exam a o secessar y s ow T e eore cal base a ow forms p ys cal sc e cesd d o develop over g , or e u dred or so years of psyc o ogy'ss ory U a swered ques o s a y sc e ce o e awa e deve op

me or mproveme of me ods a d s rume s Sk er pu ,"To s s a a sc e ce of be av or g ve a r gorous accou of sucp e ome a [for examp e, mag g, remember g, emo o , s g ] s prese s a e of k ow edge s ke ask g e ber of 1600 o

exp a a mag e c a pl er or e Faraday of 840 o expla supercoduc v y (Sk er, 1969, p 85) Rad ca be av or s s co ue pae ly w e r sc e c e erpr se, avo d g was ed e or a d egave da a

52

Science: Aims and Me ods

Induction

e psyc ology s ude s co ue o be ra ed ma ly e formame ods of ypo es s es g a d fals ca o , rad cal be av or sm sc arac er ed by a ess forma duc ve approac T s sec o seeks o

clar w a s mea w e rad cal be av or s s refer o e r approac asduc ve a d co s ders some of e p osop cal ssues ge era edbydu c oT e erm, duc o , as used by rad cal be av or s s refers pr mar y o

a way of do g sc e ce a g ves prom e ce o da a ra er a oeory co ras o e me od of ypo es s, w c akes eory as s

s ar g po a d seeks o es e ru or approx ma e ru of e rv a s da a, e duc ve approac a emp s o der ve ge era eore capr c ples da a T e s mples way o l us ra e e d e e cebe wee eory dr ve a d da a dr ve approac es s o d s g s eki ds of ques o s asked by eac Hypo es s es ers e d o ask, "Is seory rue (or approx ma ely rue ? a d rad cal be av or s s e d o as" wo der w a wou d appe f (S dma , 960, p 8) K ow ga peop e ord ar ly recall up o e ems from a l s , a rad ca

be av or s m g ask, " a wou d appe f al ems e l s wererepea ed w ce? Or " a would appe f reca l was de ayed for o ealf our? Or " a wou d appe fwe arra ged words e l s bysema c ca egor es? I s way, e sc e s s e couraged o look aw a does appe , o col ec forma o abou be av or, ra er a oco s der w a e da a reveal abou e s ape or capac y of a po ecal s ruc ure

Seco d, duc o refers o e process of reaso g from spec cs a ces o ge era aws, a process a s based o wo assump o s: aa a umber of spec c s a ces cou s as ev de ce of a ge era aw,

a d b a pas regu ar es cou as ev de ce of ure regular esDe a led a d oroug accou s of me ods for es abl s g ge era yare g ve S dma (1960), Herse a d Bar ow ( 976), a d Jo s oa d Pe ypacker (1980) Br e y, rad ca be av or s s seek o es ab sge eral y by e care ma pula o of exper me a var ab es acr ss

5



Cha ta number o si ua ions I a single variable is shown o be similarlye ec ive across severa si ua ions his is aken o be a demons ra ion ohe generali y o ha variablePhilosophical problems inheren in he induc ive e hod mainly

concernhe na ure o evidence Three prob ems o induc ion will be

deal wi h here genera i ing rom speci c ins ances he assump ion ocon inued uni ormi y and induc ion o heories The rs wo o heseprob ems will be amiliar as Hume's c assic problems o induc ion

Genera zing om spec c ins ancesThe rs problem has been s a edin he o owing way: "Given a universa empirica generali a ion and acer ain number o posi ive ins ances o i o wha degree do he a ercons i u e evidence or he ormer? (Laudan 98 p 73) In o herwords how do we us i universal s a emen s on he basis o a lim ednumber o observa ions?

Qui simp y here are no ogic l grounds or be ieving a a ni enumber o observa ions demons ra e (are evidence o a uni ersal casehe obs rva ion o speci c ins ances does no cons i u e a demons ra-ion o universali y Genera i ing rom speci c ins ances merely assumesha hose ins ances are a examples o a single princip e Fur hermorehere are no hard and as rules o guide he scien is no laws o scien i cprocedure ha s a e he number o observa ions required o make auniversal generali a ion Es ab ishing genera i y is a ma er o udgmennd he process o induc ion is "a behaviora process no a ogical one

which is he reason ogica ana ysis has ai ed o accoun or i he heror no we make an induc ive in erence and he degree o enaci y wi hwhich we cling o ha in erence wil depend upon our behavioral his ory[experience (Sidman 960 p 59) The philosopher is correc ins a ing ha here is no logical reason or assuming generali y bu hereis a behavioral reason as he o owing sec ion wi clari

Assuming con inued un rmi The second problem o induc ion alsorela ed o he na ure o evidence is a more general issue ex endingbeyondscience o everyday behavior Hume posed he ques ion "Howdowe know ha na ure will con inue o behave in he ure as i has

5

Science Aims nd Me ods

behav ed in t he past?" The f a ct t hat nat ure ha s beha ved unif orm y in t he past does not log icaly g ua ra ntee t ha t it w il continu e to do so in t he fu t ure. Becau se he su n ha s a lw ay s appea red in the morning does notassu re that it w il cont inu e to a ppear in t he morning ; beca use meta s a lw ay sexpand w hen hea ted does not a ssu re t ha t they w ill continu e to do

so There is nosolu tion to t his problem of indu ct ion beca useu niformity into the tu re can never be demonstrat ed. On ythe tu re can y ie d t he evidence req uired to sa tis t he issue a nd t he f ut ure remains, f orev er, t he fu tu re. Indu ction is a ga in a ccounted for behav iora lly : inductive g ener-a liz at ions a re ba sed on experiences in a nd observa tions of t he w or d(beha viora hist ory ), a nd continued unif ormity has been apa rt of those experiences and observa tions. There is no possibilit y of demonstrat ingtha t t omorrow w il be a stoda yor a s y esterda y, bu t ou rbehav iora history is su ch t ha t w e ha ve in t e pa st experienced tomorrow s being the sa me a s y esterday s. That experienceleadsus to t hink a bou t and act tow ard t he

w orld a s if it s u niformit ies w i l continu e. This way o behaving oward he wor d is some imes said o res onprincip e o he uni ormi y o na ure ( or example Hospers 95which is given as he ounda ion o al science The princip e can be demons ra ed bu i makes sense in he ligh o our experience iworld our behavioral his oryno ed above his second problem oinduc ion is no con ned o he scien i c domain In everyday ma ei is common prac ice oassume generali y o behave as hough aspeco he world ha have hi her o been consis en wil con inue o beha cou d be he consequences no assuming genera i y? Ouworlds our ives wou d have o be nego ia ed a resh in every momeevery encoun er The assump ion o con inued uni ormi y is an everea ure o human behavior and as such is accoun ed or by a behaanaly sis

Induc ion o heories.Laudan urges ha a en ion be given o yeano her problem o induc ion arguing ha cri ica discussionsinduc ion end o overemphasi e he wo problems ou lined abohereby obscuring ano her equa ly impor an problem He calls hiprob em o "induc ion o heories and s a es i in his way "Giv

55



C a texpand when heated a week from today But ike other inductivegeneralizations they are supported by direct evidence by positiveinstances of the general statement and unti new evidence is producedthey continue to be reliab e Such genera izations are prone on y to therst and second of the problems out ined above heories that postulate

unobservab e and/or hypothetical processes mechanisms or entities arealso sub ect to the philosopher s criticism that they cannot be logica yassured; an psychological theory of this type also has to dea withinduction's rst and second problems Such theories challenged furtherby the fact that supporting evidence is indirect rather than direct are thussub ect to the criticism that even ifal possib e conse uences ofthe theoryor theoretica statements cou d be obser ed statements referring tounobservable or hypothetica properties cannot be con rmedHypothetico deduction cannot con rm the accuracy of state entsabout unobser ables

Shifting Views of the ms of Science

Science whether nominal y inductive or hypothetico deductive seemsprone to the problem(s) of induction with the third problem reser edfor theories or theoretica statements that refer to unobser ables Whatwould dictate the use of either method to a researcher and what criteriamight scientists apply when deciding how to go about research in their

eld?Laudan has been interested in the changing fortunes of hypotheticoeduction and argues that the current favoring of this method over

induction is related not to logic or the power of the method but to viewsof the aims of science he d by a scienti c community during a particularera If the aim of science is to reduce natural phenomena to fundamentalmechanisms to postulate structures or mediating entities as exp anations this will determine that their conse uences must be deduced andtested for If however the aim of science is to formulate generalempirical laws based on obser ation this will determine an inductiveapproach that attempts to generalizeom data Criteria for choosing a

58

Science: Aim and Me od

method will depend on what Laudan ca s "our shared archetypsigni cant science that in our own era he argues "virtua y a l invtheoretica entit es and processes which are inferentia y far remfrom the data which they explain (Laudan 1981b,p 186) In othertimes "speculative theories and unobser ab e entities were anath

(Laudan 1981b,p 186) and at those times an inductive methodolodominated the philosophy of science Laudan not only a philosophscience dealing with contemporary issues (for examp e Laudan 1984)is a so a historian of the philosophy of science He deve opeconcept of shared archetypes from a historica ana ysis of shi s innatureof physica theory and epistemology in the late 18th and e19th century he concept is important for contemporary psycho oandrecounting Laudan s historical analysis helps clari the way ching views of the aims of science have in uenced the deve opmespeculative theories in experimenta psycho ogy

Thers phase: ae herial heoriesAccording to Laudan a ma or shiin the phi osophy of science occurred over the period 1740 1850philosophy of science of the ear y 18th century promoted a riginductive methodo ogy that was erce y opposed to the methodhypothesis and especia y opposed to any kind of theorizing thapealed to unobserved events processes or entities Empiricism nated and legitimate scienti c knowledge was restricted to phenomthat cou d be direct y obser ed Newton s achievements gave the lesucceedingscientists and epistemo ogists who barred hypotheses frthe domain of science " he [natural] phi osophers of the presenthold hypotheses in vi e esteem (Ben amin Martin 1748 uotedLaudan 198 1 p 10) and " he wor d has been so ong befooledhypothesesin a parts of phi osophy that it is of the utmosconse uence [for progress in rea knowledge to treat them withcontempt ( homas Reid 1785 uoted in Laudan 1981 p 10) aronly two examp es of the genera mood of the time Of invisib e enor agents oseph Priest ey wrote" the agent is invisible everyphi osopher is at iberty to make it whatever he p eases and to ascrit such properties and powers as are most convenient for his purp

5



Cha toseph Pries le 1775 quo ed in Laudan 1981 p. 113) Epis emo o-

gis s of he ime were convinced ha he fa lac of a rming heconsequen rendered he produc s of h po hesis es ing useless asscien i c knowledge and were a so aware of he dangers of appea ing ounobservab es as explana ions.

The empiricis one ofhe ime became even more force in responseo he developmen of a ple hora of heories known as ae her heories orae herial heories which argued he exis ence of a sub le uid or ae herhrough which ac ion akes place l hough ae hers were unobser ablehe cou d be invoked o explain a arge number of m s erious phenom-ena and b he 17 0s scien i c li era ure was rep e e wi h explana ionsc aiming ha ligh hea magne ism gravi and mos o her ph sicalprocesses resu ed from movemen s or vibra ions in an impercep ibleae her.

David Har le and George LeSage gave he ini ia impe us owardaccep ance of he me hod of h po hesis (Laudan 1981 Har ear icu a ed a heor ofmind and percep ion ha pos ula ed a s le uidor ae her in he cen ral ne ous s s em hrough which vibra ions ookp ace LeSage's heor concerned an invisible ae her of par ic es habombarded bodies and caused hem o move. He argued ha bodies werea rac ed o one ano her because heir facing surfaces par ial shie dedhose surfaces from par ic e bombardmen and consequen l he grea erpressure exer ed on heir ou er surfaces forced hem o move closeroge her. In his wa LeSage's ae her heor a emp ed o explainamong o her hings gravi a ion.

No surprising he heories of Har e and LeSage were condemnedb empiricis philosophers and scien is s ofhe ime for a ofhe reasonsgiven above Har e and LeSage new ha if heir heories were o beaccep ed he dominan empiricis phi osoph had o be weakened andsuppor for he me hod of h po hesis s reng hened. Consequen l heurned heir e or s oward epis emo ogical issuesHar e began b acknow edging induc ion as he soundes me hod

for es ablishing re iab e scien i c knowledge (Laudan 1981 . Havings a ed his recogni ion of he power of he induc ive me ho he pro-ceeded o argue ha i shou d no be considered o be he onl me hod

60


avai ab e o science and ha he me hod of h po hesis a so had muco er Har le s main defense was ha al hough con rma ion cou d naran ee a he r never he ess a wide range of con rming ins a cerendered a heor probable and in he case ofhis own heor i s wideexplana or scope rendered i useful o na ural know edge Har le appea ed o he heuris ic val e of h po heses arguing ha he coulead quickl o con rma ion and re a ion and herefore o he producion of new and useful fac s abou he worldBu he failed o convince his cri ics chie becausehe could no give

a ra iona accoun of wh h po heses concerning unobservab es shobe be ieved For Har l s con emporaries i was a necessar condi ioa legi ima e heor ha i should al f he avai ab e da a. Har lehowever wen a s ep fur her an made i a su cien condi ion olegi ima e heorizing a posi ion his con empo aries cou d no accFor hem here remained he cen ral pro lem ha heore ical s amen s concerning unobservable phenomena cou d no be admi edhe realms of na ura knowledge since hose s a emen s could nocon rmed b observa ion.

George LeSage moun ed a more robus a ack han ar le who mhave conceded oo much o he induc ivis s b al owing ini ia hinduc ion is he bes rou e o sure know edge. Convinced ha his hwas dismissed on me hodological ra her han subs an ive grouLeSage new ha he me hod of h po hesis had o gain epis emcredibili before his ae her heor would ge wha he considered oa fair hearing. Sage conceded far ess o he induc ivis s han Hararguing ha induc ive me hods were no as foo proofas heir proponen sc aimed His argumen revolved around he no ion of wha is and iobser able since he induc ivis s c aimed ha heories a s a e cloo da a and deal onl wi h observables had a grea er degree of cerhan heories ha were infere ia l far removed from heir da a. LeSaarguedha a scien i c heorizing wen be ond observa ion and hahere was noclear poin a which once crossed one heor cou dbe saido be fur her removed from irec observa ion han ano her In o hwords here is no via le dis inc ion be een heories which go behe evidence and hose which do no .



Cha ter

o do wi h human psy hology han wi h epis emology Epis emologially, hypo heses on inued o suffer from he possibili y ha al houghhey may a oun for a large number of obser ed phenomena, hey mays ill be false To argue for he superiori y of hypo heses ha su essfullypredi novel and some imes surprising phenomena was, in Mill s

opinion, o on se he psy hology of surprise wi h pis emologi alques ions on he na ure of eviden e Mill a ep ed ha many people areimpressed by a heory ha makes su essful predi ions, and are espe-ially impressed if hose predi ions are novel or surprising in some way,bu he alled for epis emologi al suppor for he ri erion ofindependenes ing ra her han a us i a ion bas d on psy hologyBy he end ofhe 8 5 s, however, he me hod ofhypo hesis had gained

he unpre eden ed redibili y i re ains oda A e an e ofhe me hodof hypo hesis was essen ial o allow physi a heories on erned wi hfundamen al and usua ly unobser able s ru ures o be admi ed in o herealms of legi ima e s ien i knowledge Today s shared ar he pes ofsigni an s ien e mainly involve he sear h for heo e i al en i ies,pro esses, or s ru ures, whose observa ional onsequen es mus bededu ed and es ed for The me hod of hypo hesis goes unques ionedoday, and i would be in eres ing o onsider wha he shape of ourpresen s ien i knowledge migh be if he proponen s of he me hodof hypo hesis had been less su ess l in heir drive o es ablish i sepis emi redibili y

Shared Archetypes in Contemporary Psychology

Applying Laudan's no ion of shared ar he ypes of signi an s ien eo on emporary experimen al psy hology an help o resolve some ofhe on sions be ween he radi al behavioris approa h and o hersbe ause i dire s us o look for some of hose shared ar he pes hagovern he hoi e of me hod For example, he ogni ive or informa ionpro essing approa h on erns i selfwi h hypo he i al inner s ru ures orpro esses ha media e be ween inpu and ou pu This approa h shareshe broad fea ures of o her spe ula ive s ien es in ha i appea s o


fundamen al s ru ures as explana ions of a ion Like hem, i mushe me hod of hypo hesis be ause he only way o pro eed wi h hk nds of s ru ral heories is hrough dedu ing heir obser a iononsequen es and es ing for hem Eviden e is indire ,and he

approa h suffers from he lassi (Humean) problems of indu ion

wellas from Laudan s problem of indu ion o heories Again,as wi ho her spe ula ive s ien es, ea h heory awai s i s downfallas he pro essof ma hing heory o real world phenomena pro eeds Su h heorieall s ien es an only be en a ively held

adi al behaviorism's shared ar he ypes di er from hose of on emporary psy hology Radi al behavioris s do no on ern hemselvesmedia ing pro esses and s ru ures u wi h behavior environmerela ions They seek general behavioral prin iples, derived da a based on dire observa ion Theirs is a philosophy ofs ien e loser o heperiod whenspe ula ive heories and unobser able en i ies were anaema (Laudan, 98b,p 86) han o he shared ar he ypes of our ownera ha vir ually all involve heore i al en i ies and pro esses whiinferen ially far removed from he da a whi h hey explain (Lau98 b p 86) As an approa h based on dire eviden e, givin

prominen e o da a ra her han o heory, radi l behavioris me hodogy does no require he me hod of hypo hesis Spe ula ive heoanno n ion wi hou he me hod; radi al behaviorism does no reoni and rarely, if ever, alls on i

The Context of Scienti c Behavior

Sk nner freely admi ed ha in some ir ums an es he me hod hypo hesis is useful, bu re e ed i as an essen ia omponen of s ieand no ed ha in his own resear h experien e he had never fa eproblem ha was more han he e ernal problem of nding ord(Sk nner, 959, p 369) I is rue ha a resear her may approa hexperimen already guessing i s ou ome or wi h a hun h (perhaps bon ba kground knowledge) abou how he variable of in eres wie e ive, bu as Sk nner also no ed, he guesses and hun hes wi

65



Cha t

which the experimenter proceeds are not the formal hypotheses ofscienti c method; they are simply tentative statements for which rthersupport is sought (Skinner, 1969, pp 82 83)

A good example of the way radic beha v iorists proce d w ithout theformal methodology of prediction and hypothesis testing can be seen in

a report by Matthijs,whose researchis in a eld known as stimulus equ ivalenceor equiva lence rela tions and involves questions about hewa y w ords and sy mbols become semantically rela ted. Ma tthijs (1988)states that his research "is in the rst pla ce an attempt to expand and tosystematically replicate the ndings on stimulu s equivalencein a schizo-phrenic popu lation " He reports that hisresearch both replicates andexpands on background knowledge. Aer describing his procedu res, hecontinues: "ter a su bject has been tau g ht all these conditional rela tions,the qu estion arises whether he ha s learned anyt ing more than simple conditional if-then performances, or whether the contingencies have been success l in esta blishing in the subject's behav ior a class of verbal,sy mbolic, or equivalent stimuli" (Matthijs, 1988). Note that Matthijsma k es no predictions abou t the sort of behavior that will be generated bythe contingencies, but asks Sidman's I wonderwhat would happeni 'question (Sidman, 1960, p. 8). Some facts are already knowna bout thedevelopment of equ ivalence classes, and Matthijs tries to see whetherthey continue to hold true (byreplication) and whether the knowledgebase can be expanded by examining the generation of eq u ivalence classesu der more complex contingencies The knowledge base grows throughreplication and expansion, and when more of the signi cant data (inSidman's use of that term) are compiled, radical behaviorists will be ina position to derive general principles from those data Note also that inMatthijs' experiment nothing is wasted Such an experiment cannotproduce negative data because, as Sidman put it, Data can be negativeonly in terms of a prediction hen one simply asks a question ofnature,the answer is always positive Even an experimental manipulation thatproduces no change in the dependent variable can provide useful ando en important information (Sidman, 1960, p. 9) It is true thatMatthijs could statepos hocseveral hypotheses andreport whether these

66

Science: Aims nd Me ods

wer con rmed or not, but it is also true that this is not theway hisresearch was conducted

Green and D' liveira (1982) and others continue to present studewith a straightforward, logical, and rational vision of the reseprocess Skinner, however, argued that this ideal vision does not

spond to the everyday reality oflaboratory research It is more appateto recognize the somewhat disordered nature of the process thadescribe (or prescribe) science as a series of logical steps: The beofthe scientist is o en reconstructed by scienti c methodologists wita logical framework of hypothesis, deduction, and the testing of trems, but the reconstruction seldom represents the behavior ofscientist at work (Skinner, 1974, p 236). In the early 1950s a prwas initiated that attempted to identi the progress psychology hmade in understanding and accounting for human behavior by looat some of the major theoretical approaches then current Skinner, awith other major theorists of the time, was invited to give an accouhis position in systematic and formal terms. Themes to be discussProjectA included: Background and orienting factors; Structure othe

systemas thus far developed; Initial evidential grounds for assumptof the system; Construction of function forms; Mensurational aquanti cational procedures; Formal organization of the system; Scand range of application of the system; History to date in mediaresearch;Evidence for the system; Speci c methods, concepts, or prciples of the system believed valuable outside the context of the syDegree of programmaticity; Intermediate and long range strategythe development of the system ( och, 1959, pp 666 673) The organers of Project A felt the time had come to consider how psychologdeveloped as a system ofknowledge, what advances had been made, anhow each part of psychology contributed to the overall discipnowledge has grown rapidly in the short history of man's e orts

develop a science of behavior, and the time seems appropriate for a e ort to examine the progress that has been made in attempting to away, or ways, to the attainment of the explanatory power that weto think of as characteristic of science (Wol e, 1959, p v).

67



Cha ter3

Specu ativ e theories, in conjunction w ith the method of hy pothesis,have twomajor effects on scienti c psy choogy tha t ag ain do not concern radica beha v iorists but that shou d be noted First, they e courage a style ofinquiry whereby theories and theoristscompetefor erica tion a ndfa si cat ion: "The deductive mode tends to encou ragea n adv ocacy sty e

of inquiry whereinexperimenta resu ts a re marshalled in support of propositiona statements, whereas the inductive stra tegy promotes atten-tion to any properly obtained da ta Oohnston & Pennypacker, 1980 p.31) Scientists a re encourag ed to a sk qu estions abou t the accuracy or otherwise of theories or theoretica sta tements rather than qu estionsabou t beha v ior itself. Second, it encourages in contemporary psychology the same practice that peraded physics du ring the decades of aetherialheorie; ha i o a y , a "prolifera ion of per onal heorizing W a kin , 1990) in he en e ha if hypohe ica l y em and mechani m are heimpor an expla na ory concep , hen any number of mo i ca ion o

ho e concep ca n and frequ en y do) produce who e new heor e wi h new experimen a l e and ye more a emp o v eri o r fa icompe ing heorie. In hi wa y, muchof cieni c p ychology expendenormou energy a emp ing o e abli h heore ica upremacy .

0

Chapter 4

A ms, M thods, and th Ind v dual

By ex rac ing he me hod ofhypo he i from p ycho ogy' me hodologi-cal package and comparing i wi h induc ion, he previou chaphigh igh ed an overa view ofhe aim ofcience ha inform and guidehe me od u ed by radica behaviori I no ed ha p ycho ogyuden are rained in he me hod of hypo he i and he ma ery o

experimen a de ign and a i ica ana y i of da a. Thi chap er con ier in more de ai ome of he phi o ophical and cien i c i ue r a eo he a i ica rea men of behaviora da a, and con ra radicabehaviori m' view on me hod for ana zing behavior.

P ycho ogyrelie ex en ive y on inferen ia a i ic for drawingconclu ion abou he e ec of independen variable . Thi ype oanaly i i roo ed in he concep of varia ion, he average, and he nordi ribu ion. The a i ica view con ider varia ion o be an unde irabfea ure of p ycho ogica da a, and require individua i y o be upprein favor of he average. Fur hermore, i i ba ed on an a ump ion hvaria ion conform o he norma di ribu ion, ha mea ure of p ychologica a ribu e in a popu a ion c u er arounda mean and rai o inhe direc ion of exce or de ciency. The a i ica view of varia ioencourage he u e oflarge number of ubjec and he group compaon approach o experimen a que ion . Thi view of varia ion andhow o cope wi h i i he ar ing poin for experimen a de ign and danaly i in many area of experimen al p ycho ogy, providing ju iion for ha ubiqui ou fea ure of con emporary p ycho ogy he eof igni cance. If he ubjec ma er i variab e, i i argued, hen hprobabi i y of an ou come being due o varia ion need o be a e eand hi can be done u ing a i ica e of igni cance



Cha t

advance (Sk nner, 195 p 48). The same is true of the e p anatorystatus of chance, as a paraphrase of Sk nner will show: "Chance snegat ve evidence; it po nts to the weakness of a current sc ent ce p anation By ts very nature, chance must yield g ound as a scienti canalys s is able to advance behav or is brought under re ned

e perimental contro more and more of the phenomena current yass gned to chance w l be e p cab e in termsof control ng variables andchance, l ke spontane ty, wi l recede

Orderly Rela ions and Experimen al Con rol

Concepts l ke chance and the average or dea sub ect do not enter ntoradical behaviorism's formu at on of science n general or psycho ogy inpart cular L ke other psycho ogists, behav or analysts recogn ze varia-t on in human behav or, they recognize the ndiv dua ity of peo le andother organ sms But they appr ach variation from the bio ogicaperspect ve, not from the stat stica , Quetel an perspective Rather thanconsider ng variat on (and thus nd vidua ity) to be an unwe come aspectof behav oral data, as in the Quete ian approach, they argue that it isfundamenta to all scienti c phenomena and that the task of sc ence sto account for var ation, to seek out the order n var ab l ty rather thanto silence t: "Var at on s the rule, not the e ception, of a that e sts Inthe most genera sense, the sub ect matter ofa sc ence is variabi ityL kea lother natural phenomena, behavior d sp ays var ab l ty, and ike theother sc ences, the sc ence of behav or has as ts task the e p anat on ofthat var ab ty ohnston& Pennypacker, 980 pp 201 202).

In consider ng the sub ect matter of natura sciences in the atet ent eth century, it may be d cult to appreciate that before thedevelopment of e perimenta contro , aspects of the physical universethat are now the sub ect matter of physics, b o ogy, and chem stry a soseemed n n te y var ab e Sc ent c chemistry ordered our humanunderstanding of a seeming y in n te array of substances nto a n tenumber of elements, and prior to Ga leo t was perhaps inconceivab ethat on y a few aws of mot on could e ua ly descr be the movement of

8

Aims, Me ods, and e Indi du

ce stial and terrestrial bod es But, as Sidman ( 1960) notes, the nsc encesassumed that under y ng the variabi ity was some k ndconstancy, so e order, and methods ofexperimen alcontro weredevelopedfor coping with the sub ect matter and uncovering orderelat ons Psycho ogy, on the other hand, begins w th the assum

that its sub ect matter s intrinsical y variable and has developed mthat applys a is icalcontrol and re y on tests of signi ance as a form oevidence for ts scienti c assert ons

The sumption of underlying order and the techn ues growing oofthat assumption have demonstrated n the natura sc ences that ncan be described and interpreted n terms of order y re ationscontrast ng the basic assumptions of order and ntr nsic variabSidman (1960) argues that f we take ntr nsic var abi ity as a stapoint, we are ed to develop methods that mathematical y covar ab ity and in doing so, c ose o the possibil ty of nding rthorder He notes that a though modern phys cs has reached a s adeve opment that suggests an e ement ofchaos or randomness in nature,it has reached this stage on y a er the most care e ploration of sourofvariabi ity and contro ofe perimental error Ifthere is randomness innature, physics has atta ned a degree of contro over its sub ect mthatmay a ow its con dent admission But start ng from the assumt on of variab ity, psycho ogy c oses o the possib ty of attain ngsame degree of e perimental controS dman has put it, "Modephysics is deep y invo ved in a rea m of phenomena in which variis the ru e But this shi was not a matter of philosophy; t was forcthe data And the data which necessitated the change cou d nevebeen obtained if natural var abi ity had been accepted from the starthard core of intrinsic variabi ity was accepted on y a er errorsmeasurement hadbeen reduced to uantitative ns gn cance and a ere p oration of possib e contributory factors fai ed to e iminate variabi ity (S dma , 960 p 4 ) Psycho ogy reverses the core phsophica presumpt on of p ysics and other natura sciences in accepvariabi i prior to e per menta contro of its sub ect matter

adi a be a ior sts tak order as t eir start ng point S inner wrote ofscience t at t s a search for rder, r un for it es, for aw re at ons



Cha terhe s a s a n e en e mode p omo ed by F she and who ehea

ed y adop ed by ma ns eam expe men a psy ho ogy se es a use uun on n answe ng pa u a k nds o ques ons and n dea ng w hpa u a k nds o da a S a s a me hods a e app op a e n s ua onswhe e va ab ty s a ep ed as an un on o ab e ea u e o da a and

onsequen y whe e " han e a o s a e a owed o en e n o expemen as ua ons hey a e use o den ng ave age e e s and huso so v ng mmed a e p ob ems o wh h ex ended esou es a e noava ab e

In adop ng me hods app op a e o he so u on o p a a p ob emson empo a y expe men a psy ho ogy a es ou he eng nee ng p anhe bas s en e p an equ es an assump on o unde y ng o de andhe deve opmen o me hods apab e o a k ng and e m na ng sou eso va ab ty a he han he " a a s a y a ep ed on ep on on ns va ab y (S dman 1960, p 194) ha he eng nee ng p an

p o eeds w hP n p es de ved ndu ve y ons u e e ab e ba g ound knowedge nso a as hey on nue o ho d ue un on ad o y ev den eomes o gh . Un ke he body o know edge de ved om he

s a s a n e en e mode ha may be a e ed o mod ed by a s mp ehange n p o edu e a hange n he usua and onven en eve oon den e p n p es de ved om a umu a ed obse a ons a e he do be e ab e un newev den e on ad s hem I has been no edabove ha he esu o a es o s gn an e oun s as ev den e o oaga ns s en asse ons and ha he same da a (ev den e) may e hebe n avo o o aga ns a s en asse on n e a on o a eve oon den e a ma e o p o edu e Indu ve y de ved gene a p np es a e so de ved by v ue o ev den e om many sou es and manyns an es o obse va on and a e on y on ad ed byin pendenev den e hey ho d ue by obse va on a he han by p o edu e

Aga n ad a behav o sm s d s n om he ma ns eam o on em-po a y expe men a psy ho ogy n s p e e en e o expe men a a hehan s a s a on o and o ndu ve y de ved p n p es ha a ep ed ve o he behav o o nd v dua s. Es ab sh ng base nes n hebehav o o nd v dua s measu ng he e e veness o expe men a

9

Aims Me ods, and e Indiv du

va ab es aga ns hem eve s ng expe men a ea men s and obsewhe he o no aspe s o behav o eve se a k ng he behav ond v dua o gan sms a oss me exam n ng da a om nd v dsubje s n de a and p esen ng nd v dua da a n pub shed o mdemons a e behav o ana ys s' omm men o espe and wo k w

he a ha peop e and o he o gan sms a e un que

93



Chapter 5

Concep s of Causa ion

Th conc pt of causation is xplicitly o implicitly wov n into many ofou ways of talking about th wo ld and into th p actic s of many ofoul gal, political, conomic, ducational, and sci nti c institutions Dspit its wid sp ad us , th conc pt ofcausation is su p isingly di cultto pin down, v n in sci nc , which igo ously d mands ca fully d iv dvid nc fo its ass tion of causal lations

Th a va ious ways of consid ing causation:y what m ans can w saf ly say that on v nt caus s anoth ? causal lations s qu ntial?

an v nts b causally lat d ov tim and spac o a caus scontiguous with th i cts?

Is it mo us ful to think ofcausal lations as chains omo compl xw bs o n two ks?

y what m ans do w id nti conc ptual units to t st fo causalin u nc s?

Qu stions of this kind a qually as applicabl in physics, ch mist y,biology, m dical sci nc , and so on as in th b havio al sci nc s utb havio al sci nc s a uniqu ly ask d wh th th i subj ct matt canb d sc ib d within th alms o causation as und stood in th natu alsci nc s This chapt consid s som asp cts of causation both insci nc a whol and in th sci nc of b havio info m d by adicalb havio ism, including th qu stion of wh th human b havio isa m nabl to causal d sc iption In xam ning va ous f atu s of causation and causal th nk ng, it w ll b com cl a that th s asp ct of sc nc

5



Cha t



Cha tDete minism and Human Behavio

Causal explanations a e as ndamenta to psycho ogy as to othesciences and the concept of causation implies an initial ete ministicview of the subject matte of science a backg ound assumption thatnothing in the unive se occu s spontaneous y o by accident ll eventsa e assumed to be inte elated with disc ete events eliably linked toothe p io eve ts n sum science assumes that all phenomena a edependent and this dete ministic assumption in most sciences isunp ob ematic

In elation to human behavio howeve the e exists a continuingtension between the asse tion that human behavio is subject to causalaws and the asse tion that it is so adical y di e ent f om the subjectmatte of othe sciences that it is not amenab e to ete ministic causexplanation G nbaum (1953), fo example notes It is not uncom

mon to nd that even those who have complete con dence in thecontinued success of the scienti c method when app ied to inanimatenatu e a highly skeptical of its app icability to the study of humanbehavio Some go so fa as to asse t uite catego ically that the methodsof the natu a sciences a e in p incip e incompetent to yield p edictionsof man's individual o socia behavio (G nbaum 1953, p 766) Oneof the immediate conse uences ofsuch a view acco ding to G nbaumis to pe manently ba al social studies inc uding psychology f omachieving the status ofscience because the essence ofscience is to explainphenomena both in elation to p io events and as instances of a causa

aw Fu the it p esents a tile scena io fo the tu e: ifhuman behaviodoes not exhibit causal elations then we a e denied the possibi ity ofea ning anything f om the past that may be of use in managing thetu e G nbaum puts it To deny the existence of unifo mities inhuman behavio individual and social is to asse t that signi cant essonscannot be d awn f om the past and that man's futu e is cap icious andelusive (G nbaum 1953, p 767) te natively the assumption thathuman behavio is causal y dete mined and the eby susceptib e to causadesc iption suggests a oute towa d a eviating p ob ems di ectly c eatedby human behavio The gap bet een maste y ofou ph sica envi onment

00

oncepts of ausation

an maste y of social economic and po itical systems may be coe ab y na owed by the application of the dete ministic assumptcommon in othe sciences to human behavio

Skinne (1971) exp essed this when he a gued that ou unde stanof human behavio has not app eciably advanced since the time o

G eeks and that we cou d go a ong way towa d so ving the te ip oblems that face us in the wo d today (Skinne 1971, p 1) ththe app ication of science in the eld of human behavio Suchendeavo howeve cal s fo a majo shi in some of the wayscommonly view human behavio The popu a view of human behin weste n cu tu es wi be discussed be ow This section conce nscienti c me it of a guments against causal dete minism in humbehavio It is one thing to asse t that wemigh move fo a d to ab ighte tu e human behavio could be shown to be causadete mined and uite anothe to demonst ate that the a gumen

against dete minism have no me it The fo me is simp y optime ui ing the latte fo p actica suppo tG nbaum desc ibes fou a guments fo indete minacy th ee

which wi l be t eated he e:

1) the a gument f om individuality (since each individual is unun ike any othe individual this p ec udes the possibility ofp edictionand gene a i ation);

2 the a gument f om comp exity (human behavio is so int icatecomplex that causal e ations a e not discove ab e) and

3)the a gument f om pu posiveness (human behavio being di ectowa d the futu e is not cont o ed by antecedent events and is not subject to the causal aws of science)

G nbaum notes additiona objections to a dete ministic viewhuman behavio that in a sense move away f om scienti c a gumtowa d la ge socia /cultu a issues: objections fo example that emo al/ egal uestions such as pe sona esponsibi ity and justi catfo punishme t though such uestions a e of the utmost impo tancto the cu tu eas a who e they wi l not be dea t with he e because

0



ha er C s Ca sa



ha erNo ing ha New on had de ned force as he cause of changes of

mo ion ha is o say of acce era ion Russe wro e " Fo ce in New onis he cause of changes of mo ion whe her in magni ude or direc ionThe no ion of cause is regarded as impor an and force is conceivedimagina ively as he sor of hing ha we experience when we push or

pul (Russel 946 p 524) I gradually became c ear however hagravi a ional e ua ions cou d be worked ou wi hou al uding o forces:"Wha was obser able was a cer ain rela ion be een accelera ion andcon gura ion; o say ha his re a ion was brough abou by hein ermediacy of force was o add no hing o our know edge (Russell946 p 524) Russel described his concep ion of causa force as " he

fain ghos of he vi alis view of he causes of mo ion and wi h heincreasing sophis ica ion of scien i c e ua ions "gradua ly he ghos hasbeen exorcized (Russel 946 p 524) Science ad ong been movingaway from he no ion of an in erna ife force direc ing movemen and

Hume s in uen ia views on causa ion moved i s i r her ow rd anunders anding of causa ion in erms of cons an rela ionsHume poin ed ou ha our percep ion of causa ion includes more

han simple obser a ions of cons an re a ions Wha we obser e andearn by experience he argued are no more and no less han re a ions" he fre uen Conjun onof ob ec s (Hume 777/ 975 p 70) haweadd o our obser a ion is a sense of power or agency on he par of acausa even : "We suppose ha here is some connexion be een hem(cause and e ec ); some power in he one by which i infa ibly produceshe o her and opera es wi h he grea es cer ain y and he s rongesnecessi y (Hume 777/ 975 p 75) This added supposi ion according oHume derives from he waywefeel whenwemove abou in he worldma ingchanges by pushing pul ing i ing dropping and o he isemanipu a ing ob ec s and is mere y a hing ofhough Cohen and Nage( 934) describe his as common sense causa ion "The common senseno ion of cause is an in erpre a ion of nonhuman behavior in ermspecu iarly adop ed o human behavior Thus John broke he windowis supposed o express a causa re ion because here is an agen John'whoprodu ed he breaking of he window(Cohen&Nage 934 p246) Simi ar y in a s a emen ike "mois air rus s iron m is a r s said

06

C s Ca sa

o be he cause and rus ed iron he e ec where mois air is be ieveprodu e he rus ing "In he popu ar mind a lhangesre uire ausesoexp ain hem and when found are in erpre ed as agen s producingchange (Cohen&Nagel 934 p 246) H umes analysis demons ra edha no ions of agency force or necessi y of connec ion are super uo unders anding or describing causa re a ionsThe modern concep ion of causa ion has replaced he no ion of fo

wi h ha o nc ional re a ions and scien i c e ua ions refer o even sas a nc ion of o her e en s ra her han in erms of A exer ing a force onThis is no mere y a super ial seman ic issueno ed in Chap er 2words carry concep ua sys ems wi h hem in addi ion o heir individe ni ions and hese can guide and di ec our opera ions in unno icways I was sugges ed above ha he no ion of agency is especimpor an in rela ion o causal hink ng and human behavior Tha sbecause he modern concep ion of causa ion is so wel es ablishe

science i ma be possib e oday o use he erms cause and e ec care a ion and he like wi hou invoking force a he same ime

The ha n me aphor.Ano her fea ure of causa hinking ha hasundergone revision is he no ion ofhe causa cha n The chain me aphoris perhaps he mos popu ar image of causa ion and perhaps he mconvenien for cer ain prac ical purposes I embraces he re a ina ure of causa io in ha i se s even s in a rela ion of succession o o her wi hou necessarily invoking force on he par of any link inchainThus he chain me aphor is able o describe a se uence of ev

be ween for example adminis ra ion of a drug and he cessa ion ofpainadminis ra ion of a drug is fo owed by a change in he cons i u ionblood which is fo lowed by a change in he ac ivi y of ner eendingswhich is followed by a reduc ion in pain Or as in a much used exabe ween he cue bal s riking he red bal which bounces o he cushand s rikes he b ack ba l which hen fa ls in o e pocke The chainsuch examples has an iden i able beginning an end each inkcon iguous in space and ime and he me aphor il us ra es causa ioa unidirec ional linear process In he above kinds of examp es whechain is measu ab e from beginning o end he me aphor may be u

0

Cha te



Cha tefo p ac ical pu poses O e of he u accep ab e co se ue ces of heme apho , howeve , is ha i imp ies li ea causa io , aceablebac a d o a si g e causa eve , as if al causal ela io s o ce se imo io p oceeded i a s aigh fo a d o e o o e fas io

Causal accoun s and heore cal webs.N R Ha so 955) a es hechai me apho o as He a gues ha scie i c ac ivi y is o co ce edwi h ide i i g causa chai s, ha scie is s i fac a ely efe o causes,a d ha i p ac ice he e is li le i scie ce o i dai y life o which heme apho ca be made o apply Scie is s, acco di g o Ha so , do ohi i e ms of how fa a o g a causal chai hey have p og essed ihei wo Fu he mo e, a d mos impo a ly, he me apho does oa e i o accou he vo umi ous bac g ou d ow edge aci y ivo ved i causa accou s I ig o es who sys ems of co s uc s a dp ope ies i cluded i causal accou s ha a e o give simp y byobse va io a d expe ie ce While he pu pose of di g he cause of agive phe ome o is o explai ha phe ome o , a he same imehe e a e as ma y causes as he e a e exp a a io sCo side a sce a io i which a pe so pic s up a b ic a d hu ls i

owa d a wi dow The b ic hi s he wi dow a d he glass sha e s Iwould be possib e o assemb e a eam of scie is s f om seve a discip i es, i cludi g physics, chemis y, mecha ics, biology, a h opology,sociology, a d psycho ogy (wi h, i shou d be emphasized, seve adi e e i ds of psycho ogis s p ese ) a d o give as ma y causaaccou s of he glass sha e i g as he e we e di e e scie is s i he

eam Because each accou is es ed wi hi i s ow web of co s uc s,assump io s, a d heo ies, o o e of hem is compa ab e o a y o heCompa a ive eva ua io wou d be mea i gless Each accou s a ds ofa s o i e a io o o he s bu o he me hods a d bac g ou dow edge of i s ow discip i e The di ec io i which scie is s oo

fo causal ela io s co espo ds ough y o he dis i c io s amo gscie i c discipli es l dea wi h e a io s amo g a se of co s uc sha de e each e d l hough he e may be ove lap be ee some se sofco s uc s a d e a io s, as i biochemis y fo examp e, each discip i e ypica y deals wi h i s ow sys em of c assi ca io , s ow se of

08

s sa

co s uc s, a d a emp s o ide i i e ela io s amo g hose co -s uc s i he fo m of causal depe de cies

Suchdis i c io s may give he imp essio ha a u e i self is composed of hese di e e i ds of e eme s, he co s uc s of eachdiscip i e Bu he dis i c io s a e mo e p ope ly u de s ood ashuman

i ve io s, co ve ie ways of dividi g a u e ha have deve oped ia dem wi h a g owi g body ofowledge a d, co se ue y, a g owi geed fo specia iza io Roma yshy 1978) poi ed ou ha ow -edge is i self i ima ely e a ed o i s o ga iza io , ha ow edge doo simply p ese i se f o us as we desc ibe a d explai ou wo d Two d does o imp i o us a u a dis i c io s be wee bio ogy,chemis y, physics, mecha ics, a d so o Ra he ,weimpose hesedis i c io s upo he wo d,weo ga ize he wo ld i hese waysRoma yshy pu i , The o ga iza io of owledge is i o e se se heowledge, a d owledge is i o e se se i s o ga iza io (Roma yshy ,

1978, p 8)Ha so ma es he same poi whe he a s abou he heo y adea u e ofcausal e ms a d he i abili y of he chai me apho o emb achis fea u e of causali y D ugs, blood, a d e ve e di gs a e co cep ual u i s e a ed wi hi a e o of co cep ual u i s Wi houhe e o he wo ds hemse ves a e mea i g ess as causa expla aio s I is he bac g ou d owledge, he co cep ua e o , hagives mea i g o causa expla a io s The cue ba examp e, s i i g i s simplici y, is simi a y o ly mea i g agai s a co cep ual bacg ou d i vo vi g ow edge ofhe moveme of sphe oid bodies, a g esof de ec io , a d he p ope ies of bil ia d ab es O y wi h hisco cep uabac g ou d is a causal e a io h ow i o elief Fami ia -i y, pa icula ly i such simp e cases, dissipa es o fades bac g ouowledge a d eaves a supe cia imp essio of o e o o e ca sa

co ec io sThe chai accou ig o es he fac ha causal e ms a e mo e ha

obse va io sI ig o es co cep ual sys ems yi g behi d hose e ms,givi g mea i g o hem causal na on Ge ui e causa co exio sca be exp essed (exp ici y o imp ici ly) o ly i a guage ha is maeve led s ge e a i y a d i s exp a a o y powe This is why h

09



Cha te oncepts of ausation



contiguous wi h the behavior, to account for the moment Episodicobser ations consider that some feature of the patient's internal stateaccounts for present behavior but with access to the patient's reinforcement history, it becomes c earer that present behavior i causa ly relatedto events at a temporal distance

Personal history is n glected in the episodic account by a commitmentto contiguous causation, but the variation and selection causal modedraws attention to the effects of past experience on current behavior Inthe atter mode, the present person is the sum ofpast effects, and presentbehavior interacts with both current contingencies and past e ects.Persona history (experience) is a necessary part of explanations ofpresent behavior in the variation and selection causal mode

Beyond Links in the Causal Chain

Causal thinking, in science in genera and in the science of behavior inarticu ar, has several features. The present chapter has concen rated ononly some ofits features as well as on the way culture-speci c views of theperson inform the direction in which psycho ogy looks for causarelations and the form that those re ations take

Historical y, causa thinking in the physica sciences has moved awayfrom the notion of inherent force or agen n the part of the independent variable to a view that causes and eects are no more than functionalrelations from A acts to produce B" to B is a nction ofA " Similar y,radical behaviorism dispenses with force or agency, replacingcausewitha change in he in penden variableand ec with a change in hepen n variab Behavior (the person) stands in a dependent variablerelation to environmenta events as independent variab es

With its distinctive view ofthe person and its emphasis on the selectivero e ofthe environment, radica behaviorism looks for causal relations inthe interaction bet een behavior (the person) and environmental consequences, a kind of causation that does not require contiguous linksbetween one event and another. Persona history is an important part ofcausa explanation in this tradition since the present person is the sum of

1

oncepts of ausation

pas effects. Behavior analytic experiments that demonstrate the seleceaction of consequences empirica y validate se ection as a causal m

Another feature of causal thinking is sti l to be discussed. It has bbrie y mentioned as a severe comp ication for the chain metaphoability to account for causation the theory-laden nature of causal ters

The concepts ofcausation, explanation, and theory are intimately bountogether in the statements we make about how and why things happin the wor d. The ro e of theory and forms of explanation wil bconsidered in the fo lowing chapter.

1 3



Chapter 6

Interpretive Techniques and ExplanatoryTheories

o her fea ure of Mach's phi osophy of science ha Skinner adop eddirec y as no ed in he previous chap er: We may now ake ha morehumb e view ofexp ana ion and causa ion which seems o have been rssugges ed by Mach and is now a common charac eris ic of scien i chough wherein in a word exp ana ion is reduced o descrip ion and

he no ion ofnc ion subs i u ed for ha ofcausa ion (S inner 931!1972b pp. 448-449) I was poin ed ou ha he dis inc ion be weencause and nc ion re a es o his orica deve opmen s in he his ory ofheconcep of causa ion Simi ar y Mach s dis inc ion be ween exp ana ionand descrip ion is his orica y signi can in re a ion o major heore ica !phi osophica deba es of his ime and con inues o be signi can inre a ion o con emporary experimen a psycho ogy

To he modern reader accus omed o hinking of science as anen erprise goingb ond descrip ions of phenomena o exp ana ions heproposa o imi (reduce) exp ana ion o descrip ion may seem con radic ory o scien i c aims Fur hermore he proposa imp ies wo separa eand exc usive ac ivi ies: ha when phenomena are described hey areno a he same ime exp ained and ha o exp ain is in some sense oaccounfor ha which is described In o her words in mere y describingeven s one is no accoun ing for hose even s Hempe and Oppenheimbegin heir c assicSdies in he Logic of Expna ion wi h precise y hisasser ion Scien i c research in i s various branches s rives o go beyonda mere descrip ion of i s sub ec ma er by providing an exp ana ion ofhe phenomena i nves iga es" (Hempe & Oppenheim 1 960 p. 35)

Ifscience s rives no mere y o describe bu o go beyond descrip ion o

5

Cha ter Int rpr tiv T chniqu s and Eplanatory Th ori s



exp ana on, how cou d such an em nen sc en s and ph osophe asE s Mach p opose m ng sc ence o desc p on an he eby exc udehe poss b y of exp a n ng (accoun ng fo ) na u ahenomena?In c a ng Mach's and Sk nne 's d s nc on be een desc p on

and exp ana on, h s chap e adds o he a gumen ha ad cabehav o sm's accoun s (exp ana ons) of s subjec ma e avo d mechan s c n e p e a ons of he behav o of o gan sms, human o o he se

Description and Functional Relations: Mach

The d s nc on be ween desc p on and exp ana on s a p oduc of ofea u es of Mach's a gumen

) he de n on of desc p on, wh ch s e a ed o Mach's v ews on

causa on; and2) Mach's oppos on o ce a n k nds of heo es, espec a y hose

g ounded n a mechan s c v ew of na u e and wh ch d aw on hen e p e ve echn que of appea ng o hypo he ca en es o b dgeempo a and spa a gaps be een func onal y dependen even s(causes and e ec s)

Desc p ons, n Mach's e ms, a e exp ana o y n he sense ha heyaccoun fo phenomena The somewha m s ead ng d s nc on be een

desc p on and exp ana on de ves f om a majo deba e of he 9 hcen u y conce n ng app op a e n e p e ve echn ques n phys cs, andf om a spu e ove a emp s o desc be na u al phenomena n e msana ogous o he wo k ngs of a g ea mach ne

Mach asse ed ha comp e e desc p ons of phenomena suf ce asexp ana ons He w o e of desc p on, I s on y poss b e of even s hacons an y ecu , o of even s ha a e made up of componen pa s hacons an y ecu Tha on y can be desc bed, and concep ua y ep esen ed, w ch s un fo m and confo mab e o aw; fo desc p onp esupposes he emp oymen of names by h ch o des gna e s

1 6

Int rpr tiv T chniqu s and Eplanatory Th ori s

e emen s; and names can acqu e mean ngs on y when app ee emen s ha cons an y eappea " (Mach, 893/ 960, p 6) In passage, Mach made he po n ha was a so made a e by Han( 955), efe ed o n he p ev ous chap e , ha he wo ds usedodesc be phenomena a e many- eve ed n he gene a y and exp a

o y powe hen a phys c s desc bes he efac on of gh n wa ehe wo ds, gh , ef ac on, and wa e , a eady compac seve a concua p ope es ha , f need be, can be he desc bed by o he wo scompac ng concep ua p ope es Mach's po n (and Hanson's) ha desc p ve e ms n sc ence mp y p ope es and e a ons Unp a ned phenomena a e hose n wh ch he sc en s has no ye d se ed ecu ng e emen s, e emen s ha am d a mu p c y e evep esen (Mach, 893/ 960, p 6) Mach added: hen once we haeached he po n whe e we a e eve whe e ab e o de ec hesamefews mp e e emen s, comb n ng n he o d na y manne , hen hey appo us as h ngs ha a e fam a ; we a e no onge su p sed, he eno h ng new o s ange ou n he phenomena, we fee a home w h hemhey no onge pe p ex us, hey a eine (Mach, 893/ 960, p 7).Desc p ve e ms n sc ence, as n o he d sc p nes, a e embed

w h n heo e ca f amewo ks, webs of e a ed cons uc s and conceha g ve hem mean ng exp ana on ofwhy gh ef ac s n wa e s

con a ned n ano he desc p on, a desc p on of he behav o ofgene a ype of wave phenomena ( gh be ng a s ng e ns ance of gene a ype) ha confo ms o he aw of ef ac on when ave ngh oughan op ca med um ha s dense han a (of wh ch wa s ans ance) In desc b ng he e a on be een concep ual p ope es ( gand wa e ) n he fo m of a gene a aw ( ef ac on), he phenomenonexp a ned

L gh ef ac s n wa e " s a desc p on of a e a on be een con epua p ope es ha n se f s no exp ana o y I does no sa s h

ques on, Why does gh ef ac n wa e ?" Tha ques on s sa s ed( he phenomenon accoun ed fo ) b a he desc p on of he e a onbe een he p ope es of gh , of wa e , and he aw of ef c on Inano he con ex he desc p on, gh ef ac s n wa e , does nc on asan exp ana on, as he answe o he ques on, hy does h s s a gh oseem o bend when pu n he ake " n h s con ex , because

127



Cha t 6 In e p e ive Techniques and Eplana o y Theo ies



constructs were origina y deve oped to connect He referred to thesemode s as inte ectua machinery and cautioned that the machineryof thought shou d not be mistaken for descriptions o f the rea wor d:A person who knew the wor d on y through the theaer, if brought

behind the scenes and permitted to view the mechanism of the stage saction, might possib y be ieve that the rea wor d a so was in need of amachine room, and that if this were once thorough y exp ored, weshou d know a . Simi ar y, we, too, shou d beware est thein e ec ualmachinery, emp oyed in the representation of the wor d onhe sage ofhough be regarded as the basis of the rea wor d" (Mach, 893 960,p 6 0) .

Mach s emphasis on description versus exp anation, a distinction thatseems to the modern reader antithetica to the aims of science, is in facta distinction bet een dierent interpretive techniques and causa mo es.His position may be summarized as fo ows: science is escriptive,observationa , and integrative its task is to observe and describe regu arnctiona dependencies and to integrate those dependenc es in t e formo gener aws. Accepting the heuristic va ue of systems that go beyondthe rea m ofthe observed to the hypothetica , Mach opposed the practiceof e evating the hypothetica to the status of exp anation since nothingis described hypothetica constructs do not rnish exp anations Hea so opposed the practice of diverting attention away from nctionadependencies toward hypothetica constructs, of turning constructst emse ves into onto ogica rea ities and into the focus of inquiryFina y, he opposed a causa mode that requires things in bet een to

connect dependent phenomena and that consequent y views the workings of the universe as a vast machine, to be understood by breaking itdown into its component parts; a wor d as machine view.

For Mach, appropriate exp anations consisted of descriptions given inanguage that is many eve ed, compacting conceptua properties, andre ating them in the form of genera aws Inappropriate exp anationstransfor hypothetica entities, the inte ectua machinery of science,into onto ogica rea ities and attempt to provide inks in the causachain by means of those entities

3

p q p y

De c iption and Functional Relation : S inne

Sk nner s distinction bet een description and exp anation and hob ection to particu ar kinds of interpretive techniques c ose y fo oMach s arguments. ear y as 938 Skinner described his deve oping

system in the fo owing way: The system is positivistic It conitse f to description rather than exp anation Its concepts are de nedterms of immediate observations and are not given oca or physio ogproperties A re ex is not an arc, a drive is not the state of a cenextinction is not the exhaustion of a physio ogica substance or stTerms of this sort are used mere y to bring together groups of obsertions, to state uniformities, and to express properties of behavior wtranscend sing e instances" (Skinner, 938, p. 44). This ear y pasencapsu ates ideas he ater e aborated and demonstrates his commitm

a science that is, ike Mach s, descriptive, observationa , and integrSkinner s descriptions take the same form as Mach s; they are stments of nctiona dependencies, of regu arities in the re ation bet een

dependent and independent variab es. He was at pains to point out tdescription in this sense di ers from narration, where The story simp y to d ofsomethin that has once happene " (Skinner, 938, p 9)Anarrative statement is not exp anatory; it simp y states the occurreof a sing e event: In the narrative form, for examp e, it may be said tatsuch and such a moment the ape picked up a stick Here there isreference to other instances of the same behavior either past or tureis not asserted that a apes pick up sticks" (Skinner, 938, p 9) Irefraction examp e, a narrative statement wou d be: at timeX this beamrefracted through this medium," a statement that describes an instawithout reference to regu arity Light refracts in water," howeveexpressesa uniformity, a regu arity in the behavior of ight in certainmedia Apes eat bamboo" simi ar y expresses a regu arity, summaria uniformity, a re ation bet een conceptua properties

To be exp anatory, a description must re ate uniformities bet eenc asses or properties Skinner referred to re ex, drive, extinction, anforth, terms th t n his system simp y integrate and summarize re atio

33

Cha ter6 In erpre ive Techni ues and Eplana ory Theories



Theydogo beyond single instances to desc ibe unifo mities, butdo nogo beyond the elations obse ved. A e ex, fo example, in the Skinne iansystem desc ibes a pa ticula kind of co elation betwe n stimulus andesponse When Skinne stated that it is not given local o physiological

p ope ties," he was efe ing to the p actice of locating e ex within the

o ganism and asc ibing to it physiological p ope ties such as a neu ological a c b idging a gap between its two end te ms, stimulus and esponseFo Skinne , a e lex desc ibed no mo e o less than a elation The te mis an abst action of a eliable unifo mity. If a e ex is located at all, it islocatedin he re ion between pa ticula kinds of stimuli and esponsesand not within the o ganism. In the exp ession of these elations, whichamid all multiplicity a e eve p esent" (Mach, 1893/1960, p 6), lies

explanation. Behavio is explained in the desc iption o unifo m elations between dependent va iables (units ofbehavio ) and independentva iables in the context in which it occu s Explanation, fo Skinne as

fo Mach,isdesc iption, and again the question ofwhy Skinne soughtto con ne his system to desc iption is aised What a e the explanationsthat Skinne uled out of his scienti c system?

In the case of Mach and the atomic debate in 9th centu y physics, thedistinction between explanation and desc iption g ew out of disputesove inte p etive techniques and causal thinking. Simila ly, in 20thcentu y psychology, Skinne 's distinction g ew out of his opposition topa ticula kinds of inte p etations of human behavio and to a causalthinking that equi es tempo al gaps between events to be lled by linksin a causal chain.

Explanation an Theo y Skinne

Skinne 's views on explanation, desc iption, and theo y in a science ofbehavio a e woven into much of his w iting fom his docto a disse tation onwa d, and seve a pape s a e given ove wholly o mainly tooutlining these views, notablyCurren Tren in E erimen al P y holo ( 947/1972b),Are Theories ofLea ing Ne essa ( 950/ 972b),

3

Cri ique of Psyhoana i Coneps and Theories( 956), andThe Fghom he Labora o (1972c)

Despite his ca e l de nition of the inte p etive technique he ega dedas ha mful and dive siona y in a science of behavio , and his considoutlineof a theo etical system he ega ded as eective, Skinne 's positi

has o en been commented on as if it we e an a gument that theo yaltogethe unnecessa y in a science of behavio . Westby ( 966),example, esc ibed Skinne 's app oach as a G and ti Theo y." Hisviews have also been ead as a claim that his own explanato y systsomehow atheo etical. Sc iven ( 956), fo example, const ucteda gument to demonst ate that Skinne 's system does in fact amouna theo y: I shall not be t ying to show that Skinne 's theo ies a e bI wish to show only that he does employ them" (Sc iven, 1956, pSuch comments and conclusions a e cu ious ca icatu es of Skinnposition, but they sha e a simila ity with ca icatu es of Mach's pa t

pation in the atomic debate which, as Laudan noted, add essed mfundamen al scienti c issues than the ontologica status of atomSimila ly, Skinne 's pa ticipation in the theo y debate goes beyondquestion, Shall we have a theo y o not?" to mo e ndamenta issuconce ning unde lying assumptions ofthe theo ies we al eady have, theiuse lness and explanato y powe , alte natives to those theo ies, and kind of causa mode that unde lies t aditional inte p etive patte ns

Skinne 's distinction between desc iption and explanation is, Mach's, intimately bound to the issues of inte p etive techniques causa modes. Laudan noted that supe cia accounts of the atomdebate, p esenting it as a dispute ove the ontological status of atoobscu e a mo e ndamenta discomfo t with inte p etive techniquethat adopt a mechanistic causa mode and lead to a mechanistic vienatu e. Accounts of Skinne 's position that p esent it as anti theo etmiss the same impo tant points and obscu e the ea focus ofhis ana ysis.

It is di cult to unde stand how even the most casua eading of, fexample,Curren Tren in Experimen al Psy holo (Skinne , 1947/1972b) could leave an imp ession that Skinne opposed theo y science of behavio ; he quite clea ly exp essed the opposite view

3 5

Cha t Interpretive Techniques and Eplanatory Theories



argued in his paper, Behavior can only be sa isfac orily unders oodby going beyond he fac s hemselves.Wha is needed is a heory ofbehavio (p 30 1 , emphasis added) and, Whe her par icular experimen al psychologis s like i or no , experimen alpsychology isproperly and inevi ably commi ed o he cons ruc ion of a heory ofbehavior.A heo is essen ial o he s ien unders anding ofbehaviora subje ma e (p 302, emphasis added). When Skinner wro e hesewords, psychology was beginning o doub he claims of i s majorheoris s ha a comprehensive heory of behavior would be for hcoming. Hull's heore ical sys em had been dominan bu was coming undera ack, and wha has been described as psychology's Age of Theory(Smi h, 1986) had begun i s decline Skinner's con ribu ion o heheory deba e was o examine he genesis of psychology's dominanin erpre ive sys ems and o ou line a form of heory cons ruc ion awould sa is his (and Mach's) view of science as descrip ive, observa

ional, and in egra ive.

Constructinga Theo

Despi e con rary in erpre a ions, i is clear from he above excerp s haSkinner was commi ed o he developmen ofa heory of behavior Buhe erm, heory, is somewha ambiguous since i can carry a leas hreemeanings, wo ofwhich involve he no ion of specula ion and he hird,he no ion of in egra ion Firs , a heory may be simply a guess,a

predic ive or explana ory guess of he sor , I have a heory ha such andsuch will happen or I have a heory ha his is caused by ha , wherehe speaker is guessing an ou come or sugges ing a causal rela ionSecond, heory may refer o a model involving one o morehypo he ical en i ies cons ruc ed in an a emp o accoun for mys erious (unexplained) phenomena. This ype of heory proposes a speculaive explana ion which, for scien i c purposes, requires experimen ales ing o es ablish o wha degree he model s empirical da a i

a emp s o explain.

136

T ird, heory may also refer o an explana ory sys em like S inner'sha describes regulari ies, s a es general principles, and in egra es uformi ies in a given subjec ma er. These las kinds of heoriesdo nocarry he same requiremen of being submi ed o experimen al chesince hey are da a driven (derived from obser a ion) and are no

cons ruc ed prior o experimen a ion. In his sense, in egra ive heorare no specula ive hey describe wi hou guessing Theore ical ermhis ype ofexplana ory sys em do no preemp experimen a ion; ra herhey are derived from i Specula ion does no ake place a he levelexplana ion bu a he level ofexperimen a ion, when an a emp is madeo discover which ou of he mul iplici y of variables presen in a givcon ex may be nc ionally rela ed Explana ions do no refer oprocesses or en i ies beyond obse a ion ra her, he descrip ions coprising explana ion are s a emen s abou obser ed regulari ies.

S inner proposed ha a science of behavior may bene from he

cons ruc ion of he las k nd of heory, one ha in egra es obser edregulari ies He iden i ed hree s ages of heory cons ruc ion The rand perhaps mos impor an s age is o iden i he basic da a. The nexs ep involves he developmen of heore ical erms ha express rela ioamong da a, in egra ive erms: Observed rela ions of his sor are hfac s of a science or, when a su cien degree of generali y has beenreached, i s laws (Skinner, 1 947/1 972b, p 307) .fur her regulari iesappear, heory cons ruc ion moves on o a hird s age involving headdi ion of new heore ical erms o describe hese new regulari iThird s age concep s (Skinner, 1947 972b, p 307) are addi ions o

regulari iesexpressed a he second s age wi hou being addi ions o hbasic da a They emergeom he regulari ies hemselves wi hou invokingunobserved or hypo he ical proper ies

Skinner gave a simple example from he his ory of h science mechanics: Galileo, wi h he help ofhis predecessors, began by res ricing himself o a limi ed se ofda a He proposed o deal wi h he posi ionsof bodies a given imes, ra her han wi h heir color or hardness or si(S inner, 1947/ 1972b, p 307) This decision charac erizes he rs sof cons ruc ing a heory, where da a are limi ed and de ned. Galile

137

Cha t 6 Interpreti e Techniques and Eplanatory Theories



hen proceeded o demons ra e a rela on be ween pos on and me"(Sk nner, 947/ 972b, p. 307) A h s second s age, heore cal ermsare developed o descr be law l regular es n he bas c d a. To descr behe rela on be ween he pos on of a ball on an ncl ned plane and heme elapsed s nce s release, for example, he erm, accelera on, s

developed. La er, as o her fac s were added, o her concep s appearedmass, force, and so on. Th rd-s age concep s of h s sor are some h ngmore han he second-s age laws from wh ch hey are der ved. They arepecul arly e produc of heory-making" (Sk nner, 947/ 972b, p. 307).

When Sk nner rs began o cons ruc an explana ory sys em, hecare lly de ned h s bas c da a, h s sub ec ma er, summar zed n heerm, behav or: Behav or s ha par of he func on ng of an organ sm

wh ch s engaged n ac ng upon or hav ng commerce w h he ou s deworld .. .by behav or, hen, I mean s mply he movemen of an organ smor of s par s n a frame of reference prov ded by he organ sm self or

by var ous ex ernal ob ec s or elds of force I s conven en o speak ofh s as he ac on of he organ sm upon he ou s de world" (Skinner,938, p 6). Al hough he de n on of behav or has always been a

complex ma er (for example, see Lee, 988) , he mos s gn can aspechere s in a ame of r ren e, wh ch den ed Sk nner's da a assome h ng o her han s mple opography (as Gal leo's da a were someh ng o her han n r ns c fea ures of bod es) . The da a o be expla ned,he sub ec ma er of Skinner's sc ence of behav or, are no musclew ches or lever presses hey are rela ons be een behav or an he

world ha organ sms engage w h- behavior and he on ex in whi h i

o ursHav ng de ned h s sub ec ma er, he proceeded o cons der erms ham gh express hose rela ons. I has a ready been no ed ha he languagen wh ch we ord nar ly descr be behav or does no always share heaccuracy of he descr p ve anguage of o her sc ences. Vernacularexpress ons o en carry w h hem h dden concep ual schemes haa readymply rela ons no g ven by sc en c a a exam na ion ofhe language of m nd, of learn ng, and of language self (Chap er 2)demons ra ed ha a hough hese erms may be adequa e for every ay

3

purposes, hey mplya priori concep ual schemes ha may con sera her han llum na e emp r ca rela ons. Sk nner d d no rule ou heuse of everyday erms n an explana ory sys em he s mply cau oned herms der ved from ord nary language should no be adop ed uncr callyBehav oral sc ence mus no ake over w hou care l cons dera on heschemes wh ch underl e popular speech" (Sk nner, 938, p 7) In lw h h s v ew of sc ence as descr p ve, obser a ona , and n egra veheore ca rms n he Sk nner an sys em refer o emp r cally der vedrela ons w h n he sub ec ma er. Cond on ng and ex nc on, forexample, descr be he shap ng of behav or as a func on of even s n hcon ex n wh ch occursOperan behaviorrefers o any ac on he parof he organ sm ha produces an e ec ndan operan o a class ofresponses hav ng a par cular eec . In exper men al s ua ons w h ra sfor example, lever press ng s a class of responses hav ng he e ec produc ng food Topography s no mpor an for exper men al purposes. A ra may press a lever w h s paw, s foo , s nose, or s ail, he opography of he operan s of less mpor han s rela on o hecon ex n wh ch occurs Human operan s may be opograph callymore d se han he s ngle un s of he ra 's lever presses or he p geon'skey pecks Depend ng on he exper men al ques n n hand, an operancan refer o any h ng fr m wash ng d shes o a v olen verba ou burs ,he common fea ure be ng ha each s den ed as a un of behav orfunc ona ly rela ed o even s n s con ex .

Sk nner also des gna ed erms o descr be dependenc es be ween hse ng cond ons and consequences of behav or.D rimina ve s mulus

refers o a d scre e aspec of he se ng cond on n wh ch an operanoccurs and wh ch s nc onally rela ed o ha operan S m lar y,rein r er refers o he e ec of a d scre e consequence on behav or.Several consequences may follow an operan , bu no all of hosconsequences may be func onally rela ed o A re nforc ng consequences one ha shapes and/or ma n a ns an operan In he case od scr m na ve s mulus and re nforcer, as n he case ofoperan , n r ns cproper es of ob ec s or even s are of less mpor han he nc onarela ons hose erms descr be. A red l gh s no a d scr m na ve s mul

39



Cha t 6 Interpretive Techniques and Eplanatory Theories



to the mechanistic think ng underlying these kinds of theories (whichwill here be referred to as models or theoretical models for the purposeof greater clarity) was based on the Machian view of ca se and eect asfunctional depend ncy. Like Mach, Sk nner found no discomfort inintegrating cause an e ect ( nctional relations)withouta mediatingstructure or mechanism through which actio takes place o Skinnerand other radical behaviorists, behaving organisms, human or otherwise,are not mechanical structures to be likened to telephone exchanges andnetworks, information processing systems, computer storage banks, andthe like They are biological organisms operating within a context thata ects their behavior and that th in turn have an e ect upon,organisms that are changed by their experience in that contextMachbefore him re sed a view of the world as great m chine, Skinner re ectedmachine analogies in his scienti c system and eschewed mechanicaprinciples for describing organisms and their worlds

Another feature of his opposition to models that include t rms notderived from data was a practical a gument Scienti c odelling carriesa requirement of experimental testing to establish the best t betweencompeting models and data and as such, Skinner argued, they arewaste l of valuable energy and resources This argument was raised inChapter 3, where the methodologies of mainstream experimental psychology and behavior ana ysis were compared It was noted there thatdata obtained in the testing of a model are only considered valuable ifthey conform to predictions deduced from the model If results do notconform to predictions, then data so care lly collected in the research

process have little meaning or va ue The model is either re ected orundergoes modi cation leading to rther experimentation, but the datathemselves turn out to be useless except insofar as they demonstrateproblems in the model Since the process of constant experimental checkusually leads to the decline of one model and the rise of anot er eithera modi ed model or a competing one), a large part of the researchassociated with the testing of models is discarded esearch designedwith res ect to theory is a so likely to be wasteful That a theory gen ratesresearch does not prove its va ue unless the resear h is valuable Much

1

useless experimentation results from theories, and much energy anare absorbed b them Most theories are e entually overthrown, angreater part f the associated research is discarded" (Skinner, 972b, p. 7 )

Discussing explanatory systems that appeal to events taking pl

some other level will be useful in helping o illumi ate SkinconcernsThis will be done in the following chapter, which will arthat Mach's 19th century views on interpretation and causa modesown science remain relevant to 20th century psychology, and Skinner's views of the 1940s and 95 s remain relevant to psychtoday.

14 3



Chapter 7

Mechanistic Thinking in Psychology

The two p ece ng ch pte s note th t c us l th nk ng n cbeh v o st ph losophy oes not e y on th ngs- n-between to expl nfunct on l e t ons. c l beh v o st , fol ow ng M ch, expl nbeh v o n ts f me of efe ence n nteg t ve theo et c te mse ve fom obse v t on w thout o e ng t on l ent t es, ethe s ome ums to b ge sp t n /o tempo l g ps between epen entphenomen

Th s nte p et ve techn que sets beh v o n ys s p t f om mo et t on p tte ns of expl n t on th t ppen beh v o to some othesystem o st uctu e th t s s to cont ol t, to be ts sou ce o c use Theu st c p esumpt on efe e to n Ch pte 5 t kes beh v o to be secon y fe tu e, m n fe t t on of somethng e e n ny ttempt toexpl n beh v o th t s gu e by th s p esumpt on must necess lyppe l to events t k ng p ce somewhe e else, t some othe eve ofobse t on" (Sk nne , 950/ 972b, p. 69).

Theo et c ccounts efe ng to some othe mens on e conse b y fom Sk nne 's sys em. They nvo ve sh w y fom obse v t on( t ) to theo et c concepts not cont ne n o g ven by t but wh che s to exp n t Th s nte p et ve techn que nvo ves e p ng fom

the e lm of the obse ve to the e m of the hypothet c n o e ngthe hypothet c n ccount of the obse ve The le p s not necesst te by t but by p esc ent c ssumpt ons bout beh v o n thebeh v ng pe son ( ssumpt ons th t e not p t of c l beh v o sm'sph losophy of the pe son). Whe e Sk nne ns ste on ely ng onobse t on to esc be un fo m e t ons n nteg t ve theo et c

14



Cha th h f h h h d f

Mechanis ic Thinking in Psychology



ph osophy of exp a a o , wh ch s s s upo he reduc ve pr or y ofhe er eve " (Ski er, 1984 , p 515)

The Psychodyna ic Model

The psychody am c model, fou ded a d deve oped by Freud, fo owshe rad o al pa er of accou g for behav or by appeal g oprocesses w h he d v dual a d adop s he mecha s c causal modeof prov d g er a med a g ks be wee behav or a d he co ex wh ch occurs Ski er co s dered some aspec s ofF reud' s co r buo o psychology pra sewor hy O e of Freud's grea co r bu o s o

he a alys s of huma behav or was o draw a e o o he fac haeve s he l fe h s ory of he d v dual (e per ce) m y be ausalrela ed o prese behav or Freud's work also co rad c ed he rado a v ew of huma behav or as here ly ra o a a d self ge era ed

by argu g ha causal ue ces may be u suspec ed by d v du ls, had v duals are o ecessar y aware of he causes of he r behav orS i er a so o ed Freud's ab l y o carry h s argume s w hou heusua exper me al es g charac er s c of sc e ce: H s ach eveme h s respec appears a l he more mpress ve whe we recall ha he wasever able o appeal o he qua a ve proofs charac er s c of o her

sc e ces. He carr ed he day w h sheer persuas o w h he mass g ofs a ces a d he de ea o ofsurpr s g para e s a d a alog es amo g

seem gly d verse ma er als" (Sk er, 1 956, p. 77)The psychody am c mode s par cu ar y eres g re a o o

prese argume s A hough Freud fo lowed he rad o al pa er ofloca g causes of behav or s de he orga sm a d ve ed hreediscre e er age s d, ego, a d superego whose co c g eedsgave r se o behav or, he a so we beyo d hose er age s o exp ahe r behav or ur erms of e v ro me a var ab es he h s oryof he perso O e of Sk er's argume s aga s rad o a erpreve pa er s was ha er al de erm ers of behav or seem o br gqu ry o a e d, g v g he mpress o ofhav g so ved he problem of

accou g for behav or by po g o some presumed eve , process,

150

or e y ha s sa d o g ve r se o behav or. Wha s o e forgo e sha he er a de erm er se f has s l o be accou ed for, o her sehe rela o has o bee demo s ra ed emp r cal y bu mere y s a ed

verba ly: We do o rea y expla d s urbed behav or' by a r bu g o a x e y' u we have also exp a ed he a x e y The ex ra s ep

requ red s he sp r of a exper me a sc e ce: s a search for ama pulab e var ab e ra her ha a verba exp a a o " (Ski er, 1972c,p 316) Sk er po ed ou ha as a horoughgo g de erm s "(Sk er, 1956, p 79), Freud accep ed he respo s b y of exp a gh s er al e es by ook g for pas e v ro me a lue ces a dha h s mode herefore co s s s of hree s eps a causal seque ce frompas o prese : Some e v ro me a co d o , very o e he ear yfe of he d v dual, eaves a e ec upo he er me al appara us,

a d h s ur produces he behav oral ma fes a o or symp omE v ro me a eve , me a s a e or process, behav ora symp om

hese are he hree ks Freud's causal cha " (Ski er, 1956, pp. 78 80)Th s seque ce d ers from o her er al accou s ha ks heperso 's pas a d prese I s, however, s m ar o o her er aaccou s ha s r ves o he empora gap be wee cause a d eecby prov d g a s ruc ure rough wh ch ac o akes place I he sameway ha some 18 h a d 19 h ce ury phys c s s could o accepobser edgrav a o al a rac o a d repuls o w hou pos u a g amed a g ae her hrough wh ch ac o akes place, Freud proposed amed a g s ruc ure o accou for he lue ce of he pas o presebehav or L ke 18 h a d 19 h ce ury ae her heor s s, Freud used h shree compo e mode o br dge he gap space a d me be weeeve s he had proved o be causal y rela ed" (Sk er, 1956, p 80). A dl ke 18 ha d 19 h ce ury ae her heor es, h s hree er al l ks hecha were o der ved from da a bu were add o s o .

Such add o s o da a are prob ema c o o cou s I he rs p ace,as Sk er o ed, ra her ha clar g rela o s be wee depe de a ddepe de var ab es, hey mu p y he var ables o be exp a ed For

examp e, a psychody am c accou of phob c behav or akes a rela obe ee some objec /eve a d behav or a d mul pl es o re a o s

1 1

Cha t 7Mechanistic Thinking in Psychology



between event/ob ect, ntrap ych c con ct, and behav or, w thintrap ych c con ict mediat ng between pa t and pre ent.

Second, uch addit on to data quick y become a focu of intere t inthe r own r ght, d vert ng attention from ob er able funct ona relat onin the context in which phob c behav or occur and toward con icting

relation aid to be taking place among component of the modelw th other theoret cal model , Freud' empha i on the intrap ychic lifeof the indiv dual d vert attent on away from the context of behav or andcare l de n t on of the propertie of behav or Sk nner noted Freud'ugge tion that bling riva ry played an important part n h earlyrelat on h p with a boy who wa older than h m elf but who wa in theubord nate family po it on of be ng Freud' nephew To cla i theirrelat on hip a one of ibling r valry d vert attention fro the pe cpropert e of the c rcum tance and ob cure the nctional relat onthat would de cribe what actua ly took place between Freud and hi older

rival Sk nner put t, empha upon behavior would le d u tonquire nto the peci c act plau ibly a umed to be engendered by the ech ldhood ep ode " (Sk nner, 1956, p. 83) What did Freud do to orwith h nephew, n what context d d the behav or occur, and what werethe con equence of h act on ? How wa the behavior of the youngFreud haped by h encounter with hi nephew and what pattern ofbehavior ur ved into adulthood? Sk nner noted, What ha ur vedthrough the year not aggre ion and guilt, later to be man fe ted inbehavior, bu rather pattern of behavior them elve It not enough toaythat thi a l that meant' by bl ng rivalry or by it eect upon

the menta apparatu Such an expre on ob cure , rather than lluminate , the nature of the behav oral change taking place in the childhoodlearning proce " (Skinner, 1956, p 84) The intrap ychic l fe ofaggre ion, gu lt, repre ion, xat on, and o forth divert attent on fromcareful de cript on of the propertie of behavior and the context nwh ch t occur . a re ult, the peci c relation operating in that contextare lo t and replaced by relation a umed to be tak ng place n omeother d men on

Sk nner matched Mach' crit ci m of model that become the focu ofintere t in their own right. But wherea Mach wa prepared to accept thatmodel could be provi ionally u eful in ugge ting new functiona152

relation , Sk nner wa not convinced. G ven the dominance of inter ptat on guided by pre c ent c view of human behavior, whichrequireanother y tem or dimen ion to expla n behav or, it may be that anytheoret cal model of th ub ect matter i doomed to relegate behavto econdary tatu and g ve primacy to the model becau e, n th viewbehav orbegin a an expre ion of omething el e Had phy ic t inMach' day v ewed the relative movement of bod e a merely thman fe tation of an nternally located y tem, t plau ble to ugge tthatMach would have been le amenable to model n hi own ciencfor the ame rea on that Sk nner oppo ed them n a c ence of behavioWhen one et of event i v ewed a the man fe tat on of a morefundamental (if unob er ed) et of eve t , then t i likely that the morefundamenta y tem w ll a ume pr macy over the data wh ch t aid toexplain Where Mach n h phy ic had one trad t ona pattern tocontend with echan t c cau al think ng Sk nner in hi behavioralc ence had to contend with t o mechani t c cau a th nk ng and the

practice of interpret ng behavior a a m nife tation of a more nd menta ,nterna , y temThe p ychodynam c y tem i tradit ona n both of the e en e .

mportant relat on n a p ychodynamic nterpretat on take place nobetween behavior and c ntext or behav or and experience, but betwebehav or and ome nner world of con ict that prov de a mediatingtructure bet een a per on' pa t and their pre ent The model d vertattent on from pec c propert e of behav or and the context n wh cht occur , ob curing relationa al tak ng place by focu ing onrelat on a umedto be tak ng place

Mo elling Memo

Contemporary model of memory fall into the broad category ocogn t ve p ychology, along w th information proce ng, art cialntelligence, emantic net ork , cogn t ve mapping, and o on. L k

p ychodynamic y tem , the co nitive y tem follow the tradit onapattern of accounting for behavior by appeal ng to proce e taking pla

15



Cha t 7 Mechanistic Thinking in Pschology



Towa d he end of his eview, Mo is s a es, The s ave sys ems havep oved o be mo e comp ex en i ies han was a s imagined, and heinumbe is p o ife a ing" (Mo is, 1986, p 293), and The u e ofwo king memo y seems o be heading owa d he f ac iona ion ofhesys em" (Mo is, 1986, p 293) No e ha he au ho does no efe obehavio having p oved mo e comp ex han s imagined, bu ounimagined comp exi y of aspec s of he mode The mode has aken oncha ac e is ics of he behavio i was inven ed o exp ain, e ega ing hebehaving pe son o seconda y s a us Fu he , since a of he cons uc sof he mode a e hypo he ica , hey may ake on wha eve fea u es op ope ies he scien is decides

The mode , hypo he ica in na u e, is modi ed and mu ip ied, andwhe he his is done in an eo o accoun o da a o in an e o o savehe me apho s on which he mode is based is a deba ab e issuemo eof he comp exi ies of human emembe ing become eviden , exis ing

s uc u es a e convenien y modi ed o mo e s uc u es added e echa co p exi y in o he heo e ica mode s, e ms efe ing o hoses uc u es a e addi iona o he behavio obse ved and he causa modeis essen ia y mechanis ic A hypo he ica sys em p ovides one o mo einks in a chain be ween behavio and he con ex in which i occu sWo king memo y wi h i s Cen a Execu ive, i s icu a o y oop

and i s Visuo-spa ia Sc a chpad may we nc ion as one of Mach soo s of hough , a use heu is ic fo es ab ishing p evious y unknownnc iona e a ions bu o be dispensed wi h when i no onge gene a es

new e a ions: I hope o demons a e ha such a heo e ica concep

p ovides a use backg ound fo a ve y wide ange of bo h pu e andapp ied esea ch" (Badde ey, 1982, p 414). Th mode does appea ohe p expe imen a y es ab ish nc iona e a ions, fou of which a eou ined he e (Badde ey, 1982, P 415)

1) The phono ogica simi a i y e ec : a e a ion be ween phono ogicap ope ies of e e sequences and peop e s abi i y o ep oduce hemThe mo e phono ogica y simi a he sequence is, he ha de he

subjec wi nd i o ep oduce he sequence "

156

2) The wo d eng h e ec : a e a ion be ween he eng h of wo ds in asequence and peop e s abi i y o ep oduce he sequence Memo yspan fo wo ds is a simp e nc ion of he spoken du a ion of hecons i uen wo ds "

3) The una ended speech e ec : a e a ion be ween visua and au ama e ia p esen ed simu aneous y and peop e s abi i y o eca hvisua y p esen ed ma e ia If a subjec is equi ed o emembeasequence of visua y p esen ed i ems, hen his pe fo mance wi bma ked y impai ed if i e evan ma e ia is spoken a he same ime

4) A icu a o y supp ession a e a ion be ween ma e ia p esen ed o subjec a he same ime as s/he is equi ed o speak and peop e s abio epo he ma e ia p esen ed If subjec s a e p even ed f om

subvoca y ehea sing ma e ia by equi ing he subjec o u e somei e evan speech sounds such as he wo d he' hen hei immediamemo y span is impai ed " ( efe ences o subvoca ehea sa and

memo y span may be dispensed wi h wi hou a e ing he empi icae a ion)

These fou expe imen a y demons a ed nc iona e a ions can bedesc ibed in he fo owing way

1) phonological similarity afects remembering;2) word length af ects remembering;3) simultaneous presentation of visual and aural materiala ects remem-

bering; and

4) simultaneous presentation of material and speaking affects remem-bering.

Addi iona heo e ica e ms ike Cen a Execu ive, Visuo spa iaSc a chpad, and A icu a o y Loop a e i e evan in desc ibing hesee a ions since wha o how much a pe son emembe s is shown o e

di ec nc ion ofaspec s ofhe con ex in which behavio occu s wo deng s, is eng s, phonemic simi a i ies, acous ic simi a i ies, and so onand no amoun of addi iona , in e na , heo e ica efe ences a e s hosee a ions If he e ms of he mode a e omi ed fom he exp ession of

157



Cha ter7b h i M h f i i i i i d

Mechanis ic Thinking in Ps cholog



behavio Mo e o en, howeve , fo ce is given su p us meaning i is usedo imp y some so of in e nal agency o mechanical causa ion Pe hapshe same p omise of an e ec ive educ ionism in psychology hamain ains ou fai h in physical causes a so leads us o pe e ua e he ideaha he mo iva ing agen s (mo ives, ensions, d ives, e c ) goad o fo ceo d ive he o ganism in o ac ion" (p 48)

In o de o conside he s a us of mo iva ion as a scien i c concep oa egi ima ely disc e e sub ec ma e , wo a eas wi l be examined he ebo h a e iden i ed as disc e e e ds ofinqui y wi hin he b oad disciplineof Psychology and ca y he heading, Mo iva ion Physio ogical s udiesp ovide he clea es pic u e of mo iva ion's s a us as a media ing concepbe ween nc ionally ela ed even s, bu hey a e comp ica ed by e minology ha f equen ly con ses mo iva ion as a media ing va iab e wi hbehavio a measu es hemse ves (dependen va ables) T e second eaexamined involves a dis inc ion be een ex insic and in insic mo ivaion This a ea also fai s o di e en ia e be ween in insic mo iva ion andmeasu es of behavio

Physiologi al motivationIn he physiological adi ion, he empi icada a in mo iva ion expe imen s combine physiologica and behavio alva iab es Typica y, some pa of he b ain is in e fe ed wi h and somep evious y unseen pa e n ofbehavio occu s Fo example, a lesion in heven omedial nucleus nea i s midline is followed by emendous oveea ing, bu anima s wi h lesions 1 5 o 2 mil ime e s o he mid ine s opea ing al oge he (S e a , 1974 p 8). These expe imen s demons a enc ional e a ions be ween damage o some pa of he b ain (independen va iable) and di e en kinds of obse ab e, measu ab e behavio(dependen va iable), ei he ove ea ing o cessa ion Ano he exampleno es ha when an a ea of he pos e io hypo halamus is emoved,o ganisms sleep excessive y whi e, conve se y, emoval of an a ea of hean e io hypo ha amus esu s in anima s emaining cons an ly awake(S e la , 1974 p 9). Again, independen va iables (speci ed b ainesions) and dependen va iab es ( ime spen as eep o awake) a efunc ional y e a ed A he leve of expe imen a ion, da a de ived f om

16

hese s udies a e c ea A he eve of exp ana ion, he heo e ica lescien i c and concep ua confusions p olife a e

To say ha he independen va iab e aec s mo iva ion, which in u na ec s behavio :

1) is no a s a emen of wha was obse ved ( he media ing concepheo e ica e m addi iona o he da a);

2) canno be given he s a us of a scien i c exp ana ion since mo ivais no desc ibed excep by efe ence o measu es of behavio ( hdependen va iab e), and

3) is scien i ca ly inelegan in ha i mu ip ies a he han simp i eempi ica ela ions

The empi ical da a in physiological s udies demons a e he fo lowfunc ional ela ion:

Independen V ri ble (lesi n r de ci )

Dependen ri bl me sure beh vi r)

Bu hese da a beco e complica ed a he heo e ica leve by haddi ion of a media ing va iable:

Independen V ri ble (lesi n r de ci )

M +M v On ve

Dependen ri bl tme sure beh vi r)

Fu he mo e, he heo e ical e m, mo iva ion, of en nc ions simplyas a ep acemen fo measu es of behavio and can be disca ded wi hosing sigh of he scien i c e a ion Fo example

1) No lesion of he hypo ha amus has eve been epo ed hahasesu ed in an exagge a ion of sexual mo iva ion" (S el a , 1974 p9)

63

Cha t 7

2) N f h h h h b d h hMechanistic Thinking in Psychology



2) No es on of he hypo ha amus has eve been epo ed ha hasesu ed n an exagge a on of sexua behav o ."

The second s a emen has he advan age of e egance n ha does noa ude o add ona p ocesses o en es and does no confuse he da aby efe ng o a e a on ha has no been demons a ed

A he expe men a eve , phys o og ca psycho ogy makes an mpoan con bu on o he sea ch fo causa e a ons be een b o ogy andbehav o . A he heo e ca eve , howeve , mo va on as a med a ngconcep ends mo e o c oud and confuse he emp ca e a ons han o

um na e hem. ndeed, The Phys o ogy of Mo va on" may beans a ed comfo ab y and w hou sc en c oss n o The Phys o ogy

of Behav o ."

In rinsi motivation.The e a u e and expe men a s udy of mo vaon a so cons de s he concep n a manne ha s no phys o og ca and

ye s somehow n e na o he o gan sm Th s e a u e has a head ng ofs own, al hough was no ed above ha he da a and heo e cal e ms

a e occas ona y cons de ed o be ong o he cogn ve app oach, espec a y o se f-pe cep on and/o a bu on heo y (Bem, 1972; Leppee a ., 973; Dec & yan, 1 980)

n one ype of nonphys o og cal esea ch, a d s nc on s d awnbe ween behav o mo va ed by ex e na va ab es, ex ns c mo va on,and behav o ha s no appa en y dependen upon ex e na va ab esn ns ca y mo va ed behav o (fo examp e, Dec , 1975; Dec & yan,980) Aga n, he sc en c da a f om h s esea ch coun as mpo an

con bu ons n he ongo ng a emp o un ave comp ex e a onsbe een behav o and s causal va ab es. Bu he heo e ca anguage nwh ch conc us ons a e d awn and behav o exp a ned confuses heemp ca e a ons and, n h s case espec a y, d ve s a en on f omca e de n on of he con ex s n wh ch behav o occu s.

Befo e exam n ng he ava ab e sc en c da a, we shou d no ove ooksome og ca and ngu s c p ob ems nvo ved n he de n on ofn ns c mo va on. F s , s asse ed ha n ns c mo va on s anndependen even o p ocess Th s book ev ews an eno mous

16

amoun of esea ch wh ch es ab shes unequ voca y ha n ns c mova on ex s s" (Dec , 1975, p v). Bu when de ned, n ns c mo vas ps f om be ng a un a y even o be ng a mo e comp ex p ocenvo v ng h ee new concep s n ns ca y mo va ed behav o s ahose behav o s ha a e mo va ed by he unde y ng need fo comp

ence and se f-de e m na on" (Dec & yan, 1980, p 42) . The e a ocon a ned n h s de n on a e as fo ows:

(1) some behav o s a e mo va ed by an unde y ngneedfo ompeten eandse determination;

(2) hose behav o s a e ca ed n ns cal y mo va ed behav o s.

n ns c mo va on s hus de ned as an unde y ng need fo compeence and se f de e m na on. Mov ng on o an ope a ona de n on

c ea es ano he d cu y n ha efe s o an absence of some h ng

w hou a ow ng fo he demons a on of a need fo compe ence anse f de e m na on: We ope a ona y de ne n ns ca y mo va edbehav o s as hose ha a e pe fo med n he absence of any appa eex e na con ngency" (Dec & yan, 1980, p. 42) Th s de n oasse s ha behav o ha an obse ve canno accoun fo by appea h s o ca o cu en causa va ab es s o be accoun ed fo by he conceof n ns c mo va on. The absence of causal va ab es, howeve , s equ va en o a demons a on of he concep s ofneed, compe ence, andse f-de e m na on Those concep s a e me e yassumedby he o g nade n on. The causa e a on be een need, compe ence, se fde e mna on, and behav o s asse ed w hou be ng demons a ed.Da a n h s e d a e gene a ed fo he mos pa by a s anda dexpe men a p ocedu e n wh ch base ne measu es a e compa ed wmeasu es eco ded a e n e ven on. A he base ne s age, ac v es puzz eso v ng, d aw ng, w ng newspape head nes, and so on af ee y ava ab e and he me spen by nd v dua s n hese ac v eseco ded.Subsequen n e ven ons ake seve a fo ms: some g oups of subje

a e ns uc ed ha he ac v y w be fo owed by a ewa d o paymenof money; some a e ewa ded o pa d a e he ac v y bu no ns uc ed

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Cha ter7i i b l d b f i g h d d i bl

Mechanistic Thinking in Psychology



mo iva io , may be eplaced by e ms efe i g o he depe de va iable(behavio ) wi hou osi g sigh of he scie i c e a io s demo s a edI deed, e ai i g he co cep a he heo e ica o expla a o y evemu iplies a d co fuses hose ela io s Dispe si g wi h i has he e ecof cla i i g c io a depe de cies

Like o he hypo he ica e i ies, mo iva io ca also be modi ed a dmul ip ied a wi l This p ac ice is evide especia ly i socia psychologica s udies whe e di e e desc ip ive labels a e added o he basicco cep so ha co side able esea ch e e gy a d expe ise is devo ed oa eas such as: he achieveme mo ive he powe mo ive af ia ivemo ives avoida ce mo ives, a d so o (McClella d, 1987). e a io sa e he co fused whe causal co s uc s a e mul ip ied ye agai , foexamp e whe he co cep of i ce ive is added: ha is he i ce ivefo he achieveme mo ive " (McClella d, 98 , p 226)o eabove, i ce ive a d mo ive (o mo iva io ) a e i c uded i he sameo di a y la guage co cep ua scheme as impu se, fo ce, d ive, goad,spu , i duceme , a d so o (Webs e s, 1986), a scheme ha imp ies ap opel i g o d ivi g e e g So i ack i g ques io s abou behavio a di s causal e a io s, mo iva io (a p ope li g e e gy) is i se ed be weefu c io al depe de cies

Con ex Even

Mo ive/Mo va on(force, propu sion)

Behavior(fre uenc , dura ion)

Ques io s he begi o be aised abou he o igi s a d s e g h of hemedia i g e i y a d whe his happe s, a o he fo ce o d ive is ca edupo wha is i ha d ives he mo ives ha d ive behavio

168

Incen ive(force, propu sion)

Mo ve/Mo i a ion(force, propulsion)

.Behav Or(fre uenc , dura on)

Hypo he ical media i g co cep s he e, as i o he a eas of psycho ogy,co i ue o mul ip y a d have he e ec of emovi g i e es fu he a dfu he f om behavio a d he co ex i which i occu s o ques io sabou he hypo he ical co cep s hemse ves

Because co cep s ike achieveme , a lia io , powe , a d avoida ceca eadily be added o mo iva io , a d give he li guis ic s uc u e of

asse io s such as his pe so is mo iva ed by a eed fo achieveme (oa eed fo compe e ce, selfde e mi a io , a ia io , a d he ike)," iis possib e ha he co cep cou d expa d as fa as o di a y la guagewou d a ow Ma y o he o di a y a guage exp essio s could simila ybe a ached o mo iva io : his pe so is mo iva ed by a eed fopu c uali y o by a eed fo laugh e " his pe so is mo iva ed byagg essio o by va i y " These s a eme s all asse causa s a us foo di a y a guage co cep s bu hose co cep s simp y desc i e cha ace is ic pa e s of behavio We desc ibe people pu c ua whe heyypica y a ive a mee i gs a a ag eed ime We desc ibe as agg essive

a pe so whose behavio is i ou opi io b u a , a g y, oud, viole ,a d so o Vai peop e ypica y p ee a d a k abou hei ow me i swi hou p aisi g o app audi g o he s A d we efe o someo e whowo ks ha d, ge s good ma ks i exami a io s, is apid y p omo ed, a dso o as a high achieve o high y mo iva ed Usi g hese desc ip io s asif hey we e causal e i ies, d ives, fo ces, o mo iva o s is me e y ci cu a

Wy does te ratpress t e Co side how he co cep of mo iva iomigh be i oked i he si p es behavio a y ic p epa a io , a a i



Cha terre ex phys o ogy" (Sk nner 1978 p 1 14) It was at th s ear ystage that

Be av or sm d Rad cal Be av orism

h h h h b f d b



re ex phys o ogy" (Sk nner, 1978, p 1 14) It was at th s ear y stage thatqu te by acc dent" someth ng changed the d rect on of h s research He

began to t me de ays between a rat's be ng fed at the end of h s apparatusand then return ng down a back a ey to beg n ts run aga n He foundthat the de ays changed n an order y way: Here was apr ess someth ngke the process of cond t on ng and ext nct on n Pav ov's work, where

the deta s of the act of runn ng, ke those of sa vat on, were not themportant th ng" (Sk nner, 1 978, p 1 15) L ke Pav ov, Sk nner was

a ready ded cated to the organ sm as a who e," and concerned not w thdeta s of the act of runn ng (or n Pav ov's case, sa vat on), but w thorder y re at ons bet een that act and other observab e var ab es In theserespects an nterest n aw re at ons and an emphas s on re at onsbe een env ronment and behav or Sk nner and Pav ov are a ke

Sk nner referred to Pav ov's work as h stor ca y fundamenta (Sk nner, 931 972b, p 44 ) n that t d spensed w th t o conceptsprev ous y ascr bed to the behav or of ntact organ sms vo on andspontane ty In trac ng the deve opment of the concep of the re ex,Sk nner ( 931 972b) noted that an rre evant and unsupportedassumpt on had been made that the re ex s nvo untary Th s de nt on of the re ex ent credence to the concepts of spontane ty andvo t on For f the re ex cou d be sa d to be nvo untary behav or, thenother k nds of behav or cou d be sa d to be vo untary or spontaneous andtherefore not suscept b e to sc ent c treatment The study of re exes nsurg ca y prepared organ sms had dent ed re at ons between spec cexternal st mu and spec c muscu ar responses Pr or to Pav ov, re exphys o og sts had been unab e to s m ar y dent st mu for thebehav or of ntact organ sms and had conc uded that some aspects ofbehav or are spontaneous Pav ov contr buted to the process of underm n ng vo t on and spontane ty by demonstrat ng aw re at ons nthe behav or of ntact organ sms

Sk nner ( 193 1972b) argued that we hab tua y nvoke nonphys caconceptssuch as vo t on, m nd, or spontane ty when the behav orobser ed cannot be seen to be re ated n phys ca terms ( ntr ns cmot vat on, referred to n the prev ous chapter, be ongs n th s categoryof concepts) He rther argued that the exper menta just cat on for

178

these concepts s noth ng more than the absence of demonstrabnecess y" (Sk nner, 931/ 972b, p 440) Throughout h s career Sner, was cons stent y cr t ca of the nc us on of such concepts nsc ent c account, argu ng (as Chapter 4 noted), Spontane y s negt ve ev dence; t po nts to the weakness ofa current sc ent c exp anat on,but does not n tse f prove an a ternat ve vers on By ts very natuspontane y must y e d ground as a sc ent c ana ys s s ab e to advanc(Sk nner, 1953, p 48) Pav ov had g ven the ead n demonstrataw re at ons n the behav or of ntact organ sms, and Sk nnerfo owed when he argued that a sc ence of behav or must, ke othnatura sc ences, assume aw ness n ts subject matter It s contradtory to c a m to be a behav ora sc ent st and at the same t me a oconcepts such as vo t on or spontane ty as part of a sc ent c accou

The Sk nner an system fo ows Pav ov n the fo ow ng mportanrespects: a) t s ded cated to the organ sm as a who e"; b) both sysemphas ze behav or as a nct on of env ronmenta events; c) botsystems are ded cated to descr b ng the behav or of ntact organ smssc ent c ( aw ) terms and d) n demonstrat ng aw processes, bothsystems underm ne concepts such as vo t on and spontane ty ad spense w th hese concepts n the r accounts

These s m ar t es are h stor ca y mportant because Pav ov's wohe pedto create a sh n both phys o ogy and psycho ogy In the formed sc p ne, the sh was from a parts" v ew of the organ sm to cons derat on of the organ sm as a who e, and n the atter, the sh was fromntrospect on to an emphas s on the contro ofbehav or by features ofhe

context n wh ch t occursTwo fundamenta d ss m ar t es be een the Sk nner an and Pav ovan systems are mportant n a ph osoph ca rather than a h stor csense, nvo v ng d erent ph osoph ca pos t ons on both he nature osc ent c nference and on the exp anat on of comp ex behav or W tforty three references to Pav ov and cop ous quotat ons from h sC ndt ned xes (Pav ov, 1927), Sk nner's rst ma or work,TheBehav rf Organ sms( 938), may be v ewed as a scho ar y cr t que of thePav ov an system, mark ng a deve opment n th n ng and pract ce thd stances the Sk nner an system from Pav ov's account n two cruc

17 9

Ch tera s Firs i arg es agains e plana ions of beha ior gi en in erms of

Behaviorism d Radic Behaviorism

he physiology ofhe higher par s ofhe nervous sys em" (Hillix & Marx



ways. Firs , i argues agains explana ions of behavior given in erms ofhe ac ivi y of he nervous sys em and for he inves iga ion of behavioras a sub ec ma er in i s own righ Second, i moves beyond a s imulusresponse psychology by developing an analysis of operan (emi ed)behavior ra her han focusing on responses ha are buil in

Behavior and the nervous systeAl hough Pavlov is no ed for encouragingan accoun of behavior free from men al or psychic concep s, hewas never heless making inferences ha were removed from he da ahemselves The sub i le of hisConditioned R exesa es s o his in

claiming o beAn Investigation ofthe PhysiologialAtivi of the CerebralCortex(Pavlov, 1927) Chap er 6 discussed in de ail Skinner's views onaccoun s ha relega e behavior o secondar s a us in rela ion o apresumed underlying sys em, and i is use l o place hose views in hecon ex of his cri ique of he Pavlovian explana ory sys em.

In The Behavior of Organis sSkinner ( 938) argued ha accoun sseeking o explain behavior in erms of he nervous sys em s em from aninabil y o conceive of behavior as a lawful sub ec ma er in i s ownrigh Ifbehavior is considered o be oo complex o be comprehensible,i migh be made comprehensible by poin ing o an underlying sys em,a physiological sys em, ha can more easily be conceived of as law lThe more sophis ica ed neurological views generally agree wi h hepopular view in con ending ha behavior is in i self incomprehensiblebu may be reduced o law if i can be shown o be con rolled by anin ernal sys em suscep ible o scien i c rea men . Fac s abou behaviorare no rea ed in heir own righ , bu are regarded as some hing o beexplained or even explained away by he prior fac s of he ner oussys em" (Skinner, 938, p 4)

Paradoxically, while Pavlov had demons ra ed ha he behavior ofin ac organisms was lawful in cer ain respec s, he main ained a commimen o explaining behavior by an appeal o he ner ous sys em. Whais i ha he nervous sys em ofhe dog recognizes as individual phenomena of ex ernal origin?" he asked (Hillix & Marx, 1974, p 03 Pavlov,906), and on he con ribu ion of his eld of research he wro e, The

inves iga ion of he condi ioned re exes is ofvery grea impor ance fo

80

he physiology ofhe higher par s ofhe nervous sys em (Hillix & Marx,1974, p 105 : Pavlov 906) I is paradoxical also ha Pavlov houghwas libera ing physiology from he evil in uences of psychology whihe same ime his work in physiology was crea ing profound changepsychology. Hillix and Marx summarized, Ironically, a er hebecame famous for his work on he condi ioned re ex, he ussians sabou Pavlovinizing psychology and he Americans se abou psyc ogizing Pavlov I was a fa e Pavlov deser ed, for his empirical work really behavioral and hus psychological, despi e he fac ha his hypoeseswere abou presumed co ica even s" (Hillix & Marx, 1974, p99)

As a physiologis , Pavlov considered himself o be s udying he corfunc ioning of dogs. This is an impor an poin ofdepar ure forSkinne ,and he used Pavlov o illus ra e his con en ion ha behaviora da a afrequen ly ransla ed from he form in which hey are obser ed inevidence ofsome underlying sys em or s ruc ure, requiring a concep uleap from he da a in o ano her sys em ofexplana ion. Crucia ly, Skinnerargued ha his need no be he case. Behavior can be rea ed as a subma er in i s own righ , as he experimen s repor ed inThe Behavior ofOrganis s demons ra e He argued r her ha in making his ranslaion from behavioral da a o neurological conc p s, bo h he sciencesbehavior and neurology are hampered by a con sion of sub ec ma e

Neurologis s are hampered by a lack of behavioral da a, havingcon ne heir research o rela ively simple cases, or o cases in whichabsence of comple e ehaviora func ion and some neurological dciency presen hemselves oge her. I is simpler o demons ra e rela ion be een he inabili y o speak, for example, and some ma ncion in he higher nervous sys em han o demons ra e he rela iobe ween an in ac nervous s s em and e co ple e behaviora nc ionof speaking The la er di cul y arises in par because an adequabehavioralaccoun or analysis of he comple e nc ion is lacking. Ascience ofbehavior may provide he accoun ha co ld i for neurology sresearch in o norma cor ical nc ioning and normal behavior.

The behaviora scien is is hampered by cons an reference o neulogical concep s,diver ed fro examining behavioral da a as i prese si selfo hypo hesizing in ernal, neurological s ruc ures as explana ion

8



Ch tersome ve sio s of logical positivism uled p ivate eve ts out of bou ds

Beha orism d Radical Behaviorism

should have a y special physical status because it lies withi th



some ve sio s of logical positivism uled p ivate eve ts out of bou dsbecause the e could be o public ag eeme t about thei validity. I t ospectio could ot be accepted as a scie ti c p actice, a d the psychologyof people like Wilhelm Wu dt a d Edwa d B. Titche e was attackedacco di gly. adical behavio ism, howeve , takes a di e e t li e. It doesot de y the possibility of self obse atio o self-k owledge o its

possible use l ess but it questio s the atu e of what is felt o obse eda d he ce k ow . It esto es i t ospectio but ot what philosophe sa d i t ospective psychologists belie ed they we e specti g, a d itaises the questio of how much of o e s body o e ca actually obse ve"(Ski e , 974, p 6)

About Behaviorism(Ski e , 974) outli es a philosophy i volvi g adie e t way of co ceptualizi g the pe so a d of i co o ati g ivateeve ts withi the system as a whole. Whe Watso p oposed eph asi gme talistic co cepts to i co po ate them i to e ed scie ti c methods, he o e ed o ly a pa tial solutio to di culties stemmi g gelyfom psychology's dualistic view of he pe so U til a philosophy thatsepa ates volu ta y behavio f om i volu ta y a d p ivate eve ts f ombehavio is eplaced by o e e compassi g p ivate expe ie ce as pa t ofa u i ed system, the the same di culties that Watso attempted totackle will emai u esolved.

Se knowledge and the verbal ommuni .adica behavio ism di ectsatte tio to the way ve bal behavio , like othe ki ds of behavio , isshaped by eve ts i the co text i which it occu s a d thus di ects

atte tio to the social o igi s of co scious ess, awa e ess, a d selfk owledge (see Blackma , 99 ) The commu ity shapes ve bal behavio to co espo d to exte al, obse able objects a d eve ts, a d itattempts to do the same thi g whe e eve ts a e p ivate. The exte t towhich we k ow o a e awa e of ou p ivate wo ld i the se se of bei gableto desc ibe it ve bally depe ds o the exte t to which ou commuity has bee able to establish elatio s bet ee ou p ivate wo ld a dli guistic te ms. I the adical behavio ist fo mulatio , the e is othi gme talo psychic about ou p ivate wo ld A small pa t of the u ive seis co tai ed withi the ski of each of us. The e is o easo why it

188

should have a y special physical status because it lies withi thbou da y" (Ski e , 974, p. 2 ) Neithe is ou p ivate wo ld excludedfom the ealm of scie ti c a alysis P ivate eve ts a e obse able, eveif o ly by a audie ce of o e . . . Me tal [ ctio al eve ts, i co t ast a eu obse able because they a e o physical; o o e ca eve obse ebelief itself o i tellige ce itself, ega dless of claims that they c bi fe ed fom thei physical ma ifestatio s, public a d p ivate " (Baum& Heath, 992, p 3 3) The ve bal commu ity ca solve the p obleof p ivacy to the exte t that it ca establish a best t i its shapi g ofve bal te ms fo p ivate eve ts. I this fo mulatio the eed fo pa allelsystems, fo dichotomous wo lds, evapo ates. Self k owledge is social o igi " (Ski e , 974, p. 3 ); we come to k ow ou selves th ougsocial i te actio to the exte t of the se sitivity a d skill of ou ve balcommu ity

Watso i his methodological behavio ism accepted dualistic psumptio s about behavio a d the behavi g pe so , but Ski e i hisadical behavio ism moved beyo d dualistic fo mulatio s, givi g ospecial status to p ivate eve ts a d allowi g fo thei i clusio i ascie ti c a alysis adical behavio ism's accou t of self k owledge,co scious ess, awa e ess, a d so o is philoso hically close to Geo gHe be tMead s ( 934) symbolic i te actio ism a d to the positio ofLev S. Vygotsky ( 962) o the elatio betwee la guage, thi ki g, a dco scious ess tha it is to Watso s fo mulatio (Blackma , 99 )

Edwardc

TolmanEdwa d C Tolma is va iously classed u de the headi gs, behavio is(Hillix & Ma x, 974), eobehavio ism (as i Smith, 986), acog itive o ga izatio al theo ies (Bowe & Hilga d, 98 ) He waawa ded is Ph D at Ha a i 9 5, two yea s afte the publicatio ofWatso 's Psyholo the Behaviorist Views It( 9 3) Tolma was sti t oduced to Watso 's behavio ism i 9 4 a d was, i his ow wo ds,soldo the app oach (Tolma , 959, p. 94) I additio to this statedcommitme tto beh vio ism, Tolma 's expe ime tal wo k was mostly

189



Chapter 8

another example: If we say home' when someone says house', it is not

Behaviorism d Radic Behav orism

the minds and hearts of men and women' rather than the world in which



p y y ,because we associate the t o words but because they are associated indaily English usage Cognitive association is an invention" (Skinner,1978, p. 98)

Cognitive psychology implants the real world inside the head of theorganism, and this form of reasoning, S inner maintained, contributesto our inability to solve many of our pressing social problems. If theworld exists in some internal representation of mind, associations, ideas,and attitudes then the problems ofthe world a so exist in that same placeand change must be e ected in that place If, however, behavior isinterpreted in relation to environmenta contingencies, in mutual interaction bet een environment and behaving organism, in the real worldinhabited by the behaving organism, then change can be e ected in therea world Skinner was deeply concerned with t e fate of the humanspecies, with human, social problems. This concern can be notedthroughout R ections on Behaviorism and Socie , which deals ith,among other topics, Human Behavior and Democracy, Are We ree toH ve a Future? The Ethics of Helping People, and Humanism andBehaviorism (Skinner, 1978) earlier work,Science and HumanBehavior(1953), discusses the role of controlling agencies like government and law, religion, psychotherapy, and education, dealing with TheIndividual as a Whole, The Behavior of People in Groups, and thequestion, Can Science Help?Upon Further Reection (1987) tac lesissues such as: Why We Are Not Acting to Save the World, What IsWrong with Daily Life in the Western World? The Shame ofAmericanEducation, Intellectua Self-Management in OldAge, and Some Thoughtsabout the Future.

Skinner's criticisms of cognitive psychology are rooted partly in hisphilosophy of science, which rejects inferences from obser ation todimensions not given in data, and partly in his deep concern withhuman/socia problems: The appeal to cognitive states and processes isa diversion which could well be responsible for much of our failure tosolve our problems. We need to change our behavior and we can do soonly by changing our physical and social environments We choose thewrong path at the very start when we suppose that our goa is to change

194

the minds and hearts of men and women rather than the world in whichthey live" (Skinner, 1 978, p. 1 12)

To place Tol an and Skinner under one Behaviorism heading may beaccurate in a historica context, but is wholly inaccurate in a philosophica context Tolman sought to identi processes that mediate betweeninput and output, an S-O-R framework, and gave the lead to contemporary cognitive psychology Radica behaviorism, in contrast, seeks toidenti relations bet een the behavior of organisms, human or otherwise, and the context in which it occurs Skinner's philosophy of sciencrejects inferences from behavioral data to hypothetical inner processesand his concern for human well being draws him toward interpretationsof behavior that carry with them a potentia for change.

Cla k L. Hull

Hull'sPrinc les o Behavior (1943) appeared ve years a er the publication of Skinner'sThe Behavior o Organisms (1938) In it, Hullattempted to prescribe a strictly mathematical system based in thepostulate deductive method His college training had been in engineering and philosophy, and his system for psychology seems to have broughttogether concerns from each of these disciplines: philosophical issuerelating to the nature of psychology as a science, along with an attemptat the mathematical precision characteristic of engineering Thet omain points of divergence between Hull's approach and Skinner'sare

rst, their view of the nature of the scienti c process, and second, theirview of mechanistic causal sequences that mediate bet een stimuli andresponses. The gulf between Hull and S inner will require comparatively little elaboration, since it is largely illustrated by previous section

Hull saw science as a strictly formal/logical process: The body of ascienti c system consists of the mathematical derivations of the theorems which correspond to the empirical facts ofthe science" (Hull, 1952,p. 3). A scienti c system,in Hull's view, begins with a set of postulatesfrom which theorems are deduced, and the important relations of thesub ect matter of the system are expressed mathematica ly. He viewed

19 5



Chapter9

clearly applies to other behavioral traditions and to much of contempoh l b d l b h f

Concuding Remark

Capra beginsThe Tu ing Point: Science, Socie and the Rising Culture



rary psychology, but not to radical behaviorism Of Newtonian science,Skinner explicitly stated, A science ofhuman behavior cannot be closelypatterned after geometry or Newtonian mechanics becausits problemsare not necessarily of the same sort" (Skinner, 1938 , p 437)

It is unfortunate that the recurring er ors of behaviorism, mechanism,

and dualism have been repeated in descriptions ofradical behaviorism byparticipants in the new world view debate; unfortunate because radicalbehaviorism and behavior analysis have much to contribute to thisdebate Important as it is for scienti c thinking and practice, and withinterest reaching far beyond the walls of academia, the debate hasimplications for the way we relate to our global envi onment and for t eproblems created and suered by people Participants in this debate havecited the wrong branch of contemporary psychology as an example of t eold world view of mechanistic, dualistic, Newtonian/Cartesian sciencen addition, they have failed to recognize the similarities bet een theirown concerns and those of B F Skinner and, by dismiss ng radicalbehaviorism as an example of an outmoded world view, have failed torecognize the importance of Skinner's philosophy for their own argument These concluding remarks will suggest an outcome to the newworld view debate that may surprise some of its participants

Facing a Global Crisis

There is an essential s milarity in the arguments of Skinner and Capra(1983) concerning the imme iacy of modern global problems and theneed for a new way of thinking to overcome them Skinner argued,Most thoughtful people agree that the world is in serious trouble Anuclear ar could mean a nuclear winter that would destroy all livingthings; fossil els will no las forever, and many other critica resourcesare nearing exhaustion; the earth grows stea ily less habitable; and all thisis exacerbated by a burgeoning po u ation that resists control Thetimetable may not be clear, but the threat is real" (Skin er, 1987p 1)

204

Cap a beg sThe Tu ing Point: Science, Socie and the Rising Culture(1983) by juxtaposing the cost of the United States' nuclear weapoprogram witha statistical breakdown ofthe malnourishment, starvation,and poor access to health care that are features of life in many of theworld's poorest nations The threat of nuclear catastrophe, industriapollution, overpopulation, and disruption of the planet's ecologicabalance are all cited as a modern globa crisis: a crisis of a scale aurgency unprecedented in recorded human history" (Capra, 1983, p 1

Skinner and Capra agree that the world is threatened in a great manways by aspects of human behavior Both address themselves to identing sources of this global crisis and to o ering a broad solution At thispoint their reasoning diverges, but their conclusions may be closer ththe new world view argument would have anticipated

Capra traces the root cause to a misplaced emphasis on science Ouculture takes pride in being scienti c; our time is referred to as theScienti c Age It is dominated by rational thought, and scienti cknowledge is often considered the only acceptable kind of knowledgThat there can be intuitive knowledge, or awareness, which is just as vaand reliable, is generally not recognized This attitude, known ascientism, is widespread, pervading our educational system and all othsocial and politica institutions" (Capra, 1983, pp 22 23) He arguthat our understanding and control of nature has been greatly improedby science, but our understanding and control of social a airs has notimproved in a similar manner: Scienti c and technologica knowledgehas grown enormously since the Greeks embarked on the scienti c

venture in the sixth century B C But during these t enty ve centuriesthere has been hardly any progress in the conduct of social a airs"(Capra, 1983, pp 25-26). Since the seventeenth century, heargues,physics has given the lead to other sciences biology, medical sciencepsychology, economics, and so on and these have modelled themselveson the conceptual framework and the methodology of classical physicsCapra de nes this framework as a mechanistic view of the world" andargues that a mechanistic conception of reality domin ted the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries when Matter was thoughtto be the basis of all existence, and the material world seen as a multitu

205



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Skinner, B F (1966) Oper nt behav or. In W K Hon (Ed ),Operantbehavior: Areas of research and application(pp 12-32) New York:App eton-Century-Cro s.

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Ha pe Co lins



I d x

Abnormal psychology, 4Abs rac ion, 73, 134ccelera ion, 106, 138

Acciden s, 10, 25, 68, 100, 178Accura , 23, 49-51 , 58, 70, 138Accusa ions, 8Achievemen , 1 5, 59, 62, 1 50, 168-

169 Ac , 29, 35, 40, 55, 1 16, 139, 149,

170, 178Ac ing, 36, 38-39, 98-99, 138, 194Ac ion, 17, 27, 33-36, 38, 41-42, 44,

60, 65, 117 118, 123 , 131 132,138, 141 142, 151-152, 161-162,172, 177, 197

Ac ion over me, 120Ac ivi ies, 35, 44, 97, 1 4, 125, 14 ,

165-167Ac iviy, 38, 89, 107-108, 141 , 165-

166, 174, 180, 183Ac s, 30, 22, 152Addic , 190Adminis ra ion, 107

Adul hood, 152Advoca , 70Advocaes, 2 1Ae her, 60-62, 131, 145, 151, 172Ae herial, 59-60, 70A lia ion, 1 9Age, 15, 59, 11 9, 136, 194, 205Agen , 36, 105-1 07, 1 12-1 13, 1 17,

122, 161-162, 171Agen s, 27, 33, 35 3 , 41 , 59, 1 0-

107, 11 2, 150, 162

Aggression, 98, 1 14, 1 52, 169, 1 91 -192Air, 106-107, 127Alliance, 9 1 0Al era ions, 1 10Al erna ves, 6-8, 28, 3 1 , 13 5, 140,

61 , 66, 179Ambigui y, 76American indian, 33mericans, 181Ampli er, 52Anachronisms, 14Analogies, 32, 112, 142, 150, 161, 191Analysis, 6- , 1 , 16, 1 9, 23-27, 29,

31-33, 36, 39-42, 45, 47 48, 5 ,54-55, 57, 59, 68-69, 71, 75 76,81-82, 85, 91, 105, 107, 112,1 14, 135, 1 2 , 14 -146, 149-150,171 , 174 , 176 , 179-181, 183,186, 189, 201, 204,207-208

Analys s, 1 1, 19, 26, 44, 82, 84-85, 9 ,114-115, 170- 71 ,201

Anemome ers, 1 10

Ang , 24Angles, 109, 185An mal, 102-103, 162, 170, 176-177,

184, 190-191, 193n e e , 99, 01, 103 105

An hropology, 108, 120An i heory, 135An icipa ion, 17, 193Anxie y, 1 4, 1 51Apes, 133ppara us, 68, 15 1-1 52, 178

223

Applied behavior analysis, 85Applications, 1 1, 67, 85, 88, 10 1, 185

Ind

Authority, 86 87Average, 19, 71 72, 74 75, 82, 84 85,

Index

111 _ 11 2, 11 6, 1 2 1, 1 42, 1 45,174-175, 177, 183 186, 188-189,

Buddhist, 97-98C culus, 28, 44



Arabesque, 32Ar , 17, 133 134Archetypes, 59, 64-65Architecture, 57Are , 103-104, 149, 162, 166

Areas, 3-4, 7, 10, 37, 57, 71 , 97 98,103 104, 114, 116, 149, 162,166, 168 169

Aristotle, 207A ous , 24, 51, 1 14Art, 68, 97Arti ci intelligence, 4, 26, 1 53Aspirin, 1 16Assertions, vi, 3, 6, 12, 14, 56 57, 73,

78 80, 83, 92, 95, 100, 125, 169,174, 201, 203

sociate, 193 194Association, 6, 36, 193-1 94Associationism, 175ssociationists,13

Assumptions, 1, 3, 13, 16 17, 23-25,53 55, 67, 71, 73 74, 81, 83, 89-92, 97, 100 10 1, 103, 108, 1 11 ,120, 135, 145, 154, 160, 178

Asthma, 49 50Astronomers, 103Astronomy, 15 , 23, 105Atkinson,R. L. & R c., 155, 160,

174Atomism, 129Atoms, 128 1 31, 13 5, 202Attention, 9, 20, 29, 40, 55, 70, 91 ,

98, 104, 122, 129 130, 132, 141,150, 152 153 , 159, 164 , 188 , 198

Attitudes, 96, 98, 1 16, 14 6, 1 94, 200,205, 208

Attribution, 41 42, 96, 98, 160, 164,200, 208

Audience, 2, 32, 189

224

g87, 92

Avoidance, 168-169Awareness, 1 88 1 89, 199, 205xioms, 196

Ayllon,T , 171

Azrin,N. 171Baby, 38Background, 1, 19, 45, 51 , 65 67, 74,

90, 92, 97, 100, 108 109, 131,141, 156, 175

Baddeley, A. D 1 54-1 56, 158Bakan, D 77, 79 80Bamboo, 133Bandura, A., 9 , 1 13Banks, 142, 154Ba low,D H., 53, 72, 75 76, 85B e ines, 84, 92, 165 -166Battery, 30, 154Baum,W. M., 189Becoming, 20, 131, 158Beer, 42-43Bees, 111Behaving, 11 , 20, 38 39, 55, 96, 98-

99, 11 1 , 141 142 , 145 , 156, 160 ,189, 194, 201

Behavior, 6-7, 2 3, 5-33,36 45, 47,52 55, 57, 65 73, 75, 81-82, 8486, 88-93,95 101, 103 107, 11 1,

1 13-123, 126-128, 133 142, 145172, 176 190, 192, 194 205, 207208

Behavior psychology, 185Behavior An ysis, 7 8, 1 6, 26, 36, 40,

42, 45, 85, 142, 145, 176, 183,204

Behavior-environment, 65, 193Behaviorists, 8 12, 1 5 18, 21 , 23,

27 28, 36,40, 42, 44 45, 52 53,57, 64 66, 69-72, 76, 83-85, 96,

174 175, 177, 183 186, 188 189,196, 202 203

Belgium, viiiBeliefs, 97, 189Bel shaped curve, 72 73, 193Belsey, A., 8Be , D J., 160, 164Bernstein, DJ., 160, 166-167Bi , 3Bi e, 147Bi liard b !' 12 , 1 6, 1 09, 203Binyon, M., 8Biochemistry, 108Biographer, 1 12Biologist, 74, 207Biology, 3-4, 1 5, 23, 82, 95, 102, 108

109, 1 14, 120, 164, 205, 207Bipolarity, 41Birth, 81 , 208Blackman, D 7, 188 189, 199Blac more,J. T , 1 12, 128Blood, 107, 109, 147Bloodstream, 49 50Blueprint, 2Boden, M. A., 175Bodies, 60, 83, 97, 103, 109 1 10, 131 ,

137 138, 153Body, 16 17, 19, 48, 79 80, 89, 92,

97, 109, 147, 186, 188, 195Bolles,R c , 161Bombardments, 60, 131Botanizing, 186Botany, 102Bower,G H., 189, 192-193, 197 198Bradley,J., 128Brain, 147 149, 162, 177, 191Britain, 13Brownstein, A.J., 26Brush,S. G., 128 129, 172, 202Buddhism, 98

Cannon/Bard theory, 24Capra,F. 2, 14 16, 21, 97 98, 1 10,

201, 203 208Cardi , viiCaricatures, 135, 141

Carneau, 26Catania, A. C. , 26Categories,33-34, 51, 53, 121, 153,

175, 178, 197Caus ity, 109-1 10, 1 13, 1 16 1 17,

131 , 159Cause, 16, 20, 41, 44, 103-108, 110

1 14, 1 16, 122, 125, 129, 142,145 , 151 , 171, 192, 205

Cause-eect, 1 13, 177, 202Certainty, 2, 6, 61, 78 79, 106, 196Chain metaphor, 20, 1 07 1 12, 1 15

117, 123Chains, 20, 95, 107 1 12, 1 15-1 17,

122-123, 131 , 151 , 154, 156,172, 197 198, 202

Chance, 47 48, 73 74, 76-78,80-82,87, 92

Changes, 1, 3, 1 5, 19, 21-22, 30, 37,40, 66, 79, 83, 90 92, 105-107,1 13, 120, 122, 152, 161, 181 ,194 195, 208

Chaos, 7, 2, 83

Chemistry, 3, 23, 51, 82, 95,103,108-109, 1 14Chiesa,H., viiiChi d en, 31, 40, 87, 89, 1 59Chi dhood, 1 52Choice, 37, 64, 69, 96, 174Choms , N. 8-9C ses, 25, 34, 36, 66, 84-86, 91, 1 19,C se 128, 133, 139C si cations, 23 24, 46, 102 108,

190

225

Cl n c l psychology,14 , 191Cl n c n,11

l k

nd x

1Con rm t on,56, 61 62, 14 -141

nd x

Cooke, N.L 9Copenh gen,12

Der v t ons,195 196Desc rtes, R.,16 1 , 1D



Clocks,14, 1 2, 1 1Cogn t ons,4, , 39, 193, 1 99, 2 3Cogn t ve psychology,1 6, 14 , 153,

16 , 192 195, 19 ,2 3Cogn t ve sc ence,26

Cohen,M. R.,1 6 1 , 1 12Cohen, R. S.12Columb ,1 4Commerce,13Common sense,1 6, 112Commun c t on,23, 1 1Commun c tors,36Commun ty,, 1 , 23, 46 4 , 5 , ,

1 -1 9, 199Competence,165, 16 , 169, 1 1Complex t es,13, 1 1, 1 3-1 5, 1 1,

156, 15Computer,142, 154, 16Comput ng,96Concepts,1, 6 , 13, 19 2 , 25, 29,

36 , 59, 6 , 69- 2, 4 5,2, 95-96, 9 , 1 , 1 5, 112 11 3,11 , 12 , 123, 125, 12 , 133,135, 13 -13 , 14 , 145, 14 ,149, 156, 15 -1 2, 1 1 2, 1 41 5, 1 1 , 193 , 19 19 , 2 1 ,2 6

Concept on,13, 16, 3 39, 6, 92, 9 ,

1 5 1 , 1 12-113, 161, 1 4, 2 1-2 3, 2 5 2 6Conceptu l z t on,19, 44, 5, 161Cond t oned responses,15, 1 2Cond t on ng,11-12 ,6 , 139, 1 4

1 6, 1 , 1 3Cond t ons,4 , 46, 5 , 63, , 99,

1 2, 1 4, 11 , 12 , 139, 191192, 196, 2 1, 2 2

Conduct,6 , 46, 1 15, 12 1, 2 5Con dence,19, 4 , 9 , 1 , 9 , 92,

226

Con cts9 9 , 152 1 3Con ront t on,5Connect ons11, 1 5, 1 , 1 9, 113,

13 , 146 , 1 , 19 191, 2 3C nsc ousness,15 16, 1 4, 1 1 9,

19 7

Consequences,19,3 , 4 , 49-51 , 55-56, 5 , 59, 64 65, - , 9 -1 ,1 5 , 1 , 11 4, 11 1 23 , 1 2 ,139, 152, 1 3, 193, 2 1 2 2, 2

Cons stenc es,26Construct on,6 , 136 13 , 14 , 191,

2Constru ts,, 2 21, 1 5, 1 -11 ,

11 4 , 1 2 1 , 1 2 , 1 29 , 1 3 1 1 32 ,149 , 1 6 , 159-16 , 16 , 1 1 ,1 3, 192, 19 19 , 2 2, 2

Context,-9, 1 , 22, 26, 32-33, 41,5 , 65, 6 , 69, 6, 9 -91 , 1 5,12 , 129, 134, 13 139, 141 142,14 , 149 15 , 152 154, 156 16 ,164, 16 -169, 1 1, 1 , 1 9 1 ,1 2 1 3, 1 , 193, 195-196, 19199, 2 1, 2

Cont gu ty,116, 11Cont ngenc es,1 , 3 31, 66, 69, 4

5, 99, 12 , 122, 165 16 , 1 3,193 194, 199

Cont nu ty,1 , 199Cont nuum,196, 19 -1 99Control,19, 26, 4 , 46, 4 , 52, 2 4,

6- 9 ,92 , 145, 155 , 1 , 1 9 ,1 2, 1 5, 191, 2 4 2 5

Controlled,4, 9 , 1 1, 1 , 192Controll ng v r bles,1 , 33, 39, 41 ,

2, 166Convent on, 36, 3 , 43, 4 , , 9 ,

1 4, 16Convent on l,19, 96

Copern cus,15Correl t on,46, 134Correspondence,5 1Cortex,14 149, 1 , 1 3Cre t on,3 -39, 1 1

Cre tor,11Cr t c sms,-9, 56-5 , 152, 193-194,2 3

Cr t cs,61, 63Cue,15, 1 , 1 9, 2 6Cul-de s c,1 4Culture,2, 4, 1 19, 24, 96, 96 9 ,

1 1 , 1 2 ,2 5-2Cun tz,A. R 56Czub ro , J.9D n, . 11D v es, . 2De th,2Deb tes,i 1 3, 4, 6, , 1 12, 1 , 2

21, 51, 62 63, 125-126, 12 -129,131, 134 136, 2 2, 2 4

Dec ,E L 16 -161, 164-16Deduct on,49, 6 6 , 11 , 196Deese, J ,9De c ency, 1 2, 1 1De c ts,14 , 163De n t ons,4, , 1 1, 14, 23-2 , 3 31,

63, 1 , 11 1, 126, 135, 13 , 149,

152, 159 16 , 164 16 , 1 1 , 1 ,196, 19 ,2 2de G ust no, D ,14De tz, S.M., 26Democr cy,194ependenc es,1 9, 13 -133, 139 1 4 ,

142, 14 , 16Dependent v r bles,41 , 66, 9 , 99,

1 13, 1 1 , 122, 134, 16 , 162163, 16 16 , 1 1

Depr v t on,1

Descr pt ons,2, 2 , 2 , 3 , 39, 6 , 95,1 , 11 2 11 3 , 11 5 , 1 25 1 3 , 1 32135, 13 , 141, 152, 159,169,1 4, 1 , 19 , 2 3 2 4

Des gns,, 46 4 , 1 , 6, - , 91

11 , 11 5 -11 6Determ n nt,14 , 19Determ ners,15 151Determ n sm,12, 1 -1 4Determ n st,1 5 1Development l psy hology,4Dev t ons,2, 4 5Dev l, 1D lect,4D ce,2D chotomy,1D ck nson,A. M., 16 , 166D erences,9, 21, 24, 36-3 , 4 -41,

46-4 , 53, 5 6, , , 1 419 19

D mens o s,3 , 141, 145, 149, 1521 54, 16 , 1 2, 1 2, 1 , 194

D s b l ty,32D sc pl nes, v ,3 4, 6- , 21, 23, 51 ,

6 , 2, 1 1 9, 12 , 12 , 146,162, 1 3 , 1 9 , 195, 199, 2 6

D scont nu ty,1 5D scr m n t on,96, 1 6, 1

D sorder,1D spl cement,191 192D spos t ons,161D sput t on,9D sputes,6, 2 , 1 12, 126, 1 29, 134

1 35 , 1 5 5, 1 5 , 1 2, 2 2srupt on, 15 , 2 5

D sson nce,114Doctr ne,, 13, 1 , 4, 9 , 2 3Dogs,6 , 1 1 1, 1 6,1 -1 1, 193D Ol ve r ,M., 4 , 6

227

Dominance, 46, 49, 69, 153D eam , 154

Empi ici t, 60Encoding, 96

Ind Index

Expec ation , 97, 1 16, 193, 197 198Expe ience ,13 14, 24, 39, 45, 54 55,

Fault, 207Feeling , 25, 29, 96 99, 186 187, 190



,D ive , 64, 133, 161 162, 168 169,

197D l, 170D ug , 107, 109Duali m, 1 1, 17 18, 97, 186 187, 199,

204Duali y, 16, 96, 99Dynami m , 191Ea th, 131 , 204Ecology, 2Economic , 205, 207Economi t , 206Economy, 171Ectomo ph, 147Education, 6, 8, 86 87, 194, 207E ec , 21 , 41 43, 68, 73, 81 , 84 85,

87 90, 102, 105 107, 110, 112116, 122 , 139 , 142, 151 , 156158, 166, 168 169, 202

E ect , 19, 41, 47, 57, 70 , 87,92,95, 11 0, 120 1 23, 126, 141, 152,I , 177

Eo t , 52, 60, 67, 156, 158E on, R., 148 149Ego, 97, 98, 150Ein ein, 13Elect icity, 30, 154Elegance, 164Element , 13 14, 23, 47, 51, 81 83,102 103, 109, 1 27Elliott, , viiiEme gence, 62Emotion, 4, 24 25, 34 35, 51 52, 160Emo ional, 121Emotion , 31Empi ical epi temology, 5 , 18 5Empi ical gene alization, 54, 56, 85 86Empi ical law ,58Empi ic m, 59

228

g,Encoding to age et ieval, 160End te m , 1 34Endomo ph, 147Endowment, , 99Ene gy, 38, 52, 70, 142 143, 1 61 , 1 68,

171, 197Enginee , 89 91En itie , 19 20, 25, 30, 32, 36 37, 56

59, 64 65, 99, 126, 130 132, 136137, 140 141, 145, 151, 155 156,159 160, 164, 166 169, 171 172,202

Envi onmen , 4, 21 , 27, 30, 36 , 3839,41 4 , 69, 99 100, 1 10, 1 14115, 1 17, 121 122, 154, 159,174, 177 178, 194, 197, 199,201 202, 204, 208

Envi onmental input, 1 16, 203Epi temologi t , 59 60Ep emology, 5, 14, 59, 62, 64, 185Equivalence, 66E , 15, 49, 58 59, 65, 69, 105, 129E o , 8 12, 16 18, 41, 49, 73 75,79

80, 83, 192, 203 204E te , W. K 26Ethic , 194Ethology, 4Evan , ., 160Evidence, 1 3,19,37,53 56, 58, 6165, 67, 69,76, 79 83, 92, 95 96,

99, 103 , 114 , 172, 179, 181 , 183 ,193

Evil, 181Evolution, , 74, 120Exam, 104Examination , 7, 10, 25, 31, 52, 88,

103 104, 138, 1 69, 174Executive, 155 157Ex tence, 5, 60, 100, 1 12, 1 93, 205

p ,65, 68, 84, 98 99, 106, 108,116 , 122, 142 , 148 , 150, 153154, 188

Expe imen , 6, 3, 47, 52, 65 66,7576, 81, 85 86, 110, 193

Expe imen al p ychology, 7, 18 , 21,45, 48, 59, 64, 71, 76,79, 91 92,96, 125, 128, 134 136, 142, 147,161, 196

Expe imentation, 19, 75 76, 81, 130,137, 142 143, 160, 162

Expe imente , 47 49, 51 52, 66, 76,78 , 80, 84, 118 119, 121 , 166

Expe iment , 6, 4, 43, 46, 52, 76 77,110, 115, 120, 123, 162, 167,171 , 175 , 181 , 184, 190 191

Explanation , 1, 3, 19, 41, 51 , 58, 60,65, 96, 99 100, 108 1 10, 11 4,122, 125 126, 128 132, 134, 137,141, 146, 148, 180 182, 193,200, 208

Explanato y y tem , vi vii, 1 16, 1 30131, 135, 137 140, 143, 146,154, 180, 201 202

Extinction, 90, 128, 133, 139, 176,178

Eye, 40, 118Eyewitne , 24Ey enck,M., 8, 37, 56, 154, 203Fallacy, 49 50, 60Fal i cation, 45,47, 51 , 53, 70 , 196,

198Fal ity, 50 51Fa aday, 52Fa ci t, 8F hing, J. 75Fate, 9, 181, 194Fathe hood, 39Fatigue, 197

g , , , , ,Fe te , C. B. , 26Feye abend, P. K. 128Fi he , R A , , 76 80,92Fixation, 152, 191 192F xed atio, 170Fluc uation , 47, 73, 76Fluid , 37, 60, 62, 1 47Fluidity, 37Fo ce, 14, 19 20, 35, 57, 62, 105 10

11 1 113, 122, 138, 160 162, 1169, 171

Fo ec , 76Fo mali m, 68Fo m lity, 196Fo mulation , 10, 17, 21 , 34, 36, 38

74, 82, 96, 11 1, 121, 149, 155184 185, 188 189, 198,200

F ac ionation, 156F ame, 138, 145F amewo k , vii, 4 6, 10, 1 4 16, 21

22, 45, 67, 127, 173, 190, 195,200, 202 203, 205, 207 208

F equency, 79 80, 166 169F eud, S. 150 152, 161F u t ation, 98, 191Function , 11, 17, 20, 44, 48, 57,65

67, 69, 77, 84, 87, 91 92, 102,104, 107, 112 116, 122, 125,127 128, 139 141, 148 149, 1158, 163, 179, 181 , 199, 203

Functional an ly i , 7, 176Functional elation , 20 21 , 40, 107,

112 113, 122, 126, 128 130, 1139, 142, 145, 152, 156 15,162 163, 177, 183, 198

Functionali t, 184Galileo, 1 5, 82, 137 13 8Ganglia, 197Gene, 1 17

229



Knowin 18 21 26 39 40 53Knowled e1 2 4 6 19 31 39 48

Li ener 40 44Locke J. 13 14

Index Ind

ay F 8ead G. H 189eanin 23 29 31 32 52 981

e omorph 14e al 55 5 85 86e aphor 14 16 20 30 32 33 3



51 52 59 62 64 6 69 9 8089 90 92 105 106 108 109121 185 193 205

Koch S. 5 9 6Kuhn T 1

Kuo 1 5Labora ory 4 11 28 52 6 69 1 1011 8 135 201

Laka o I 1Lan ua e 2 32 34 36La al K. A., 26Laudan L. 54 60 62 64 65 128

130 135Law lne 1 9Law 13 18 4 53 54 58 69 4

8 82 84 86 89 91 100103 105 1 11 112 126 12 130132 13 138 180 186 194

Le hey T. H. 9Learnin 8 4 12 26 30 33 40 44

48 9 100 113 134 138 141146 152 154 1 5 1 90 1 93

LeeV viii 4 5 10 11 31 33 120121 138

Lepper . 160 164 166Le a e G 60 63 69Le ion 148 162 164Lever 138 139 169 1 1

Lewin 161Lie e viiiLimi ed hold 89 90Lin ui ic 2 33 35 36 38 44 1 04

141 146 148 149 160 164169 188 199

Link 10 12 13 20 3 10 1 10115 116 122 131 150 151 154156 1 2 19 201 202

Link in a cau a chain 96 1 10 1 12131 132 134

232

Locu 38 44Lo u E.F., 24Lo ic 45 4 49 50 58 69 9 80

125 1 96Lo ical po i ivi m 9 10 1 4 186 1 88

Lo ical po i ivi 1 9 1 5accorquodale K. 9ach E , 9 20 1 1 1 1 13 12 5 136

140 143 145 152 153 156 1581 2 202

achine 14 15 1 10 1 12 1 16 126130 132 142 160 161 206

achine room 132achinery 132 161ackenzie B.D. 8 9 1 1 1 5acleod B. 1 2 14 1 6 203a ne i m 60a ni ude 106 140 1 6a nu 1ahoney . J. 1 1 14 1 1 8 203ain ream 1 45 92 142 200alcolm N., al nc ion 115 116 181allone L. W. 26a nouri hmen 205an 2 13 32 34 6 4 100 203anipula ion 3 4 48 53 66 1 16anipula or 8

ap 1 16 190 1 93appin 153arker 21 1 3 198 203arr J. 8ar in B. 59 89 90arx . H. 1 5 1 180 18 1

184 185 18 189 190a hema ic 2 23a hij W 66aze 190 192cClel and D. . 161 168

eanin 23 29 31 32 52 981109 1 14 12 136 142 162196 202

ea ure 1 24 4 3 84 8 163166

ea uremen 3 51 3 4 83 186190ea urer 4echanic 9 3 12 23 108 109 1 12

1 14 131 13 204echani m 1 1 19 49 5 58 69 0

96 99 131 132 141 142 149202 204 206

echani 131echani ic heorie 1 20echani ic hink n 1 6 18 20 96

110 131 141 142 145 1 2 203edia 131 133edia e 15 20 64 1 19 1 4 195

19edia in en i ie 19 58 1 31 1 59

160 166 168 1 1 1 2 202edia in proce e 65edia in variable 162 163 1 1edia ion 199edia or 190 198edium 28 12 131 133 145 1 2emory 4 35 39 50 51 5 98

1 16 146 14 153 160 1 2 190202en 190 195en er K. 131en al elemen opera ion proce e

a e 13 14 26 96 1 16 146151 154 184 193 202

en al life 28 1 84en ali ic a emen 29en ali y 13erchan . 2 14 16 1 10

e aphor 14 16 20 30 32 33 339 10 112 115 11 120 123154 156 160 200

e aphy ic 1 26e eor 34

e hodolo ical behaviori m 186 18189 202e hodolo ica packa e 18 48 1

6e hodolo i 45 6e hodolo y 3 45 59 65 66 68 69

129 142 155 1 84 18 196205 206

e hod 6 1 3 18 19 21 3145 46 48 52 53 61 62 6 691 2 83 8 91 92 100 108149 1 3 184 185 18 188 193202 208ill J. S. 63 64

iller E. 148ind 5 13 14 16 1 26 28 29 31

33 44 60 9 10 138 146148 154 1 8 185 186 194 19202 208

i repre en a ion 9 14 1ode 12 15 16 20 21 2 41 44

0 96 115 1 1 122 123 129131 132 135 143 150 156

12 2 19 202odel 6 14 16 19 30 8 86 8892 98 11 4 120 130 132 136141 142 146 148 1 50 160 1 21 4 185 202

omen um 1 10 1 1 5 1 5oney 86 165or an . J. 1 0orri E K. 9orri N., 154 156 158o ion 82 106 108

233



P act ces (co t ued)141, 207

P t t 7 44

P og ess, 59, 67, 120, 205P g ess o , 120

ndex

P t 33 34 56 58 59 73 75

r ndex

178, 190 192React o , 8, 68, 1 97, 203

d

99, 154 158Rem ss o , 81



P act t o e s, 7, 44P ec s o , 25 26, 28, 51 52, 78, 19 5P ecu so s, 174P ed ctab l ty, 40, 73, 1 15 1 16P ed ct o s, 47, 50, 52, 63 64, 66, 68,

76, 86, 88, 100 102, 142P em ses, 49 50, 1 10, 1 85, 1 87P estley, J , 59 60P gog e,I 2P macy, 56, 153P mates, 148P c ples,1 2, 4 7, 18 20, 47, 52 57,

65 69,85, 89 92, 100, 137, 142,160, 175, 177, 184, 195 1 96,198, 203

P obab l t es, 15 , 48, 71 , 76 78, 81 , 99P oblems, 1, 5, 8, 17, 21, 24 29, 38,

46, 49, 51, 54 58,61, 65, 69, 7779, 84, 86, 88 92, 97, 100 101,130, 142, 149 150, 164, 175,182, 184 185, 187, 189, 191 192,194, 200, 204, 207 208

P oblem solv g, 37P ocedu es, 1 1 , 18 1 9, 46, 48, 54, 66

68, 76 80, 92, 120, 165, 170,176 177, 184, 196

P ocesses, 1, 4 5, 18, 23, 29 31, 33 35,37 39, 44 45, 49, 52 54, 57 60,

62, 64 65, 67 68, 76 78, 84, 88,91 , 96 98, 102 103, 107, 1 19121, 137, 142 , 146 , 148 , 150155, 164 165, 167, 178 179, 182184, 191 196, 198, 201

P oducts, 2, 18, 28,.60, 88, 126, 138,161, 183, 199, 207

P oduct o , 7, 61 , 68 69P og ams, 1, 3, 31, 89, 91, 118, 171,

185 187, 193, 205P og ammat c ty, 67

236

P ope t es,33 34, 56, 58 59, 73 75,98, 102 105, 108 109, 121, 127130, 132 134, 137, 139 140, 146,152 153, 156

P opos t o s, 31

Psyc e, 8Psyc at , 147Psyc olog es, 203Psyc olog sts, v -v , 4 6, 8, 1 1, 13 ,

18, 26, 28, 31, 35, 46, 48, 75, 80,82, 85 87,98, 108, 114 115, 120121, 136, 159, 174, 184 185,188, 190, 193, 198, 201 202, 206

Psyc ol g z g, 181Psyc ology, 6 8, 3 8, 10 , 15 22,

24 25, 27, 30 31, 33, 35 37, 42,44 48, 50 53, 57, 59, 64 5, 67,69 72, 74 77, 79 83, 86, 88, 9192, 96, 98, 100, 108, 111, 114,116 117, 120 , 122 , 125 , 128 ,134 136, 142 143, 145 147, 150,153, 158, 160 162, 164, 169,171 176, 179 208

Psyc ot e apy, 194Pu s me t, 1 01 , 1 74Pu pose, 9, 14, 24 28, 31 , 59, 86,103,

107 108, 113 , 119 , 136, 139 ,142, 146, 175, 186, 192, 196 197

Pu pos ve ess, 101, 104Qua t t es, 73 75Quetelet,A, 72 75, 82Rac l , H. 17, 68Ra dom ess, 83Ra ge, 6, 8, 11 , 57, 61, 67, 76, 99,

1 17, 140, 156,208ate, 84, 87, 104, 140, 170, 208

Rat o, 46, 102, 140Rat o ale, 45 47, 76, 78 79Rats, 72, 85, 139, 169 171, 175 176,

Reade s, 8, 10 1 1, 1 8, 40, 44, 87, 125,132, 141 , 158, 159

Readi g, 7, 12, 36, 85 87, 135, 1 59Real ty, 14, 33, 67, 75, 98, 102, 128,

130 132, 205Reaso , 9, 3, 32, 43, 54, 1 17, 153,159, 166, 188Reaso i g, 26, 49, 53, 73, 78,110,

115 , 148 , 159 , 184, 192, 194 ,205Rece cy, 56Recog t o , 2, 18, 45, 60Reduct o , 14, 1 03, 1 07, 16 1, 1 67,

187Reduct o sm, 162Refe e ce, 8, 10, 12, 29, 31 , 33, 56,

105, 12 1, 133, 138, 145, 149,158, 163, 181, 1 84

Refe e t, 29, 31Re lexes, 17, 25, 81, 1 13, 133 134,

176 183, 185 186, 193, 199,203Ref act o , 127, 133Reg ess o , 191 192Regula t es, 7, 37, 53, 74, 128, 133,

137 138, 1 0 141, 196Re ab l tat o , 1 71Re ea sal, 57, 155, 157Re d, T., 59, 62Re fo ceme t, 18, 26, 30 31, 38 40,

72, 89 90, 99, 114, 1 18, 120 122,128, 140, 170, 193Re fo ce s, 40, 90, 1 19, 139 140,

149, 170Related ess, 131Relat o s p, 3, 11 5, 152, 199, 201Relat v ty, 36Releva ce, 20, 128, 172, 186Rel ab l ty, 3, 8 1Rel g o , 194Reme be g, 29, 37, 39, 5 2, 56 ,98

Repe to e, 38, 1 18, 202Repl cab l ty, 80Replicatio , 66, 85Rep ese tat o s, 129, 132, 154, 194Rep ess o , 152

Resco la,R A, 12Resea c e s, 7, 25 , 46 47, 50, 58, 65,77, 80

Resp at o , 102Respo ses, 14 15, , 25, 30, 43 44, 60

114, 116 , 1 19, 134, 139 140,170, 173 174, 177 178, 180, 1183, 186, 190 191, 193, 195,197 199

Respo se output, 1 16, 1 73 1 74, 197198

Respo s bil ty, 63, 77, 10 1, 15 1Results, 8, 10, 24, 48 49, 52, 68, 70

72,76, 78 80, 87 88, 92, 104,118, 121, 142 143, 147, 152,162, 166, 186 187, 190 191, 2208

Ret a, 149Ret eval, 30 32, 38, 96, 154Rewa d, 165 166, 174, 192R c elle,M. 8Roge s,c. 8,97Roma ys y , R 109Rose , J J , 160Ross, L. 41Rules, 26, 31, 47, 49, 54, 82 83, 130,

13 9

Russell, B , 5, 105 106, 185Russ a s, 181Rya , R M , 160 161, 164 167S O-R, 30, 173, 190 191, 193, 195

197 198, 200, 202 203S-R, 11, 174, 190 191, 193, 198 1

203

2 3 7

Salame 158Salivation 68 178S h d l 26 89 90 12 1 170

ndex

101 102 106 109 112 125 126133 137 148 153 161 170175 179 182 183 188 198 199

1

Ind

185 189 193 199 201 205 207208

Smith L 8 11 26 112 136 174

137 151 192 207Step by step45Stewart1 2



S hedules 26 89 90 12 1 170S hemata 51S hemes 28 32 48 8 87 138 139

160 161 1 68S ien es 1 5 6 13 5 16 23 49 51

52 62 64 65 82 83 95 100105 113 115 122 138 150173 179 181 184 185 193202 2 5 206

S ienti method 7 8 1 1 45 66 6880 85 100 75 201

S ientism 205S ientists 1 3 5 8 1 1 12 15 17 18

23 25 26 28 30 33 35 39 4449 53 54 58 60 67 70 81 8488 90 91 108 112 1 15 126127 131 155 156 179 181 192

S rat hpad 155 157S rivenM 135Sear 2 28 64 83 84 88 96 97

1 02 11 4 1 5 1 1 54 1 64Se ond stage 138Se re ions 68 177SeegerR. ]. 128Sele tion 8 6 20 72 74 1 15 1 17

118 120 122 123 183Self 38 97 99 11 7 165 171 200

208

Self agen y 19Self determination 165 167 169Se f generation 161Self knowledge 188 189Sel management 194Self obser ation 188Self per eption 160 64Semanti s 38Sensation 35 184 187Sense 5 6 12 16 21 33 34 38 39

51 52 55 70 76 78 82 85 90

2 8

175 179 182 183 188 198 199Senten es 8 31 40 Sequen es 15 107 115 116 118

131 151 156 157 195Serendipity 68

Series 67 69 0 197Sets2 4 6 10 18 42 44 46 48 5069 81 87 88 91 102 107 10811 0 11 4 11 5 11 8 1 37 1401 45 1 49 1 53 1 73 1 8 1 1 95

Settings4 6 11 25 40 57 68 99118 121 139 140 147 158 159185 187 201 208

Shape53 64 72 74 89 02 17Shaping 1 18 120 1 39 1 0 183 1 89

199 202Sheldon W , 147Sherrardc. 9Sherrington 177Shi rin M 155Shi 2 6 37 59 83 101 105 145

175 179 192 199 202Short term memory 57 154 1 55 158SidmanM viii 52 5 66 75 81

83 85 87 92Sight 163 168Signi an ; 6 47 48 71 72 76 80

83 87 92 105 12Simpli ity 109 1 10 1 15Situations 6 24 25 46 47 54 81 84

86 89 92 97 114 120 139166 170 171 190 191

Skill 32 86 1 43 1 89Skin 188inner B F , 8 5 7 13 15 17 18

2 21 25 32 38 39 43 45 5265 69 81 86 88 99 101 11 11 17 120 125 126 128 133 143145 147 149 154 159 172 183

t :..

E

Smith L., 8 11 26 112 136 174175 185 189 197

So ial learning 4 97 1 13So ialpsy hology 4 100 199So iety 2 6 14 74 194 205

So iologists 75 1 15 206So iology 108So rates 207Speakers 31 33 136Spe ialization 109 148Spe ies4 102 117 187 194Spe ulation 26 136 137Spee h 28 139 157 158Spen e 11 174 175Spender S. 8Spine 102Spirit 151Spontaneity 81 82 167 178 179Stability 1 10Stages 30 78 83 98 1 14 1 19 1 32

137 138 140 165 166 173 178182

Statements 18 29 43 47 50 54 5658 61 66 69 70 72 74 78 8486 88 91 97 106 115 123129 133 1 37 140 163 164169 196

States 2 2 13 15 18 19 35 36 47

48 50 52 54 55 57 66 72 7584 86 96 104 105 112 116122129 133 137 15 1 156184 186 194 199 202 205

Statisti al inferen e 19 78 86 92Statisti ian 76Statisti s 71 75 104Stein D G , 160Ste la E., 162 163Stengers1 ,2Steps 29 61 67 69 73 75 11 0 1 1 1

Stewart1 2Stimuli 26 30 40 66 1 13 1 18 1

121 134 139 140 7 74 178182 183 186 190 191 195 1199

Stimulus Organism Response 30 19Stimulus Response 174 176 180182 183 186 190 197

Stone 131 154Storage 30 32 38 96 142 146 15

155StormsM D , 41Strain 47 148Strategies 37 39 67 70 85 86 120

129 159 201Strength 21 1 14 168 197 207Stress 51Strip 191 192Stru tu es20 27 31 33 35 3739

44 53 58 64 65 67 69 102116 117 119 120 131 141 1145 15 153 156 158 160169 172 181 182 191 192 2203

Students vi vii 45 46 48 49 536768 71 86 103 104 112 174176 177 207

Sub e ts 6 7 2 19 24 35 46 56 71

84 85 93 157 165 167 84Substantives 35 36Su ess 14 51 62 87 100 103 20Su ession 107 1 16Su essors 13 14Suggestion 32 1 52 1 58 185Sun 55 57 99Super ondu tivity 52Superego 15 200Surrogates 193Symbols 5 14 23 66 11 6

2 9

Symptom, 15 1Syntax, 18, 33Systems 6 7 18 0 7 8 33 40

Index

1 3, 1 7, 130, 177 178, 1 84,187 188, 19 , 04

Th ngs n bet een 131 13 145

r1 Index

1 8, 175, 177 178, 180T ends, 4, 10 1 1, 87, 134 135T als 19

1 1 , 140, 188Ve bal commun ty, 3, 188 189, 199Ve b l epo ts 4



Systems, 6 7, 18, 0, 7 8, 33, 40,44, 46,68,70,98, 101 10 , 10711 , 115 116, 130 13 , 136, 14143, 146 147, 149, 153 156, 171,174, 176 177, 179, 183, 187,

189, 197, 0Szasz, T., 8Talk, 31 3 , 35 37, 40, 1 1, 109, 169Tao, Tapes, 30, 154Teache , 1 18Techn ques, 5, 7, 15, 0, 51, 68, 7

75,78, 83 84, 90, 1 5 1 6, 1 9,131 135, 140 141, 145 , 154 , 17117 , 176

Technology, 89 91 , 07Telephone, 14 , 191Tempe ament, 147Temp ate, 1 17Te m no ogy, 13, 3, 5 6, 36, 40,

91, 16Test,6, 9, 46 48, 53, 63, 70 73, 76

77,79, 83 84, 87, 9 , 95, 104,190

Teste s, 53Test ng, 6 7, 18 19, 47 48, 51, 53, 56

57, 60, 63 69, 76 77, 79 80, 87,114 , 136 , 14 , 150, 196, 198

Text, 38, 46, 160, 173 176Textbooks, 24, 68, 171Texts, 7, 4, 7 , 76, 1 73Themes, 8, 4, 67Theo ems, 67, 69, 195 196Theo sts, 1, 41 4 , 67, 70, 97, 136,

151 , 161 , 17 , 191 , 198 199

Th ngs- n bet een, 131, 13 , 145,17

Th nke s, 17Th nk ng, 3, 1 6 0, 6 7, 9, 33,

37 40, 44, 7 , 95 99, 105, 107,

110 11 1, 115 , 117 , 1 1 3 , 1 5,131 , 134, 141 14 , 145 , 153,161 , 17 , 179, 187, 189, 19900, 03 04

Tho nd ke, 1 1Thought, 1 , 4 6, 15, 4, 31, 33, 35,

96 , 106 , 113 , 116 117, 1 5 , 13013 , 154, 156, 161 , 173, 1811 3, 187, 194, 05 06

T cs, 148T me , 90T mes, 8, 48, 51, 57, 59, 73, 78,137,

161 , 175, 193T metab e, 1 04, 04T tchene ,E B. 188Todd, ] T., 9Token, 171Tolman,E. c 10 11, 1, 173 176,

189 193, 195 00, 03Topog aphy, 5 , 138 139T aces, 19, 73, 84, 11 1, 161, 05T ad t on, 8 1 , 1 6, 30, 43 46, 7 , 74,

85, 96 , 11 1 , 1 1 1 , 161 16 ,

173 174, 177, 18 184, 190, 193,199, 0 04, 06, 08T a n ng, v , 3 , 46, 48, 1 84, 195T ans o mat on, 14T ans ence, 34T ans t on, 15T ans t onal, 130

T als, 19T uth, 1, 49, 7 , 53, 187Unce ta nt es, , 6, 77 79Unde stand ng, 6 7, 11 , 15, 17 , 6,

35, 39, 46,67, 8 , 88, 101, 104

107, 130, 136, 05, 07Un o m t es, 54 55, 83 84, 100, 133134, 137, 198

Un ta y, 165, 198Un ts, 95, 109, 117, 119, 1 1, 134,

139, 186Un ty, 6, 4, 1, 99, 03Un ve sa y, 54Un ve se, 14, 15 , 35, 8 , 100, 13 ,

188, 06Unobse ables, 57 58, 60 61, 69, 78Unp ed ctab l ty, 81Usage, 7 8, 31, 56, 81 , 161 , 1 94Use,7, 1, 4, 6 7, 9, 3 , 36, 58,

65 66,71, 77, 84, 86, 91, 95,100, 107, 139, 148, 161, 174,176, 07

Use ness, 31, 135, 158, 188Val dat on, 49 50Val d ty, 188, 196Va ue, 6, 5 , 61 6 , 73, 77,104, 13 ,

14 , 166, 0Va ab l ty, 19, 44 45, 81 84, 87 89,

91 9Va ab es, 17, 19, 33, 38 39, 40 41,44, 46 47, 53 54, 65 66, 71 73,75, 78, 80 85, 88 90, 93, 97, 99,104, 11 114, 118, 1 1 1 , 133134, 137, 140 141, 1 50 151, 160,16 168, 171, 1 74, 178, 197

Ve bal epo ts, 4Ve bs, 33 37, 39, 44, 99Ve cat on, 57, 6 , 70Ve nacula , 18, 8, 44, 138V s on, 67, 149, 06

V ta st, 106Vocabula y, 6, 3Vo ce, 7, 36Vol t on, 167, 178 179Vygots , L. S., 189Wales, vWate whee s, 1 10Watk ns,M ]., 70Watson, ] B. 9, 1 1, 13, 1, 173 17

184 190, 196, 198 199, 03Webste 's, 1 61 , 16 8We ght, , 170, 193Westby, G., 135hewel , W., 63ho , B. L. 33 36

W ndm l s, 1 10W ndow, 106, 108, 1 14 1 15W ne, 4 43Wol e, D , 67Women, , 38, 195Woodwo th, R. S. 161Woolga , S. , 1Wo d-length, 157

Wo ds, 1, 5 6, 3 9, 31 34, 37, 3940, 47, 53 54, 56 57, 61, 66, 77,89,107, 109, 113, 119, 1 5, 1136, 141 , 154, 157 161, 171 ,177, 189, 19 194

Wo d as-mach ne, 15 , 0, 1 3Wo lds, 55, 14 , 187, 189, 07 08

chiesa, m. (1994). radical behaviorism. the philosophy and the science

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