chapter ii organizational structure of...
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CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF ASEAN
This chapter examines the evolution of organizational
structure of ASEAN before and after the 1976 Bali Summit.
Any discussion on the ASEAN institutional machinery tended to
raise some basic questions:
(1) Whether the ASEAN member countries would like to step up
their cooperation more than they presently have? Whether
there should have been a formal structure of the
Association, founded on a treaty as legally binding
document and not only on Bangkok Declaration?
(2) Whether it was desirable or feasible to permit extension
of ASEAN membership so that it could cover most, if not
all South-East Asian countries, and why?
(3) Whether A SEAN s hOl..il d have a strong centralized
secretariat or a loose and modest one?.
A. Organizational Structure Before 1976
The 1967 Bangkok Declaration out 1 i ned the mechanism
required to carry out the aims and purposes of the
Association, and stated that the following machinery should be
established:
(a) Annual Meeting of Foreign Ministers, which shall be by rotation and referred to as ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Special Meeting of Foreign Ministers may be convened as required;
(b) A Standing Committee, under the chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the host country or his representative and having as its members the accredited Ambassadors of the other m~mber countries, to carry on the work of the Association in between Meetings of Foreign Ministers;
(c) Ad-Hoc Committees and Permanent Committees of specialists and officials on specific subjects;
(d) A National Secretariat in each member country to carry out the work of the Association on behalf of that country and to service the Annual or Special Meetings of Foreign Ministers, the Standing Committee and such other committees as may hereafter be established. 1
The Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) was, according to
the Bangkok Declaration, the highest policy and decision
making and coordinating organ of the ASEAN. An AMM was
convened annually in each of the ASEAN member countries on a
rotational basis in alphabetical order, attended by all ASEAN
Foreign Ministers. Special Meetings of the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers (FMMs), might be held as required or when necessary.
The FMMs might discuss formulation of common stand on and
approach to the situation in the region or any matters which
should be urgently addressed. Between the AMMs, the ASEAN
Standing Committee (ASC) was responsible for the day-to-day
execution of routine as well as urgent activities. The ASC
submitted reports and recommendations to the AMM for approval.
Some ad-hoc committees were set-up to handle specific issues,
including the negotiations on synthetic rubber with Japan in
the early 1970s, and during the Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. Other semi-permanent sub-committees were set-
up to cope with certain other matters. The most significant
roles, however, were played by the National Secretariats in
each member country, headed by the Secretaries General. They
met formally as a group to prepare the agenda for a 11 ASC
meetings.
The organizational structure of ASEAN prior to the 1976
Bali Summit appears in Annex-1, on page 29·
1For the full text of the ASEAN Declaration, see ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1988(Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat, 1988), third edn., pp. 27-28.
28
N \.0
r-;HISTERIAL HEEliNG 1
I
I ______________________ l _____ _ r~rnCotlriinEE I
I
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUC1DRE
OF ASEAN BEFORE 1976
-------------
r~-"E_E_II_NG_O_F_A._!SE_A_N -SE-C-RE-TA-_-., I AD HOC COHHIITHS I I PERMANENT COMMITTEES I I RIES GENERAL I •
SCCAN (Special Co-ordtnating Couittee of ASEANl
ABC (ASEAN Brussels Coui ttee)
I SPECIAL COHMI TTH Qf j II ACCRIS (A SEAN Co-ordtna- I i CENTRAL BANKS AND I' 1 tinQ Coutltee for Recons 1
MONETARY AUTHOPIIIES --\--1 trui:tton and Rehabiilta- I 1 1 1 1 !ton of lndo-Chtna I
1 II States) _
1.---S-EN_I_OR-0-FF-I-C!-Ii'-"S_O_N_l I SENIOR OFFICIALS ON I SYNTHETIC Ruem Jl·J suGAR I
SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON I I SENIOR TRADE OFFICIALS I ASEAH SECRETARIAT I
I (ASEAN Gene~~C Coni ttee) U .____j
FOOD AND AGRICULTURE
I COHML'NICAIION I AIR
~ I JRA>FIC SERVICES
METEOROLOGY
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
I F !NANCE
1-
LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COHMUN I CATION
-.
r SOCIO-CULTURAL ACTIVI1IES
I Source: ASEAN Secretariat, An Overview of ASEAN
(Jakarta, July 1985), no. 1.
CIVIL AIR TRANSPORTATION ! I
_j SHIPPING I
' I I
' MASS MEDIA I J
TOURISM
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
l i
ASEAN NATIONAL I SECRETARIAT OF INDONESIA
L ____ _.
I ~----;;SEAN NATIONAL
l SECRET~RIAT OF MALAYSIA
I ___________ ___j
I ASEAH NATIONAL I I ~- ~SEAN NATIONAL! I SECRETARIAT OF THE I' ! SECRETARIAT OF SINGAPORE I I PHILIPPINES - -~ I
~..-_ -----l~ I , ' I ASEAN NATIONAL I
SECRETARIAT OF THAILAND
§ ())
>< 1-'
In commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the
Association, the ASEAN Secretariat was of the view that during
its initial years after its formation,
seemed to be doing "well in providing
frequent contacts and consultations. "2
the ASEAN machinery -
the framework for
Indeed, for a new
regional organization such forum was required to build mutual
trust and understanding before it could embark on more
meaningful coope~ation.
The ASEAN Declaration did not clearly mention how those
bodies would function. Neither did it elaborate the functions
and competence of the institutions of ASEAN. The absence of
fixed institutions within ASEAN during its formative years
could perhaps be considered as a virtue. Thus, it provided the
flexibility for the member governments in dealing with
regional problems, for which they lacked precedent. They
needed more time to know each other's aspiration and interest,
before regional cooperation and solidarity could be expected.
The looseness in the organizational structure could be seen by
observers as an indication of low and slow process of
institutionalizing ASEAN machinery. Moreover, since there was
no machinery set out in the Declaration in regard to the
enforcement of its provisions, from the legal point of view,
there would be no sanction to be imposed on any member state,
which might violate or neglect the ASEAN's decisions. Former
Malaysia's Prime Minister Husein Onn was of the view that
ASEAN has been able to absorb national differences because it is a relatively informal organization without rigid rules of proced~re and without elaborate structural machinery. ASEAN cooperation succeeds because such cooperation is free 1 y extended, arriving out of the experience that in specific instances of cooperation our separate individual interests are advanced even as our
2ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN-The First 20 Years (Jakarta, 1987), p. 69.
30
common regional interest is served. 3
S i nee there were no specific procedures in the A SEAN
Declaration to regulate the decision making process, it came
to be common practice in ASEAN to take decisions by consensus
and to avoid the voting procedure. Such practice, named
rightly or wrongly as ''ASEAN way", was in fact 1n tune with
what was commonly practised in Indonesia and other countries
in the region. The phrase in Bahasaindonesia is "musyawarah
untuk mufakat", which means "deliberation to reach consensus".
An Indonesian scholar, Koentjaraningrat, who wrote on local
socio-political processes stated, that
the concept involves the processes that develop general agreement and consensus ... which emerge as the unanimous decision [which] can be reached by a process in which the majority and the minorities approach each other by making the necessary readjustments in their respective viewpoints, or by an integration of the contrasting standpoints into a new conceptual synthesis. 4
He concluded that the concept excluded the possibility of the
majority imposing its views on the minorities. The consensu~
approach was seemingly a sort of a prescription to keep ASEAN
united, especially dl..!ring its first years of existence. The
political genesis of ASEAN that led to the adoption of the
musyawarah (consultation) principle meant that every voice
should be heard, and mufakat (consensus) could only be reached
when all were satisfied. Decision-making and policy-making
powers were deliberately decentralized and vested in the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers. Point 10 of the Joint Communique of the
Fifth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, in Singapore in April 1972
" R p A d d p V Quisumbing, eds., ASEAN "Cited in . . nan an .. Identity, Development & Culture (Quezon City, 1981), pp. xvi-
xvi i .
.iKoentjaraningrat, ed., "The Village in Indonesia Today," in Villages in Indonesia (Ithaca, n.d.), pp. 386-405.
31
stated: "They noted, in particular, the development of an
A SEAN consensus in dec 1 s ion making in accordance with the
ASEAN spirit of solidarity.··S In practice, a proposal should
be decided upon and based on consensus before it was adopted
as an A SEAN's decision, otherwise such p roposa 1 would be
dropped or settled through another consensus after some
compromises had been reached. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew
once observed that ASEAN countries had learned to manage their
differences and to contain them. "ASEAN had made progress in
an Asian manner, not through rules and regulations, but
throug'h musyawarah and consensus. Most important, ASEAN
countries have made a habit of working together and of
consu 1 t i ng each other over common prob 1 ems. " 6 The above
mentioned practice, under scor·ed one premise that A SEAN was not
a supra-national body and had no binding jurisdictional power
in its institutional structure.
Over the years, various instruments in the forms of
Permanent, Ad-hoc and Special Economic Committees were
established in accordance with the Bangkok Declarationr
especially to facilitate economic cooperation. The committees
consisted of specialists, experts and officials on specific
subjects as drawn from ASEAN member countries. They were
directly responsible for the operation and implementation of
ASEAN projects. The seats and chairmanship of these
committees were distributed among the ASEAN countries on a
rotational basis. Hans H. Indorf, one of the nine political
scientists, who examined the political factors affecting
ASEAN economic cooperation in the early 1980's observed that
for the first five years of ASEAN's existence,
5ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, p. 73.
6 Po i n t 7 , J o i n t Commu n i que , ..!1~5!._t_h --!A..!!M'--'M!...!.--'a"'-!..!n~d!.._...!....P~o~s!..!t~__!M__!__!_i !..!n__!i_,s!..!t~e~r~i.:::a~l Meeting with the Dialogue Countries (Jakarta, ASEAN Secretariat, n.d.), p. 51. Emphasis added.
32
any discussion over the pooling of sovereign prerogatives in a joint administration were simply avoided by maintaining five separate national ASEAN secretariats. [The existing machinery] could not cope forever ... ASEAN projects in increasing numbers and camp 1 ex i ty. A more centra 1 i zed arrangement appeared necessary if not desirable. 7
He noted that in 1968 the Philippines was the first to suggest
a more cohesive administration for ASEAN. Through the years,
"fvlani la has shown a keen interest in a more legalized,
centralized and productively organized Association." The
qL;Jes t ion of how fast ASEAN' s organization shou 1 d grow and
evolve was approached differently by the member states. While
commenting on various member countries' attitudes, Indorf
observed:
Indonesia was considered ... as the key to ASEAN development ... that should acquire as much influence and authority within a strengthened ASEAN ... Singapore remained conceptually opposed to anything that could even vaguely be interpreted as a threat to its vigorous notion of sovereignty ... Malaysia ... more moderate ... since the change of prime minister in mid-1981 ... Thailand has preferred a loose association ... "8
It seemed obvious that most of the member countries
preferred to have modest organizational structure, which was
non-con trover s i a 1 in nature. Fuad Hassan, then Head of the
Agency for Research and Development, Department of Foreign
Affairs of Indonesia, viewed that
indeed, during its first decade ASEAN remained mainly as an indicator of an emerging goodwill for regional cooperation rather than a machinery in operation dealing with feasible cooperative
7Hans H. Indorf, Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia : Bilateral Constraints Among ASEAN Member States (Singapore, 1984), p.66.
8rbid. pp.66-67.
33
projects. There were moments in which the question was raised on whether or not the organization will survive at all. One must recognize the fact that the founding members have had no ex peri e1ce in structured cooperative efforts in the past.
ASEAN activities and programmes expanded in response to
national, regional and international developments. At the
Fifth AMM held in Singapore, on 13-14 April
Ministers agreed that
1972,
an overall review of ASEAN's organisational and procedural framework including the consideration of the need and desirability of a central secretariat should be undertaken and new guidelines and criteria of priorities formulated with a view to rendering the Association more effective as an instrument for regional cooperation. 10
the
The establishment of a central secretariat had been
earlier proposed by the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Carlos
P. Romulo, in 1967, but political and practical factors then
were not conducive to its adoption. 11
[T]he time had come for the strengthening of the structure of ASEAN by establishing a Central Secretariat for ASEAN ... The Ministers noted with appreciation the offer by the Indonesian Government to have such Secretariat established in Indonesia provided there was no such offer from other ASEAN member countries. The Ministers also noted ... the invitation of the Philippines to hold the meeting ... to work out the details of the Central Secretariat. 12
9Fuad Hassan, "ASEAN, Its Status and Future Political Perspective", in ASEAN Newsletter (Jakarta), March-Apri 1 1984, p. 6.
la'"ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, p. 73.
11 Estrella D. Solidum, Bilateral Summitry in ASEAN (Manila, 1983)' p. 7.
~ 2 Point 9, Joint Communique, Sixth AMM, in ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, p. 75.
34
The following year, on the second day ·Of the Seventh
Meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, held in Jakarta on 7-9 May
1974, the Philippine Foreign Secretary, Carlos P. Romulo made
a statement on the permanent site of the ASEAN Secretariat. He
stated that realizing the value of the Secretariat as a
prestige symbol for the Association,
we have made every effort to give the proposed Secretariat a setting worthy of its significance. President Marcos earlier this year authorized the Department of Foreign Affairs to offer Manila as a site for the Central Secretariat. The Philippine Government, to confirm the seriousness of the offer, thereupon took the following steps: First, it donated more than 8,000 square meters of land on an attractive site fronting Manila Bay; Second, it completed architectural plan-s for the 14-storey building, including a conference complex, to house the Secretariat; Third, it appropriated the sum of P43 million for the construction of the Secretariat building; Fourth, it appropriated an amount sufficient to cover the full operating expenses of the Central Secretariat for the first two xears in the operations of the Central Secretariat. 13
While the Foreign Secretary was of the view that it was
a generous and attractive offer, the fact that the Philippine
Government could make the offer was indicative of the Filipino
response to the ASEAN and of their desire to symbolize its
permanence in a physical structure and setting worthy of its
importance. Shortly before the opening of the Jakarta Meeting,
he discussed this question with Foreign Minister Adam Malik at
length. Romulo had an opportunity to pay a call on President
Soeharto, in the course of which the question of the site of
the Centra 1 Secretariat was taken up. President Soehar to
shared the view on the significance of the ASEAN as a vehicle·
for regional development. He then expressed his own desire,
13rnstitutionalizing the ASEAN (Manila, Department of Foreign Affairs, n.d.), p.13.
35
and that of the Indonesian people, as expressed also by
Foreign Minister Adam Malik, for the Central Secretariat to be
located in Jakarta. Romulo concluded that
sensing the strength of their feelings on the matter, I pondered his arguments with the seriousness that they deserved, I communicated with President Marcos by overseas telephone [who] authorized me to announce to the Ministerial Meeting that in deference to President Soeharto's wishes and in the interests of regional unity and harmony, the Philippines hereby withdraws its offer in favour of Indonesia. We shall support Indonesia's offer of Jakarta as the site for the Central Secretariat. In addition, we urge the members of the ASEAN to make this supper t unanimous. 14
Accordingly, the Ministers "unanimously agreed that the
ASEAN Secretariat be located in Jakarta. " 15 Stressing the
importance to ASEAN of institutionalizing its structure and
function, Romulo said that such institutionalization required
the formulation or articulation of a charter for the
Association. He observed that
the institutionalization of the ASEAN which we are now undertaking would be incomplete, and even meaningless, unless the principles of the Bangkok Declaration are embodied in legally binding form. Once ratified, allegiance to the Charter implies the full commitment of the member-countries to the purpose of the ASEAN. 16
The Seventh AMM further noted the proposal of the
Philippines for the adoption of a Charter for ASEAN as part of
14 Ibid. p. 14.
15 Point 8, the Joint Communique, in ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1' p. 75.
16 rnstitutionalizing the ASEAN, n. 14, pp.6-7. Emphasis added.
36
the current efforts to institutionalize the functions and
structure of ASEAN. The Ministers agreed to refer this
proposal to the Standing Committee and member governments were
requested to submit their comments. 17
Since the formation of ASEAN, one could raise the
question ~hether the Association would be able to provide a
frame of cooperation for the whole region of South-East Asia.
The fourth point of the 1967 Bangkok Declaration stated that
""the Association is open for participation to all States in
the South-East Asian region subscribing to the aforementioned
aims, principles and purpose. ·· 18
There had been no indication, so far, that Indo-China
could be brought into ASEAN. While analyzing the prospects of
Indo-chinese states joining the ASEAN, an Australian scholar
observed:
Although the ASEAN governments (and particularly ... Foreign Minister Adam Malik) made moves towards expanding the Association's membership to include Laos, Cambodia, North Vietnam and South Vietnam, it was clear that meaningful participation by Vietnam and Laos was impossible while they remained devided by war. S i hanouk was unw i 11 i ng to jeopardise Cambodia's neutrality by joining ASEAN. 19
The Paris Peace Agreement, in January 1973, seemed to
revive the idea of enlarging ASEAN. At the FMM in Kuala
Lumpur in the following month, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers
called for a meeting of all Southeast Asian countries in ""Asia
Forum··, ··at an appropriate time in the future·· as a step in
this direction. Further steps were taken when during the Sixth
17 ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, p. 75.
18 ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, pp. 27-28.
19 Tim Huxley, ASEAN and Indochina: A Study Responses 1975-81 (Canberra, 1985), p. 11.
37
of Political
AMM held in Pattaya, Thailand on 16-18 April 1973, the
Ministers approved the establishment of the ASEAN Coordinating
Committee for the Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of Indo-
China States (ACCRIS). They felt that
[in rebuilding the countries] could be
''ASEAN participation
jointly effected by
of the countries making allowances for
cancer ned. ·· 20 However,
the preferences
they could not agree on what type of
assistance they might provide to the Indo-Chinese states. The
Khmer Republic, Laos and South Vietnam were present as
observers at some of the AMMs before 1975, nevertheless, the
ASEAN remained doubtful about full participation by the
Indochinese states. While analyzing this issue, a South-East
Asian expert observed:
ASEAN did not consider that their wartime activity permitted full participation. As a result, the successor regimes in Indochina have viewed A SEAN with some reserve. Burma was invited by the ASEAN countries, but until very recently its foreign policy was to avoid regional organizations outside the United Nations framework. A 1 though Sri Lanka has been interested in joining ASEAN, it is located outside South-East Asia.21
Meanwhile, the fall of Phnom Penh and Saigon in April
1975 and the subsequent political transformation that ensued
there had put the political identity of Laos under pressure.
This meant that the ASEAN states had to abandon hope, if any,
for an expansion of the Association to include all the
countries of the region. In this situation any expression of
interest in membership by Communist governments in Indochina
would have created difficulties for ASEAN. Michael Leifer, a
British political scientist, was of the view that
20ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, p. 74.
21Michael Haas, "ASEAN: The Formative Years", in R.P. Anand, ed., Cultural Factors in International Relations (New Delhi, 1981)' p.176.
38
if the government of a reunited Vietnam had then expressed an interest in regional cooperation it would certainly have required an institutional alternative to ASEA.N in the way that Indonesia had insisted on such an alternative to ASA. Such a prospect did not present a desirable option to a group of regional partners who had worked together with a measure of harmony for nearly eight years. 22
The need to improve economic cooperation among ASEAN
member states in line with the main objectives of the ASEAN
Declaration, required the involvement of Economic Ministers.
ASEAN's Economic and Planning Ministers responded positively
to the ASEAN Foreign Ministers' request. They took up the
opportunity to discuss economic cooperation toward the end of
1975, more than eight years after the formation of ASEAN.
The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) deemed it necessary to
create their own machinery and institutionalized the Senior
Economic Officials Meeting (SEOM) with the main task ·of
preparing recommendations and decisions on the basis of the
proposa 1 submit ted by the re 1 evant Permanent Commit tees.
Po 1 it i ca 1 cooperation among A SEAN states became more intensive·
especially after the Kuala Lumpur Declaration of November
1971, in which the idea of creating South-East Asia as a Zone
of Peace, Freedom and Neutra 1 i ty (ZOPFAN) was undertaken.
Since then the Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) which had been
inducted as an informal body, outside the formal ASEAN
machinery, played important role in making recommendations to
the special meetings of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers (FMMs),
which were different from the AMMs. The FMM could be held at
any time, as and when necessary, whereas the AMMs were held on
annual basis. In the past, the FMMs "were convened to discuss
22 Mi chae 1 (London,
Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia 1989)' p. 64.
39
and arrive at common position on situation in the region,
common approaches to external relations, and collective . . l f "23 economic diplomacy at 1nternat1ona ora.
B. Organizational Structure Since 1976
The Declaration of A~EAN Concord, which was signed at the
Bali Summit on 24 February 1976 suggested, among other things,
improvement of ASEAN machinery through:
1.
2.
Signing of the Agreement on the ASEAN Secretariat. Regular review of the structure with a view effectiveness.
the Establishment of
ASEAN organizational to improving its
3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional framework for ASEAN. 24
The preamble of the Agreement on the Establishment of the
ASEAN Secretariat, signed in Bali on 24 February 1976
stipulated that the ASEAN Foreign Ministers were
mindful of the rapidly growing activities of ASEAN since its establishment in the implementation of the aims and purpose of ASEAN embodied in the ASEAN Declaration. They recognized that the growth has increased the need in ASEAN for central administrative organs to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN organs and for more effectjve implementation of ASEAN projects and activities.l5
The ASEAN Secretariat was established in Jakarta in 1976
"to fill the need in ASEAN for a central administrative organ
to provide for greater efficiency in the coordination of ASEAN
organs and for more effective implementation of ASEAN projects
23.A.SEAN Secretariat, n. 2, p. 71.
24ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, p. 38.
25 Ibid. p. 165.
40
t . . t . ..26 and ac lVl 1es.
Since the Bali Summit, the highest authority in ASEAN has
been the Heads of Government of the member countries, which
might meet as and when necessary to give policy directions to
the Association.
The AMMs retained the key function of making policies,
and overseeing the implementation of these policies. These
AMMs were convened annually in each of the six ASEAN countries
on a rotational basis in alphabetical order. At each
meeting, the Foreign Ministers formulated policy guidelines,
reviewed a 11 ASEAN decisions and handed down the approved
policies and programmes to the ASC or other concerned bodies
for implementation.
Continuity between the AMMs was maintained by the ASC
which comprised the Foreign Minister of the host country, the
Ambassadors accredited to that country, and the 0 i rectors
General of each ASEAN National Secretariat. The ASC carried
out the work of ASEAN in between the AMMs. It handled matters
relating to the ASEAN machinery, ASEAN external relations and
non-economic activities, and oversaw the work of the ASEAN
Secretariat. It also submitted, for the consideration of the
FMMs, an annual report which highlighted the activities.of the
previous year.
The ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEMs) held regular meetings
to review and consider recommendation for A SEAN economic
cooperation. It met bi-annually and was responsible for:
a) Formulating recommendations for the consideration of governments 9f member states for strengthening ASEAN economic cooperation;
26 Facts on ASE.A.N, (K.uala Lumpur, Min. of Foreign Affairs),p.17.
41
b) Reviewing the coordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic cooperation;
c)
d)
Exchanging views and consultation development plans and policies as a harmonising regional development; and
on national step towards
Performing such other relevant functions as agreed upon by the member governments. 27
There have been five committees under the AEMs, namely
. the Committee on Finance and Banking (COFAB), the Committee on
Food, Agriculture and Forestry (COFAF), the Committee on
Industry, Minerals and Energy (COIME), the Committee on
Transportation and Communications (COTAC) and the Committee on
Trade and Tourism (COTT).
The ASEAN Ministers of Education, Information, Health,
Labour, Social Welfare, Science and Technology, Energy, Law,
Agriculture and·Forestry, and .Environment had meetings as and
when necessary to give policy guidance to the relevant ASEAN
Committees.
Despite ASEAN's consistency in maintaining the
Association as a forum for consultation and cooperation, thus
to retain their individual identity, more countries have
shown interest to have dialogues with ASEAN. Consequently,
ASEAN had ten committees in the third countries, four in the
capitals of the European Community member countries, five in
the capitals of its other dialogue partners, and one in
Geneva. These committees facilitated the conduct of ASEAN
relations with the third countries and with various
27Muthiah Alagappa, " Asean institutional framework and modus operandi: Recommendations for change" in Noordin Sopiee, et. al., eds. ASEAN at the Crossroads: Obstacles, Options & Opportunities in Economic Co-operations, (Kuala Lumpur, 1987)' p. 184. .
42
international organisations. Each committee comprised the
Heads of the Diplomatic Missions of ASEAN in the respective
host countries, to conduct consultative meetings with their
host governments for the purpose of implementing decisions
made at formal dialogue meetings, or to take up matters
concerning policies or measures undertaken by the host
government which affect ASEAN's interests. The growth of a
common external view might be considered the ASEAN's
outstanding achievement in its first decade. It led to the
establishment of formalized dialogues with ASEAN partners,
held soon after the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, called
the Post Ministerial Conference/PMC. Up to 1987 there have
been ten commit tees in Bonn, Brusse 1 s, Canberra, London,
Ottawa, Paris, Tokyo, Washington, Wellington, ~nd Geneva. The
ASEAN Geneva Committe was established especially to deal with
matters related to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD).
The organizational structure of ASEAN since 1976 appears·
in Annex-2, on page 44.
43
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ENCE& TECH
LOGY(COSll
~ource: ASEAN National Secretariat, A3EA~ at a Glance (Jakarta, 1987), p. 222.
SENIOR • OFRCW..SOt-l DRUG
MATIERS
/==~] § (D
X
N
Pursuant to the decision of the Fifteenth AMM, the ASEAN
Task Force ( ATF) was formed. It under took a 'Comprehensive
Review and appraised of ASEAN cooperation' and presented its
Report to the Foreign Ministers. The ATF Report to the
Sixteenth AMM in 1983 stated, among others, that the working
machinery of ASEAN suffered from structural imbalance which
adversely affected the decision making process. Coordination
among existing ASEAN bodies was intricate and cumbersome. The
ATF recognized that cooperation in the political and economic
fields was of paramount importance an.d hence believed that
there was a need to realign existing bodies, abolish some and
create new appropriate agencies. An ASEAN Council of
Ministers (ACM) should be constituted to incorporate the AMM,
AEMM and other ministerial meetings. It also noted that the
ASEAN Secretariat had remained a very modest central
organization both in terms of human and financial resources.
Consequently, the Secretariat had not been really effective·'in
per form i n g i t s fun c t ions . 28
The ATF had made a number of recommendations on policy
measures and new directions, including among others, that the
Standing Committee be replaced by a Committee of Permanent
Representatives of not lower than ambassadorial level, to
provide continuity and a better defined direction to ASEAN
activities. It should be located in Jakarta so as to
effectively carry out its functions. The powers and authority
of the Secretary General should be reviewed in the light of
the new expanded functions. The term of duty of the Secretary
General and of the home-based staff should be increased to
four years. Committees in third countries created earlier and
located in the capitals of countries or international
zeFor more deta i 1 s of the ASEAN Task Force Recommendations, see Noordin Sopiee, ed., ASEAN at the Crossroads: Obstacles, Options & Opportunities in Economic Co-operation (Kuala Lumpur, 1978). pp. 206-209.
45
organizations with which ASEAN maintained dialogues were
. f t . 29 perform1ng a necessary unc 1on.
During the Fourteenth AMM held in Manila on 17-18 June
1981, Brunei attended for the first time as an observer. In
August 1982, "the ASEAN Foreign Ministers formally agreed to
admit Brunei as a full member when request to that effect was
received" 30 The following year during the Sixteenth AMM held
in Bangkok on 24-25 June 1~83, Prince Mohamed Bolkiah,
representative of the Sultan of Brunei, informed the meeting
of the intention of the Brunei Government "to apply for
membership of ASEAN after the resumption of its full
independence and sovereignty on the 1st of January 1984. "31
At a special meeting of ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in
Jakarta on 7 January 1984 Brunei Darussalam became the sixth
ASEAN full-fledged member, a week after its independence. The
promptness with which Brunei had joined the Association
testified to the importance that it had attached to ASEAN. In
return, the other ASEAN countries considered it a significant
development. S i nee then ASEAN has become a "Community of
Six." Commenting on the entry of Brunei as the sixth member
of the Association, Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja stated that "ASEAN wi 11 further consolidate the
so 1 i dar i ty, unity and cohesion of opinion among the member
countries. ASEAN will be more representative in reflecting
the attitudes and voice of the South-East Asian region ..... 32
The year 1986, again, saw discussions regarding the
29 Ib i d. pp. 206-209.
30 Hans H. Indor f, n. 7, p. 45.
31 ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1988, n. 1, p. 111.
32 oepartment of Foreign Affairs, "Year-End Press Statement .. (Jakarta, 1984), p. 5.
46
extension of ASEAN membership to other countries and areas.
Tunku Abdul Rahman, the former Prime Minister of Malaysia, had
suggested during his visit to Australia that
Australia and New Zealand be included in the ASEAN grouping. This pass i b i 1 i ty had a 1 ready been discussed when ASEAN was formed. However, the then Malaysia's Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmad Rithauddeen, responding to the suggestion, indicated that ASEAN members would generally prefer to confine the organization to Southeast Asian countries.
Papua New Guinea also asked to become member of the ASEAN grouping earlier in the year. No decision was taken during 1986, but according to Indonesia's Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, the Association was studying Part Moresby's request. It seemed unlikely that ASEAN, at this stage will grant it, one reason being that Papua New Guinea is already a member of the South Pacific Forum. 33
Having explained the organizational structure of ASEAN
before and after the Bali Summit, some observations could be
made. Between 1967 and 1987, there had been only three
meetings of ASEAN Heads of Government. For any region a 1
organization, three summit meetings during that long period
could be considered too few. It was in sharp contrast with the
regional organization in South Asia called SAARC, which had
set the convening of their seven Heads of Government on annual
basis. It is debatable, however, whether such ann~al summitry
would be able to produce tangible results which could be
ex pee ted by their peoples. At best, such highest level
meetings could provide fresh impetus needed to boost
cooperation among the member countries. With regard to
ASEAN, however, one could not belittle the importance of
bilateral summitry which had been so popularly conducted
33 Hans Christoph Rieger, -ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Running in Circles or New Directions?-, in ISEAS, South-East Asian Affairs 1987 (Singapore, 1987), p. 34.
47
between ASEAN Heads of Government, to fill the gaps, if any,
on bilateral basis. In a way, this practice had, by and
large, succeeded in set t 1 i ng the differences between the
countries concerned. To understand the beneficial role of
bilateral summitry, Estrella D. Solidum had studied and
observed that bilateral summitry enhanced the effectiveness of
ASEAN if the outcome
1. gives direction to ASEAN's policies such as by contributing to the preservation of its fundamental principles and enabling it to accept new responsibilities for mutual benefit;
2. smoothen its processes such transactions and cutting down making and action;
as by facilitating time for decision-
3. provides a congenial environment for the members by increasing their vitality to work, their mutual responsiveness, and their will to play down conflicts;
4. increases the members' areas of cooperation efforts, and
desire to and for
search for new new co 1 1 ec t i ve
5. improves the quality and quantity of ASEAN's resources, to include the creditable assets such as symbols and values which create ASEAN's appea1. 34
According to Solidum, there had been ninety six bilateral
meetings between 1976 and 1981. The largest number of
meetings, around nineteen of them, were between Malaysia and
Thailand, followed by Singapore and Thailand which had
fourteen. Singapore had about twelve meetings with Malaysia,
and thirteen with Indonesia. Thailand and Indonesia had nine
meetings between them. The Philippines had the lowest number
of bilateral meetings of Heads of States, namely seven with
Indonesia, six with Thailand, five wit!} Singapore, and two
34 Estrella D. Solidum, n. 12, p. 11.
48
1( with f'-1alaysia.·"
The issues that were taken up in the meetings included
ASEAN cooperation, intra-ASEAN problems, foreign policy,
security, international developments and the organization
itself. Bilateral summits were considered useful in providing
explanations for an understanding of the pol icy perceptions of
the political leaders at the highest level, and contributed to
the attainment of peace, progress, and security in the region.
Hans H. Indorf, however, was doubtful that inter-country
visits could substitute for ASEAN summit meetings. The
use f u 1 ness o f b i 1 a t era 1 s u mm i t r y co u 1 d on 1 y be cor r e c t i f ,
over a reasonable period of time, all the ASEAN Heads of
Government exchanged visits with each other. This ideal
situation did not correspond to reality. Furthermore, the
hypothesis that all significant intra-ASEAN issues could be
discussed on a bilateral basis (and did not require a summit)
was theoretically correct. In fact, "there was little
agreement among the ASEAN governments on this point since the
degree of importance accorded to an issue was a relative
judgement. "36
Narciso G. Reyes, then Secretary Genera 1 of the ASEAN
Secretariat of the Philippines, suggested in 1980 the holding
of a third ASEAN Summit Meeting the following year (1981).
He had submitted a memorandum to the ASEAN Standing Committee
justifying the proposed summit meeting.
stated among others,
In the memorandum he
The urgency, magnitude and gravity of the political and economic problems of the 1980s suggested that the ASEAN Heads of Government should at least
;sibid., p.12.
~~ ··Hans H. Indorf, n. 7, p. 74.
49
•
consider convening the proposed summit meeting . . . . After four years ·of silence, the voice of ASEAN should be heard again at a summit level. The Heads of Government should assess the situation and give ASEAN fresh purpose and direction as it confronts the challenges of the 1980s and beyond. 37
Reyes proposed that the summit meeting be convened in August
1981 "to coincide with ASEAN's fourteenth anniversary, with
the new ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta as the venue in case
there should be any impediment to holding the meeting in some
other ASEAN capita1.·· 38 He knew that, as a rule, it should
have been Manila's turn as the site for the third ASEAN Summit
at that time, but one could think that it would not be
appealing to suggest the Phi 1 ippine capital, as President
Marcos had, by then, begun to lose his credibility, apart from
other factors.
The memorandum was in effect dismissed as out of order-on
the ground that the Secretary General had no authority to make
suggestions about summit meeting, which were the exc 1 us i ve
prerogative of the Heads of Government. It was never·
discussed, nor was it formally considered. It was simply
shelved. Reyes found this procedure more disturbing than if
the memorandum itself had been formally considered, and
rejected, on its merits. He stated that "the Heads of
Government were regarded as ceremonial figures in ivory towers
who should not be bothered to come down to earth except to
sign agreements ready-made at subordinate levels. "39
The Third ASEAN Summit Meeting was held in Manila on 14-
37 Narciso (Manila,
G. Reyes, .. A SEAN's Ach i 11 es Hee 1 " , 1983), vol. 4, pp. 12-13.
38 Ibid. p. 13
39 Ibid. p. 13
50
i n !...F_,S'-"I=--.!..R'-='e~c~o~r=d
15 December 1987. It was characterized by less intensity of
protocol and ceremonial programme, partly due. to safety
The reasons, resulting
roles played by
from the
the Heads
possibility of sabotage.
of Government had given the
impression that their gathering were more of symbolic nature
than playing decisive role in giving more weight in ASEAN
regional cooperation, in a more direct way. In any case, the
convening of AHGM had been given due importance as a sort of
yardstick to show how strong the ASEAN cohesiveness was. At
the end of the summitry, the Meeting of ASEAN Heads of
Government (AHGM) was not institutionalised. On Machinery for
ASEAN Cooperation the AHGM stated briefly that they "agreed to
meet every three to five years, if necessary. To enhance
coordination, a Joint Ministerial Meeting (JMM) of Foreign and
Economic Ministers may be held, as and when necessary. They
were of the view that the ASEAN organizational structure
should be continually improved with the view to enhancing its
effectiveness. "40
The 1967 Bangkok Declaration had assigned the AMI'l with
responsibility for all (political, economic, socio-c~ltural)
intra-ASEAN cooperation but, with the institu~ion of the AEMM
after the 1976 Bali Summit, the AMi·!' s competence was
~ssentially restricted to the polit:cal, diplomatic and socio-
cultural fields. The t..MM, however, retained the
responsibility to formulate guidelines and coordinate all
ASEAN activitic2. The AMM also remained the primary
institution t0r the conduct of the Association's external
rela!:ions.
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed in the 1976 Bali
Summit, stipulated:
JQCited from Point 22 of "Manila Declaration of 1987", in ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1988, n. 1, p. 56.
51
Ministerial meeting on economic matters shall be held regularly or as-deemed necessary in order to : (i) formulate recommendations ... for the strengthening of ASEAN economic co-operation; (ii) review the co-ordination and implementation of agreed ASEAN programmes and projects on economic co-operation; (iii) exchange views and consult on national development plans and policies as a step towards harmonizing regional development; and (iv) perform such other relevat functions as agreed upon by the member Governments. 41
Although the Bali Summit institutionalised the AEMM and
made it part of ASEAN's formal structure, there was no
guarantee that decisions by the AEMM could not be amended by
the AMM. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers ·retained the right to
negotiate all international agreements and a kind of veto
power over all commercial agreements, although the individual
economic minister had the right to report directly to the
executive Head of Government. The 1987 Manila Summit tried.to
overcome the shortcoming by formulating that enhanced
coordination of a Joint Ministerial Meeting might be held ··as
and when necessary." Whether, in future, a kind of rivalry
between AMM and AEMM would still exist remained to be seen.
To head the ASE.A.N Secretariat in Jakarta, the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers appointed H.R. Dharsono of Indonesia, as the
First Secretary-General. He was supposed to hold office for
a term of two years, after which the office would rotate to
the next ASEAN country in alphabetical order. The appointment
of the first Secretary-General, however, was not so smooth as
it looked. As it has been mentioned earlier in this Chapter,
the Philippines withdrew its offer to be the site of the
Secretariat, although it had
tendered 1 and 'f renting Man i 1 a Bay' , construction costs and operating expenses for two years. Only
l ~ 'ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, pp. 36-41.
52
the per son a 1 intervention of President Soehar to, with an in~irect assurance of support for the Philippines to be first in assuming the SecretaryGeneral's post (later over-ruled by the other countries which insisted upon an alphabetical sequence) could avoid an embarrassing stalemate. Foreign Minister Romulo confessed 'sensing the strength of their feelings' and withdrew the offer, but the Philippine's -enthusiasm for the organizat
4i2on has never been the same since this
incident.
In January 1978, the Indonesian Secretary-General of the ASEAN
Secretariat, H.R. Dharsono, was asked by the Indonesian
Government to quit his post because of his public criticism on
some issues of domestic po 1 icy. The other A SEAN partners
quietly but strongly objected to the step as damaging to the
image of A SEAN. But Indonesia persisted. 43 The Chairman
of the ASEAN Standing Committee, Thai Foreign Minister Upadit
Pachar i yangkun was induced to write to Dhar so no, requesting "a
transfer of the position at the earliest convenience." In the
meantime Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja,
tra';elled to all the other ASEAN capitals seeking informal
consent for the removal. Despite deep apprehension, the
other four member countries of ASEAN agreed on strictly legal
grounds. According to Article 3 of the Agreement on the
Establishment of the ASEAN Secretariat, the Secretary-General
"shall be appointed by the ASEAN Foreign Ministers upon
nomination by a Contracting Party on a rotational basis in
alphabetical order. The tenure of office shall be two ,.
)''ears.~~~" Rotation was by country, not by individual.
Consequently, Dharsono resigned on 18 February 1978, and was
succeeded by Ambassador Umarjadi Njotowijono for the
remaining fifteen weeks of Indonesia's term. "The precedence
J2Hans H. Indor f, n. 7, p. 67.
13 Ibid., p.68.
!,! · ASEAN Documents Series, n. 1, p. 165.
53
of a recall had an inhibiting effect upon the selection and - . .. 45
performance of subsequent secretar1es-general.
The succeeding Secretaries-General of the ASEAN
Secretariat 46 were usually appointed from among the ASEAN
countries' senior diplomats, with the rank of Ambassador, as
in the cases of Datuk Ali bin Abdullah from Malaysia who took
office from 1978 to 1980, followed by Narciso Reyes of the
Phi 1 ippines ( 1980-1982). Singapore did not comply with the
precedence when it cou 1 d not nominate its senior career
diplomat for the post. Eventually, Chan Kai Yau, whose
profession used to be teaching, was approved by the ASEAN
Foreign Ministers to occupy the office from 1982 to 1984. The
next Secretary General, Phan Wannamethee, former Thai
A.mbassador to Britain, was appointed for the position from
1984 to 1986. The two year term for a Secretary-Genera 1 to
perform his duty was considered too short. Hence, with all the
five original members of ASEAN having had their rotational
turn to hold the key-position at the ASEAN Secretariat, the
A SEAN Foreign Ministers at the Eighteenth AMM signed the
Protocol to amend the Agreement on the Establishment of the
ASEAN Secretariat which extended the term of office of the
Secretary General from two to three years. The following year ~·~·'?
they appointed Roderick Yang of Brunei Darussalam as
Secretary-General of the ASEAN Secretariat ··for a period of
three years, effective 16 July 1986. " 47
45 Ibid . , p . 68 .
J5According to Article 2 of the Secretariat Agreement, the Head of the Secretariat shall be known as the Secretary-General of the A SEAN Secretariat. His function and powers did not authorize him to act as the 1 ega 1 representative of the Organization.
J' 1 See point 71 of the Joint Communique of the 18th AMM and point 81 of the Joint Communique of the 19th AMM, in 19th AMM and Post Ministerial Conferences with the Dialogue Partners
54
Some recommendations for restructuring of the ASEAN
institutions, after the 1976 Bali Summit, were not implemented
as one would expect it. Several overlapping activities ·and
some ambiguities still existed. Take for example, the five
permanent committees, which worked under the coordination of
the Economic Ministers. In practice, the committees could not
submit their reports directly to the Economic Ministers, but
they had to present them to the Standing Committee and the
ASEAN Foreign Ministers, who then channelled the matters to
the Economic Ministers. Even the decisions made by the
Meetings of the ASEAN Economic Ministers, according to the
working procedure, had to be referred to the Annual
Ministerial Meeting for approval by the ASEAN Foreign
Ministers. As a consequence, to some extent, progress was
liable to be slow. Against such shortcomings, the re
organizational process was still going on.
Up to 1987 there were two decision-making processes which
were applicable within ASEAN, 1) non-formal, and 2) formal.
1. Non-formal decision-making procedure on political
matters, was neither stipulated in the 1967 Bangkok
Declaration nor in the 1976 Bali Declaration. That was
why one could say that political cooperation was not
within the ASEAN organizational structure. If one of the
ASEAN members would like to submit a political proposal,
it could submit it through a Senior Officials Meeting
(SOH). This kind of meeting, usually was attended by the
Directors General for Political Affairs and/or the
Directors General of the National Secretariats of the
member countries or the Secretaries-General of the
Ministries for Foreign Affairs of the individual
countries plus other senior officials. Such proposal
(Jakarta, n.d.), p.52.
55
could also be channelJed direct to the ASEA~ Minjsteri~l
Meeting, which would then refer it to SOM. SOM could
then discuss the proposal. On this stage, there could be
two possibilities:
a. If the proposal was acceptable to the SOM, the
execution of the agreement could be realized soon.
b. Otherwise, if the SOM could not accept the
proposal, but the proposal was acceptable in
principle, it could be returned to the member
concerned for a reformulation.
2. Formal decision-making procedure, which was applicable to
economic, social, cultural, scientific and technological
and information matters, could be found in the formal
organizational structure of ASEAN. If there was any
propose 1 on one of the subjects, a project proposa 1
should be submitted in the form of a working programme,
together with proposed budget to the committee concerned ..
The Committee then considered the plan. There would be
two possibilities :
a. If the proposal could not be accepted, it would be
returned to the member which proposed it.
b. If the propose 1
submitted to the
cou 1 d be accepted, it
Standing Committee.
would be
At this
stage, there would be other possibilities:
1) If the proposal could not be accepted by the
Standing Committee, it would be returned to
the Committee concerned.
2) If the proposal could be accepted, there would
56
be an approach to the third party, or to the
dialogue partner(s), which could be expected
to provide the fund for implementing such
project. But if the propose 1 was not
acceptable to the dialogue partner(s), the
proposal would be returned to the Standing
Committee, which would then discuss the
considerations of the dialogue partner(s).
In comparing both the decision-making procedures, one
could say that decision-making process on political matters
was shorter, i.e. through SOM and AMM, whereas decision-making
process for other matters would take longer. This could impose
an impediment to ASEAN cooperation in certain fields.
As ASEAN had expanded to six members, Singapore suggested
that the principle of consensus in decision-making process
should be more flexible. According to Singapore, innovation
was not possible when consensus was based on the lowest common
denominator, therefore, the ASEAN leaders needed to consider
what was called as a "Six minus X" principle. The principle
was, if there was agreement among some members on a certain
activity, and the interests of other members were not harmed
nor was their future participation prevented, then those who
agreed should be allowed to proceed. Dhanabalan, then
Singapore Foreign Minister said:
Given six members of different development levels and interests, progress will be very slow if we insist that we should all move in tandem at all times. Instead of viewing the 'Six minus X' principles as a divisive one, we should try to see it as a way of propelling ASEAN ahead into new heights of cooperation. Members would then have the option of choosing the timing of their own
57
i nvo 1 vement. 48
In view of the development of cooperation among ASEAN
countries, ranging from trade and industry to the management
of ASEAN's external economic relations, and also the wider
scope of cooperation in socio-cultural fields and those in
science and technology, there was a need to strengthen the
ASEAN institutions so as to ensure that cooperation would not
be hampered by its deficiencies. For instance, the staff of
the A SEAN (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Secretariat comprised only few personnel:
three Bureau Directors; a Foreign Trade and Economic Relations Officer; an Administrative Officer; a Public Information Officer; and an Assistant to the Secretary-Genera 1. 49
One who visited the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta would
immediately get the impression that it lacked technical staff,
let alone research staff. The inefficiency could also be seen
in providing the back-up for various meetings within ASEAN.
This was bound to make it difficult to separate policy-making
from technical preparation.
At the Twenty-eighth Council Meeting of the ASEAN
Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ASEAN-CCI), in Jakarta on
11 Ju 1 y 1986, a proposa 1 \.Jas made to estab 1 ish a Group of
Four teen ( G-14) to study and recommend measures for the
advancement 6f ASEAN economic cooperation and integration.
Each of the six member institutions of the ASEAN-CCI nominated
two prominent personalities from their ranks for the G-14.
Data' Paul Leong Khee Seong of Malaysia and Mohammad Sadli of
Indonesia were chosen to be Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the
~ 8 0pening Statement of Foreign Minister of Singapore S. Dhanabalan at the 19th AMM, in 19th AMM and Post Ministerial Conferences with the Dialogue Partners (Jakarta, n.d.), p. 14.
~ 9ASEAN Documents Series 1967-1988, n. 1, p.166.
58
Group. The first meeting of G-14 in Kuala Lumpur on 2 December
1986 adopted terms of reference of G-14 as follows:
The Group of Fourteen will explore, study and recommend all possible measures and concrete steps with regard to trade and other areas that can be taken to foster closer economic co-operation and integration in the Asean Community of Nations. Its Report will be submitted to the Asean-CCI for final approval before submission to Asean Governments. The Group of Fourteen wi 11 also help to mobi 1 ise pub 1 i c awareness in the member countries on the cha l 1 enges that 1 i e ahead, the need to move Asean forward, and the various means for achieving this object i ve . 50
As part of its public awareness programme and in order to
generate widest possible debate in the ASEAN Community, they
organised the First ASEAN Economic Congress, held in Kuala
Lumpur, on 13-22 March 1987. There were 400 participants from
ASEAN states and from the EEC, EFTA, Japan, Australia, New
Zealand, the United States and other countries. The G-14 was
in existence until the end of the Third ASEAN Summit. Its
report was handed to ASEAN-CCI in Bangkok on 3 July 1987, for
onward transmission to the ASEAN Governments.
On strengthening the ASEAN Institutions, it was stated
that the Group was sensitive to the fact that ASEAN have been
an inter-governmental regional organization without a
supranational objective. They however made a distinction
between supranationalism and effective inter-governmental
central institutions. The absence of the latter made a higher
level of economic co-operation extremely difficult. With
those considerations in mind, they proposed changes in seven
parts of the ASEAN machinery, viz, "Asean summitry,
Ministerial-level meetings, the principal 'working'
institutions, the Asean Secretariat and National Secretariats,
50 ASEAN-CCI, ASEAN-The Way Forward (Kuala Lumpur, 1987), p. vi.
59
principles of decision-making, Government-private sector
relationship and dispute resolution. ·· 51 Other proposals
included:
~ 1
1. The Asean Heads of Government Meeting should be held on an annual basis so that the leaders, as a collective, can play a more direct and effective role in fostering economic co-operation by providing the necessary political commitment and direction, and overseeing the process of implementation.
2. The Asean Economic Ministers Meeting should be made responsible only for trade, industry and investmel")t and accordingly it should be redesignated the Asean Trade and Industry Ministers Meeting. The meetings of the Asean Ministers of Finance, Agriculture, Minerals and Energy, Primary Commodities, Transport and Tourism and Education should be institutionalised to oversee co-operation in their respective sectors.
3. The responsibilities of the Asean Foreign Ministers should now be converged on the onerous task of developing Asean's political, diplomatic and socio-cultural relations to pave the way for furthering comprehensive cooperation.
4. The Standing Committee should be reconstituted and its terms of reference redefined so that it becomes a continuously functioning institution with the necessary standing and authority to manage Asean's business.
5. The Permanent Commit tees shou 1 d be strengthened by providing them with full-time technical and administrative staff.
6. The scope and respons i b i 1 it i es of the following four existing Permanent Committees should be restructured and re-designated in line with the proposed Ministerial Meetings and programmes
a. Committee on Trade and Tour ism as the Committee on Trade, Industr-y and
·'Ibid. p. 71 .
60
Investment;
b. Committee on Minerals and Energy [remained to be] the Committee on Minerals and Energy;
c. Committee on Finance and Banking as the Comm1ttee on Finance; and
d. Committee on Communications as Transport, Communications.
Transport and the Committee on
Tourism and
7. The Secretary-General should be given a status just below that of the ASEAN Ministers but above that of all other bureaucrats participating in the Asean process. In line with his position, the Asean Secretariat should be strengthened to allow it to play a more effective role in Asean co-operation ... 52
According to Rusli Noor, Secretary-General of the ASEAN
Secretariat53 , to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of
the Organizational Structure of ASEAN, it would be ideal if
every member country would appoint a minister, whose primary.
responsibility would be to deal with internal coordination for
other activities related to the ASEAN cooperation. The
minister would then be in a better position to coordinate
various ministries concerned in his own country. So far, the
Directors General for the ASEAN National Secretariat were in
charge of coordinating such activities. Unfortunately, when
the Director General invited for meetings to the Ministries
concerned, the latter would only assign officials with the
rank of Directors, or even would delegate it to their
subordinates. Thus one could not expect that the results of
such meetings wou 1 d have enough weight. In addition, each
52Ibid. pp. 72-77.
-~ ""In an interview in April 1991 he disclosed his personal observation.
61
member country cou 1 d assign an ambassador attached to the
ASEAN Secretariat. The Secretary Gene~a1 of the ASEAN
Seer etar i at and the ace red i ted ambassadors cou 1 d then be
expected to prepare various ASEAN meetings better and quicker.
62