CHAPTER X

THE FINAL PHASBa t.ABOUR GOVERNMENT GRANTS INDEPENDENCE TO INDIA

I

BRITAIN'S INDIA POLICY

In the British general election of 1945 the Indian question

did not figure prominently in the Labour Party's campaign. Though

the Labour Party did not desire to raise the Indian question as

such in its election campaign, many Labour Lead ars and pro-Labour

organisations brought up the Indian question into the Labour Party's

electoral campaign.

What might be regarded as a reflection or the Labour Party's

official thinking concerning India in 1945 was contained in a

letter (1) by Morgan Phillips, Tabour Party's Secretary, in reply

to the Secretary of Swaraj House, London, when the latter offered

help and support to the "parties of the Left" in the general election

of 1945. Commenting on this offer, Morgan Phillips saida

that at the present stage in Indian affairs, we should prefer not ·to bring the question of India into the foreground of election politics. Lord Wavell's offer, which, in our opinion, is a good one and probably the best we could ~offer_7 at the moment ••••

This curt reply of Morgan Phillips shows not only what the Labour

Party's official policy was towards the Indian question at the

moment but also that the Labour Party's top echelon was definitely

not in favour of making the Indian question an issue 1n the

Labour Party's flection campaign.

British champions of Indian freedom were determined to

spotlight tbe Indian political question in the constituency of

(1) The Hindy, 28 June 1945.

- 479

Prime Minister Churchill. Gandhiji in his message(2) to the

British electors stressed.that victory in the West and impending

victory in the East were empty without the central fact of India's

freedom.

The Labour PartY's top echelon, refused to make India: an

issue in the Party's electoral campaign. For this, apart from

the Labour Party's official stand, the reason would partly seem

to be the top priority in the Party's electoral campaign given to

the gigantic tasks ot Britain's social and economic reconstruction

in the post-war period. When Britain was extremely busy with her

own internal pressing problems, the Indian question did not natu-

rally get as much attention of the Labour Party as Indians would

have liked. "Although India had not featured high in Labour's

election manifesto, there was a clear determination to achieve self-

government L-for IndiaJ "• (3)

The Labour Party, after the election of 1945, in its own

right as a Parliamentary Party with an overwhelming majority formed

the first stable Labour Government. This event was naturally of

great interest to Indian nationalists who natttrally felt that the

Labour ·Government, true to its past pledges and declarations, would

concede India •s demand .•

With its improved position, from July.l945 onwards, the

Labour Party could no longer find reasons to hesitate to act

promptly in regard to the Indian question. Thus the Labour

(2) Ibid., 2? June 1945.

(3) Hugh Tinker, eriment t (London, 1967, Chatham House

d Pak:ist 33.

- 480

Government, being in a vantage position (of course influenced

by a variety of other factors too) found it less difficult to

redeem its past commitment to India. This apart, pressure exerted

by .Labour back•benehers, who constituted a sizable section in the

new Parliament, was another tactor which had its impact on the

Labour Government 1il shaping its India policy. Added to ~hese,

the new Labour Government bad also to bear in mind the implica-

tions .of world public opinion and Britain •s interests in the Far

East in formulating her India policy.

July ~945 to August 1947; a period of little over two

years constitutes the final phase in the evolution of the Labour '

Party's attitude towards the Indian demand for independence.

During this period the Labour Party •s attitude towards India,

which had been one of sympathy right from 1918, was further ..

influenced and shaped by a variety of factors - internal and

external ·• a radically alte:red world situation; the attitude of

USA and USSR towards Britain •s ·India policy; the impact of

resurgent Asian nationalism in general and India's dynamic nationa-

lism in particular; considerably weakened position of Britain both

economically and militarily; Britain's preoccupation w1tb urgent

domestic reconstruction programmes; bar inability due to lack of

resources and perhaps weariness too to hold on to. her far-flung

empire, particularly the Indian sub-continent; Labour Party's own

ott-repeated declarations in the past to support the grant of

self-government, self-determination and independence to India,

and the Labour Government's moral obligation to honour its past

promises and assurances to India; and Britain's doubts about, and

reluctance to rely upon, the loyalty of the armed forces and

- 481

administrative set up in India.

~an the eve of the formation of the Labour Government,

Ernest Bevin, who became an important member of. Attlee•s Cabinet,

declared:

.Labour. is not going to give up the hopes of settling the Indian problem because of the breakdown of the Simla talks ••• ln the mutual interest of the British Commonwealth and of world peace generally that there should be a finaJ solution ot this problem.(14)

Among prominent Labourites, I.ord Listowel thought that the new

Labour Government would make the settlement of Indian self•

government issue one of the priority questions for the new Parlia-

ment.(S) H.N.Brailsford said: "India will offer the first test

alike or our sincerity and our tact." He emphasised that resto-ration ot the provincial self•governments, release of all political

prisoners, and lifting the ban on the Congress were the three

obvious things to be done.(6)

The aforesaid representative views ahow bow the Labour

Government was likely to shape Britain's India policy. Soon after

assuming power, the Labour Government formed an 'India Committee•

of the Cabinet with Prime Minister Attlee, the Secretary of State

and Under Secretary of state for India and Sir Stafford Cripps as

members to draw up fresh instructions far the Viceroy.

. The collapse of the Simla Conference brought in its wake

a spectacular change in India's political outlook. This was

(4) The Kindy, 1 July 1945.

(5) Ibid.

(6) Ibid.

- 482

hastened by two significant events: the British general election,

and the surrender of Japan. Beside these two apocalyptic events,

Britain's "position as an imperial power ~in the post-Second

World War_/ was subjected to no less fundamental alteration. The

vast problems of Indian independence had been postponed during

the war ••• L-but now_/ it could be postponed no longer •••• And

all over the East the movement of nationalism was on the march".(?)

The "time was ripe for action L- to solve amicably the Indian questionJ •••• The Lat:our Government considered that further - -delay would only L create../ greater difficulties •••• "{8)

The advent of the Labour Government in 1945 in Britain

was an event of far-reaching importance from the viewpoint of

.Britain's India policy as well:as India's demand for independence.

The Labour Pal"tY in its election manifesto of 1945 had referred

to the grant of self-government to India as the keystone of its

India policy. ...

The Speech from the Throne at the opening of Parlia-

ment in August 1945 declared& "His Majesty's Government are

determined to do their utmost to promote in conjunction with the

leaders of Indian opinions the realisation of free self-government

in India. "(9) This was the first authoritative declaration of

the new Labour Government's India policy.

It is important to note that 1n the debate on the King's

speech, Woodrow ~yatt, prominent Labour back-bencher, str eased

the imperative need for finding a solution for the Indian question.

(7)

(8)

(9)

Francis Williams, Ernest Bevin: Portrait of a Great Englishman (London, 1952), p. 248.

Earl Attlee, Bmp~re tpto Commonwealth (London, 1961), p. 37.

UK, Commons! farliamentarx Debates, Series 5, _vol. 413, 1945-46, eo s. 53·57.

- 483

He said: "A nation ru~ed by anothel nation is a nation with a

cancer in the soul." He thought that "the reason for the failure

ot the Simla conference was a very genuine tear among MOslems

about congress rule." He said that if "that deadlock was allowed t

to continue, and not solved' there would be greater trouble in

India than at any time since the Mutiny". He suggested the

holding of elections 1n India on the basis of wider franchise,

and ensuring another conference to "settle some firm plan tor I

India's future".(10)

unlike the first two Labour Governments of 1924 and

1929-31, the third Labour Government Of the post-war period, right

from the beginning• showed its earnest desire and firm resolve to

tackle the long-standing Indian issue, and thereby redeem its

long-standing commitment and promises in respect of India.

The Labour Government came into being at a turning point

in the annals of Indo-British relations when it became imperative

to carry out the promises that "had been made to Indians during

the war, designed to enlist their support •••• "(11) Added to this,

"there was an overwhelming majority of opinion in Britain in favour

of handing over to Indians the governance of their country under a

constitution of their own choice. Any Government of the Left in

Britain which, instead, had involved the country in a head-on-

- collUsion with politically minded India would have been given

short shrift". (12) The new Secretary of State for India, Lord

(10)

(11)

(12)

UK, Commons! .fatliamentarY I!§ bates, Series 5, vol. 413, 1945-46, co s. 367-70.

H.s.L.Polak and others, Hahatma Qandh1 (Bombay, 1966;, Second Impression, Jaico Publication), p. 297.

-r .... .e. Ibid. Also see John Strachey,-;snd of Empire (London, 1959), p. 210.

Pethick·Lawrence, declared on 7 August at a Press Conference I

that equal partnershiJ{between Britain and India was the ideal

goal to be reacbed.(l3) In the House or Lords, he declared that the British Government proposed. to grant full self-government to

India as soon as possible and that this would be done by, and in

consuitation with, the directly elected representatives of the

Indian people.(l4)

In the new Labour Government, Sir Stafford Cripps, who

was tor long kn~~ tor biB advocacy ot the Indian cause, came to . ~ .... .. '

·exercise more influence than ever on India policy. He publicly

declared "that time should not be wasted in trying to arrive at

a temporary arrs.ngement, but that means be eXpedited to arrive

at a permanent solution •••• and for this purpose new elections '

should be held in India". (15) With this proposal of Cripps the

Viceroy agreed.

It is significant to note that it was in this con·text that

·Lord Wavell, the Viceroy declared (on 21 August 1945) that elections

to the central and provincial assemblies would be held. in the coming

winter, and that he would be visiting England tor consultations.

The announcement of Wavell was widely welcomed in British

political circles. The influence exerted by British public opinion

and Labourites in regard to the need for pursuing a more helpful

policy towards India did not fail to have its effect on the tabour

(13)

(14)

Indian Annf!l Registpr, 1945, vol. 2, p. a, see The T mes, 8 August 1945.

Also

UK, Lords, ftrl1amentarY Debate§, Series 6, vol. 138, 1945-46, co • 257 ft.

(15) B. V. Hodson, The Great Divide: Britain, lndii• Pakistan, (London, 1969), P• 129.

-485

Government. Tbe Spect§tor (23 August 1945) commented that the

announcement of the Viceroy • s return to London and the holding

of elections in India were good augury for pollt1cal- progress

in India. T!Je Manchester Gu.grdJ,an (23 August 1945) editorially . described. the new polit.1cal moves in India as "a new and hopeful

· approach to the problem which baffled the coalition". The !!!.

§tatesman and N51tign (31 August 1945) remarked: "The Viceroy's

visit to London for consultations on future policy has revived

the hopes ot India. The expected better moves towards a better

atmosphere have been promptly made." 1:.abour MPs, William Dobbie

and Sorensen and Independent MP, Vernon :Ba.rtlet, were satisfied

at the decision to hold. elections in India. (16) !n the new

Parliament• there was stro11.g suppor't for; the Jndian cause among

Labour MPs. They felt cQnif.dent that India would "attain freedom

within the lifetime of the present Governm~nt." A few of them

were not under any illusion about. the attitude of Attlee and

some other members of the Cr0vernment of Britain. According to

them, "there might not have been any reference to India in the King •s

speech, but for strong representations made to the Prime Minister

by influential back-benchers including Alderman Dobb1e."(17)

The initiative for the Viceroy's visit to London came

from the new Labour Government of Britain. The decision to invite

Lord Wavell to London for fresh discussions on I~dia was welcomed

in political quarters as evidence of the Labour Government's

declared intention to grapple with the Indlan problem. Lord

Pethick-Lawrence announced in the House of Lords that with

(16) The Hindu, 25 August 1945.

(17) Ibid.

- 486

the new Government in office it became necessary to "review with

Lord wavell the whole field of the problems with which India is

confronted • ••• Accord.ingly, with the full concurrence of His

Majesty's Gove~nment, I have invited the Viceroy to come home for

consultations. • •• "(18) The Viceroy had long discussions with the }

Secretary ... of State and the India Committee of the Cabinet. As to "'

the procedure for reaching a final constitutional settlement, the ' ,......

British Government vas inclined to reply on the suggestions embodied '---'

in·the Cripps proposals for 'provincial option•.

Qecl~ation of Brita&n'l India fplicy

·()). 19 September, on his return to India, Lord Wavell

announced that His Majesty's Government were determined to do

their utmost to promote in conjunction with the leaders of Indian

opinion the early re~lisation of self-government in India. They

intended, he said, to convene a constitution-making body to

ascertain .whether the Cripps proposals were acceptable or whether

some alternative or modified scheme was preferable. Discussions

were also to be held, with the representatives of the Indian states

to ascertain their part.icipation in the constitution-making body.

The Government would consider the conclusion of a treaty between ~

Great Britain and IndiaV, he added, that he would take steps to

bring into bei~g an Executive Council which would have the support

of the m8in Indian parties.(l9)

The tact that the Labour Government, in spite of having a

large number of important and urgent problems on its hands,had

(18) U'Kt Lords, Parliamentary Debates, Series 5, Vol. 136, 1945-46, col.

' (19) V.P.Menonf The Transfer of Power in India (Bombay, 1968);

pp. 220•2 •

-487

found time, during the first days in office, to give attention

' to the Indian problems, is an 1ndieation,at last of its earnest-

ness to solve the Indian question. The task of making and

implementing a new ~onstitution for India was a compl~x and

difficult one which would require goodwill, cooperation, and

patience on the part of all concerned. The British Government

and the. Viceroy were well aware of the difficulties, but were

determined to overcome tbem.(20)

iQn the same day, in a broadcast message, Prime Minister

Attlee said that the British Government were acting in the spirit

of Cripps' proposals. He gave the assurance that the British

Government would not try to introduce into the proposed treaty

any matter which was incompatible with the interests of India. He

appealed to Indians to make a united effort to evolve a constitu-

tion which could be regarded as fair by all parties and interests

in India. (air However, these statements of Attlee and Wavell revealed

that the Labour Government in 1945 still implicitly believed in,

and adhered to, the Cripps' proposals as a basis tor settling the

Indian problem the very proposals which bad been rejected by all

the Indian parties. Although the Labour Government gave adequate

proof of its desire to tackle the Indian problem, at heart it was

still thinking in terms of a policy which was a product of the

once Conservative dominated coalition government. The new plan

seemed to be a hotch-potch combination of the scornfully rejected

Cripps proposals and the abortive Simla Plan.

(20) Ibid.' pp. 221-22.

(21) Ibid., P• .222.

- 488

The Congr$ss characterised this new plan as vague,

inad.equate and unsatisfactory, and deplored the absence' of any

mention of independence. The Muslim teague too reiterated its

stand that no solution would be acceptable except on the basis

of Pakistan. But lord Pethic'::Lawrence was "neither disturbed t

nor dishe'artened by. CthisJ response." ''The declaration", he

said, "is not itself a solution of the complex political problem

of India. • •• The deelaratio~ is the opening ot a road along

which Indians can travel to complete self•government."(22)

The announcement of the Labour Government plan for Iildia

was widely welcomed in British political circles. The Press(23)

- representing the Labour, pro-Labour, Left-wing and independent

shades of opinion - and most ot the commentators hailed the plan

as tbe dawn of lndia•s .freedom. If the mass of editorial comments were any indication of the Labour Government's approach to the

Indian question, 1 t showed that the \Labour Government was anxious

that its intentions in India were not any more misconstrued, and

that Britain was equally anxious that sovereign authority over

India passed into Indian bands.

·tabourites,R~action

Reginald Sorensen was dissatisfied with Lord Wavell 's

statement. He regretted that nothing was being done to form a

representative interim Cent•al Executive. He ch-.acterized the

emphasis on Cripps proposals as untortunate.(24) w.G. Cove

(22)

(23)

(24)

News Chronicle, 24 September 1945. For details see Pail% H§rald (25 September 1945), Reypolds News (23 September 1945), New Statesman and N§it!on (22 september l945)

3 Daily Worker {22 September 1945), and Ahe Econom1§~ (22 Sept.l945' The Hindu, 23 September 1945.

-489

deplored the revival of the Cripps plans "if only for psycholo•

gical reasons•:. (26) In his letter to the editor of the DailY

H~raldt Cove said "that the road to L-lndia•s_7 independence was

almost if not completely blocked". He felt that the new proposals

vere so effectively hedged in by Churchillian sate guards. He

said: "we are read'! to do everything for India except to get out."

If there was no difference between independence and Dominion

Stat'us, he pertinently asked, "Why not they make an unequivocal

declaration or Indian Independence?"(26) The reactions of both Sorensen and Cove to Britain's

proposed plan was consistent with the Labour Party's Left-wing

attitud.e towards the Indian issue. Both ware not satisfied with

the plan. Both desired and urged that Br.itain should do more in

the form of giving independence to India.

The v1ews and opinions expressed by the Labour1tes(27)

were illustrative or the kind and degree of influence they came to exert on the new Labour Government. Summing up the attitude

ot the Labour MPs, Cove remarked "we have no feeling of despair

or cynicism but hope in our·approach to the Government. We have

got to exercise pressure.. Our motto is trust 1b Labour Govern-

ment, but keep your powder dry."(28)

(25)

(26)

(27)

(28)

Ibid.

Dailz., Herald, 25 September 1945.

The Jlindu, 25 .August 1945. . Labourite Lord Faringdon, Barstow and J'ullus Silverman emphasized the urgency of the Indian problem; and the imperative need tor the Labour Government to proceed in the direction of Indian freedom.

Ibid.

- 490

A document signed by over SO members or Parliam.ent and

persons sympathetic to Indian nationalist aspirations welcomed

the Labour Government's initiative in invl ting the Viceroy to

London to discuss the Indian situation afresh and~leomed the

holding ot elections in India. It asked the Government to release

all pol1t1eal prisoners and urged that freedom of the Press and

speech, assembly, organisation and movement of persons within the

·country should be placed on a democratic basis and conform with

democratic practice. (29)

.Prof. H.J. Laski, speaking at the Trades nbion Congress,

stressed ;tbe importance of self-government and freedom for

India. (30) Prime .Minister Attlee declared that the Labour Govern-

ment wa.s giving the greatest attention to settle the problems of

self-government for India. (31)

Writing in the Je!f L!lfldJl (15 September 1945) on what Labour

should do about India, Fenner Brockway demanded the transference

of Indian affairs tD the Dominion Office; release of all pol! tical

prisoners; establishment of a responsible representative Indian

Government which should be responsible to the Central Assembly; and the summoning of a Constituent Assembly. Similar views were

expressed earlier by the l]ew I,eader. (1!:) September 1945).

The Jew Leader regretted the absence of the word

independence in the Labour Government's proposals for India. In

taet, it said, that the Government had failed to understand the

psoehology of India. It asked the Government to accept India's

(29) The ltlndu, 8 September 1945.

(30) Ibid., 12 September 1945.

(31) Ibid., 14 September 1945.

- 491

independence, to release prisoners and remove the ban on Congress.

It also favoured the expeditious introduction of democratic

franchise in India. (32)

A deputation representing the India League Parliamentary

Committee - consisting of Messrs. Dobbie, Sorensen, Cove, Platts•

Mills and Henry White met the Secretary of State for India on

17 September 1945. The deputation urged the revocation of

emergency in tbeprovinces; the reconstruction of the Central

Government; restoration of the civil liberties and the release of

political prisoners and to keep open the electoral registers.

Besides·, the dep.utationists were anxious that the Labour would not

be committed to continue the cautious Tory policy in regard to

India. They urged that a reiteration of the Cripps offer would

not ~e sufficient, and that differences among political parties in

India should not any longer be made the pretext tor inaction and

that 1n accordance with the Labour Party's principles and resolu•

tions, they should immediately take steps to implement the promise

of self•government on a truly democratic basis.(33)

!he move made by the new Labour Government to tackle the

Indian deadlock was strongly supported and influence exerted by

considerable sections of the British public opinion and ·t.abour!tes.

II

ALL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY DELEGATION

The pressures ot British public opinion and Party members

proved effective in prompting the Labour Government's move in

(32) For details see New Leader, 29 September 1945 (editorial), and 6 October 1945, Vol. XXXVII, No. 40.

(33) The Hindu, 20 September 1945.

- 492

regard to t·he Indian question. Thus the Labour Government •s

decision to send an All•Party Parliamentary Delegation to India

was not a sudden and spontaneous one. The Secretary of State

Lord Pethick•Lawrence hoped:

it 1s the wish of the Governmellt • • • and the people of tbis country that before long the Indian people will be given that self-government to which they are. entitled, a.nd which will place them on a footing of equality with others of His Majesty's

. dominions. (34)

~n 4th December 1945, Herbe~t Morrison in the louse of

.Commons, (35) simultaneously with the Secretary of state in the

House .or Lords 9 (36) announced that the Government would send an

all~Party Parliamentary delegation to India. Lord Pethiok-

La~ence said that the full significance of the proposals contained

in the Viceroy's, announcement ot 19 September had not been properly

appreciated. !he holding of discussions for the setting up of a

constitution-making body atter the election was not intended to

delay matters.· But the. Government regarded the setting up of a

constitution•liak:ing body by which Indians would decide their own

future as a matter of great urgency.

At the very beginning of the year 1946, in a broadcast

message Lord Peth!ek•Lawrence said that the year 1946 would be a

crucial year in India's age-long history. He wanted Indians to

realise that the British Government and the white British people

(34) Tbg HT.imeg, 16 November 1945. Also see a.s.L. Polak and others, n. 11, P• 301.

(36)

(36)

~~, Commons1 ParliaMfOtary Debates, Series s, Vol. 416, 1945-46 t COlS. 2l02- •

UK, Lords, ParliamentarY Debates, Series 5, Vol. 138, 1945~6, cols. 259~0. Also see The Time§, 5 December 1945.

- 493

earnestly desired to see India rise quickly to the ttlll and

free status or an Etql\al partner in the British Comtnonwealth. "The

problem is a practical one • It is to work out a rational and

acceptable plan or action. It must be a plan under wb.1cb. autho-

rity can be transferred to .Indian oontrol under forms of government I:,

wbich will willingly be accepted by the broad mass ot India• s

people ;;;so that the new India will not be torn and rent by internal

strife and d1ssension.s."(3?)

The Government considered that 1twou1d be an advantage

· lf members of the British rarliament could meet leading political

tnd1an· personalities to learn their views at first hand• and also

convey the general desire of the people of England that India

snoul4 $p$~~1ly attain ber fUll and rightful position as an indepen• dent statfi.:.:~n the .Britisb. Commonwealth. fhe Government. therefore•

. . ·.' . --.~~··

proposed to' send ~u.t to India an aU•Party Parliamentary Delegation

under tb.e auspices. ;l)f the Empire Parliamentary Association. ~he

Secretary or State said that the delegation would not be given power to commit the Go~:nment to any definite pol1oy.(38} "Not

.• as a device to play tor ti••· but as a possible interim means of

encouraging confidence in its resolute intentions both 1n India

and among 1ts supporters tb.e Government decided to send ~-this all• -Jlsrty Parliamentary Delegation../ to India. • •• "(39) 'The news of the Parliamentary Delegation• s visit to India

created •o great enthusiasm in India. fhe Delegation would neither (37) See Menon, n. 19, p. 226.

(38) 'OK, Lords1 Parliamentarl Debates, Series 5, Vol. 138• 5 December 1945, co1s. 63·54.

(39) C.H.Phillips and Mary Doreen Wainwright• eds., flle Pi£&1t1Qn J# Ind1i' ... foliC ies &Qg ftu;:s;geet1yea 1935·lti7 ~London, 1970) p. 535.

make an official enquiry nor submit a formal report. Except

two individual members - Reginald Sorensen and Woodrow Wyat~~

the other eight members of this delegation were neither distin-

guished persons in Britain's public life nor were well-informed

about Indian affairs. V.P.Menon commented:

Tbe proposed visit ot the Parliamentary delega-tion did not evoke any interest; because it was thought to be only a device to till the gap while the elections were in progress.(40)

The Socialis! Comm~n~!tl editorialized that the reason for the

lack of interest in India in the proppsed delegation was "the

various pronouncements on India made in the Labour Government's

name have not been imaginative or radical enough to uproot

L-India•s_7 suspicion about BritiSh intentions".(41)

- 494

The elections held for the Central Legislative Assembly

(and provincial legislatures) clearly established Congress and the

Muslim League as the only two most powerful parties that were to

· be reckoned with in Indian politics. The Congress, which polled

91.3 per cent of the votes in non-Mohammedan constituencies, won

57 seats; the Muslim League 30; :Independents 5, Akali Sikhs 2;

and Europeans a, making a total of 102 elected seats. The result ot this election was of_profound significance, both politically

and psychologically, and its impact was felt by the authorities

both in India and in Britain.

The delegation arrived on 5 January and it was in India

tor about a month. It consisted of ten members - eight were drawn

trom the House ot Commons and the other two trom the Bouse or

(40) ~anon, n. 19, p. 226.

(41) Socialist Commentatr, January 1946, p. 242.

- 495

Lords.(42) It was led by Robert Richards, a former ODder

Secretary ·Of State for India in the first Labour Government (1924).

On the eve of the Delegation's departure, tord Pethick-Lawrenee

wrote to the Presidents of the Congress and the Muslim League

informing them that the delegates were coming as individuals. They

were not empowered in any way to act on behalf of the British

Government. But thetlr impression would of course be conveyed by

them to the ministers and others in Parliament. The Secretary of

State hoped that cooperation would be extended to the Delegation.

The delegation "came a1mply as friendly enquirers anxious to learn -;t~.,.

all L theif could"(43) It is importAOt to Vote that the Labour Government, while

constituting the All--~rty Parliamentary Delegation, entertained

some misg·ivings about the suitability of the inclusion of certain

persons • more particularly in respect of R.W. Sorensen ~now

lord Sorensen_7, perhaps because of his staunch and relentless

advocacy of the Indian cause in the past, and his intimate associa-

tion with the India League Lne was its Pres1dentJ, an org~nisation

that strove tor, and spearheaded, the cause of Indian freedom. But

on~ber seeondtthoughts, the Government decided to include . 1

Sorensen (ln the d~legation) whose inclusion undoubtedly added

significance to this body which otherwise consisted of only

(42) The all-party Parliamentary Delegation consisted ot Prof. Robert Richards, MP, a former Ubder Secretary of State for India, (leader of the delegation) , Arthur Bottomley, MP, Mrs. Muriel Walbead Nichol, MP, Woodrow Wyatt, MP, Sorensen, (now Lord Sorensen} MP, and Lord Chorley, all belonged to the Labot.n' Party; R. Low, MP (now Lord Arlington), Godfrey Nicholson, .MP, Lord Munster, a former ODder-secretary of State for India, all Conservatives; and R .Hopkin Morris, Liberal MP.

(43) Philips and Wainwright, n. 39, p. 539.

obscure and unfamiliar faces as far as the Indian question was

·concerned. fbe members of this delegation varied in political

temperament and outlook. (44)

!fhe Delegat1on during its s o3 ourn in India met and held

talks with almost all the important political leaders in India.

- 496

,..., .. ttlt was an unasual Parliamentary Delcagation because • • • J. they.,./

bad to convince India that .Britain was sincere 1n her intention

to hand over power and that the Labour Government• s promise in

tbe King's speech of speedy self-government was not an empty

formula.•*(45)

At the conclusion or its tour of India,(46) the delegation,

while summing up 1ts impressions, acknowledged that the party

differences disappeared in the unity of tbe damand tor independence.

'fhe views expressed tv many members of tb.e delegation clearly reflected what tbey telt about India.- Robert Richards said;

- -We are all conscious • ~ ct J. In that.../ India has a.t last attained political manhood and it will be the p:r1v1lege of the Government ot England ••• to extend and further that confidence which India. bas in herself and in ner ability to take her place among-the free nations of the world •

Ma.~ or Woodrow Wyatt thought 11 lnd1a mu.st bec;ome independent tbis

year. • • • If sbe does not become in~pendent, her feat must be

irrevocably set o.n the road. to independence.,••

Immediately on their return to London, the Delegation

members stressed the urgency of the Indian political situation

- 497

and urged that the substance of' power must be transferred.(47)

' The delegation reported their 1mpre.ss1ons to the Cabinet. The

Cabinet was told that· .in the opinion of' the Delegation, the British

Government must arrange to withdraw from India with dignity or risk . being thrown out. The leader of the delegation stressed ttroremostly

- -i, this../ unanimous decision tb.at Indian must be guaranteed immedia-tely her national freedom: ,·and,.sovetetgn rights." (48) All members

of the Delegat~ on, regardless of' party distinctions. seemed to

concur in the conclusion. Most of them wesle also convinced that

Dominion Status was tio longer an adequate tormUla. On the q~estion

of PakiStan, the differences of opinion among tbe members of the

Del(:tgat1on appeared to be slightly mor.e marked.

The first-hand account of their impressions and appraisal

ot India given by tb.e Parliamentary Delegation went a considerable

way in prompting the Labour Government on their next move in regard

to Ind1a.(49) This next step eame when it was decided to send out

ttie Cabinet 1Uss1on to India.

(47) the li&OCUb 10 February 1946

(48) .. Philips and Wainwright, n. 39, P• 545,

(4.9) Len-d Sorensen (then l..fr. R. Sorensen), wb.o was one of the members of this delegation, has admitted that the Labour Government had already resolved to proceed in the direction ot giVing tndependenee to India.

For the Labour Government• s reaction to th.e delegat1on1 s appraisal of tb.e Indi.an si tuat1on, see Sore.nsen, n. 44·, p. 271 Frank Mora.est JawabarliJ.l Nebru; A »1QC'Ullli {Bombay, 1966) • pp. 315-16.

- 498

III

TlfE CABINE~ MISSION

Greatly influenced by the sitaation in India, arui the

Parliamentary delegation• s first nand information on India, the

Lab.our Government resolved to take the next b1e step in solving

.the Indian problem.. 'I'hus, tb.e Labour Government• s decision in

March 1946 to send out the Cabinet Mission to India was taken not

-on the $pur or the moment. It was the resUlt of a variety of

factors and bappe:n1ngs. Lengthy consultations took place

- 499

However, there is no gainsaying the fact that this incident made

clear to the Labour Government of Britain and the British authori•

ties in India that they could no longer rely upon the unflinching

loyalty of the armed. torces-one of the vanguards of British rule

in India. This realisation r,was one or the decisive factors ~icb

prompted the 'Labour LGovernment to initiate and hasten the process

of transfer of power to India.

In the meantime, the outcome or ele.ct1ons to the Indian

legislature convinced Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, that the Congress

commanded. majority support, and the only opposition to Congress

came from the MUslim League; and the League, in spite of its anti•

Congress posture, was not prorGovernment. Thus, in order to bridge

the gulf between Congress and the League, the Viceroy suggested to

the Home Government a three-phased programme - forming the Central

Executive representative of Principal. Parties on a proportional

basis, forming a Constituent Assembly to frame a constitution, and

bringing about governments in the provinces on a coalition basis.

The Secretary of State for India and the British Cabinet

found much to agree with the Viceroy's analysis of the Indian

situation,- but they felt grave doubts regarding his assumption that

the stages of negotiation could be kept in watertight compartments.

The Labour Government took the view that the Indian situation

demanded a different approach. It proposed sending out to India ..

a Cabinet Mission of three Ministers to conduct, in ass,ciation

with the Viceroy, negotiations with Indian leaders.

The Viceroy welcomed this proposal. The Labour Govern-

ment's decision to send out a Cabinet Mission to India was the

most 1mag1nat1~e one ever undertaken by a British Government in

- 500

the annals ot Indo-British relations. This decision showed a

marked change of spirit on Britain's part, the Labour Government's

awareness of the change of situation in India, and its effort to

approach. the Indian problem from the right angle.

On 19 February 1946 Lord Petbick•Lawrenca in the House of

Lords; simultaneously with Prime Minister Attlee in the House of

Commons declared: "in view of the paramount importance not only to

India and to the· British Commonwealth but to the peace of the world

ot the sucees.sful outcome of discussions with leaders of Indian

opinion" the· Government had decided to send out to India a special

mission of three Cabinet Ministers to seek, in association with

the Viceroy, an agreement with Indian leaders on the principles "*

we are mindful of the right·s of the minorities and the m1nor1tie s should be able to 11 ve free from·fear. on the other hand, w• cannot allow a m1nor1 ty 1D place their veto on the acJvance ·of the majo~1ty.(54) ·

- 501

The existence of sharp cleavage. between the Left-wingers .

and Right•wingers in the Labour Party in their attitude to the

Indian question influenced the Labour Government's approach to tbe

Indian question. This became evident when the personnel of the

Cabinet M1ss1on was announced. In fact, A. v. Alexander - one of

the three members ot the Cabinet Mlssion - "JAS, §gnt to tct iS f

l!rtake. on cr,ipp§ I enthU§iasm. and mtke the y_ltimate. arrangement I

!,£s;eptable t;p .~P9 rJs;ht-wipg of t}Je .. LabQUJ' Pjl"tx". (55)

The announcement was ~11 received in India. Congress

. President Azad characterised it as a wise decision. Gandhiji

appealed to the country not to suspect the bonafides or the Cabinet

Mission. Nehru noticed a pleasant change in Attlee 's statement.

Other parties too, while welcoming the Mission's visit, offered to

cooperate,

(54} UK; Commons, Parliam!ntary; !2ebate~, Series s, Vol. 420, 1945-46, cols. 1418•24.

(55} A.K.Majumdar, ~dvtnt of Ipdtpendtnce {Bombay, 1963) 1 p. 216. F~phasis added.

This could be further correborated by A.V.Alexander's vivid account about the Cabinet Mission. His detailed diary on the Cabinet Mission's work in India establishes beyond doubt the markedly serious differences of opinioO between A.V. Alexander on the one band, Cripps and Pethick-tawrence on the other, and the •mental alliance• between Alexander and Lord Wavell, the Viceroy, J!s-a-viJ Cripps and ~thick• Lawrence ·in their approach to, and assessment of, the Indian question. See for details A.V. Alexander, Qabtnet Mission's DiarY 1946 (Cambridge, Churchill College, unpu lished).

- 502

Parliamentary Debates

The GoverntrK=Jnt •s policy statement of 19 February was

debated(66) on 15 March in the House .of Commons. R.A.Butler,

Conservative MP, ope.ned the debate for the Conservative ·Opposition.

He trusted that the Cabinet Mission would go to India in a

"positive state. ·of mind". He desired that the Mission .would assist

in· establishing a machinery through which India •s freedom to decide

for herself J:l·er own d est!ny through a constitution or constitutions

framed by Indians representing the various elements and parties

in India •s nati('lnal ltfe. In making this statement, the Conserva-

tive MP made. clear the he still stood by, and considered as best ·

Britain's India policy announced bat the time of .the sending of the .

Cripps Mis s!on in March 1942. ~"Nicholson, Conservative MP, and

Hopkin Morris, ·Liberal MP, both members of the Parliamentary

Delegation, endorsed the Cabinet's decision to send a delegation to

India. Robert R1ehards, Labour MP, who led the Parliamentary

Delegation, said that the Mission was going out to India to assist

at the birth of a new era. Mrs. Nichol, R. Sorensen, Thomas Reid,

and William Cove, all Labour MPs wholeheartedly welcomed the

Government•s proposal to send the Cabinet Mission to India, stressed

the need ot Indian treedom, and considered that the very raet of a

Labour Government g1Y!ng independence to India would rally progress-

ive forces throughout the world.

Arthur Greenwood, (67) replying to the debate, (58) expressed

Government's pleasure at the tone and temper of the debate, and

(56) UK, Commons, Parliameptary Debates, Series 5 9 Vol. 420, 1945-46, cols. 1413-18.

(57} Ibid., cols. 1475•76.

(58) Ibid., cols. 1414-76 cover the entire debate.

---

- 603

said that this debate would clear suspicions from the minds of

the Indian people who would regard it as an expression of Britain's

goodwill in facing a very difficult and complex problem. Prime

Minister Attlee concluded, "We are resolved to succeed."

A remarkable sense of urgency and sincerity that pervaded

the House was amply borne out by the sympathetic tone and tenor of

this debate. Almost all the speakers, transeending their party

lol:alties, stressed the imperative need for finding a solution to

the Indian problem. Thus the Government•s decision of sending a

Cabinet Mission to India was widely supported by Parliament.

Th·e Left-wing Labour weekly, 1JiJW L§ad.f!L. (23 March 1946)

welcomed the Government's decision to send th~ Cabinet Mission to

India. But in an attempt to caution the Government 1 t expressed

the hope that India's right to choose to be in.dependent would not

be.:-bd.:t>ne halt•heartedly. For the negotiations, it appealed, a new

psychology snourd-be er-Gat-ed---by--r-elea-s~n-g-th-e-r-emaining pQlitical_

prisoners.

:rne ~§.binet Mi§sion PlaD As H.N.Brnilsford has remarked, "IDEALS AND EVENTS are the

twin poles around which allcaf)mic existence turns. To ignore either

is to misinterpret history and to tail to prepare tor the future". (59)

This is exactly the kind of situation that confronted the Cabinet

Yuss1on when 1t set out to chart the turbulent sea of Indian

politics in an attempt to find an answer to the Indian demand tor

independence. The Cabinet Mission arrived in Dndia on 24 March

1946. The Secretary of State tor India, Lord Pethick•Lawrence,

(59) See H.S.L. Polak and others, n. 11, p. 295.

•504

declared that the object was to set up quickly acceptable

machinery whereby Indians could determine the form of government

under which India could realise full independent status,. and to

make the necessary interim arrangements. H.V. Hodson has aptly

remarked:

Tho linking of those two purposes proved, in the event, the most difficult cf the 'M.f.ssion•s task, and a cause of its .final frustration; and this in turn was due, in large measure, tc conflict over the status of the l1uslim League as represen-tative of the Muslims of India.(60)

; .

This ne~A" procedure went much beyond Cripps • instructions in 1942.

Tne Mission was struek by the conflicting approaches of the

Congress and tbe League - united In.dia ver §Jl~ Pakistan.

"The Cabinet Mission's negotiations were held against the

lurid background of communal trouble''. ( 61) The members of the

Cabinet Mission "negotiated with the L-IndianJ party leaders on

terms or complete equality and considerable 1n.formality".(62) The

Cabinet ~ssion did not fail in doing their utmost to assist the

two rna!n political parties to reach agreement upon the fundamental

issue ot the unity or division of Indta. The Cabinet Mission

convened the Simla Con.ferenee wblcb proved abortive. This paved

the way tor the framing of the 16th May Plan whCch was simulta•

n.eously annomtced by .Prime Minister Attlee in the House of Commons

and the Cabinet Mission in India on 16 May. Despite the Mission's

acknowledgement of the universal desire for the unity of India,

"they were grea.tly impressed by the very genuine and acute anxiety

(60) Hodson, n. 15, p. 134.

(61) Pyarelal, .Hrulatmi& ·Gandhi,: c;rhe Last pba§~ (Ahmedabad, 1958), Vol. 2, p. 185.

(62) Hugh Tinker, n. a, p. 39.

- 505

of the Muslims lest they should find themselves subjected to a

perpetual Hindu majority rule". Attar examining the question or

the possibility ot a partition ot India, the Mission concluded

that neither a larger nor a small sovereign state ot Pakistan would

provide an acceptable solution tor the communal problem. The plan of 16 May envisaged: an Indian Union comprising

both British India and the lhdian States to deal with defence,

toreign atfa1rs 1 and communications; a constituent a.ssembly to be

elected by members of provincial legislative assemblies, the

provincial representatives would torm into three sections, and

the basis ot the constituent assembly would not be changed unless

agreed to by majority of members of each of, both the communities;

immediate appointment of an interim government supported by the

Indian parties; and conclusion of an agreement between the

Constituent Assembly and the United Kingdom.

The fundamental principles of the Cabinet Mission scheme

were deceptively simple. Theoretically all the warring parties

could have been satisfied. The ·teague was offered a d§ facto

Pakistan. The Congress could tind a tJni ted India, though somewhat

emasculated, and an assurance of provincial autonomy.(63)

The Cabinet Mission declared on 25 May that the authority

and the functions of the Constituent Assembly, and theprocedure

which it was intended to follow were clear from the Cabinet Mission's

statement of 16 May. The Mission stood by that statement.(64)

(63) Michael Brecher, Nehty: A Political Biograp!)Y (London, 1959), pp. 119-20.

(64) Despite this stand ·tord Petbick-Lawrence stressed to Gandhiji that Britain's express purpose was to "launch India on its passage to sovereignty and independence". See tor details PYJ,ll;elal, Ma~atma Gandhi; The tast Phase (Ahmedabad, 1956), Vol. I, p. 2 2.

- 506

It appealed to the Indian leaders and people to accept

the proposals "in a spirit of accommodation and goodwill, instead

or facing a grave danger of violence, chaos and even civil war".

Bob Edwards, Chairman of the ILP did not see "in the

Cabinet proposals ~embodied in the statement of 16 May_7 a

solution of the Indian problem based on ••• Socialist principles".

He declared that only the method of free elections could lay the

toundations for unity and "a Socialist India of the future". So

he urged the Brit.ish Government to declare immediately indepen-

dence tor India, to withdraw the British army from India, and to

hand over power to the Congress to form a transitional government

and organise elect1ons.(65) Tbe N§W L@ade~ recognised "the

-Government's proposals Las envisaged by the Cabinet Mission's -plan of 16 May../ tor India represent an historic advance*'. But

this advance, it said, became possible because there was a Labour

Gover.nment in Britain and the British Labour Movement bad pledged

to recognise India's independence. The Labour Government's

attitude to India, it rightly pointed out, has been determined by

other factors. (66)

(65) New L9ader, 1 June 1946.

(66) Ibid., 25 May 1946. Among the factors that determined the Labour Government 1s attitude to India, the New Leader rightly analysed that, firstly, the international tension with Russia made !ritain to realise that a discontented India would be a great weakness. A cooperating India, independent, allied to ~itain, would obviously be of great importance in that situation. Secondly, the acute felt desire to meet American criticism of British £'"policy towards freedom struggle in dependencies - particularly in lndi~. Thirdly, the awareness that Britain's political domination of India could not continue and that it was . better in the interest of Britain's economic future to make a deal with India as soon as possible,

- 507

The foregoing reactions of the Left-wing circles to tbe . plan of 16 May show. that they were not wholly sat! sfied with the

Labour Government's new offer, and were aware of the pertinent

factors that would influence the Labour Gc)vernment 's attitude to

the Indian ~uest1on. ·

The Ind.ian leaders failed to agree as to the ratio of representation or tH . .fferent parties in constituting the interim government. So the Cabinet Mission announced on 16 June that the

Viceroy should invite .fourteen persons to serve as members of the

1nter1m .Government, and that constitlltion•making would proceed on

the basis of 16 May plan. The scheme of interim Government as

suggested by the Cabinet Mission's statement of 16 June "was ·a

perilous compromise between the two fundamentals on ~ich it

rested .. parity between caste Hindus and Muslims and the acknowledge-

ment of the League claims to appoint all the Muslim members -

had been the chief bones ot contention during the First Simla

Conference, Which had been broken over the second of them."(67)

The Cabinet M1ss1on proposals demonstrated "the British

conviction that continued unity alone was practicable, they offered

a considered and in some respe~ts ingenious attempt to reconcile

that unity with the entrenchment of minority•eommunity rights;

and, finally they afforded conclusive evidence of the British

desire to withdraw from India at the earliest possible moment."(68)

The basic drawback of the Cabinet Mission's scheme was its eomple•

xity and cumbersome procedure. "The three-tier scheme ••• was an

(67)

(68)

E. W.R. Lumby, The Transfer pt..,.Power (London,l954), p. 99.

lUcbolas Mansergh, Survey pr British Commonwealth Affairs, 1939•1952 (London, Oxford university Press, 1958), Vol. 2, p. 218.

intellectual ~PYt de force but it was impracticable in the

environment of a deadly struggle for power. It would have led

- 508

to endless trict.ion betw4;?en the Centre, the Groups and the

provinces, and between the Congress and the League, making efficient r .

adm1JJ.~strat1on impqssible. "(69) ••A great document ••• the ,l .

CCabinetJ Mi_ssi.on .plan. might bave been had it not been based

upon an ambiguity and .sustained by a double cross. • • • In the

end it had to be abandoned ~ a casualty to the philosophy of

empiricism". (70) The abandonment of this plan became inevitable

because it tailed to provide the direly needed panacea to the

political tangled skein ot India.

Whatever might be said in support of the Cabinet Mission's

proposals and achievements, it is hardly deniable that the Cabinet

Mission did not succeed in. translating tits ostensible object into

concaete action. It was not solely because of Hindu-Muslim

antagonism, an.d lack ot finesse displayed by Wavell, as claimed

by Attlee, this could, to a ·very great extent, be attributed to

the marked differences of opinion among the members of the Cabinet

Mission and the Viceroy and the marked absence of oneness in t:, 1 c

·their approach to, and assessment of, the Indian problem. The Cabinet

Mission and the Viceroy did not see eye to eye with the Indian

prQblem. The differences between the Viceroy, and the Cabinet

Mission - particularly Pethick-La~ence and Cripps - were consider-

able and became acute at many a point to indicate as if they were

pursuing conflicting approaches.(2) Even among the Cabinet Mission

members - between A. V. Alexander on the one band, and

(69) Ibid., P• 122.

(70) · Pyarelal, no. 61, p. 216.

- 509

Lord Pethiek•Lawrence and Cripps on the other - there were

differences ot opinion on many aspects of the Indian problem, and

these differences became so marked at times as to bring together

Lord wavell and A.V.Alexander as against Pethick-tawrence and

Cripp.s. (3} The manner in which wavell and Alexander argued and

upheld relentlessly the importance of the Muslim League's views

and cause created an 1nerasible impression of their being pro-

Muslim.

This difference among the Cabinet Mission members and the

Viceroy 1s markedly discsrnible in their conflicting views on, and

approaches to, the interim Government, its status and power; the

Constituent ASsembly, its legal basis and procedureJ leaders like

Gandhi and 31nnah; and the constitutional issue.

It was, therefore, not surprising that the Cabinet Mission

failed in accomplishing its avowed objective - to seek agreement,

in conjunction with leaders or Indian opinion, on principles and

procedure relating to the Indian constitutional issue. It is 1.

true that the Cabinet Mission did their best to find a solution to

the problem. But what they did not look upon with favour and equa•

1 nimity, and tried to avoid outwardly, they quietly and deliberately

brought them through the back door. This trcould be seen conspicuously

ln three vital respects. Firstly, they gave the impression of their

sincere desire to avoid partition, and preserve intact India's

unity. But this was subverted by their own act of according

de fa£!2 recognition to the birth of Pakistan which was facilitated

through the grouping of provinces. secondly, they showed their

unwillingness to comply with the Muslim League's demand for parity

- 510

with the Hindus and the League's sole right to nominate all its

representatives to the interim government. Again, not being unaware

of the harmtul consequence, the Mission conceded those very demands

in the.ir 16 June statement concerning interim Government. Thirdly,

they desired to preserve India's unity -at least the facade ot

unity - but they destroyed it by their ingenious constitutional

plan whicb sought to establish a very frangile confederation of two

full-fledged sovereign federal states. In short, what the Cabinet

Mission was inclined to achieve w the right hand, it :·not unwittingly killed it by its lett hand.

Cab,inet Jlss'pp Proposals and ~be Labour1tes

!he Labour Party's annual conference in June 1946 at

Bournemoutb reflected-the prevailing attitude of the Labour Party

and Government to the lbdian question.(?!) The conference sent a

message of goodwill to Lord Pethick•Lawrence. It wished the

Cabinet Mission success, and hoped that an independent India would

soon emerge. Prof. Catlin speaking at this conference said: "one

ot the brightest page.s or British history was now being written by the Cabinet Mission in lndia".(72) Prof.· H.J. Laski declared that

the imminent independence tor India demonstrated "the sense of

imaginative magananimity ••• ot Great Britain".(73) Prime Minister

Att lee said &

(7l)?laH1ndu, 15 June 1946

(72) !bid.

(73) Ibid., 11 June 1946.

We have invited the people of India to decide their· own destiny. If they will stay with us in the British Commonwealth we shall welcome

them. It they desire to go out, we shall stretch out the band of friendship to them.(74)

- 511

These utterances reflected a sense ot realism and urgency on the

part ot the Labour leaders and their earnest desire to settle the

Indian issue.

While welcoming the proposals, Fenner Brockway(76)

regretted that the Cabinet Mission, rather than the Indians them•

selves, bad to outline the proposals. He thought that the Short-

term plan would allow Indians to have immedidte responsibility,

and the long-term plan would give Indians the right to choose their

own torm.ot independence. Lord Strabolgi(76) considered the plan

of the Cabinet Mission as "a stateamanlike document". The grouping

of provinces seemed to him to be the fairest proposal.(??) W.G.

Cove, Labour MP, was sat.isfied that the principle ot Pak.istan was

rejec~ed. He said a "It is vitally necessary that the Indian un1 ty .. should be maintained". Laster Hutchinson, (78) another Labour MP,

commented that the Cabinet Mission •s proposals were of historic

importance. He justified the rejection of Pakistan on geographic

and economic lines. He advised the Indian leaders to accept the

British Government proposals as a fair basis upon which they

themselves could amend and improve.

(74) The Rt. Bon'ble C.R. Attlee, ~ol1cy and pyrpoge: Selected Speeehep (London, 1946), p. 47. Also see The Hindu, 12 June 1946.

(75)

(76) (77) (78)

AlJe Hindu, 17 May 1946;

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

also T}le Times, 17 May 1946.

- 512

Comment'ing on the Viceroy's scheme for interim Government,

Prot. George Catlin(79) saidc "It does seem as if the situation

has taken a detini te turn for the better". He reaffirmed that

Britain was writing one of the brightest pages of her history in

her handling ot the Indian situation. R•W• Sorensen,(80) ·Labour

MP, welcomed the Viceroy's move. Be held the view that it was the

only way out.

PifliamentarY Debate on tpe Cabinet tt!sslon flAP

On 18 July the Secretary of State, Lord Pethick•Lawrence,

rev1ewed(81) the Cabinet Mission's work in the House of lords. He

appealed to the Congress ana the Muslim League to put aside their keen communal and party feel~s and work together tor the good

of India. He said that the Cabinet Mission •s two-told task was

to c·onvince Indians of the si1•carity ot the British peopJe in

otfering them independence within or without the British Common-

wealth, according to their choice, and to bridge the apparently

unbridgeable gap separating the rival views of the two great

Indian parties.

A similar statement (8.2) made by Sir Stafford Cripps on

18 JUly in the House of Commons ensued a debate. Cripps said

that the circumstances in 1946 were vastly different trom those

or 1942 or 1939. In India, he said, there was full political

(79) Th2 Hindu, 18 June 1946.

(80) Ibid.

(81) UK, 'Lords, Pgrliamgntary Pebates, Series 5, Vol. 142, 1945-46, eols. 579•91.

(82) UK, Commons, PArliamentarY Debates, Series s, Vol. 425, 1945-46, cols. 1394-1416.

- 513

awakenin.g after the war. He axpressed the be11efa "our best hope

of maintaining the valued friendship and cooperation of the Indian

peop1e was to offer them their f~l and untratmneled freedom as to

their own tuture and to help them to the best of our ability to

achieve their desires as smoothly and quickly as possible". To

Cripps no other approach would have had any chance of success at all.

The copies or this statement g1 ven to Pressmen in advance

on the eve of the debate differed. in one vital respect from the

actual statements ma.ae by Lord Pethick-Lawrence and Sir Stafford

Cripps in Parliament. The Government originally intended "simply c.o..louJ\ "-Q.~7>

to give Parliament a

and in tact, made on 18 July. This last minute change in the

ministerial statement was not only a rebuff to Jawaharlal Nehru '

and the Congress but it was a great concession made to soften

- 514

Jinnah. This dramatic change in the Government's stand reinvigo-' rated and greatly accelerated Jinnah's intransigent claim for a

separate sovereign State for Muslims. This change would be of

considerable significance from the point of view of assessing the

Labour Government • s reaction to Congre.ss' stand on the Constituent

Assembly's status, procedure and functioning.

Cripp·s declared that 1 t was ( 1an essential feature of the

Cabinet Mission's scheme that the provinces should go into the

se.ctions. The representatives of both the parties in the Consti-

tuent Assembly were at liberty to advance their views ,as to what

should or ~shotild not be the basis of the future constitution. The

purpose' of the Const·ttuent Assembly, he said, was to hammer out

an agreement from diverse opinion and plans. They were not

expected to go outside the terms of the statement of 16 May as

that t·would not be .fair to other parties who eame in on the basis

of that agreed procedure. The success of the new constitution, he

held, would depend on the tree consent of many diverse elements of ·

lndian people. He emphasized that a union could not be forced,

and that it must be by agreement. He concluded that it was the

task of the Constituent Assembly to attain that agreement.

Winston Churchill launched(84) an attack on Government's policy~

He contended that the directions given to the Cabinet Mission went

beyond the 'Cripps Offer' made in 1942. The Coalition. Government

(84) UK, Comnonsi· Parliamentary Debates, Series 5, Vol. 425, 1945-46, co s. 1416-425.

-.515 1

headed by him, he said, offered Dominion Status of the westminster

type. :But the Labour Government, he grumbled, instructed the

Cabinet Mis s1on to offer full independence instead of Dominion

status. The speech of Sir stanley Reid,(85) another Conservative

MP, was not disheartening. Disagreeing with Churchill's stand,·~he

sa1d.that they were taoed with one ot the greatest events in the

history ot the human race - the transfer of power by Britain to

India. He looked torwarded to the day when India would enter the

British Commonwealth as a free and equal partner.

Cove,(86) Labour MP, characterised Churchill's speech as a

mischievous one intended to prevent progress. The plan, he said,

.was a resilient one and Britain would not afford to offen.d the

Muslims. He hoped the minorities would not be so safeguarded as

to prevent the voice of the majority having its rule in India. It r--,

is very important to note that although Cove specificJ·ally asked .._,

that tho Government spokesman should make clear whether the entry

into the groups would be tree or eoiDpulsory, A. v. Alexander, reply-ing, ignored th~point altogether. Thomas Reid(87) said that the

time was long past when Britain could rule India without consent.

He .appealed to Indians to set up an Interim Government and sweep

aside little trivialit1es.(88)

Winding up the d.ebate A. v. Alexander, (89) one of the members of the Cabinet Mission said, "to say we have made divergence

from 1942 is really splitting hairs". He repudiated the arguments

(85) Ibid.' cola. 1426•29'. (86) Ibid.' cols. 1429-31. {87) Ibid., eols. 1432-35·. (88) Ibid.' cols. 1436•37. (89) Ibid.' cols. 1442-48.

- 516

of Churchill. In 1946, be declared, tbey had to deal with a

situation when there was political awakening throughout the world,

and especially in the East. He agreed that "the ultimate end of

British rule sho.uld be to bring indeJendence and freedom to the

peoples with whom we have associated. It 1s ln. promotion of that

spirit ~e have taken our Mission". He concluded that there was

no reason wh~~!. they should not make rapid and substanti~+ progress

to the complete freedom ~t India.

!'t is undeniable that this stand of the Labour Government

was in no small measure 'influenced by the irrepressible and

irresistible tide against imperialism in the post-war world; also,

Br.itain 's depleted economic resources could ill-afford to maintain

the far•flung empire. The Labour Government understood "the

forces working tor Indian independence to have successfully asserted

themselves"• {90) Commenting on this debate, 1he T~Jne§ (19 July

1946) wrot,e:

The~have manifested both to India and the world the determination of the people of Britain ••• to transfer unconditionally to the people of India every vestige of authority • • • and ••• complete national sovereignty.

The Government spokesmen's statements and replies in tbe

course ot this debate bear eloquent testimony to the Labour Govern-

ment's sincere desire to transfer power to India in an orderly

manner. With the exception of Winston Churchill, the Parliamentary

debate on the whole was marked by caution, moderation and

restraint. The Labourites stood behind the Government's plan and

earnestly a~pealed to Indians to avail themselves ot the opportunity

to accept and work the new scheme.

(90) .§peiali§t Commentary, July 1946, p. 382.

- 517

The Indian political scene

After the departure of the Cabinet Mission and before

the advent. ot the Interim Government and Constituent Assembly two

important political developments occurred in India. These develop-

ments, to a very great extent, determined, influenced and shaped

the course ot Indian politics and the Labour GOvernment's India

policy in the following months. Firstly, the AICC meeting at

Bombay on 6 July ratified the Congress Working Committee's resolu-

tion reaccepting the Cabinet Mission's plan. Pandit Nehru declared

that they would remain in the Constituent Assembly so long as they

thought it was tor India's good and they would come out when they

thought it was injuring their interests. He stressed that he would

have no tr·eaty with the British Government if they sought to:;.impose

anything on India; and the minorities issue was a domestic problem.

"We accept no outsider •s interference 1m it • • • and theredJil'e these

two limiting factors to the sovereignty of the Constituent

Assembly of India are not accepted".(91)

This statement of Jawabarlal Nehru about the role of the

Constituent Assembly and Congress' attitude to the 16 May Plan

brought about definitely a marked change in the atti tud.e of the

Labour Government in regard to the Indian question !~general and

Congress leaders in particular. Cripps and his colleagues - parti-

cularly Attlee and Petbick-Lawrence - fostered a grievance in

thier minds against the Congress leaders that they trifled with

the British plan as set out in the statement of 16 May. They could

not get over this t.i::;gr1evance. Cripps, Attlee and Pethick-Lawrence

(91) ~ian Annual Register, 1946, Vol. II, pp.146-47.

- 518

were united in their demand "that Congress should now by a way

of supreme effort remove the doubts and suspicions in the Muslim

m1nd, L~andJ tell the world quite bluntly ••• L-that theyJ

accepted the British interpretation of the Cabinet Mission's

statement of December 6tb".(92) This stubborn stand of the Labour

Government would give an insight into the Government's latest

thinking on the Indian question. Thus the Labour Government

declared, rightly or wrongly, that an unqualified acceptance by

Congress of the British interpretation of the 16 May Plan as the

minimum condition to make aD7 further tangible and constructive

move to cut the gordian knot in India.

The utterances of Nehru angered Jinnah who charact4rised

Nehru's statement a·s "a complete repuc.Uation of the basic formula

upon which the long-term scheme rested and all its fundamentals,

terms and obligations and rights of parties accepting the

scheme". (93) Sensing the retaliatory mood of Jinnah, the Labour

Government's spokesmen substantially modified their statements(94)

in Parliament with a view to assuaging the bitter feelings of

J'innab, but in vain. The most dangerous and unpleasant manner -

the League's resolve to observe the Direct Action Day on 16 A~ust -,......_

in which J1nnah retaliated to the Congress sounded the last bUJ,gle ........ of the Cabinet Mission plan.

(92) Sudhir Ghosh, Gandhi's Emissary (London, 1967), pp. 202-oa. ( 93) Quoted in Menon, n. 19, · p. 284. See also Ingip.n Annual

Registei, 1946, Vol. 2, pp. 167•71. These pages cover Jlnnah•s speech at the meeting or the All-India Muslim League 1s Council. In the course ot hls speech J1nnah attacked Nehru's statement.

(94) see ante, pp. 35•36.

- 519

The observance of this day brought in its wake an orgy

or violence, bloodshed, killing and human sufferings. After this

incident, the Congress suggested to the Labour Government that it

should either "transfer complete power to the Indian Government",

or "the replacement ot Lord Wavell by a man with a greater persona-

lity .••• skilled in ••• the science of human relationships". (95)

But the Labour Government remained reticent and definitely dis-

inclined to commit itself, categorically to either of these

courses. However, it does not mean that the Labour Government was

tot.ally unaware of the gr~vity of the explosive situation in India

and utterly reluctant to move in this matter.

The resolution of the t~slim taaguo was widely regretted

and commented upon by the British Labourites and Press. The news

of this resolution caused considerable gloom among members of all

parties in the House of Commons. (96) All expressed deep regret.

Sorensen hoped that the ~uslim League would modify its attitude

later and that preparations tor the Constituent Assembly would

nevertheless go on. le said a "It is a great disappointment for

Labour". (97) J1rs. M. Nichol, Labour MP, characterised this as a

tragic .disappointment .• (98) A special meeting ot the India Group

of Labour MPs convened at the House of Commons on 30 July

discussed the latest developments in India arising out ot the

League's resolution. Major Woodrow Wyatt, MP, who presided over

this meeting, was understood to have made a long speech indicating

the s1gn1t1cance of the latest Muslim move.(99) In respect of

• (95) Sudhir Ghosh, n. 92, pp. 188-90. (96) The Hindu, 30 July 1946. (97) Ibid. (98) Ibid. (99) Ibid., 31 July 1946.

-520

the magnitude of disaster wrought by the observance of the

'Direct Action ·DaY' there were differences between prominent

Left•wing Labourites and Government. It is very strange that the

Government spokesman agreed that tension was still high but he

disagr_eed as to the nature and magnitude of the disaster. (100)

Even-the Conservative MPs and Press reacted unfavourably(lOl) to

this latest move of Jinnah.

IV

INTERD1 GOVERNMENT AND THE CONSTITtrriONAL CRISIS

The Cabinet Mission during its stay 1n India honestly

endeavoured to set up an interJ.m Government, but their efforts

bore no frUit. So they approved and authorised the Viceroy to

constitute a caretaker government of officials as a stop gap

arrang~ment.(l02)

With the emergence of the Congress and the Muslim League

as the victorious major parties in. the elections to the Consti-

tuent Assembly, the Indian political impasse was complete. Comment-

ing o~ the Indian political scene, Woodrow Wyatt, Labour MP,

warned; "if tbe British failed soon to find a way of handing over

L-power to Indians_7 smoothly, there may ••• be a revolution to

drive them out". Be candidly suggested that the only cure to the

-------------------(100)

(101)

(102)

UK, Commons, Parr§iimentarr pebates, Series s, Vol. 426, 1945-46, eols~ 16•20.

Quinton Hogg, Leader. of the Conservative Group, expressed his deep regret and disappointment. Godfrey Nicholson, another Conservative, considered it as a tragedy.

Alexand.er Papers, pabinet Mission DiarY (Cambridge, Churchill College Library), p. 102.

Indian tangle was "to _sea thB:t they L-the · Indian leadersJ get

l"esponsibility without delay". (103) It a deadlock occurred in

regard to the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, be felt "it

- 621

will und011betedly fall to the lot of the British to take the

initiative in resolving 1t".(l04) The Viceroy(lOp) got in touch

~1th the Seer~tary of State on the subject ot forming an interim

Government. With the approval of the Secretary ot State, the

Viceroy wrote confidentially on 22 July to Nehru and J1nnah stress•

ing the need. tor forming an interim Government and soliciting

their cooperation in that task.(l06) Both Nehru and Jinnah, for

different reasons, rejected this offer. (107) The Secretary ot

State agreed that the Viceroy should see Nehru but suggested that

it the situation showed signs of moving towards a crisis, the

represantatives ot both Congress and the Muslim League might be

sent to London to discuss the situation.

The Muslim League's resolution of 29 July caused consider-

able anxiety to the Government. The Viceroy f'elt the urgent need

tor a representative Central Government. He was anxious, even

though be was against the idea of a Government dominated by one

party, to get the r~ngress in, while keeping the places for the

Muslim League vacant.

( 103) See Woodrow Wyatt 1 s article "Ferment in India" in the New Statesman. and liati9n, 20 July 1946, p. 40 ff.

(104) Ibid. , 27 July 1946; p. 62.

(105) Uenon, n. 19, p. 288.

(106) Ibid.' pp. 288•89.

(107) Ibid., pp. 289-90.

- 522

The Secretary of State felt that it was impossible to

allow Jinnah•s non-cooperation to bold up the formation of an

interim Government and that the Viceroy should therefore persuade

Jinnah to allow the League members to enter the Government. The

Secretary of State agreed that it would not be desirable to see

Jinn&h immediately and that an offer should be made to Nehru to

form an interim Government. It was left to the Viceroy to decide

whether the .Muslim League places should be kept vacant or not.

If the Congress declined to come in, the si tu.ation would have to

be considered further. The Secretary ot state fully.sbared thQ

Viceroy's dislike of an interim Government dominated by one party,

but in view o£ the grave political situation prevailing in India

he agreed to the necessity of forming an interim Government with

popular support. (108)

With the concurrence of the Home Government, the Viceroy

on 6 August invited Nehru to form an interim Government. The

decision to go ~ead without the Muslilll League had been taken,

not without considerable misgivings.

The Congress Working Committee meeting (109) at Wardha on

8 August accepted the Viceroy's invitation to form Government and

authorised Nshru to negotiate with the Vicer_oy. By another resolu-

tion, it sought to enlist the cooperation of the Muslim League.

But this did not satisfy J1nnah.

On 24 August, the personnel of the Interim Government was

announeed. On the same day• the Viceroy in his broadcast(llO)

------------------~· (108). Ibid., p. 290.

{109) All•India Congress Committee, Xndiap National Congress March 1940- September 1946 (Allahabad, n.d.), pp.l67-69.

(110) Th§ Hindu, 25 August 1946. Also %,be Time§, 25 August 1946 • . J

- 523

d ascribed ,the formation of the inter 1m Government as a very

momentous step taken forward on India •s road to fre.edom. He

stressed that he would fully implement the Home Government's

policy of giving the new Government maximum freedom in the day-

to-day administration of the country. It was desirable, he said,

that the Constituent Assembly should begin its work as early as

possible, and the procedure laid down in the statement of 16 May

regarding the traming of provincial and group constitutions should

be faithfully adhered to. He hoped that the Muslim League would

reco~s1der its decision to take part in the plan. He appealed to

Indians to sb_ow that they were sworthy of their country and their

country was worthy ot the freedom it was to receive.

"During the autumn of 1946 events heavy with consequences

for India's destiny moved uneasily on".(lll) The Home Government

was anxious that the interim Government should at once take office.

Towards the end of August 1946, Attlee in a personal telegram to

Wavell, instructed him to go ahead and torm an interim Government,

without the Muslim League. Attlee's tsar was that, if procrastina-.

tion continued, Congress would turn against the British Government

and once again break out in rebell1on.(ll2) At the Viceroy's

suggestion, Nehru sought Jirmah 's cooperation in forming the

Government but he got no positive response. The interim Government

assumed office on 2 September.

It is indisputable that the Labour Government and the

Viceroy were sincerely interested in their desire to set up the

(111) Vera Britain, Petbick·I.awrence: A Portrait (London, 1963), p. 183.

(lla) Michael Edwards, The L&st Years of British Ryl§ 1n india (London, 1963), P• 123.

-524

interim Government. But 1 t is equally Wldeniabla that: 1) the

Viceroy's proposal assented to by the Home Government, t.o hasten

tne foprocess ot torming the interim Government was solely influenced

by India's stern po11t1cal realities and the p;essing need for a

representative Indian Government based on popular backing. 2J Both

the Viceroy and the Secretary of 8tate intensely disliked the idea

ot allowing either or the conflicting parties - Congress and the

Muslim League - to dominate the interim Government. Mainly because

of the grave situation wrought by the 'Direct Action• resolution

of the League and its blatant refusal to cooperate with Congress

in forming the interim Government, the British authorities did not

vant to miss the initiative, so they invited the Congress, to

begin with, to torm interim Government. 3) '.7:n view of the change

that became e"Vident in the Viceroy's attitude towards the formation

of interim Government, it is highly doubtful whether the Viceroy

would have allowed the 1nterim·Government to come into being atal1t

had he.been left to himself to decide the matter. Despite this

discernible change in the·Viceroy•s thinking it was the Home

Gover.nment •s anxiety and firm decision that were considerably

responsible tor the advent ot the Congress-led interim Government.

The Daily He~ald (6 September 1946) described the acceptance

ot pOW'er by Pandit Nehru and his colleagues as "a supreme act ot

courage and ot taith". It askeda "Can Mr. Jinnah let £the dreadful

warnings of Bombay and Calcutta.] go unheeded when his statesman•

like share in the constitution-making could save this country from

fresh wounds". The New statesman and Nation (14 September 1946)

said that the Congress• "prestige has been enhanced by its

assumption of responsibility, while that of the Muslim League has

- 525

been depressed bY its negative attitude."

The British Press welcomed the birth of the new regime in

India. But at the same time it made pointed reference to the

absence of the Muslim League in the new Government.

Nehru 1n his broadcast(ll3) on 7 September said that the

interim Government was part ot a larger scheme, which included . .

the Constituent Assembly. The Congress, be said, indeed had

accepted the position ot sitting in groups which would consider

the formation of groups. The Congress did not look upon the

Constituent Assembly as an arena tor conflict, or tor the forcible

imposition of one point of view over another. The Congress, he

said; wanted to go to the Constituent Assembly with the fixed

determination to have a oo#mon basis of agreement on all oontro• "

versial issues. He invited the League to enter the Constituent

Assembly as equals and partners with them. As a rejoinder to this,

Jinnab said that Nehru '*has made no definite proposals to me; you

cannot butter paranips with words".(ll4)

The catastrophic consequences wrought by the 'Direct

Action Dar• bad hardened theVieeroy's determination to bring the

Muls1m League into the Government. There cropped up between the

V1c$roY and the Secretary of State a conflict of views as to the

methods of dealing with the

-526

issue and to adhere to the statement of 16 May. He was prepared

to lose the cooperation of the Congress than go ahead with the

const1 tution•making on a one-party basis, ~\which the Cabinet Mission

had never intended.

The Viceroy took thjs rigid attitude because of the Cabinet

Mission's assurance(ll5) to the Muslim teague that decisions in

the sections would be by a majority vote of the representatives ot

the provincGs within the section; and the constitution for the

provinces would definitely be framed by the sactione. So, the

Viceroy talt' that His MaJesty's Government was in honour bound to I

respect this assurance. Sut the implementation of this assurance,

which had been given without full considerations, was beset with

great practical difficulties.

The Secretary of state agreed to the Viceroy's p,roposal of

meeting .tinnab to reach a settlement. (116) The Viceroy m.et Jinnah

end urged him to bring the League into ths Government. But Jinnab

sought certain clarifications.

The Congress was not willibg to give up its claim to have

a nationalist Muslim as one of its representatives in the Govern•

ment, and to accept at its face value the Muslim League's claim

that it was the sola representative of the Muslims of India. Tbe

clarifications and assurances given by the Viceroy to Jinnah, modi-

fied Jinnah's stand on the r~sl~ League1s entry into the Government.

On 13 October Jinnah wrote to the Viceroy"••• for other very

weighty grounds and reasons which are obvious and need not be ' mentie.tned," th~ bad decided to join the Interim Government: (117)

(115) (116) (117)

Ibid.' p. 311. Ibid. Hodson, n. 15, p. 171.

- 527

Ckl 15 ~october the interim Government was reconstituted

by including the League •s nominees. By its delaying tactics the

League did not gain anything mora than what was offered. .As v. Po. Menon has aptly pointed out, "the League bad accepted from the

Viceroy what it had refused from the Congress". l'he Times

(15 October 1946) deolElred that tho Muslim League •s decision t·o

join the Government "marks the beginning of a new and promising

stage in ths progress of India towards tho satisfaction of national

aspirations" •

. Tbe manner in which the process of interim Government· was

completed, and tbe correspondence and consultation that tookr·plaee

bett;een tb~ Viceroy end the Secretary of State establish that

Wavel.l's relentless endeavours in bringing the Muslim League into

the interim Government and his blunt suggestion to Congress to

accept publicly a f'ormula of hAs own devising favourable to the

Muslim League •s stand, were no doubt actuated by his earnest desire

to bring both the parties toQether which was absolutely essential

to the smoot