Alfeo Vivas, on his behalf and on behalf of the Shareholders of the Eurocredit Community Bank,Petitioner, vs. The Monetary Board of the BSP and the PDIC,Respondents.GR No. 191424; August 7, 2013

Facts:The Monetary Board placed the Eurocredit Community Bank under Prompt Corrective Action framework on account of the findings of serious findings and supervisory concerns. Vivas moved for the reconsideration of such action. ECBI also unjustly refused to allow the BSP examiners from inspecting its books and records. The MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership, because of its inability to pay its liabilities, insufficient realizable assets and violation of cease and desist order of the MB for acts constituting unsound banking practices. Vivas argued that the MB committed grave abuse of discretion for placing ECBI under receivership without prior notice and hearing, pursuant to RA 7353, Sec. 11.

Issue:Whether or not the MB committed grave abuse of discretion in placing ECBI under receivership without notice and hearing.

Ruling:No, the MB did not gravely abuse its discretion. The ECBI was given every chance to be heard and improve its financial standing. Moreover, the MB has the power to forbid a bank from doing business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing, when the circumstances warrant it. Under RA 7653, the MB was given with more power of closure and placement of a bank in receivership for insolvency or if the continuance in the business would result in the loss of depositors or creditors. The close now, hear later doctrine was justified on practical and legal considerations to preclude unwarranted dissipation of the banks assets and as valid exercise of police power to protect creditors, depositors, stockholders and the general public.

Llamas vs Court of AppealsBefore this Court is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein petitioner-spouses Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas. On September 29, 2009, this Court promulgated a Decision[1]in the above-captioned case, denying the petition for Annulment of Judgment andCertiorari, with Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners. Petitioners are assailing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakatiCityconvicting them of the offense Other Forms of Swindling punishable under Article 316, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).Briefly, the antecedent facts are as follows:On August 14, 1984, petitioners were charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMakatiwith, as aforesaid, the crime of other forms of swindling in the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11787, which reads:That on or about the 20thday of November, 1978, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, well knowing that their parcel of land known as Lot No. 11, Block No. 6 of the Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd 67036, Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, LRC Record No. N-26926, Case No. 4896, situated at Barrio San Dionisio, Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila, was mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell said property to one Conrado P. Avila, falsely representing the same to be free from all liens and encumbrances whatsoever, and said Conrado P. Avila bought the aforementioned property for the sum ofP12,895.00 which was paid to the accused, to the damage and prejudice of said Conrado P. Avila in the aforementioned amount ofP12,895.00.Contrary to law.After trial on the merits, the RTC rendered its Decision on June 30, 1994, finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for two months and to pay the fine ofP18,085.00 each.On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its February 19, 1999 Decision in CA-G.R. No. CR No. 18270, affirmed the decision of the trial court. In its December 22, 1999 Resolution, the appellate court further denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.Assailing the aforesaid issuances of the appellate court, petitioners filed before this Court, on February 11, 2000, their petition for review, docketed as G.R. No. 141208. The Court, however, on March 13, 2000, denied the same for petitioners failure to state the material dates. Since it subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration on June 28, 2000, the judgment of conviction became final and executory.With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the April 19, 2001 Warrant of Arrest, the police arrested, on April 27, 2001, petitioner Carmelita C. Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term. The police, nevertheless, failed to arrest petitioner Francisco R. Llamas because he was nowhere to be found.On July 16, 2001, petitioner Francisco moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.There being no action taken by the trial court on the said motion, petitioners instituted, on September 13, 2001, the instant proceedings for the annulment of the trial and the appellate courts decisions.The Court initially dismissed on technical grounds the petition in the September 24, 2001 Resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for reconsideration, in the October 22, 2001 Resolution.[2]In its September 29, 2009 Decision, this Court held that, following the ruling inPeople v. Bitanga,[3]the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases. The Court likewise rejected petitioners contention that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the case.Petitioners are now before this Court seeking the reversal of the September 29, 2009 Decision and, consequently, the annulment of their conviction by the trial court. In their Verified Motion for Reconsideration,[4]petitioners ask this Court to revisit and take a second look at the issues in the case without being unduly hampered by any perceived technical shortfalls of a beleaguered innocent litigant. In particular, they raise the following issues:1.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AND IN LIGHT OF THE CORRECT APPLICATIONS OF DOCTRINAL JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONERS HAD PURSUED THEIR MORE THAN TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS QUEST FOR JUSTICE AS INNOCENT MEN, AND HAD HONESTLY MAINTAINED THAT THEIR RESORT TO REVERSE, SET ASIDE AND/OR ANNUL, IS IN LINE WITH JURISPRUDENCE AND LAW,ANY TECHNICAL SHORTFALLS [OR] DEFECTS NOTWITHSTANDING[;]2.WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, AGAIN IN LIGHT OF APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION, PETITIONERS ARE NOT BARRED FROM RAISING SUCH QUESTION OF JURISDICTION AT ANY TIME AND IN FACT MAINTAIN THAT RESPONDNET COURTS HADNO JURISDICTIONIN LAW AND ENLIGHTENING DOCTRINES TO TRY AND DECIDE THIS CASE;3.AGAIN WITH ALL DUE RESPECT ANDUNFORTUNATELY, THE VERY JUSTIFYING MERITS OF PETITIONERSAPPROPRIATE INSTANT REMEDY;HAD NOT CONSEQUENTLY BEEN PASSED UPON, TO UPHOLD THE PARAMOUNT CONSTITUTIONAL CHERISED MANDATE, THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE MUST BE UPHELD, EXCEPT ONLY UPON ESTABLISHED AND ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT; AND4.PETITIONERSVERY HUMBLY BESEECHTHIS HONORABLE COURTS HIGHEST SENSE OF MAGNANIMITY, UNDERSTANDING, JUDICIOUS WISDOM AND COMPASSION, SO THAT JUSTICE MAY TRULY AND JUSTLY BE RENDERED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONERS AS IT MUST, GIVEN THE VERY UNIQUE AND COMPELLING JUSTIFICATIONS HEREOF[.][5]Petitioners likewise pray for a referral of the case to the CourtEn Bancfor oral argument or to be allowed to submit written supplementary pleadings for them to state the compelling reasons why their motion for reconsideration should be allowed.In the interest of justice and for humanitarian reasons, the Court deems it necessary to re-examine this case.Admittedly, petitioners took many procedural missteps in this case, from the time it was pending in the trial court until it reached this Court, all of which could serve as enough basis to dismiss the present motion for reconsideration. However, considering petitioners advanced age, the length of time this case has been pending, and the imminent loss of personal liberty as a result of petitioners conviction, the Court resolves to grantpro hac vicethe motion for reconsideration.This Court has, on occasion, suspended the application of technical rules of procedure where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.[6]It has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses on the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. The strict and rigid application of rules that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided.It is far better and more prudent for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties.[7]This Court notes that the case was allowed to run its course as a petition forcertiorari, such that in its April 12, 2004 Resolution, it said Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review oncertiorarix x x. Likewise, in its February 10, 2003 Resolution,[8]the Court said, It appearing that Atty. Francisco R. Llamas, in his own behalf and as counsel for petitioners, has failed to file their reply to the Solicitor Generals comment on the petition for review oncertiorariwithin the extended period x x x.Thus, the Court, at the first instance, had recognized that the petition, although captioned differently, was indeed one forcertiorari.Since we have resolved to treat the petition as one forcertiorari, the doctrine inPeople v. Bitanga[9]no longer finds application in this case.Next, we proceed to resolve the substantive issues raised by petitioners.Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code states:ART. 316.Other forms of swindling. The penalty ofarresto mayorin its minimum and medium periods and a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not more than three times such value, shall be imposed upon:x x x2. Any person who, knowing that real property is encumbered, shall dispose of the same, although such encumbrance be not recorded;x x xIn every criminal prosecution, the State must prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crime chargedandthe complicity or participation of the accused.[10]For petitioners to be convicted of the crime of swindling under Article 316 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, the prosecution had the burden to prove the confluence of the following essential elements of the crime:1.that the thing disposed of be real property;2.that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered,whether the encumbrance is recorded or not;3.that there must be express representationby the offender that the real property is freefrom encumbrance; and4.that the act of disposing of the real property be made to the damage of another.[11]One of the essential elements of swindling underArticle 316, paragraph 2, is that the act of disposing the encumbered real property is made to the damage of another. In this case, neither the trial court nor the CA made any finding of any damage to the offended party. Nowhere in the Decision of the RTC or that of the CA is there any discussion that there was damage suffered by complainantAvila, or any finding that his rights over the property were prejudiced.On the contrary, complainant had possession and control of the land even as the cases were being heard. His possession and right to exercise dominion over the property was not disturbed. Admittedly, there was delay in the delivery of the title. This, however, was the subject of a separate case, which was eventually decided in petitioners favor.[12]If no damage should result from the sale, no crime of estafa would have been committed by the vendor, as the element of damage would then be lacking.[13]The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is that petitioners should be acquitted of the crime charged.WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration isGRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 29, 2009 isSETASIDEand a new one is enteredACQUITTINGpetitioners of the crime charged on the ground of the prosecutions failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.SO ORDERED.DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL ROBERTO LASTIMOSO, ACTING CHIEF PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP), DIRECTORATE FOR PERSONNEL AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT (DPRM), INSPECTOR GENERAL, P/CHIEF SUPT. RAMSEY OCAMPO and P/SUPT. ELMER REJANO,petitioners,vs.P/SENIOR INSPECTOR JOSE J. ASAYO,respondent.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before the Court is respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision promulgated on March 6, 2007. In said Decision, the Court granted the petition, holding that the Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the civilian complaint against respondent and that the latter was accorded due process during the summary hearing.Facts: Respondent argues that the decision should be reconsidered for the following reasons:1. The summary proceeding was null and void because no hearing was conducted; and2. The evidence presented at the summary hearing does not prove that respondent is guilty of the charges against him.Respondent insists that the summary hearing officer did not conduct any hearing at all but only relied on the affidavits and pleadings submitted to him, without propounding further questions to complainant's witnesses, or calling in other witnesses such as PO2 Villarama. It should, however, be borne in mind that the fact that there was no full-blown trial before the summary hearing officer does not invalidate said proceedings. InSamalio v. Court of Appeals,1the Court reiterated the time-honored principle that:Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. In other words,it is not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony.2(Emphasis supplied)Ruling: The first issue presented by respondent must, therefore, be struck down.To resolve the second issue, respondent would have the Court re-calibrate the weight of evidence presented before the summary hearing officer, arguing that said evidence is insufficient to prove respondent's guilt of the charges against him.However, it must be emphasized that the action commenced by respondent before the Regional Trial Court is one forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and as held inPeople v. Court of Appeals,3where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision the same is beyond the province of a special civil action forcertiorari.Yet, respondent-movant's arguments and the fact that the administrative case against respondent was filed way back in 1997, convinced the Court to suspend the rules of procedure.The general rule is that the filing of a petition forcertioraridoes not toll the running of the period to appeal.4However, Section 1, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court provides that the Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. InGinete v. Court of Appeals5andSanchez v. Court of Appeals,6the Court saw it proper to suspend rules of procedure in order to promote substantial justice where matters of life, liberty, honor or property, among other instances, are at stake.The present case clearly involves the honor of a police officer who has rendered years of service to the country.In addition, it is also understandable why respondent immediately resorted to the remedy ofcertiorariinstead of pursuing his motion for reconsideration of the PNP Chiefs decision as an appeal before the National Appellate Board (NAB). It was quite easy to get confused as to which body had jurisdiction over his case. The complaint filed against respondent could fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990. Section 41 states that citizens' complaints should be brought before the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), while Section 42 states that it is the PNP Chief who has authority to immediately remove or dismiss a PNP member who is guilty of conduct unbecoming a police officer.It was only inQuiambao v. Court of Appeals,7promulgated in 2005 orafter respondent had already filed the petition forcertiorariwith the trial court, when the Court resolved the issue of which body has jurisdiction over cases that fall under both Sections 41 and 42 of R.A. No. 6975. The Court held that the PLEB and the PNP Chief and regional directors haveconcurrent jurisdiction over administrative casesfiled against members of the PNP which may warrant dismissal from service, but once a complaint is filed with the PNP Chief or regional directors, said authorities shall acquire exclusive original jurisdiction over the case.With the foregoing peculiar circumstances in this case, respondent should not be deprived of the opportunity to fully ventilate his arguments against the factual findings of the PNP Chief. He may file an appeal before the NAB, pursuant to Section 45, R.A. No. 6925. It is a settled jurisprudence that in administrative proceedings, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.8InLand Bank of the Philippines v. Celada,9the Court stressed thus:After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.10Thus, the opportunity to pursue an appeal before the NAB should be deemed available to respondent in the higher interest of substantial justice.WHEREFORE,respondent's Motion for Reconsideration is partlyGRANTED. The Decision of the Court dated March 6, 2007 isMODIFIEDsuch that respondent is hereby allowed to file his appeal with the National Appellate Board within ten (10) days from finality of herein Resolution.

Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan 460 SCRA 588 June 22, 2005, TINGAFacts: -Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy Chief of Staff for Comptrollership of the AFP.-On Sept27, 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Roxas, Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the Field Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after due investigation, filed a COMPLAINT vs. Garcia for VIOLATION OF1. SECTION 8 (IN RE Section 11) of RA 6713(Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees)2. Art 183, RPC3. Sec52(A)(1), (3) & (20) of the Civil Service Law-based on this complaint, a case was filed vs. Petitioner-Wife and 3 sons were impleaded for violation of RA 1379 insofar as they acted as conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of ill-gotten wealth-Also, a PETITION W/ VERIFIED URGENT EX PARTE APPLICATION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT was filed by Ombudsman before the SB vs. Garcia, his wife and 3 sons: Ombudsman, after conducting inquiry (similar to PI) has determined a prima facie case exists vs. Maj. Gen Garcia since during his incumbency as a soldier and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer and his other lawful income SB GRANTED PETITION, ISSUED WRIT OF PRELIMINARY ATTACHMENT-Garcia filed MTD then this PETITION (same day): a.LACK OF JURISDICTION over forfeiture proceedings (CIVIL ACTION) under RA 1379 should be w/ RTC as provided under SEC2(9) of the lawb. Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in Civil Actions pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully acquired property vs. Pres. Marcos etc.c. Sandiganbayan was intended principally as a criminal courtBASIS: Presidential issuances and lawsd. Granting that SB has jurisdiction, petition for forfeiture is fatally defective for failing to comply with jurisdictional requirements under RA 1379, SEC2:i. inquiry similar to a PIii. Certification to SOLGEN of prima facie case here: no certificationiii. action filed by SOLGEN - here: by OmbudsmanCOMMENT by Sandigaybayan:1.Republic vs. SB: there is no issue that jurisdiction over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with the Sandiganbayan.2. Under Consti and prevailing statutes, SB is vested w/ authority and jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture under RA 13793. Section4a(1), PD 1606, not Section 2(9), RA 1379 should be made the basis of SBs jurisdiction:a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher ranks; 4. SBs jurisdiction based on PD 1606 encompasses all cases involving violations of RA 3019 IRRESPECTIVE OF WON THESE CASES ARE CIVIL OR CRIMINAL IN NATURECOMMENT BY OMBUDSMAN:1. Republic vs. SB2. Grant of jurisdiction over violations of RA 1379 did not change even under the amendments of RA7975 and RA 8294, though it came to be limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials3. It has authority to investigate and initiate forfeiture proceedings vs. petitioner based on Consti and RA 6770: The constitutional power of investigation of the Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its power to investigate any act of a public official or employee which appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials as defined under R.A. No. 13794. Section 15, RA 6770 expressly empowers Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of unlawful acquisition of wealth.5. ON REQUIREMENTS under RA 1379: inquiry was conducted similar to PI + SOLGENs participation no longer required since Ombudsman endowed w/ authority to investigate and prosecute6. dismiss petition for forum shopping: MTD was already filed before SBREPLY by Garcia1. SBs criminal jurisdiction is separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction : SBs jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been removed w/o subsequent amendments expressly restoring such civil jurisdiction2. Petition for forfeiture is not an ancilliary action for the criminal action against him, so not under jurisdiction of SandiganbayanISSUES:1. WON SB has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture under RA 13792. WON Ombudsman has authority to investigate, initiate and prosecute such petitions for forfeiture3. WON petitioner is guilty of forum shoppingHELD: Petition W/O MERIT, dismissed1. SB HAS JURISDICTIONReasoning: Republic vs. Sandiganbayan: Originally, SOLGEN was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before then CFI of the city or province where the public officer/employee resides or holds office [RA 1379, SEC2]Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan [PD 1486], original and exclusive jurisdiction over such violations was vested in SB.PD 1606: repealed 1486 and modified jurisdiction of SB by removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in connection w/ crimes w/n exclusive jurisdiction of SB, including:> restitution or reparation for damages>recovery of instruments and effects of the crime>civil actions under Art32 and 34 of the Civil Code>and forfeiture proceedings provided under RA 1379BP 129: abolished concurrent jurisdiction of SB and regular courts, expanded EOJ of SB over offenses enumerated in SEC4 of PD1606 to embrace all such offenses irrespective of imposable penalty.PD1606 was later amended by PD 1869 and eventually by PD 1861 because of the proliferation of filing cases w/ penalty not higher than PC or its equivalent and even such cases not serious in nature*jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and 1379 is lodged w/ SBunder RA 8249: SB vested w/ EOJ in all cases involving violations of :>>RA 3019 - Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act>>RA 1379 - An Act Declaring Forfeiture in Favor of the State Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor.>>ChapII, Sec2, Title VII, Book II of the RPCWhere 1 or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense (see above)ON CIVIL NATUR OF FORFEITURE ACTIONS-they are actions in rem, therefore, civil in nature BUT FORFEITURE OF AN ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED PROPERTY PARTAKES THE NATURE OF A PENALTY [as discussed in Cabal vs. Kapunan]SB VESTED W/ JURISDICTION OVER VIOLATIONS OF RA 1379 [An Act Declaring Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor.]: the law provides a procedure for forfeiture in case a public officer has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property. No penalty for the public officer for unlawful acquisition but the law imposes forfeiture as a penalty for unlawfully acquired properties2. YES, as resolved in Republic vs. SB (it was the main issue there)RA 1379, Sec2: SOLGEN authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedingsPD 1486: vested SB w/ jurisdiction over RA 1379 forfeiture proceedingsSec12: Chief Special Prosecutor has authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases, not SOLGEN, to SB, not CFI (BUT THIS IS JUST AN IMPLIED REPEAL as may be derived from the repealing clause of PD 1486)PD 1487: created OmbudsmanPD 1606 repealed expressly PD 1486PD 1607 provided that Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor has exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the SB, file info therefore, and direct and control prosecution of said casesalso removed authority to file actions for forfeiture under RA 1379the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No. 1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379, but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals (now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.PD 1630: expanded the Tanodbayans authority: given exclusive authority to conduct PI of all cases cognizable by SB, to file info therefore and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases**1987 CONSTI enactedRA 6770 + ART XI, SEC 13 of 1987 CONSTI: POWERS OF OMBUDSMAN:1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; (11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.*It is the Ombudsman who should file petition for forfeiture under RA 1379BUT powers to investigate and initiate proper action for recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed AFTER FEB 19863. ON FORUM SHOPPING: GUILTYGarcia failed to inform the court that he had filed a MTD in relation to the petition for forfeiture before the SB.A scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the same reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the Arguments and Discussion[89] in the Petition of petitioners thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the annulment of the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29 October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2 November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking of appropriate action against the counsel and party concerned.

FRANKLlN ALEJANDRO,vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, G.R. No. 173121 April 3, 2013

On May 4, 2000, the Head of the Non-Revenue Water Reduction Department of the Manila Water Services, Inc. (MWSI) received a report from an Inspectorate and Special Projects team that the Mico Car Wash (MICO), owned by Alfredo Rap Alejandro, has been illegally opening an MWSI fire hydrant and using it to operate its car-wash business in Binondo, Manila. On May 10, 2000, the MWSI, in coordination with the PNP-CIDG, conducted an anti-water pilferage operation against MICO.

During the anti-water pilferage operation, the PNP-CIDG discovered that MICOs car-wash boys indeed had been illegally getting water from an MWSI fire hydrant. The PNP-CIDG arrested the car-wash boys and confiscated the containers used in getting water. At this point, the petitioner, Alfredos father and the Barangay Chairman or punong barangay of Barangay 293, Zone 28, Binondo, Manila, interfered with the PNP-CIDGs operation by ordering several men to unload the confiscated containers. This intervention caused further commotion and created an opportunity for the apprehended car-wash boys to escape.

On August 5, 2003, the respondent Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau, after conducting its initial investigation, filed with the Office of the Overall Deputy Ombudsman an administrative complaint against the petitioner for his blatant refusal to recognize a joint legitimate police activity, and for his unwarranted intervention.In its decision dated August 20, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman found the petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and ordered his dismissal from the service. The Deputy Ombudsman ruled that the petitioner cannot overextend his authority as Barangay Chairman and induce other people to disrespect proper authorities. The Deputy Ombudsman also added that the petitioner had tolerated the illegal acts of MICOs car-wash boys.

Alejandro filed MFR, denied by the Office of the OmbudsmanAlejandro appealed to CA but dismissed it due to premature filing as Alejandro failed to exhaust proper administrative remedies.

Issue: WHETHER THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER ELECTIVE OFFICIALS AND HAS THE POWER TO ORDER THEIR DISMISSAL FROM THE SERVICE.Held: The Ombudsman has concurrent jurisdiction over administrative cases which are within the jurisdiction of the regular courts or administrative agenciesThe Office of the Ombudsman was created by no less than the Constitution.It is tasked to exercise disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials, save only for impeachable officers. While Section 21 of The Ombudsman Actand the Local Government Code both provide for the procedure to discipline elective officials, the seeming conflicts between the two laws have been resolved in cases decided by this Court.

In Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole,we pointed out that "there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent x x x as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other." The two laws may be reconciled by understanding the primary jurisdiction and concurrent jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman.The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate any act or omission of a public officer or employee who is under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 6770 provides:Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:

(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases. [italics supplied; emphasis and underscore ours]The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction extends only to public officials occupying positions corresponding to salary grade 27 and higher.

Consequently, as we held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Rodriguez,any act or omission of a public officer or employee occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the Ombudsman and of the regular courts or other investigative agencies. In administrative cases involving the concurrent jurisdiction of two or more disciplining authorities, the body where the complaint is filed first, and which opts to take cognizance of the case, acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent jurisdiction.In this case, the petitioner is a Barangay Chairman, occupying a position corresponding to salary grade 14.Under RA 7160, the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan has disciplinary authority over any elective barangay official, as follows:

Section 61. Form and Filing of Administrative Complaints. A verified complaint against any erring local elective official shall be prepared as follows: (c) A complaint against any elective barangay official shall be filed before the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned whose decision shall be final and executory. [italics supplied]Since the complaint against the petitioner wasinitially filedwith the Office of the Ombudsman, the Ombudsman's exercise of jurisdiction is to the exclusion of the sangguniang bayan whose exercise of jurisdiction isconcurrent.

Darma Maslag vs Elizabeth Monzon, WilliamGeston, and Registry of Deeds of BenguetGR. No. 174908 June 17, 2013

Facts: In 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for reconveyance of real property with declaration of nullity of original certificate of title against respondents. The Complaint was filed before the Municipal Trial Court. After trial, the MTC found respondent Monzon guilty of fraud in obtaining an OCT over petitioners property. Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court(RTC) declaring the MTC without jurisdiction over petitioners cause of action. The presiding judge declared that it will take cognizance of the case pursuant to Section 8, Rule 40of the Rules of Court which provides for appeal from orders dismissing the case without trial; lack ofjurisdiction.RTC thereafter reversed the decision of the MTC, prompting the petitioner to file a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the said appeal and affirmed the respondents contention that the proper remedy is a Petition for Review under Rule 42, and not an ordinary appeal.Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue: W/N petitioners ordinary appeal is the proper remedy

Held: No. The CA is correct in holding that the proper mode of appeal should have been a Petition for Review under Rule42 of the Rules of Court, and not an ordinary appeal under Rule 41.Under the present state of the law, in cases involving title to real property, original and exclusive jurisdiction belongs to either the RTC or the MTC, depending on the assessed value of the subject property. Since the assessed value of the disputed property is onlyP12,400, MTC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. In fact and in law, the RTC Resolution was a continuation of the proceedings that originated fromthe MTC. It was ajudgment issued by the RTC in the exercise ofits appellatejurisdiction. It cannot be overemphasized that jurisdiction overthe subject matter is conferred only by law and it is not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside.

Neither would theactive participation of the parties nor estoppels operate to confer original and exclusive jurisdiction where the court or tribunal only wields appellate jurisdiction over the case. The present court looks at what type of jurisdiction was actually exercised by the RTC, and not into what type ofjurisdiction the RTC should have exercised. Inquiring into what the RTC should havedone in disposing of the case is a question that already involves the merits of the appeal, but the court obviously cannot go into that where the mode of appeal was improper to begin with. Wherefore, Petition for Review is denied for lackof merit. The Court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), AS REPRESENTED BY ITS INCUMBENT CHAIRMAN EFRAIM GENUINO G.R. No. 190566 : December 11, 2013

Facts: Petitioner was a teller at the Casino Filipino, Angeles City Branch, Angeles City, which was operated by respondent Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). While he was performing his functions as teller, a lady customer identified later as one Cecilia Nakasato approached him in his booth and handed to him an undetermined amount of cash consisting of mixed P1,000.00 and P500.00 bills. There were forty-five P1,000.00 and ten P500.00 bills for the total amount of P50,000.00. Following casino procedure, petitioner laid the bills on the spreading board. However, he erroneously spread the bills into only four clusters instead of five clusters worth P 10,000.00 per cluster. He then placed markers for P10,000.00 each cluster of cash and declared the total amount of P40,000.00 to Cecilia. Perplexed, Cecilia asked petitioner why the latter only dished out P40,000.00. She then pointed to the first cluster of bills and requested petitioner to check the first cluster which she observed to be thicker than the others. Petitioner performed a recount and found that the said cluster contained 20 pieces of P1,000.00 bills. Petitioner apologized to Cecilia and rectified the error by declaring the full and correct amount handed to him by the latter. Petitioner, however, averred that Cecilia accused him of trying to shortchange her and that petitioner tried to deliberately fool her of her money. Petitioner tried to explain, but Cecilia allegedly continued to berate and curse him. To ease the tension, petitioner was asked to take a break. After ten minutes, petitioner returned to his booth. However, Cecilia allegedly showed up and continued to berate petitioner. As a result, the two of them were invited to the casinos Internal Security Office in order to air their respective sides. Thereafter, petitioner was required to file an Incident Report which he submitted on the same day of the incident.

On January 8, 2009, petitioner received a Memorandum issued by the casino informing him that he was being charged with Discourtesy towards a casino customer and directing him to explain within 72 hours upon receipt of the memorandum why he should not be sanctioned or dismissed. In compliance therewith, petitioner submitted a letter-explanation dated January 10, 2009.

On March 31, 2009, petitioner received another Memorandum dated March 19, 2009, stating that the Board of Directors of PAGCOR found him guilty of Discourtesy towards a casino customer and imposed on him a 30-day suspension for this first offense. Aggrieved, on April 2, 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking a reversal of the boards decision and further prayed in the alternative that if he is indeed found guilty as charged, the penalty be only a reprimand as it is the appropriate penalty. During the pendency of said motion, petitioner also filed a Motion for Production dated April 20, 2009, praying that he be furnished with copies of documents relative to the case including the recommendation of the investigating committee and the Decision/Resolution of the Board supposedly containing the latters factual findings.

Subsequently, on June 18, 2009, PAGCOR issued a Memorandum dated June 18, 2009 practically reiterating the contents of its March 19, 2009 Memorandum. It informed petitioner that the Board of Directors 2009 resolved to deny his appeal for reconsideration for lack of merit.

On August 17, 2009, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, before the CA, averring that there is no evidence, much less factual and legal basis to support the finding of guilt against him. Moreover, petitioner ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing the harsh penalty of a 30 -day suspension. Justifying his recourse to the CA, petitioner explained that he did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission (CSC) because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30- day suspension which is not within the CSCs appellate jurisdiction. He also claimed that discourtesy in the performance of official duties is classified as a light offense which is punishable only by reprimand.

In its assailed Resolution dated September 30, 2009, the CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse from the CA. Invoking Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, the CA held that the CSC has jurisdiction over issues involving the employer-employee relationship in all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government- owned or controlled corporations with original charters such as PAGCOR. Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in the assailed Resolution dated November 26, 2009. In denying the said motion, the CA relied on this Courts ruling in Duty Free Philippines v. Mojica citing Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. CA, where this Court held as follows: It is now settled that, conformably to Article IX-B, Section 2(1), [of the 1987 Constitution] government-owned or controlled corporations shall be considered part of the Civil Service only if they have original charters, as distinguished from those created under general law. PAGCOR belongs to the Civil Service because it was created directly by PD 1869 on July 11, 1983. Consequently, controversies concerning the relations of the employee with the management of PAGCOR should come under the jurisdiction of the Merit System Protection Board and the Civil Service Commission, conformably to the Administrative Code of 1987. Section 16(2) of the said Code vest[s] in the Merit System Protection Board the power inter alia to: a) Hear and decide on appeal administrative cases involving officials and employees of the Civil Service. Its decision shall be final except those involving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the Commission.

Hence, this petition where petitioner argues that the CA committed grave and substantial error of judgment

ISSUE: Was the CA correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies?

HELD: Court of Appeals decision reversed. It bears stressing that the judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of PAGCOR, not an appeal. Suffice it to state that an appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.

In sum, there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law in view of petitioner's allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA's outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.

Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions. Hence, courts exercising certiorari jurisdiction should refrain from reviewing factual assessments of the respondent court or agency. Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances and since this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in order.

ROBERTO DIPAD and SANDRA DIPAD, vs. SPOUSES ROLANDO OLIVAN and BRIGIDA OLIVAN, and BRIGIDA OLIVAN, and RUBIO GUIJON MADRIGALLO

Facts: Due to a collision between the car of petitioner spouses Dipad and the passenger jeep owned by respondents, the former filed a civil action for damages before the sala of Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Judge Clavecilla.

During trial, Roberto Dipad mentioned in his direct testimony that because he was not able to make use of his vehicle for his buy-and-sell business, he suffered damages by way of lost income for three months amounting to P40,000. Then, during cross-examination, the defense required him to produce his personal copy of his ITRs for the years 2001, 2002 and 2003.

Dipad vehemently objected on the ground of confidentiality of the ITRs. He also claimed that the demand therefor was incriminatory and in the nature of a fishing expedition.

By reason of the opposition, Judge Clavecilla suspended the trial and required petitioners to show their basis for invoking the confidentiality of the ITRs. After the parties submitted their respective Comments on the matter, the MTC in its 3 February 2005 Order required the production of the ITRs.Aggrieved, the spouses Dipad filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by Judge Clavecilla. Thereafter, they instituted a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the RTC, assailing the 3 February 2005 Order of the MTC for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In that Petition, they opposed Judge Clavecillas ruling in this wise:

The respondent Judge stated in his order that the cited provision does not apply, stating that "what is being requested to be produced is plaintiffs copy of their tax returns for the years 2001 to 2003, " thereby ordering Dipad, "to furnish defendants counsel within five (5) days from receipt of this order copy of their income tax returns for the years 2001 to 2003, inclusive."

RTC: We beg to differ to such holding, because if a copy of a taxpayers return filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue can be open to inspection only upon the order of the President of the Philippines, such provision presupposes the confidentiality of the document; and with more reason that the taxpayer cannot be compelled to yield his copy of the said document.

Thus, it is indubitable that compelling the petitioners to produce petitioner Roberto Dipads Income Tax Returns and furnish copies thereof to the private respondents would be violative of the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code on the rule on confidentiality of Income Tax return as discussed above.

In its 6 May 2005 Decision, the RTC dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for being an inappropriate remedy. According to the trial court, the errors committed by Judge Clavecilla were, if at all, mere errors of judgment correctible not by the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but by ordinary appeal.Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but their motion was denied by the RTC.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC is correct in dismissing the petition for being an inappropriate remedy.Held: Yes, Court stressed that it is basic in our jurisdiction that a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is not a mode of appeal.The remedy, which is narrow in scope,only corrects errors of jurisdiction.Thus, if the issue involves an error of judgment, the error is correctible by an appeal via a Rule 45 petition, and not by a writ of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

As defined in jurisprudence, errors of jurisdiction occur when the court exercises jurisdiction not conferred upon it by law.They may also occur when the court or tribunal, although it has jurisdiction, acts in excess of it or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. On the contrary, errors of judgment are those that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. They include errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings based on a mistake of law or of fact.

Here, it is patently clear that petitioners do not question whether the MTC has jurisdiction or authority to resolve the issue of confidentiality of ITRs. Rather, they assail the wisdom of the MTCs very judgment and appreciation of the ITR as not confidential. Specifically, they claim that the ruling violated the provisions of the NIRC on the alleged rule on confidentiality of ITRs.

Based on the definitions above, we conclude similarly as the RTC that if there is an error to speak of the error relates only to a mistake in the application of law, and not to an error of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. The only error petitioners raise refers to Judge Clavecillas mistake of not applying Section 71, which allegedly prohibits the production of ITRs because of confidentiality. Certainly, as correctly posited by the court a quo, if every error committed by the trial court is subject to certiorari, trial would never come to an end, and the docket will be clogged ad infinitum.

UCPB VS LUMBO

FACTS: The respondents borrowed the aggregate amount of P12,000,000.00 from UCPB. To secure the performance of their obligation, they constituted a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land located in Boracay, Aklan and all the improvements thereon that they owned and operated as a beach resort known as Titays South Beach Resort. Upon their failure to settle the obligation, UCPB applied on November 11, 1998 for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage, and emerged as the highest bidder at the ensuing foreclosure sale held on January 12, 1999. The certificate of sale was issued on the same day, and UCPB registered the sale in its name on February 18, 1999. The title over the mortgaged property was consolidated in the name of UCPB after the respondents failed to redeem the property within the redemption period.

On January 7, 2000, the respondents brought against UCPB in the RTC an action for the annulment of the foreclosure, legal accounting, injunction against the consolidation of title, and damages (Civil Case No. 5920).

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 5920, UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession to recover possession of the property (Special Proceedings No. 5884). On September 5, 2000, the RTC granted the ex parte petition of UCPB,4 and issued on December 4, 2001 the writ of possession directing the sheriff of the Province of Aklan to place UCPB in the actual possession of the property. The writ of possession was served on the respondents on January 23, 2002 with a demand for them to peacefully vacate on or before January 31, 2002. Although the possession of the property was turned over to UCPB on February 1, 2002, they were allowed to temporarily remain on the property for humanitarian reasons.5

On February 14, 2002, the respondents filed in the RTC handling Special Proceedings No. 5884 a petition to cancel the writ of possession and to set aside the foreclosure sale. They included an application for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession.

On March 19, 2002, the RTC denied the respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Aggrieved by the denial, the respondents brought a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus in the CA.

ISSUE: WON THE PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED

HELD: Yes. Assuming, though not conceding, that the RTC did err in denying the respondents application for injunction to prevent the implementation of the writ of possession, its error related only to the correct application of the law and jurisprudence relevant to the application for injunction. As such, the error amounted only to one of judgment, not of jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and such error is reviewable only through an appeal taken in due course. In contrast, an error of jurisdiction is committed where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, and such error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ ofcertiorari.25

Considering that there is no question that the RTC had jurisdiction over both Civil Case No. 5920 and Special Proceedings No. 5884, it should follow that its consideration and resolution of the respondents application for the injunctive writ filed in Special Proceedings No. 5884 were taken in the exercise of that jurisdiction. As earlier made plain, UCPB as the registered owner of the property was at that point unquestionably entitled to the full implementation of the writ of possession. In the absence of any clear and persuasive showing that it capriciously or whimsically denied the respondents application, its denial of the application did not constitute grave abuse of discretion amounting to either lack or excess of jurisdiction.

It was of no consequence at all that UCPB made its ex parte application for the writ of possession the action (Special Proceedings No. 5884) when Civil Case No. 5920 (in which the respondents were seeking the annulment of the foreclosure and the stoppage of the consolidation of title, among other reliefs sought) was already pending in the RTC, for the settled jurisprudence is to the effect that the pendency of an action for the annulment of the mortgage or of the foreclosure sale does not constitute a legal ground to prevent the implementation of a writ of possession.26

The second concerns the CAs reversing and undoing the RTCs denial of the respondents application for the injunctive writ, and enjoining the RTC from implementing the writ of possession against the respondents "pending the final disposition of the petition for its cancellation and the annulment of the foreclosure sale."27 The CA effectively thereby granted the respondents application for the injunctive writ. In so doing, however, the CA ignored the essential requirements for the grant of the injunctive writ, and disregarded the patent fact that the respondents held no right in esse that the injunctive writ they were seeking would protect. Thus, the CA committed another serious error.

LIGOT VS REPUBLIC

FACTS: Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.

On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary of the members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly provided that the increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution."

When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the salary increase by virtue of the Courts unanimous decision in Philconsa v. Mathay:

"that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution.. Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which provided for retirement gratuity.On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the sum of P122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress.

Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired on December 30, 1969.

On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement claim by virtue of the Auditor-Generals adverse decision to Singsons claim On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligots request for reconsideration.

Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the decision of the Auditor-General alleging that at the time of his retirement, the salary for members of Congess as provided by law was already P32,000 per annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary increase.

ISSUE/S: Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary increase of the member of Congress

HELD: The petition was dismissed.Ratio Decidendi:There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is whether or not he can claim in based on the P32,000 per annum salary of the members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant retirement gratuity to members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed.Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase.

SALIBI VS COMELEC

FACTS: a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, was filed in the SC, seeking to annul the Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections

- When petitioner filed his COC for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months- Its undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his familywere then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.- Private respondent filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacyand to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for Disqualification against him before the COMELEC- private respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government Code- both petitioner and respondent presented evidence as to prove their argument- the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position- the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him- petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this Case- the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation in view of the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time.

ISSUE: Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.

HELD: As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.

2. As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty3. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.4. Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall be finaland non-reviewable.5. In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.6. In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.

AGG Trucking vs Yuan

FACTS:

Petitioner Alex Ang Gaeid had employed respondent Melanio Yuag as a driver since 28 February 2002.His clients were Busco Sugar Milling Co., Inc., operating in Quezon, Bukidnon; and Coca-cola Bottlers Company in Davao City and Cagayan de Oro City.

Petitioner noticed that respondent had started incurring substantial shortages. It was also reported that he had illegally sold bags of sugar along the way at a lower price, and that he was banned from entering the premises of the Busco Sugar Mill.Petitioner asked for an explanation from respondent who remained quiet.

Alarmed at the delivery shortages, petitioner took it upon himself to monitor all his drivers, including respondent, by instructing them to report to him their location from time to time through their mobile phones.He also required them to make their delivery trips in convoy, in order to avoid illegal sale of cargo along the way.

Respondent, along with 20 other drivers, was tasked to deliver bags of sugar from Cagayan de Oro City to Coca-Cola Bottlers Plant in Davao City on 4 December 2004.All drivers, with the exception of Yuag who could not be reached through his cellphone, reported their location as instructed.The Coca-Cola Plant in Davao later reported that the delivery had a suspiciously enormous shortage.

When confronted about the shortage and his failure to report his loacation, respondent did not respond to petitioner. Thereafter he was instructed to "just take a rest" which respondent construed as a constructive dismissal. After respondent demanded that his separation be made in writing, petitioner insisted that respondent return the next day and take a rest. Respondent however, went to file a complaint with the BLR for illegal dismissal and asked for his separation pay and 13th month pay; alleging that he was dismissed based on his non-returned call.

The Labor Arbiter however, sustained the dismissal for lack of substantial proof to sustain the allegation of illegal dismissal and that parties were under an employer-employee relationship. Upon appeal with the NLRC, the LA decision was reversed because respondent was deemed to be under preventive suspension without pay. A motion for reconsideration was made but was denied for being filed out of the reglamentary period.

On appeal through certiorari to the Court of Appeals, the court ruled on the existence of an employer-employee relationship and reversed the NLRC decision by reinstating the Labor Arbiters decision instead with modification to the award for damages.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed error in reversing the NLRC decision.

HELD:

Petitioner is correct in its argument that there must first be a finding on whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion and on what these acts were.In this case, the CA seemed to have forgotten that its function in resolving a petition for certiorari was to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public respondent NLRC.The CA proceeded to review the records and to rule on issues that were no longer disputed during the appeal to the NLRC, such as the existence of an employer-employee relationship.The pivotal issue before the NLRC was whether petitioners telling respondent to take a rest, or to have a break, was already a positive act of dismissing him.

Furthermore, the NLRC Resolution that reversed the LA Decision had nothing in it that was whimsical, unreasonable or patentlyviolative of the law.It was the CA which erred in finding faults that were inexistent in the NLRC Resolution.

In addition to this, the CA erroneously modified the NLRC decision when it can no longer be modified for being filed out of time. It is not a mere technicality that the CA may brush aside. The NLRC Resolution sought to be set aside had become final and executory 25 days before respondent filed his Motion for Reconsideration.Thus, subsequent proceedings and modifications are not allowed and are deemed null and void.

PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: That on or about the 1st day of September, 1991, and for some time prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Sasmuan, Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ABELARDO PANLAQUI being then the Municipal Mayor of Sasmuan, Pampanga, RENATO B. VELASCO and ANGELITO PELAYO, being then the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator and the Municipal Treasurer, respectively, of Sasmuan, Pampanga, VICTORINO MANINANG being then the Barangay Captain of Malusac, Sasmuan, Pampanga, and hence all public officers, while in the performance of their official functions, taking advantage of their position, committing the offense in relation to their office, and conspiring and confederating with one another and with WILFREDO CUNANAN, the representative of J.S. Lim Construction, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and with evident bad faith cause undue injury to the Government and grant unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the following manner: accused ABELARDO P. PANLAQUI, without being authorized by the Sangguniang Bayan of Sasmuan, Pampanga, entered into a Contract of Lease of Equipment with J.S. Lim Construction, represented by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN, whereby the municipality leased seven (7) units of Crane on Barge with Clamshell and one (1) unit of Back Hoe on Barge for an unstipulated consideration for a period of thirty (30) days, which equipment items were to be purportedly used for the deepening and dredging of the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers in Sasmuan, Pampanga;

thereafter accused caused it to appear that work on the said project had been accomplished and 100% completed per the approved Program of Work and Specifications and turned over to Barangay Malusac; as a result of the issuance of the Accomplishment Report and Certificate of Project Completion and Turn-Over, payments of P511,612.20 and P616,314.60 were made to and received by accused WILFREDO CUNANAN notwithstanding the fact that no work had actually been done on the Palto and Pakulayo Rivers considering that J.S. Lim Construction had no barge or any kind of vessel registered with the First Coast Guard District and that no business license/permit had been granted to the said company by the Municipal Treasurer's Office of Guagua, Pampanga, which acts of the accused caused undue injury to the Government and granted unwarranted benefits to J.S. Lim Construction in the total amount of ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED TWENTY- SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-SIX AND 80/100 PESOS (P1,127,926.80), Philippine Currency.

ISSUE: WON THE COURTA QUOACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION WHEN IT DISREGARDED THE MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE (PD) NO. 1594

HELD: No. It is fitting to reiterate the holding of the Court in People v. Tria-Tirona,[6] to wit: x x x it is clear in this jurisdiction that after trial on the merits, an acquittal is immediately final and cannot be appealed on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception where double jeopardy cannot be invoked is where there is a finding of mistrial resulting in a denial of due process. x x x Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.[7] The Court further expounded in First Corporation v. Former Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals,[8] thus: It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo. (Emphasis supplied.)[9]

[G.R. No. 118251.June 29, 2001]METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY,petitioner, vs.HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding Judge, RTCManila, Branch 31, and DOMINADOR ONG,respondents.FACTS: Accused, as Treasurer of the Sun Ray Metal, Inc., a corporation duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud the Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, a banking entity organized and doing business under the laws of the Philippines, with office situated at Dasmarias corner Ugalde Streets, Binondo, this City, represented by LUCILA Y. UY, its Senior Manager, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, under trust Receipts dated September 6, 1989 and September 15, 1989 executed by the said Dominador Ong/Sun Ray Metal, Inc. in favor of the said Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, received in trust from the latter or all valued at P413,133.00 for the purpose of holding the said merchandise in trust under the express obligation on his part to dispose of the same and turn over the proceeds of the sale to the said bank, if sold, or to the account for or return the same, if unsold, on its due date or upon demand, but the said accused, once in possession of the same, far from complying with his aforesaid obligation, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so despite repeated demands made upon him to that effect and with intent to defraud, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same or the value thereof, to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company represented by LUCILA Y. UY in the total amount of P 413,133.00, Philippine Currency.[2]

The public respondent ratiocinated that the private respondent was not duly authorized to represent Sun Ray Metal, Inc. considering that there were other high-ranking officers who could have negotiated the contract; that there was no written authority from the board of directors of the said corporation authorizing the private respondent to execute the trust receipts in its behalf in favor of petitioner bank.Moreover, the defense sufficiently proved that the restructuring agreement effectively novated the obligation under the trust receipts.

ISSUE:The public respondent judge gravely abused his discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when the latter acquitted the private respondent.

HELD:The petition is not meritorious.We have thoroughly perused the records and carefully analyzed the cases relied upon by the petitioner and found no cogent reason to depart from the judgment of the public respondent in the case at bar.

In the present case, inasmuch as the prosecution was never denied any opportunity to present its case and that there is no indication or proof that the trial was a sham, a review and consequent setting aside of the trial courts decision of acquittal will put the private respondent in double jeopardy.Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon valid indictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and (5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.[11]Consequently in such an event, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof, or for any offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.[12]

The record shows that the courta quoallowed both parties an exhaustive presentation and offer of evidence and submission of their respective memoranda.If indeed public respondent has misappreciated certain evidence, as argued by the petitioner in this petition, such are not jurisdictional matters that may be determined and ruled upon in a certiorari proceeding. If at all, such alleged error by the public respondent was merely an error of judgment, but not an error of jurisdiction.In this case, petitioners action does not concern the civil aspect of the case but the validity of the judgment itself.Indeed, petitioner does not actually question the award of damages.What he contends is that the trial court decided the case outside the issues made out by the pleadings and thereby deprived the prosecution of due process.

In the prayer[19]of this petition in the case at bar, what is prayed for is that the decision of respondent Judge dated November 28, 1994 acquitting the private respondent be reversed.Nothing therein is mentioned about damages or the civil aspect of the case.

In fine, the instant petition should be dismissed not only for lack of merit but also for lack of legal personality on the part of the petitioner to appeal the public respondents ruling on the criminal aspect of the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner.

PEOPLE v ASISPonente: Mendoza, J.Date: August 25, 2010Petition for review on certiorari of a resolution of the Court of Appeals

RATIO DECIDENDI:A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level.

While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.

An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.

QUICK FACTS:The RTC acquitted accused Abordo of the attempted murder of Montes, and only held him liable of Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez, and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals, but the CA dismissed the petition for being the wrong remedy. According to the CA, the remedy should have been an appeal, not petition for certiorari.

FACTS:Name of Accused: AbordoName of Offended Parties: Montes, Calvez, and MajaitPetitioner: People of the PhilippinesRespondents: Judge Asis of the RTC, and Abordo

Abordo was riding his motorcycle on his way home when an altercation ensued between him and the three offended parties Montes, Calvez, and Majait. The accused Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.Abordo was charged with two counts of attempted murder (Majait and Montes?) and one count of frustrated murder (Calvez?).

RTC:The RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait, when it found no treachery and evident premeditation. Four mitigating circumstances were appreciated in favor of Abordo. Abordo was acquitted with respect to the complaint of Montes.

CA: (petition dismissed)The OSG filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA based on the ground that Judge Asis of the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its decision of acquitting Abordo in one case, only holding him liable for Serious Physical Injuries and Less Serious Physical Injuries In the two other cases.The CA dismissed the petition, saying that the filing of the petition for certiorari was the wrong remedy. It said that as the State was questioning the verdict of the acquittal and findings of lesser offenses by the trial court, the remedy should have been an appeal.It said thus:Where the error is not one of jurisdiction but an error of law or fact a mistake of judgment appeal is the remedy.Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. In filing the petition for certiorari, the accused is thereby placed in double jeopardy.Such recourse is tantamount to converting the petition for certiorari into an appeal, contrary to the Constitution, the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence on double jeopardy.The petition is dismissible not only on the ground of wrong remedy taken by the petitioner to question an error of judgment but also on the ground that such action places the accused in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy to question a verdict of acquittal is a petition for certiorari.

DECISION: Petition of the People was partially granted.

HELD:Yes.Certiorari is the proper remedyA petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level.Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court.

Exception to Finality-of-Acquittal DoctrineIn our jurisdiction, we adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the dismissals of, criminal cases.

In People v Louel Uy, the Court said that petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is appropriate upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court in acquitting the accused:Committed reversible errors of judgment

Grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or denial of due process.Such commission of the lower court renders its judgment void.No double jeopardy

When the order or dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. Such dismissal order, being considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.

OSGs petition for certiorari before the CA, however, is bereft of meritWhile the CA was erroneous of dismissing the petition, the OSGs petition for certiorari if given due course is bereft of merit.

While certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. A reading of the OSG petition fails to show that the prosecution was deprived of its right to due process.

Also, what the OSG is questioning are errors of judgment. This, however, cannot be resolved without violating Abordos constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy. An appellate court in a petition for certiorari cannot review a trial courts evaluation of the evidence and factual findings. Errors of judgment cannot be raised in a Rule 65 petition as a writ of certiorari can only correct errors of jurisdiction or those involving the commission of grave abuse of discretion.Error of Judgment v Error of Jurisdiction

Any error committed in the evaluation of evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of judgment is one in which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction.

An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.Certiorari will bot be issued to cure errors by the trial court in its appreciation of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of law.

[G.R. No. 130106. July 15, 2005]PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner, vs.HON. PERLITA J. TRIA-TIRONA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 102, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City and CHIEF INSPECTOR RENATO A. MUYOT,respondents.

FACTS:Can the government appeal from a judgment acquitting the accused after trial on the merits without violating the constitutional precept against double jeopardy?Armed with two search warrants,[2]members of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Anti-Organized Crime Division, together with members of the NBI Special Investigation Division and the Presidential Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Task Force Hammer Head serving as security, conducted a search on the house of accused-private respondent located on Banawe, Quezon City. The alleged finding of 498.1094 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) thereat led to the filing of an information charging private respondent with Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,[3]as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659.

The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent -- Branch 102 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.

When arraigned on 27 November 1996, private respondent, assisted by a counselde parte,pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[5]After trial on the merits, public respondent rendered a decision[6]acquitting private respondent on ground of reasonable doubt.

The decision, more particularly the acquittal of private respondent, is being assailedviaa petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner contends that public respondent, in acquitting private respondent, committed grave abuse of discretion by ignoring material facts and evidence on record which, when considered, would lead to the inevitable conclusion of the latters guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It added that the appealability of the trial courts decision of acquittal in the context of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy should be resolved since it has two pending petitions[7]before the court raising the same que