chapter iv the civil war in cambodia,...
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CHAPTER IV
THE CIVIL WAR IN CAMBODIA, 1970-1975
The history of Cambodia, from the date of the ouster of
Prince Norodom Sihanouk on 18 March 1970 to the liberation of
Phnom Penh by the Khmer Rouge on 17 April 1975, constitutes the
story of the struggle for power between the group headed by Lon
Nol and the other by Prince Sihanouk. Both had invested all
their resources and energies which were at their disposal to gain
an upper hand at .the political, diplomatic and military fronts.
At the ideological level while Lon Nol was backed by the us, 1 the
cause of Prince Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge was backed by the
People's Republic of China (PRC), North Korea and North Vietnam.2
As a result of the Civil war the relatively placid life of the
Khmer people was disturbed. The bombing raids of the US on the
Cambodian countryside, aimed at wiping out the Communist
strongholds of North Vietnam and of the Viet Cong, forced the
Cambodian peasants to abandon their homes and fields and flee to
the capital city to escape death. 3 About a million of them who
thus had migrated were to be taken care, which cost an additional
burden on the Lon Nol administration at a time when production
declined and the supplies from outside were blocked by the
Comrnunists. 4 The inability of the regime and its failure to
1. William Shawcross, Sideshow : Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia, Great Britain, 1979, pp.112-127.
2. Prince Norodom SihanoukfWilfred Burchett, My War with the CIA, England, 1973, pp.30.-33.
3. Shawcross,n.1, p.183. 4. At the time of the overthrow of the Prince in March 1970,
Phnom Penh had a population of about 600,000 Khmers, Chinese and Vietnamese. By the end of war in April 1975, the population of the capital rose to 2-3 million. see ibid, p.183.
168
solve the country's major problems of security, inflation and
corruption disillusioned the people. The common man caught in
the crossfire of the contending forces of Lon Nol regime and of
the Khmer Rouge was not so much concerned with the ideology as
with the security of his life and property. The Khmer Rouge by
exploiting the weakness of Lon Nol and by using the support
extended by the -PRC, North Korea and North Vietnam, Prince
Sihanouk and well-trained revolutionary cadres, overthrew the
Khmer Republic on 17 April 1975 and established a Communist
Government, the first of its kind in the history of cambodia. 5
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RUMER REPUBLIC
Prince Sihanouk was ousted from power on 18 March 1970, when
he was abroad by Lon Nol Sirik Matak group in a vote of no
confidence passed by the Cambodian National Assembly and the
Council of the kingdom. 6 In his place Cheng Heng, whom the
Prince had appointed as acting Chief of State in January 1970,
was given the full title of Head of State. On 19 March 1970, the
US Government accorded the recognition to the new regime of Lon
Nol. 7 South Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia greeted the coup in
Phnom Penh with enthusiasm and extended recognition to Lon Nol. 8
5. Shawcross, n.1, pp.365-68. 6. "Cambodian Right-wing Clique Stages coup d'etat Against Head
of state Samdech Norodom Sihanouk", Peking Review, Peking, vol.13, no.13, 27 March 1970, p.22.
7. "President Nixon's News Conference of March 21", Department of State Bulletin, Washington D.C., 6 April 1970, pp.437-38.
8. The Times, London, 21 March 1970, see also Malcolm Caldwell and Lek Tan, Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War, New York, 1973, pp.266-67, 283. T.D.Allman, "We Have Not Been Wasting our Time", Far Eastern Economic Review, hereafter FEER, Hongkong, vol. LXVII, no. 15, 9 April 1970, p.18.
169
On 20 March the National Assembly voted to arrest Prince Sihanouk
on the charges of treason if he retunred to Phnom Penh. 9 On the
basis of a Manifesto issued on 31 March 1970 by a 'Committee of
Intellectual', the Cambodian National Assembly and the Senate
voted unanimously on 9 October to proclaim Cambodia a Republic.
The Government claimed that the proclaimation was made "on the
demand of the Khmer people of all social strata to revert to
constitutional legality".lO The Republic came into force on 1
November 1970. A new flag was adopted, and 10 October was
declafred as a Public holiday. All titles of nobility were
abolished. The new regime declared that Cambodia would remain
neutral and that it would honour international comrnitments. 11
Lon Nol, who had formed the Government on 12 August 1969
reorganized it on 2 July 1970 and retained Prime Ministership and
the portfolio of defence. Sir ik Matak became Deputy Prime
Minister.
Lon Nol, due to bad health, expressed his desire to stepdown
from the position of Prime Ministership on 20 April 1971. When
Sirik Matak, Chuop Hell and In Tarn expressed their inability to
form the Government, it was resolved on 3 May that Lon Nol was to
be the titular premier while effective power was to be exercised
9. Le Monde, Paris, 24 March 1970. 10. Asian Recorder, New Delhi, vol.XVI, no.51, 17-23 December
1970, p.9909, see also David P.Chandler, "Changing Cambodia", Current History, vol.59, no.352, December 1970, p.338, T.D.Allman, "Cambodia Dismantling the Monarchy", FEER, 5 September 1970, p.lO.
11. Asian Recorder, vol.XVII,no.22, 28 May 3 June 1971, p.l0175.
170
by Sirik Matak. 12 Three days later a new Cabinet was formed and
it expressed its desire to promulgate a new Constitution for the
country to adopt measures to improve the economic, financial and
social conditions and control the prices of the essential goods
and also its firm desire to put down the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese Communists and to follow neutral and non-aligned
foreign policy.13
POPULAR DEMONSTRATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PRINCE SIHANOUK
Following the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk, his followers
organised mass demonstrations in several provinces. In Kompong
Cham, the students and other demonstrators demanded the
restoration of the Portrait of Prince Sihanouk which had been
removed earlier. Riots brokeout when the authorities refused to
do so. The provincial government offices and the law courts were
stormed, and two members of the National Assembly "who tried to
explain why they had voted to depose" the Prince were hacked to
death in Kompong Cham. The peasants seized Lon Nol's brother Lon
Nil adn killed him. 14 The rioters from Siem Reap, Prey Veng and
Svay Rieng moved towards the capital. Hence, the government
closed Phnom Penh and the airport, imposed curfew and prohibited
traffic in the capital. The demonstrators were turned away by
12. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, London, vol. no.XVIII, 4-11 September 1971, p.24811.
13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., vol.no.XVII, 13-20 June 1970, p.24027-28. see also
SWB FE/3444/A3/4, 4 April 1970.
171
the armed forces, in which nearly ninety people either got killed
or wounded. 15
In Phnom Penh, the middle class was happy with the removal
of the Prince.16 There were also a few anti-Sihanouk
demonstrations in the capital. On 5 and 11 April 1970, groups of
students led a demonstration in support of the new regime
chanting anti-Viet Cong and anti-North Vietnamese slogans.
DJAKARTA CONFERENCE
In order to avert the near war situtation in Cambodia and to
restore peace and neutrality, Adam Malik, Foreign Minister of
Indonesia proposed on 19 April 1970 an Asian Conference. 17 In
response to his call an 11-Nation Conference met in Djakarta
during 15-17 May 1970 which was attended by representatives of
Australia, cambodia, Japan, south Korea, Laos, Malaysia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and South
Vietnam. 18 The Conference revealed sharp differences of opinion
among the pariticipants. Yem Sambaur who attended as a "special
invitee" requested for economic, military and diplomatic help
which was declined by Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia and Singapore.
The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese activities in Cambodia were
15. "Cambodian People Demonstrate against Right-wing clique", Peking Review, vol.13, no.14, 3 April 1970, pp.32-33. see also T.D.Allman, "Sealing Their Own Doom ?", FEER, vol.LXVIII, no.14, 2 April 1975.
16. T.D.Allman, "When the Khmers Kill Khmers", FEER, vol.LXVII, no.15, 9 April 1975, p.5.
17. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.14, p.24030. 18. Ibid.
172
criticized by South Vietnam, South Korea, Thailand and New
Zealand. The suggestion of appointing a permanent body to
workout a solution for the Indo-China question and on sending an
inspection team to Cambodia to report on the situation was
opposed by Japan. The communique issued on 17 May 1970 by the
conference was, however, called for the ending of hostilities.
For the withdrawal of foreign troops, neutrality of Cambodia,
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
Cambodia, reactivating of the International Control Commission
(ICC), the participants of the Geneva Conference and other
interested parties had to convene an international conference to
solve the Cambodian problem. 19 It was suggested to consult the
USSR and the UK to ractivate the ICC and for convening an
International Conference. The us supported the decisions taken
at Djakarta Conference. 20
GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE
After being informed by Kosygin, the Prime Minister of
the Soviet Union, of his ouster from power, Prince Sihanouk,
speaking to the members of the Khmer community at the Moscow
airport, said that if the Soviet Union and the PRC would not
19. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no. XVI.II,29 August-5 September 1970, p.24162. Thailand prom1se "military equipment" to Lon Nol see also T.J.S.George, "The Crusader's Crosses", FEER, vol.LXVIII, no.22, 28 May 1970, p.S.
20. ••us Supports Decisions Taken at Meeting of Asian Ministers", Department of state Bul.~etin, 8 June 1970, pp. 710-11.
173
recognize the new regime in Cambodia he would consider setting up
a Government-in-Exile, but if they chose to recongnize Lon Nol
regime his political career would come to an end. 21 The Prince
was accorded a warm welcome by the Chinese Prime Minister, Chou
En-lai on 19 March 1970 when he arrived in Peking. 22 On 23 March
the Prince issued a proclamation from Peking denoucning Lon Nol's
Government and at the same time announcing his intention to form
a 'Government of National Union' and to organize a "National
Liberation Army" and a "United National Front 11•23
The DRVN hailed the Prince's proclamation of 23 March and
pledged full support to the Khmer Liberation forces. Whereas,
the USSR was unwilling to respond favourably to the Prince's
call. At the same time, the PRC gave unconditional support to
him. 24 Before the formal announcement of ~he Government-in-Exile
on 5 May 1970 by the Prince, the Summit Conference of the Indo-
Chinese peoples was held during 24-25 April 1970 on Lao-Vietnam-
China border area at the initiative of the Prince. The three
Indo-Chinese people were represented by Prince Norodom Sihanouk
of Cambodia, Prince Souphanouvong, President of the Lao Patriotic
Front, Nguyen Huu Tho, President of the NLF of South Vietnam and
21. SihanoukfBurchett, n.2, p.27. 22. "Cambodian Head of State Samdech Norodom Sihanouk Arrives in
Peking",Peking Review, vol.13, no.13,27 March 1970, p.3. 23. "Message to Compatriots and Solemn Declaration by Cambodian
Head of State Samdech Norodm Sihanouk, March 23, 1970, Peking Review, vol.13, no.13, 27 March 1970, pp.13-15.
24. Sihanouk/Burchett, n.2, pp.33-35.
174
Pham Van Dong, Prime Minister of the DRVN. They exchanged views
and expressed their unanimity in fighting against their common
enemy, the us. 25 It also expressed its full support to the 23
March 1970 Five-point proclamation of the Prince and expressed
"its resolute support to the heroic struggle of the Khmer people"
against the Lon Nol-Sirik Matak and the us imperialists. 26 Chou
En-lai attended the final session and endorsed it. 27
On 5 May 1970 the Prince announced the formation of the
Government-in-Exile with its headquarters in Peking. It was
composed of the leading members of his entourage and Communists
like Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim whom he once tried to
suppress. On 26 March 1970 the latter signed a declaration of
'unreserved support' to the Prince's call of 23 March 1970. 28
The Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia (RGNUC}, the
Politburo and the Central Committee of the National United Front
of Cambodia (NUFC) and the People's National Liberation Armed
Forces of Cambodia (PNLAFC)were constituted. 29 Prince Sihanouk
was the Head of State.
25. SWB FE/3366/1, 30 April 1970. 26. "Joint Declaration of summit Conference of Indo-Chinese
Peoples, April 25, 1970", Peking Review, vol. 13, Special Issue, 8 May 1970, pp.3-6, 10.
27. "Chou En-lai's Speech", Peking Review, vol.13, Special Issue, 8 May 1970, pp.34-35.
28. "Three Cambodian National Assembly Deputies Statement", Peking Review, vol.13,no.16, 17 April 1970, pp.21-22. see also Francois Ponchaud, Cambodia Year Zero, Nancy Amphoux, trans England, 1977, p.189.
29. "Proclamation of the Royal Government of National Union under the leadership of the National United Front of Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.13, no.20,15 May 1970, p.6.
175
THE NATIONAL UNITED FRONT OF CAMBODIA (NUFC)
Penn Nouth became the President of the NUFc. 30 The People's
National Liberation Armed Forces of Cambodia (PNLAFC) consisted
of a President, three Vice-Presidents and two members. Khieu
Samphan was the president and Pol Pot, Nuon Chea and So Vanna
were the Vice-Presidents. Thieun Chhith and Son Sen were the
members.
The NUFC, which was formed in May 1970 to fight against Lon
Nol, consisted of Marxists, Progressives and right wing
mandarins. 31 The first group had five to six thousand Khmer
Communists who moved over to Hanoi after the Geneva Accords of
1954. They returned to Cambodia in 1970 to fight against Lon
Nol. The second group consisted of French-edcated Marxists like
Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn and Hu Nim who served in the government
and moved into the maquis in 1967 after the Samlaut rebellion
fearing liquidation. This group emerged as a distinct entity in
the fighting force of the NUFC after 1970. 32 The third group
consisted of "Sihanoukists" i.e., the followers of the Prince.
30. "List of Members of Political Bureau of Central Committee of National United Front of Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.13, no.20, 15 May 1970, p.11.
31. Thiounn Mumm and Thiounn Prasith were Marxists, Sarin Chhak, Chan Youran, Keat Chhom and Chou Seng were progressives, Ngo Hou, Hout Sambath and Chea San were right wing mandarins, see J. L. S. Girling, "The Resistance in Cambodia", Asian Survey, Berkeley, Cali, vol.XII, no.7, July 1972, p.561.
32. Roger Kershaw, "Cambodia", National Union - a Milestone in Popular Front Technique", The World Today, London vol. 22, no.2, February 1976, pp.60-61.
176
The political programme of the NUFC was aimed at guaranting
the democratic liberties to all Khmers, except 'traitors',
equality of sexes, abolition of polygamy, freedom of religion
with Buddhism as state religion and respect to the rights of the
national minorities. Right to property was assured and they
wanted to work out a fair system of land rents and rates of
interest on loans~ It was their policy to improve the formation
of Trade Unions, encourage industries and nationalise banks and
foreign trade. The foreign policy of the NUFC was 'one of
national independence, peace, neutrality, non-alignment,
solidarity, and friendship with peace' loving nations. It did
not want to participate in any military alliance, nor did it want
allow any foreign country to set up military bases. 33
On 5 May 1970 Peking announced the recognition of the RGNUC
and promised to grant unlimited loans and supply of arms. 34 As
the USSR was indifferent to the Prince's Proclamation, it was not
willing to support him. But countries like Albania, North Korea,
North Vietnam, Cuba, Syria, the PRG of South Vietnam, Yugoslavia
and Rumania recognised the Prince's government. Meanwhile,
Bulgaria renewed a commercial treaty with Lon No1. 35
33. "Political Program of National United Front of Kampuchea", Peking Review, vol.13, no.20, 15 May 1970, pp.7-11. see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVIII, 8-15 August 1970, p.24127.
34. "Chinese Government Formally Recognises Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia", Peking Review, vol. 13, no. 20, 15 May 1970, p.14, see also J.L.S. Girling, Cambodia and the Sihanouk Myth, Occasional Paper No.7, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, June 1971, p.7.
35. "Chinese Government", n.34, p.14.
177
By agreeing to come together to work with the Prince, the
Communists were able to persuade other partners in the NUFC to
accept their policies. The Prince on his part said : "I am an
admirer of Communism. . . but I am not a Communist ... I am a
nationalist, a Cambodian like my ancestors". On his personal
position, he said "I had chosen not to be with either the
Americans or the Communists, because I considered that there were
two dangers, American imperialism and Asian communism 11 •36 He
further said that even though his government was established
outside Cambodia, it was 'not a Government-in-Exile' as in fact
it had "its roots in Cambodia ...• our comrades in the guerrilla
movement tell us that for the moment our place is in friend's
countries 11 •37 The liberation struggle was conducted in the name
of the Khmer Rouge and was organized by Khieu Samphan, Hou Youn
and Hu Nim, and they were in charge of Eastern, Northwestern and
Southwestern parts of Cambodia respectively. 38
~ INYASION OF CAMBODIA ~ ~ US-SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES
Lon Nol, who was bent on clearing the Vietnamese sanctuaries
on Khmer soil asked the North Vietnamese and the NLF troops on 13
March 1970 to vacate Cambodian territory within 48 hours. on the
expiry of deadline on 16 March the South Vietnamese forces began
shelling the Communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. After the coup,
36. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.33, p.24127. 37. Ibid. 38. Ponchaud, n.28, pp.173-189, see also Gir1ing, n.31, p.562.
178
Thieu said that the two countries would co-operate to push the
Communists out. The US command in Saigon established radio links
with Lon Nol army on 19 March and the next day the South
Vietnamese were authorised to provide forward artillery spotters
for the Cambodians, if they needed it.39
From 20 March onwards all the interested parties began to
act. Meanwhile, Khmer Krom began its attacks on the Communist
sancturies. South Vietnamese troops and the US advisers moved
into the Svay Rieng province. 40 In Kandal Communist positions
were attacked by the south Vietnamese. The NLF forces which
attacked an outpost of Lon Nol in the same area were shelled with
the South Vietnamese assistance and on 23 March Communist
positions were bombed. The attack by the US bombers continued the
next day also. on 27 March fifty five Communists were killed in
a combined Cambodian-South Vietnamese and the US operations. 41
By the end of March the Vietnamese Communists intensiified
and widened their military operations in cambodia. 42 During the
first half of April the ill-equipped Lon Nol forces were unable
to restrict the movement of the Vietnamese forces. 43 Lon Nol,
39. Ben Kiernan, How Pol Pot Came to Power : A History of Communism in Kampuchea, 1930-1975, London, 1985, p.304.
40. The Times, London, 21 March 1970. 41. Kiernan,n.39, p.304. 42. "Ambassador Bunker Discusses Vietnam on 'Meet the Press'",
Department of state Bulletin, 1 June 1970, p.687. 43. Bernard K.Gordon with Kathryn Young, "The Khmer Republic :
That was the Cambodia that was", Asian Survey, vol.11, no.1, January 1971, p.34.
179
who was confident of tackling the problem of the Vietnamese
without foreign assistance changed his mind and made an
international appeal for arms. By mid-April 70,000 volunteers had
enlisted in the army. All AK-47 rifles seized in South Vietnam
were sent to Phnom Penh. Khmer Krom and Khmer Serei were ordered
to move into Phnom Penh and 1,500 Khmer Serei troops were ready
for deployment. 44 Son Ngoc Thanh was busy since February in
South Vietnam to recruit more persons.
But, Mike Mansfield, the Democrat Senator was opposed to the
extention of aid to Lon Nol on 1 April. 45 The Lon Nol government
had formally requested the US for military assistance. The State
Department had examined the request. 46 Lon Nol had asked
equipment for 400 batalions, communications, 2,500 military
trucks, 1,000 Jeeps, 30 helicopters, 30 fighters and 12 transport
aircraft. 47 on 29 April Nixon had approved the supply of 4-5,000
rifles to Lon Nol. A shipment of 1, 500 guns were sent to
Cambodia· from South Vietnam one week before. But the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee opposed Nixon's decisions. 48
Preparations were made for a full-scale intervention in cambodia
in which 32,000 US and 40,000 South Vietnamese troops had to
involve. 49
44. Shawcross, n.1, p.131. 45. straits Times, Singapore, 2 April 1970. 46. Times of India, New Delhi, 17 April 1970. 4 7. Shawcross, n. 1, p.132, see also Times of India, 23 April
1970. 48. Times of India, 30 April 1970. 49. Gordon with Young, n.43, p.35.
180
Massive killings of the Vietnamese at Parrot's Beak area
took place. At least 3,500 Vietnamese residents were killed and
20,000 were detained.so The Vietnam war was extended into
Cambodia with the invasion of Cambodia by the US-South Vietnamese
forces on 29 April 1970. Nixon described it "not an invasion of
cambodia ... on.ce enemy forces are driven out ... we will
withdraw". 51 The war effects were felt long ago because of the
use of the Cambodian territory by the Vietnamese Communists as a
result of the US "Menu 11 bombings on them. The government
repression in rice collection after 1966 helped the CPK to
mobilize its cadres.
THE RESISTANCE
In the 'heart land' ninety per cent of the seven million
people live in less than one-third of the territory, the rest
inhabit the 'empty lands' of the North, Northeast and South on an
average only two to three persons per square kilometre. The empty
lands consisting of hills, mountains and forest "has ceased to be
the preserve of the Phnom Penh Government, even in name". The
territory, which had not been under the effective control of the
Government, was occupied by the NUFC forces. 52
The Khmer Rouge who were active and opposed to the Prince
50. New York Times, 9 May 1970. see also T.D.Allmen, "The Cambodian Pogrom", FEER, vol.XLVIII, no.19, 7 May 1970, pp.22-23 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.14, p.24029.
51. New York Times, 1 May 1970, see also "The Cambodia Strike : Defensive Action for Peace", Department of State Bulletin, 18 May 1970, p.619.
52. Girling, n.31, p.549.
181
had to change their attitude towards him. His deposition in
March 1970 and his subsequent call of 23 March, the support
extended to him on 26 March by the three left deputies, Joint
Declaration of the Summit Conference of the Indo-Chinese people's
of 24-25 April and the establishment of the RGNUC on 5 May in
exile, which was .supported the PRC, the DRVN and North Korea,
Compelled the Khmer Rouge to work with the Prince. It was a
marriage of convenience between the Prince and the Khmer Rouge.
The Prince also made it clear that the moment a 'genuine people's
government' had been established in Cambodia, he would resign
"as Head of State after our people's certain victory over their
enemies, reactionary oppressors and their masters - the US
imperialists. And on that very occasion I will give our
progressive youth and working people the possibility of fully
assuming the responsbility of national construction and defence"
with the co-operation of the entire nation". 53
Thus, the Prince made it clear that after the defeat of Lon
No1, real power could be edxercised by the Cambodian Communists.
Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge became active. The 5,000 Khmer Viet
Minh who had moved to Hanoi after the Geneva Accords of 1954,
began returning to Cambodia. At the same time, the Vietnamese
cadres began aiding the Khmer cadres in their operations against
Lon Nol. The Principal aim, apart from aiding the Khmer Rouge,
was to preserve their own supply lines and disrupt the enemy's
53. "Message to comptriots II • • • I n. 23, p. 14.
182
supply lines. 54
On 20-21 March both the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese
Communists entered the southern Prey Veng province 55 and 700
people joined the revolutionaries from Peam Montea sub district
and formed insurgent battalion. The South Vietnames troops
attacked the villages near Krachap and they looted the property
of the people killing a monk at Wat Krassang in Svay Rieng. 56
The US which began their air strikes from 29 April attacked Snuol
on 3 May leaving seven dead. Then Mimot was attacked in which
dozens of villages were destroyed and Fish Hook was attacked by
the South Vietnamese. There were 8,000 US and 12,000 South
Vietnamese troops.57 The US air force which was at liberty to
bomb any target and responsible for large-scale destruction in
Cambodia left Cambodia on 30 June 1970 after two months stay.
Nixon said that they had captured arms, ~mmunition and rice and
killed 11,000 Vietnamese and Cambodian enemies. 58
At ·this juncture the Vietnamese Communists were active in
Kampot, Prey Veng and Takeo. Kampot was the stronghold of the
Khmer Rouge and had their headquarters in the Elephant mountain
regioin. 59 Lon Nol government used the South Vietnamese troops
54. "Ambassador Bunker Discusses ••• 11 , n.42, pp.686-88. 55. "A Report on the conclusion of the Cambodian Operation",
Department of State Bulletin, 20 July, p.69. 56. Kiernan, n.39, p.307. 57. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVII, 15-22 August
1970, p.24132. 58. "A Report on the .... ", n.55,p.71. 59. Keesing's contemporary Archives, n.14, p.24029.
183
and Khmer Krom to kill both ethnic Vietnamese and Khmer. At the
end of April 1970, Yem sambaur, Foreign Minister in the Lon Nol
government, had admitted that 3,554 deaths took place and he
blamed the North Vietnamese and the VietCong for these deaths.60
Lon Nol government treated the ethnic Vietnamese numbering
about five lakh i~ Cambodia as threat to his regime because they
may sympathize with the Viet Cong. Therefore, they were rounded
up and dumped them into 'concentration camps'. Killing of these
captives began in the first week of April. It was quite shocking
that hundrends of bodies began floating in Mekong. 61
With the outbreak of civil war in Cambodia the Khmer Rouge
began to control the rice-growing areas. They made routes to
Phnom Penh and provincial capitals. The US and South Vietnamese
air strikes burnt down the prosperous rubber plantations and
paddy fields in eastern cambodia. As a result, people became
homeless and unemployed. The looting and arson committed by the
troops of South Vietnam and undisciplined Lon Nol troops helped
to increase the ranks of the revolutionaries. As the economy of
Lon Nol government was on the verge of collapse, the US came to
his resuce with its aid to his government. 62
The liberation forces began to control the countryside. On
20 April, Saang, 18 miles away from Phnom Penh fell to the
60. Caldwell and Tak, n.8, p.299. 61. SWB FE/3352/6-7, 14 April 1970. see also A1lmen,n.so, pp.22-
23. 62. Caldwell and Tan, n.8, p.304.
184
revolutionaries. It was possible for the Khmer Rouge to attack
the capital from there. During the US invasion of Cambodia, May
June 1970, 338 Americans were killed and 1, 529 wounded ·in
Cambodia. 63 The Khmer Rouge had established six main base areas
and commanding key areas in the countryside. Kompong Cham, Hu
Nim's old electoral district was a stronghold of the
Communists. 64 Their activity was intensified in Battambang and
Siem Reap. Meanwhile, the Khmer Rouge began recruiting cadres.
The Vietnamese Communists acted as advisers, instructors and
organizers, but leadership remained with the Khmer Rouge. They
also began to protect the civilian population and reorganize the
administration.65 People began to join the Khmer Rouge due to
their loyalty towards the Prince, social grievances and survival.
Though the US forces left Cambodia, as promised, the South
Vietnamese forces remained. The discipline maintained by the
North Vietnamese/Viet Cong created good impression in the minds
of the peasants. In the first week of July 1970, the Khmer Rouge
planned to attack on Kompong Thorn, but it was averted with the
arrival of the South Vietnamese forces. 66 Then the Khmer Rouge
63. "A Report on the ", n.55, p.69, see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.l4, p.24030.
64. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, n.l4,p.24029. 65. Caldwell and Tan, n.,8, p.314. 66. Times of India, 8 July 1970. see also Keesing's Contemporary
Archives, n.57, p.24136.
185
diverted their attention to the ancient Temple complex of Angkor
Wat, the erstwhile seat of Khmer culture, and captured it. They
wanted to snatch Siem Reap. 67 The South Vietnamese forces backed
by bombers and artillery, killed 69 North Vietnamese and Viet
Cong soldiers in clashes near Svay Rieng and the towns of Kompong
Trabek and Tuk Meas. 68 From 1 August 1970 onwards, the Communists
started harassing or attacking Government positions within four
miles of the capital in four separate occasions. But they were
beaten by the Lon Nol forces. 69 In September the village of
Taing Kouk was captured by the Khmer Rouge and put up stiff
resistance but it was recovered by Lon Nol forces on 26
September. The Prince claimed that two-thirds of the country was
liberated and the Lon Nol government controlled only the capital
and some important areas. 7 0 The US too agreed that Lon Nol' s
authority confined to one-third of the territory. 71
THE M ~ ~ THE LON NOL GOVERNMENT
As ·noted above, though Lon Nol felt that his government
might tackle the resistance problem he realized the need of
outside help. Thereofore,he appealed to the us in April for aid72
67. Times of India, 11 July 1970. 68. Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 21 July 1970. 69. Times of India, 18 August 1970. 70. Patriot, New Delhi, 28 September 1970. see also
L. F.Goodstadt, "Calculated Revolution", FEER, vol.LXX, no.47, 21 November 1970, pp.5-6.
71. "Secretary Rogers and Secretary Laird Interviewed on 'Issues and Answers", Department of State Bulletin, 2 November 1970, p.550.
72. SWB FE/3354/A3/1, 16 April 1970.
186
As noted above considerable amount of military aid was given.73
He also said that the US-South Vietnamese troops in cambodia had
killed 7,900 of the enemy and captured enough arms to equip more
than 30 battalions. 74 In order to solve the military problems
faced by Lon Nol in the fiscal year of July 1970-June 1971, it
was agreed by the US to give aid at least US$ 25 million. 75 By
the beginning of September, there was a financial crisis. On 11
September Secretary Laird asked Kissinger to give US $60 million
in aid to Cambodia without which the government of Lon No1 would
collapse and the US credibility would be at stake. on 15
September the us decided to increase aid to Lon Nol and it was
approved on 16 October 1970. As a result of the aid extended by
the us, Lon Nol was able to increase the army, from 40,000 to
150,000 by the end of the year. 76
To add to the complexity of the situatioin, the RGNUC
organised effective propaganda against Lon Nol regime and
established its administrative networks in several provinces of
Cambodia. 77 The organisation at the lowest level was Phums
(hamlets), Khums (villages), Sroks (district) and Khets
(provinces). The Committees were elected and the members were
73. Times of India, 30 April 1970. 74. The Hindu, Madras, 27 May 1970. 75. The Times, London. 11 July 1970. 76. "A More Balanced Sharing of the Burdens of Security",
(Statement by M.R.Laird, Secretary of Defence), Department of State Bulletin, 21 December 1970, p.754.
77. Gordon with Young. n.43, p.37.
187
assigned specific political, military, economic, cultural and
social responsibilities. Those who had devotion to the cause of
the NUFC and commanded honesty and moral character were eligible
for election.78
By November 1970 the Khmer Rouge infitration grew intense
in Battambang, S~em Reap, Pursat, Kampot, Takeo, Prey Veng,
Kampong Chhang and Phnom Penh. Nearly two-thirds of Cambodia's
territory was claimed to have come under the control of the rebel
forces. 79
THE KHMER ROUGE AND THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS
The establishment of the Worker's Party of Kampuchea (WPK)
in September 1960, the death of its Secretary-General, Tou
Samouth in July 1962, Pol Pot assuming the Party post in 1963 and
the Cambodian Communists armed rebellion against the Prince's
regime in 1967 were instances of the assertion of independence by
the Cambodian Communists from the Vietnamese tutelage. Regarding
the Prince's regime the Khmer Communists opposed the Vietnamese
view of supporting him because he was anti-imperialist and
helping for the cause of national unification of Vietnam. The
Khmer Rouge turned hostile towards the DRVN and moved closer to
the PRC and it reflected in the bilateral relations between the
Khmer Rouge and the DRVN during the 1970-1975 period.
78. Caldwell and Tan, n.8, p.315. 79. Gordon with Young, n.43, p.39.
188
After the establishment of the RGNUC in May 1970, some 1,500
cadres who returned to Cambodia from Hanoi in mid-1.970 had to
work in Cambodia with the Khmer Rouge. 80 But the arrival of
these cadres from Hanoi was not liked by the Khmer Rouge. "Now
they were, at best, a tolerated minority and at worst seen as
infiltrators and ~nemies. For the CPK leadership, it seemed they
had come not to help, but to replace or destory". 81 Since the
Khmer Rouge had no faith in the Khmer Viet Minh, they were
physically liquidated. 82 The Khmer Rouge also began to liquidate
the Sihanoukists and the former members of his government. Thus,
both the Khmer Viet Minh and the Sihanoukists became the targets
of attack and they were branded as 'Third Force'. The Khmer
Rouge felt that it might divide the country's political forces
into three or four directions. on the purges the 1973 Party
History says "The Party took the position of strength,
attacking finally and chasing absolutely the third force which
was the· obstacle". 8 3 The local Khmer Rouge held political
positions in CPK organisations, where the Khmer Viet Minh were
80. Ben Kiernan, "Pol Pot and the Kampuchean", Communist Movement", in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds.), Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981, London, 1982, p.265.
81. Stephen Heder, "Kampuchea's Armed Struggle : The Origins of an Independent Revolution", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, vol.11, no.~, 1.979, p.l.9.
82. Prince Norodom Sihanouk, War and Hope : The Case for Cambodia, Paris, 1.979, pp.44-45.
83. summary of Annotated Party History, by Easten Region Military Political Service, September 1.973, Text reproduced in Karl D. Jackson (ed.), Cambodia, 1975-1978 : Rendezvous With Death, Appendix A, New Jersey, 1989, p.266.
189
assigned the combat positions. Half of the 1,500 retunred Khmer
Viet Minh died and it was presumed that the Khmer Rouge attitude
towards them might be the cause in the reduction of their
number. 84
When Nuon Chea, the deputy secretary of the CPK after
occupying large areas, wanted to start the combined military
operation against Lon Nol, it was opposed by I eng Sary and Son
Sen, who were in charge of the Northeastern zone. Pol Pot after
his return to Ratanakiri from Hanoi opposed the Nuon Chea's
proposal. But the Vietnamese and Hou Youn supported Nuon Chea.
The Vietnamese had offered a 200 bed military hospital,
establishment of a military training school in the Northeast, use
of Vietnamese cadres and technical advisers and they were all
turned down. Finally, the Vietnamese dropped the idea of a
combined struggle. Despite this, the Vietnamese retained their
cadre in the Northeast for about a year. 85
In Kratie there were no Khmer Rouge bases. But they
established their headquarters near Chinit river after Lon Nol's
Operation Chenla I in October 1970, which was aimed at clearing
the route to Kompong Thorn. In the East, the Vietnamese
recognized the authority of Pol Pot's Party centre and
established military, medical, radio-telegraphic and
84. Kiernan, n.80,p.266. 85. Kiernan, n.39,p.308.
190
aorninistrative schools. In the Southwest also they did the same.
When Pol Pot carne to know about them, they were closed down in
the middle of 1971. Both Heng Sarnrin and Hun Sen were graduated
from there. So Phirn, the Secretary of Eastern Zone was ignored
by Pol Pot. The Black Book claimed that the Party Centre
"devoted more time to political education than to technical
training. 86 The Vietnamese liberated a lot of territory in the
East and snatched weapons from the enemy and gave them to the
Khmers to raise a brigade.
In Kompong Thorn province, Southern zone, the local Khmer
Rouge forces fired on the Vietnamese Communists from behind
while the latter were attacking the Lon Nol forces in September
1970. 87 The Pol Pot group began its attacks on the Vietnamese
cadres. For sometime, communication between the Party Centre and
other zones was very limited. Therefore, there was some regional
autonomy. In Eastern zone, the Vietnamese met the Khmer
Communists on 7 October 1970 and guaranteed them that "when the
liberation of the country is achieved, they will participate in
the unified Khmer government. 88
According to the Black Book, the CPK Central Committee which
met in Plenary session in October 1970 decided that independence
and sovereignty of the country was important. Therefore, they
86. Ibid, p.J11. 87. Shawcross, n.1, p.250. 88. David E.Brown, "Exporting Insurgency The Communists in
Cambodia", in J .J. Zasloff and A. E. Goodman, (eds.) IndoChina in Conflict, Lexington, 1972, pp.1J0-131.
191
wanted to rely on their own forces. It was also decided that the
Vietnamese solidarity would continue with vigilance. In November
a week long inter-party summit meeting took place and the
relations strained. Hence, the Vietnamese were warned not to
divide Khmer people and the revolutionary army. The result was
that the Vietnamese assistance declined and the Vietnamese
advisers maintained low profile in late 197o. 89
THE ORGANISATION OF THE CPK
The CPK divided the areas which were under their
control as regions. They were :
I SOUTH WEST REGION : It included the provinces of Kampot, Koh
Kong, Sihanoukville, Kompong Seila, Takeo, Kompong Chhnang,
Kompong Speu, Oudong and Kandal provinces. 90 The zone was headed
by Koy Thuon who was assisted by Sreng, Deputy Secretary and Ke
Pauk, military commander. At a later date Ke Pauk got more
control over the zone.
II EASTERN ZONE : Kratie, svay Rieng, Prey Veng and Kompong Cham
provinces were included in the zone. The population of the zone
was equal to that of the Southwestern zone. But its area was
small in size. The zone was better organized and it was divided
89. Kiernan, n.39, pp.312-13. 90. Ith Sarin, "Life in the Bureaus (Offices) of the Khmer
Rouge", in Timothy Michael Carney ( ed.) , Communists Party Power in Kampuchea (Cambodia) : documents and Discussion, Cornell University, Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper n.106, Ithaca, New York, 1977, p.43.
192
into five regions (21, 22, 20, 24, and 23). For the next five
years its leadership remained stable. The zone executive
consisted of party secretary, Phim, Deputy Phuong and secretary
of Region 24, Chhouk.
Kratie. 91
Tiv 01 became the province chief of
III NORTHWEST ZONE : Kompong Thorn, Siem Reap, Oddar Meanchey and
Banteay Chmar and regions from 1 to 7 were inclubed in the Zone
and headed by Muol Sambath. He was assisted by Khek Penn and
military commander Keu. Then he got control of the zone at a
later date.
IV NORTHEAST ZONE The Central Committee of the CPK directly
administered the zone headed by Son Sen.
V NORTH ZONE : The Regions numbered 31, 32, 35 and 36 included in
the zone. There were limited communication facilities.
VI Pursat, Battambang and Pailin provinces.
VII SPECIAL REGION : It was created at the end of 1971 and aimed
at controlling the area around Phnom Penh. The headquarters of
the Special Region were located on the Kompong Speu-Kompong
Chhnang border. Sok Thuok was the Chief of the Region. Besides
him there were Hang and Ros Chetthor.
VIII Preah Vihear, Stung Treng, Mondolkiri and Ratanakiri were
under the control of the Central Committee of the CPK. All these
provinces were the strong military bases of the CPK and close to
91. Kiernan, n.39, p.315.
193
Thailand, Laos and Vietnam. 92 In the liberated areas, elections
were held for the village and sub-district chiefs. The village
chief was elected by secret ballot and in turn he selected his
team. The Vietnamese encouraged those who commanded respect
including monks to contest for the post of village chief. The
CPK divided each region for the sake of convenience, into
sectors, (Damban), districts (Srok), village (Khum) and hamlet
(Phum). 93 The Chief of each Region had great influence in their
areas. These positions were occupied by the members of the
Central Committee of the CPK and the RGNUC.
THE COMMUNIST ACTIVITY IN THE SOUTHWEST ZONE
After the coup Non Suon and Phouk Chhay were released by Lon
Nol and they went into the countryside. But some others
remained in the capital. Pol Pot's brother Saloth Chhay who was
also released stayed in Phnom Penh in order to contest in the
elections which were due in September 1970. Meanwhile, Non Suon
went to the Southwest zone and began to work with the masses and
he became the Secretary of Region 31 in Kompong Chhnang province
in September. Phouk Chhay became the political commissar of the
zone armed forces. 94 Then there was some confusion regarding the
post of Secretary as there were Mok and Chou Chet equally
92. "Cambodian Peop1e 1 s War of Resistance Against US Aggression and for National Salvation in Fine shape", Peking Review,, vol.13, no.46, 13 November 1970, p.21.
93. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.43. 94. Ibid.
194
competent and popular. Therefore, the post of Chairman was
created for Chet who was in charge of political and
administrative affairs. Mok controlled military affairs. At the
same time, Prasith, Sangha Hoeun and Thuch Rin were also active
in the zone. 95
In the Southwest zone, the revolutionary movement became
popular because of genuine democratic elections and land reforms.
In Kompong Trach, a person was not allowed to retain over five
hectares of rice land. 96 In Kandal province land was scarce.
Hence, each family was given one hectare rice land and poor
people got benefit by this scheme. During 1970-73 period the
revolutionary organisation challenged the authority of Pol Pot.
Kandal area was led by Sok Thuok and his deputies were Heng and
Ros Chhetthor. 97 They belonged to the cc of the CPK. Non Suon
became a political commissar of Saang-koh Thorn sector of Kandal
province. Non Suon was the "most important Communist cadre in the
country 11 •98 By December 1973 in Kandal Province the Khmer Rouge
under the leadership of Khieu Samphan, established its authority
by quelling the pro-Sihanouk and Pro-Vietnamese elements. No
doubt it was a setback for Non Suon. After 1972 both Hang and
Ros Chetthor disappeared. On Kandal the Black Book criticized
the Vietnamese policy of keeping its cadres. It said
Some elements of this group attacked the Communist Party of
95. Kiernan, n.39, p.314.
openly Kampu-
96. "Prosperous Cambodian Liberated Zone", Peking Review, vol. 16, no.20, 18 May 1973, p.13.
97. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.34. 98. Ibid.
195
chea, when the others carried out manoeuvres of seduction. And they launched continuous attacks at the time when our party had not yet achieved its unity in the whole country. 99
During 1970-71, clashes occurred in Saang-Koh Thorn district
of southern Cambodia between the Khmer Communists and the
Vietnamese Communists. As a result of the trouble anti-Vietnam
policy gained ground. But in May 1972 Hou Youn in a meeting in
the Southwest zone advocated the unity with the Lao and the
Vietnamese Communists to drive the us out of Indo-China. 100
Hu Nim represented the Southwest zone at a resistance
Congress in May 1970. In 1972 Chou Chet became the chairman of
the zone and he had great influence in the zone. Phouk Chhay
became political commissar and Ta Mol< military commander. Hou
Youn, Minister of the Interior in the RGNUC was also in the zone.
Except Ta Mol< all others were purged at a later date. 101 These
purges helped Pol Pot to bring the zone under the control of the
Party Centre.
Regarding the political programme implemented in the
Southwest Zone during 1972-73 Ith Sarin said that each
administrator must have Love, respect and serve the people
sincerely and affectionately. They must always be modest and
simple towards the people. They should not steal people's
property and take bribe from them. In every possible way they
99. Kiernan, n.ao, p.269. 100. Ibid, p.270. 101. Ith Sarin, n.90, pp.43, 37.
196
should be honest towards the people.
According to Ith Sarin, the Cultural Revolution had eserted
great influence on the cadre training programme. The philosophy
of the party was that the Khmer Rouge had to help the people in
the field. When a peasant fell ill, the cadres had to give the
needed medicines. The people began to support the organisation
because of their close co-operation with them. 102
But by the end of 1973, the Pol Pot group was able to weild
considerable influence in the Southwest Zone and Chou Chet was
attacked by the Khmer Rouge. As the Pol Pot group began to
control the affairs, strict rules and stiff penalties for non-
compliance were imposed. The zone had a troop strength of
15,000. 103 But the cadres solidarity with the Prince and the
Vietnamese was not liked by the Khmer Rouge. Therefore, the
immediate concern was to control the affairs of the zone and
estabilsh the authority of the Party Centre and implement its
policies. The Southwest Zone suffered during its attack on Phnom
Penh in July due to lack of co-ordination.
suffered due to the US B-52 bombing. 104
The forces also
In late 1973, the Vietnamese and the Chinese cadres
disappeared and the Khmer forces stayed. With the dawn of 1974,
difficult days started. It is quite unfortunate that the zone
leaders such as Ta Prachha and Prasith were taken away and
killed. These developments forced the People to flee.
102. Ibid, pp.46-50. 103. Ibid, p.43. 104. Kiernan, n.ao, p.274.
197
People who committed mistakes were taken away and killed by the
Khmer Rouge. Youths of 16 years old were recruited into the army
and those who refused were killed. 105
For some time the Southwest Zone cadres had resisted the
Khmer Rouge encroachments. In November and December 1973 the
local cadres won two large battles against the Pol Pot forces. 106
Byt by 1975, the zone was brought under the effective control of
the Pol Pot group. Ta Mok, the military commander became the
dominant figure there. Cadres like Phouk Chhay, Hou Youn and
Chou Chet lost the positions and patronage of the Pol Pot
group.107
NORTHWEST ZONE
Leav Keo Moni, a Hanoi trained, began to command troops in
Battambang province by November 1972. The revolutionary
organization was loyal to the Prince. According to Lon Nol
district Chief Keo Moni was popular with the people and he
mobilized people for the cause of revolution. During 1970-71,
the Communists began to behave in a better way towards the
people. Even the captured soliders were not killed and were
asked to desert to the side of the NUFc. 108 Yun Soen a former
student of Paris, became the Deputy Secretary of Region 22 in
Kompong Cham. From 1973 onwards things changed here.
105. Ibid, pp.275-76. 106. Ibid. 107. Kampuchea Dossier, Part 2, Hanoi, 1978, p.37. 108. Kiernan, n.39, p.319.
198
Villagers were massacred in north of Pursat province by Pol Pot
forces from 1974.
Pot.109
Kornpong Thorn was the native Province of Pol
NORTHERN ZONE
Rath Sarnuoen played a co-ordinating role with the Lao and
Vietnamese Communists. Taing Sarirn was initially appointed as
CPK Secretary of a district in the Northern zone and then he
became a member of the CPK Committee for Region 31 by the end of
1970. 110
NORTHEASTERN ZONE
In this zone, violence occurred against the people from the
middle of 1974. The pro-Sihanouk cadres who refused to oblige
Pol Pot's policies became the targets of attack. The Cham
Muslims who had supported the Prince opposed the collectivization
process and they favoured the abolition of middle men. 111
EASTERN ZONE
There was conflict between the Pol Pot group and the pro-
Sihanouk and Pro-Vietnamese forces. Anti-Pol Pot forces
controlled the zone in 1974. In Prey Veng popular military
rebellions broke out.112 so Pum who came from Hanoi resolved
109. FBIS, 4 October 1977, p.H-38. 110. Kiernan, n.39, p.319. 111. Kiernan, n.ao, p.278. 112. Kampuchea Dossier, Part 2, n.107, p.39.
199
these problems. Then he became a Party Secretary of Reg ion 2 5.
The revolutionaries became popular through moderate land refoms
and were able to attract volunteers.
Despite the conflict between the Khmer Rouge and the
Vietnamese, the war was going on well on Lon Nol. By the end of
1970, there were. 15,000 Khmer Communists fighting in regualr
units. The September Chenla I operation was effectively stalled
by the Communists. Then the breaking of the siege of Kompong
Thorn failed. By January 1971, the Khmer Rouge claimed 12 well-
trained regiments. By June the CIA estimates of regular and
guerrilla forces put at 125,000. In July, the us Defense
Intelligence Agency "estimated that the Communists control some
two to three million.people in Cambodia out of a total of about
seven million".113
Lon Nol was able to retain control in towns and nearby
areas. The Communists succeeded in bringing the rural areas as
under their control. Thus, they won the political war in the
countryside. But their influence did not spread to all parts of
the country and they were not popular with the majority of the
people. Therefore, before the final victory, the CPK Centre
wanted to spread to all parts and wanted to attain "mastery over
the revolutionary qroups".114
Regarding the social analysis of the Khmer society, the ICP
113. Kiernan, n.39,p.322. 114. Ibid, p.323.
200
felt that the Cambodian society was considered in 1920s as one of
the 'nascent capitalism ... with many vestiges of feudalism'. It
is to be remember that Hou Youn also held the ICP view. But the
Khmer Rouge considered the Khmer society as 'a semi-colonial and
semi-fedual country' and it was in line with the Communist Party
of China's analysis of pre-revolutionary China. It was felt that
the peasantry was exploited by the fedual landlords. But the
Khmer peasant was indebted to the ethnic Chinese adn it was not
mentioned by the Khmer Rouge. 115 Even though they wanted to rely
on the 'worker peasant forces' to win revolution, they 'did not
depend on the forces of the workers' because, in fact, they did
not become the vanguard but they were only the peasants. 116 The
CPK felt that the exploiting classes resisted the people's war.
Those who experienced oppression were fully determined to wage
war against the exploiting and imperialist classes.
THE CONGRESS OF THE CPK, JULY 1971
A two week conferende of the CPK was held in the Northern
Zone at Pol Pot's headquarters in July 1971. The participants
ere Pol Pot, Noun Chea, Vorn Vet, Non Suon, Ney Sarann, Um
Neng, Chou Chet, So Phim, Phuong, Chhouk, Seng Hong, Koy Thuon,
Ke Pauk, Mok, Muol Sambath, Khieuu Samphan, Hou Youn, Hu Nim,
some ethnic minority representatives and many Hanoi-trained
115. W.E.Willmott, "Analytical Errors of the Kampuchean Communist Party", Pacific Affairs, vol.54, no.2, Summer 1981, p.210.
116. Kiernan, n.39,p.324.
201
Khmers. 117
A new Central Committee was elected with thirty members.
Chou Chet, Urn Neang, Kang Chap, So Doeun and Khieu Samphan became
new full members. Both Hou Youn and Hu Nim became candidate
members. Entry of Hanoi-trained Khmers was stalled and Keo Meas
was left out and the Politburo remained unchanged.
National Democratic Revolution became the party policy
followed by Collectivization and evacuation of towns. But Hou
Youn, Hu Nim, Khieu Samphan, So Phim and Koy Thuon opposed
collectivization and they favoured mutual aid teams. 118 Hou Youn
as Minister of Interior, Communal Reforms and Co-operatives was
against to use his name as a screen and made him a 'puppet
minister'. He also sensed the elimination of markets.
The CPK wanted to establish contacts with foreign powers on
the basis of equality and non-interference in the internal
affairs of others. Non Suon treated the 1971 Congress as a study
session. Vorn Vet claimed that the Congress took place after the
study session. 119 It can be presumed that it was a secret
Congress and passed resolutions favourable to Pol Pot group.
DECLINE OF KHMER REPUBLIC'S WAR EFFORTS
The Khmer Rouge intensified its attacks on the Khmer
117. Ibid, p.327. 118. For a discussion of mutual aid teams see Hou Huon, "Solving
Rural Problems A Socialist Programme to Safeguard the Nation", trans by Chanthou Boua in Ben Kiernan and Chanthou Boua (eds.), Peasants and Politics in Kampuchea, 1942-1981, London, 1982, pp.136, 139-42, 144-50.
119. Kiernan, n.39, p.328.
202
Republican forces. On 21 January 1971 Pochentong airport was
fired with rockets by the Viet Cong forces. On the Khmer
Republic's side efforts were not effective to resist the
enemy. 120 The US rushed war materials to Cambodia on 23 January
to help the Khmer Republic to recover from devastation caused by
a Communist attack in which the Cambodian Air Force was almost
completely destroyed.121 There was a steady decline of the
territory administered by Lon Nol and steady increase of the
terri tory under the Khmer Rouge control. The Khmer Rouge also
increased its strength between 30 to 40 thousand men. With their
strength, they were in a position to challenge the authority of
Phnom Penh government with the control of rice producing areas by
the Khmer Rouge, it 'created serious food shortages and food
riots' brokeout. To avert starvation, the us began to airlift
120 tons of rice daily into Phnom Penh. People began to move
into the capital from Kompong Cham, svay Rieng and Prey Veng
provinces as a result of the US B-52 bombings on heavily
populated Khmer Rouge controlled areas. 122 Keeping in view the
military weakness of Lon Nol, who was unable to resist the enemy,
Secretary Laird in June asked the US president to help to
increase the Republican troops to 220,000 and an aid of US $350
million for the next year. 123 It was agreed to increase the
120. "Behind the Facade of the Phnom Penh Administration", Vietnam Courier, Hanoi, no.?, December 1972, p.22.
121. The Hindu, 24 January 1971. 122. Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.13, 26 March - 1 April 1973,
p.11299, see also Ibid, vol.XIX, no.24, 11-17 June 1973, p.11435, Laura Summers, "The Cambodian Civil War", Current History, vol.63, no.376, December 1972, p.259.
123. Shawcross,n.1, p.194. see also Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.31, 30 July-S August 1973, p.11517.
203
Cambodian army to 220,000 by January 1973.
In August 1971, Lon Nol launched operation Chenla II to
clear the Highway through Region 31 to Kompong Thorn City. The
Republican forces which were around 200,000 was not effectively
fielded a division for the task and it led to the catastrophic
collapse of the Chenla II operation on 4 December 1971. 124 The
Republic recruited more number into the army. It lacked "any
ideological preparation for the civil war and a total pre-
occupation with a foreign enemy defined a racial and religious
terms. "After the failure of the Chenla II in December 1971,
when the fleeing soldiers to Phnom Penh were asked, they said
that they could not kill the other Khmers. They were recruited
'to defend Khmer culture, they could not in turn contribute to
its destruction". Several soliders defected to the Khmer Rouge
side. 125 From the military point of view, the failure of Chenla
II appeared to be problematic for the survival of the Republic.
From a political point of view, prospects for the consolidation
of the Republic were equally doubtful. Hence, the failure of the
"Chenla II marked the turning point in the Cambodian war because
it was a political as well as a military defeat for Lon Nol; it
signaled the beginning of widespread public recognition of civil
war".126
124. "Big Victory on Highway 6", Peking Review, vol.14, no.51, 17 December 1971,pp.l7,22.
125. Summers, n.122, p.260, see also Zudith Coburn, "The Army Nurses its wounds", FEER, vol.LXXIV,no.51, 18 December 1971, p.16.
126. Summers, n.112, p.259.
204
During the Chenla II operation in August 1971, the peasants
who had been given shelter to the Vietnamese were killed by the
Khmer Rouge in Baray, Kornpong Thorn. There took place anti-
Vietnamese demonstrations in the Northern and Eastern Zones. It
was alleged that Ke Pauk, the Zone military Commander, was
responsible for th violence. Meanwhile, Speical Zone around
Phnom Penh was created. The Party's Centre strategy was
implemented by using dernestic Communists against Hanoi-trained
Khmers. Regarding the elimination of such people, a local CPK
member said thus :
We called those Khmers from Hanoi to come to study and someone led them away. So, really we were expelling them... When we began pulling them out the others did not realize what was happening. And so we were able to get rid of almost all of them. Very few realized what was happening in time and escaped to Vietnam. 127
NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
During 1970-71 period the revolutionaries introduced certain
reforms in the liberated areas. The policies of land
distribution became popular among poor peasants. Therefore, they
supported the revolution. But with the dawn of 1972, pro-
Sihanouk, Hanoi-trained Khmers and the Vietnamese were gradually
liquidated by the Khmer Rouge. They were friendly with the
people. After their elimination in all the regions attempts were
made to install pro-Pol Pot Party Centre cadres to important
127. Quoted in Kiernan, n.39,pp.334-35.
205
positons. After this Pol Pot set in motion the ideas of National
Democratic Revolution to give a shape to the liberated areas.
According to Ith Sarin the party was not mentioned in the
liberated areas. In order to preserve the ~ecrecy and the
existence of the party, the government was ascribed to the
'Angka' or 'Organisation' . 128 The process of collectivization
was in tune with the ideas of mutual aid teams proposed by Hou
Youn and other Khmer left intellectuals. At village level a group
of about 12 to 15 people were put together headed by a chairman
who was, in turn, elected by the village chief. These groups
were responsbile for the organisation of agricultural
produciton. 129
Tensions prevailed between the Khmer Rouge and the North
Vietnamese. According to Hou Youn, the party 'has foreseen all
in preparing for danger from the VC/NVA'. He felt that the Khmer
Rouge" seems to have control over all activities in its zones.
The VC/NVA are far from being the masters 11•130
The Khmer Rouge had introduced strict rules for its cadres".
Consumption of liquor, gambling, adultery and feudal terms of
address were eliminated. Personal characteristics were to be
replaced by a collective spirit. Short-tempered cadres were
accused of having 'thick individual traits'. One should
128. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.34. 129. Hou Yuon, n.118, pp.136-50. see also Laura Summers
"Translator's Introduction", in Khieu Samphan's "Cambodia's Economy and Industrial Development", Data Paper no.111, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, 1979, pp.1-19.
130. Carney, n.90, p.18.
206
observe a cadre and cr i ticiae in order to help them better
socialists. Every one was expected to have trust in the Angkar
because the organisation has as many eyes as a "pine apple and
cannot make mistakes". It was hoped that the Khmer Rouge might
hate the Republican government. To make revolution they had to
depend on their own strength, i.e., self-reliance. To win the
favour of the people the cadres had to respect, 'the ways of the
people' and had to 'study from the people in order to be like the
people. Interaction between the cadres and the peasant was
necessary in order to educate each other in the way which
Communists called 'construction'. Moreover, they emphasized the
need of more production and encouraged to hate Lon Nol. The
movement under Pol Pot became totalitarian by the end of 1972.
But the peasants remained passive, very attached to their habits
and customs. The New collective life being imposed upon them
frightened them. Most of them kept secret their attachment to
Sihanouk and his regime. The Khmer Rouge knew pretty well that
he was popular among the peasants and abroad. Therefore, they
wanted to convert his popularity for their own advantage. "The
Central Committee of the Khmer Communist Party pulled Sihanouk
into their trap by means of Peking. Having got him in hand, the
Khmer Rouge got ready to squeeze him dry 11•131
From mid-june 1972, the people in the Regions of 13 and 35
in Takeo and Kampot were asked to wear black dress and family
131. Ith Sarin, n.90, pp.34-55.
207
bonds were discouraged. Hanoi-trained Khmers were relieved of
their duties and dubbed them as revisionists, lazy and cowards.
The captured Lon Nol solders were killed by the Khmer Rouge, but
the Vietnamese never killed, instead encouraged defection to the
side of revolutionaries. In Region 15, Northwest of Phnom Penh
500 Lon Nol soldiers were killed by the Khmer Rouge in 1972. The
CPK Centre used ~he domestic veterans to eliminate the Hanoi-
trained Khmers and Sihanoukists. Then the Purge of domestic
Issarak veterns pegan. In the Eastern Zone, Yun Soeun, Zone's
deputy secretary tried to re-establish secondary education, but
it was opposed by the Party Centre. In Region 21, anti-
Vietnamese demonstrations were organized in mid-1972 and Vietnam
was branded as the acute enemy by the CPK. Attacks also took
place on the Khmer Rumdos by the CPK in Region 32 in the Northern
zone. The CPK sought the help of the Khmer Rumdos to expel the
Vietnamese from Cambodia. 132
As a result of attacks on the Vietnamese, their troop
strength came down to 8,000. But nearly 30,000 troops stationed
on the border and at supply routes and the CPK began to
confiscate food and anununi tion from the Vietnamese. In April
1972, the CPK forces drove the Vietnamese where they did not
accept the CPK state power. The conflict helped the South
Vietnamese forces to reopen highway 2 in mid-1972 and establish
the authority of the Republic. 133 When the Paris peace tasks
began for a negotiated settlement in Vietnam, the CPK refused
132. Ibid, p.42. see also Shawcross, n.1, p.251. 133. Shawcross, n.1, p.251.
208
for a negotiated settlement to the Cambodian war. 134 At the same
time, Pol Pot obtained guarantees from Prince Sihanouk to that
effect. The Khmer Rouge feared that Vietnam may incorporate
Cambodia in the Indo-China Federation. On 7 February 1973, a
joint communique from the DRVN and the RGNUC insisted that in
Cambodia war would continue. 135
The Khmer Ro~ge objected to the Vietnamese buying of draught
animal, fearing that it may affect local agriculture, and
objected to the taxing of river traffic by the Vietnamese and
felt that their withdrawal would stop the US aerial bombings. On
1 December 1971 Chau Seng, Minister of Speical Missions in RGNUC,
claimed that the Khmer Rouge controlled four-fifths of Cambodia's
territory and five-sevenths of the population. 136 In view of
this Lon Nol was jokingly called the 'Mayor of Phnom Penh',
rather than as president of the Khmer Republic. 137
The Khmer Rouge continued their military operations during
1972 in and around Angkor Wat. Lon Nol government feared that
the North Vietnamese troops, which occupied the temple area,
would invite Prince Sihanouk to install him at the Angkor area.
At Phnom Bakleng area, Lon Nol forces were able to recapture
Phnom Bakleng which restored some strategic advantage to the
government. 138 The Khmer Rouge continued to register success
134. Ith Sarin, n.90, pp.20-21. 135. Shawcross, n.1, p.264. 136. Peter A.Poole, "Cambodia The Cost of Survival", Asian
survey, vol.XII, no.2, February 1972, p.150. 137. Gordon with Young, n.43, p.39. 138. Peter A.Poole, "Cambodia : Will Vietnam Truce Halt Drift to
Civil War ? 11 , Asian Survey, vol.XIII, no.1, January 1973, p.78.
209
after success with its army which rose to an estimated 40 to 50
thousand men which made rubber plantations area as its
headquarters. Apart from the Khmer Rouge forces, there were some
independent regiments, answerable only to the headquarters. The
average battlion consisted of several hundred men which included
ten or fifteen No~th Vietnamese radio operators and advisers. 139
The Khmer Rouge claimed that it controlled 90% of the Cambodian
territory and a population of 5,500,000. 14° Khieu Samphan said:
"The liberated zone in Cambodia is vast in expanse whereas the
areas temporarily occupied by the enemy are small and ever
contradicting, consisting only of Phnom Penh and a few provincial
capitals 11•141
The Khmer Rouge, apart from controlling more area and
population, had achieved more effective rural administration
through mass organisations. They were : Peasants' Association,
Patriotic Monks' Association and the Secret Alliance of Communist
Yough of Kampuchea. These organisations helped to recruit
members with middle class background. 142
ECONOMIC CRISIS
The activities of the Khmer Rouge affected the economy of
139. Donald Kirk, "Cambodia 1973 : Year of the Bomb Halt", Asian Survey, vol.XIV, no.l, January 1974, p.94.
140. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XIX, 18-24 June 1973, p.25941.
141. Donald Kirk, "Cambodia in 1974 Governments on Trial", Asian Survey, vol.XV, no.1, January 1975, p.54.
142. "Prosperous Cambodian Liberated zone", Peking Review, vol.16, no.20., 18 May 1973, pp.14-15.
210
Cambodia. To weaken Lon Nol's power base, the Khmer Rouge began
cutting off roads leading to towns and villages from the
beginning of April 1970. On account of the conflict, rubber
plantations in Memot and Snoul could not be maintained properly.
As a reult, the Chup plantations, covering 20,000 hectares, the
largest in the country, had to be abandoned. A 5, 000 hectare
tract, owned by the French Societie Khmere de Culture Tropicale
in Kompong Thorn province, was closed in December 1970.
Therefore, the rubber exports declined. 143
This affeted rice production also. War conditions
discouraged the peasants to plant normal quantities of rice and
were unable to harvest what they had planted. The US bombings
forced the peasant to abandon the lands and took refuge in Phnom
Penh. Hence, the rice cultivation declined to 30%. 144 In 1970
rice export declined due to less production and dislocation of
transport system. By August 1970 bridges were blown up by the
Khmer Rouge. Therefore, the Battambang-Phnom Penh rail system got
disturbed and the closure of Route 4 to Kompong Som and other
routes leading to the Gulf of Thailand greatly hindered the rice
exports. 145
By June 1971 there was acute shortage of rice in Phnom Penh.
Cambodia, a rice exporting country, had to import 32,000 tons of
143. Cambodia exported 47,485 tons of rubber in 1969. It declined to 18,426 tons by November 1970. see Donald Kirk, "Cambodia's Economic Crisis", Asian Survey, vol.XI, no.3, March 1971, p.248.
144. Ibid, p.249. 145. Ibid., see also Poole, n.138, p.81.
211
rice to feed the people of Phnom Penh and the army. So, Khung
Thay Ly, Minister of Industry, Trade and Food was forced to
resign on 23 July 1971. When the guerrilla raids destroyed the
civilian fuel stocks In Tarn, Minister of Interior and security,
was asked to resign. Thus there was no security to the
Government establishments and the common man was unable to get
rice at reasonable price.146
Lon Nol was faced with yet another problem. By 11 September
1971 elections were due to the National Assembly which had
already been given an year's extension in September 1970. The
situation was not conducive to elections. Hence, he proclaimed
an emergency on 20 October 1971 and suspended the freedom of
Press, freedom of expression and secrecy of correspon-dence. The
newspapers which had been suspended earlier were not allowed to
reappear. 147
LON NOL.BECOMES HEAD OF STATE
On 10 March 1972 Cheng Heng, Head of State, announced his
resignation in favour of Marshal Lon Nol. Soon after assuming
off ice the Marshal dissolved the Consti tutent Assembly. The
National Assembly was converted into Constitutent Assembly after
the expiry of its date on 11 September 1971. On 12 March,
146. Boris Baczynskj, 11 In Cambodia Two's company", FEER, vol.LXXIV, no.40, 2 October 1971, p.14, see also T.D.Allman, "One Man's Pinnacle 11
, Ibid, pp.14-15. 14 7. Keesing 's Contemporary Archives, vol. no. XVII, 13-20 May
1972, p.25256, see also Judith Coburn, "Cambodia : New GameOld Wicket", FEER, vol.LXXIV, no.44, 30 October 1971, p.12.
212
Sirik Matak, the Prime Minister was dismissed following the
corruption charges levelled against him by law students. 1 48 Lon
Nol also assumed the position of the President of the Council of
Ministes and promised to appoint a new Prime Minister soon.
SON NGOC THANH BECOMES PRIME MINISTER
Yem Sambaur, the former President of the Assembly and Sim
Var, Cambodian Ambassador to Japan, were persuaded by Lon Nol to
accept the premiership. As they declined the offer Lon Nol
appointed Son Ngoc Thanh, an old, staunch rival of Prince
Sihanouk, as the Prime Minister on 18 March 1972 the second
anniversary of the overthrow of Prince Sihanouk was power. 149 On
14 October he stepped down after the elections to the National
Assembly in favour of Heng Thun Hak.
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
A new constitution, providing for a strong chief executive
had been submitted for referendum on 30 April 1972, which was
approved by 96% of the voters. 150 Basing on the new
consititution, elections were held for the presidentship on 4
June 1972. Besides Lon Nol, In Tam, Cabinet Minister, and
Professor Keo An, Dean, Law Faculty at Phnom Penh University
148. Judith Coburn, "And Now, A King in Khaki", FEER, vol.LXXV, no.12, 18 March 1972, pp.5-6.
149. Poole,n.138,p.79. see also T.J.S.,George, "Last Round for Lon Nol", FEER, vol.LXXV, no.13, 25 March 1972, p.5.
150. "A US Instigated Referendum", Vietnam Courier, no.1, June 1972, p.18.
213
contested for the. post. In the elections Lon Nol got 574, 738
votes (55%) and his rivals In Tam and Keo An got 250,900 (24%)
and 214,522 (21%) votes respectively. 151 On 3 July Lon Nol was
sworn in as Cambodia's first elected President.
ELECTIONS ~ THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
According to. the new electoral law promulgated on 15 July
1972 the provinces under Sihanoukists control each was to be
represented by at least two deputies, elected from among the
refugees of those provinces. 152 The Republican party and the
Democratic party led by Sirik Matak and In Tarn respectively,
boycotted the elections protesting against the 'unconstitutional
and un-democratic' electro! law. Hence, the Social Republican
Party led by Lon Non, the President's brother and the Pracheachon
led by Pen Yough contested in the elections, which were held on 3
September 1972. All the 126 seats were won by the Social
Republican Party. In the Senate elections held two weeks later
also all the seats were bagged by the Social Republican Party. 153
On 14 October Hang Thun took the reigns of Pr irne Ministership
from Son Ngoc Thanh.154
On 4 November Lon Nol announced the formation of a committee
151. "Electoral Farce in Phnom Penh", Vietnam Courier, no.2, July 1972, p. 19. see also Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVIII, 15-22 July 1972, p.25368.
152. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XVIII, 28 October -4 November 1974, p.25546.
153. Kirk, n.139, p.92. see also Cynicism, FEER, vol.78,no.44, Regime in Distress", Vietnam p.15.
Boris Baczynskj, "Socio-28 October 1972, p. 24. "A Courier,no.5, October 1972,
154. "Behind the Facade ... ", n.l20, p.24.
214
to handle the problems of national reconciliation and
reconstruction after cease-fire. He offered complete amnesty to
the Khmer Rouge. After expulsion of the Prince and laying down
of arms, they could serve in the army or take employment. Thus
they could return to the civilian life.
THE KHMER ROUGE ATTACKS ON GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHMENT
On 4 June 1972, two rockets were fired by the revolutio-
naries at the Ministry of Defense. A third rocket was aimed at
Lon Nol' s private building killing three small girls. A few
days later, terrorists fired thirty more rockets at the capital
resulted in killing two people and wounding five persons. The
North Vietnamese troops attacked a provincial headquarters at
Takhmau, 6 miles away from Phnom Penh on the same day . 155 It
exposed the security weakness of Lon Nol.
As a result of the disruption of rail line between Phnom
Penh and Battambang, and the Route 5 by the enemy, food riots
borke out on 7 and 8 September. On 9 September, the US announced
the airlifting of rice from Saigon. Thailand also supplied some
rice and it helped to normalize the situation. 156 The riots
exposed the short supply of rice and the inability of the Lon Nol
Government to meet the situation.
At the diplomatic level, the representatives of the RGNUC
were allowed to participate for one session of a meeting of Non-
155. Poole, n.138, p.ao. 156. Ibid, pp.S0-81.
215
Aligned States at Georgetown, Guyana in August. 157 Definitely it
was a diplomatic victory for the Khmer Rouge. Sensing danger,
the Khmer Republic sent a delegation to the UN led by Foreign
Minister at the end of 1972, who were able to retain seat in the
General Assembly. 158 There were rumours by the end of 1972 that
the Republican officials were in touch with the PRC and the DRVN
and with some dissident Khmer groups. But at this stage
rapproachment betw·een the warring Khmer factions appeared
doubtful.
BOMB ATTACK ON PRESIDENTIAL PALACE
By the beginning of March 1973, rumours were ripe that Phnom
Penh was on the verge of a non-Communist coup. The teachers went
on agitation against the government. 159 The government's desire
to win popularity by celebrating the third anniversary of the
overthrow of the Prince on 18 March 1973 foundered when on 17
March Captain So Pothra, son-in-law of the Prince, made a bomb
attack on Presidential Palace. 160 In the attack 43 people lost
their lives and 50 were wounded. However, the President escaped
unhurt. 161 Immediately after the attack, the President
157. "The Cambodian People March On", Peking Review, vol.15,no.46, 17 November 1972, p.10.
158. International Herald Tribune, 24 November 1974, see also Bangkok Post, 25 November 1974.
159. "Lon Nol Clique's Sharpening Crisis", Peking Review, vol.16, no.12, 23 March 1973, p.19.
160. Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.19, 7-13 May 1973, p.11372. see also "Phnom Penh SOS", Vietnam Courier, no. 12, May 1973, p.20.
161. Asian Recorder, n.160. p.11372.
216
Proclaimed again state of emergency, the third after the advent
of the Republic. Consequently, Civil liberties wre suspended for
six months. Fifty five members of the royal family, including
Queen Kossamak, and several opposition leaders, journalists,
editors, commanders, teachers and students were arrested. 162
Following the resignation of Hang Thun Hak on 17 April
1973, 163 Lon Nol announced the appointment of a Supreme State
Council, the country's highest decision-making body, composed of
the leading members of various political parties. The leaders of
the opposition parties demanded the restoration of democratic
institutions. These developments, in one way or other helped in
the formation of a new cabinet on 14 May 1973 by In Tam and he
said that his government would negotiate with the Khmer Rouge,
reorganize the army and form a Natioal Security Police. He also
assured that he would improve the economy and regulate food
supplies. 164
PRINCE SIHANOUK AND THE KHMER ROUGE
The Khmer Rouge during 1972 and 1973 effectively
demonstrated their strength in attacking the Lon Nol
establishments. It was due to their high-level training and
motivation imbued by their leaders to its cadres that they
achieved this. Meanwhile, they had established their
headquarters in the rubber plantations 100 miles away from Phnom
Penh. 165
162. Ibid., see also Kirk, n.139, p.92. 163. Asian Recorder, vol.XX, no.24, 11-17 June 1973, p.11434. 164. Ibid, vol.XIX, no.28, 9-15 July 1973, p.11480-81. 165. Kirk, n.139, p.93.
217
In January 1973, the Prince became favourable for
reconciliation, but by February he changed his mind, presumably
under pressure from the Khmer Rouge. 166 Kissinger also said on
23 January that the us halt bombing Cambodia from 29 January, if
the other side reciprocated and a defacto cease-fire would come
about. 167 Already cease-fire agreements were signed in case of
Laos and Vietnam. But both sides were unwilling to negotiate
with each other.
PRINCE SIHANOUK'S VISI'I' TO THE "LIBERATED" ZONES
As the resistance was in progress the position of Prince
Sihanouk, interestingly enough, began to decline in the resist-
ance setup. He indeed claimed that he was recognized by the
Khmer Rouge as the legitimate Head of State. But, the Khmer
Rouge systematically liquidated pro-Sihanouk cadres. 168 His
weakend position however became clear when he visited the
'Liberated zone' in cambodia accompanied by his wife Princess
Monique and his Special Envoy Ieng Sary in order to strengthen
his ties with the Khmer Rouge operating in Cambodia. There
developed a split between his Roylist supporters and the forces
of the Khmer Rouge. When he came to address a meeting at Phnom
Kulen, the Khmer Rouge forces drove away the cadres who were
invited to the meeting. 1 69
166. Ibid, p.94. 167. Shawcross, n.1, pp.261-62. 168. Ith Sarin, n.90, p.39. 169. Ponchaud, n.28, p.l90.
218
Prince Sihanouk, Princess Monique and !eng sary travelled
into the 'Liberated zone' in March 1973. 170 They travelled from
the northeastern Province of Stung Treng to the Angkor Wat in
Siem Reap province. 171 The significance of the Prince's journey
was aimed at providing the needed propaganda and support to the
RGNUC leaders. Secondly, it may be presumed that the Khmer Rouge
carried out the insurgency. So he had to follow their wishes. 172
PEACE OVERTURES TO THE PRINCE
Meanwhile, Lon Nol regime tried for peace settlement with
Prince Sihanouk. On 6 July 1973, Long Baret, Republican Foreign
Minister tried for peace by requesting all parties to apply
Article 20 of the Paris Agreement of January 1973 which called
for the ending of Military activities in Cambodia by foreign
countries. 173 The Prince rejected the peace proposals. 174
Meanwhile, In Tam, the Prime Minister, resigned on 7 December
1973 and was succeeded by Long Baret as Prime Minister on 20
December 1973.
As noted above, the Prince Sihanouk was opposed to a
negotiated peace settlement, as the Khmer Rouge intensified their
attacks on Phnom Penh and very often cutting the roads and firing
170. "A Historic Tour'', Vietnam Courier, no.l2, May 1973, p.19. 171. "Warm Congratulations on the Great success of Samdech
Sihanouk' s Inspection Tour of the Liberated Zone in Cambodia", Peking Review, vol.16,no.15,13 April 1973, pp.4-5.
172. Kirk, n.139, pp.94-95. 173. Asian Recorder, vol.XIX, no.37, 10-16 September 1973,
p.11589. 174. "Summary of Negotiating Efforts on Cambodia", Department of
State Bulletin, 31 March 1975, p.401.
219
on oil tankers. On 20 July, the Khmer Rouge started its most
virulent offensive against Lon Nol. In August 1973, the Prince
advised all foreigners and diplomats to leave Cambodia or become
'victims' of the war for Phnom Penh. In August 20,000 - 30,000
Khmer Rouge troops were operating within 25 - mile radius of the
capital. 175 Then, they penetrated the defenses of Kompong Cham,
4 7 miles northeast of Phnom Penh and overran it by early
September. 176 But Lon Nol forces, after a months fighting,
snatched a vital airstrip. The Khmer Rouge had to vacate Kompong
Cham due to lack of supplies. 17 7
On 9 November 1973, the seat of the resistance government
was transferred from Peking to the NUFC controlled area in
Cambodia and Khieu Samphan was chosen as the acting Prime
Minister. 178 There was speculation that Lon Nol would step downn
and a coalition government would be formed under the leadership
of Prince Sihanouk.l79
EVACUATION OF VILLAGES
In 1973, a tough young militant cadre came to the Southwest
zone and forced the villagers to move to uninhabited forest
175. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XIX, 5-11 November 1973, p.26186.
176. Ibid. 177. Kirk, n.139, pp.96-99. 178. "Cambodia : To Move Back Those RGNU Ministries Functioning
Abroad", Peking Review, vol.16, no.46, 16 November 1973, p.12.
179. Kirk, n.139, p.99.
220
land. This programme was carried out in Karnpot, Takeo and Kandal
provinces. "This large-scale relocation process which lasted
from July to December 1973 had extremely harsh results, was
bitterly opposed by most people and caused many to flee to South
Vietnarn". 180 The relocated villages were not allowed to bring
many things with them. Their harvest was confiscated by the
State and the rice was rationed. It is very interesting to note
that in a Buddhist dominated country like Cambodia, even religion
was also attacked; monks were forced to join the army or forced
to leave the pagodas to work in the fields. Families were
separated and Communal eating was introduced. State monopoly was
established over rice, salt, fuel, cloth and petrol. When the
government policies were implemented in Region 31 at the instance
of Ke Pauk and Khieu Ponnary 50,000 peasants fled to Kompong Thorn
City.181 There were low food rations. Soldiers had to work
along with other people. Black dress was compulsory for all of
them and violation of rules resulted in death sentence. The
towns people were asked to clear the forest for cul ti vat ion.
Work was collective and the harvest was confiscated to meet the
demand of the army Money was abolished. In the Northeast, the
tribal people opposed the idea of collectivization.
The number of Buddhist festivals were reduced to two per
year. The Cham rnuslirns were totally forbidden. Islamic practices
were forbidden and they "threatend to destroy all mosques by the
180. Kiernan, n.BO, pp.278-79. 181. Kiernan, n.39, p.371.
221
end of 1974". When more Buddhist monks were not willing to serve
in the army there were large-scale killing of monks in July in
Kampot. 182
In Southwest people portested the CPK's attempts to relocate
people and confiscate rice. In March 1974 10,000 Khmer Rumdos
surrendered to Lon Nol forces and wanted to fight against the
CPK, but they wer.e not allowed to do so. 183 Above 16 years old
youth were drafted into the army and it was followed by the
execution of Prasith in mid 1974. Therefore, 200 of his
followers escaped arrest and went to Cardamom mountains on Thai
border and they had the backing of the ethnic Khmers and local
Thai officials across the border. 184
The Cham Islamic movement in the Eastern Zone was disbanded
and its leader Sos Man was asked to live quietly in a village in
Region 21. The white Khmers (Khmer Saor) mostly muslim Khmers
broke away with the Khmer Rouge and went into the forest. Their
leaders were former Communist officials.
and oppose collectivization of property.
the abolition of middlemen 11 •185
"They support Sihanouk
They believe simply in
In 1974, the remaining Vietnamese were dirven out from the
Eastern Zone and most of the Hanoi-trained Khmers were arrested.
The Vietnamese women who had married Khmer men were exempted.
182. SWB FE/ 4 7341 A3 /2, 14 August 1973. see also Kiernan, n. 39, p.382.
183. Washington Post, 8 March 1974. 184. Wilfred Burchett, The China, Cambodia, Vietnam Triangle,
London, 1981,pp.195-96. 185. Kiernan, n.39, p.387.
222
Anti-Vietnamese policy was floated and Vietnam was criticised as
revisionist because of its peace agreement with the US and its
opposition to the Co-operatives in Cambodia. The Prince was also
not supported by the Khmer Rouge who had described him as "a
leech on the revolution". Freedom of speech was also curtailed
and people were scared to criticize the Khmer Rouge even in their
homes. If it was overheard the persons were taken away, tcrtured
and killed. As part of the Khmer Rouge policies, all the rubber
plantations in the 'liberated zone' were nationalized. 186
THE US BOMBINGS
During February - August 1973, the us dropped 257,465 tons
of bombs on Cambodia. The US bombings resulted in killing of
civilians and destroying villages. Many people fled fearing
bombing. Therefore, the us bombing was the main reason for
refugee movement187 and several thousand got killed and wounded.
The war created 3,389,000 refugees out of seven million Cambodian
population. Half of these were displaced during 1973. The
massive suffering of the 1973 bombing and the outrage it provoked
helped the Pol Pot group to gain a political leverage within the
revolution. During the February-August bombings, 16,000
insurgents were killed. 188 The Khmer Rouge who had lived in the
186. Asian Recorder, vol.XX, no.37, 10-16 September 1974, p.12187.
187. Kiernan, n.80, pp.280-81. see also Shawcross, n.l, p.272. 188. Kiernan, n.80, p.282.
223
jungle for ten years in isolation were prompted to attack on
Phnom Penh. It "was a madness born of desperate isolation, which
bred a dreadful hatred of their enemy and a contempt for the
attitudes of the outside world. 189
FORMATION OF HX2H EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
On 31 March 1974 Lon Nol dissolved the Supreme State Council
and formed the High Executive Council composed of the President,
Prime Minister, and two opposition leaders, Cheng Heng and Sirik
Matak to assist the Assembly in its work. 190
ABDUCTION OF THE EDUCATION MINISTER
On 19 January 1974 the secondary school students protested
against corruption. The teachers demanded for higher pay to meet
the price rise. On 16 March two teachers were arrested, allegedly
one teacher was in possession of a Sihanouk banner • 191 Even
after their release the strike continued. Hence, the government
suspended civil liberties on 13 May 1974. 192 When the
prohibitive orders were defied, 61 students and teachers were
arrested. All were released except five students and four
teachers. From 31 May onwards demonstrations were organized. On
189. Shawcross, n.1, p.299. 190. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XX, 19-25 August
1974, p.26679. 191. Ibid.,, vol.no.XX, 19-25 August 1974, p.26679. 192. "New Storm of Patriotic Student Movement in Phnom Penh",
Peking Review, vol.17, no.24, 14 June 1974, p.17.
224
4 June the students kidnapped Keo Sang Kim, the eduction minister
and his secretary. By holding them as hostages, they demanded
the release of students and teachers. The minister was killed by
an unidentified person, allegedly a Khmer Rouge agent to foment
trouble in Phnom Penh. 193 The students demanded drastic steps to
solve corruption and inflation. On 15 September the government
announced a series of measures to check economic distress. But
inflation and corruption continued to evade solution.
Both Pauk and Mok led the combined forces of the CPK
Northern and Southwestern zone and took control of Oudong on 18
March 1974. The 20,000 Oudong People were pushed into the
jungle.
killed.
All teachers, students, and Lon Nol soldiers were
Buildings were destroyed and People were evacuated and
sent to Pursat and Battambang.
EXTERNAL AID
The Khmer Republic pursued collaboration with the US during
its five year rule. Thailand supplied military equipment
consisting of 20 gun boats and reconnaissance aircraft and other
material to petrol the Mekong. The Thai government also sent
Thai citizens of Cambodian origin as volunteers to Cambodia to
assist the army. 194
The US dispatched 32,000 of its troops to Cambodia in May
1970. To Nixon, it was not an invasion of Cambodia but extension
193. Keesing's Contemporary Archives,, n.191, p.26680. 194. New York Times, 3 June 1970, see also Statesman, 7 June
1970, Caldwell and Tan, n.S, pp.331-32.
225
of the Vietnam War. 195 Nixon promised to withdraw troops within
two months but, the US Congress was not convinced and therefore,
it opposed additional military and economic aid. However,
therefore, Nixon's request was approved by the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. Apart from the aid, the US Congress fixed 200
US officials and 85 third country nationals to assist Cambodia.
The US was committed to spend more than half a billion dollars a
year on Lon Nol regime, most of it as military aid. 196
During the fiscal year 1974 the US provided Cambodia with
some US $ 400 million worth in military assistance, another US $
180 million in foodstuffs, mainly rice and US $ 95 million in
other forms of economic aid mostly for refugee relief. 197 The US
spent seven bi 11 ion on Lon Nol during the War period. 198
Correspondingly the Communist powers, the PRC, North Korea, North
Vietnam and the PRG of South Vietnam aided the NUFC. They gave
arms, equipment and medical supplies and North Vietnam provided
military instructors. The Prince, in his foreign visits,
emphasized the importance of his war against the us imperialists.
He visited Rumania, Algeria, Albania, Mauritania and Yugoslavia
dUring 19 June- 19 July 1972. 199 The decision to replace Lon Nol
representation at the UN was postponed in December 1973. 200 On
13 March 1975 the Prince threatened all foreign embassies
195. Gordon with Young, n.43, pp.34-35. 196. Kirk, n.139, p.95. 197. Kirk, n.141, p.60. 198. International Herald Tribune, 7 February 1975. 199. SWB FE/4019/A2/1, 20 June 1972. 200. Keesing's Contemporary Archives, vol.no.XXI,
1975,p.27154.
226
2-8 June
foreign embassies stationed in Phnom Penh to vacate, otherwise,
he might not establish diplomatic relations with them after the
liberation of Phnom Penh. 201 In consequence, by the end of March
1975, Australia, France, the UK, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand
recognized the legitimacy of the Prince and closed their
embassies in Phnom Penb. 202 on 5 April 1975 Japan, South Korea
and South Vietnam closed their embassies.
officially recognized the RGUNC regime. 203
On 28 March the USSR
Thus, the situation
turned in favour of the RGNUC at the diplomatic level and became
hostile to Lon Nol.
THE KHMER ROUGE OFFENSIVE - FALL OF PHNOM PENH
The Khmer Rouge forces, after having established their
control over practically the whole of Cambodia, turned their
attention towards capturing Phnom Penh. At about 1. 00 AM on 1
January 1975 they launched an offensive on the capital from all
sides. 204 The decision to liberate Phnom Penh and the other
territories outside the Khmer Rouge control was taken by the CPK
Central Committe in June 1974. By the end of January goods
ceased to reach Phnom Penh through the Mekong river. 205 Water-
mines, which had been imported from the PRC, were used to block
201. SWB FE/4855/1, 15 March 1975. 202. SWB FE/4866/A3/3, 1 April 1975. 203. Asian Recorder, vol.XXI, no.18, 30 April - 6 March
p.12559. see also Ibid, vol.XXI, no.21, 21-27 May pp.12591-93.
204. Bangkok Post, 3 January 1975. 205. Strait Times, Singapore, 11 March 1975.
227
1975, 1975,
the Mekong river to supply essential items. Thus, it became a
graveyard. Therefore, flying of ships stopped in Mekong.
previously, it used to supply eighty per cent of the Capital's
needs. By the end of February they were in firm control of Tuol
Leap, 12 miles west of Phnom Penh, from where they could hit the
capital. 206 The 6 March rocket raid temporarily suspended the
air supplies. On 13 March a shell blew up an ammunition dump at
the airport. 207 On 24 March the NUFC forced the Republicans to
evacuate Tuol Leap. 208 On 1 April, the National Bank of Cambodia
ordered a New York bank to pay US $ 1,000,000 to Marshal Lon Nol
on condition to leave the country. 2 °9 On 2 April the NUFC's
forces captured a marine base, two-and-a-half miles northeast of
the capital city. On 5 April Phnom Penh was attacked and on the
following day the Khmer Rouge forces advanced into Highway 4.
Then they occupied Kompong Speu temporarily. 210
Representatives of teachers, students, Buddhist monks and
trade union orgnaisations announced on 8 April to form a
Committee to negotiate with the NUFC and it demanded the
resignation of all Republican leaders. The positon of the
Republicans became very weak and its request for US aid was
declined by President Ford. By 10 April the Republican defenses
were crumbling on all sides. A temporary Supreme Committee,
206. SWB FE/4843/A3/1, 1 March 1975, see also Asian Recorder, vol.XXI, no.13, 26 March-1 April 1975, p.12501.
207. SWB FE/4848/A3/2-3, 8 March 1975. 208. SWB FE/4864/A3/6-7 26 March 1975. 209. Bangkok Post, 2 April 1975. 210. SWB FE/4873/A3/1, 9 April 1975.
228
headed by General Sutsa Khan, was established in the place of
Parliament to tackle the situation.2ll In view of the serious
deteriorating military situation around the Phnom Penh city, the
US embassy staff was asked to vacate by the us President Ford.212
On the night of 13-14 April NUFC troops occupied the
positons east of Pochentong cutting off the airport from the
city.213 On the morning of 14 April a pilot of the Republican
Air Force dropped two bombs on the General Staff Headquarters
before defecting. 214 Two days later Pochentong airport and the
entire east bank of the Bassac river was occupied. Thousands of
the Republican soliders abandoned their positions and joined the
stream of refugees moving into the centre of the city.
The Supreme Committee unanimously decided on 16 April to ask
the Prince for an immediate cease-fire and transfer of power to
the Royal Government on condition that the cease-fire should be
supervised by the UN. The Prince declined the offer, and asked
the Republicans to 'flee Cambodia if they can'. By then, the
Khmer Rouge leaders were in firm control of the city. Even
though some sporadic fighting was going on in the South, it was
considered no more than a nuisance. The commander of the elite
parachute brigade, instead of surrendering, committed suicide.
211. SWB FE/4878/A3/7, 15 April 1975. 212. "US Personnel Evacuated From Phnom Penh", Department of
State Bulletin, 28 April 1975, p.540-41. 213. SWB FE/4879/AJ/7-8, 16 April 1975. 214. SWB FE/4880/AJ/12, 7 April 1975.
229
Some Republican soliders aimed their guns at their leaders who
resisted to surrender and some others fled.
Before the arrival of NUFC troops, the Ministry of
Inforamtion was occupied by an organization called 'Nationalist
Movement'. It consisted of 300 young men, most of whom were
students who wore black Pyjamas and its leader Gen.Keth Dara, son
of a former Republican Interior Minister, broadcast a statement
around 12 noon on 16 April calling upon all Republicans to lay
down their arms. 215 The NUFC disarmed his followers who branded
him as an agent of CIA, who had acted to sow division.
It was believed that the collapse of the Republican leaders
was due to the NUFC's superior efficiency. The Republicans had
223,000 men whereas the NUFC had 60 to 70 thousand men. The NUFC
troops outmanoeured to be enemy troops with superior strategy.
The Republicans were also short of man power, the reason being :
Government ineffectiveness, callousness and corruption have turned the populace sour and resentful. Some students and teachers have gone to the jungle to join the insurgents. People do not vounteer for the Army any more; ~nsiiid, they do everything possible to escape l.t.
Hence, the Republicans had to recruit into the Army even
boys of 10 or 12 years of age. The Republican leaders also
215. SWB FE/4881/A3/1-2, 18 April 1975. 216. Keesing's Contemporary Archives,, vol.no.XXI, 2-8 June 1975,
p.27154.
230
lacked public sympathy because of corruption and ineffeciency.217
Thus widespread corruption, low level of public morale and
impotency of the Republican Army paved the way for the
establishment of the first Communist Government in the history of
Cambodia. The US expresses its sadness at the fall of Lon Nol
government. 218
217. International Herald Tribune, 7 February 1975. 218. "Us Expresses Sadness at Fall of Government of Khmer
Republic", Department of state Bulletin, 5 May 1975, p.566.
231