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Chapter 2 Preservation of Electronically Stored Information

Todd L. Nunn

Michael Goodfried

Ted Webber

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Todd L. Nunn is a partner in the Document Analysis Technology Group (“DATG”) at Preston Gates Ellis in Seattle. His practice focuses on e-discovery and complex docu-ment production, class action defense, and insurance coverage. Todd is a frequent writer and speaker on e-discovery issues, and is the Chairman of the Electronically Stored Information Discovery Subcommittee, a subcommittee of the Washington State Bar Association Court Rules and Procedures Committee that is considering e-discov-ery specific amendments to the Washington State Court Rules.

Co-authors Michael Goodfried and Ted Webber are staff attorneys in DATG at Preston Gates Ellis whose practices focus on e-discovery and complex document pro-duction. Co-author Trudy Tessaro is an attorney in the firm’s Business Litigation Group and DATG who contributes to DATG’s Blog at www.ediscoverylaw.com.

http://www.ediscoverylaw.com

Chapter 2: Preservation of Electronically Stored Information v Nunn, Goodfried, Webber v 17

Preservation of Electronically Stored Information

Table of Contents

Introduction ............................................................................................................................................................ 19

The Duty to Preserve Evidence ................................................................................................................................ 19

When Does the Duty to Preserve ESI Begin?................................................................................................. 20

Scope of the Duty to Preserve ........................................................................................................................ 21

When Does the Duty to Preserve End? .......................................................................................................... 22

Possible Consequences When the Duty to Preserve is Not Met .................................................................... 22

Unique Preservation Issues Presented by Electronic Data ..................................................................................... 29

Records Management—Document Retention and Destruction Policies ............................................................... 30

Companies Should Consider Implementing and Following a Document Retention Policy ......................... 30

Considerations for a Reasonable Document Retention Policy ...................................................................... 30

Legal Hold Notices as a Best Practice of Document Retention ..................................................................... 32

Retention Considerations for Disaster Recovery Systems ............................................................................. 33

Legal Hold Notices ................................................................................................................................................... 34

Scope of the Legal Hold Notice ...................................................................................................................... 34

Implementing a Legal Hold Notice ................................................................................................................ 36

Contents of a Legal Hold Notice..................................................................................................................... 37

Implement a Policy to Preserve Documents from Employees who Leave the Company ............................. 38

Ensuring Preservation—Collection of Documents ...................................................................................... 38

Preservation Issues for Parties Seeking Discovery of Electronic Documents ........................................................ 39

Address Preservation of Evidence Concerns Early ....................................................................................... 39

Consider Notifying Opposing Counsel in Writing ........................................................................................ 39

If Circumstances Warrant, Obtain a Preservation Order from the Court .................................................... 40

If Relevant Evidence Is Destroyed, Consult a Computer Forensics Expert and Consider Seeking

Appropriate Sanctions.......................................................................................................................... 41

Review Material Produced and Follow Up Promptly .................................................................................... 41

Employ Other Discovery Tools ...................................................................................................................... 42


Introduction“It goes without saying that a party can only be sanc-tioned for destroying evidence if it had a duty to pre-serve it.”1 If a company has no such duty, then it cannot be faulted.2

This chapter discusses the legal issues related to the preservation of electronically stored information (“ESI”). It discusses the duty to preserve evidence—what it is, when it applies, and the consequences that may result if the duty is not met. This chapter also discusses the unique challenges presented by electronic data, and how document retention policies and legal hold notices can be used to help manage ESI—including practical tips and checklists to help litigants take reasonable and appropri-ate steps to preserve ESI and avoid claims of spoliation. Finally, this chapter discusses the preservation issues that face parties seeking discovery of ESI.

The Duty to Preserve EvidenceWhat is the duty to preserve email and electronic docu-ments in litigation? It may accurately be characterized as a duty to prevent spoliation of evidence.3 Spoliation is “the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to preserve property for another’s use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litiga-tion.”4 The factors that determine whether spoliation occurred vary by jurisdiction,5 but generally there must be a showing that evidence has been destroyed after the

party knew, or should have known, that the material in question may be relevant to litigation.

As a general rule, a duty to preserve evidence arises once a party has notice of its relevance.6 The Eighth Circuit has held that “if the corporation knew or should have known that the documents would become material at some point in the future then such docu-ments should have been preserved.”7 Another formu-lation of the duty to preserve rule states that:

While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its possession once a complaint is filed, it is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the dis-covery of admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the sub-ject of a pending discovery request.8

There must be a specific threat or dispute to which the evidence relates. A company is not required to retain all email communications that might be rel-evant to some nonspecific future litigation. For example, the plaintiffs in Concord Boat Corp. v. Bruns-wick Corp.9 argued that because the defendant was embroiled in various antitrust matters from 1992 to present, the defendant was under a duty to preserve all email relevant to antitrust issues from that date on. The court rejected such a broad duty, noting both the prevalence of email usage and the ever-present threat of litigation faced by large corporations.10

Preservation of Electronically Stored Information

1 Zubulakev.UBSWarburg,LLC,220F.R.D.212,216(S.D.N.Y.2003)(“ZubulakeIV”). 2 Id. 3 Silvestriv.Gen.MotorsCorp.,271F.3d583(4thCir.2001). 4 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at216(citingWestv.GoodyearTire&RubberCo.,167F.3d776,779(2dCir.1999)). 5 Cf.ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at212;Velav.Wagner&Brown,Ltd.,2006WL1004476(Tex.App.Apr.19,2006);Durstv.

FedExExpress,2006WL1541027(D.N.J.June2,2006). 6 Turnerv.HudsonTransitLines,Inc.,142F.R.D.68,72–73(S.D.N.Y.1991). 7 Lewyv.RemingtonArmsCo.,Inc.,836F.2d1104,1112(8thCir.1988). 8 Turner,142F.R.D.at72(quotingWm.T.ThompsonCo.v.Gen.NutritionCorp.,Inc.,593F.Supp.1443,1455(C.D.Cal.

1984)). 9 1997WL33352759(E.D.Ark.Aug.29,1997).10 Id.,at*4(“toholdthatacorporationisunderadutytopreservealle-mailpotentiallyrelevanttoanyfuturelitigation

wouldbetantamounttoholdingthatthecorporationmustpreservealle-mail….Suchapropositionisnotjustified.”).

20 v Understanding the New E-Discovery Rules

Identifying the particular boundaries of a litigant’s duty to preserve involves two related inquiries: when does the duty to preserve attach, and what evidence must be preserved?11

When Does the Duty to Preserve ESI Begin?The duty to preserve ESI is triggered when a party has notice that the evidence is relevant to litigation, or when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.12

The duty to preserve material evidence arises not only during litigation, but also extends to that period before the litigation when a party reasonably should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation.13 Determining when a party anticipates liti-gation requires a fact intensive inquiry, however, and a precise definition of when such anticipation occurs is “elusive.”14 The duty to preserve is generally triggered when litigation is “probable,” “likely,” or “reasonably anticipated.”15 Courts state the test in a number of dif-ferent ways, but invariably include elements of prob-ability and reasonableness. “The majority of courts have held that pre-litigation destruction can constitute spoliation when litigation was ‘reasonably foreseeable’ but not where it was ‘merely possible.’”16 The duty to preserve evidence does not arise “if there was merely a potential for litigation.”17 Thus, the fact that one or

two employees contemplate the possibility that a fel-low employee might sue does not generally impose a firm-wide duty to preserve. The Zubulake court found that the duty was triggered when “almost everyone associated with Zubulake recognized the possibility that she might sue.”18

Thus, one can conclude that a duty to preserve exists once a party has notice that litigation or a gov-ernment investigation is already underway or is imminent. A party’s obligation to preserve relevant evidence will generally be triggered upon service or receipt of any of the following:• A draft complaint, whether or not actually filed• Requests for production of documents• A Civil Investigative Demand (or other agency

equivalent)• A third party subpoena• A written request for preservation of specific docu-

ments relating to actual litigation• A complaint filed with a regulatory body, such as

the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-sion (EEOC)

• A written demand letter from a lawyer for a party that sets out the party’s claim, describes the resolu-tion desired, and clearly threatens litigation if the claim is not resolvedThe most difficult determinations occur where liti-

11 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at216.12 Id.13 Silvestriv.Gen.MotorsCorp.,271F.3d583(4thCir.2001);see alsoKronischv.U.S.,150F.3d112,126(2dCir.1998)

(“Thisobligationtopreserveevidenceariseswhenthepartyhasnoticethattheevidenceisrelevanttolitigation—mostcommonlywhensuithasalreadybeenfiled,providingthepartyresponsibleforthedestructionwithexpressnotice,butalsoonoccasioninothercircumstances,asforexamplewhenapartyshouldhaveknownthattheevidencemayberelevanttofuturelitigation.”);Bayoil,S.A.v.PolembrosShippingLtd.,196F.R.D.479,483(S.D.Tex.2000)(“Noticedoesnothavetobeofactuallitigation,butcanconcern‘potential’litigation.Otherwise,anypersoncouldshreddocumentstotheirheart’scontentbeforesuitisbroughtwithoutfearofsanction.”).

14 SamsungElec.Co.,Ltd.v.Rambus,Inc.,439F.Supp.2d524,542(E.D.Va.2006).15 See,e.g.,ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at217.16 PerformanceChevrolet,Inc.v.MarketScanInfo.Sys.,Inc.,2006WL1042359(D.IdahoApr.18,2006);see also7

JamesW.Moore,Moore’s Federal Practice§37A.11[3][a],at37A-27(3ded.2003);AmericanBarAssociation,Civil Discovery Standards,StandardNo.10(Aug.1999)(Thedutyarisesonlywhen“litigationisprobableorhasbeencommenced.”);HynixSemiconductor,Inc.v.Rambus,Inc.,No.C-00-20905RMW,slipop.at7(N.C.Cal.Jan.31,2005)(JudgeWhyteframedthetestasfollows:“Thequestion,then,iswhetherRambushadcommencedor intended to commence litigationatthetimeitimplementeditsdocumentretentionpolicyandbegandestroyingdocuments.”)(emphasisadded).

17 Lekkasv.MitsubishiMotorsCorp.,2002WL31163722,at*2(N.D.Ill.Sept.26,2002).18 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at217.


gation has not commenced, but is somewhere on the continuum of possibilities. Such situations can arise where a party receives notice of a dispute or a weak threat of litigation, is considering instigating an action themselves, or becomes aware of potential litigation through a third party source. As noted earlier, the duty to preserve relevant information does not attach in every instance where litigation is possible, only where it is probable. Whether litigation is “probable” is a highly factual matter requiring consideration of the particular circumstances at hand.

For purposes of assessing intentional spoliation, one court has suggested using the more widely devel-oped standard for anticipation of litigation under the work product doctrine as an analytical tool to help determine the point at which litigation was reason-ably foreseeable.19 The work product doctrine limits the discoverability of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial.20 The established standard to determine whether the work product protection applies is that the document “must be prepared because of the prospect of litigation when the preparer faces an actual claim or a potential claim following an actual event or series of events that rea-sonably could result in litigation.”21

The following are some considerations that may be relevant to determining whether litigation is probable.

Litigation threatened or demand letter received:• Does the communication accurately describe the

event(s) giving rise to the demand? Is it consistent with the information known?

• Does the demand appear to be warranted under the facts known?

• Who authored the demand letter, and what is his/her role?

• To whom was the threat of litigation or demand let-ter directed, and what is his/her role?

• Is the threat of litigation explicit or merely inferred?• Is the threat of litigation credible or does it appear

specious?Third party source, such as a news media report,

suggests possible litigation:• Is the source reliable, and does the information

appear accurate based on the facts known?• A report by the news media alone probably would

not give rise to a duty to preserve; however, a duty may be triggered if the news report is coupled with other information indicating that litigation will probably ensue.If the preserving party itself is considering

litigation:• What persons within the organization have infor-

mation about the contemplated litigation? Do they have authority to bring suit? If not, have they informed the decision-maker(s) about the circum-stances giving rise to the claim?

• Has legal counsel, whether in-house or outside counsel, been consulted to determine whether a cause of action may exist?

• Has the organization taken any concrete steps towards filing suit, or communicating with the adverse party about the potential claim?

• Has a demand letter been sent? Has a demand let-ter been researched and/or drafted?

Scope of the Duty to Preserve“To be sure, the duty to preserve does not require a liti-gant to keep every scrap of paper in its file.”22 Corpora-tions are not obligated, upon recognizing the threat of litigation, to “preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic document, and every backup tape.”23 Indeed, “[s]uch a rule would cripple large corpora-tions.”24 “While a litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in its possession… it is under

19 Samsung,439F.Supp.2dat542(thecourtanalogizedthisstandardwithregardtoclaimsofintentionalspoliationbecausetherehastobeadirectrelationshipbetweentheanticipatedlitigationandthedestructionofrelevantevi-dence—similartohowworkproductrequiresadirectrelationbetweentheanticipatedlitigationandthecreationofadocument.Thecourtnotedthatthisanalogydoesnotapplytoclaimsofnegligentspoliation).

20 SeeFed. R. Civ. P.26(b)(3);Hickmanv.Taylor,329U.S.495(1947).21 Nat’lUnionFireIns.Co.ofPittsburgh,Pa.v.MurraySheetMetalCo.,Inc.,967F.2d980,984(4thCir.1992).22 Danisv.USNCommc’ns,Inc.,2000WL1694325,at*32(N.D.Ill.Oct.20,2000).23 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at217.24 Id.;see alsoWigintonv.CBRichardEllis,Inc.,2003WL22439865,at*4(N.D.Ill.Oct.27,2003)(“Apartydoesnothave

togoto‘extraordinarymeasures’topreserveallpotentialevidence.”);The Sedona Principles: Best Practices


a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, is rea-sonably likely to be requested during discovery, and/or is the subject of a pending discovery request.”25

The “Key Players”The duty to preserve extends to any documents or tan-gible things (as defined by Fed. R. Civ. P. 34(a)) made by individuals “likely to have discoverable information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses.” The duty includes documents prepared for those individuals as well, to the extent those docu-ments can be readily identified. The duty also extends to information that is relevant to the claims or defenses of any party, or which is “relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.” Thus, the duty to preserve ex-tends to those employees likely to have relevant infor-mation—the “key players” in the case.26

What Must Be Retained?A party’s duty to preserve specific types of documents does not arise unless the party controlling the docu-ments has notice of those documents’ relevance.27 Zubulake IV instructs:

A party or anticipated party must retain all rel-evant documents (but not multiple identical cop-ies) in existence at the time the duty to preserve attaches, and any relevant documents created thereafter.28

“[A]nyone who anticipates being a party or is a

party to a lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an adversary.”29

When Does the Duty to Preserve End?Because case law has yet to resolve the question of when the duty to preserve evidence ends, there is no clear guidance for deciding when a company no lon-ger needs to preserve evidence. If a potential adver-sary does not follow up on its demand letter within a reasonable amount of time, shouldn’t the preservation obligation end? When in the sequence of a case should the preservation obligation end? At the conclusion of discovery? Trial? Appeal? Settlement? The preservation obligation must end at some reasonable point in time.

Possible Consequences When the Duty to Preserve is Not MetFailure to preserve potentially relevant ESI, once the duty to do so has been triggered, raises the spec-ter of spoliation of evidence and sanctions. A court’s authority to sanction a party for the failure to preserve or produce relevant evidence is both inherent and statutory.30 Whether proceeding under Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 or under a court’s inherent powers, the analysis is essentially the same.31 However, the power to enter a default judgment or to dismiss a case for noncompli-ance with a discovery order depends exclusively upon Rule 37.32

Spoliation sanctions are intended to serve one or more of the following purposes: (1) to ameliorate the prejudice caused to an innocent party by a discovery

Recommendations & Principles for Addressing Electronic Document Production,Principle5, (TheSedonaConference®,July2005)(“Theobligationtopreserveelectronicdataanddocumentsrequiresreasonableandgoodfaitheffortstoretaininformationthatmayberelevanttopendingorthreatenedlitigation.However,itisunreasonabletoexpectpartiestotakeeveryconceivablesteptopreserveallpotentiallyrelevantdata.”).

25 Wm.T.ThompsonCo.v.Gen.NutritionCorp.,Inc.,593F.Supp.1443,1455(C.D.Cal.1984).26 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at217–18.27 InreOldBancOneS’holdersSec.Litig.,2005WL3372783,at*3(N.D.Ill.Dec.8,2005).28 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at218.29 Id.at217.30 Danisv.USNCommc’ns,Inc.,2000WL1694325,at*30(citingChambersv.NASCO,Inc.,501U.S.32,50–51(1991)(fed-

eralcourtsmaysanctionbadfaithconductbyitsinherentpowersorbytheFederal Rules of Civil Procedure)).31 Cobellv.Babbit,37F.Supp.2d6,18(D.D.C.1999);GatesRubberCo.v.BandoChem.Indus.,Ltd.,167F.R.D.90,107

(D.Colo.1996)(“anydistinctionsbetweenRule37andtheinherentpowersofthecourtaredistinctionswithoutdifferences”).

32 SocieteInternationalePourParticipationsIndustriellesetCommerciales,S.A.v.Rogers,357U.S.197,207(1958).


violation; (2) to punish the party who violates his or her obligations; and/or (3) to deter others from com-mitting like violations.33 A district court considering the imposition of sanctions must show restraint,34 and any sanction leveled must be proportionate to the harm caused.35 A court is given broad discretion to choose the appropriate sanction for a discovery violation given the unique factual circumstances of each case.36

In general, courts will examine three factors in determining whether to impose sanctions for spolia-tion of evidence: (1) a breach of the duty to preserve or produce documents; (2) the level of culpability for the breach; and (3) the prejudice resulting from the breach, or, stated differently, whether the evidence would have been relevant to the moving party’s case, in that a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the evidence would have been favorable to the moving party.37

The culpability threshold varies across jurisdic-tions. Some require bad faith, while others have concluded that mere negligence is sufficient.38 The rationale for sanctioning even the negligent loss of evidence which should have been preserved is that it restores the “evidentiary balance” by shifting the cost to the party that destroyed evidence.39

A reasonable records retention plan can be rele-vant in a court’s determination as to the culpability or blameworthiness of the party.40 The Lewy court sug-gested the following inquiry when destruction of evi-dence occurs under a records retention policy:

[I]f the trial court is called upon to again instruct the jury regarding failure to produce evidence, the court should consider the following factors before deciding whether to give the instruction to the jury. First, the court should determine whether Reming-ton’s record retention policy is reasonable consid-ering the facts and circumstances surrounding the relevant documents. For example, the court should determine whether a three year retention policy is reasonable given the particular document. A three year retention policy may be sufficient for docu-ments such as appointment books or telephone messages, but inadequate for documents such as customer complaints. Second, in making this determination the court may also consider whether lawsuits concerning the complaint or related com-plaints have been filed, the frequency of such com-plaints, and the magnitude of the complaints.

Finally, the court should determine whether the document retention policy was instituted in bad faith. In cases where a document retention policy is instituted in order to limit damaging evidence available to potential plaintiffs, it may be proper to give an instruction similar to the one requested by the Lewys. Similarly, even if the court finds the pol-icy to be reasonable given the nature of the docu-ments subject to the policy, the court may find that under the particular circumstances certain docu-ments should have been retained notwithstanding the policy. For example, if the corporation knew

33 See generallyNat’lHockeyLeaguev.Metro.HockeyClub,Inc.,427U.S.639,643(1976)(notingdualpurposeofpun-ishmentanddeterrence);Marroccov.Gen.MotorsCorp.,966F.2d220,224(7thCir.1997)(discussingcompensatorypurposeofdirectedverdictassanctionforprejudiceresultingfromlostdocuments:“sanctionscanbeemployedforawidearrayofpurposes,buttheycannotreplacelostevidence”);Telectronv.OverheadDoorCorp.,116F.R.D.107,135(S.D.Fla.1987)(discussingthreepurposesofsanctions:punishment,deterrenceandcompensationforprejudice).

34 Barnhillv.U.S.,11F.3d1360,1368(7thCir.1993).35 Newmanv.Metro.Pier&ExpositionAuth.,962F.2d589,591(7thCir.1992).36 Nat’lHockeyLeague,427U.S.at642.37 SeeResidentialFundingCorp.v.DeGeorgeFin.Corp.,306F.3d99,107(2dCir.2002).38 Id.(“Thesanctionofanadverseinferencemaybeappropriateinsomecasesinvolvingthenegligentdestructionof

evidencebecauseeachpartyshouldbeartheriskofitsownnegligence.”).39 Turnerv.HudsonTransitLines,Inc.,142F.R.D.68,75(S.D.N.Y.1991).40 SeeJeffriesv.ChicagoTransitAuth.,770F.2d676,681(7thCir.1985)(findingthatthedestructionofdocuments

throughabusinessretentionscheduledidnotimputeanybadfaithorconsciousnessofguiltwherethedestructiondidnotviolatefederalregulationsandthedefendantwasnotonnoticethatalawsuitwouldbefiledagainstit);see alsoLewyv.RemingtonArmsCo.,Inc.,836F.2d1104(8thCir.1988).


or should have known that the documents would become material at some point in the future then such documents should have been preserved.41

The court cautioned that “a corporation cannot blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous document retention policy.”42

Parties faced with litigation involving electronic discovery need to appreciate the unique challenges posed by ESI and make sure they are taking adequate steps to meet their preservation obligations. The con-sequences of failing to do so can be dire.

Courts have considerable latitude to fashion appro-priate sanctions for spoliation of evidence, and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 “authorizes a panoply of sanctions for a

party’s failure to comply with the rules of discovery.”43 The nature and severity of the sanction usually hinges on the culpability of the noncompliant party and any prejudice suffered by the other party as a result. Sanc-tions may be relatively mild, such as an order extend-ing the discovery period, precluding the introduction of evidence or cross-examination on a subject,44 or allowing additional or alternative discovery.45 To ensure that a party does not benefit from its own dis-covery failings, courts may bar a party from intro-ducing certain evidence at trial,46 bar the testimony of particular witnesses at trial,47 or preclude a party from introducing any evidence or argument pertain-ing to a specific topic.48

41 Lewy,836F.2dat1112(citationsomitted).42 Id.43 ResidentialFundingCorp.,306F.3dat101.44 Larsonv.BankOneCorp.,2005WL4652509(N.D.Ill.Aug.18,2005)(wherethedefendantbreacheditsdutytopre-

servebyfailingtoestablisha“comprehensivedocumentretentionpolicy”andbyfailingtoproperlydisseminatethepolicytoitsemployees,andconductevinced“extraordinarilypoorjudgment”and“grossnegligence”butnotwillful-nessorbadfaith,themagistraterecommendedthattheprejudicetotheplaintiffcouldberemediedbyprecludingthedefendantfromcross-examiningtheplaintiff ’sfinancialexpertandbyinstructingthejuryaboutthesanction).

45 Crandallv.CityandCountyofDenver,Colo.,2006WL2683754(D.Colo.Sept.19,2006)(courtdeniedmotionforsanctionsbutallowedadditionaldiscovery,opining:“Mereexistenceofadocument(inthiscasee-mail)destructionpolicywithinacorporateentity,coupledwithafailuretoputacomprehensive‘hold’onthatpolicyoncethecorporateentitybecomesawareoflitigation,doesnotsufficetojustifyasanctionabsentsomeproofthat,infact,itispotentiallyrelevantevidencethathasbeenspoiledordestroyed.”);see alsoStreamlineCapitalLLCv.HartfordCas.Ins.Co.,2004WL2663564(S.D.N.Y.Nov.19,2004)(wherekeywitnessessystematicallydeletedpotentiallyrelevantemailsbeforeandduringlitigation,themagistratedeferreddecisiononsanctionsandorderedwitnessestoconsenttoproductionofpertinentemailsstillavailablethroughtheiremailservicecompaniesinordertodetermine,totheextentpossible,thedegreeofprejudicethedefendantsufferedbyvirtueofthedeletions);RendaMarine,Inc.v.U.S.,58Fed.Cl.57(2003)(inviewofthekeyplayer’spracticeofdeletingrelevantemaildocuments,whichcontinuedevenafterthelawsuitcom-menced,thecourtorderedthedefendanttoproduceatitsexpensethoseback-uptapesthatwerecreatedonandafterthedateonwhichthedutytopreservewastriggered,andtoprovideaccesstotheharddrive);Wigintonv.CBRichardEllis,Inc.,2003WL22439865(N.D.Ill.Oct.27,2003)(magistraterecommendedthattheplaintiff ’ssanctionsmotionbedeniedwithoutprejudice;themotioncouldberenewediftheplaintiff ’sexpertwasabletodiscoverrelevantdocu-mentsonbackuptapes).

46 See,e.g.,Thompsonv.U.S.Dep’tofHous.&UrbanDev.,219F.R.D.93(D.Md.2003)(defendantprecludedfromusinganyofthe80,000e-mailrecordsitbelatedlyproduced).

47 U.S.v.PhilipMorrisUSAInc.,327F.Supp.2d21(D.D.C.2004)(courtbarredtestimonyfromatleast11witnesseswhofailedtocomplywiththecourt’spreservationorderandthedefendant’sowninternaldocumentretentionprogram);Sheppardv.RiverValleyFitnessOne,LP,203F.R.D.56(D.N.H.2001)(wherethedefensecounsel’sfailuretoproducecomputerrecordsandtoretainalldraftsofsettlementdocumentsreflectedlackofdiligenceratherthanintentionalefforttoabusediscoveryprocess,thecourtbarredtestimonyofthewitnessandimposed$500insanctions).

48 See,e.g.,SerraChevrolet,Inc.v.Gen.MotorsCorp.,No.CV-01-VEH-2682-S(N.D.Ala.May20,2005)(amongothersanctions,thecourtprohibitedGMfromchallenginganyaspectoftheplaintiff ’sexpertopiniononcertaintopics);see alsoInreLTVSteelCo.,Inc.,307B.R.37,2004WL547933(Bankr.N.D.OhioJan.6,2004)(notingthatthecourtwouldbewithinitsdiscretiontodismissthecreditor’sclaimbecauseofthecreditor’srepeatedandwillfulfailureto


Increasingly severe sanctions are likely when a par-ty’s discovery failings are grossly negligent, reckless, deliberate, or in bad faith. Courts may shift the bur-den of proof on a particular issue, forcing the defen-dant into the awkward position of having to disprove a claim asserted by the plaintiff.49 Another possible evi-

dentiary sanction is an adverse inference instruction, which allows a jury to infer from the fact that a party destroyed certain evidence that the evidence, if avail-able, would have been favorable to the party’s oppo-nent and harmful to the party who destroyed it.50

If the breach of a duty to preserve is particularly

complywiththedebtor’sdiscoveryrequestsrelatedtothecentralissueofthecreditor’sclaim,thecourtinsteadbarredthecreditorfromofferingevidenceorargumentpertainingtothedisputedportionoftheclaim);Wilsonv.Sund-strandCorp.,2003WL21961359(N.D.Ill.Aug.18,2003)(assanctionfordiscoveryabuseandtardyproductionofa“smokinggun”email,thecourtprecludedthedefendantfromopposingtheadmissionofvariousemailsandrecords);Deloachv.PhilipMorrisCo.,Inc.,206F.R.D.568(M.D.N.C.2002)(wherethedefendantwithheldcomputerizeddataandthedefenseexpertsubsequentlyusedthedatainarebuttalreport,thecourtallowedtheplaintiffstheoppor-tunitytorespondtothedefendants’rebuttalexpertreport,andruledthatthedefendantswouldnotbeallowedanopportunitytoreplytotheplaintiffs’responsetothewithheldinformation).

49 See,e.g.,Coleman(Parent)Holdings,Inc.v.MorganStanley&Co.,Inc.,2005WL679071(Fla.Cir.Ct.Mar.1,2005)(forthedefendant’snumerouswillfulandgrosslynegligentdiscoveryabuses,thecourt’ssanctionsincluded:(1)bur-denofproofonfraudissueshiftedtothedefendant,(2)courtwouldreadtojuryastatementoffactsrecountingthedefendant’sdutytopreserveevidenceanditsfailuretodoso,andsuchfactswouldbedeemedconclusive,and(3)thedefendantorderedtocompensatetheplaintiffforcostsandfeesassociatedwithdispute).

50 See,e.g.,Zubulakev.UBSWarburg,LLC,229F.R.D.422(S.D.N.Y.2004)(“ZubulakeV”)(wherethedefendantactedwillfullyindestroyingpotentiallyrelevantinformation,whichresultedintheabsenceofsuchinformationoritstardyproduction,thecourtgrantedtheplaintiff ’smotionforsanctionsincludingadverseinferenceinstructionandmon-etarysanctions);see alsoInreNapster,Inc.CopyrightLitig.,2006WL3050864(N.D.Cal.Oct.25,2006)(adverseinferenceinstructionandmonetarysanctionsimposedwherethedefendantacknowledgedthatitspersonnelrou-tinelydeletedemailswithoutregardtowhetherthedeletedemailswererelevanttothelitigation,butthebehaviordidnotconstituteapatternofdeliberatelydeceptivelitigationpracticesandtherewasevidencethattheactualnumberofemailslostwassmall);EastonSports,Inc.v.WarriorLaCrosse,Inc.,2006WL2811261(E.D.Mich.Sept.28,2006)(adverseinferenceinstructionrecommendedbasedinpartonakeyplayer’scancellationofhisYahooemailaccountsince“[t]heinevitable,andfullyforeseeableresultofthatcontractterminationwasthelossofrelevantevidencewhichwouldotherwisehavebeenrecoverable”);3MInnovativeProps.Co.v.TomarElecs.,2006WL2670038(D.Minn.Sept.18,2006)(courtaffirmedthemagistrate’sreportthatrecommendedtheimpositionofsanctions,includinganadverseinferenceinstruction,basedinpartuponthedefendant’sfailuretoimplementalegalhold);Morganv.U.S.Xpress,Inc.,2006WL1548029(M.D.Ga.June2,2006)(personalinjuryplaintiffavoidedsummaryjudgmentbasedinpartonadverseinferenceallowedbythecourtfor“questionablecircumstances”surroundingthedefendant’sdestructionofsatellitepositioningdata);ClarkConstr.Group,Inc.v.CityofMemphis,229F.R.D.131(W.D.Tenn.2005)(imposingrebuttableadverseinferencebaseduponthecity’sgrosslynegligentfailuretoinstitutealitigationholdandconsequentdestructionofemailprintoutsandrelevanthardcopydocuments);E*TradeSecs.LLCv.DeutscheBankAG,230F.R.D.582(D.Minn.2005)(sanctionsintheformofanadverseinferenceinstructionandattorneys’feesimposedwhereapartycommittedspoliationbypermanentlyerasingharddrives,failingtoretainDVDsofrelevantaudiorecordings,andfailingtoplaceanadequatelitigationholdonemailboxeswhilemakingnochangestoitsthree-yearretentionpolicyforemailbackuptapes);Broccoliv.EchostarCommc’nsCorp.,229F.R.D.506(D.Md.2005)(adverseinferenceinstructionandmonetarysanctionsimposedwherethedefendantfailedtosuspendits“extraordinaryemail/docu-mentretentionpolicy”whichprovidedforautomaticpurgingofemailsafter21daysandcompletedeletionofallelec-tronicfilesofformeremployees30daysaftertheirdeparture);ParamountPicturesCorp.v.Davis,2006WL2092581(E.D.Pa.July26,2006)(spoliationinferencebasedonthedefendant’swipinghisharddrivecleanofalldatafurthersupportedthecourt’sjudgmentinfavoroftheplaintiffafterbenchtrial);DaimlerChryslerMotorsv.BillDavisRac-ing,Inc.,2005WL3502172(E.D.Mich.Dec.22,2005)(magistraterecommendedanadverseinferenceinstructionasasanctionforthedefendant’snegligentfailuretoinstitutealitigationholdwhichresultedinirretrievablelossofemailmessagesthroughcomputersystem’sautomaticdeletionfeature);Hous.RightsCtr.v.Sterling,2005WL3320739


flagrant, a court may strike a party’s pleadings and enter judgment against it.51 This is an extreme rem-edy which is imposed only where there has been will-ful and bad faith spoliation, and less drastic sanctions

cannot properly redress the wrongdoing. For example, several courts have imposed litigation-ending sanc-tions against parties who attempted to delete dam-aging evidence from their computers using special

(C.D.Cal.Mar.2,2005)(adverseinferenceinstructionandmonetarysanctionsimposedwherethedefendantscom-mitted“egregious”discoveryabuses,including:failuretoinstituteorcommunicateaproperlegalhold;failuretoverifywithappropriatepersonnelwhethertherewasanemailbackupsystem;failuretosearchfordocuments;and“purposefulsluggishness”intakingstepstopreventdestructionofevidenceandinrespondingtodiscoveryrequests);MosaidTechs.Inc.v.SamsungElecs.Co.,Ltd.,348F.Supp.2d332(D.N.J.2004)(findingthedefendant’sactionswent“farbeyondmerenegligence,demonstratingknowingandintentionalconductthatledtothenonproductionofalltechnicale-mails,”thedistrictcourtaffirmedthespoliationinferencejuryinstructionandmonetarysanctionsimposedbythemagistrate);AdvantacareHealthPartners,LPv.AccessIV,2004WL1837997(N.D.Cal.Aug.17,2004)(adverseinferenceinstructionandmonetarysanctionswarrantedwhere,inadvanceofacourt-orderedinspection,thedefendantsdeletedfromtheircomputersnumerouselectronicfileswhichhadbeencopiedfromaformeremployer’scomputersystems);MasterCardInt’lv.Moulton,2004WL1393992(S.D.N.Y.June22,2004)(althoughitfoundnobadfaithinfailuretopreserveemailsincethedefendantssimplyperseveredintheirnormaldocumentretentionpractices,thecourtruledthattheplaintiffwouldbeallowedtoprovethefactsreflectingthenon-retentionofe-mailandarguetothetrieroffactthatthisdestruc-tionofevidence,inadditiontootherproofofferedattrial,warrantedcertaininferences);Andersonv.CrossroadsCapi-talPartners,LLC,2004WL256512(D.Minn.Feb.10,2004)(adverseinferenceinstructionimposedfortheplaintiff ’suseof“Cyberscrub”datawipingsoftwarepriortoacourt-orderedinspection);3Mv.Pribyl,259F.3d587,606n.5(7thCir.2001)(negativeinferenceinstructionwarrantedwheresixgigabytesofmusicweredownloadedontoaharddrivethenightbeforethecomputerwastobeturnedoverforinspection);TrigonIns.Co.v.U.S.,204F.R.D.277(E.D.Va.2001)(adverseinferenceinstructionimposedwherethegovernmenthadadutytopreservecorrespondencebetweenexpertsandconsultants,includingdraftsofexpertreports,andthedestructionofsuchevidencewasintentional).

51 Leonv.IDXSys.Corp.,464F.3d951(9thCir.2006)(affirmingthetrialcourt’sdismissaloftheplaintiff ’sclaimsanda$65,000sanctionbasedontheplaintiff ’sdeletionof2,200potentiallyrelevantfilesfromhisIDX-issuedlaptopcom-puterduringpendencyoflitigation);Plassev.TycoElecs.Corp.,2006WL2623441(D.Mass.Sept.7,2006)(whereaforensicinspectionshowedevidenceofdeletedfilesandtheplaintiff ’sexplanations“verge[d]ontheabsurd,”thecourtdismissedthecomplaintwithprejudiceandinvitedthedefendanttosubmitanapplicationforcostsandattorneys’fees);RidgeChryslerJeep,LLCv.DaimlerChryslerServs.N.Am.,LLC,2006WL2808158(N.D.Ill.Sept.6,2006)(theplaintiff ’sfalsestatementstothecourtandfailuretopreserveevidencewarranteddismissalofthecomplaint);Covucciv.KeaneConsultingGroup,Inc.,2006WL2004215(Mass.Super.Ct.May31,2006)(dismissalofthecomplaintwastheonlyappropriatesanctionwheretheplaintiffintentionallyandinbadfaithdestroyedevidencerelatingtothecreationof“crucial”emailandprovidedfalseandmisleadingtestimonyatdepositionandatevidentiaryhearing);Krumwiedev.BrightonAssocs.,L.L.C.,2006WL1308629(N.D.Ill.May8,2006)(theplaintiff ’swillfulandbadfaithspoliationofevidenceand“hidetheball”tacticswarranteddefaultjudgmentoncounterclaims);Maganav.HyundaiMotorAm.,No.00-2-00553-2(ClarkCounty,Wash.Super.Ct.Feb.15,2006)(defaultjudgmentwasenteredbaseduponHyundai’smisrepresentationsandfailuretoproduceevidence,reinstatingthejury’searlier$8milliondamagesaward);Metro.OperaAss’n,Inc.v.Local100,HotelEmployees&Rest.EmployeesInt’lUnion,212F.R.D.178(S.D.N.Y.2003)(judg-mententeredintheplaintiff ’sfavorontheissueofliabilitywherethedefendantsfailedtoproduceemailandelec-tronicdocumentsandfailedtopreservecomputerharddrives,amongotherdiscoveryabuses);InreTelxonCorp.Sec.Litig.,2004WL3192729(N.D.OhioJuly16,2004)(magistraterecommendedanentryofdefaultjudgmentonliabilityagainstPricewaterhouseCoopers,LLP,concludingthat“PWCand/oritscounselengagedindeliberatefraudorwassorecklesslyindifferenttotheirresponsibilitiesasapartytolitigationthattheyfailedtotakethemostbasicstepstofulfillthoseresponsibilities.”);QZO,Inc.v.Moyer,594S.E.2d541(S.C.Ct.App.2004)(trialcourtdidnotabuseitsdiscretioninstrikingthedefendant’sanswerandenteringjudgmentfortheplaintiffontheissueofliabilitywherethedefendantreformattedacomputer’sharddrive,effectivelyerasinganyinformationthecomputermayhavecontained,adaybeforesurrenderingitforcourtorderedinspection);NartronCorp.v.Gen.MotorsCorp.,2003WL1985261(Mich.Ct.App.Apr.29,2003)(courtdismissedtheplaintiff ’sclaimsasdiscoverysanctionafterfour-dayevidentiary


wiping software bearing such names as “Evidence Eliminator” or “Data Eraser.”52

Destruction of evidence in a civil case or regulatory

investigation, if sufficiently egregious, may even lead to criminal charges against the spoliator. For example, at least one court has suggested that incarceration of a

hearingonallegeddiscoveryabusesbytheplaintiff,e.g.,delaysinrespondingtodiscoveryrequestsandattenuatedandpiecemealproductionofaltered/partiallydeleteddatabase);R.S.Creative,Inc.v.CreativeCotton,Ltd.,89Cal.Rptr.2d353(Cal.Ct.App.1999)(trialcourtproperlyimposedterminatingsanctionsagainsttheplaintiffforegregiousdiscov-eryabuses,includingthedeletionoffilesfromharddrivesaftertheplaintiffstipulatedthatcomputersanddisketteswouldnotbeoperatedortoucheduntilthedefendants’computerexpertcouldexaminethem);CenturyML-CableCorp.v.Carrillo,43F.Supp.2d176(D.P.R.1998)(defaultjudgmententeredagainstpartywhowillfullydestroyedcus-tomerrecordsandalaptopcomputerfollowingaTROprohibitingdestructionofthoseitems);LongIslandDiagnosticImaging,P.C.v.StonyBrookDiagnosticAssocs.,728N.Y.S.2d781(App.Div.2001)(trialcourterredinnotdismissingthedefendants’counterclaimandthirdpartycomplaintassanctionforspoliationofevidence—contrarytothecourt’sorders,thedefendantspurgeddatabasesandproducedbackuptapesthatwerecompromisedandunusable);Crown-LifeIns.Co.v.Craig,995F.2d1376(7thCir.1993)(courtentereddefaultjudgmentagainstaninsureronanagent’scounterclaimassanctionforaninsurer’swillfulfailuretocomplywithdiscoveryordersrequiringtheproductionofarelevantdatabase);Am.BankersIns.Co.ofFla.v.Caruth,786S.W.2d427(Tex.App.1990)(entryofdefaultjudgmentontheissueofliabilityagainstaninsurerforfailuretoproducecomputerdatawasnotanabuseofdiscretion);Com-puterAssoc.Int’l,Inc.v.Am.Fundware,Inc.,133F.R.D.166(D.Colo.1990)(thedefendant’sdestructionofsourcecodewarrantedadefaultjudgmentontheissueofliability);Wm.T.ThompsonCo.v.Gen.NutritionCorp.,Inc.,593F.Supp.1443(C.D.Cal.1984)(courtimposedthe“ultimate”sanctionofstrikingthedefendant’sanswerandenteringadefaultjudgment,andimposedmonetarysanctionsof$453,312.56fortheplaintiff ’sfeesandcostsassociatedwiththedis-coveryabuses);see alsoInreQuintusCorp.,2006WL3072982(Bankr.D.Del.Oct.27,2006)(courtentered$1,888,410judgmentinfavorofabankruptcytrusteeassanctionfortheadverseparty’sdestructionofcrucialfinancialrecords).

52 AristaRecords,LLCv.Tschirhart,2006WL2728927(W.D.Tex.Aug.23,2006)(imposingsanctionofdefaultjudgmententeredwhereforensicevidenceshowedthatthedefendantdeliberatelyused“wiping”softwaretopermanentlyremovedatafromherharddrive,thecourtstated:“Thesanctioninthepresentcaseistodeterotherdefendantsinsimilarcasesfromattemptingtodestroyorconcealevidenceoftheirwrongdoing.”);Elec.FundsSolutionsv.Murphy,36Cal.Rptr.3d663(Ct.App.2005)(trialcourtproperlystruckthedefendants’answerasadiscoverysanctionfordiscoveryabusethatincludedmisrepresentationstothecourt,failuretocomplywithdiscoveryordersandintentionaldestruc-tionofevidencethroughtheuseof“DataEraser”software;however,compensatoryandpunitivedamageawardstotal-ingover$24millionwouldbevacatedandremandedsincethecomplaintthatsoughtdamagesinexcessof$50,000failedtoputthedefendantsonnoticeoftheirmaximumpotentialliability);Commc’nsCenter,Inc.v.Hewitt,Civ.No.S-03-1968WBSKJM,2005WL3277983(E.D.Cal.Apr.5,2005)(wherethedefendantsused“EvidenceEliminator”softwareonharddriveswhileunderacourtordertoproducemirrorimagesofsuchdrives,themagistraterecommendedthatthedefendants’answerbestrickenanddefaultenteredagainstthedefendantson8of10causesofaction;themagistratealsoorderedthedefendantstopaytheplaintiff ’sattorneys’feesandexpensesinconnectionwiththemotionamount-ingto$145,812);DirecTV,Inc.v.Borow,2005WL43261(N.D.Ill.Jan.6,2005)(grantingsummaryjudgmentagainstthedefendantontheissueofliability,thecourtaffordedtheplaintiffanadverseinferencebaseduponthedefendant’suseof“EvidenceEliminator”softwaretoeraseevidencerequestedbytheplaintifffromhiscomputer);KucalaEnters.,Ltd.v.AutoWaxCo.,Inc.,2003WL21230605(N.D.Ill.May27,2003)(magistraterecommendedthatacompetitor’ssuitagainstapatentholderbedismissedwithprejudiceassanctionforegregiousdiscoveryabuse,whichincludedtheuseof“EvidenceEliminator”softwaretodeletedocumentsfromacomputerinadvanceofacourt-orderedinspection);KucalaEnters.,Ltd.v.AutoWaxCo.,Inc.,2003WL22433095(N.D.Ill.Oct.27,2003)(districtjudgeadoptedallthemagistrate’sfindingsandrecommendations,withtheexceptionthattheplaintiffwouldbeallowedtoproceedonaclaimofnon-infringementandtodefendaninfringementcounterclaimontheconditionthatalldiscoverybemade“forthwith”).But seeAndersonv.CrossroadsCapitalPartners,LLC,2004WL256512(D.Minn.Feb.10,2004)(theplaintiff ’suseof“Cyberscrub”datawipingsoftwarepriortoacourt-orderedinspectionofhercomputer,afteragreeingontherecordthatshewouldnotpurgeherharddriveordeleteanydocuments,andhermisrepresentationsabouttheageoftheharddrivewerenotsufficientlyegregioustowarrantdismissal,butdidwarrantanadverseinferenceinstruction).


party’s CEO might be an appropriate sanction for civil discovery misconduct.53 In the realm of regulatory investigations in the securities field, the Arthur Ander-sen54 and Frank Quattrone55 criminal cases illustrate that criminal charges may follow a party’s wrongful destruction of relevant evidence.

Courts commonly award monetary sanctions against a party that has breached its duty to preserve. The court may hold the spoliator in contempt56 or re-quire it to pay a fine to the adverse party57 or directly to

the court.58 More frequently, courts will award the in-jured party its reasonable costs, expert fees, and attor-neys’ fees incurred as a result of the discovery abuse.59

Even where no sanctions are imposed, mistakes and miscommunications over preservation duties can be costly. Discovery motion practice can throw a case off course, diverting the parties’ energies away from the merits of the litigation and consuming resources—in-cluding valuable court time—that would be better spent addressing the parties’ substantive claims.60

53 InCooneyv.BeverlyEnter.,Inc.,No.CV2003-1049-3slipop.(SalineCountyCir.Ct.,Ark.June15,2005),thecourtfoundthedefendantsincontemptofthecourt’spriorordercompellingdiscovery.Inadditiontoorderingthedefend-antstobringthemselvesintofullcomplianceandpaytheplaintiffs’attorneys’fees,thecourtstatedthatitwould,onitsownsuggestion,takeunderadvisementwhatadditionalsanctions,ifany,shouldbeimposedonthedefendants,includingwhethertheCEOandothersshouldbeincarcerated.

54 U.S.v.ArthurAndersen,LLP,374F.3d281(5thCir.2004).Inthiscase,theFifthCircuitaffirmedtheconvictionofArthurAndersenforobstructinganofficialproceedingoftheSECbaseduponevidencethat,inordertoprotectthefirmandthefirm’slargestsingleaccount(Enron),ArthurAndersenorderedamassdestructionofdocumentstokeepthemfromthehandsoftheSEC.Duringtrial,ArthurAndersenunsuccessfullydefendedthedestructionofdocu-mentsasalegitimatepracticeunderitsdocumentretentionpolicies.TheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtsubsequentlyreversedtheconvictioninArthurAndersen,LLPv.U.S.,544U.S.696(2005),inpartbecausethejuryinstructionsfailedtoconveytherequisiteconsciousnessofwrongdoing.Thecasehasbeenremandedforfurtherproceedings.

55 U.S.v.Quattrone,441F.3d153(2dCir.2006).Attrial,FrankQuattrone,aninvestmentbanker,wasconvictedforobstructionofjusticeandwitnesstamperinginconnectionwithinvestigationsconductedbytheSEC,NASDandagrandjury,andsentencedto18months’imprisonment.Amongotherthings,Mr.Quattronesentanemailtobankersinhisgroupthat“stronglyadvise[d]”themtocomplywiththefirm’sdocumentdestructionpoliciesatatimewhenhekneworshouldhaveknownabouttheinvestigations.AlthoughtheSecondCircuitheldthaterroneousjuryinstruc-tionsrequiredremand,itconcludedthattheevidencewassufficienttosupporttheconvictions).

56 See,e.g.,LandmarkLegalFound.v.EPA,272F.Supp.2d70(D.D.C.2003)(EPAheldincivilcontemptforviolatingapreliminaryinjunctionbyreformattingharddrivesanderasingoroverwritingbackuptapescontainingpotentiallyresponsiveemailandorderedtopaytheplaintiffs’reasonableattorneys’feesincurredasaresultofEPA’scontuma-ciousconduct).

57 Procter&GambleCo.v.Haugen,179F.R.D.622(D.Utah1998)(theplaintiffwasorderedtopaythedefendant$10,000forfailingtopreserveorsearchtheemailoffiveindividuals($2,000foreachindividual)).

58 See,e.g.,U.S.v.PhilipMorrisUSAInc.,327F.Supp.2d21(D.D.C.2004)(courtsanctionedthedefendant$2,750,000tobepaidtocourtregistryforitsfailuretofollowthecourt’spreservationorder);see alsoDanisv.USNCommc’ns,Inc.,2000WL1694325(N.D.Ill.Oct.20,2000)(magistraterecommendedthatthedefendantCEObesanctioned$10,000fordocumentpreservationfailings,tobepaidtocourtregistry).

59 Consol.AluminumCorp.v.Alcoa,Inc.,2006WL2583308(M.D.La.July19,2006)(fornegligentfailuretopreserveelectronicevidence,thedefendantwasorderedtopayreasonableattorneys’feesincurredbytheplaintiffinbring-ingsanctionsmotionandinvestigatingandattemptingtoobtaindiscoveryatissueandcostsofre-deposingcertainwitnesses);Velav.Wagner&Brown,Ltd.,2006WL1684191(Tex.App.June21,2006)(affirming$75,000sanctionsawardbaseduponthedefendant’sfailuretoproperlypreserveandtimelyproduceitsexpert’sunderlyingcomputerdata);InvisionMediaCommc’ns,Inc.v.Fed.Ins.Co.,2004WL396037(S.D.N.Y.Mar.2,2004);Nat’lAss’nofRadia-tionSurvivorsv.Turnage,115F.R.D.543(N.D.Cal.1987)(thedefendantwasorderedtopaymonetarysanctions—$105,000totheplaintiffsand$15,000totheclerkofcourt).

60 See,e.g.,Danisv.USNCommc’ns,Inc.,2000WL1694325(N.D.Ill.Oct.20,2000)(thepartiescollectivelyspentover$1.5millionlitigatingsanctionsissuesalone).


Unique Preservation Issues Presented by Electronic DataThe preservation of ESI presents some unique chal-lenges when compared to traditional, “hard copy” data. These challenges arise in large part because of a few areas in which ESI differs dramatically from hard copy data: volume, organization, and content.

An estimated 92 percent of new information created today is electronic,61 and much of that is never reduced to printed form. As storage of electronic information has become virtually effortless for computer users and increasingly less expensive, many companies are find-ing that they possess vast quantities of electronic docu-ments unlike anything they would have accumulated in the paper world. An employee may easily store the equivalent of millions of pages on a single hard drive or on the company’s network server.

In addition to the increased volume of informa-tion stored electronically, the way in which electronic information is organized often poses additional challenges. In contrast to paper records, which are typically sorted by subject matter and require some conscious decision-making and physical effort to organize and file, electronic information is not nec-essarily stored in any rational order. Employees may simply move material into one huge folder, without taking the time or effort to sort it in any meaningful way. Further, there are many more potential locations and sources of electronic material than there are for paper records. Depending on a company’s computer network structure and the employee’s own computer usage practices, an employee may save electronic information on the hard drives of his desktop com-puter, home computer and/or laptop, on the compa-ny’s file servers, and on floppy disks or CD-ROMs.

Adding to the problem, ESI is often retained with-out regard to its relevance to the company’s ongoing business. Some employees send and receive hundreds of emails each week. Although many of these emails have no lasting business value, the employee may keep them all by default, because doing so takes signifi-cantly less time and effort than identifying the truly

significant emails and storing them in a coherent fashion. On the other hand, companies may employ janitorial systems to automatically delete email after a certain time period, which could not happen in a paper world. Although this helps reduce the volume of information being retained, the automated manner in which it happens results in a decision being made about the retention of a document without regard to its content.

In addition, electronic documents may contain information that “disappears” when the file is con-verted to hard copy unless separately captured on conversion, such as hidden comments viewable only in the electronic version of a document, hidden col-umns in a spreadsheet, or the metadata attached to an electronic document.62 Computer systems may lose, alter, or destroy information as part of their routine operations, making the risk of losing information sig-nificantly greater than it would be in the context of paper documents. It may be difficult, or even impossi-ble, to interrupt or suspend routine operations of com-puter systems to isolate and preserve discrete parts of the information they overwrite, delete, or update on an ongoing basis, without creating other problems for the overall system. Suspension of these features may also make discovery more costly and time consuming by causing a greater accumulation of duplicative and irrelevant data that must be reviewed. In this envi-ronment, defining the scope of a company’s duty to preserve evidence, and ensuring that that duty is sat-isfied, becomes especially challenging.

The drafters of the 2006 e-discovery amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure recognized these unique challenges. The new Rule 37(f) responds to a distinctive and necessary feature of computer sys-tems—the recycling, overwriting, and alteration of ESI that attends normal use. It provides some protec-tion from sanctions for a party’s failure to preserve and produce certain electronic material in discovery:

Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information

61 SeeLyman,PeterandHalR.Varian,How Much Information?2003,available athttp://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003.

62 Metadataincludesbothvisibleinformation,suchasauthor,recipient,andsubjectlineofanemail,aswellashiddendata,suchaslastsaveddateandcreator.

http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003

http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/how-much-info-2003


lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system.63

Although this “safe harbor” provision is a welcome advance, it provides no bright lines or quick answers. Whether a party is able to take advantage of this pro-vision to avoid sanctions in a specific case will depend upon the particulars of the case. The effect that this new rule will have on litigants’ preservation efforts, if any, remains to be seen.

Records Management—Document Retention and Destruction PoliciesCompanies Should Consider Implementing and Following a Document Retention PolicyA document retention and destruction policy is a set of guidelines instituted by a company to control the volume of material it retains and to organize how rec-ords are stored, retrieved, and purged. An effective policy increases a company’s ability to meet its pres-ervation obligations and respond to requests for docu-ments while decreasing its costs in doing so.

Because there is no such thing as a “standard” company or organization, there is no such thing as a “standard” document retention policy. Every policy will be unique, and will depend on the culture, nature, and needs of the company for which it is developed.64 Successfully implementing a policy consistent with individual company practices allows a company to more effectively:• Comply with all relevant law by providing mech-

anisms for preserving those documents it is required to keep pursuant to law or regulation.65

• Allow for the destruction of documents that are not

required to be kept and for which there is no reason to keep.

• Retain useful corporate information by providing mechanisms to identify and keep information that has a business purpose.

• Reduce the volume of storage devoted to outdated, unnecessary, or duplicative information.

• Ease the retrieval of documents and other informa-tion when it is necessary.

• Educate employees about the importance of docu-ment retention and destruction.

• Prepare for document retention obligations arising from actual or potential litigation.

Considerations for a Reasonable Document Retention Policy“The hallmark of an organization’s information and records management policies should be reasonable-ness.”66 Stated another way, the approach taken toward retaining documents and data should be reasonable af-ter considering facts and circumstances specific to the actual documents.67 For example, “[a] three year re-tention policy may be sufficient for documents such as appointment books or telephone messages, but inad-equate for documents such as customer complaints.”68

The nature of the company’s business needs should also be considered. Given the ubiquity of computers to-day, a records retention policy should specifically ad-dress ESI.69 However, retention decisions should be based on content—not form, and retention periods should be driven by the information contained in the document—not whether it is in hard copy or electronic form.70

The law is well settled that document destruc-tion and retention policies are not only an accept-

63 Fed. R. Civ. P.37(f).64 The Sedona Guidelines for Managing Information and Records in the Electronic Age,Guideline2,com-

ment2.c.at18(TheSedonaConference®,July2005)[hereinafterThe Sedona guidelines].65 Id.66 Id.atGuideline1,Comment1.b.at14.67 Lewyv.RemingtonArmsCo.,Inc.,836F.2d1104,1112(8thCir.1988).68 Id.69 Forabroadoverviewofelectronicrecordsmanagementprinciplesandsuggestedguidelines,seeThe Sedona

Guidelines.70 SeeGregoryS.McCurdy&MarthaJ.Dawson,Are Instant Messages Discoverable? Is This Digital Medium More Like

E-Mails or Phone Calls?,TheNationalLawJournal,June7,2004,§1,col.2,available athttp://www.prestongates.com/publications/article.asp?pubID=479[registrationrequired].

http://www.prestongates.com/publications/article.asp?pubID=479

http://www.prestongates.com/publications/article.asp?pubID=479


able means of controlling corporate data, but are expected.71 A reasonable policy does not require that everything be maintained,72 and clearly would be of little use if it did. Document destruction is an equally important component of all good retention policies. Even in the context of litigation, courts have recog-nized that companies must be allowed to dispose of some data.73 As long as a mechanism—such as a legal hold notice—is put in place to ensure that documents potentially relevant to litigation are retained, a com-pany may dispose of irrelevant documents.

A reasonable policy should also address the poten-tial storage of corporate documents off of the cor-porate computer network. Today’s growing culture of telecommuting raises the risk that documents are being stored on laptops and home computers outside the reach of any scheduled retention and destruction processes. For organizations where this is an issue, an effective retention policy should specifically address this possibility. This can be done by setting protocols to ensure that necessary documents are retained—e.g., by requiring user to save such information on a regular basis to a corporate server.

Another crucial element of a reasonable retention

policy is that the guidelines it sets for the retention or destruction of information are based on objec-tive, neutral criteria. As a starting point, all retention and destruction policies must comply with any fed-eral, state, or local laws and regulations concerning the retention of specific materials. For other materi-als, document retention policies must not be imple-mented with the goal of selectively deleting “bad” documents. When a party has destroyed relevant evi-dence through its adherence to a document retention policy, and spoliation is alleged, a court may consider whether the document retention policy was instituted in bad faith.74 If it appears that a retention policy was created or implemented solely for gaining a tactical advantage in litigation, a court will closely scrutinize the timing and development of the party’s policy.75 On the other hand, a consistently implemented policy may protect a company against claims of selective document destruction.76

The most effective way to prevent claims of bad faith regarding the administration of a document retention policy is to use it regularly and consistently. This means that once a reasonable retention policy has been adopted, it needs to be communicated,77

71 ArthurAndersen,LLPv.U.S.,544U.S.696,704(2005);RemingtonArms,836F.2dat1112.72 The Sedona Guidelines,Guideline1,Comment1.c.at15;see alsoZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at217.73 Id.74 RemingtonArms,836F.2dat1112.75 SeeRambus,Inc.v.InfineonTechs.AG,220F.R.D.264(E.D.Va.2004)(wheretheplaintiffdevelopedbothitspat-

entlitigationstrategyanddocumentretentionprogramatthesametime,thecourtorderedtheplaintifftoproduceprivilegeddocumentsrelatingtothecreation,preparation,orscopeofthedocumentretentionpolicyforin camerareview);SamsungElecs.Co.,Ltd.v.Rambus,Inc.,439F.Supp.2d524(E.D.Va.2006)(theplaintiffdevelopeditsdoc-umentretentionpolicyafteritreasonablyanticipatedlitigationand“theprogramwasimplementedprincipallytoridthecompanyofdiscoverabledocumentsatatimewhenitanticipatedlitigation”);see alsoRambus,Inc.v.InfineonTechs.AG,222F.R.D.280(E.D.Va.2004)(basedonin camerareview,thecourtgrantedthedefendant’smotiontocompelbasedonthecrime/fraudexceptiontotheattorney-clientprivilege,orderedproductionofotherdocumentsonthesamesubjectmatter,andfurtherruledthatdiscoverywouldbeallowedregardingdocumentsproducedandontheissueofsanctions).But seeHynixSemiconductor,Inc.v.Rambus,Inc.,No.C-00-20905RMWslipop.(N.D.Cal.Jan.4,2006)(afterbenchtrial,thecourtconcludedthatdismissalofRambus’patentinfringementclaimswasnotwarrantedundertheuncleanhandsdefense,sinceRambus’adoptionandimplementationofadocumentretentionpolicywasa“permissiblebusinessdecision”and“shreddays”didnotconstituteunlawfulspoliation).

76 SeeRendaMarine,Inc.v.U.S.,58Fed.Cl.57,61n.4(2003)(“[t]heexistenceofthepolicycouldbearonthequestionofthesubjectivegoodfaithofpersonsoperatingunderthepolicyandincompliancewithit.”).

77 See,e.g.,InrePrudentialIns.Co.ofAm.SalesPracticesLitig.,169F.R.D.598(D.N.J.1997)(aninsurer’s“haphaz-ardanduncoordinatedapproachtodocumentretention”warrantedanadverseinferenceinstructionand$1millionsanction).


consistently implemented,78 and enforced. Success is most likely when senior management is brought on board early and demonstrates a commitment to the implementation and enforcement of the policy. Suc-cessful implementation requires that all employees understand the policy and its importance to the com-pany. To ensure this, a company may want to consider a mandatory training program, as well as provide employees with ongoing resources and incentives to facilitate participation. Reminders sent at regular, pre-determined intervals might also be a good idea. Further, the oversight of responsible personnel, such as records managers and information system admin-istrators, can help ensure that the records reten-tion program is consistently and uniformly applied. Finally, there should be some mechanism to verify that employees are following the policy.

All the steps involved in drafting, implementing, and enforcing a retention policy and schedule should be well documented.79 Such documentation is invalu-

able to defending later charges of willful or bad faith document destruction.

Legal Hold Notices as a Best Practice of Document RetentionRegardless of how a document retention policy is ulti-mately designed, it is important that it provide for the suspension of document destruction and lay out the processes with which to preserve documents poten-tially at issue in any litigation. A company should con-sider having the retention policy include a “Discovery Response Plan for Litigation” that outlines the specific steps for implementing a legal hold system for actual or “probable” litigation, as discussed below. The policy should lay out the specific steps necessary to suspend the destruction of documents and identify specific per-sonnel responsible for overseeing these actions.80 As part of a records retention program, companies should consider having a procedure to identify potential dis-putes and protect the corresponding ESI.81 “A corpo-

78 See,e.g.,Carlucciv.PiperAircraftCorp.,102F.R.D.472(S.D.Fla.1984)(courtfoundthatthedefendantdestroyedrelevantdocumentswiththeintentionofpreventingthemfrombeingproducedinlitigationandentereddefaultjudgmentassanctionwherethedefendant“utterlyfailed”toshowthatitsdocumentretentionpolicywasactuallyimplementedinanyconsistentmanner);see alsoU.S.v.PhilipMorrisUSAInc.,327F.Supp.2d21(D.D.C.2004)(find-ingit“astounding”thatthedefendant’semployeesfailedtofollowthecourt’spreservationorderandthedefendant’sowndocumentretentionpolicies,thecourtimposedamonetarysanctionof$2,750,000andbarredtestimonyfromatleast11witnesseswhofailedtocomplywiththedefendant’sdocumentretentionprogram).

79 See,e.g.,casesinvolvingRambus,Inc.anditsimplementationofarecordsretentionpolicy,supranote75.80 SeeThe Sedona Guidelines,Guideline5,at42.81 See,e.g.,ZubulakeV,229F.R.D.422;Danisv.USNCommc’ns,Inc.,2000WL1694325(N.D.Ill.Oct.20,2000);Metro.

OperaAss’n,Inc.v.Local100,HotelEmployees&Rest.EmployeesInt’lUnion,212F.R.D.178(S.D.N.Y.2003);see alsoBroccoliv.EchostarCommc’nsCorp.,229F.R.D.506(D.Md.2005)(sanctionsimposedwherethedefendantfailedtosuspendits“extraordinaryemail/documentretentionpolicy”whichprovidedforautomaticpurgingofemailsafter21daysandcompletedeletionofallelectronicfilesofformeremployees30daysaftertheirdeparture);DaimlerChrys-lerMotorsv.BillDavisRacing,Inc.,2005WL3502172(E.D.Mich.Dec.22,2005)(whereemailmessageswereirre-trievablylostthroughthedefendant’scomputersystem’sautomaticdeletionfeature,themagistraterecommendedanadverseinferenceinstructionassanctionforthedefendant’snegligentfailuretoinstitutealegalhold);InreOldBancOneS’holdersSec.Litig.,2005WL3372783(N.D.Ill.Dec.8,2005)(thedefendantwasbarredfromcross-examiningtheplaintiffs’expertassanctionforitsnon-productionofunderlyingfinancialdataresultingfromitsnegligentfail-uretoinstituteanddisseminatealitigationhold);E*TradeSecs.LLCv.DeutscheBankAG,230F.R.D.582(D.Minn.2005)(sanctionsintheformofanadverseinferenceinstructionandattorneys’feesimposedwhereapartycommit-tedspoliationbyfailingtoplaceanadequatelitigationholdonemailaccountswhilemakingnochangestoitsthree-yearretentionpolicyforemailbackuptapes);Hous.RightsCtr.v.Sterling,2005WL3320739(C.D.Cal.Mar.2,2005)(courtgrantedamotionforadverseinferenceinstructionandmonetarysanctionswherethedefendantscommitted“egregious”discoveryabuses,including:failuretoinstituteorcommunicateaproperlegalhold;failuretoverifywithappropriatepersonnelwhethertherewasanemailbackupsystem;failuretosearchfordocuments;and“purposefulsluggishness”intakingstepstopreventdestructionofevidenceandinrespondingtodiscoveryrequests).


ration cannot blindly destroy documents and expect to be shielded by a seemingly innocuous document retention policy.”82 A records retention policy that is inconsistent with a party’s preservation obligations in litigation does not operate to excuse the party’s failure to respond to discovery.83 However, “[t]he existence of the policy could bear on the question of the subjective good faith of persons operating under the policy and in compliance with it.”84

Additionally, the safe harbor provision under amended Rule 37(f) applies only if a computer system was operated in “good faith.” The committee notes state that the existence of a preservation obligation may play a role in determining whether or not the operation was in good faith, and that “[g]ood faith in the routine operation of an information system may involve a party’s intervention to modify or suspend certain features of that routine operation to prevent the loss of information, if that information is subject to a preservation obligation.”

Retention Considerations for Disaster Recovery SystemsMost businesses adopt some type of disaster recovery process to address legitimate concerns about keep-ing a business up and running in the event of a cata-strophic disaster. These types of disasters can be natural (floods, fires, earthquakes) or technological (full server hardware failures). A common method of providing disaster recovery protection is through the use of backup tapes. As a general rule, backup tapes should only be maintained long enough to provide adequate recovery from a disaster. Problems arise when tapes are instead used as routine data archive depositories, in place of good document management practices, or saved simply because an IT person wants to save everything possible. Tapes are also problem-atic when maintained in large numbers for indefi-nite periods of time for no real business purpose. To understand why this can be such a problem, it is important to understand how backup tapes work.85

Typically, backup tapes record a snapshot of an entire server at the time the tape is made. They do not copy files in any organized fashion and to access a specific file on any given tape, the entire tape must be restored. If a document is saved on a server that is routinely backed up, it is backed up each time a tape is made. If tapes are not recycled or overwritten and new tapes are used each time, multiple copies of the same document will be saved on each subsequent tape. If the document has been edited in any way between backup cycles, slightly different copies of the same document will be saved. Given the amount of data most tapes are capable of storing, data duplication quickly becomes an enormous obstacle if and when the relevance of any material on those tapes comes into question or documents need to be reviewed.

Under the recent revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, disaster recovery systems should be treated as “not reasonably accessible.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) establishes a two-tiered approach to the pro-duction of ESI, differentiating between information that is reasonably accessible and that which is not. A responding party need not produce ESI from sources that it identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If the requesting party moves to compel discovery of such information, the respond-ing party would be required to demonstrate undue burden or cost. Once that showing is made, a court may order discovery only for good cause, subject to the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).86

For all of the foregoing reasons, companies should consider taking a close look at their disaster recovery policies and consider including a procedure for han-dling this media under their document retention policy. The company should make decisions about the num-ber of tapes maintained and the length of time they are kept. Frequently, disaster recovery retention is decided on an ad hoc basis, inconsistently or not at all. This can cause miscommunication with outside parties, includ-ing the court, regarding what is being preserved, and create serious problems in litigation. Ultimately, a com-

82 Lewyv.RemingtonArmsCo.,Inc.,836F.2d1104,1112(8thCir.1988).83 RendaMarine,Inc.v.U.S.,58Fed.Cl.57,61(2003).84 Id.at61n.4.85 See generallyhttp://www.emaglink.com/tape-facts.htm.86 TheseprovisionswerepreviouslylocatedatFed. R. Civ. P.26(b)(2)(i),(ii),and(iii).

http://www.emaglink.com/tape-facts.htm


pany should consider rotating and recycling tapes on the shortest schedule possible. “Absent a legal require-ment to the contrary, companies may recycle or destroy hardware or media that contain data retained for busi-ness continuation or disaster recovery purposes.”87

Legal Hold NoticesWhen the duty to preserve documents arises, coun-sel should immediately work with the client to estab-lish an appropriate document preservation protocol. A company’s document retention policy may need to be suspended, at least in part. The most common method of assuring the preservation of documents for litigation is to put a legal hold notice in place.

Scope of the Legal Hold NoticeHow does counsel determine the scope of the legal hold notice? Essentially it comes down to determin-ing the likely sources of relevant documents. There are two main questions to answer to identify sources of relevant documents: (1) Who has the documents? and (2) Where do the documents physically reside?

Identifying Key PlayersThe duty to preserve ESI begins with the identifica-tion of the key players—the employees most likely to have potentially relevant documents.88 The key play-ers are the employees who created or received docu-ments that may support or refute the claims by the parties or any third parties.89 Counsel should use rea-sonable discretion when deciding who is a key player; not every employee is necessarily a key player, even though some relevant documents may have been dis-tributed company-wide.

Placing employees under a legal hold notice does not necessarily mean that their documents will be col-lected and reviewed. The purpose of identifying key employees at the early stage of litigation is to cast a broad net to meet the duty to preserve relevant evi-dence. The list of employees whose documents will be collected and reviewed can often be narrowed

once the nature and scope of the case is more clearly defined, after the actual requests for production of documents have been served, after responses and objections to the requests have been formulated, and possibly through the meet and confer process. On the other hand, based on the requests for production, the key employees that are identified at the early stage may turn out to be insufficient to meet the company’s discovery obligations, and additional employees may need to be placed under a legal hold notice. A re-eval-uation may be necessary if the complaint is amended, additional requests are served, a cross-complaint is served, or parties are added to the litigation.

It is often helpful to utilize interviews or question-naires as part of an iterative process to identify key players. Personal interviews or form questionnaires sent out by litigation counsel can help narrow the field of key players whose documents should be preserved. These same devices may often serve to identify alter-nate sources not previously considered, while ruling out key players which counsel might otherwise have had to place under legal hold notice. They may also serve to educate counsel about internal issues not eas-ily discoverable through document review, such as internal product code names, organizational report-ing relationships, or the potential of sensitive busi-ness, personal, or privileged information residing in certain files. A questionnaire also serves to document the process of determining whose documents will be preserved.90 Typical questions could address individ-ual reporting relationships within the company hier-archy, job history descriptions, involvement with the subject matter at issue in the case, and individual data retention habits.

Location of Relevant DocumentsCounsel should work with the information technology (“IT”) department to determine the types of systems utilized by the company that could contain relevant ESI. Counsel should consider addressing these ques-tions to the information technology department:• Document Management Systems

87 The Sedona Guidelines,Guideline3,Comment3.d.at28.88 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.212.89 Fed. R. Civ. P.26(a)(1)(A)and(b)(1).90 ThisdocumentationwouldbeveryhelpfultoprepareforaRule26(f)conferenceorRule30(b)(6)deposition.


• What email server system, including server soft-ware, do they use?

• What types of applications do they use?• Do they save documents to network file shares?• Do they use internal websites?

• Janitorial Programs• Do they use any programs that automatically

delete email or other documents after a certain number of days, or when the volume reaches a certain size?

• On what criteria is the automated deletion based?• What is required to disable such programs for

specific individuals or locations?• Disaster Recovery Systems

• What are their disaster recovery policies for email servers?

• What are their disaster recovery policies for other file servers?

• What is the recycle period?• Other Communication Tools

• Do they employ technology that saves voicemail electronically?

• Do the employees regularly use instant messag-ing programs to communicate?

• What, if any, online collaboration tools are used by employees?

Electronic documents may be physically located in a wide variety of locations. The following are all potential sources that counsel may wish to consider for preservation:• Databases• Networks• Computer systems• Servers• Hard drives (including portable Hard Disk Drives

(HDDs))• Archives• Disaster recovery media• Storage Media: DVDs, CDs, Floppy discs, Zip discs,

Jazz discs, Tapes, Cartridges, etc.

• Laptops• Personal Computers• Internet Data• Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) including Palm,

Blackberry, Cellular phone, Table PC, etc.Additionally, many companies routinely move

employees from office to office and computer to com-puter. It is important to investigate whether data belonging to a relevant custodian may still exist on a computer being used by a non-custodian. If a com-pany does not have a standard protocol for wiping computer drives clean for each subsequent employee, data for relevant custodians may exist on multiple computers. Likewise, counsel may be accidentally col-lecting documents belonging to a non-custodian that exist on a custodian’s computer.

Even when company policy requires custodians to store data in a centralized location, many will still store materials on their hard drive. Do not rely on rep-resentations such as “our employees are not allowed to store materials on their hard drives” or “employees do not know how to change their default storage options” when preserving documents. It is important to inves-tigate all potential storage options, even those consid-ered unlikely by IT personnel.

Counsel needs to become familiar with the client’s computer systems and policies. The new federal rules require an attorney to be able to explain the company’s systems, and the potentially relevant documents they contain, in the meet and confer conference required under the amended Rule 26(f). Counsel should un-derstand any applicable records retention policies and disaster recovery protocols in place. Counsel should consider informing the IT department about the need to preserve relevant electronic evidence and work with them to ensure that existing data is preserved in ac-cordance with the client’s discovery obligations.91 This point underscores the importance of understanding the client’s computer systems and its protocols for elec-tronic data management.92

91 See,e.g.,DaimlerChryslerMotorsv.BillDavisRacing,Inc.,2005WL3502172(E.D.Mich.Dec.22,2005)(whereemailmessageswereirretrievablylostthroughthedefendant’scomputersystem’sautomaticdeletionfeature,themagis-traterecommendedanadverseinferenceinstructionassanctionforthedefendant’snegligentfailuretoinstitutelegalhold);E*TradeSecs.LLCv.DeutscheBankAG,230F.R.D.582(D.Minn.2005)(whereapartycommittedspoliationbypermanentlyerasingharddrives,failingtoretainDVDsofrelevantaudiorecordings,andfailingtoplaceadequatelitigationholdonemailaccountswhilemakingnochangestoitsthree-yearretentionpolicyforemailbackuptapes,


Counsel should consider meeting with the employ-ees who actually oversee these systems. Counsel should be cautious about relying on the representa-tions of individuals who are not fully engaged with the corporate computer systems as to where, how, and for how long documents are stored, but should addition-ally confirm with the staff in charge of those systems. Counsel should be sure they actually understand what IT personnel are telling them. Computer jargon is eas-ily misinterpreted. It is important for counsel not to assume they understand what is being represented without asking the follow up questions necessary to clarify the overall picture in a language that mini-mizes chances for error.93

Counsel also needs to consider possible sources of potentially relevant documents that are not directly controlled or maintained by particular employees, such as file shares, internal websites, databases, and any other shared or collaborative environment which has ESI.94 Just as counsel should keep detailed records of their decisions regarding who was considered for

legal holds, including any decisions regarding employ-ees who were determined not appropriate for legal holds, counsel should keep such records regarding non-employee sources of ESI.

Implementing a Legal Hold NoticeCounsel should consider the proper means of com-munication for the company’s culture. In many com-panies, email is the most appropriate means to convey the legal hold notice. In some companies, a memo cir-culated in hardcopy may be more effective. No matter what method is chosen, counsel should implement the legal hold notice through a written communication, and the employees placed under legal hold should be individually identified (i.e., do not send a legal hold to an email distribution list or a memo to “depart-ment heads”). The notice should be sent by the legal department and preferably by a senior member of that department.95

Counsel also needs to meet with the information technology staff to make sure the documents of the

thedistrictcourtadoptedthemagistrate’srecommendationtoimposesanctionsintheformofanadverseinferenceinstructionandattorneys’fees);Hous.RightsCtr.v.Sterling,2005WL3320739(C.D.Cal.Mar.2,2005)(adverseinferenceinstructionandmonetarysanctionsimposedwherethedefendantscommitted“egregious”discoveryabuses,including:failuretoinstituteorcommunicateaproperlegalhold;failuretoverifywithappropriatepersonnelwhethertherewasanemailbackupsystem;failuretosearchfordocuments;and“purposefulsluggishness”intakingstepstopreventdestructionofevidenceandinrespondingtodiscoveryrequests);Danisv.USNCommc’ns,Inc.,2000WL1694325(N.D.Ill.Oct.20,2000);see alsoComputerAssoc.Int’l,Inc.v.Am.Fundware,Inc.,133F.R.D.166(D.Colo.1990)(defaultjudgmentontheissueofliabilitywaswarrantedwhere“evenassumingthatmaintenanceofonlyasingle,updatedversionofsourcecodewas,inothercircumstances,abonafidebusinesspractice,anydestructionofversionsofthecodeafterserviceofcomplaintcouldnotbeexcusedasabonafidebusinesspractice”).

92 See,e.g.,PhoenixFour,Inc.v.StrategicRes.Corp.,2006WL1409413(S.D.N.Y.May23,2006)(failuretotimelylocateandproduceinformationfromcomputerserveramountedto“grossnegligence”warrantingmonetarysanctionsagainstthedefendantsandtheircounsel).

93 See,e.g.,InvisionMediaCommc’ns,Inc.v.Fed.Ins.Co.,2004WL396037(S.D.N.Y.Mar.2,2004)(theplaintiff ’sdis-coverymisconduct,includingdisregardofdiscoveryobligations,misleadingstatementsregardingtheexistenceandlocationofevidence,andfailuretomakereasonableinquirieswarrantedsanctions);Keirv.UnumprovidentCorp.,2003WL21997747(S.D.N.Y.Aug.22,2003)(thedefendantwasnotsufficientlydiligentincomplyingpromptlywiththecourt’spreservationorderandbackuptapeswereinadvertentlyoverwritten);Linnenv.A.H.RobinsCo.,Inc.,1999WL462015(Mass.Super.Ct.June16,1999)(backuptapeswererecycledincontraventionofacourt’spreserva-tionorder);GTFM,Inc.v.Wal-MartStores,Inc.,2000WL1693615(S.D.N.Y.Nov.9,2000)(thedefendant’smisrepre-sentationsaboutcomputercapabilitieswarrantedmonetarysanctionsof$109,753.81);Crown-LifeIns.Co.v.Craig,995F.2d1376(7thCir.1993)(anattorney’saffidavitthatallresponsivedocumentshadbeenproducedwas“blatantlyfalse,”giventhatthepartyhadnotproducedrawdata);see alsoTulipComputersInt’lB.V.v.DellComputerCorp.,2002WL818061(D.Del.Apr.30,2002).

94 Non-employeesourcesofdocumentsarelikelytocontaindynamicdata—thatis,electronicallystoredinformationwhichchangesonaregularbasis,suchaswebsitesordatabases.

95 The Sedona Guidelines,Comment5.f.


key players are not destroyed through janitorial or other automated systems. As long as their accessible documents are not destroyed, the company should in most cases be able to continue with normal disaster recovery and recycling procedures.96

Issuing the notice may be only the first step, how-ever, as there may be an ongoing need to follow up to ensure that the litigation hold notice is understood by the relevant individuals and is being properly observed. As the Zubulake court stated in its fifth opinion: “A party’s discovery obligations do not end with the imple-mentation of a ‘litigation hold’—to the contrary, that’s only the beginning. Counsel must oversee compliance with the litigation hold, monitoring the party’s efforts to retain and produce the relevant documents.”97 The court further counseled that “[t]he litigation hold in-structions must be reiterated regularly and compliance must be monitored.”98 Sending a quarterly or semi-an-nual legal hold notice reminder to the employees that reiterates the content of the legal hold notice is a good policy. If the notice was sent via email, consider attach-ing the original notice to the reminder.

Contents of a Legal Hold NoticeThe legal hold notice must properly convey the scope of material that has to be preserved, but does not nec-essarily have to contain a detailed list of the content of documents to be preserved. It should be tailored to the litigation at issue and give clear instructions about what needs to be preserved, describing in broad terms the subject areas of interest, and relevant time frames. The legal hold should also clarify the types of docu-ments to be preserved, possibly including a summary of the new definition of a document under the Fed-eral Rules of Civil Procedure. The goal is to make sure relevant documents are retained, so err on the side of being over-inclusive. The use of broad categories has the additional benefit of making the preservation notice easier to follow, as it saves the custodian from having to perform a detailed analysis to determine if a document must be preserved.

The following is a checklist of information that counsel should consider including in a legal hold:

• Indication that the communication is Attorney- Client Privileged.

• Name of the case.• Description of the claims.

• An accurate, but general, summary of the claims that have been, or are anticipated to be, asserted by or against the party.

• Broad enough to describe for custodians the universe of the potentially relevant documents.

• Explicit notice that normal document retention has been suspended.

• Description of the subject matter of relevant documents.

• Description of categories of documents to preserve, including a description of what the word “docu-ment” means.

• Instruction to err on the side of preserving a doc-ument if it is questionable whether it should be preserved.

• Instruction on any affirmative steps that must be taken, other than not deleting, to preserve documents.

• Direction for handling new documents.• Consider whether the claims and issues relate to

past conduct only, or whether they also relate to future or continuing conduct.

• Clearly state whether there is a continuing duty to retain new documents that are created after the date of the notice and may be relevant to the subject matter of the claims.

• A prominent warning that not complying with the notice may result in the loss of relevant documents and potentially subject the company to sanctions.

• Instruction regarding what custodians should do with their documents if they change comput-ers, transfer to a new department, or leave the company.

• Instruction regarding what custodians should do if they run out of space to store documents.

• Instruction for how to suspend any automatic jani-torial programs (e.g., how to except documents from deletion, how to move documents into folder not subject to deletion).

96 The Sedona Guidelines,Guideline3,Comment3.d.at28.97 ZubulakeV,229F.R.D.at432.98 Id.


• Information about who the custodians should con-tact with questions.

• Contact information for the legal department.Since legal hold notices should be sent out as soon

as possible after a trigger event occurs, counsel may not yet have received a complaint or any discovery re-quests. Counsel should re-evaluate the legal hold notice when formal pleadings are received, but should also keep in mind that the complaint could be amended or additional requests could be served in the future.99 Counsel should also make efforts to keep any revisions to the legal hold notices as consistent as possible.100

Implement a Policy to Preserve Documents from Employees who Leave the CompanyIf an employee is placed under legal hold, that person’s documents must be maintained if s/he leaves the com-pany. There should be a detailed policy in place that requires the human resources department to notify both the legal and information technology depart-ments any time an employee leaves the company. Only after the names are checked against a list of legal hold notices will IT then be authorized to delete the former employee’s documents in accordance with the cor-porate retention policy. Companies are increasingly finding it beneficial to set up databases to maintain this information and provide some level of automation with regard to notifications and related procedures.

Ensuring Preservation—Collection of DocumentsThe same level of thought and detail necessary to iden-tify and preserve relevant documents should also be used in their collection. An important step is to keep a description of the guidelines and procedures followed in collecting the documents. On a technical level, make sure the party doing the collecting understands the need to maintain the integrity of the electronic data,

including maintaining the file structure of documents and email. Electronic documents are dynamic and may be easily altered.101 To avoid potential claims of evi-dence spoliation, be aware of the ways that electronic documents may be altered. Turning on a computer sys-tem, using automatic update fields, recycling disaster recovery media, system maintenance activities, saving new data, or installing new software may all inadver-tently cause documents to be altered or modified. The format in which documents are collected, as well as the step-by-step procedures used in the collection, should be included in counsel’s collection guidelines.

A subtle but important aspect of document collec-tion is to avoid, to the extent possible, disruption to the client and custodians. Again, this will require counsel to coordinate with the client’s IT personnel. Counsel and the client may decide that outside counsel should collect the documents; or it may be simpler and less disruptive to have the client’s IT staff, working under instruction from legal, collect the client’s files. Depend-ing on the configuration of client’s computer systems, it is possible that most of the relevant electronic mate-rial may be collected remotely; i.e., without physically touching the custodian’s computer. If a custodian’s computer must be directly accessed, it is advisable to schedule this around the custodian’s schedule. Not only will this save the client lost work time, but also it lowers the risk of collection errors or omissions that may result if the collection takes place in a hurried fashion.

After documents have been collected, counsel should consider the method used to store documents. It is helpful to create an archive or library of documents that is well-organized and easily accessible. Counsel has discretion in the method they use to retain docu-ments;102 however, maintaining documents in an inac-cessible format can lead to unnecessary expense when it comes time to review and produce documents.103

99 The Sedona Guidelines,Comment5.f.100 Id.101 Electronicdocumentscontainhiddeninformation,calledmetadata,whichcaneasilybealteredwhendocumentsare

accessed.Careshouldbetakentokeepthemetadataintact.Foramorecomprehensivediscussionofmetadata,seeToddNunn,Uncertain and Unseen, Pending Amendments to the Federal Rules Should Provide Guidance to Handling Metadata,LawandTechnologyNews,January2006.

102 ZubulakeIV,220F.R.D.at218.103 Quinbyv.WestLBAG,No.04CV7406,2006WL2597900(S.D.N.Y.Sept.5,2006)(thecourtdeclinedtoshiftcosts

totheplaintiffofrestoringdocumentsfrombackuptapesforformeremployeeswhenthedefendantknewtheywerepotentiallyrelevanttolitigationatthetimetheywereplacedonbackuptape).


Regardless of what decisions are made regarding the collection process, make sure to track all decisions that led to the conclusions. Keep detailed accounts of all communications with IT staff to avoid later claims of misunderstanding. Retain any document collection questionnaires or interview forms. Keep a log not only of the employees and sources from which documents were collected, but also those sources that were con-sidered and rejected. All of these will greatly diminish the chance of later spoliation charges.

Preservation Issues for Parties Seeking Discovery of Electronic DocumentsAttention to preservation issues extends beyond a par-ty’s need to fulfill its own obligations. Litigation counsel should also consider what steps might be appropriate to ensure preservation of information under the con-trol of the opposing party. The most effective approach is to consider both aspects of preservation in tan-dem—keeping in mind that discovery requests or other demands you make on the opposing party that have preservation implications may well be reciprocated. Be cautious in making any request or demand if your cli-ent would object or be hard-pressed to comply, were they to be presented with a similar request or demand.

Address Preservation of Evidence Concerns EarlyAs with one’s own preservation plan, consideration of what steps are needed to ensure the preservation of information under the control of the opposing party should take place as early as possible. The earlier both parties are focused on preservation issues, the less likely crucial information will be lost. Recogniz-ing that there is no substitute for frank discussions between the parties regarding what information is rel-evant, and what reasonable steps might be followed to preserve such information, the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure now require such discussion as part of the meet and confer process.104

Consider Notifying Opposing Counsel in WritingThe first step to ensure that information under the con-trol of the opposing party is preserved is to make sure that the opposing party is aware of the need to preserve it. As discussed earlier, the duty to preserve electroni-cally stored materials is triggered when a party has no-tice that the evidence is relevant to litigation, or when a party should have known that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation. Serving the opposing party with a properly drafted complaint and discovery re-quests clearly should serve this purpose. But in situa-tions where the service of either the complaint or the discovery requests is expected to be delayed, counsel may want to consider sending a preservation of evi-dence letter to ensure that the opponent is on notice as early as possible of the need to preserve potentially rel-evant documents in advance of discovery requests.105

There are several elements to include in a preserva-tion of evidence letter, though the exact content and construction of the letter will vary depending on such factors as whether or not a complaint has been served, your familiarity with the opposing party’s operations and systems, and what previous communications have taken place between the parties. The first element to include is an explanation of the existence or immi-nence of litigation and the nature of the litigation. If no previous communication has taken place between the parties, this aspect of the letter will likely require more attention than where, for example, the opposing party has already been served with a complaint. The letter should describe the types of evidence to be preserved, both in terms of the subject matter and in terms of the possible locations of the evidence. Where counsel has adequate knowledge of opposing party’s systems and operations to do so, the letter should identify the indi-

104 Fed. R. Civ. P.26(f)(statingthatpartiesmustconfer“todiscussanyissuesrelatingtopreservingdiscoverableinformation”).

105 See,e.g.,Wigintonv.CBRichardEllis,Inc.,2003WL22439865,at*4(N.D.Ill.Oct.27,2003)(“[T]he[preservationlet-ter]issignificantbecauseitalertedCBREtothetypesofelectronicinformation(withintherealmofallrelevantdocu-ments)thatwerelikelytoberequestedduringdiscovery.Ultimately,CBRE’sdutywas…topreserveevidencethatithadnoticewouldlikelybethesubjectofdiscoveryrequests.CBREcannotnowclaimthatitdidnotknowthatelec-tronicdata(suchase-mailsorInternetuserecords)werelikelytobethesubjectofdiscoveryrequests.”).


viduals, by name or by position, within the company that may possess relevant electronic evidence, and de-scribe the material to be preserved with specificity. If the material’s relevance to the litigation is not immedi-ately apparent, a brief explanation of its relevance may be warranted. Finally, ask that the evidence be located immediately and preserved.

Preservation of evidence letters serve a limited but useful function. Preservation of evidence letters can reduce the risk that the opposing party will destroy relevant documents. If drafted properly, the preserva-tion letter provides a party with clear notice that it may have relevant evidence, and can also be useful in help-ing them identify and preserve the likely sources of that evidence. Keep in mind, however, that a preservation of evidence letter by itself does not create a duty to preserve every shred of information described in the letter. In fact, courts may cast an unsympathetic eye on a preser-vation of evidence letter that is overly broad and seems

designed with an eye toward establishing a foundation for spoliation, rather than an honest effort to alert the opposing party of the need to preserve evidence.106

If Circumstances Warrant, Obtain a Preservation Order from the CourtSo long as both parties are acting in good faith, most preservation issues can be resolved without the direct involvement of the court.107 There may, however, be times where a party acts in bad faith. Where will-ful destruction of evidence is a real risk, be prepared to take action beyond notifying opposing counsel in writing of the duty to preserve potentially responsive documents. If there is good cause to believe a litigant or third party is apt to alter or destroy relevant elec-tronic evidence, consider obtaining an order to pre-serve evidence,108 or an order permitting the seizure of computers and storage media.109

Courts will consider a number of factors in decid-

106 See,e.g.,Freyv.GaineyTransp.Servs.,Inc.,2006WL2443787(N.D.Ga.Aug.22,2006)(Questioningtheplaintiff ’scounsel’s15-page“spoliationletter,”thecourtobserved:“Suchanextensiverequestformaterialscertainlywouldlenditselftoaneffortonanyplaintiff ’sparttosandbagadefendantintheeventthatanyofthosematerialswerenotpre-served….[I]tisdifficulttoallowapotentialplaintifftomakeanendrunaroundtheFederalRulesofCivilProcedurebyfilingapreemptive‘spoliation’letter.”).

107 See,e.g.,Fed R. Civ. P.26(f),advisorycommittee’snote(“Therequirementthatthepartiesdiscusspreservationdoesnotimplythatcourtsshouldroutinelyenterpreservationorders.Apreservationorderenteredoverobjectionsshouldbenarrowlytailored.Ex partepreservationordersshouldissueonlyinexceptionalcircumstances.”)

108 BalboaThreadworks,Inc.v.Stucky,2006WL763668(D.Kan.Mar.24,2006)(duringinitialcasemanagementconfer-ences,thecourtorderedmirrorimagingofallofthedefendants’computersandperipheralequipmenttobedoneattheplaintiffs’expense,andorderedthepartiestomeetandconferonappropriatesearchprotocolthatwouldaddresstheissueofprotectionofattorneyclientprivilegeandnon-businessrelatedpersonalinformation);see alsoAntiochCo.v.ScrapbookBorders,Inc.,210F.R.D.645(D.Minn.2002)(theplaintiff ’smotionforexpediteddiscovery,entryofapreservationorderandtoappointneutralcomputerforensicsexperttotakemirrorimageofthedefendants’harddriveswasgranted,eventhoughnodiscoveryhadyetbeenpropounded);Hypro,LLCv.Reser,2004WL2905321(D.Minn.Dec.10,2004)(inlightofthedefendant’spreviousattempttodeleteincriminatingemailanddocumentsfromhiscompanylaptop,thecourtenteredanorderrequiringallpartiestopreserveandprotectevidence);PropathServs.,L.L.P.v.Ameripath,Inc.,2004WL2389214(N.D.Tex.Oct.21,2004)(thecourtenteredapreliminaryinjunctionpro-hibitingthedefendantsfrom,amongotherthings,deleting,destroying,oralteringanydocument,email,orcomputerdrivecontaininganyProPathorProPathrelatedinformation,andrequiredthedefendantstosegregatesaiditemsintoaconfidentialfilenottobeusedintheirbusiness);Kadantv.SeeleyMach.,Inc.,244F.Supp.2d19(N.D.N.Y.2003)(theplaintiff ’smotionforpreliminaryinjunctionwasgranted;thedefendantswereenjoinedfromdestroying,eras-ing,oralteringanyofitscomputer-storedinformationthatconcernedanyoftheplaintiff ’sclaimsagainstthem).

109 Henryv.IAC/InteractiveGroup,2006WL354971(W.D.Wash.Feb.14,2006)(grantingapreliminaryinjunctionforcingtheplaintifftoreturncomputersandelectronicfilestothedefendantsafteraforensicfirmfirstremovedtheplaintiff ’sownprivilegeddocumentsatherexpense);AutoNation,Inc.v.Hatfield,2006WL60547(Fla.Cir.Ct.Jan.4,2006)(grantingtemporaryinjunctivereliefandorderingaforensicinspectionofapersonalcomputer);QZO,Inc.v.Moyer,594S.E.2d541(S.C.Ct.App.2004)(thetrialcourtenteredaTROonthesamedayacomplaintwasfiled,


ing whether to enter a preservation order. For exam-ple, a Pennsylvania court set forth a three-part balancing test for evaluating a motion for a preserva-tion order: (1) the level of concern the court has for the continuing existence and maintenance of the integ-rity of the evidence in question in the absence of an order directing preservation of the evidence; (2) any irreparable harm likely to result to the party seeking the preservation of evidence absent an order directing preservation; and (3) the capability of an individual, entity, or party to maintain the evidence sought to be preserved, not only as to the evidence’s original form, condition or contents, but also the physical, spatial, and financial burdens created by ordering evidence preservation.110 When seeking a preservation order, be sure to address these considerations in the motion.

In extreme cases where a risk of destruction is particu-larly high, i.e., where the facts demonstrate that the adverse party has the opportunity to conceal or destroy evidence, and that the party is likely to take the opportunity for de-ceptive conduct, ex parte relief may be possible.111

If Relevant Evidence Is Destroyed, Consult a Computer Forensics Expert and Consider Seeking Appropriate SanctionsDespite the precautions counsel takes, counsel may discover that relevant evidence has been altered or deleted, either innocently or maliciously. Where the altered or deleted files are likely to contain informa-tion that is particularly relevant, counsel may need to consult with a computer forensics expert to recover the missing evidence.

Review Material Produced and Follow Up PromptlyOnce the opposition has provided responses and documents to the discovery requests, be diligent in reviewing it, and follow up if there appear to be dis-crepancies. For example, confirm that the universe of ESI produced covers the relevant time period, and that there are no large gaps of time for which no information has been produced.112 Similarly, deter-mine whether email has been produced for all the key players. In some situations, it may be useful to

orderingthedefendanttosurrenderimmediatelyacomputerbelongingtheparties’formerpartnership);Dodge,War-ren&PetersIns.Servs.,Inc.v.Riley,130Cal.Rptr.2d385(Ct.App.2003)(preliminaryinjunctionrequiringpreserva-tionofelectronicevidenceupheld;thedefendantswereprohibitedfromdestroyinganyelectronicstoragemediaandrequiredtoallowacourt-appointedexperttocopyallofit,torecoverlostordeletedfiles,andtoperformautomatedsearchesofevidenceunderguidelinesagreedtobypartiesorsetbycourt);GatesRubberCo.v.BandoChem.Indus.,Ltd.,167F.R.D.90(D.Colo.1996)(courtallowedexpediteddiscoveryandissuedasiteinspectionorder,allowingtheplaintifftoenterthedefendant’spremisestolocateandcopymaterials,includingelectronicrecords,forpreserva-tion);Rantav.Ranta,2004WL504588(Conn.Super.Ct.Feb.25,2004)(theplaintiffwifewasorderedtostopusingthecouple’slaptopcomputeranddeposititwiththeclerkofcourt);PhysiciansInteractivev.LathianSys.,Inc.,2003WL23018270(E.D.Va.Dec.5,2003)(courtgrantedlimitedexpediteddiscoverytoenterthedefendant’spremisesandobtaina“mirrorimage”ofthecomputerequipmentcontainingelectronicdatarelatingtothedefendants’allegedattacksontheplaintiff ’sserver;discoverylimitedtoinformationonthedefendants’computersrelatedtotheallegedattacks,andassistanceofcomputerforensicexpertrequired).

110 CapricornPowerCo.,Inc.v.SiemensWestinghousePowerCorp.,220F.R.D.429(W.D.Pa.2004).111 ComcastofIll.X,LLCv.Till,293F.Supp.2d936(E.D.Wis.2003)(courtgrantedtheplaintiff ’sex partemotionfor

expediteddiscoveryandforapreservationorder);CarltonGroup,Ltd.v.Tobin,2003WL21782650,at*8n.8(S.D.N.Y.July31,2003)(courtgrantedanex parteapplicationforTROandrelatedreliefinordertolocateandrecoverstoleninformation,andorderedreturnoflaptopsand“bitstreamcopying”ofthedefendants’computerstopreservedeleteddata).But seeHarrisonv.Jones,Walker,Waechter,Poitevent,Carrere&Denegre,L.L.P.,2004WL2984815(E.D.La.Dec.9,2004)(participationbyformeremployeranditsattorneysintheexecutionofstatecourt’spreservationorderauthorizingimagingoftheplaintiffs’harddrivesmaysupportstatelawclaimsoftrespass,invasionofprivacy,andabuseofrights);FirstTechn.SafetySys.,Inc.v.Depinet,11F.3d641(6thCir.1993)(ex parteorderpermittingtheplaintiffanditscounsel,withU.S.Marshal,toenterthedefendants’businesspremisesandinventoryandimpoundcomputerrecordsandcopyandinventorybusinessrecordswasabuseofdiscretion).

112 See,e.g.,ResidentialFundingCorp.v.DeGeorgeFin.Corp.,306F.3d99(2dCir.2002)(emailfromrelevanttimeperiodmissing).


compare the productions received from different par-ties or third parties for any major discrepancies, as emails sent between them ought to be produced by each of them.113 Where there are reasonable grounds to believe that the opposition has not complied with its discovery obligations, promptly follow up with the party—or the court, as necessary. The appropri-ate level of follow up will depend on the severity of the discovery failing, as well as the opposing par-ty’s promptness and cooperation in remedying it. In extreme cases, where for example there is evidence that relevant information has been willfully destroyed

113 See,e.g.,CumisIns.Co.v.Diebold,Inc.,2004WL1126173(E.D.Pa.May20,2004)(theplaintiffconvincedthecourtthatthedefendantmaynothavesatisfieditsdiscoveryobligationsbyshowingthatresponsiveDiebolddocumentsandemailshadbeenobtainedfromothersources,buthadyettobeproducedbyDiebolditself).

114 See,e.g.,Alexanderv.F.B.I.,186F.R.D.78(D.D.C.1998)(examinationofaformerofficial’sharddriveandserversallowedinordertodeterminewhetherresponsivedocumentsthatwerenotproducedactuallyexisted);UkiahAuto.Invs.v.MitsubishiMotorsofN.Am.,Inc.,2006WL1348562(N.D.Cal.May17,2006)(wherethedefendantassertedthatmanyfinancialrecordsweremissingfromtheplaintiff ’spaperproduction,themagistrateruledthat,unlesstheplaintiffwasabletoproducetherelevantdocumentsinelectronicformonitsown,theplaintiffwouldberequiredtoproduceitscomputertoanagreed-uponneutralinspectorwithin30daysandshoulderthecostofsuchinspection);Tilbergv.NextMgmt.Co.,2005WL2759860(S.D.N.Y.Oct.24,2005)(allowingaforensicsearchofthedefendant’scomputersystemandadditionaldiscoverybytheplaintiffafterthediscoverycut-offwhereapartialforensicsearchshowedthatrelevantdocumentsexistedonthedefendant’semailservers,centralserver,andindividualwork-sta-tions,andwheretheplaintiffpresentedrelevantdocumentsreceivedfromthirdpartieswhichwereneverproducedbythedefendant);GTFM,Inc.v.Wal-MartStores,Inc.,2000WL335558(S.D.N.Y.Mar.30,2000)and2000WL1693615(S.D.N.Y.Nov.9,2000)(theplaintiffs’motionforon-siteinspectionofcomputerrecordsgranted);RendaMarine,Inc.v.U.S.,58Fed.Cl.57(2003)(inviewofakeyplayer’spracticeofdeletingrelevante-maildocuments,whichcon-tinuedevenafterthelawsuitcommenced,thecourtorderedthedefendanttoprovideaccesstothedefendant’sharddrive).But seeFloeterv.CityofOrlando,2006WL1000306(M.D.Fla.Apr.14,2006)(denyingtheplaintiff ’smotiontogainentryintotheOrlandoPoliceDepartmentofficestoinspectitscomputerharddrivessincetheharddrivescon-tainedmuchirrelevantinformationandcouldcontaininformationaboutongoingcriminalinvestigations,confiden-tialsources,andthelike,andtheplaintiffhadnotmadeanyshowingthathehadrequestedinformationcontainedonthecomputerharddriveswhichthecityhadfailedtoproduce);Williamsv.Mass.Mut.LifeIns.Co.,226F.R.D.144(D.Mass.2005)(courtdeniedtheplaintiff ’srequestforaforensicsearchofaformeremployer’sinformationsystemswheretheplaintiffofferednocredibleevidencethatthedefendantswereunwillingtoproducecomputer-generateddocumentsorthatthedefendantshadwithheldrelevantinformation);Menkev.BrowardCountySch.Bd.,916So.2d8(Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2005)(quashingadministrativelawjudge’sorderallowingaschoolboard’sexpertunfetteredaccesstoateacher’shomecomputerstodiscoverwhethertheycontainedvariouscategoriesofinformation;therewasnoevidenceofanydestructionofevidenceorthwartingofdiscovery,andanorderaffordednoprotectionagainstthedisclosureofconfidentialorprivilegedinformation);Betheav.Comcast,218F.R.D.328(D.D.C.2003)(courtdeniedtheplaintiff ’smotionforanordercompellingthedefendantstoallowhertoenterupontheirpremises,inspecttheircomputersystemsandrelatedprograms,andcopyanyrelevantinformation,sincetheplaintiffwasmerelyspecu-latingthatthedefendantsfailedtosatisfytheirdiscoveryobligations);InreFordMotorCo.,345F.3d1315(11thCir.2003)(adiscoveryordergrantingtheplaintiffunlimitedanddirectaccesstoFord’sdatabaseswasanabuseofdiscre-tionintheabsenceofafactualfindingofsomenon-compliancewithdiscoveryrulesbyFord);McCurdyGroup,LLCv.Am.BiomedicalGroup,Inc.,2001WL536974(10thCir.May21,2001)(thedefendant’sskepticismthattheplaintiffhadnotproducedcopiesofallresponsivedocumentsdidnotentitlethedefendanttoconductaphysicalinspection

or withheld, you may consider seeking direct access to its computer systems.114

Employ Other Discovery ToolsA number of other discovery tools are available to parties engaging in electronic discovery to ensure that preservation obligations are being met. If the litigation is in federal court, it is likely that that the other side will disclose the identities and locations of key play-ers and documents in its Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures. In addition, interrogatories may be useful to obtain basic information about a party’s computer systems


oftheplaintiff ’sharddrives);Convolve,Inc.v.CompaqComputerCorp.,223F.R.D.162(S.D.N.Y.2004)(thecourtrejectedtheplaintiff ’srequestfordirectaccesstoCompaq’sharddrives,servers,anddatabasessincetheplaintifffailedtoshowwidespreaddestructionorwithholdingofrelevantinformationbyCompaq).

115 Treppelv.BiovailCorp.,233F.R.D.363(S.D.N.Y.2006)(thedefendantswereorderedtotreataDocumentRetentionQuestionnaireandtheplaintiff ’ssupplementalletterinquiriesregardingelectronicdocumentmaintenanceandreten-tionasinterrogatoriesandprovidesubstantiveresponses);Sonninov.Univ.ofKansasHosp.Auth.,220F.R.D.633(D.Kan.2004)(thedefendantwasorderedtoprovideacompleteandfullresponsetointerrogatoriesseekinginformationaboutcomputerandemailsystemssincethedefendant’s“verybriefandgeneralresponse”wasinsufficient);see alsoConcernedCitizensofBelleHavenv.BelleHavenClub,223F.R.D.39(D.Conn.2004)(thecourtgrantedtheplaintiff ’smotiontocompelthedefendantstorespondtointerrogatoriesandrequestsforadmissionsrelatingtothedatabasecompiledbytheplaintiffs).

and records retention policies.115 Counsel may also take Rule 30(b)(6) depositions to uncover important information about electronic evidence controlled by the opponent. Depositions taken early in the case may

provide the information needed to craft document requests, while depositions later on may provide a means to test compliance with discovery obligations.

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