CHAPTER THREE

An Exposition of Hegel's Dialectic with Reference to his Epistemology and Ontology

CHAPTER THREE

An Exposition of Hegel's Dialectic with Reference to his

Epistemology and Ontology

In the present chapter, I shall discuss the dialectic of G.W.F.Hegel in

epistemological and ontological situations as expounded by him primarily in

Science of Logic (1812-16). Dialectic also presents the basic procedure

adopted by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) and the Philosophy

of Right (1821). I shall start with Hegel's critical assessment of Kant's

dialectic of reason. In Hegel's philosophical system, the method of dialectic

moves with two operative terms, viz. contradiction and sublation

(Aujheben). I shall try to show that these are not two separate terms, but

mutually interdependent and under certain circumstances, they pass into

each other. In this way, as the dialectic of Hegel operates, nothing is ever

lost. Each step in the process takes up into itself what was passed before it

and is, in turn, taken up by the step that follows. The final category of Logic-

the notion of Geist - sublates within itself all previous categories whatever.

At the end, I shall attempt to show that since Hegel's dialectical

principles are the explications of the connectedness of the categories of

logic, hence dialectic is operating in our thought alone. This illustrates the

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method of abstraction employed in Hegel. He realized this, but could not

overcome this method substantially. So, his dialectical principles remain

confined to the sphere of the Geist. Post-Hegelian developments are

basically reactions to Hegel's overemphasis on the notion of Geist.

For the sake of clarity and precision, I shall divide the whole chapter

into three parts:

1) Hegel's critical assessment of Kant's 'Transcendental Dialectic'.

2) Hegel's formulation of dialectic as presented in the Science of Logic,

Phenomenology of Spirit and the Philosophy of Right.

3) Concluding remarks on Hegel's dialectic.

Let us take them one-by-one:

Part 1

Hegel starts with the claim that the substance of all prevIOus

philosophies is contained, preserved and absorbed in his own system.

However, we find that " ... there are two influences upon him which far

outweigh in importance all the others. These are the idealism of the Greeks

and the critical philosophy of Kant. The fundamental principles of Hegel are

the fundamental principles of the Greeks and of Kant".' It may, therefore,

I Stace, W.T., The Philosophy of Hegel, 1955 (New York, Dover Publications Inc.), p. 43.

68

arguably be said that though Hegel's dialectic IS constructed upon a

foundation that has already been laid by Kant.

Hegel acknowledges Kant's 'transcendental dialectic' as his greatest

contribution to philosophy; both for its basic distinction between

'understanding' and 'reason', and for its insights into the nature of our

attempts to apply our concepts to the absolute unconditioned.

Hegel recognizes very clearly that the critical philosophy of Kant

represents the watershed between rationalism and empiricism and as a

matter of fact, he appreciates Kant un stinkingly for this in Science of Logic.

But at the same time, he vehemently criticizes Kant for stopping short at

'what is, at best, a halfway station'. Far from being content with Kant's

rejection of metaphysics, Hegel proceeds to build a new metaphysical

system based on his own exposition of the notions of understanding, reason

and dialectic. In fact, in his Science of Logic, Hegel clearly says that:

"It is to be remembered that I frequently take the Kantian philosophy

into consideration in this work (superfluous though this may seem to some),

because however its detailed determinations and the individual parts of its

development may be regarded in this work and elsewhere, it still remains the

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basis and beginning of modern German philosophy; whatever faults we may

find with it, this must be set down undiminished to its credit".2

The above statement clearly states that Hegel's criticism of Kant

does not amount to the denial of the latter. Instead, Hegel's attempt has

been to integrate Kant's distinction into his own. In this way, Hegel's

philosophy accepts and further develops the distinction manifested in

Kant's philosophy between 'understanding' and 'reason'. In Kant,

'reason' is never in immediate relation to an object, rather it is

'understanding' that holds sway in his epistemology. On the other hand,

for Hegel, the function of 'understanding' through the process of

abstraction - is to prevent contradiction, between individual and

universal, finite and infinite, identity and difference and so on. And the

realm of 'reason' seeks to unify that which the understanding has

divided. 'reason' shows that the function of understanding to define

things in terms of their 'isolation', constitutes a process of 'abstraction':

that is to say, a process of 'drawing out from a given context'. The

function of reason is, thus, to make manifest the 'concrete' relation in

which an idea, concept or thing manifests.

2 Hegel, G. W.F., Science oj Logic, (tr.) W.H. Johnson & L.G. Struthers, Vol. I, 1966 (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.), p.73.

70

While Kant argues in his Critique of Pure Reason that the function of

reason is to draw a limit to the extent of the categories of understanding,

Hegel, on the other hand, regards reason as the indispensable corrective to

the deficiencies of understanding in his works. Michael George points out, -

"It was Hegel's purpose in his philosophical system to demonstrate both the

method by which, and the extent to which, 'reason', understood

dialectically, could be just such a corrective". 3

That is why, Hegel comments on Kant's categories by saying, " ... this

exposition is very incomplete, being is part self-hampered and cross-grained,

and in part faulty is view of its results which assures that cognitions has no

other form of thought then finite categories. In both respects, these

antinomies deserve a more exact criticism, as well investigating their

standpoint and method more closely as liberating the main and essential

point from the unless mould into which it has been forced" 4

Hegel rejects Kant's professed claim that the paralogisms, antinomies

and the Ideal are no tricks of sophistry, but contradictions which 'reason'

must necessarily hit on; or, the natural appearance of the antinomies no

longer actively deludes 'reason' when it perceives its base, yet still 'reason' is

3 George, Michael, "Marx's Hegelianism: An Exposition" from Hegel and Modern Philosophy, ed. David Lamb, 1987, (London, Croom Helm), pp. 118-19. 4 Hegel, Science of Logic, (tr.) W. H. Johnston & L. G. Struthers, etc., pp. 204-06.

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deceived by it. In this context, Hegel says: "The true solution can only be

this that two determinations, being contradictory, and yet necessary to the

same concept, cannot be valid each of itself, in its one -sidedness, but have

their truth only in their transcendence, in the unity of their concept". 5

In this way, we can say that the unresolved contradictions of Kantian

dialectic are just examples of something more pervasive in Hegel's eye,

"Our categorical concepts when we consider them as descriptions of reality

as a whole or of pervasive aspects of this reality show a crucial inadequacy.

And this leads us in contradiction, for their categorical concepts are

inescapable; they are meant to denigrate indispensable aspects of reality if

there is to be a reality for us at all. If, then, these concepts portray a reality

which is in some sense impossible or incoherent, we are caught in a

contradiction: the seemingly indispensable descriptions of reality portray a

reality which cannot be,,6

According to Hegel, what Kant could discover is the 'dialectic of

reason', which can, at one and the same time, entertain opposing and even

contradictory attitude towards the world in the form of antinomies. But the

solution in this regard, Hegel explains, can only be this- that two

5 Ibid, pp. 205-06. 6 Taylor, Charles, Hegel and the Modern Society, 1984 (London, Cambridge Uni. Press), 1984, p. 228.

72

determinations, being contradictory and yet necessary to the same concept

cannot be valid each by itself in its one-sidedness, but have their truth only

in their transcendence, in the unity of their concepts. In this context, Hegel

writes in Science of Logic:

"These Kantian antinomies still remam an important part of the

critical philosophy: they, principally, effected the fall of the prevlOUS

metaphysics, and may be looked on as a chief transition to modern

philosophy; for they in particular assisted to produce a conviction of the

invalidity of the categories of finitude by examining their content: and this is

a more correct method than the former method of a subjective idealism

according to which their only fault is supposed to be that they are subjective

and not that which they are in themselves".7

Though Hegel appreciated Kant's discovery of the antinomies of pure

reason, yet he complains that Kant could locate only four such pairs, when is

fact, there are indefinitely many more. Hegel remarks, -

"What Kant tried to give is an appearance of completeness to his four

cosmological antinomies by his method of classification, which he borrowed

from his scheme of categories. A deeper insight into the antinomies, or

7 Hegel, G. W.F., Science of Logic, (tr.) W.H. Johnson & L.G. Struthers, etc., p. 204.

73

rather into the dialectic nature of 'Reason' shows, however, that every

concept is a unity of opposite moments, which could therefore be asserted in

the shape of an antinomy. Thus, becoming, determinate, being and so on,

and other concepts, could each furnish its particular antinomy, and as many

antinomies could be set up as concepts were yielded,,8

Hegel, therefore, criticizes Kant's treatments of antinomies as the most

profound example of 'one-sided' and limitedness of his philosophical

viewpoint. For instance, the first pair of Kant's antinomies is:

"Thesis: The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as

regards space.

Antithesis: The World has no beginning In time, and no limits In

space,,9

Hegel would agree with Kant that both the thesis and the anti thesis of

the above antinomy could be defended by a valid argument with sound

premises. But whereas Kant claims such antinomies prove the illusory nature

of pure reason by tying to give us knowledge beyond the sphere of actual

and possible sensibility, Hegel argues that these antinomies not only

mutually exclude each other, but also compliment each other. In the Science

8 Hegel, Science of Logic, (tr.) Johnston & Struthers. etc., p. 205.

9 Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reasons, (tr.) N.K. Smith, etc., p. 396.

74

of Logic, Hegel regards then as the moments in the insightful and

'speculative' view of reality and well within the realm of experience. Neither

is false, both are true, that is, partially true perspectives of the 'Truth' from

different viewpoints.

This was an entirely new elucidation of the dialectic of reason induced

by Hegel with the recognition of identity in every moment of contradiction.

So as to say, "It goes to the credit of Hegel to recognize the significance of

identity in every moment of contradiction. This strikingly new interpretation

of Hegel's dialectic consists in his attempt to incorporate logic into it".lO

According to Hegel, the drawback of Kantian dialectic is to confine its

boundaries considerably. Hegel criticizes the above antinomy with the

remark that its essential defect in its traditional forms is that it posits the

finite as something existing on its own and then tries to make the transition

to the infinite as something different from the finite.

In this way, in his Science of Logic, Hegel attempts to remedy Kantian

defects with his dialectical interpretation of deduction of categories.

10 Singh, R.P., "From Dialogue to Dialectic: Socrates, Kant, Hegel and Marx", July 2000, Indian Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. XXVII, No.3, p.265.

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Part 2

As we have seen, Hegel's criticism of Kant's concept of reason

consists in the fact that while recognizing its dialectical characteristic,

reasons fails to overcome the contradictions prevailing between finite

and infinite, simple and complex, freedom and necessity, conditioned

and unconditioned. It seems to be the contention of Hegel that the limit­

riddled constitution of reason in its dialectical function as expounded by

Kant is responsible for the agnostic impasse into his account of the

relation between knowledge and unconditioned. So, Hegel took over all

of the old classifications or categories which Kant had collected from his

predecessors, and made them into dialectic movements in groups of

three. Hegel's first division of three categories is that into Being, Nature

and Spirit, Being is "Reason in itself' (in German, an sich): Nature is

"Reason for itself' (Fur sich); and Sprit is Reason "reflected back into

itself' (an und fur sich).

At the human level, we find a triad of categories of subjective,

objective and absolute spirits. Hegel did not use the word 'Spirit' in the way

in which it had been used before but in his own way. And since he did not

define it, we can only guess at what he meant, guiding ourselves by what

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else he said. By 'Spirit', then" ... he seems to have meant something like

. ." II conSClOllS aim .

Hegel explains this process himself with reference to his Philosophy

of History as follows: "The relation ... of the earlier to the later systems of

philosophy is much like the relation of the corresponding stages of the

logical idea: in other words, the earlier are preserved in the later; but

subordinated and submerged. This is the true meaning of a much

misunderstood phenomenon in the history of philosophy - the refutation of

one system by another ... the rejection of a philosophy ... only means that its

barriers are crossed, and its special principle is reduced to a factor in the

complete principle that follows." 12

Hegel's contention is that Being is to be defined not only as finite, but

alone as infinite. In other words, it is required to be shown that the being of

the finite is not only being in its own, but also the being of the infinite. On

the contrary, the infinite being unfolds itself in and through the infmite.

The objections against moulding the transition from the fmite to the

infinite, Of, from the infinite to the finite can be met only by a notion of

11 Feibleman, James K., Understanding Philosophy: A Popular History of Ideas, 1988 (Bombay, Jaico Publishing House), p. 149. 12 Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of History, Quotation taken from David Macgregor's The Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx, 1984 (London, George Allen and Unwin), pp. 134-135.

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Being which shows that the supposed gulf between the fmite and the infinite

does not exist. In order to show this, Hegel improves the capacity of 'reason'

in its theoretic countenance itself as to render unnecessary any such gulf

between fmite and infinite, and so on, whereas Kant leaves 'reason' with no

better than a regulative function, as a canon, not an organ of truth; for Hegel,

'reason' by resolving and sublating the contradictions of the 'reflective

understanding' does, in fact, revel itself as the constitutive and self­

constituted truth. The substantive theme of the Science of Logic is to show

that the absolute Idea is internally self-specified and every self-specifying

concept.

Tltis is the process operative in the Kantian antinomies and Hegel

opines that it has much wider application. Hegel's formulation of the

dialectic of categories requires two lives of arguments: the first showing that

a given category is indispensable: the second showing that it leads us to a

characterization of reality which is somehow contradictory. Hegel, in fact,

fuses there together. This is known as 'the incorporation of dialectic into

logic'. And it makes Hegel's position strikingly different from the Kantian

logic.

The forms and categories, in Kant's formulation, are valid if they

were correctly formed and if their use was in conformity with the ultimate

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laws of thought and the rules of syllogism no matter what the content to

which they were applied. Quite contrary to this procedure, Hegel's logic and

with it, his dialectic is always dynamic and expresses dynamic of objective

reality as whole.

Hegel said that there was a subjective spirit, which gave rise to its

opposite, the objective spirit. The commentators on Hegel explain it, this, as

"You begin, he (Hegel) thought, with yourself, your ego. But in all of

Hegel's writings there are wheels within wheels. The subject contains within

itself a triad: sensation, which is the base presence of experience;

perception, upon which the attention is fixed; and understanding, by which

universals are derived from things and regarded as their essences". 13

But to set the subject apart as an all-important subject of knowledge, it

has to be put in opposition to the object, the other, which the subject, in a

sense generates for itself. Thus, for there to be a subject at all, there has to be

an object. He nowhere said so, but he was talking, of course, about the

conscious self.

"The spirit of consciousness leads us to the contents of consciousness,

which is the object. This object is rational, and in its tum, is divided into

13 Feibleman, James, K., Understanding Philosophy: A Popular History of Ideas, 1988 (Bombay, Jaico Publishing House), p. 149.

79

three movements: the theoretic spirit or conscious thought; the practical

spirit; and, from their unity, the free spirit.,,14

Now, we have a subjective spirit, with its subdivision into a dialectic

movement, and an objective spirit, similarly divided. The resolution of the

two is the absolute spirit, which subordinates, but exceeds the previous too.

As we should have come to expect by now, Hegel divided the absolute spirit

further into another dialectic. These three he called art, religion and

philosophy. Weare drawing close to the end. Art and religion are opposites,

and they are resolved by philosophy, which is the highest of all human­

enterprises. By philosophy, he meant, of course, his own philosophy, which

was higher still- the higher of them all.

Here, I shall list some of the other movements of the dialectic as

Hegel saw them: Being and non-Being, resolved by 'becoming'; essence and

existence resolved by a 'change'; actuality and potentiality resolved by

'fact', and so on. By these movements, Hegel did not mean to describe a

process, which takes place in time and passes. Rather he seems to have

meant a permanent set of relationship, which are arranged in a sort of time­

order, but are not happening in time.

14 Ibid., pp. 149-150.

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In order to achieve this task., Hegel employs the method of abstraction

in his dialectic of reason in the following manner: According to Hegel's

epistemology, things given in 'sensible-certainty' are the truest and richest

kind of knowledge and both these because nothing is yet abstracted or

conceptualized. Abstraction, for Hegel, is a characteristic of understanding,

which 'draws away' an aspect from the totality of the things given in

'sensible-certainty', and tries to examine it in isolation and thereby,

establishes a distinctive attribute pertaining to it.

It is, however, the function of understanding through a process of

abstraction to present things in mutual exclusion, restrictive prediction. "To

substantiate this point, let us take certain examples. The concepts 'family',

'black', 'cat' are treated not as isolated concepts, but rather as standing in an

intimate and dependent relation with other like concepts. In case of the

'family', it is the concepts such as citizenship, the state and civil society that

form the conceptual contextual background. In the case of 'black', it is the

entire colour spectrum, and for the 'cat', it is the animal kingdom." IS It is this

'intimate connectedness' between concepts and the actual things that forms

what Hegel terms the concrete nature of thought.

IS These examples, in reference to the concept of abstraction are taken from Singh, R.P.'s Dialectic of Reason: A Comparative Study of Kant and Hegel, 1955 (New Delhi, Intellectual Book Comer Pvt. Ltd.), p. 78.

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Whereas understanding restricts itself to a consideration of concepts is

isolation, concrete reservation must make dear the means by which, and the

reasons for which, such concepts do, in fact, fonn a nexus of mutual

interdependence. Every concept, as far as Hegel is concerned, has these

characteristics; viz. a moment of self-identity and another movement of self­

differentiation; and that forms the basis of the Hegelian dialectic.

Regarding the dialectical unity between law of thought (logic) and the

laws operating in the objective reality (ontology), Hegel observed in the

Science of Logic that:

"Logic was there found to determine itself as the science of pure

thought, having pure knowledge as its principle, which is not abstract, but a

concrete living unity, for it is opposition in consciousness between a

subjective entity existing for itself, and another similar objective entity, is

known to be overcome, and existence is known as pure concept in itself, and

the pure concept known as true existence. There are then the two moments,

which are contained in Logic. But they are now known as existing

inseparably, and not as in consciousness each existing for itself, it is only

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because they are known as distinct and yet not merely self-existent that their

unity is not abstract, dead, and immobile, but concrete. 16

It is in this connection that the claim is made afterwards that Hegel's

logic is new. Novelty is supposed to consist in Hegel's fonnulation of the

dialectical unity between laws of thought and laws of reality. This unity is

not a permanent and fixed substratum, but a process wherein everything

opens with its inherent contradictions and unfolds itself as a result.

Conceived in this way, unity contains its difference and involves self­

differentiation and an ensuring unification. Every existence precipitates itself

into negatively and remains what it is only by negating this negativity.

Hegel calls it - 'The negation of the negation'. It is a process in which

the lower from is not rejected but assimilated in a higher fonn. And this

process goes on, until it reaches to the' Absolute spirit', which presents the

'truth' of the whole of reality.

In fact, the negative or contradictory character of the categories

basically motivates Hegel's dialectic. The categories of Hegel denote and

deal with the reality. So, the dialectic operating in reality is basically the

16 Hegel, G.W.F., Science of Logic, (tr.) Johnston & Struthers, etc., Introduction, p. 71.

83

dialectical nature of the categories. In the subheading 81 of the Encyclopedia

of the Philosophical Sciences, Hegel writes:

"Everything that surrounds us may be viewed as an instance of

dialectic. We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable and

ultimate, is rather changeable and transient, and this is exactly what we

mean by that dialectic of the finite by which the finite, as that which is itself

is other than itself, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to

tum suddenly into its opposite ... All things, we say that is, the finite world

as such are doomed; and in saying so, we have a vision of dialectic as the

universal and irresistible power before which nothing can stay, however, and

stable, it may deem itself we find traces of its (Dialectic) presence in each of

the particular provinces and phases of the natural and the spiritual world.

Take as an illustration the motion of the heavenly bodies. At this moment,

the planet stands is this spot, but implicitly it is the possibility of being in

another spot, and that possibility of being otherwise the planet brings into

existence by moving. Similarly, the 'physical' elements prove to be

dialectical. . .. It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other

natural process and, as it were, forces nature beyond itself.,,)7

17 Hegel, G.W.F., The Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences: An Outline, (tr.) William Wallace, 1892 (London, Second Revised Edition) p. ISO.

84

The above statement by Hegel reveals that there are two terms, which

are central to Hegel's philosophical system, and these are the operative

terms of the dialectic as such. These are:

1. Contradiction

2. A ujheben or Sublation

In fact, there are not two separate terms, but mutually interdependent

and under certain circumstances, they pass into each other. In the Science of

Logic, Hegel explains the terms of contradiction as,

" ... everything is inherently contradictory, and in the sense that this

law, in contrast to others, expresses rather the truth and the essential nature

of things. It is one of the fundamental prejudices of logic as hitherto

understood and of ordinary thinking, that contradiction IS not so

characteristically essential and immanent a determination as identity.

Nevertheless, if it were a question of grading the two determinations and

they had to keep separate, then contradiction would have to be taken as the

profounder determination and more characteristic of essence. For as against

contradiction, identity in merely the determination of the simple immediate,

of dead being: but contradiction is the root of all movement and vitality: it is

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only in so far as something has a contradiction within it that it moves, has an

urge and activity". 18

It may be recalled here, that, for Socrates, human-thought develops by

the elimination of all contradictions in the process of dialogue; but for

Hegel, contradiction is internal to each term.

Hegel's position that 'everything is contradiction' is dependent on his

position that every concept of the logic involves and applies to its

contradictory concept. In his works, Hegel believes that this contradiction is

usually kept aloof from things, from the sphere of being and of truth. He

continues, "It is asserted that there is nothing that is contradictory, was first a

contingency, a kind of abnormality, and a passing paroxysm of sickness. But

now as regards the assertion that there is no contradiction that it does not

exist, this statement need not cause any concern and absolute determination

of essence must be present in every experience, in everything actual, as in

every notion. Further, (the contradiction) is not to be taken merely as an

abnormality, which only occurs here and there, but is rather the negative as

determined in the sphere of essence, the principle of all self-movement,

which consists solely in an exhibition of it. External conscious motion itself

18 Hegel, G. W.F., Science of Logic, (tr.) A. V. Miller, 1969 (London, George Allen and Unwin), p. 439.

86

is contradictions immediate existence. Something moves, not because at one

movement, it is here and at another there, but because in this 'here' it at once

is and is not. The ancient dialecticians must be granted contradictions that

they pointed out in motion: but it does not follow that therefore, there is no

motion, but on the contrary, that motion is existent contradiction itself,.19

With these arguments for defending the importance of the feature of

contradiction in the method of dialectic, Hegel concludes,- "Similarly,

internal self-movement proper instinctive urge in general ... is nothing else

but the fact that something is, in one and the same respect, self-contained

and deficient, the negative of itself. Abstract self-identity is not as yet a

living mass, but the positive being in its own self a negativity, goes outside

itself and undergoes alternation. Something is therefore alive only in so far

as it contains contradiction within it, and moreover is this power to hold and

endure the contradiction within it.,,20

Thus, for Hegel, contradiction IS internal to each term-each term

contains its contradiction within itself. That is how, every term whether a

concept or a reality develops. Hegel says near the end of the Logic that there

19 Ibid., p. 439. 20 Ibid, pp. 439-49.

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is nothing whether in actuality or in thought, that is a simple and abstract as

commonly imagined. In his own words:

''Nothing exists as just brutally given and simply possessing one or

two fully positive characteristics. Nothing exists that is just fITst and primary

and on which, other things depend without mutual relation. People intend to

think about such things, but they cannot really succeed in doing so unless

they stay on the level of imaginative pictures. Imagining that such things

exist is possibly only as long as we are ignorant of what is actually present.

What appears at first simple and immediate is actually complex and

medicated.,,21 Mediation (Vermittlung) and mediated (Vermittelt) and the

opposites immediacy (Unvermittlung) and immediate (Unvermittelt) are key-

terms through which Hegel explains not only contradiction, but also its

sublation.

To 'mediate' is to be in the middle to connect two extremes. Hegel

tries to show that everything is mediated, that nothing exists as immediate

first. There is nothing that is first and independent. In the logic, mediation

will involve the gradual development of categories to a print where there is

nothing that is posited as first and independent. In Hegel's dialectic, the

21 Kolb, David, The Critique of Pure Modernity - Hegel, Heidegger and After, 1986 (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press), p. 46.

88

thesis is always regards as 'immediate' or as characterized by 'immediacy'.

The third term is the merging of mediation and emerging as a new

immediacy. And this process goes on being, as it first comes before us, is the

immediate, the simple and undifferentiated. The very self-identity and

indeterminateness gives rise to the category of Nothing.

With this category of Nothing, we come to the mediation, which is the

same as difference, division, and distinction. With the second term 'nothing'

being has developed within itself the distinction between being and nothing

and this differentiation is 'mediation'. With the third term 'Becoming', the

differences are again absorbed in an identity, and thus, we have a new

immediacy. When this, in tum, gives birth to its opposite, we have a fresh

field of mediation, which is again merged in a further synthesis and so on.

The final category of the Logic-the Notion - will be immediate in the sense

that all pervious mediations are merged in its unity. Yet in as much as it still

remains and preserves all distinctions within its unity, it is in that way, the

highest mediation.

The synthesis of a triad both abolishes and preserves the differences

of the thesis and anti-thesis. Hegel expresses this activity of the synthesis as

aufheben or sublation, which is the operative term of Hegel's dialectic. It

may be seen as manifesting three distinct yet mutually interrelated moments.

89

"First it has the moment of 'transcendence', in which it goes beyond a 'limit'

or 'boundary'. Secondly, it is 'negation' of this first negation, this 'limit' in

which it is the moment of 'preservation' in which it has 'gone beyond' or

trailscended is brought again into a new relation. ,,22

These three moments of sublation, though distinct, form a unita.ry

process of Logic which is differentiated into its various components only for

the purpose of helping an 'understanding' of the process itself. The very

process by which a category 'passes beyond itself and posits another

category to which it is intimately related is, at one and the same logical

moment, the process by which it 'transcends' its limited abstract self-identity,

'negates' that identity and emerges into a connected unity or nexus, in which

it is preserved as an intrinsic part of some greater whole. The differences

between the first and the second number of each triad are sublated by 'the

third. Being and Nothing and the antagonism between them are sublated in

the unity of Becoming. This new category of Becoming is again an identity

of difference, not a simple identity.

"The fact that it is an identity of differences means that the differences

are merged. The fact that it is an identity of differences means that they are

22 George, Michael, "Marx's Hegelianism: An Exposition, "in Hegel and Modern Philosophy, (ed.) David Lamb, etc., p.123.

90

preserved. We have not a mere identity i.e. simple abolition of differences.

Nor have we a mere opposition i.e. simple preservation of differences. What

we have is an identity of opposites. Simple abolition would mean that we

have an identity, but no opposites. Simple preservation would mean that we

have opposites, but no identity. Becoming is the unity of being and nothing

are still there, present in becoming and may be got out of it by analysis.

They have ceased to exist as separate entities, as opposite abstractions. In

this sense, they are abolished. But they now exist in combination as factors

of a concrete unity. They exist in absorption, and not lost. And when the

synthesis becomes the thesis of a new triad it will in its tum be merged but

yet preserved along with its opposite in a further synthesis".23

In this way, as the dialectic operates, nothing is ever lost. Each step in

the process takes up into itself what was passed before it and is, in tum,

taken up by the step that follows. The final category of Logic-the Notion-

sublates within itself all previous categories whatever.

Thus, Hegel's dialectic shows that all lower categories are s.ublated in

the higher ones. But it requires sufficient explanation and necessary

substantiation. The novelty in Hegel's logic is that it incorporates dialectics

23 Stace, W.T. The Philosophy of Hegel, 1955 (New York, Dover Publication Inc.), pp. 106-7.

91

into itself. This means that dialectic is a method, a procedure that- Hegel

adopts in the process of formulating and deducing the concepts is large. In

the process, Hegel also formulates the principles of his dialectic.

As a matter of fact, the more general and more abstract concept is

always prior to the less general and less abstract. And this principle not only

decides for Hegel that the first category is Being, but also determines the

order of the subsequent categories. Hegel defines Being as follows:

" ... Being, Pure Being-without any further determination. In its

indeterminate immediacy, it is similar to itself alone, and also not dissimilar

from any other; it has no differentiation either within itself or relatively to

anything external: nor would it remain fixed in its purity, were there any

determination or content which could be distinguished within it, or whereby

it could be posited as distinct from an other. It is pure indeterminateness and

vacuity" . 24

It would be better to demonstrate the above mentioned definition

of Being with the help of an example. Here, I would like to employ the

example of, let us say 'a table'. In order to know its being, we have to

abstract it from all its qualities whatever, its brownness, hardness, its

24 Hegel, Science of Logic, (tr.) Johnston & Struthers, etc., p. 94.

92

particular figure, even its very tablehood. We have to think its mere 'is

ness', its being, what it has in common with every other object in the

universe. But such being has no determinations at all. Therefore, we can

say that it is absolutely indeterminate in nature- completely empty and

nothing else other than a pure vacuum.

Now, the problem is how to deduce any other category from this Pure

Being? How can mediation be found in the pure Being, which is a complete

emptiness? As a matter of fact, every logical deduction is essentially based

on the principle that the subsequent must be contained in the antecedent. The

breach of this principle in formal logic is what is called the 'fallacy of illicit

process'. There cannot be anything present in the conclusion, which is not

present in the premises. This is really the old-principle- ex nihilo nihil fit.

Nothing can come out of nothing- this is just as true of the Hegelian logic as

of the humble formal logic. Now, if pure Being excludes all determinations,

how then is any deduction possible?

The answer to this problem constitutes the fundamental principle of

the Hegelian dialectic. It rests upon the discovery that it is not true, as

hitherto supposed, that a universal absolutely excludes the differentiation.

Hegel found that pure Being, though absolutely indeterminate contains its

opposite-the mediation-hidden within itself and that this opposite has to be

93

extracted or deduced from it and made to do the work. pure Being, as a

vacuum, utterly empty, is the same as Pure Nothing. The absence of

everything is simply nothing. Being, therefore, is the same as Nothing. Hegel

writes: II Nothing, pure Nothing: it i:, simple equality with itself, complete

emptiness, without determination or content: undifferentiated ness in itself ...

Nothing, therefore, is the same determination (or rather lack of

determination), and thus altogether the same thing, as pure Beingll•25

Thus, the pure concept Being is seen to contain the pure concept of

Nothing and to show that one category contains another is to deduce the

other from it. Hence, we have the category of Nothing which is opposed

to Being, but has been deduced from the category of Being.

However, the opposition between Being and Nothing has an aspect

of unity which Hegel quite often terms as identity. But the identity of

Being and Nothing is not immediate. This identity is possible through a

mediation. This is the category of Becoming. Hegel writes:

"Pure Being and pure Nothing are, then, the same: the truth is, not

either being or Nothing but that being-not parses-but has passed over

into Nothing, and Nothing into being. But equally the truth is not their

lack of distinction, but that they are not the same, that they are

2S Hegel, G. W.F., Science of Logic, (tr.) Johnston & Struthers etc., p. 94.

94

absolutely-distinct, and yet unseperated and inseparable, each

disappearing immediately, in its opposite. Their truth is, therefore, this

movement, this immediate disappearance of the one into the other, in a

word. Becoming, a movement wherein both are distinct, but is virtue of a

distinction which has equally immediately dissolved itself.26

In the process of deducing one category from another, we can

explicate the second principle of Hegel's dialectic known as the

'Negation of negation'. This is a principle of development, a principle in

which the lower state is not annihilated, but assimilated in the higher

stage. This principle is operative in the whole process of the deduction

of one category from another.

In fact, the unity of being and nothing is possible because they

pass into each other. Becoming is the category which sublates being and

nothing into itself. This is the first triad of Hegel's logic. The second

category Nothing is not brought in by Hegel from anything external to

being. It is deduced from the first category, and this means that the first

contains the second, and is shown to produce it out of itself. This is how

the categories deduce themselves and with their deduction, they resolve

contradictions.

26 Ibid., p. 95.

95

Just as it is true that the higher categories contain the lower ones:

similarly, it is also true, in another sense, that the lower categories contain

the higher ones. Becoming contains being but being also contains becoming.

This is evident from the fact that becoming is deduced from being. And as a

matter of fact, it is possible to deduce from a category only what that

category contains in. So Hegel formulates that being contains becoming

implicitly, and becoming contains being explicitly. The first term in a triad is

called by Hegel 'in itself (or an sich), that is to say, implicit. The third tern is

'in and for itself (or fur sich), that is to say, explicit. The first term is

implicitly or potentially the same as the third. For the third term grows out of

the fist in the course of the dialectical principle of negation of negation. In

this context, Hegel brings the concept of 'reflection' in Science of Logic, as

he says, -'

"Reflection, as sublating the negative, is a sublating of its other, of

immediacy. Since, therefore, it is immediacy as a returning movement, as a

coincidence of the negative itself, it is equally a negative of the negative as

negative. ,,27.

27Hegel, Science of Logic, (tr.) by A.V. Miller, 1969 (London, George Allen and Unwin), p.401.

96

What is true of the first triad i~ true of the entire series. Just as being is

implicitly becoming, so becoming is implicitly the next synthesis, and so OD.

"And since all these syntheses each issues out of the last, and since there is

never at any point any new material brought in from outside, it follows that

being is not only implicitly becoming, but also implicitly all the subsequent

categories. There are several dozen categories in the logic. All there are

implicitly contained in Being. If they were not, then the deduction of then

would be impossible ... being is implicitly all the categories which follow it.

The final category is explicitly or actually all the categories which precede

As stated earlier, Hegel incorporates dialectic into his logic. The term

'dialectical' is used to express entire deductive process of the categories used

to signify specifically the sublation of one category into its opposite and

thus, it breaks down the absolute distinction set up by Kant between simple

and complex, causality and freedom and so on.

The dialectic of Hegel performs the function of getting out of each

category what is not in it. The view that 'is' and 'is - not' exclude each-other

is the view of what Hegel calls the 'understanding', as distinct from the true

view which is the view of 'reason'. At the level of understanding, two

28 Stace, W.T., The Philosophy of Hegel, etc., pp. 108-9.

97

opposites like the one we have cited above, Being and Nothing, absolutely

exclude each other. At the level of 'reason', it is shown that being and

nothing exclude each other in as much as they supplement each other. Their

exclusion is not absolute. What is absolute is their mutual supplementation.

Here, it must be remembered that none of the Hegel's categories are

completely abstracted from reality. Hegel's categories are epistemological

and ontological as well. Epistemologically, by means of categories we do

our thinking. Ontologically, the categories denote and deal with the reality.

So the dialectic, which is operating, is Hegel's deduction of categories has

this dual function to perform, namely to show that dialectic is operating in

human-thought and that simultaneously, it is operating in the objective

reality. But as an absolute idealist, Hegel regards the dialectic of thought a

primary and the dialectic of reality as secondary, as an extemalization of the

dialectic of thought.

\Vhat is true of the first triad is also true of the further deduction of the

categories from becoming and can be expressed as follows:

"Here, becoming becomes the movement of a determinate being and

it is expressed as follows:

1 ) As determinations, such as quality.

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2) As determinateness, transcended quality.

3) As quantity qualitatively detennined measure,,29

This means that quantitative changes lead to qualitative changes and

vice-versa. This is another dialectical principle apart from the two discussed

before i.e. unity and struggle of the opposites and the negation of the

negation. The combination of quality and quantity is found on what Hegel

calls as measure. Hegel as the dependence of quality upon quantity, or as

quantity upon which quality depends defines measure. Quality, for Hegel, is

the internal self-determination, which is identical with the being, which it

determines. Quantity is a determination, which is external to what it

determines.

Thus, three laws of dialectic operating 10 Hegel's deduction of

categories are:

(i) Unity and the struggle of Opposites.

(ii) Negation of the Negation.

(iii) Transition from quantity to quality and vice-versa.

In the second large division of the Science of Logic known as the

Logic of Essence, we come across pairs of categories like identity and

29 Singh, R.P., Dialectic of Reason: A Comparative Study of Kant and Hegel, etc., p.90.

99

difference, actuality and possibility, from and content, cause and effect and

so on. It may seem strange to think of correlative terms as manifesting

dialectic. But that is why; the correlatives are correlative that Hegel shows

dialectic operating bet ween the pairs. Hegel, however, wishes to claim that,

"it is not only the correlatives with which we are familiar that demonstrate

this 'insuperability and mutual dependency, but that, is a very strong sense,

all our logical concepts form a chain or nexus of just such a correlation,,30

However, the logic of Being and the logic of essence finally culminate

in the logic of notion, which is nothing, but the self-consciousness of the

Geist. This means that all the categories of the objective logic are ultimately

derived from the subjective logic. So, the dialectic laws operating in the

deduction of the categories are ultimately derived from the Geist.

Therefore, if we understand by Hegel's dialectic as a gradual

explication and development of the 'connectedness' of the categories of

logic, then the dialectic is operating is our thought alone. But as such, a

'dialectical nexus' of concepts is not itself sufficient to account for our

knowledge of the objective reality. Dialectic must come out of thought and

confront" the world, which is given. That is to say, it must have a relation to

the objective world of matter into which man daily finds himself thrown.

30 George, Michael, "Marx's Hegelianism: An Exposition", etc., p. 127.

100

Hegel recognized this and in the Phenomenology of Spirit, he first

outlines three means by which the objective reality may be aufgehoben by

man or, what is the same thing can be removed from its given state as

something 'other' to man and made into something which exists 'for' him is

a world in which he can find and make his home. The three means that

Hegel postulates by which man dialectically transcends the alien externality

of the world are will, thought and activity.

In the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel postulates that man first seeks

to aufgehoben the material world through the exercise of his will. In the

independence and dependence of self-consciousness: Lordship and Bondage

or which is generally known as Master/Slave dialectic.

Hegel demonstrates what are the social consequences for mankind of

his attempt to construct his own sense of self, his need for recognition by

other men, upon the basis of an exercise of will. There is an immediate

conflict of wills between master and slave with each one attempting to

extract from the other an enforced 'recognition'. This conflict is only

resolved when one of them, under the threat of death, so to say, from the

other, yields his will and grants a forced recognition of the other. Hegel says,

"The lord related himself immediately to bondsmen through a being (a

thing) that is independent, for it is just this which holds the bondsman in

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bondage; it is this chain from which he could not break free in the struggle,

thus proving himself to be dependent, to possess his independence in

thinghood".31 The outcome of master-slave dialectic is the creation of two

realms in which the former dominates the latter.

This analogy has its reflection in Hegel's formulation of dialectic in

the realm of concepts and ideas, and then its application to the external

material reality. Just as Master becomes the exerciser of the mental labour,

of formulating ideas, planning and so, in and the slave is the bearer of

physical labour, one which brings those ideas and plans into reality.

Similarly and exactly in the same process, the dialectic of concepts are

applied to the external material reality. The dialectic operating in the realm

of concepts commands the world of ideas; and the transformative activity

performed in the material world is aimed towards the satisfaction of the

dialectic of ideas.

There is yet another way of looking at Hegel's attempt to apply the

dialectic of concepts to the actual reality. In the preface to Philosophy of

Right, Hegel writes:

31 Hegel, G.W.F., Phenomenology of Spirit, (tr.) A.V. Miller, 1979 (Oxford, Clarendon Press), p. 115.

102

"What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational. On this

conviction, the plain man like the Philosopher takes his stand, and from this

philosophy starts its study of the universe of mind as well as the universe of

nature" . 32

There is a distinction between 'reality' and 'actuality' in Hegel's

idealism. Hegel's fundamental contention is that a thing given in sense-

certainty relates to a definite process of development through which it

undergoes in the course of time.

This process is known as the reality of a given thing. Hegel also calls

this process as the 'reason' of why a thing comes into existence. Things

come into existence because of the 'reason' and therefore, after the 'reason'.

A thing comes into existence and realizes its full potentiality in the course of

development. But how a thing comes into existence and to what extent will

it be able to realize its potentialities are some of the questions that can be

answered when we see the 'reason' why a thing comes into existence. Thus,

for Hegel, the dialectic operating in the realm of the concepts are

externalized to the sphere of actuality and its totality is the reality says

Hegel:

32 Hegel, G.W.F., Philosophy of Right, (tr.) T.M. Knox, 1987 (London, Oxford University Press), p.1 O.

103

"The concepts' moving principle, alike engenders and dissolves the

particularizations of the universal, I call dialectic... The Dialectic of the

concepts consists not simply in producing the detenninations as a contrary

and a restriction, but in producing and seizing upon the positive context and

outcome of the determination, became it is this which makes it solely a

development and an immanent progress. Moreover, this dialectic is not an

activity of subjective thinking applied to some matter externally, but is

rather the matter's very soul putting forth its branches and fruit organically.

This development of the 'Idea' is the proper activity of its rationality, and

thinking as something subjective, merely looks on at it without for its part

adding to it any ingredient of its own. To consider a thing rationally means

not bring reason to bear on the object from the outside and so to temper with

it, but to find that the object is rational on its own account: here it is mind in

its freedom, the culmination of self-conscious reason, which gives its

actuality and engenders itself as an existing world".33

The above passage is amply representative them of Hegel's dealing

with dialectic through its placing of the category of 'reason' at the centre of

this. In this way, the transcendental dialectic, which was operating only in

the realm of the concepts (in Kant) is eXternalized to the sphere of actuality

33 Ibid, pp. 34-35.

104

and its totality is the reality in the dialectic of Hf":gel. With this, I shall come

to the third part of the chapter.

Part 3

This Hegelian notion of dialectic influenced the succeeding

philosophical developments in various possible manners. This influence

appears most prominently being the reactions given by school of Marx

(1818-83), Engels (1820-95) and Lenin (1870-1924). One of the most

important phases in the development of the notion of dialectic comes in the

form of the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels. They claim to have

extracted the rational core of Hegelian Dialectic- or as figuratively

commented by Lenin, "picked out the pearl of dialectic from the dungheap

of the absolute idealism,,34 and established it on the foundation of the

philosophical materialism. Marx considers Hegel's Phenomenology and its

final outcome- the dialectic of negativity- as one-sided and limited in many

ways. Marx strongly criticizes the concept of 'Absolute Idea' as expounded

in Hegel's speculative dialectic. What is central to Marx's own conception

of man is a social and historical being, whereas for Hegel, it is the "self-

abstracted entity, flXed for itself, is man as abstract egoist/egoism raised in

34 Lenin, V.I., Materialism and Empirio- Criticism, Part II, 1972 (peking, Progress Publications), p.289

105

its pure abstraction to the level of thought".3S Just as man is conceived by

Hegel in terms of 'consciousness', similarly all the laws of dialectic are also

conceived by Hegel abstractly. That is why, Marx declares in Capital that:

"The mystification which dialectic suffers in the Hegel's hands, by no

means, prevents him from being the first to present its general form of

working ... With him, it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side

up again, if you could discover the rational Kernel within the mystical

shell".36 Thus, for Marx and Engels, the ultimate source and sustenance of

the laws of dialectic lies, not in Kantian transcendental idealism or Hegelian

absolute idealism, but in the philosophical materialism.

However, from the times of Marx and Engels to the postmodern

philosophy, there are certain fundamental changes in the general intellectual

climate of Europe. With the advent of postmodernity and its prominent

Frankfurt School, new interpretations of Kantian and Hegelian definitions of

'reason' and the notion of dialectic were presented and discussed in the

realm of philosophy.

On the basis of the above analysis, we can say that Hegel's deduction,

developed out of Kant's dialectic, has emerged under definite principles.

3S Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 1977 (Moscow, Progress Publishers) p.142 36 Marx, Capital, Vol. I, 1961 (London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd.), p. 20

106

These principles represent the laws of human-thoughts as well as the laws of

objective-reality and here, these two spheres mutually interact.

Thus, we see that Hegel's dialectic has exercised tremendous

influence on the succeeding phiiosophical developments. This influence can

be seen not only in the field of philosophy, but in the fields of psychology,

theology and socio-political philosophy as well.

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