chapter - 7 additional studiesenvironmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/risk... · 2017. 7....

Environmental Impact Assessment Report

M/s. Vansh Laminate LLP Survey No. 179/P2, Village: Ratavirda,

Taluka: Wankaner, District: Morbi, Gujarat.

T. R. Associates (Ahmedabad) NABET Accredited

Chapter-7: Additional Studies 7.1

CHAPTER - 7

ADDITIONAL STUDIES

A. PUBLIC CONSULTATION

All the aspects of the TORs are incorporated in the draft EIA/EMP report, the same has

been submitted to the Gujarat Pollution Control Board (GPCB) for conducting public

hearing/public consultation as per EIA Notification, 2006 and its subsequent

amendments.

Public hearing for the proposal of M/s. Vansh Laminate LLP to manufacture Melamine

Formaldehyde Resin, Phenol Formaldehyde Resin & Urea Formaldehyde Resin as well

as Laminated Sheets has been conducted by GPCB on 04/07/2017 at 10:00 Hrs, at

project site, Survey No. 179/P2, Village: Ratavirda, Taluka: Wankaner, District: Morbi.

A minute of Public Consultation/Public Hearing is included in the EIA report as

Annexure – 11.

B. RISK ASSESSMENT STUDY

The said study report is presented in next page.

C. SOCIAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT, R & R ACTION PLAN

The socio‐economic study of the study area is carried out and details are presented in

the Chapter‐3/Section‐ 3.9. It may be noted that the proposed project is to be

established on Non Agricultural land. The project site is intended for the industrial

purpose and thus no displacement of villagers/people will take place. Therefore, the

R&R (Rehabilitation & Resettlement) policy/plan is not undertaken. However, the

direct financial and social benefits with special emphasis on the benefit to the local

people will be preferred and the proposed budgets for corporate social responsibility

(CSR) activities are summarized in Chapter‐ 8 /Section‐ 8.5.






B. RISK ASSESSMENT

7.1 Overview of Project

M/s. Vansh Laminate LLP is proposing to manufacture Melamine Formaldehyde Resin,

Phenol Formaldehyde Resin & Urea Formaldehyde Resin as well as Laminated Sheets

at Survey No.: 179/P2, Village: Ratavirda, Taluka: Wankaner, District: Morbi, Gujarat.

The total production capacity of proposed unit for resins are 900 MT/Month and

laminated sheets 1,50,000 Nos./Month. The project site is highly developed with all

basic infrastructure facilities such as proximity to man power, electricity, water supply,

transportation, telecommunication systems etc. Proposed project site is

approximately 4 km away from national highway no. 8A which is well connected to

other state highways as well as national highway.

M/s. Vansh Laminate LLP has a total land area of 11,534 m2. Out of the above stated

land area approximately 3,875 m2 is green belt area (approx. 33.6 % of the total land

area).

Proposed manufacturing unit is a medium scale unit having total investment of about

Rs. 5.3 Crores out of which resin plant cost will be approx. Rs 95 Lakhs. Major plant

machinery to be installed are storage tanks, reactors (MOC: MS), utilities which

includes Thermic Fluid Heater (TFH), Steam Boiler and Cooling Towers. Hazardous

chemicals mainly Phenol, Formaldehyde (37%), Methanol will be stored and used in

the process for manufacturing resins.

7.2 Surrounding Area

The proposed unit will be set – up in village: Ratavirda. The location of proposed unit

is surrounded by many ceramic‐ tiles manufacturing units. There is no major

inorganic/organic chemical manufacturing unit located within 1 km radius from

proposed location. The google image showing proposed unit is given in Chapter: 2

Figure No.: 2.2. The nearest village is Ratavirda having population 1440 located at 0.7

km in East North East direction from project site. The project site is intended for the

industrial purpose and thus no displacement of population will take place. There is no

protected area notified under the Wild Life (Protection) Act (1972) & Eco‐sensitive

area notified under the Environment (Protection) Act‐ 1986 exists within 10 km radius

areas from the project site.

7.2.1 Objective and Scope

The main objective of risk assessment study is to propose a comprehensive but simple






approach to carry out risk analysis and management of industrial prototype hazard.

Risk Assessment (QRA) techniques used world‐over to determine risk posed to people

who work inside or live near hazardous facilities, and to aid in preparing effective

emergency response plans by delineating a Disaster Management Plan (DMP) to

handle onsite and offsite emergencies.

Scope of the Study:

Hazard Identification ‐ Identifying sources of accidents involving release of

hazardous material in the atmosphere and the various ways (that is scenarios)

they could occur.

Consequence Assessment ‐ Estimating the probable zone of impact of accidents as

well as the scale and/or probability of damages with respect to human beings and

plant equipment and other structures.

Accident Frequency Assessment ‐ Computation of the average likelihood of

accidents.

Risk Estimation ‐ Combining accident consequence and frequency to obtain risk

distribution within and beyond a process plant

7.2.2 Risk Analysis Methodology:

Information on Location, Layout, Process Parameters

Hazard Identification

Quantification of Hazards

Select Most Credible Scenario which can culminate into an accident out of several

major and minor.

Select Worst Case Scenario which has the highest potential to cause an accident

of maximum damage

Estimate Consequences: in the plant in the form of fire, explosion and toxic

effects

Estimate Frequency of Occurrence

Estimate effect of damage

Estimate the Risk: Risk is expressed as the product of frequency of an event and

the magnitude of the consequences that result each time the event occurs.






7.3 Hazard Identification and Risk Analysis

The Hazard identification and risk analysis is used to identify possible accidents and

estimate their frequency and consequences. While identifying hazards only those

areas of plants having potential risk are used further for risk analysis. Hazard is

considered as characteristic of system/plant/process that presents potential for an

accident. Hence, all the components of a system/plant/process are thoroughly

examined to assess their potential for initiating or propagating an unplanned

event/sequence of events, which can be termed as an accident.

7.3.1 Hazard Identification Methods

The proposed project of setting – up resin manufacturing unit comprises of a

numbers of stages from site selection, conceptualization to decommissioning. Each

stage of plant possesses hazards. In case of proposed project during the stage of

Environmental Clearance the proposed project is considered at predesign stage.

Hazard identification method used or the proposed plant is given below.

o Identification of major hazardous units based on Manufacture, Storage and

Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 of Government of India (as amended

in 2000); and

o Preliminary Process Hazard Analysis: Hazard associated with raw materials,

intermediates, by‐ products, final products, plant equipment.

o Hazard Indices: Identification of hazardous units and segments of plants and

storage units based on relative ranking technique, viz. Fire‐Explosion and Toxicity

Index (FE&TI).

7.3.2 Identification of Hazardous Chemicals used within Premises

Following chemicals to be stored and utilized within the premises falls under

Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemicals Rules, 1989 (as amended

in 2000). List of Hazardous Chemicals is given below:

Amongst the below described raw materials and products, some are the hazardous

chemicals as per the MSIHC rule 2000. Chemical and physical properties of raw

materials are given in Table 7.1.






Table 7.1 Chemical Properties of Hazardous Chemicals

Sr. No.

Chemicals TLV

Toxicity Level Flammable Limit Chemical Class (As per MSIHC

Rules)

LD50 Oral mg/Kg

LD50 Dermalmg/Kg

LC50 mg/l

LEL% UEL% FP 0C BP 0C

Class (As per

petroleum classification)

1 Phenol* 5 ppm 317 669 125 1.7 8.5 79 (CC) 85 (OC)

182 C Flammable,

Toxic, Hazardous

2 Formaldehyde* (37%)

0.3/l ppm 100 270 203 6 36.5 500C (CC) 600C (OC)

96 B Flammable,

Toxic, Hazardous

3 Methanol* 200 ppm 5628 15800 64000 ppm/ 4 hr

6 36.5 12 0C 64.5 A Very high flammable

5 Caustic Soda* 2 mg/m3 N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A N.A 1388 ‐‐ Hazardous

6 Melamine N.A 3161 1000 N.A N.A N.A 93.3 0C N.A C Slightly

flammable

7 Urea ‐‐ 8741 ‐‐ ‐‐ N.A N.A N.A N.A ‐‐ N.A

Note: * Hazardous chemicals as per MSIHC rule, 2000 Note: CC: Close Cup; OC: Open Cup; N.A.: Not Available.

The Toxicity level of hazardous chemicals as per Manufacture, Storage and Import of Hazardous Chemical (Amendment) Rules, 2000 (MSIHC) is

shown as below:

Sr. No Toxicity Oral Toxicity LD50 (mg/Kg) Dermal Toxicity LD50 (mg/Kg) Inhalation Toxicity LD50 (mg/Kg)

1 Extremely Toxic <5 <40 <0.5

2 Highly Toxic >5‐ 50 >40‐200 >0.5‐2

3 Toxic >50‐200 >200‐1000 >2‐10






7.3.3 Storage Details of Raw Material and Products:

Details of the raw materials and products with storage are given in Table 7.2.

Table 7.2: Storage Details of Raw Materials

Sr. No.

Name of Raw Material

Consumption per Month

Consumption Per Day

Physical State

Mode of Storage

Material of Construction

Capacity of

Storage Unit

No. of Units

Total Storage Capacity

Storage Inventory (days)

1 Melamine 120 MT 4.8 MT Solid Bags HDPE 50 kg 300 nos.

15 MT 3

2 Urea 120 MT 4.8 MT Solid Bags HDPE 50 kg 300 nos.

15 MT 3

3 Phenol (94%) 145 MT 5.8 MT Liquid Tank MS 25 MT 1 nos. 25 MT 4

4 Formaldehyde

(37%) 524 MT 21 MT Liquid Tank

HDPE MS

10 MT 25 MT

1 nos. 1 nos.

35 MT 1.5

5 Methanol 19 MT 0.76 MT Liquid Tank MS 25 MT 1 nos. 25 MT 30

6 Caustic Soda (Flakes)

4.5 MT 0.18 MT Solid Bags HDPE 25 kg 80 nos. 2 MT 11

7 Acetic Acid 1.5 MT 0.06 MT Liquid Tank HDPE 1 MT 1 nos. 1 MT 16

8 Kraft Paper 236.3 MT ‐ Solid Raw Material Storage Area ‐

9 Design Paper 33.7 MT ‐ Solid Raw Material Storage Area ‐






Table 7.2A: Storage Details Products

No. Description Physical Form Mode of storage Transportation Capacity of

storage

1 Phenol Formaldehyde Resin Semi Solid MS tank (1 No.) Captive consumption & sale.

Quantity will be transported by

road, rail & ship.

30 MT

2 Melamine Formaldehyde Resin Semi Solid MS tank (1 No.) 30 MT

3 Urea Formaldehyde Resin Semi Solid MS tank (1 No.) 30 MT

Table 7.3: Identification Hazard Associated with Storage of Raw Materials:

Sr. No.

Name of material stored

Hazard Rating Systems

Type of hazard / Risk involved

Causes Effect Control Measures proposed

(1) Phenol

25MT tank Ambient

TLV – 5 PPM STEL‐10 PPM NFPA Ratings: Health:4; Flammability: 2; Instability: 0 Flash Point: 79.440C

Toxic Chemicals Exposure Risks Fire /Explosion

Glands/seal leaks in valves, pumps,

Hose/pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints carrying phenol

Overflow from storage tanks

Toxic when contact with Skin

Causes burns Toxic if

swallowed Irritating to Skin,

Eyes and Respiratory System

Dyke wall shall be provided to all above ground storage tank.

Separate from strong oxidant. Fire hydrant system shall be

installed. Safety shower and eye washer shall

be installed near storage area. Flame proof Electrical fittings shall

be provided at flammable storage






Sr. No.





(2) Formaldehyde

(37%) 25 MT tank

TLV – 0.3 PPM (1 ppm)

NFPA Ratings: Health ‐ 3

Flammability ‐ 2Reactivity ‐ 0 Flash Point:

500C

Toxic Chemicals Exposure Risks Fire /Explosion

Glands/seal leaks in valves, pumps

Hose/pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints carrying Formaldehyde (37%)

Overflow from storage tanks

Very toxic by inhalation, in contact with skin, Very toxic if swallowed.

Causes burns. Limited evidence

of a carcinogenic effect.

Risk of serious damage to the eyes.

May cause sensitization by skin contact.

area. Proper selection of MOC for

chemicals storage tank. Earthing/bonding shall be provided

for static charges. Flame arrestor shall be provided on

flammable material storage tank vent.

Level gauge and level measurement instrument shall be provided on material storage tank.

Lightening arrestor on all chimney and building shall be provided.

Hazardous material should be stored away from the plant and safe distance shall be maintained.

Safety permit system shall be followed for loading, unloading of hazardous chemical.

Fencing, caution note, hazardous identification board should be provided.

Only authorized person shall be permitted in storage tank area and register will be maintained.

(3)

Methanol 25 MT tank & 10 MT tank

TLV – 200 PPM (8‐hr TWA) STEL‐250 PPM NFPA Ratings: Health: 1 Flammability: 3

Fire /Explosion

Glands/seal leaks in valves, pumps

Hose/pipe failure, leakage from flanged joints carrying Methanol

Loading and unloading process

Nearby ignition sources

Highly Flammable

Toxic by inhalation

Toxic when contact with Skin

Toxic if swallowed

Danger of very serious






Sr. No.





Fire due to Bottom nozzle failure

Damage of storage tank Pump discharge nozzle failure

Unloading road tanker hose rupture

irreversible effects.

A. Identification of Process hazards:

Name of

hazardous

process and

operation

Material in the

process /

operation

Type of hazard possible toxic

gas release / fire / explosion

/ run away reaction /

rupture, etc.

Causes

Control Measures to be provided

Thermic Fluid

Heater Oil

Fire/Explosion

Heat burns

Flash point variation of thermal

fluid/oil over a period of time

(Thermal fluids which were not

flammable at the operating

temperature when they were

initially installed but over time

Regularly replacement of thermic

fluid

Monitoring of flashpoint of thermic

fluid heater regularly

Installing Fluid conditioning

equipment in the thermal fluid






Name of

hazardous

process and

operation

Material in the

process /

operation




rupture, etc.

Causes


become flammable at the operating

conditions)

Mist Formation around leak points

such as flagged joints, around valves

and connection points in the pipe

line. These may create explosive

atmospheres being formed outside

the pipework where ignition sources

such as motors pumps and electrical

equipment are present

Lagging Fire – leak and dispersion of

oil within insultation leads to fire

system

Reduce the extent of mist formation

by fiting mist guards

Avoiding lagging fires

Following type of instrumentation

suggested:

Install temperature indicator cum

Controllers to indicate temperature

and prevent undesired overheating at

the inlet and outlet of the system

Photo cell to sense flame failure, give

alarm and switch off the burner.

Magnetic level switch in the

deareator cum expansion tank to cut

off the burner if the thermic fluid

level falls below the minimum level.

Synchronising mechanism exists

between the hot oil circulation pump

and burner, so that the burner will

not be switched on until the






Name of

hazardous

process and

operation

Material in the

process /

operation




rupture, etc.

Causes


circulation pump reached the full

speed.

Reactor

Vessel

Formaldehyde

(37%),

Melamine,

Urea, Phenol

Fire/Explosion

Release of Heat and Flammable gases

Fire, Toxic gas release and Explosion Failure of agitator, heating and

cooling system in the reactor

Failures of external boiler, condenser and piping system

Raw Materials quantity must be

controlled either volumetrically or

gravimetrically.

Process control devices must be

installed includes the use of sensors,

alarms, trips and other control

systems that either take automatic

action or allow for manual

intervention to prevent the

conditions for uncontrolled reaction

occurring.

High Temperature indicator valve and

alarm system must be provided

Auto cut off system must be provided

after reaching of predetermined

maximum safe temperature.

Pressure gauge is must provided.

Safety Control valve is must be






Name of

hazardous

process and

operation

Material in the

process /

operation




rupture, etc.

Causes


provided.

The Vessel Emergency Relief vent

should discharge to a suitably

designed catch pot or should be so

positioned that people working in the

area and members of the public will

not be in danger if the contents of the

vessel are discharged.

Use skilled worker Proper selection of MOC

Mechanical seal in all pumps and

reactors

Transportation of finished product from vessel to storage tank through

close pipe.

Boiler Heat burns

Thermal radiation

Explosion Heat burns

Leaking safety and or safety relief valves

Malfunctioning of Water level

indicator

Annual inspections Safety interlocks to be provided Safety and pressure gauge valves fitted Properly supported and protected






Name of

hazardous

process and

operation

Material in the

process /

operation




rupture, etc.

Causes


Steam leaks (steam systems)

High stack temperatures (excess of

350ºF)

Condensate dripping down stack or out the front of the boiler

Constantly resetting of controllers and safety devices

against corrosion

Testing of Jackets and joints of tubes regularly






B. General hazards and controls

Type of

Emergency

Identification

of Area Possible Causes Possible Results

Material

handling In Plant

Flammable, eye irritating &

accidently leakages Fire and health Hazards

7.3.4 Hazard Indices:

Hazard indices are used as relative ranking of hazard potential of proposed plant. The method used DOW fire and explosion index, Mond

Toxicity index provide direct and easy approach to a relative ranking of the risks in process plants.

DOW index : Fire‐Explosion and Toxicity Index (FE&TI)

The Fire and Explosion Index (FE&TI) calculation is a tool to help determine the areas of greatest loss potential in a particular process. It also

enables one to predict the physical damage that would occur in the event of an incident. For the proposed project storage tanks are considers

to know fire and explosion potential of each tank.

To calculate the Fire and Explosion Index, however, only storage tanks having storage capacity of 25 MT which have an impact from a loss

prevention standpoint has been evaluated. These are known as Pertinent Process Units.

Important factors for selecting Pertinent Process Units include:

a. Chemical energy potential (Material Factor)

b. Quantity of hazardous material in the Process Unit

c. Process pressure and process temperature

d. Units critical to plant operation, e.g. Reactor, storage tank






Table ‐7.4: Fire & Explosion Index

Sr.

No.

Material

Stored

Storage

Qty.

Nh Nf Nr MF GPH SPH FEI Degree of

hazard

Th Ts Ti Degree

of

Hazard

Radius

of expo.

(ft.)

1 Phenol 25 MT 4 2 0 10 1.93 2.12 41 Low 325 125 9.56 Medium 34

2 Methanol 25 MT 1 3 0 16 2.05 3 98 High 250 50 5.5 Low 83

3 Formaldehyde

(37%)

25 MT 3 2 0 10 2.20 2.50 55 Low 250 125 9.6 Medium

to high

46

Note: MF=Material Factor, GPH= General Process Hazardous, SPH= Special Process Hazardous, FEI: Fire and Explosion index

Based on F & EI and toxicity index TI, following categories are available:

Sr.

No.

Category F & EI TI Degree of

Hazard

1 I F<65 T<6 Low

2 II 65<F<95 6< T<10 Medium

3 III F> 95 T> 10 High

From the above stated toxicity index, it is evident that methanol storage tank has high potential physical damage and loss.






7.3.5 Credible Accident Sources/Worst Case Scenarios

Maximum Credible Accident (MCA) scenario indicates most believable, reasonable,

likely or possible accident scenario and damage distance based on it. MCA scenario

takes into account the effect of existing control measures also. It considers the

malfunctioning of the control system, opening of safety valve/failure of safety valve,

leakages from flange joint, pipe line etc. and failing of some safety devise.

Worst‐case scenario (rarely possible) is defined as the release of the largest quantity

of a regulated substance from a single vessel or process line failure that results in the

greatest distance to an end point, eg catastrophic failure. It considers the failure of all

control systems and release of the whole mass resulting in maximum damage.

Based on the storage and properties of the chemicals at the proposed resin

manufacturing unit, the some typical scenarios relevant for MCA analysis is given in

the following Table.

Table ‐7.5: Scenarios Considered for MCA Analysis

Sr.

No.

Chemical Storage

Quantity

Pool Fire Flash fire Toxic

Dispersion

Worst case

scenario

1 Methanol 25 MT

MS tank

2 Phenol 25MT

MS tank

‐ ‐ ‐

3 Formaldehyde

(37%)

25 MT

MS tank

‐

4 Causitc soda

(Flakes)

25 Kg

HDPE Bags

‐ ‐ ‐ ‐

The above table indicates that major material storage is flammable liquid. Fires could

occur due to presence of ignition source at or near the source of leak or could occur

due to flashback upon ignition of the traveling vapour cloud.

Tank fires may occur due to the following: ̇ Ignition if rim seal leak leading to rim seal

fire and escalating to full‐fledged tank fire.

Lighting is a major source of ignition of tank fires; and ̇ Overflow from tank leading to






spillage and its subsequent ignition, which flashes back to the tank leading to tank

fire. The chance of overflow should be less unless operator has grossly erred.

Spillage due to overflow may result in a dyke fire if ignition occurs after sufficiently

long period.

For radiation calculations, pool fire is important and the criteria of 4.5 kW/m2

selected to judge acceptability of the scenarios. The assumptions for calculations

are: ̇ It is not continuous exposure ̇ It is assumed that no fire detection and mitigation

measures are initiated

7.4 Consequence Modeling

Hazardous incidents start with a discharge of a flammable or toxic material from its

normal containment. Discharge can take place from a crack or fracture of process

vessels or pipe work, an open valve or from an emergency vent. The release may be in

the form of gas, liquid, or two phase flashing of gas‐liquid.

7.4.1 Damage Criteria:

The storage and unloading at the storage facility may lead to fire and explosion

hazards. The damage criteria due to an accidental release of any hydrocarbon arise

from fire and explosion.

A. Fire Damage

Table 7.6 tabulates the damage effect on equipment and people due to thermal

radiation intensity whereas; the effect of incident radiation intensity and exposure

time on lethality is given in Table 7.6.

Table 7.6: Damage Due to Incident Radiation Intensities

Sr. No.

Incident Radiation

(kW/m2)

Type of Damage Intensity

Damage to Equipment Damage to People

1 37.5 Damage to process equipment 100% lethality in 1 min. 1% lethality in 10 sec.






Sr. No.

Incident Radiation

(kW/m2)

Type of Damage Intensity

Damage to Equipment Damage to People

2

25.0

Minimum energy required to ignite wood at indefinitely long exposure

without a flame

50% Lethality in 1 min. Significant injury in 10 sec.

3

19.0

Maximum thermal radiation intensity allowed on thermally

unprotected adjoining equipment

‐‐

4

12.5

Minimum energy to ignite with a flame; melts plastic tubing

1% lethality in 1 min.

5

4.5

‐‐

Causes pain if duration is longer than 20 sec, however blistering is un‐likely (First

degree burns)

6

1.6 ‐‐

Causes no discomfort on long exposures

Source: Techniques for Assessing Industrial Hazards by World Bank.

Table 7.7: Radiation Exposure and Lethality

Radiation Intensity

(kW/m2)

Exposure Time (seconds)

Lethality (%)

Degree of Burns

1.6

‐‐

0 No Discomfort even

after long exposure

4.5 20 0 1 st 4.5 50 0 1 st 8.0 20 0 1 st 8.0 50 <1 3 rd 8.0 60 <1 3 rd 12.0 20 <1 2 nd 12.0 50 8 3 rd 12.5 ‐‐ 1 ‐‐ 25.0 ‐‐ 50 ‐‐

37.5 ‐‐ 100 ‐‐






B. Damage due to explosion

Explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy accompanied by the generation of

pressure wave and a loud noise. The rate of energy release is very large and has

potential to cause injury to the people, damage the plant and nearby property etc.

BLEVE ‐ fireball

A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) occurs when there is a sudden loss

of containment of a pressure vessel containing a superheated liquid or liquified gas. It is

sudden release of large mass of pressurized superheated liquid to atmosphere. The

primary cause may be external flame impinging on the shell above liquid level

weakening the vessel and leading to shell rupture. Calculations are done for diameter

and duration offrreball and the incident thermal flux.

Pool fires and jet fires are common fire types resulting from fires over pools of liquid or

from pressurized releases or gas and/or liquid. They tend to be localised in effect and

are mainly of concern in establishing potential for domino effects and employee safety.

ALOHA Models are used to calculate various components ‐ burning rate, pool size,

flame height, In jet fire modelling the steps followed for the thermal effects are

calculation ofthe estimated discharge rate, total heat released, radiant fraction/source

view fraction, transmissivity and thermal flux and thermal effects.

Vapour cloud explosion

When gaseous flammable material is released a vapour cloud forms and if it is ignited

before it is diluted below its lower explosive limit, a vapour cloud explosion or a flash

fire will occur. Insignificant level of confinement will result in flash fire. The vapour

cloud explosion will result in overpressures. Table 7.6 tabulates the damage criteria as a

result of peak over pressure of a pressure wave on structures and people.

Table 7.8: Damage Due to Peak Over Pressure

Human Injury Structural Damage

Peak Over Pressure (bar)

Type of Damage Peak Over Pressure (bar)

Type of Damage

5 ‐ 8 100% lethality 0.3 Heavy (90% damage) 3.5 ‐ 5 50% lethality 0.1 Repairable (10% damage)2 ‐ 3 Threshold lethality 0.03 Damage of Glass

1.33 ‐ 2 Severe lung damage 0.01 Crack of Windows

1 ‐ 11/3 50% Eardrum ‐ ‐

Source: Marshall, V.C. (1977) ' How lethal are explosives and toxic escapes'.






C. Effect due to toxic gas release

Various approaches are used to determine the consequences of toxic gases:

• IDLH

• ERPG

IDLH (“Immediate Danger to Life or Health”) is the maximum concentration from which

escape is possible within 30 minutes without any escape‐impairing symptoms or

irreversible health effects.

7.4.2 Details of Model Used for Consequence Analysis

ALOHA provide output as amount of chemical discharged from the source as well as

its concentration in air it takes into account different levels of concentrations for a

specified chemical.

Software used for calculation‐ ALOHA (AREAL LOCATIONS OF HAZARDOUS

ATMOSPHERES) ALOHA is a computer program designed especially for use by people

responding to chemical accidents, as well as for emergency planning and training.

ALOHA can predict the rates at which chemical vapors may escape into the

atmosphere from broken gas pipes, leaking tanks and evaporating puddles. It can

then predict how a hazardous gas cloud might disperse in the atmosphere after an

accidental chemical release.

ALOHA provides output as amount of chemical discharged from the source as well as

its concentration in air it takes in to account different levels of concentrations for a

specified chemical. Different concentration levels are given below:

ERPG 1: is the maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that

nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other

than mild transient adverse health effects or perceiving a clearly defined,

objectionable odor.


nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or

developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms which could

impair an individual's ability to take protective action.


nearly all individuals could be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or

developing life‐threatening health effects.

IDLH: The Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) level. A chemical's IDLH is






an estimate of the maximum concentration in the air to which a healthy worker

could be exposed without suffering permanent or escape‐impairing health effects.

Input data for aloha are as below:

Weather Data:

Average Wind Speed: 5 m/sec, 3m/sec & 1.5 m/sec

Average Ambient Temperature: 350C, 400C, 220C

Average Humidity: 58%,21%,71%

Atmosphere Stability Class: D (windy day time), B (Moderate wind, day time), F

(Extreme calm, night time)

Chemical Properties:

Chemical properties of each hazardous chemical stored within premises is given in Table

No.: 7.2

Storage Details:

Storage quantity and type of storage of chemicals is given in Table No.: 7.3






Table 7.9: Consequence analysis and Damage Distance (Failure of raw material storage tanks)

Name of Chemical

Type of Impact Flammable (Distance in meter) Toxic Dispersion

Pool Fire (meter)

Fire Ball(BLEVE) (meter)

Worst Case Scenario

Flash fire(Flammable Area of Vapor

Cloud) (meter)

ERPG (3)/ IDLH ERPG(2) ERPG(1)

Radiation Intensity(kW/m2)

37.5 25 4.5 37.5 25 4.5 UEL LEL

Fatalities 100% 50% 100% 50% ‐ ‐

Wind Speed

Stability Class

Methanol (25 MT x 1)

5 D 10 10 14 76 115 317 15 16 ‐ ‐ ‐

3 B 10 10 15 82 121 329 15 16 15 meters ‐‐‐(6000 ppm =

IDLH)

49 meters ‐‐‐(1000 ppm = ERPG‐2)

144 meters ‐‐‐ (200 ppm = ERPG‐1)

1.5 F 10 10 14 90 129 345 LOC was never

exceeded (43080 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

43 meters ‐‐‐(7180 ppm = 10% LEL)

49 meters ‐‐‐(6000 ppm =

IDLH)

162 meters ‐‐‐(1000 ppm = ERPG‐2)

460 meters ‐‐‐ (200 ppm = ERPG‐1)

3 B ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 18 meters ‐‐‐(250 ppm =

IDLH)


47 meters ‐‐‐ (10 ppm = ERPG‐1)

Formaldehyde (37% solution) 25 MT x 1)

5 D ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 17 meters ‐‐‐(20 ppm = IDLH)








Name of Chemical

Type of Impact Flammable (Distance in meter) Toxic Dispersion

Pool Fire (meter)

Fire Ball(BLEVE) (meter)

Worst Case Scenario

Flash fire(Flammable Area of Vapor

Cloud) (meter)

ERPG (3)/ IDLH ERPG(2) ERPG(1)

Radiation Intensity(kW/m2)

37.5 25 4.5 37.5 25 4.5 UEL LEL

Fatalities 100% 50% 100% 50% ‐ ‐

Wind Speed

Stability Class

3 B ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 13 meters ‐‐‐(20 ppm = IDLH)



1.5 F ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ 60 meters ‐‐‐(20 ppm = IDLH)



Note*: Phenol is stored below its flash point. it is unlike to catch fire in case of BLEVE worst case scenario.

Formaldehyde (37%): For modeling toxic dispersion 37 % of formaldehyde in total quantity stored in tank is considered with direct

source modeling

Environm

mental Impac

T. R. AssoNABET A

t Assessment

ciates (Ahmeccredited

Figure

Report

dabad)

e 7.1: Meth

hanol Pool F

S Taluk

Fire (Threat

M/Survey No. 179a: Wankaner,

Chapte

t Zone)

M/s. Vansh Lam9/P2, Village: District: Morb

er-7: Addition

minate LLP Ratavirda, bi, Gujarat.

nal Studies 7.24

Environm

mental Impac

T. R. AssoNABET A

Figur

t Assessment


re 7.2: Meth

Report

dabad)

hanol BLEV

VE ‐ Worst C

S Taluk

Case Scenar


Chapte

rio (Threat Z


er-7: Addition

Zone)


nal Studies 7.25

Environm

mental Impac

T. R. AssoNABET A

t Assessment


Fig

Report

dabad)

gure 7.3: M

Methanol To

S Taluk

oxic Dispersi


Chapte

ion


er-7: Addition


nal Studies 7.26

Environm

mental Impac

T. R. AssoNABET A

t Assessment


F

Report

dabad)

Figure 7.4: P

Phenol Tox

S Taluk

xic Dispersio


Chapte

on (Threat Z


er-7: Addition

Zone)


nal Studies 7.27

Environm

mental Impac

T. R. AssoNABET A

t Assessment


Figure 7

Report

dabad)

7.5: Formal

ldehyde (37

S Taluk

7%) Toxic Di


Chapte

ispersion


er-7: Addition


nal Studies 7.28






7.5 Failure Frequency

Fire under a tank may lead to the instantaneous release of the complete inventory of

the tank. Various causes of failure may lead to a fire under a tank:

Leakage of the connections under the tank followed by ignition. This event only

occurs for tanks loaded with flammable substances. The frequency is equal to 1

× 10‐5 per year for atmospheric tanks. (Reference Purple book: Guidelines for

quantitative risk assessment)

The best available estimates of leak frequencies for atmospheric tanks are

summarised in Table 7.10.

Reference: Storage incident frequencies International Association of Oil and Gas

Producers (UK: HSE)

Ta bl e 7.10: A t m o s p h e r ic S t o r a g e T a n k L e a k/ tank fire F r e q u e n c ie s

Type of Tank Type of Release Leak Frequency (per tank year )

Fixed/ floating roof Liquid spill outside tank 2.8 × 10‐3

Tank rupture 3.0 × 10‐6

Atmospheric storage tank Fire Frequency

Type of Fi r e Fi x e d Roof Tank (per tank year)

Internal explosion & full surface fire

9.0 × 10‐5

Internal explosion without

fire

2.5 × 10‐5

Vent fire 9.0 × 10‐5

Small bund fire 9.0 × 10‐5

Large bund fire

(full bund area)

6.0 × 10‐5






7.6 Estimation of Effect of Damage / Impact Identification

The results of consequence modeling reveal that the maximum intensity of heat

radiation is experienced for Methanol pool fire having a radius of 15 meters. This is

mainly due to the large radius of the storage tank and comparatively high heat of

combustion and heat of vaporization values of Methanol. From the dispersion

modeling of Phenol and Formaldehyde (37%), it is observed that the threat zone is

maximum for Formaldehyde (37%) from storage tank, for the atmospheric conditions

during morning and night. Threat zone distance given below are considered for

Temperature 220C, Velocity : 1.5m/sec, Humidity 71%, Atmospheric stability Class :F

considering winter night time. Percentage fatality from different incident outcome

cases and level of concerns are given below:

Chemical Incident outcome case

Level of concern

Treat zone

distance

% fatality(pfi)

Likely hood of

occurrence

Magnitude of Impact/Damage

Methanol Pool fire 25 kW/m2

15 meters

50% Likely Moderate

BLEVE 25 kW/m2

345 meters

50% Unlikely high

Formaldehyde (37%)

Toxic dispersion

IDLH 20 ppm

60 meters

‐ Very Unlikely

Moderate

Phenol Toxic dispersion

IDLH : 250 ppm

18 meters

‐ Likely Moderate

Figure 7.1 to 7.5 shows the map of vulnerable areas corresponding to different

individual outcome cases. all the threat zones in the proposed unit are super

imposed on google image. Figure 7.2 gives the location, where individual risk is

found to be a maximum at locations within premises as well as outside of premises.

The reason for high individual risk at this location is due to considering BLEVE

scenario as worst case scenario resulting from the catastrophic failure of storage

tank. A broadly acceptable level of individual risk as per the ALARP (As low as

reasonably practicable) concept of HSE, UK is 10‐6/year.

7.7 Summary

It may be noted that in dispersion modeling, the wind direction and air temperature,

atmospheric stability are found to be the deciding factors for the threat zones.






The present risk assessment study shows that proposed unit of M/s Vansh

Laminate LLP having storages of hazardous chemicals mainly Methanol could have

potential for damage to those inside and outside the industry.

Fire modeling shows that the hazardous distances for methanol storage tank

extended up to 90 meters in worst case scenario, In case of pool fire it is within 15

meters which might prevent effective fire‐fighting arrangements to be provided .

A maximum threat zone of approximately 60 meters is observed in the case of

release of Formaldehyde (37%). This threat zone can be shortened by reducing the

inventory or storing Formaldehyde (37%) in smaller tanks.

7.8 Proposed Risk Reduction Measures

Storage tank of Formaldehyde 37%/Methanol/Phenol should be installed away

from the plant area.

Wind indicator should be provided at the highest level of the plant to know the

wind direction.

Automatic sprinkler system for the flammable material tanks (over ground tanks

only) may be provided as knock on effect in case of fire is possible.

Containment dykes with proper sloping and collection sumps should be provided so

that any spillages in the bulk storage and other handling areas shall not stagnate

and shall be quickly lead away to a safe distance from the source of leakage. This

reduces the risk of any major fire on the bulk storages and the risk to the

environment shall be minimized/ eliminated.

Inspection of the storage tanks as per prefixed inspection schedule for thickness

measurement, joint and weld efficiency etc.

Provision of flameproof electrical fittings / equipment’s.

Proper maintenance of earth pits.

Strict compliance of security procedures like issue of identity badges for outsiders,

gate passes system for vehicles, checking of spark arrestors fitted to the tank lorries

etc.

Strict enforcement of no smoking.

Periodic training and refresher courses to train the staff in safety fire fighting.

Employee training and education is carried out.

Structural fireproofing in the process area could be considered as a safety measure

in the light of probable spill and fires in the area.

Emergency drills should be carried out periodically to ensure preparedness must

continue.






Wind indicator should be provided at the highest level of the plant to know the

wind direction.

Many operations involve use of highly toxic/flammable materials and these needs

to be documented as SOPs. These must be made and kept updated on priority.

Extensive training on use of Self Contained Breathing apparatus (SCBAs) must be

ensured for emergency control.

Many of the raw materials used for resin are either toxic or flammable. It is

therefore important to ensure that these materials are stored in closed, well

ventilated totally safe areas. A fire alarm system (heat and smoke detection) should

be provided for the storage area where the material is stored as toxic fumes arise

on combustion.

Loose drums of waste materials, often solvent laden, must be removed from the

working areas and close watch kept.

Proper Earthing needs to be provided through plug type systems or through the

agitators/liquid.

Ventilation should be provided for any enclosed are where hydrocarbon or toxic

vapors may accumulate. Several such areas were noticed‐ these may be surveyed

and tackled accordingly.

All personnel should be trained in handling emergency situations and should be

apprised of their role in handling emergency situation and to ensure adequacy of

the emergency procedures simulated exercise should be carried out. This was

found wanting.

Flame arrestor should be provided.

Adequate number of caution boards highlighting the hazards of chemicals should

be provided at critical locations.

Monitoring of occupational hazards like noise, ventilation, chemical exposure etc. is

carried out regularly and its record is maintained.

Good housekeeping, use of PPE, Engineering controls, Enclosure processes,

scrubber system, display of safety boards, SOP of loading / unloading, local exhaust

ventilation, safety shower etc. are important safety measures have taken to keep

these chemicals within TLV.

Appropriate personal protective equipment is provided & ensure the usage of

them.

Workers is trained for safe material handling of hazardous chemicals.

Prepare & display the safe operating procedure for hazardous chemicals storage,

handling & transporting or using.

Local Exhaust ventilation and scrubber should be installed where it is required to

reduce fumes, vapors, temperature and heat stress.






Reduce the level of physical activity by sharing workload with other or by using

mechanical means.

Following FIRE safety devices is already PROVIDED to protect from any malfunctioning

of plant equipments. Following fire protection systems is provided.

Water storage of adequate capacity to meet the requirements of water for

firefighting purposes.

Fire hydrants and automatic sprinkler system. Diesel driven pumps and headers to

supply water to fire hydrant network.

Adequate Portable fire extinguishers, sand bucket, wheeled fire & safety

equipment should be provided at the required places.

Equipment required for personal safety like blankets, gloves, apron, gum boots,

face mask helmets, safety belts, first aid boxes etc. are provided. Proximity suits

and self‐contained breathing apparatus to be provided.

7.9 Occupational Health Surveillance Programme

Introduction:

Medical surveillance program (also termed as medical surveillance for workers) can

aid in the early recognition of a relationship between exposure to a hazard and

disease, in the assurance of the safety of new substances, and as an indicator of the

effectiveness of existing control measures. It is the systematic collection, analysis, and

dissemination of disease data on groups of workers and is designed to detect early

signs of work‐related illness..

The Factories Act, 1948 and the rules framed thereunder provide for pre‐employment

and periodical medical examinations of workers employed in industries with

hazardous processes and dangerous operations under section 41‐C and section 87

respectively. Chemicals Exposed to Workers Directly or indirectly are Phenol,

Formaldehyde (37 %), Methanol. Pre‐employment medical checkup and periodically

medical examination will be done. Liver function testis will be carried out during pre‐

placement and periodical examination. In addition to the above, following safety

equipment will be provided.

Action plan for Occupational Health and safety for workers:

Monitoring of occupational hazards like noise, ventilation, chemical exposure etc.

will be carried out regularly and its record will be maintained.






Good housekeeping, use of PPE, Engineering controls, Enclosure processes, display of

safety boards, SOP of loading / unloading, local exhaust ventilation, safety shower

etc. All necessary safety measures will be taken to keep all chemicals within TLV.

Appropriate personal protective equipment will be provided & ensure the usage of

them.

Workers will be trained on safe material handling of hazardous chemicals.

Prepared & display the safe operating procedure for hazardous chemicals storage,

handling & transporting or using.

Periodical medical examination of the workers & Liver Function Testes will be done.

Register (form no.37) for work place air monitoring will be done regularly.

Employee training and education will be carried out regularly.

Control the noise at source by substitution, isolation, segregation, barriers will be

done.

Local Exhaust ventilation will be installed where it is required to reduce fumes,

vapors, temperature and heat stress.

7.9.1 Treatment Facilities Provided to Workers affected by accidental Spillage of

Chemicals

Hazards with Acute Exposure

Contact with skin may cause severe burns or systemic poisoning.

Systemic effects may occur from any route of exposure, especially after skin

absorption.

Hazards with Chronic Exposure

Repeated or prolonged exposure may harm the respiratory system. Can irritate

and inflame the airways.

Methanol affects the central nervous system, liver, and kidneys.

Special Safety Precautions

Prevent contact with skin by wearing neoprene gloves, lab coat, and resistant

apron.

Wear safety glasses or a face shield if splashing may occur.

Store in a cool, dry, well‐ventilated area, away from heated surfaces or ignition

sources.

Skin contact requires immediate washing of the affected area with soap and

water.

Remove contaminated clothing and launder before wearing again.

Procedure for treating workmen after skin contact:

Skin contact requires immediate flushing of the contaminated area with soap and

water at a sink or emergency shower for a good fifteen minutes. Remove






contaminated clothing. In case of eye contact, promptly flush the eyes with

copious amounts of water for 15 minutes (lifting upper and lower lids

occasionally) and obtain medical attention. If methanol is ingested, obtain

medical attention immediately. If large amounts of methanol are inhaled, move

the person to fresh air and seek medical attention at once. It is recommended to

provide the safety shower and eyewash station in plant.

7.9.2 Minimization of the Manual Handling of Hazardous Substance

Employers and employees should examine their workplaces to detect any unsafe or

unhealthful conditions, practices, or equipment and take corrective action. Provide

flameproof electrical motor & transfer chemicals through the pipelines. Use

specially designed pallets to hold, move raw materials, finished products through

work areas. Minimize lifting of raw materials, heavy loads by using appropriate

platforms, trolleys etc. Avoid the moving, manual handling of hazardous material.

7.9.3 DO’S and DONT’S

Handling of Chemicals

Do’s Dont’s

Know the hazards of the chemical before

handling.

Know the antidotes for chemical, which you

are handling.

Do keep material safety data sheet in

locations where chemicals are being handled

and study it.

Use appropriate personal protective

equipment like gloves, aprons, and respirator;

face shield etc. depending upon nature of the

work.

Label every chemical that you use and tightly

close the container.

Use eye wash fountain / safety shower in case

of splash of chemicals in the eye or body for

at least 15 minutes.

Segregate toxic, flammable chemicals and

keep them under control.

In addition to draining and closing valves,

lines should be blanked before taking up

maintenance work.

Do not store the chemicals that are

incompatible with other chemicals.

Do not spill the chemicals.

Do not dispose chemical without

neutralizing.

Do not keep large inventory of

chemicals.

Do not allow empty containers of

hazardous chemicals to be used by

others.

Do not use compressed air for

transferring chemicals.

Do not stand near chemical transfer

pump while it is in operation with

temporary hose connection.

Pouring of chemicals by hand or doing

siphoning by mouth should never be

adopted.

Chemicals drums should never be

moved without protection.

Do not attempt to neutralize the acid /






Provide proper ventilation at the chemical

handling area to limit their concentration

within prescribed level.

alkali on the skin. Use water only.

Do not use solvent for cleaning hands.

Material Handling

Do’s Don’ts

Use proper lifting tool and tackle having

adequate capacity.

Only authorized persons should operate

material handling equipments.

Each tool, tackle or equipment should have

number and safe working load (SWL) marked

on it.

Assess weight of the material, distance to be

carried and hazards etc. before lifting the

load.

Inspect and test all the lifting tools and tackles

regularly as per Factory Rules.

Wear Personal Protective Equipments while

handling of material.

Wherever possible, mechanized material

handling shall be adopted.

While lifting a load physically, keep the load

as near as possible to the body with feet

properly placed for body balance.

Bend knees, keep back straight, keep the load

closed to the body and lift the load.

Do not use the equipment for the

purpose other than its design intention.

Do not allow personnel to move

underneath lifted load.

Do not load the equipment above its

safe working load.

Do not use makeshift arrangements for

lifting equipment without inspection

and test.

Do not use defective tool and tackles.

Keep the tools & tackles free from

adverse effect of atmosphere by

applying suitable protective coating.

The angle between the legs of two leg

sling should not exceed 90 degree.

Do not allow male and female adult to

lift a load manually higher than 55 kgs

and 30 kgs respectively.

Do not hold the load with tip of the

fingers; grasp the load firmly with palm.

Fire Prevention

Do’s Don’ts

Follow ‘NO SMOKING’ sign.

Deposit oily rags and waste combustible material

in the identified containers and dispose them

suitably.

Fire Hose used for any other purpose should be

permanently marked and taken out of fire

hydrant system.

Keep minimum inventory of flammable and

Do not leave flammable material like

acetone, kerosene etc. used as

cleaning agent at the work area.

Do not over tighten fire hydrant

valves with F‐lever.

Do not allow wild grass growth

around storage of the gas cylinders

and switchyard.






combustible substances.

Take permission before breaking or removal of

fire barrier and ensure subsequent relocation of

fire barrier.

Check periodically the operability of fixed fire

fighting system.

Attend any abnormality / deficiency with fire

protection system promptly.

Provide earthling or bonding to prevent

accumulation of static charges to tanks where

flammable chemicals are stored / handled.

Use instruments that are intrinsically safe in

explosive atmosphere.

Do not obstruct accessibility to the

fire related equipment.

Do not destroy the inspection tag

provided with the fire equipment.

Do not misuse fire‐fighting

equipment other than intended

purpose.

Do not store the flammable material

in the open container.

Do not use instruments that are not

intrinsically safe in the explosive

atmosphere.

House Keeping

Do’s Don’ts

Assign places for everything and maintain things

at assigned places.

Clean the area after completion of work.

Use aisle space free for personnel and material

movement.

Ensure adequate illumination and ventilation for

the job.

Drop paper, plastic, glass, metal and bio‐medical

waste in a separate bin kept for this purpose.

Know the location where emergency equipment

such as first aid box, fire fighting equipment,

SCBA, Stretchers are kept.

Arrest all types of spills such as chemical, water,

oil, air / gas, steam etc. and clean up the area

immediately.

Ensure exits are indicated / painted for use

during emergency.

Do not leave combustible materials

in the work area.

Do not smoke in the area of work.

Do not allow dust bin to overflow.

Do not generate extra waste.

Do not disturb the safety equipment

from assigned location.

Do not block emergency switches

and on/off switches of the

equipment by storming of materials

in front of work.

Do not leave cleaning agent like

acetone, isopropyl alcohol, kerosene

etc. at the work area after

completion of work.

Do not block fire exit point by storing

materials or by means.

Do not leave a spillage unattended.






7.10 Disaster Management Plan

7.10.1 Disaster

Disaster , A disaster is a catastrophic situation in which the day‐to‐day patterns of life

are, in many instances, suddenly disrupted and people are plunged into helplessness

and suffering and as a result need protection, clothing,, shelter, medical and social

care and other, necessities of life.

Advance emergency planning and proper training of every employee in the

'emergency function is very essential to make emergency control measures more

effective. It is not possible to completely eliminate emergency situations, but it is

definitely possible to control them. An emergency, if uncontrolled may cause a

disaster which in turn may create a catastrophe.

There are two types of emergency control plans (1) On site emergency plan and (2) Off

site emergency or disaster plan.

7.10.2 Statutory Provisions:

Section 41B(4) of the Factories Act, 1948 requires an on site emergency plan and

detailed disaster control measures for the safety of the factory workers and the

general public living in the vicinity of the factory. The occupier is required to inform

the workers and the public about the safety measures to be taken in the event of an

accident.

Rule 13, 14 and Schedule II & 12 of the Manufacture; Storage and Import of Hazardous

Chemicals Rules, 1989 and Rule 5,7,9 and 10 of the Chemical ' Accidents (Emergency

Planning, Preparedness and Response) Rules, 1996 also provide for on‐site and off‐site

emergency plans

7.10.3 On‐Site Emergency Plan :

Objectives of the Plan

1. To protect persons and properly of your factory in case of all kinds of accidents,

dangerous occurrences (Rule 103, Gujarat Factories Rules), emergencies and

disasters happening in or affecting your plant at any time.






2. To inform people and surroundings about above happening if it is likely to adversely

affect them.

3. To inform authorities including helping agencies (doctors, hospitals, fire, police,

transport etc.) in advance, and also at the lime of actual happening.

4. To identify, assess, foresee and work out various kinds of possible hazards, their

places, potential and damaging capacity and area in case of above happenings.

Review, revise, redesign, replace or reconstruct the process, plant, vessels and

control measures if so assessed.

5. To work out a plan with detailed instructions to cope up with above happenings,

based on your personnel, equipment and records. Necessary requirements shall be

added if not already available. Levels of hazardous substances shall be minimised to

the extent possible. Establish machinery for rescue and recuperation operations,

total loss control and prevention of harms and recurrence of above happenings.

Ensure that absolute safety and security is achieved within the shortest time.

7.10.4 Site Plan of the Factory and Surrounding:

Proposed unit has prepared a plan of the factory premises and surroundings showing

therein the areas of various hazards such' as fire, explosion, toxic release etc., and also

location of assembly points, equipment room, personal protective equipment room,

telephone room, first aid or, emergency control room, main gate, emergency gates, normal

wind direction, north direction.

The same has been given in Chapter No.2; Figure No.2.4 of EIA report

7.10.5 Types of Overall Emergencies

In the risk assessment study topic no. 7.3 describes all type of hazards are listed along with

its causes in or near plant. Fire (small and big), explosion, toxic exposure, strike, storm, flood

and other hazardous possible situations shall be described with reasons. Sources of hazard

from outside or neighboring plants, tanks, structure etc. shall be mentioned.

Sr.

No.

Type of emergency

including disaster

(Major class)

May arise due to

At (Place)

People and area

likely to be

affected

1 Fire

Methanol spillage or

leakages at storage

tank

Leakages :Pipeline

carrying Methanol

Storage area

of raw

materials

Plant Operator,

Labors, workers

Admin staff






Sr.

No.

Type of emergency

including disaster

(Major class)

May arise due to

At (Place)

People and area

likely to be

affected

2 Explosion

Failure of the safety

valve/pressure relief

valve, corrosion of

critical parts of the

boiler, or low water

level.

Boiler and

Thermic Fluid

Heater

3 Release of Toxic

Gas/Vapour

Leakages from

tank/pipes/valves

Tank farm

area, process

area

4 Spillage of flammable

liquid /gas

Loading and

unloading

Tank farm

area, process

area

5 Deliberate Sabotage,

Terrorism, Air Raid etc.

‐ ‐

6 Natural Calamities: ‐

Lightening, Storm,

Earthquake, Flood etc.

‐ ‐

7 Collapsing of structure

Overturning of tanker

containing flammable /

toxic substances

‐ ‐

7.10.6 Assessment of In‐plant Hazards

Detailed hazard assessment of in‐plant and control measures provided in topic no.7.3, table

no.7.3 & 7.4 of EIA report. Storage Hazards and Controls, Process Hazards and Controls are

described in same topic.

7.10.7 Emergency Control System:

A. Emergency Organizations and Functions

The organizational set‐up necessary for chain of commands during emergency situation,

which may arise in the premises. The system is described in following Subsections.






Organizational Set‐up

Members of above teams will be available during all shifts and holidays. Protective

equipment, lifting gears, fire control points etc.; will be provided in sufficient numbers and

their locations will be well informed. Necessary vehicles will be kept ready to shift persons

'in case of emergency.

B. Emergency Control Room (Safety officer room)

The place identified as Emergency Control Center is considered as safety officer room.. The

facilities available at the Emergency Control Center shall include:

i. Internal Telephone & External Telephone:

Address and Telephone numbers of the Factory Inspectorate, Gujarat Pollution Control

Board, Police, Fire Brigade, Hospitals and OEP Team Members

ii. Manual Fire/Emergency Siren

iii. Siren Actuation Switch

iv. Important Address and Telephone Numbers

v. Emergency Vehicles

vi. Confined Space Entry Procedure

vii. List of Antidote/actions to be taken in case of hazardous chemical/materials.

viii. Material Safety Data Sheets of chemicals

ix. A copy of On‐Site Disaster Management Plan

x. Plant layout‐indicating storage of hazardous materials, layout of fire

Hydrants/extinguishers, entrances/exits, roads etc.

Plant Manager

EHS/Safety Officer

Supervisor Plant Chemist

Director

Skilled workers Security staff






xi. Portable P.A. System, Manual Siren, flood lights, Torches, Pickaxe, Saw, Nylon

Ropes.

xii. Fire Blankets / Fire Proximity Suit, Breathing Apparatus, First Aid Box etc.

xiii. List of employees with address, telephone number, blood group etc.

All communications after General Shift working hours and on Sundays/ Holidays are to be

routed through the Security Gate Office.

C. On – site facilities for emergency control

Fire Emergency: Trained personnel will be employed in all the shifts. The responsibilities and

duties include:

To fight the fire with available internal firefighting equipment and to stop leakage of

liquid etc.

To provide personal protective equipment to the team.

To cordon the area and inform incident controller or site main controller about the

development of emergency.

To train the persons (essential workers) to use personal protective equipment and fire‐

fighting equipment.

D. Fire Fighting Facilities to be provided on ‐ site:

1. Fire Buckets / Fire Extinguishers

Fire buckets and portable fire extinguishers already provided in all the areas depending

upon the specific needs of the area. Some spare equipment will also be maintained in

the inventory at an identified fire & safety equipment store.

2. Fire Alarm Sirens

It is provided to alert all the employees inside the premises about the situation of an

emergency.

3. Sand Buckets

5 nos. of sand buckets is provided within the industrial premises in case of emergency

fire.

4. Oxygen Cylinder

Oxygen cylinder is provided for emergency.

5. Safety Equipment

All types of personnel protective safety equipment required for handling the emergency

will be arranged in the proposed unit. Some of the protective equipment is as follow:

o Canister/Cartridge type masks

o Dust Masks

o PVC suits, Aprons






o Safety showers/ Eye Wash fountains

o Other personnel protective appliances, like safety glasses, gumboots, helmets, hand

gloves, face shields, safety belts, safety ladders, safety torches, blankets.

6. Details of fire extinguishers

Table 7.11 : Fire Extinguishers

Sr.

No. Type Capacity Qty.

1. Jockey Pump 200 RPM 1

2. Dry Chemical Powder 2 Kg. 10 Nos.

3. Capacity Co2 type Fire

Extinguisher. 3 Kg 08 Nos

4. Water storage tank (For Fire) 1. KL 01 Nos

E. Assembly Points:

The assembly points for gathering workers / Admin staff is fixed and clearly marked as per

the wind direction on plant layout as well as on site. In case of emergency some locations

are considered as Assembly Points. Depending on the wind direction and location of

emergency, Assembly Point is declared. The employees should run across the wind

direction and not against the wind direction.

F. Medical Arrangement:

First Aid Boxes have been provided at various strategic locations. Requisite number

employees are trained about First Aid, Liaison with nearest hospitals.

Antidotes

Antidotes for Methanol

Ethanol (30 % solution from inside, 5 % solution from outside i.e. by intravenous

injection)

Epicake syrup

In case of acidosis give sodium bicarbonate

In case of delirium give diazepam 10 mg by intravenous injection

Folinic acid (leucovorin 1 mg/Kg iv, 4 hourly)






Antidotes for Formaldehyde

Milk

Activated Charcoal or Water

Antidotes for Phenol

Polyethylene glycol 300 or 400

Activated Charcoal and 240 ml Milk

7.10.8 General Procedures and responsibilities:

Mock drill: Mock drills are carried out regularly to familiarize the staff with their roles, fire

protection equipment/system installed in the plant and use of personnel protective

equipment. Senior officials

Wind Socks: Wind direction is determined with the help of installed windsocks.

Procedure on Noticing an Emergency

If anybody notices any situation, which may lead to a disaster, should be immediately

inform the Shift In‐charge / site controller / Incident Controller / Fire & Safety Supervisor

/ Security.

Take charge of the situation as Incident Controller.

Rush to the site of emergency to get the correct picture and then to Emergency Control

Center for speedy control over the situation by making an arrangement for raising the

alarm.

On arrival of Team members, he shall assign duties as required and activate the On‐Site

Emergency Plan.

Ensure safety of the plant and the personnel in the plant. He will make an assessment of

the emergency and decide on external assistance.

Communicate and Coordinate among the Incidents Controller/ Site Controller/ Factory

manager/ fire safety supervisor etc. and is final authority on all matters related with

management of emergency such as:

Firefighting

Welfare and rescue operations.

Arrange for Civil/Mechanical/Electrical work during emergency.

Transport.






EHS/SAFETY OFFICER & Security staff:

Rush immediately to the scene of the fire/emergency, select and set out appropriate

fire/emergency equipment. He will take the below mentioned actions at the earliest

opportunity, if the fire/emergency is not controlled.

He will

Call the security personnel from their residences for additional manpower if required.

Regulate entry and exit of personal required for controlling the fire/emergency.

Restrict exit of personal required for controlling the fire/emergency.

Arrange for Personnel Protective Equipment required for the emergency.

Call, the local Fire Brigade, Police in case of necessity in consultation with the Incident

controller.

Arrange transport facilities for removal of causalities to dispensary / hospital.

Take responsibility of law and order.

Keep detailed records of the incident and progress of operations to fight the emergency.

Factory manager:

He will rush to the Emergency Control Centre and collect the information from the Incident

Controller. Further he will,

Announce the location of the Assembly Point after getting information from Incident

Controller / site controller.

Take the list of persons to be communicated internally and externally.

Maintain liaison with the press, government agencies i.e. Police, Fire Brigade etc. and

the neighborhood regarding the emergency under instructions from Incident Controller.

Courteously Receive officers from the State Government or neighbors to the

Administration Block only and inform to Incident Controller that they can be taken care

off.

Take all the steps required for the welfare such as providing tea, snacks, emergency

temporary Medical Center in consultation with the incident controller/site controller.

Disclose all the necessary information in the plant and media so as to avoid rumors and

Confusion.

Also be responsible for the head counts at the Assembly Points.

Supervisor/ shift in charge & security:

Proceed to the scene; establish contact with firemen and incident controller to

supplement efforts in fire fighting.






Assist in searching casualties and help to remove them to the medical center.

Organize outside assistance in fire fighting and rescue operations if required.

Mobilize personal protective equipment and safety appliances and assist personnel

handling emergency in using them.

Keep and check on any new development of unsafe situation and report the same to Site

Main Controller.

Effectively cordon off the emergency area and will prevent unauthorized people

entering the scene.

Permit the Fire tenders or Ambulance requisitioned by Incident Controller to the plant.

Ensure that vehicles and trolleys are sent out of the plant premises.

Ensure that all the employees are conducted out of plant and assembled at Assembly

Point.

Control Traffic Movement. Remove tankers, tanker drivers outside.

Entry of unauthorized public to be prevented.

Arrange for vehicles for shifting casualties and essential workers to safe assembly points.

Collect and preserve evidence to facilitate future inquiries.

7.11 Offsite Emergency Preparedness Plan

Offsite emergency plan would follow the onsite emergency plan. When the consequences of

an emergency situation go beyond the plant boundaries, it becomes an offsite emergency.

As the off‐site emergency plan is to be prepared by the Government, a Central Control

Committee or Group shall be formed under the Chairmanship of the area head. For example

we assume a district structure and District Collector (is the Chairman of the District Control

Committee (DCC). Other officers from police, fire, factory, medical, engineering, social

welfare, publicity, railway, telephone, transport and requisite departments shall be

incorporated as members.

However, the plant management will provide the public administration with the technical

information relating to the nature, quantum and probable consequences on the neighboring

population. The offsite plan in detail is based on those events, which are most likely to

occur, but other less likely events, which have severe consequence, will also be considered.

Incidents which have very severe consequences yet have a small probability of occurrence

would also be considered during the preparation of the plan.

The roles of the various parties who is directly involved in the implementation of an offsite

plan are described below. Depending on local arrangements, the responsibility for the

offsite plan would either rest with the plant management or with the local authority.

Environm

Aspects

The ma

Organiz

procedu

site ma

Commu

networ

Speciali

necessa

Volunta

Fuel Inf

associat

Meteor

weathe

mental Impac

T. R. AssoNABET A

s Proposed

in aspects,

zation: Det

ures, emer

in controlle

unications:

k, list of tel

ized Knowle

ary to call e

ary Organiza

formation:

ted with th

rological Inf

er condition

t Assessment


F

to be cons

which shou

tail of co

gency cont

er, their dep

Identificati

ephone num

edge: Detai

.g. those wi

ations: Deta

Details of

em.

formation:

s prevailing

Report

dabad)

Figure 7.6: O

idered in th

uld be includ

mmand st

trol centres

puties and o

on of pers

mbers.

ls of specia

ith specializ

ails of organ

the hazard

Arrangeme

g at that tim

Off‐Site Eme

he Offsite E

ded in the e

tructure, w

s. Names a

other key pe

sonnel invo

alist bodies,

zed fuel kno

nizers, telep

dous substa

ents for obt

me

S Taluk

ergency Pla

mergency P

emergency

warning sy

nd appoint

ersonnel.

olved, comm

, firms and

owledge, lab

phone num

ances store

taining det


Chapte

an

Plan

plan, are:

stems, and

tments of i

munication

people upo

boratories.

bers, resou

d and a su

ails of wea


er-7: Addition

d impleme

incident co

centre, ca

on whom it

rces etc.

ummary of

ather foreca


nal Studies 7.47

entation

ntroller,

all signs,

may be

the risk

asts and






Humanitarian Arrangements: Transport, evacuation centres, emergency feeding, treatment

of injured, first aid, ambulances and temporary mortuaries.

Public Information : Arrangements for (a) Dealing with the media press office; (b) Informing

relatives Assessment of Emergency Plan

Arrangements for: Collecting information on the causes of the emergency; and Reviewing

the efficiency and effectiveness of all aspects of the emergency plan.

Role of the Emergency Co‐ordinating Officer

The various emergency services would be coordinated by an Emergency Coordinating

Officer (ECO), who is designated by the district collector. The ECO would liaison closely with

the Factory Manager/Safety officer. The ECO has been equipped with address and phone

numbers of important agencies.

a. Role of the Local Authority

The duty to prepare the offsite plan lies with the local authorities. The emergency planning

officer (EPO) appointed should carry out his duty in preparing for a whole range of different

emergencies within local authority area. This liaison should ensure that plan is continually

kept up to date. It is responsibility of the EPO to ensure that all those organizations which

has been involved offsite in handling the emergency, know of their role and are able to

accept it by having for example, sufficient staff and appropriate equipment to cover their

particular responsibilities. Rehearsals for offsite plans should be organized by the EPO.

b. Role of Police

Formal duties of the police during an emergency include protecting life and property and

Controlling traffic movements. Their functions should include controlling bystanders,

evacuating the public, identifying the dead and dealing with casualties, and informing

relatives of death or injury.

c. Role of Fire Authorities

The control of a fire should be normally the responsibility of the senior fire brigade officer

who would take over the handling of the fire from the site incident controller on arrival at

the site. The senior fire brigade officer should also have a similar responsibility for other

events, such as explosions. Fire authorities in the region should be appraised about the

location of all stores of flammable materials, water and foam supply points, and firefighting






equipment. They should be involved in onsite emergency rehearsals both as participants

and, on occasion, as observers of exercises involving only site personnel.

d. Role of Health Authorities

Health authorities, including doctors, surgeons, hospitals, ambulances and so on, should

have a vital part to play following a major accident, and they should form an integral part of

the emergency plan. For major fires, injuries should be the result of the effects of thermal

radiation to a varying degree, and the knowledge and experience to handle this in all but

extreme cases may be generally available in most hospitals.

Major off site incidents are likely to require medical equipment and facilities additional to

those available locally, and a medical "mutual aid” scheme should exist to enable the

Assistance of neighboring authorities to be obtained in the event of an emergency.

e. Role of Government Safety Authority

This will be the factory inspectorate available in the region. Inspectors are likely to satisfy

themselves that the organization responsible for producing the offsite plan has made

adequate arrangements for handling emergencies of all types including major emergencies.

They may wish to see well documented procedures and evidence of exercise undertaken to

test the plan. In the event of an accident, local arrangements regarding the role of the

factory inspector will apply. These may vary from keeping a watch, to a close involvement in

advising on operations.

Table No.7.12 Offsite Action Plan

Sr.

No.

Action Required to be taken to

Mitigate Disaster by Aid giving

agency

Responsible

Agencies for

taking action

Equipment/Material facilities

required at site to mitigate

Emergency

A

1

Arrangements for evacuation

Rescue of persons from zone of

influence to predetermined camps

Police

Department

Self‐Breathing apparatus

with spare cylinder

Chemical gas mask with

spare canister

Vehicle with PA system

Transportation for evacuation

2 Caution to public by

announcement

3 Traffic control by cordoning

of the area

4 Law & order

5 Request to railway authority for






Sr.

No.



agency

Responsible

Agencies for

taking action



Emergency

keeping the nearest railway gate

open & to stop the trains at the

nearest railway station

of people

B Control of fire District Fire

Brigade

Self‐breathing apparatus with

spare cylinders

Foam /water fire tenders

Gas mask with spare canisters

Lime water

Neck to toe complete

asbestos suit, PVC hand gloves,

gumboots, safety goggles

Mobile scrubbing system

along with suction arrangement.

1 Scrubbing of the flashed off gas

cloud with water curtain

2 To rescue trapped persons

3 If fire is big, keep surrounding

area cool by spraying water

4 Communication to State

Electricity Board to continue or

cut off electric supply

5 Communication to water supply

department for supplying water

C Medical facilities for affected

persons (first aid and treatment)

Hospital and

public health

Ambulance with onboard

resuscitation unit, first aid,

stretchers

D Identification of concentration of

gas in zone of influence

Pollution

Control Board

Gas detector

E Removal of debris and damaged

structures

Municipal

corporation

Provide bulldozers

Provide cranes

F

1

Monitor the incoming and out

going transports

Transport

department

Provide traffic police at site

Provide emergency shifting

vehicles at site

Provide stock of fuel for

vehicles.

2 Arrange emergency shifting of

affected persons and non

affected person to specified area

3 Arrange diesel/petrol for needed

vehicles

G

1

Give all information related to

meteorological aspects for safe

handling of affected area for

living beings

Meteorological

Department

Provide wind direction and

velocity instruments with

temperature measurements

2 Forecast important weather

changes, if any

Mobile van for

Meteorological parameter

measurements






Sr.

No.



agency

Responsible

Agencies for

taking action



Emergency

H

1

Representatives of all

departments are in the local

crisis group; therefore they are

expected to render services

available with them. Since it is a

group of experts with authority,

the mitigating measures can be

implemented speedily. The

representatives from locals are also

there so that communication with

local people is easy and quick.

Local Crises

Group

Must have all resources at

hand, specially disaster

management plan and its

implementation method.

All relevant information

related to hazardous industry

shall available with crisis group

Newspaper editor shall be a

part of the group so that right

and timely media release can be

done

2 The district emergency or

disaster control officer / collector

shall be the president and he

shall do mock drill etc. so that

action can be taken in right

direction in time

I

1

Collector shall be the President

of District Crisis Group therefore all

district infrastructure facilities are

diverted to affected zone

District Crisis

Group

All necessary facilities

available at district can be made

available at affected zone

Control of law and order

situation 2 All other functions as mentioned

for local crisis group

chapter - 7 additional studiesenvironmentclearance.nic.in/writereaddata/online/risk... · 2017. 7....

Documents