chapters 10, 11, and 12

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CHAPTERS 10, 11, AND 12 Rachel McCabe

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Chapters 10, 11, and 12. Rachel McCabe. http://scaleofuniverse.com/ Just a quick app because we were talking about scale! . Don your tinfoil hats. 10: Cow to mink prion transmission, and infected growth hormone 11: The beginning of BSE, and the failures of the ministry - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

CHAPTERS 10, 11, AND 12Rachel McCabe

Page 2: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

http://scaleofuniverse.com/ Just a quick app because we were talking

about scale!

Page 3: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Don your tinfoil hats 10: Cow to mink prion transmission, and

infected growth hormone 11: The beginning of BSE, and the

failures of the ministry 12: The escalation and public reaction to

the BSE outbreak

Page 4: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Chapter 10- The Silencing 1985- TME appears in Wisconsin Marsh and Hartsough arrive on the scene

They suppose that the mink are eating scrapie infected sheep

Check the farmers meticulous records: Downer cows were a major part of the minks’

diet Marsh and Hartsough conclude that the agent

must come from the cows

Page 5: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Marsh isn’t very compelling on the public stage…

He attended a cattlemen’s meeting warning the farmers of the scrapie-like agent He had inoculated cows with TME from

minks, and vice versa The disease was transferable both ways, and

both modes of transmission were lethal Marsh didn’t have the public personality

to fight the cattle industry The suppliers ignored his warnings

Page 6: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

The Growth Hormone Scandal Only human growth hormone was

functional at treating growth disorders Source of hGH? The pituitary gland of the

brain This was a miracle! There was a huge

demand for pituitary glands from cadavers Until one 17 year old boy was diagnosed with

CJD. Sound familiar? What are the ramifications

of person to person spread of prion diseases?

Page 7: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Itty bitty pituitary gland

Page 8: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Chapter 11- Mad Cows April 1985- England A cow named Jonquil started showing

unnerving symptoms: shaking, staggering, seeming to hallucinate She was taken to a rendering plant, and

chopped into feed.

Page 9: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

The Beginning of the Ministry’s Involvement

Several other animals at this farm started showing the same symptoms

Soon the symptoms were showing in farms in completely different counties Rules out infectious disease

1986- The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food launched an investigation

Page 10: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Wells’ Work Gerald Wells, a veterinary pathologist,

examines some of the brain tissue Saw typical scrapie spongiform tissue Scrapie hadn’t been documented in cows

previously Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)

His research did not appear in a journal until a year after he submitted it

There was not much of a media response, but the government took notice

Page 11: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Alarm at the Ministry “I was just down the corridor when the

guys from the central veterinary laboratory came in. Quite a hubub… they were talking about scrapie. I understood scrapie. But they were also talking about some things I’d never heard of—Creutzfelt-Jakob disease and some thing called ‘kuru,’ a rare form of CJD once common in New Guinea among the Fore tribe of cannibals.

Page 12: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Dr. John Wilesmith By the end of 1987, there are 420

confirmed BSE cases. The ministry hires Dr. Wilesmith, a

veterinarian, to investigate. December 1987- It is determined that

BSE is associated with a feedborne source- specifically the meat and bone meal coming from the rendering factories.

Page 13: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Beef or Dairy? Mostly, the meat/bonemeal was fed to

mostly dairy cows, not cows that are sold for meat.

Isn’t BSE non-transmissible in milk? Devil’s advocate for the ministry-if the

agent isn’t getting into the products, why should we care about BSE?

Page 14: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Why did the ministry act the way it did?

The ministry had both Wells’ and Wilesmith’s data.

The author blames the ministry for keeping the public “blissfully unaware” of the disease.

Do you think what the ministry did was right? Should the public have had the right to

know? What would be the implications of media

coverage?

Page 15: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Ministry tries to keep a low profile “They vetoed any suggestion that

questions could be raised to the Parliament concerning BSE and instead suggested putting a paragraph into a journal an obscure veterinary journal that nobody read.”

“The ministry does not yet see BSE as a serious threat to public health”

Page 16: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

The Story Breaks April 22, 1988

The Sunday Telegraph and Farming News publish articles describing the disease.

Many critics accuse the ministry of ignoring the extent of BSE.

They also claim that the ministry’s primary focus was not the public’s safety. Do you think this is true?

Page 17: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

12- The Cover Up Eating scrapie infected meat from sheep

was safe for human consumption. The author argues that the ministry

“simply ignored the possibility that this disease could ever be transmitted to humans”

Do you agree with the author? If so, how should the ministry have treated

BSE?

Page 18: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

The Ministry Acts BSE becomes a “notifiable disease;” this

suspends the use of animal proteins in feeds for cows and sheep.

Another interest group steps on the scene: the Renderer’s Association. They had a huge supply, and did not want to

lose their industry. “So what if another scrapie outbreak was on

their doorstep?” The brains of these infected cows were routinely

sold in public over the counter butcher shops, as well as baked into popular meat pies

Page 19: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

The ministry’s go-to line: “there is no evidence of any risk to humans”

Meanwhile, Dr. Tim Holt writes an article that warns the public about the connection of BSE to scrapie, kuru, and CJD.

June 20 1988- the first time BSE is recognized as an “epidemic” More than 600 cows had already died from

BSE.

Page 20: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

BSE is Recognized Compulsory slaughter of infected animals is

enforced Farmers are to get 50% of the market value price

for giving up their animals. The farmers hated this! How could the compensation price relate to the

spread of the BSE epidemic? Even so, the government still does not want

outsider assistance Even when Marsh offered up his services, the

ministry declined

Page 21: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

By October 1988, there were 70 new cases of BSE being reported every month.

This is a much faster rate than previously predicted.

Breakthrough: BSE had been successfully transmitted to mice, showing that the agent is capable of interspecies transmission.

It was predicted that there would be a total of 17,000-20,000 cases of BSE in total; this turned out to be a gross underestimate.

Page 22: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

What to do with the bodies? The government had decided to

incinerate the corpses of the infected cows, but they were starting to pile up.

The transportation and slaughter of these cows was a gory process

The public became additionally aware after viewing photographs taken of these tragedies.

Page 23: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

BSE spreads to other countries By 1989, the first international cases of

BSE are starting to spring up. However, Britain wants to continue to

export the possibly infected meat and bonemeal abroad.

Germany, USA, France… all these places start boycotting British meat. Even starving Russia.

The ministry tries very hard to assure the public that there is nothing wrong with British meat, but to no avail.

Page 24: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

More Compensation As expected, farmers were trying to

sneak their possibly infected cows into the normal market instead of eliminating the infected ones.

The ministry itself led to the spread of BSE because the government didn’t offer enough money for infected cows in the beginning. How else did the ministry unintentionally

spread BSE through its actions?

Page 25: Chapters 10, 11, and 12

Conclusion: The epidemic is showing no signs of

slowing. By June 1992, there were now 631 cases

per week, with almost 100,000 new cases reported over the past 4 years.

There are many sources of blame for the situation. Who do you think was at fault for this

situation? What could have been done better?