characteristics of economic developmen general

8/11/2019 Characteristics of Economic Developmen General

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Whatever indicator one chooses as a basis for theinternational comparison in the level of econom-ic development, Hungarys position could be as-signed somewhere on the borderline betweenhigh-income and uppermiddle-income coun-tries: 0.16% of the worlds population lives here,consuming 0.31% of the total goods produced.The (rather arbitrary) classi cation by the WorldBank for 2008 considered USD 11,905 gross na-tional income per capita (based on the o ffi cialexchange rate) to be the threshold above whichcountries belong to the high-income group. Theperformance of the Hungarian economy (USD12,810 per capita or USD 17,790 on purchasingpower parity) just ful lled this criterion. Only15% of the worlds population lives in countriesricher than that. However, inside Europe, theHungarian economy belongs to the semi-periph-eral zone; in 2008 the purchasing power of GDPper capita in Hungary was only 61.6% of theEU-27 average. The ba t le to successfully bridgethe gap between Hungary and the economicallyand socially most developed core nations of thecontinent a highly important national targetfor a long time has been fought from time totime and lost during historical cataclysms.

In the 15 th century, the HungarianKingdom was a ourishing, strong feudal state,closely following in the footsteps of the mostdeveloped countries of South and West Europe.However, a f er the Age of Discovery, the geo-graphical location of East Central Europe turnedto its disadvantage. Located far away from thenewly opened shipping routes, it could not bene t from the colonial trade, and subsequentaccumulation of capital, thus instead of the

emergence of the middle classes in society, the

feudal structure was preserved. Hungarys situ-ation was further aggravated by the O t omanconquest, as a result of which the country be-came divided into three parts, and during the16th17th century it became a ba t leground forconstant con icts. In the 18 th century, when theOt oman Empire was forced to withdraw fromthe Carpathian Basin, poverty-stricken Hungary,depopulated over large areas, was annexed tothe Austrian Habsburg Empire with a subor-dinate, peripheral role. At that time, even thevery survival of the nation was questionableand the attributes of independent statehoodcould only be gradually regained. The nationalawakening that heralded the beginning of the19th century and the Revolution of 1848 as thezenith of the social and economic reforms, basedon Western examples, ended serfdom and abol-ished the privileges of the nobility. Even thoughthe War of Independence in 184849 against theHabsburgs was lost, it provided a solid basefor the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867which became the starting point for rapid mod-ernisation over the next ve decades under thedual-Monarchy.

Spectacular economic growth was fuelled by massive in ows of British, French, Germanand Austrian capital and assisted by the swi f increase in the population number and level ofeducation. As a result of the Education Law of1868, illiteracy became more and more restrictedto the older generations. Banks and companieswere established one a f er the other, but agricul-ture still remained the backbone of the economy.The agricultural sector was dominated by largeestates and it was characterised by rapid tech-

nological modernisation in practice. It still pro-

ECONOMY

On the Semi-Periphery of Europe: an Outline of HungarysEconomic History

General Characteristics of EconomicDevelopment


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vided occupation for 60% of the economicallyactive labour force in 1910 and accounted for44% of GDP. To process the agricultural prod-ucts, an extensive food industry developed led by our mills of international signi cance; more

than half of the country's exports were farmingproduce and food. Rapid extension of the rail-ways in the mid-19 th century facilitated the bulktrade of grain, in the direction of Austria andWest Europe. Within a few decades the railwaynetwork covered the whole Carpathian Basin.Its radial trunk lines converged on Budapest,the Hungarian capital, at that time experienc-ing a construction frenzy and industrialisation.The demands of the food industry and railwayconstruction fuelled the emergence of di ff erent branches of the engineering industry, as well as

coal mining and steel manufacturing. By 1910,industry employed 18% of wage-earners, andprovided more than 25% of GDP. Immediately before World War I, in Hungary continuouslarge-scale construction projects were launched,and the country was characterised by a rapidspread and application of innovations. It wasstill lagging behind the leading states of WesternEurope (the Hungarian GDP per capita wasabout 5860% of the West European average), but it was well ahead of the South and EastEuropean countries.

Af er World War I, the Austro-HungarianMonarchy collapsed, the customs and monetaryunion which provided a fertile market for eco-nomic development was abolished, and thethreads of the geographical division of labourwere severed. Due to the Treaty of Trianon,Hungary lost 71.4% of its former area, 63.5% ofits population and became one of the smallestand weakest successor states of the Monarchy.Most of its natural endowments (mineral re-sources and forests) had been allo t ed to theneighbouring countries, as well as the transver-sal railway lines and cities that would have beenable to counterbalance Budapests dominant po-sition in the urban network. A f er the painful adjustment to the new conditions and the economicconsolidation implemented by foreign loans, theGreat Depression of 19291933 brought repeateddramatic declines. Under these circumstances,the fact that the Hungarian economy could re-tain its relatively advanced position somewherein the middle of the rank of European countriescould be considered a success. The structure ofthe economy and the proportion occupied by

individual sectors did not change much: consid-erable development only occurred in the manu-facture of consumer goods, in order to substituteimports, mainly in the textile and clothing in-dustries. By the end of the 1930s more than half

of exports were directed to the German Empire,and in-line with German demands, the war mu-nitions industry enjoyed priority.

During World War II, Hungary su ff ereda loss of about one million people from bat-tleground conflicts and the Nazi holocaust.Systematic plunder rst by the German troops,then by the Soviet Red Army, aggravated thelosses caused by the destruction of productionequipment. The majority of machines which sur-vived the war were requisitioned and removedfrom the country. Industry lost more than half of

its xed assets, whilst transport and agricultureincurred similar loss. In 1946, the economic per-formance was equal to its level of 50 years prior,and the production level would only return tothat of 1942 as late as 1952.

After World War II, Hungary fell intothe sphere of in uence of the Soviet Union andwas forced to introduce a command economy.Nationalisation of the banks, industry and tradewhich had already begun during the post-warreconstruction period was completed by 1950.Collectivisation of agriculture ended in 1961; inthis sector the socialist kolkhoz type of collec-tive farms prevailed. Small private enterprises,mainly o ff ering services, had only marginal rolein the economy until the 1980s.

In the centralised planned economy state-owned companies were prescribed what andhow much to produce. The reforms of 1968 loos-ened the highly rigorous regulations, providingmuch greater freedom to companies, giving wayto market forces. However, they did not changeownership relations.

Economic strategy especially in the1950s and 60s was characterised by a large-scale accumulation and the pursuit of autarchy,mainly at the expense of living standards. Morethan half of investment was directed into themanufacturing industry, while developmentsin services, infrastructure and agriculture wereneglected. Large state investments supportedthe establishment of war-driven heavy industry mining, metallurgy and certain branches ofengineering although these were not at all inline with Hungarys available natural resources.Hungary became strongly isolated from the processes


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governing the world economy. External trade linkstied the country to the Soviet Union as a keypartner. Exports included agricultural produce,food and machinery, while raw materials andenergy sources were imported. In the 1970s,

Hungarys economy also gradually opened upto the western part of Europe. The rise in fuelprices led, however, to a worsening of the coun-trys terms of trade, with an ensuing budget de -cit and a slowdown in economic growth.

The socialist era, which ultimately ledinto a dead-end, brought deep social changes:forced urbanisation and improved educationand health care systems. The macroeconomicstructure reflected the emergence of an in-dustrial society, in which by 1990 agricultureemployed only 15% of the active labour force,

whilst at the same time the proportion of indus-try, building and construction reached 38%. Yetthe country was not able to keep pace with thetechnological and communications revolutionthat had transformed the world economy. Theapparent successes brought about through ex-tensive development were soon followed by a

decline. By 1990, the economic performance ofHungary reached only 50% or according toother estimations merely 40% of the level ofthe 12 most developed European countries, andwas even lagging behind the South European

countries which were already part of Europeanintegration. This, however, was still not the na-dir. During the recession which followed the col-lapse of the communist regime and the peace-ful economic and social transition in 1990, thecountry's GDP declined by more than 20% andthe earlier peak would only be reached again in2000. Although the recession in Hungary endedin 1994, relatively quickly compared to the othercountries of the East Central European region,the decade further widened the economic gapseparating Hungary from the western half of

the continent. Hungarian society, having an-ticipated not only national independence andpolitical democracy, but a tangible increase inliving standards a f er the change of regime, was bound to be disappointed as transition requiredpainful sacri ce.

Transition to a Market Economy: Privatisation and Capital In ux

A temporary recession during the transition andrapid changes in ownership structures wereunavoidable consequences. This decline wasworsened by the collapse of the Soviet Unionand the abolition of Comecon. Hungarian in-dustry and agriculture lost their most impor-tant (and protected) markets; more than half ofthe country's exports went to these countriesin the 1980s. A large number of factories went

bankrupt and more than one million jobs werelost. Unemployment a concept that was virtu-ally unknown during the socialist era was skyrocketing. Social di ff erences and spatial dispari-ties suddenly increased. In ation peaked at 35%in 1991 and economic decline hit a low in 1993.

The reorientation of international trad-ing relationships was vital for opening up theHungarian economy towards the EuropeanUnion, necessitating the deepening of institu-tional relationships. In 1991, Hungary signedan association agreement with the European

Community, the so-called European Agreement

that came into force in 1994 and was aimed atphasing out tari ff s and quotas hindering trade.Already by then, half of Hungarian foreign tradewas taking place with the EU countries. This rateincreased rapidly to the extent that nowadays about four- f hs of the country's exports are destined for, and 68% of its import arrive from the enlargedEuropean Union. The preconditions set by the EUfor full membership were a stable parliamentarydemocracy, a functioning market economy, andthe acceptance of acquis communautaire (com-munity law). The regime change and the estab-lishment of the institutions of the parliamentarysystem were completed in the period 19891990,whilst full transition to a market economy basedon the principles of private ownership tooklonger, and was completed only by 2004, theyear of Hungary's accession to the EuropeanUnion. Simultaneous steps aimed at Europeanintegration and adjustment to the realities ofglobalisation required the rapid modernisation

of production, which would have been impossi-


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ble without privatisation and the in ow of foreigncapital. The state of Hungarys economy today isa result of these interwoven processes.

The abolition of state ownership and theprivatisation of public property during the mar-

ket economy transition had to be carried outwithout any previous experience and in a rathershort time. The period of so-called spontaneousprivatisation in Hungary started in 1987, with-out any legal regulation, when the former man-agers of state-owned companies including therepresentatives of the communist party wereable to acquire remarkable wealth. Spontaneousprivatisation could not, however, result in themodernisation of these rather deteriorated andobsolete assets, nor a signi cant change in man-agement style, thus the majority of these com-

panies went bankrupt and/or became the targetfor foreign acquisition.After 1990, state property was usually

sold to foreign investors by tender, controlled by the necessary laws and regulations, in ac-cordance with the rules of the market economy.Compensation vouchers were given to formerowners, whose assets were originally seized bythe communist regime, but they could play only amodest role mainly in rearranging agrarian prop-erty relations. The quick sale of state-owned assets of en at prices below market value was com-pelled by the large amount of government debtinherited from the previous system, which ex-ceeded 90% of GDP at the beginning of the 1990s.Revenues raised from the sale of public propertyshould have been spent on decreasing debt lev-els, but successive governments were reluctant toful ll this obligation. The role of the state as anowner of assets shrank to an even smaller propor-tion than it is common in West European marketeconomies. Apart from retaining minority sharesin certain rms, only some companies providing basic public services (such as the nuclear powerstation, the national electricity grid, the railwayand the postal service) remained in state own-ership. Nevertheless, government gross debt,accumulated as a result of the ongoing budgetde cit exceeded 70% of GDP in 2008 and standsclose to 83% by mid-2009 with the most recentincrease being mainly due to the shrinking outputof the economy, the decline in the recession-hitmanufacturing. This is despite debt levels hav-ing shown a previous temporary decrease, whenin 2001 it fell to 52% of GDP. Indebtedness is themajor obstacle that hinders Hungary's accession

to the Eurozone. Financing external debt became anenormous burden for the Hungarian economy, and thishas been further aggravated by the recent global nan-cial crisis. Interest payments from public nancesin order to service this debt, amounted to HUF

1,100 billion in 2007, or 4% of GDP.In 1989, Hungary was the first amongthe East-Central European countries to open itsdoors to foreign direct investment, which greatlycontributed to technological modernisation andincreasing productivity. In the rst part of the1990s, about half the investments were associatedwith privatisation. The aim of these transactionswas the acquisition of valuable companies in themanufacturing sector and penetration into thelocal market. The main a t raction of green eldinvestments at that time was the abundance of

relatively cheap labour. Later, more and moregreen eld investment was directed towards theexport-oriented sectors with their higher value-added element (automotive industry, electronicengineering, precision engineering and electron-ics) or in the service sector, and were connected toremarkable technological transfer too. Numerousmultinational companies (e.g. General Electric,Nokia and Ericsson) even founded R&D unitsin Hungary. Besides the direct bene ts provided by the government for prospective investors, theexisting infrastructure (motorways and industrialparks), a favourable geographic location (for lo-gistics), a strong work ethic and contacts hithertoexisting also proved to be factors of a t raction.All of this was true mainly for Budapest and itsenvirons, and the western region of the country,where the rate of unemployment is low, and therehas been a massive demand for skilled workers.

The total inward FDI stock that has owed intothe country since the beginning of the economic tran-sition exceeded EUR 70 billion by June 2008 and isincreasing by about EUR 4 billion annually. 77%of the operating capital invested in Hungary de-rives from the European Union, of which the big-gest investor is Germany. The service sector wasthe bene ciary of over 60% of foreign investmentand more than a third of it was invested in themanufacturing industry. Companies registeredin Hungary also invested a signi cant amountof capital in the regions East Central Europe andSouth-East Europe a f er the turn of the millenni-um. Among the notably active companies aspir-ing to become regional multinationals, are MOL(oil and gas industry) and OTP Bank, but mentionshould also be made of the pharmaceutical sector


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(Richter Gedeon), telecommunications (MagyarTelekom) and hotel chains as well. Outward FDIstock in 2007 exceeded EUR 18 billion.

In contrast with the 1990s when the in- ux of capital greatly improved Hungary's bal-

ance of payments today the majority of FDIstems from the re-invested pro ts of Hungarian

shareholdings. A new tendency has developedfor foreign investors to transfer abroad most ofthe pro ts acquired in Hungary, in the form ofdividends. Besides the interest burden of thenational debt, this is the reason why the value of

GNI (Gross National Income) is lagging further and further behind GDP (in 2007 by 7.7%).

Main Features of the Reshaped Economic Structure

During the transition to market economy, alarge number of businesses were established

in Hungary and presently there are about 1.2million enterprises. Their diversi cation in sizeshows the dual structure of the economy. Mostof them (57%) are private ventures and 80% ofthem operate in the tertiary sector. The numberof companies with foreign shareholders (wheremore than 10% of the company is in foreignownership) was 25,800 at the beginning of 2007.They employ more than 600,000 workers (thisis one quarter of the total number of jobs in the business sector) and produce more than four f hs of exports. Their suppliers include severaldomestic companies. There are around 800 largecompanies in Hungary that employ more than250 people. Small and medium-size enterprises that manufacture mainly for the domestic mar-ket play a signi cant role in the employmentmarket however, their pro tability lags far be-hind the large companies.

In the last two decades the macroeconom-ic structure has changed signi cantly, so thattoday agriculture contributes only 4% of GDP,industry, building and construction contributes30%, while the service sector is responsible for66%. During the transition period the previouslyunderdeveloped tertiary sector progressed themost dynamically. Almost all commercial banksand the majority of hypermarkets and shoppingmalls are owned by foreign entities. These estab-lishments are the landmarks of modern globali-sation all over the country, and have changedpa t erns of consumption, introducing new -nancial and commercial cultures. The formerlyneglected telecommunications network was alsoexpanded and improved to meet west European

standards, with the help of foreign investment.

The output of the manufacturing industrymore than doubled compared to its 1989 value,

its structure has undergone a remarkable mod-ernisation and the leading position of exportoriented machine industry has strengthened inevery respect. With the construction of new fac-tories by large multinational automotive compa-nies (GM-Opel, VW-Audi and Suzuki) the localcar industry was established and became a mainpillar for exports. Hungarys fundamental inte-gration into the production processes of thesemultinational rms has resulted in a strong de-pendence on international market conditionsand increased vulnerability during recession-ary periods. The production of household appli-ances, consumer electronics and communicationengineering units, electronic componentry andprecision instruments, have also a t racted largeinvestments. In the chemical industry, rubberand plastic manufacturing has expanded consid-erably. The traditionally strong pharmaceuticalsector a t racted investors by preserving its com-petitiveness in the East European markets.

There is another side to the success story:the decline or disappearance of whole companiesand even industry sectors, as a result of economictransition and increased competition. All but oneof the deep sha f coalmines were closed, bauxitemining shrank to a fraction of its previous size,alumina production and non-ferrous metallurgydisappeared completely. Out of the three inte-grated iron and steel plants in the country, onlyDunaferr has been able to survive, by constantlyimproving its technology and enlarging its prod-uct range. The textile and shoe industries weremoved to other East European and Asian coun-tries that had o ff ered a plentiful supply of cheap

labour, thus the relative importance of these


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branches sharply decreased. Food processing ex-perienced a decline in the number of its produc-tion facilities, while the ever changing productrange re ected the adjustment to the labour divi-sion conceptions of multinational companies.

The heaviest toll of the transition periodwas su ff ered by agriculture, notably there has been a sharp decline in the sectors output.During the period 199094, it dropped to twothirds of its previous level, and productivity has been unable to approach its levels prior to 1989.Compensation, the dissolution of cooperativesand the privatisation of assets at the end of the1990s, allowed town dwellers without any inter-est in agriculture, to buy pieces of land, whilstat the same time many workers in cooperativesand state farms lost their jobs and sank into

poverty. With the ownership and cultivation ofland now largely divided, a land-leasing systemspread. Today, large enterprises cultivate abouthalf the arable land, which are the successors

of the former cooperative farms. The majorityof private farms situated at the opposite endof the scale are so small that they can onlyprovide some additional income or a second,part-time job. The proportion of viable private

farms in agriculture is far from the ideal. Theageing of the agricultural population and thelack of skills are just a part of the problem. Thedisconnect between producers and (to a greatextent foreign-owned) food processing plantslead to further di ffi culties: smallholders have nostrong collective bodies to represent their com-mon interests, so they are in a disadvantagedposition when in negotiations with wholesalers,international retail chains and the food industryin general, when selling their products. Whilein the 1980s around one quarter of Hungarian

exports were agricultural and food products,today this number uctuates around the 6%mark, while agricultural imports are constantlyincreasing.

Regional Processes

The market economy transition increased so-cial inequalities. The average income of theupper socio-economic groups (the top 10% ofthe population) is now about six times higherthan that of the poorest 10%, which is a strikingdisparity even under the spotlight of interna-tional comparison. In the early 1990s, regionaldisparities sharply increased and subsequently

set

led, showing similar trends to those visiblein income disparities. The emerging new socio-economic spatial pa t ern largely re ects the im-pact of international trends and ties.

Out of Hungary's seven NUTS 2 statis-tical regions, Central Hungary (which incor-porates Budapest) stands out, as the GDP percapita exceeds the national average by 64.3%


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(in 2007). Its position is even high-er when considering the numberof enterprises and the amount ofFDI per 1,000 persons. This is thesole region of the country where

economic performance exceeds theaverage of the 27 EU countries. Theagglomeration of the capital, withmore than 2 million inhabitants isthe most competitive ensemble ofset lements, even on an internation-al scale. It is a centre for adminis-tration, services and innovation, aswell as a logistic hub. Its higher ed-ucation institutions educate almosthalf the total number of students intertiary education. The dichotomy

of Budapest versus the rest of thecountry is one of the enduring andstrengthening features of Hungary'sspatial structure. Of the other re-gions, only West Transdanubia can boast economic performance whichis slightly above the national aver-age, closely followed by the CentralTransdanubian region. The weakestregions by economic performance,are located in the eastern part ofthe country where GDP per capitadoes not even reach two thirds ofthe national average. It is therefore justi ed to conclude that the oldeastwest dichotomy, as a spatialcharacteristic, continues to exist.

The change of regime in u-enced the economic developmentof Hungary's counties (at NUTS 3level) rather di ff erently and the lastthree decades have signi cantly rea-ligned their rank ( gures 100 through102). In the 1970s, the counties withmining and heavy industry centresshowed the best economic perform-ance, a f er Budapest. Among them,the heaviest tolls exacted by theeconomic transition were su ff ered by the counties located in the north-ern part of the country, and espe-cially the county of Borsod-Abaj-Zempln. Due to their geographi-cal location, good accessibility andpre-existing ties, the north-westerncounti es Gy r-Moson-Sopron and


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Vas became popular targets forforeign direct investment, follow-ing closely in the footsteps of theHungarian capital. Their rapid con-nections to international networks

facilitating the swif

movement oftheir exports to the core Europeanmarkets, and their traditional recep-tiveness to innovation have madethem the winners of the last twodecades ( Figure 103).

On the basis of the 174 mi-croregions (NUTS 4 or LAU 1level, gures 104 through 107) wecan receive an even more preciseand complicated picture. Withinthe relatively underdeveloped

areas, microregions have a rela-tively better ranking whose seatsare towns possessing a signi cantquaternary economic sector, andare well connected to globalisationnetworks. These microregions aremainly the large higher educationcentres (Debrecen, Szeged, Miskolcand Pcs). Some microregions have become famous for their tourism,showing the importance of local-ity and local resources. These areconcentrated in the holiday regionsaround Lake Balaton. The most dis-advantaged microregions are in thenorth-eastern counties and in SouthTransdanubia, forming large, contin-uous belts. The se t lement networkof these areas consists of small vil-lages without large, central townsthat could provide ample job op-portunities. They also o f en standout due to their largely unskilled Roma population. Because of longterm unemployment and strikingpoverty, the majority of the inhabit-ants of these microregions are regu-larly reliant on social bene ts.

The reduction of sharp dif-ferences that have arisen from themarket economy transition, andan improvement to the situationof regions that are lagging behind,poses a long-term challenge forregional development policy. The

magnitude of resources awarded


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from EU Structural Funds since2004 in particular if we considerthe spatial distribution of the areaswhere they were deployed on win-ning projects is far from enough to

cure the problem. Less than 20% ofthe EU support awarded (HUF 670 billion) that was deployed withinthe framework of the NationalDevelopment Plan between 2004and 2006, was spent on projectswithin the Regional OperativePrograms ( Figure 108).

Reserves of Development for the Future

Following two centuries of fruitless e ff ort di-rected at closing the gap between Hungary andthe European continents core area, the acces-sion to the European Union has improved theexternal conditions that in uence the likelihoodof achieving this target, although it still does notseem to be any closer. In the interests of enhanc-ing success, internal reserves should be mobi-lised and the country's natural resources should be exploited in a more purposeful manner. Fromthe broad range of potential options to increasethe country's competitiveness, only a few arelisted below:

The rate of economically active workingage population in Hungary is one of the low-est in Europe; only 57% of the 1664 age-group(2008). Creating new jobs and increasing theeconomic participation of the population can be an important factor in increasing the coun-try's GDP.

The rate of R&D expenditure is ratherlow, barely reaching 1% of GDP. A considerableincrease could accelerate the development of aknowledge-based economy, enlarge the scaleof activities with a high value-added compo-

nent, and encourage the

ow of foreign capital

into these sectors. Large companies engaged inmass production need to improve the trainingof skilled workers, enhancing the mobility of thepopulation by an improvement in conditions formigration within the country.

Agricultural production is the only sec-tor i n Hungary which can rely on a plentiful sup-ply of natural resources. The signi cance of thisfact will gather pace in the long term, as demandfor agricultural products in world markets in-creases, be it for food or bio-fuel crops. However,to exploit these outstanding features the sectorneeds a product pale t e which is able to exiblyadjust to market demands, farms of a viable sizeand an appropriate ownership structure.

The new, post-Trianon borders scythedthrough the connections that gave rise to region-al labour divisions, and as a result most of the border regions became disadvantaged. With theenlargement of the Schengen Zone, Hungarys borders need no longer act as a strict separation between countries. Thus new forms of economicdevelopment can arise through cross-border co-operation.

The location of Budapest, in the heart of

the Carpathian Basin, along the main route from


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the western regions of the continent to SouthEast-Europe, provides a solid basis upon whichto strengthen its gateway function and to be-come the rst metropolis from the East CentralEuropean region that joins the outer circle of

global cities.The lessons to be drawn from the achieve-ments (and failures) of economic history overthe last two decades are that in order to take

advantage of the existing opportunities, particu-larly those a ff orded by EU membership, socialconsensus concerning national goals, as wellas a responsible and consistent governmentaleconomic policy would be required. Last but

not least, the future success of Hungary is in-separable from the ability of the whole of theEuropean Union to respond the challenges ofthe 21 st century.

characteristics of economic developmen general

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