che guevara and guerrilla warfare

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Since the American Revolution,US Armed Forces have been con-fronted, and sometimes confounded,

by low-intensity conflicts (LIC) andunconventional warfare (UW).1 Toprotect US interests abroad, US mili-tary forces will be called on to con-duct insurgency warfare and peace-

keeping operations and to providelogistic support in a fluid, nonlinearenvironment.

Nonlinear battle challenges tradi-tional military roles. Thus, logisti-cians, not infantrymen defending ordestroying a supply convoy, wouldplay a more effective part in seizinga key terrain feature than would con-

ventional forces. This point is clearlymade in the 1940 version of the USMarine Corps (USMC) Small WarsManual: [T]hat small wars are, gen-erally speaking, campaigns ratheragainst nature than against hostile

armies . . . constitutes one of the mostdistinctive characteristics of thisclass of warfare. [They affect] thecourse of operations to an extent[that varies] greatly according to cir-cumstances, but so vitally at times asto govern the whole course of thecampaign from start to finish. [They]arise almost entirely out of the diffi-culties as regards supply which thetheaters of small wars generallypresent.2

Guevaras Small WarCuban revolutionary Che Guevara

formulated his principles of guer-rilla warfare from 1956 to 1958 dur-ing the revolt against PresidentFulgencio Batista. The war, whichcontributed to the fall of Batistasregime, helped install Fidel Castroas El Presidente.

Guerrilla warfare principles arepart of the Marxist dogma to whichmany insurgent organizations ad-here.3 Because US forces might face

similar situations in the future, it isimportant for commanders to studysuch tactics in order to be successfulon nonlinear, changing battlefields.

Although not considered a strate-gic military genius, Guevaras effec-tive, realistic principles served himwell. They included mobility, move-

ment by night, careful use of ammu-nition (supplies), flexibility, carefulstudy of the ground and surpriseand fury.4

Mobility. The fundamental char-acteristic of a guerrilla band is mobil-ity.5 Mobility is the ability to move

vehicles, soldiers and equipment rap-idly with relative freedom. Guevarasplan was to strike and move freely,avoiding detection. Mobility comple-mented surprise and flexibility. Theguerrillas did not become comfortableor get tied to certain areas. They hadto stay one step ahead of govern-ment forces. Their mobility put a con-stant strain on government forces,which had to spread their assets thin.

Mobility allows US forces to keepa potential enemy guessing in thesame way. The US usually has anadvantage in mobility since its indus-trial edge allows deployment of allnecessary materiel. The ability toestablish logistic resupply points(LRPs) at any place and time helpsprevent ambushes or traps.

Developing mobility in smallunits within a support battalion re-

quires the development of circum-stances and attitude to ensure eachsoldier and vehicle has the propertools to operate in any area at anytime. This means having severaldays worth of food and water foreach soldier and equipment andsupplies needed for communica-tion, minor repairs, signaling andfirst aid. Many innovative ideas arecurrently being explored to increase

every units mobility and safety.Comprehensive training geared to

developing confidence and initiativedevelops a persons attitude. Tomaintain mobility, land-navigationtraining is critical. Key leaders needto know the units mission and whateach persons role will be. Well-con-

ducted rehearsals develop soldiersconfidence and encourage planningfor the unexpected. For example, no

vehicle should stop without knowingwhere it will go next. If that decisiondepends on circumstances, the leadermust know those circumstances andwhy he should or should not by-pass an LRP.

Movement by night. Movement bynight, another important characteris-tic of the guerrilla band, includes roadmarches, convoys, reconnaissance,emplacement of operational bases,resupply activities, rehearsals andattacks. Guevara believed his guerril-las knew the ground better than didgovernment forces. Therefore, theywould have more success while op-erating at night against governmentforces whose garrison attitude keptthem safely indoors during the night.Guerrillas were free to move forces,conduct surveillance, attack withsurprise then withdraw into the night,contributing to the impression thatthey were everywhere and could at-tack at any time.

In conventional operations, night

operations are a strong componentof force protection for the parent unitand for the group conducting theoperation. Departing from a brigadesupport area (BSA) at night limits theenemys knowledge of what suppliesare loaded. If the enemy sees threepalletized-load system trucks carry-ing 120-millimeter tank rounds leav-ing the BSA quickly, heading towarda certain task forces area of oper-

CheGuevaraandGuerrillaWarfare:Training forTodaysNonlinearBattlefieldsCaptain Steve Lewis, US Army

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ations, it might be a tip-off thatsomeone is short of ammunition.Weapons training also should beconducted at night, if possible, totake advantage of the cover darknessprovides.

Careful Use of Ammunition (Sup-plies). [T]he care which must betaken of ammunition and the methodof using it are further characteristicsof guerrilla warfare.6All armies haverestrictions on available supplies, thecare and management of which cancontribute significantly to anyoperations outcome. For example,wasteful movement of unneededsupplies can detract from a battle inthe same way as can the absence ofneeded supplies. Supply bases ordepots are also high-payoff targets.

Ammunition was Guevaras mostcritical supply item. It was only avail-able from government forces, and itwas quickly expended. Food, cloth-ing and shelter were available fromthe local population, and weapons,taken from the government or guer-rilla dead, had long, useful lives ifproperly maintained. But only smallamounts of ammunition were avail-able. Guevara trained his soldiers tofire only at certain targets and tonever waste ammunition. Fire disci-pline and marksmanship were critical.

Ammunition is no less important.

As one of the most industrializednations on earth, the United Stateshas an absolute advantage in avail-able supplies. The ability to move alarge amount of supplies rapidly is akey strength. However, there is need-less waste of military assets, whichcauses support soldiers to expendunnecessary time and energy andplaces them in unnecessary dangerif they must resupply a unit thatcould not forecast or manage its re-sources properly.

That the US Army is so powerful

and fast compromises the logisticchain. The farther combat vehiclesand troops move from their sourcesof supplies, the more resources arerequired to resupply them. Therefore,timely resupply from the forward sup-ply brigade is critical. For example, atank stationed at a road intersectionstill consumes fuel even while sta-tionary because it must continue torun its engine to keep its battery

charged. If the tanks wing-man is 10kilometers away, the battalions sup-port platoon must drive farther dis-tances more frequently to resupply

both. In turn, the support platoon isexposed to greater risk and must be

protected and resupplied as well.Flexibility. Another fundamentalcharacteristic of the guerrilla soldieris his flexibility, his ability to adapthimself to all circumstances and toconvert to his service all the acci-dents of the actions.7 Flexibility isthe ability to adapt to changing cir-cumstances to take advantage ofchange. Guerrilla armies are usuallyforced to limit their operations to tar-gets of opportunity early in their cam-paigns. This requires flexibility andthe ability to take advantage of anunguarded government asset or mili-tary target.

No operation ever goes as planned,and the skill and wisdom to recog-nize changing circumstance canchange defeat into victory. However,the ability to do this is only presentif there is decentralized control andif initiative is encouraged at everylevel. The higher up the chain ofcommand that information musttravel before a decision can be madedecreases exponentially the timeavailable to use the information.

To maintain and employ flexibility,

US forces must have the properequipment and training to allow themto seize the initiative and take advan-tage of changing circumstances.Properly equipped vehicles enablesoldiers to maintain contact withhigher headquarters and monitorongoing operations.

Flexibility is further developedthrough training soldiers to use theirmental tools to maximize their physi-cal tools. The ability to call for fireand close air support as well as tocoordinate with other units must be

taught to every noncommissionedofficer (NCO).

Initiative is the most important toolthat can be taught and nurtured. Acommander, platoon leader or sectionsergeant must underwrite subordi-nates honest mistakes. Soldiers mustreally believe their boss wants themto seize an opportunity. A battalioncommander must ensure his soldiersknow he believes in their ability to

adjust to a changing environment. Abattalion commander who believes inonly centralized control could findthat his elements are dead or lost andhis vehicles out of fuel and ammuni-tion.

Careful Study of the Ground.[G]uerrilla-defended positions,when they have been selected onthe basis of a careful study of theground, are invulnerable.8 The valueof reconnaissance and preparation,map reconnaissance, terrain walks,rehearsals, familiarity with the pat-terns of the enemy and the localpopulation and a relationship withthe local population cannot be over-stated. Guerrilla forces usually arefamiliar with the people and the ter-rain in which they operate.

The most useful aspect of a studyof the ground is recognizing pat-terns. Most large organizations, es-pecially military organizations, fallinto patterns of conduct. Convoysleave and arrive; guards changeshifts; and units receive supplies.Patterns can tell how long it takes aunit to react to an enemy attack andwhat weapons it will use. Guevarasguerrillas familiarity with the area al-lowed them to always have the mostreliable information.9

US forces must recognize thatthere is more to the ground than just

dirt. During an LIC, they must remem-ber that the local population will beclose. They must know who lives inthe area of operations, what theirpolitics are, whether they are prima-rily urban or agrarian and whether op-erations are aiding or hindering themin their daily lives. Soldiers will beinteracting closely with the localpopulace, so training must go be-

yond learning to yell stay away fromthe wire.

Surprise and Fury. The form ofattack of a guerrilla army is also dif-

ferent; starting with surprise andfury, irresistible, it suddenly con-

verts itself into total passivity.10

Surprise is doing the unexpectedand doing it rapidlyan actionthat gives no indication or warningwhen it begins or when it will end.However, surprise cannot be accom-plished without mobility and flexibil-ity. Also, movement at night increasesflexibility and contributes to surprise.

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Even with limited resources andpersonnel, Guevara insisted on main-taining the edge of surprise. Attack-ing government forces when theydid not expect it was the only wayto maximize limited resources. A criti-

cal part of his plan was to keep gov-ernment forces guessing where hewould strike next, forcing them tospread their resources thin to coverall, or the most probable, targets.

US forces can keep adversariesoff balance by not establishing pat-terns. Units that establish routinesthat can be read by the enemy canfall victim to surprise attacks. In themid-1990s, US Army Rangers in So-malia established a dangerous pat-tern by taking down buildings,thought to contain Somali warlords,in the same way every time. Afterseeing the US military continuouslyuse the same tactics, the Somalis laida successful ambush. Somali ColonelAli Aden said, If you use a tactictwice, you should not use it a thirdtime.11

In 1999, a successful use of sur-prise occurred at the National Train-ing Center in Utah. The opposingforce (OPFOR) set a pattern of attack-ing the BSA with mortars about thesame time every day. Their locationwas never the same, but their targetwas usually fuel tankers. The com-

mander deduced the pattern and thenext likely area from which theOPFOR would attack. He was right,and his troops destroyed the OPFORmortar team.12

Learning by ExampleLeaders can apply Guevaras prin-

ciples to the ever-changing LIC/UWenvironment, which has several dis-tinctive characteristics, as the follow-ing examples illustrate.

No front lines and no clearly de-fined battlespace, enemy areas orsafe areas. An LIC is not limited to

the linear battle; the enemy mightcome from all sides. Therefore, it isunlikely that the conflict will havedefined enemy areas or safe areas.The danger to convoys or supplyareas will be just as great as orgreater than to infantry soldiers. Withno organized uniformed army to de-feat or terrain to hold, battles will beones of individual initiative.

During the Afghanistan guerrilla

war to repel the Soviet Army, theMujahidinAfghan rebelsroamedthe countryside. They would choosean ambush site, destroy a convoythen disappear, forcing the Sovietsto deploy more soldiers and armored

vehicles on every convoy.13

Close proximity to local popula-tion. In an urban environment orcountryside, the area of operations isusually tied to the civilian population.Protecting one civilian group fromanother requires a close relationshipwith the protected group. The mis-sion will not be to defeat anenemys standing army but to main-tain peace between two ethnicgroups or to support a newly demo-cratic government. Proximity to civil-ians might also affect logistics, since

many receiving and distribution cen-ters will be located in heavily popu-lated areas and might employ localcitizens.14

Specialized supply requirements.Individual water sources, fresh food,automotive parts, humanitarian-aiditems, nonlethal weapons and infra-structure supplies are all nonstand-ard supply items that might beneeded in a low-intensity conflict. Asmaller quantity of these items, rela-tive to a conventional war, will beneeded over an area far wider thanon a conventional battlefield. The USArmy discovered this while conduct-ing military operations in urban ter-rain training. Special ladders andother climbing aids, as well as forced-entry tools, were required.15

Specialized requirements for build-ing democracy, such as food, votingequipment and public address sys-tems, might also be needed.16 TheUSMC Small Wars Manual states,In most small war situations, almostevery accepted principle of warfareon a large scale is subject to modifi-cation due to the irregularity of the

operation. It is this characteristic thatsets the small war in a class by it-self. It is obvious then, that a suc-cessful supply plan in any small wartheater must be ready to meet theseirregular conditions.17

Greater requirement for indi-vidual or small-unit operations. Dur-ing LICs, combat units are brokeninto smaller groups and spread overthe width and depth of the area of

operations. This altered battlespacerequires a flexible, fluid supply-distri-

bution channel because if combatunits are not massed in small areas,conventional supply-distributionsystems will not work. Support sol-

diers will have to travel longer dis-tances to resupply the widespreadcombat units.

In the former Yugoslavia, USforces are currently confronting thisproblem. Since their mission is peace-keeping, forces are spread over alarge area for maximum visibility,which creates considerable supplychallenges.18 Creation of flexible sup-ply teams is needed to meet thesenew demands.

Decrease in US ability to optimizemass or use heavy weapons. US in-

dustrial power might not be usedbecause of political constraints or itmight be ineffective. For example,tanks that can destroy targets at 2,500meters might be used as roadblocks,or bombers that can deliver tons ofordnance might not be used at all.Consider the following examples ofineffective firepower.

During Frances attempt to defeatthe Vietnamese communists from1946 to 1954, they made considerableuse of heavy artillery. However, theywere surprised to discover that artil-lery had little effect on Vietnameseguerrillas. The Viet Minhthe prede-cessors of the Viet Congtook coveruntil artillery barrages ceased thencontinued their attack. The Viet Minhalso hugged French bases, keep-ing too close for the French to callin effective fire. The French also dis-covered that close air support waslargely ineffective against the guer-rillas.19

In another example, British soldierT.E. Lawrence directed Arab guerrillawarriors to avoid open battles withthe Turks because the Turks out-

gunned them. He opted for attacks onsupply and troop trainsareaswhere heavy firepower was absent.20

These examples reveal firepowerlimitations that could affect US logis-ticians abilities to operate in an LICarea. With no heavy or effective fire-power, guerrilla fighters might bemore willing to risk confrontation, es-pecially with less well-armed logisticssoldiers.


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Inability to distinguish friendfrom foe. Guerrilla fighters are civil-ians. If they are not carrying weap-ons, they are almost impossible toidentify as adversaries. Civilianswho are not guerrillas might be

passing information to the enemyor to US forces. Each person willhave loyalties, and some people willchange loyalties daily.

The Russian occupation of Af-ghanistan provides many examplesof trusted Afghan citizens commit-ting acts of sabotage against theSoviets. In one instance, a Sovietofficers driver helped Afghan rebelskidnap the Soviet officer. In another,an Afghan employee at the commu-nist party headquarters planted a

bomb. After the explosion, and notbeing a suspect, she got a new jobat Kabul University where sheplanted another bomb. Both bombscaused considerable damage andloss of life.21

An increase of nonaligned play-ers. Apart from civilian populations,there are a number of nongovern-mental organizations (NGO), gov-ernment organizations from neutralcountries, national and interna-tional businesses and religious or-ganizations whose interests might

be for, against or neutral to US in-terests.

The Center for Army LessonsLearned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan-sas, currently lists 70 NGOs oper-ating in Kosovo alone.22 Whilesuch organizations are for humani-tarian reasons, how many couldharbor a sniper or saboteur? Howmany might relay information aboutUS forces if they felt it would fur-ther their interests? Also, simplyconferring with representatives ofextreme political organizations cansometimes lend them a legitimacythat could be detrimental to US in-

terests.23

Changes in the military deci-sionmaking process and battlerhythm. Conventional US warriorsare accustomed to a well-estab-lished planning and execution cycleknown as battle rhythm. A brigade

battle rhythm for a major operationis 32 hours for planning and prepa-ration and 21 hours for execution.24

At the NTC, the battle rhythm is

one preparation day and one battleday, then the cycle repeats. In anLIC, many smaller operations might

be required, each with varying timelines.25 Therefore, the schedule thatunit leaders have trained tothroughout their careers might notapply.

The availability and use of ad-vanced technology. Geographic po-sitioning systems (GPS), night-visiongoggles (NVGs), weapons, cellularphones and GPS jammers are avail-able to anyone for relatively lowprices and can be purchased from amilitary surplus catalog.26 This avail-ability of high-tech weapons pre-sents a serious threat. Guerrillaarmies might not be able to afford atank, but they might be able to affordplastic explosives, NVGs and various

small arms.In a 1999 Army Times article,

Colonel John Rosenberger, theNTC OPFO R commander, de -scribes available technology: For$40,000 I can go buy a GPS jammerfrom Russia. They put it on themarket two months ago. Its an 8-watt jammer that will take down

both [commonly used GPS] fre-quencies for about 200 to 250miles. Well, that levels the playingfield. . . . [S]houldnt we be train-ing against the forces that create

a loss of GPS capability? Youbet.27

Trainings ImportanceA conventional army cannot be

thrust into an LIC/UW environmentwithout training or preparation. AUW environment is just thatun-conventional. If soldiers are nottrained or allowed to think for them-selves, the US Armed Forces willlose. There are limited resourcesabroad and limited amounts of train-ing time. Therefore, the US militarymust determine the correct training

needed for tomorrows battles andfocus on it.

The military can prepare forchanges in the plan, but the only wayit can really prepare for unconven-tional war is to teach soldiers to takethe initiative. Leaders must ensurethat NCOs receive the proper re-sources and the confidence thatthey will be trusted with importantmissions.

US President John F. Kennedysaid that unconventional warfare isanother type of war, new in its inten-sity, ancient in its originswar byguerrillas, subversives, insurgents,assassins; war by ambush instead of

by combat; by infiltration, instead ofaggression, seeking victory by erod-ing and exhausting the enemy in-stead of engaging him. . . . [I]t re-quires in those situations where wemust counter it . . . a whole new kindof strategy, a wholly different kind offorce and therefore a new and whollydifferent kind of military training.28

Kennedys statement shows remark-able insight into the battles of thefuture. MR

NOTES

1. John Ellis, From the Barrel of a Gun (Consho-

hocken, PA: Stackpole Books, 1995), 64. Although manyconventional battles occurred during the RevolutionaryWar, those in North and South Carolina, especially,

were considered guerrilla warfare.2. US Marine Corps (USMC), Small Arms Manual

(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office(GPO), 1940), 13, sec 3-17.

3. Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (Lincoln, NE:University of Nebraska Press, 1985).

4. Ibid., 58-61.5. Ibid., 58.6. Ibid., 60.7. Ibid.8. Ibid., 61.9. Ibid., 115.

10. Ibid., 61.11. Daniel Bolger, Battle for Hunger Hill (Novato,

CA: Presidio Press, 1997), 167.12. NTC Rotation 99-06, Combat Service Support

After Action Review(April 1999).13. MG Oleg Sarin and COL Lev Dvoretsky, The Af-

ghan Syndrome (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 97.14. LTG William G. Pagonis, Moving Mountains (Bos-

ton, MA: Harvard Business School Press, 1992), 107.15. Robert Hahn and Bonnie Jezior, Urban Warfare

and the Urban Warfighter of 2025, Parameters (Sum-mer 1999), 74-86.16. US Army, Training, Tactics and Procedures

(TTP), Volume 1, Bosnia-Herzegovina National Elec-tions, CALL Newsletter 98-18 (1998), .

17. USMC, 7, sec 3-5.18. US Army, Drawing a Line in the Mud, CALL

Newsletter 96-5 (1996), .

19. Robert Scales, Firepower in Limited War(Novato,CA: Presidio Press, 1995), 33.

20. T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (NewYork: Doubleday, 1926), 194.

21. Ali Jalai and Lester Grau, Night Stalkers andMean Streets: Afghan Urban Guerrillas, Infantry(January-April 1999).

22. US Army, .

23. P.T. Simmons, Learning to Live with NGOs, For-eign Policy(Fall 1998), 83.

24. Bolger, 206.25. NTC AAR.26. US Army, US Cavalry Equipment Catalog, 1999.27. Sean Naylor, Combat Training Just Got

Tougher,Army Times (27 December 1999), 15.28. John F. Kennedy as quoted in US Army FieldManual 90-8, Counter Guerrilla Warfare (Washington,DC: GPO, 1986), iv.

Captain Steve Lewis received his B.S.from Arizona State University and is arecent graduate of the Combined Logis-tics Captains Career Course, Fort Lee,Virginia. He has served in various pla-toon and company positions in theContinental United States. Anyone whowants to correspond with Lewis regard-ing this article can E-mail him at.

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che guevara and guerrilla warfare

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