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FREE WILL AND

THE KNOWLEDGE CONDITION

by Eddy Nahmias

Abstract

This dissertation argues that free will is constituted by a set of cognitive abilities and thatfree will is threatened not by determinism but perhaps by certain empirical theories. In Chapter

1, I argue that the question of free will should not be focused on the question of whether or notdeterminism is true. Rather, we should take a position (compatriotism) which is neutral about

the logical relations between free will and determinism/indeterminism. Indeterminism does not

necessarily threaten free will, and most of the threats thought to be posed by determinism are infact distinct from that metaphysical thesis. The remaining threats posed by determinism cannot

be answered by any legitimate libertarian theory.

Instead, I suggest in Chapter 2 that free will should be analyzed in terms of theKnowledge Condition: our ability to know ourselvesspecifically to know our conflicting

motivations, to know which of them we really want to move us, and to know how to act

accordingly. I analyze these cognitive abilities in light of Frankfurts theory of identification,and I discuss the relations between free will, free action, and responsibility.

The sort of knowledge required by this theory of free will may be threatened by empirical

theories about human nature. In Chapter 3, I specifically examine theories and experiments in

social psychology that suggest we have a limited understanding of why we do what we do, and Ioffer some responses to these threats.

The knowledge required for free will may also be threatened by certain philosophical

theories about the nature of the human mind. In the Epilogue I discuss eliminativism andepiphenomenalism as case studies for such threats. I conclude by suggesting that we may make

significant progress on the problem of free will if we come to better understand the nature of

subjective consciousness.Finally, I offer an Appendix in which I discuss the evolution and development of the

cognitive abilities required for us to have free will, specifically our ability to understand our own

mental states.


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Chapter 1Situating the Free Will Problem

1. The Power Condition and the Knowledge Condition

Most people believe we have free will. They believe that, if we did not have free will, wewould not be responsible for our actionsand perhaps our lives would have no meaning. Some

philosophers, however, argue that there is no such thing as free will; even more argue that, if acertain metaphysical thesis about the nature of causation (determinism) turns out to be true, then

we do not have free will. Are these philosophers talking about the sort of free will ordinarypeople think they have, the sort they want to have for life to be meaningful? I dont think so. In

this dissertation I will describe some of the features that are essential to most peoples

conception of free will. In this chapter I will argue that the metaphysical thesis of determinism isnot relevant to this conception.

What, then, are we talking about when we say we have free will? I think we are saying

that we possess certain abilitiesabilities that are uniquely expressed in humans and that we

exercise with varying degrees of success when we make decisions and perform actions. Theseabilities involve knowledge andpower. When we act of our own free will, we express these

abilities: we know what it is we really want and what we need to do to satisfy that desire; and we

have thepowerto act on that desire.We feel our freedom threatened when we experience a lack of knowledge or power or

both. Often we feel constrained when we cannot get what we want, because some external force

frustrates our ability to act on our desires. You want to leave the room but the door is locked.You want to get home but the traffic jam blocks your way. Some external forces are other

people: police, parents, and politicians sometimes control us against our will (though they may

also be crucial in securing our freedom). External forces and agents can undermine our power toget what we want. So can internal forces. Addictions, phobias, compulsive habits, and

unconscious drives may make us act in ways we dont really want to. Some moods and emotionsmake us act despite ourselvesthe fit of anger, the paralyzing depression, the overwhelming

lust. Hence, both external and internal forces may constrain our power to get what we reallywant.

But sometimes we feel our freedom threatened by another type of internal conflict: we

just dont know what we really want or how to determine what we should do. We may feelpulled by conflicting desires and thus torn by the realization that we cannot follow two paths at

once; we know we need to choose but we dont know how to resolve the conflict. Or we may

believe that we should act in one way but feel like acting in another way, and thus not know whatto do. You may experience a conflict because you want both to read and to watch TV and you

dont know which you want to do more, and you may experience a conflict because you think

you shouldhelp your friend move but youfeel like going to the lake, and you dont knowwhether to act on your obligations or your inclinations. If you dont know what you really wantto do, you cant act on what you really wanteven if you had the power to.

Philosophers often analyze free will in terms of the Power Condition. It lies behind the

basic libertarian view requiring that free agents have the power (a) to do what they choose andalso (b) to choose otherwise (under the exact same conditions). And it also represents the basic

compatibilist view of free will: we are free if we have the power to carry out what we want to


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willwhich I see as requiring more than free actionwithout engaging those abilities at the

time of the action. The Knowledge Condition for free will does not apply directly to actions butto agents; it involves cognitive abilities which an agent must possess in order to have free will,

and these abilities may be possessed to different degrees. Furthermore, agents may then exercise

these abilities in different ways, which will result in actions that reflect different degrees offreedom and responsibility.

5Hence, satisfying the Knowledge Condition is necessary and

sufficient for an agent to possess free will, but (1) since the Knowledge Condition comes invarying degrees, so too may different agents possess varying degrees of free will

6and (2) since

free will applies to agents, not actions, an agent with free will may exercise it to varying degreesin different actions. (These relationships will be more fully discussed in Chapter 2, section 7).

Some philosophers, notably libertarians, will see the abilities I associate with the

Knowledge Condition as obviously insufficient for free will. They believe that free will requiresthe ability to do otherwise in a strong sense that is incompatible with deterministic causation

(hence, they believe indeterminism of some sort is necessary for free will). Sometimes the term

free will as used in philosophical debates is relegated to refer only to this ability to dootherwise, and all the attention is focused on whether this ability is compatible with

determinism.7

I think this is a mistake. As I will argue in this chapter, the relation of

determinism (and indeterminism) to free will is often presented in a misleading way. I suggestthat, without giving up the language of free will, we should remain neutral on the question of

determinism and focus our attention on more tenable and interesting questions. These questions

will move the free will debate closer to problems in philosophy of mind about the nature of self-

knowledge, consciousness, and reductionism. As I will discuss in Chapters 3 and the Epilogue,this view of free will also opens it up to empirical and conceptual challenges distinct fromand

more significant thanthe threat of deterministic causation.

2. Compatibilism, Libertarianism, and Compatriotism

Historically the philosophical debate about free will has been about the compatibilityquestion and fought between compatibilists and incompatibilists. Incompatibilists believe that

free will is impossible in a deterministic universeone in which the present state of the universeis necessary given its past states and the laws of nature (i.e. a description of the present state ofthe universe is entailed by a description of the state of the universe at any other time and the laws

of nature). Compatibilists believe free will is possible even if determinism is true. Some

compatibilists (soft determinists) believe both that determinism is true and that we have freewill. Some incompatibilists (hard determinists) agree that determinism is true but then

5 As an analogy, we may apply the term strong to persons. Possessing strength to some degree will involve being

able to perform certain actions (e.g. lift various amounts of weight). A strong person has these abilities even when

not exercising them, and then she may or may not exercise them to various degrees in performing particular actions,

such as lifting loads.

6 These degrees of freedom will apply between members within a type of creature, such as human beings (e.g.

children have less free will than normal adults), and also between types of creatures (e.g. humans have more freewill than apes).

7 Some philosophers have simply given up on the term free will, and turned to other concepts such as free action,

choice, agency, autonomy, self-control, self-determination, and moral responsibility (see section 3 below). SeeDouble (1991) for an argument that the term free will does not pick out a natural kind.


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conclude that we do nothave free will. More commonly, the incompatibilist will argue that we

do have free will, and therefore, determinism must be false. This is the libertarian position.The compatibility question usually travels via the could-have-done-otherwise condition

(CDO); most philosophers agree that, in some sense, to have free will we must be able to do

other than we in fact do.8

Most compatibilists interpret the CDO condition in such a way that itcan be met even if determinism is true. Incompatibilists, however, argue that if determinism is

true, we can never act other than we in fact act. This debate has been (in every sense of theword) interminable and often seems to reduce to a clash of intuitions or to begging the question

(or both): I will try to avoid this debate wherever possible.9

Instead, I will argue that thecompatibility question, at least as it relates to the thesis of determinism, should not be the central

question in debates about free will.

A well-known incompatibilist, Peter van Inwagen, writes:

There are four possible positions one might take about the logical relations that obtain

among free will, determinism, and indeterminism: (1) Free will is compatible withdeterminism and incompatible with indeterminism (sc. of human actions); (2) Free will is

incompatible with determinism and compatible with indeterminism; (3) Free will is

incompatible with determinism and incompatible with indeterminism; (4) Free will iscompatible with determinism and indeterminism. Positions (1) and (2) are the

historically important ones. Position (3) has, to my knowledge, been taken only by C.D.

Broad. Position (4) has, to my knowledge, been taken by no one. (1985: 349)

I think van Inwagens categories do not accurately reflect the free will debate. He is right that

position (2) is historically important; it represents all libertarians. But he suggests that position

(1) represents all compatibilists when, in fact, it represents only soft determinists, and only someof them have explicitly argued that free will is incompatible with indeterminism.

10(Some hard

determinists represented by position (3) also argue for the incompatibility of free will andindeterminism, claiming that indeterminism entails randomness. I will argue below that this

claim is mistaken.)More importantly, some philosophers do hold position (4), that free will is compatible

with determinism and with indeterminismmore precisely, that it is possible free will and

determinism are jointly true andit is possible that free will and indeterminism are jointly true.11

Examples include, I believe, Peter Strawson, Harry Frankfurt, and Daniel Dennett, whose

8 Dennett (1984b) coined the acronym CDO and argues that it is not required for free will in many cases.

9 Fischer aptly calls the debate a dialectical stalemate (1994: 83-85). And Kant, of course, included it as one of

his antimonies.

10 Notably, Hobart (1934), Schlick (1939), Nowell Smith (1948), Ayer (1954), Smart (1961), and Bergmann (1977,

Appendix). Historically, the position is associated with Hobbes, Hume, Mill, Shopenhauer and perhaps the Stoics.

See section 4 below.

11 Which is notto say it is possible for free will, determinism, and indeterminism to be true together. The way van

Inwagen describes position (4) makes it seem unlikely any philosopher would hold it, since it seems the philosopher

would have to offer positive arguments for each conjunctthat free will is compatible with determinism and that itis compatible with indeterminism. But below I explain that the position requires the least defense of the four since it

only requires arguing against the necessity claims of the other positions.


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analyses of free will do not require the truth of determinism or indeterminism.12

Frankfurt, for

instance, writes, My conception of freedom of the will appears to be neutral with regard to theproblem of determinism (1971: 25). Since van Inwagen made his claim, several other

philosophers have followed this trend of remaining agnostic about the relations between free will

and determinism. Fischer and Ravizza (1998), though they use the language of responsibilityand control rather than free will, state: Indeed, an implication of our approach to moral

responsibility is that our personhood need not be threatened by eitherthe truth of causaldeterminism or itsfalsity (16). Alfred Mele (1995) using the language of autonomy, takes the

position of agnostic autonomism: agnostics do not insist that autonomy is compatible withdeterminism; nor need they insist that we are internally indeterministic . . . in a way of use to

libertarians (253).

Such philosophers are usually identified as compatibilists since they often offer someaccount of how free will is possible even if determinism is true, though they also allow that free

will may be compatible with at least some types of indeterminism. But they usually argue more

emphatically that the question of determinism, at least as we presently understand it, is irrelevantto free will. Rather, their conceptions of free will are concerned with the specific causal

processes involved in deliberation and action, and they remain neutral about whether such

relations need to be deterministic or need to involve some sort of indeterminism. Fischer andRavizzas account of control, for instance, requires that we look more carefully at the

characteristics of the actual sequence that leads to the action . . . [which] holds that ascriptions

of responsibility do notdepend on whether agents are free to pursue alternative courses of

action (1998: 37).The account of free will I develop here also represents position (4). Perhaps van Inwagen

(falsely) thinks this logical space is unoccupied because it, unlike the other three positions, has

not been given a philosophical name. Let me correct this problem. I will name the positioncompatriotism. This name is meant to suggest that compatibilists and libertarians should put

aside their debates about determinism and become compatriots in analyzing the positiveconditions of a concept of free will worth defending and in battling more pressing and serious

threats to such a view of free will.13

Compatriotism is phonetically similar to compatibilism,which is appropriate to the extent that it is anti-incompatibilist: it disagrees with (the firstconjunct of) position (2) to suggest that it is possible that free will and determinism are jointly

true [(F & D)]. But compatriotism does not hold that free will is incompatible with

indeterminismso it also disagrees with (the second conjunct of) position (1) to suggest that it ispossible that free will and indeterminism are jointly true

[(F & -D)].14

12Strawson (1962), Dennett (1984a) and Frankfurt (1969 and 1971). Other philosophers who explicitly or implicitly

accept this position include Watson (1983), Mele (1995), Wolf (1990), Fischer and Ravizza (1998), and Bok (2000).

See also Fischer (1994), who calls his view that causal determinism is compatible with moral responsibility

semicompatibilism.

13 Strawson (1962) suggests that a reconciliation between incompatibilists (whom he calls pessimists) and

compatibilists (optimists) is possible if we properly amend the optimists meager requirements for free will (see

Chapter 2 below).

14 Notice that if you believe that free will is incompatible with determinism [ -(F & D)] and you also believe that

free will exists in at least some possible worlds [( F)]notably, oursthen you are committed to the claim thatfree will must be compatible with indeterminism [ (F & -D)]. That is, the libertarian says, There is at least one


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Instead, compatriotists remain neutral with regard to the compatibility question for four

reasons. First, it is the easiest position to holdthe default position, as it were. Each of theother three positions involves claims of incompatibility, which involve the modality of necessity.

For instance, position (3) entails, It is necessarily false that free will and determinism are both

true [ -(F & D)] and also, It is necessarily false that free will and indeterminism are bothtrue [ -(F & -D)]. Hence, assuming the philosopher holding this position accepts that either

determinism or indeterminism must be true, he is committed to the claim that necessarily freewill does not exist (see footnote 14 for the other positions). Such necessity claims are

metaphysically strong and require powerful arguments to back them up. The burden of proof ison those philosophers who argue for necessary truths and entailments.

15Possibility claims are

weaker and require less support. To hold position (4) is to say it ispossible that free will and

determinism are both true and it ispossible that free will and indeterminism are both true (whichis not, of course, to say that it is possible that free will, determinism, andindeterminism are all

true together). Some may say such a position is emptythat you have to take a firm stand on the

logical relations between determinism, indeterminism, and free will.16

But compatriotists dooffer arguments against the necessity claims of the other three positions (I will present some of

these arguments below), and they have a great deal to say about the positive conditions required

for free will and the causal relations such conditions involvethey just dont see such causalrelations as necessarily requiring determinism or indeterminism.

Indeed, a second reason compatriotists remain neutral about the compatibility question is

their belief that we (e.g. philosophers and scientists) do not have clear conceptions of

determinism, indeterminism, or causationmuch less, the logical relations between themanduntil we do, we will not understand whether determinism or indeterminism or neither conflicts

with free will (depending on howfree will is conceived). Since we are unsure about how to

analyze determinism and indeterminism, we should be unsure about the implications of eachview, and should avoid claims about necessary implications for free will.

17Many philosophers,

including some incompatibilists, say that science might discover whether deterministic orindeterministic causation in fact occurs in the relevant processes of humans coming to act. In

fact, Peter van Inwagen, who strongly believes we have free will, says that if science diddiscover that these processes were deterministic, he would have to renounce his argument forincompatibilism.

18Martin Fischer, who calls such a possibility metaphysical flip-flopping,

possible worldnamely, our ownin which free will and indeterminism co-exist. Similarly if you believe, like

the soft determinist: ( F) and free will is incompatible with indeterminism [ -(F & -D)], then you are committed

to the claim that free will must be compatible with determinism [ (F & D)]. (These modal entailments use the S5system.) Compatriotists, who hold position (4) are committed to much weaker modal claims.

15 See, for instance, Lycan (1987: 10).

16 This claim may be legitimate if free will ifdefinedin a way that conceptually ties it to determinism orindeterminism. But such a definitional move, I believe, is ill-founded (see section 4 below).

17 I believe some incompatibilist intuitions are fueled by a conception of causation left over from classical physics(the Newtonian picture of mechanistic interaction). The causation suggested by modern physics is very different,

and not just because it suggests irreducibly indeterministic causal relations. It certainly is not best captured by the

image of billiard balls colliding!18

Specifically, he would give up the Beta principle. See van Inwagen (1984: 219). This seems to suggest that hedoes not accept that necessarily determinism precludes free will [ -(F & D)].


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says, I do not think that this very important and basic belief [in moral responsibility] should be

held hostage to esoteric scientific doctrines.19

Nor should our basic belief in free will be held hostage to esoteric philosophical

arguments for incompatibilism. Indeed, the third reason compatriotists remain neutral about the

relation between free will and determinism is that they believe the debates about this relation,and the related debates about interpretations of the word can, have not advanced, in part

because of the ambiguity and disagreements about the terms involved.20 The debates suggest anantinomy which can only be escaped by, as Quine suggests, a repudiation of our conceptual

heritage. Compatriotism represents one such repudiation by arguing the question ofdeterminism, at least as presented in these debates, is simply irrelevant to free will.

Fourth, and most importantly, compatriotists believe that the central questions about the

nature of free will involve the cognitive abilities it involvesfor instance, an agents ability toknow what he really wants and to know how to act accordingly (the Knowledge Condition).

Indeed, those philosophers, whether compatibilist or libertarian, who believecontra position

(3)that humans do possess free will, share many intuitions about the positive conditionsrequired for free will. I will lump together all such positive conditions under the name AS

conditions (for Agent-as-Source), because they require that agentstheir deliberations,

desires, decisions, intentionsare the source of their actions.21 Despite any disagreements aboutthe threat determinism may pose to free will, most participants in the free will debates put a lot

of effort into analyzing AS conditions and agree on many of them. (No libertarian, after all,

believes indeterminism is a sufficientcondition for free will). Furthermore, these philosophers

share views about various other threats to free will (some of which, we will see, are mistakenlyassociated with determinism).

Compatriotism locates free will not in some metaphysical ability to do otherwise in the

exact same situation but (where it seems to be located) in our cognitive abilities to knowourselves and know how to achieve what we want. That is, it situates questions about free will

amidst questions about the nature of the mind and the mind-body and mind-world relations. Inturn, compatriotism sees the most significant threats to free will not in determinism but in certain

conceptions of the mind and of the types of causal processes involved in an agents coming toact, threats that derive from certain philosophical and scientific theories of human nature.Compatriotists view these threats as more serious and relevant than those thought to be posed by

the metaphysical doctrine of determinism.22

They can then wage a unified battle against these

threats.

19 Fischer (1999: 129). See also Fischer and Ravizza (1998: 253-254). As is clear from my Chapter 3, I certainly do

not think free will must be immune to all scientific threats (but see note 23 below).

20 This is not to say the arguments have not been original, interesting, and impressive. Compatibilists conditional

analyses of can, incompatibilist responses, new libertarian theories, and arguments for and against PAP (theprinciple of alternate possibilities), including Frankfurt-style examples, have made the late 20th century an exciting

time for free will enthusiasts, but the debate about the compatibility question still seems deadlocked (see Fischer

1999). The more interesting moves, I believe, have been in the compatriotist directioni.e. theories of free will thatsuggest determinism is irrelevant to free will (such as Frankfurts).

21 These conditions are often discussed in terms of self-control, autonomy, and self-determination.

22 Indeed, determinism is a theory that might be proven true or false by physicists doing experiments that do not

involve humans (so the fate of our free will would be in the hands of a science that need not even consider us). On


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Thus, compatriotism fills a logical space in the free will debates which has remained

underdescribed:(1)The free will problem is notessentially about the question of determinism. Indeed, one can

and should remain neutral about whether determinism or indeterminism is necessary for free

will.In addition to this claim, I believe most of the philosophers I identify with the compatriotist

position share two other views:(2)Free will is constituted by a set of cognitive abilities.(3)Most humans possess free will (i.e. possess the cognitive abilities that constitute free will).

The rest of this chapter will continue to argue for the first thesis. Chapter 2 will discuss

some of the cognitive abilities required for free will that have remained largely unexplored

(thesis 2). I will argue for the third thesis to the extent that, in Chapters 3 and 4, I defend mytheory of free will against empirical and conceptual threats. Beyond that, I will defer to a

simplistic argument offered by several philosophers: free will is required for moral

responsibility; we cannot seriously doubt that we (normal humans) have moral responsibility;therefore, we have free will.

23An even simpler argument might be, We all know we have free

will, its just a matter of defining what it is we all know we have.24

I believe this is right, and

such a definition will not involve determinism or indeterminism.

3. Is that the free will debate?

What men have esteemed and fought for in the name of liberty is varied and complex

but certainly it has never been metaphysical freedom of the will.John Dewey

25

Before I proceed, I should answer a possible objection to the compatriotist position.Some philosophers (especially incompatibilists) might respond that the position is incoherent

because thefree will debate just is (by definition) the debate about the compatibility question. Ifyou want to argue about other aspects of human freedom, they would claim, then use different

languagetalk about autonomy, agency, choice, deliberation, control, or moral responsibility (orat most free action). And perhaps when you are finished you can link up your discussion to thequestion of determinism and free will. In fact, many philosophers have taken this route, and

especially in recent decades, have focused on the concepts of autonomy and moral responsibility,

the other hand, scientific theories about human nature and the mind must take into account the evidence that we at

least seem to be free and responsible (psychology, for instance, must deal with our experience of deliberation and

choice).

23 See, for instance, van Inwagen (1983: 206-7). This argument underlies his willingness to flip-flop if we

discover that our universe is, in fact, deterministic. Though I agree that free will is necessary for moral

responsibility, I do not believe it is sufficient (see Chapter 2, section 8).

24 Which is almost as simple as Samuel Johnsons famous quip, Sir, we know our will is free, and theres an end

ont.

25 Dewey (1957: 303).


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hence conceding that, after all, they are not trying to analyze free will.26

I have sympathy with

this move, since changing the name of the debate is one way to change the terms of the debate.But I think it concedes too much.

First of all, the term free will has a history in philosophy that goes beyond the debate

about determinism, even if we take into account theological determinism (Gods foreknowledge)and logical determinism (fatalism). Most philosophers, including libertarians, spend many more

pages discussing the positive conditions of agency required for free will (AS conditions) than thenegative condition of freedom from deterministic causation. More importantly, the term free

will has too much currency in ordinary language to concede that free will is only about thequestion of determinism and the ability to do otherwise. Peter van Inwagen disagrees. He

claims that the term free will is a philosophical term of art. . . . If someone uses the words

free will and does not use them within [the phrase of his own free will], he is almost certainlya participant in a philosophical discussion, and thatdiscussion, he says, is about whether an

agent can act in one way or anothercan do otherwise in the exact same situationan ability

van Inwagen believes requires indeterminism (1989: 220).I offer several reasons to suggest van Inwagen is mistaken. First, when I ask my students

to talk about what they mean by free will, most talk about our abilities to choose and deliberate,

to be free of constraints and control by others, to be conscious and in control of what we aredoing. Few bring up determinism (though some mention particular causal histories, such as

brainwashing or genetic influences, which they see as threatening free will). They must betrainedto think that universal deterministic causation may threaten free will (though, I admit, it

is not hard to get them to feel the bite of that intuition if the incompatibilist argument ispresented in certain ways).

27

Second, the term free will is used often by people in the real world and usually without

reference to the question of determinism, as in two recent letters to the editor ofThe New YorkTimes: The Chimps Dont Have Free Will (7/7/99) and Kennedy Curse or Needless Risk-

Taking; Limits of Free Will (7/21/99). When Robert Sapolsky writes inNewsweek, Who arewe then, and what will happen to our cherished senses of individuality and free will?, he is

concerned that our behaviors, thoughts, and emotions are merely the sum of our genes.28

As Iwill discuss below, this concern is distinct from the question of metaphysical determinism, whichhe does not discuss. Since free will appears in the popular media, especially in the voluminous

discussions of recent scientific findings about human nature from psychology, genetics, and

neuroscience, philosophers should not limit their use of the term to a distinct (and insular)debate. Indeed, scientists themselves use free will, usually to explain how their theories limit

it or show it to be illusory. For instance, Matt Ridley (1999) titles a chapter of his book about the

genome, Free Will, and argues that social causes threaten free will as much as genetic causes.

26 Autonomy is the focus, for instance, of Dworkin (1988), Haworth (1986), and Mele (1995). Fischer and Ravizza(1998) do discuss the compatibility question a great deal but still call their bookResponsibility and Control and

maintain a view they call semi-compatibilismthat even if free will requires the ability to do otherwise, moral

responsibility does not.27 In my experience, students feel threatened by determinism mainly because some incompatibilist arguments

present determinism as entailing that the past controls us, that we are predictable, or that our conscious deliberations

play no role in what we do. I discuss these misleading conflations in the next two sections.

28 Sapolsky, Robert, Its Not All in the Genes,Newsweek, April 10, 2000, p. 68.


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And a series of articles inAmerican Psychologist(July 1999) discusses recent fundamental

breakthroughs in the understanding of motivations, free will, and behavioral control (461).29

Furthermore, our legal system, one might say, is predicated on the concept of free will

and frequently makes reference to the term. Rarely, however, does the subject of determinism

come up in court. Instead, we want to know whether the accused knew what he or she was doingand had the mental capacities to act on such knowledge.

30When defense lawyers use the

insanity defense (or the Twinkie defense or the Steroid Rage defense), they are not claiming theirclients crimes were, like all behavior, caused by the past and the laws of nature, but that, unlike

our (normal) behavior, they were caused by a particular, mitigating causal history. Perhaps theonly instance of the question of determinism leaving the sphere of philosophical debates was

Clarence Darrows attempt to use it as a legal defense, but even he referred to particular causal

histories, not the general thesis that all behavior is the inevitable result of the past and laws ofnature: every case of crime could be accounted for on purely scientific grounds if all the facts

bearing on the case were known: defective nervous systems, lack of education or technical

training, poor heredity, poor early environment, emotional imbalance.31

These are all examplesof unfortunate histories, not necessarily deterministic histories.

Finally, the concept of free will also makes frequent appearances in literature, from the

poetry of Donne and Milton to the works of D.H. Lawrence and Dostoyevsky. These writersmay mention the concept of fate, or refer to our ability to act as we wish, but they rarely mention

causal determinism. Dostoyevskys Underground Man defines free will as the ability to choose

what is contrary to ones own interests, to defy Reason. And Miltons Adam and Eve gain free

will not by eating from the Tree of Indeterminism but by eating the Fruit of Knowledge. Whenthey become aware of their motives as being good or evil, this knowledge endows them (and

their descendents) with the burdens and blessings of free will and moral responsibility.32

Hence, the question of free will, in philosophy and especially in the real world, is notjustindeed, not mainlyabout the threat of determinism, and it should not now be relegatedwithin philosophy to that one question.

Compatriotists believes that, in understanding the nature

of humanfreedom, self-determination, and responsibility, the question of determinism is of

29 The breakthroughs discussed are just the sort I will discuss in Chapter 3 as threatening to free will, but not

because they describe deterministic processes, rather because they suggest that the source of behavioral control

comes not from active awareness but from subtle cues in the environment and from thought processes andinformation not readily accessible to consciousness (461). That is, they suggest we usually act without knowing

why we are actinga question that is unrelated to whether determinism is true.

30 And a defendants responsibility is usually mitigated if he did not intend and could not reasonably foresee the

deleterious outcomes of his actionsthough there are some interesting discrepancies in some cases, where we

punish people for consequences they could not foresee, which point to the philosophical question of moral luck

(e.g. Nagel [1979] and Williams [1981]).

31 Quoted in Ekstrom (2000: 79). She takes this quotation to suggest that the judgments of ordinary persons are

responsive to the consideration of determinism. I take it to suggest that such judgments are responsive to

particularcausal histories rather than to the problem of universal determinism.

32 One more (personal) example: when I tell people outside philosophy that I am writing on free will, their ears perk

up, but not because they want to hear about the relationship between free will and some metaphysical thesis about

the nature of causation. They want to know about free willa term they use and hear about a lotwhat it is (thepositive conditions)and what allows us (as opposed to animals, for instance) to have it. If I say I am writing about

agency or autonomy ears perk up much less.


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secondary importance to questions about the abilities of agents to deliberate, choose, and actautonomously. Hence, they certainly accept that discussions about each of the italicizedconcepts in the previous sentence are crucial to the free will debate, but they are not willing to

give up their right to the term free will in favor of those concepts alone. To do so is to give up

the game to the incompatibilist.33

Indeed, to do so would be like the naturalist giving up talkabout minds in response to a dualist who suggests that the essential question in debates about

the mind is whether or not it must be an immaterial substance. Or like the moral subjectivistgiving up talk about good and ought in the face of a moral objectivists claim that the

debate about such terms mustbe about what objective property they refer to.Hence, I will not give up the rhetorical battle, and I will continue to talk about free will,

with the caveats that the free need not be contrasted with deterministic and the will need not

suggest some dualistic faculty of mind (or homunculus within the brain). Rather, the will refersto our motivational structure, and for the will to be free requires that we have certain abilities in

regards to our motivations, notably some knowledge of them and power to influence them.

Indeed, the most important reason to hold tight to the concept of free will is that the abilities Iwill discuss have to do with our control over our internal motivational structure, our freedom to

influence our will, and not simply our freedom to control our actions (e.g. to be free from

external constraints).

4. Misconceptions about Indeterminism

In this section and the next I will dispel some misconceptions about indeterminism and

determinism that have led philosophers to accept positions (1) and (2) described by van Inwagen.Specifically, I will counter some of the arguments that indeterminism is incompatible with free

will, then counter some of the arguments that determinism is incompatible with free will. These

tactics do not, of course, entail that free will is in factcompatible with either determinism orindeterminism. But they provide reasons to reject the necessity claims of incompatibilists and of

those compatibilists who claim that free will requires determinism. Along the way, we will alsosee that other issues are more central to the question of free will than determinism and

indeterminism.Some philosophers have argued that free will is incompatible with indeterminism and

hence believe that free will requires determinism.34

If they then want to defend the existence of

free will, as most do, they naturally see this conclusion as a reason to believe there mustbe

something wrong with incompatibilist arguments and also to develop a conception of free willthat is clearly compatible with determinism.

35Nowell-Smith states, I could not be free to

choose what I do unless determinism is correct. . . . Freedom, so far from being incompatible

33 This is one more reason to differentiate compatriotism from compatibilism, since compatibilism is defined in

contrast to incompatibilism, and historically it has focused on defending the possibility of free will in the face of

determinism, hence offering inadequate positive conditions for free will. Peter Strawson (1962) recognized thisdeficiency in compatibilist (optimist) accounts of free will and suggested refinements that have been further

developed by more recent philosophers (see Chapter 2).

34 See footnote 10. C.D. Broad, the hard determinist who holds position (3), argues that free will is incompatible

with indeterminism for similar reasons (but concludes that we do not have free will).

35This has led to the development of some overly economical accounts of free wille.g. free will as the ability to

do what you want or as freedom from external constraints. See footnote 33 above.


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with causality implies it.36

Notice the identification of determinism with causality. These

compatibilists assume that causation requires deterministic laws, such that given the cause, theeffect necessarily follows (i.e. the cause is sufficient for the effect). R.E. Hobart writes, Thus

power [to choose] depends upon, or rather consists in, a law. The law in question takes the

familiar form that if something happens a certain something else will ensue. . . . It is just becausedeterminism is true, because a law obtains, that one could have done otherwise (1934: 72-74).

That is, for the agent to act freely and responsibly, his action must be sufficiently caused by hiswill (e.g. his desires and volitions), and so his act must be determinedby his will. In fact, Hobart

suggests that an undetermined action is not an action at allit is a behavior that happened to theagent, not something that he did.

This position is predicated on the belief that any lack of determinism involves an absence

of causation such that any undetermined event must be random, or an accident. Hence, Ayerargues, Either it is an accident that I choose to act as I do or it is not. . . . if it is not an accident

that I chose to do one thing rather than another, then presumably there is some causal

explanation of my choice: and in that case we are led back to determinism (1954: 275).37

Theincompatibilist would argue that for a choice (say, my choice to help a friend move or to go to

the lake) to be free, it must be undetermined by prior events. But, according to Ayer, if my

choice is really undetermined, then the event of my choice is an accident and hence out of mycontrol.

38

It is important to distinguish between two interpretations of this claim. It could mean

that, if there are not sufficient conditions (e.g. my deliberations and desires) to determine my

choice, then if I choose to help my friend, that action is out of my control andif I choose to go tothe lake, that action is out of my control. That is, if the choice is undetermined, then whichever

action occurs, it is uncaused and hence out of my control (or, as Hobart suggests, it is not even an

action). A second interpretation is that, if my choice is undetermined, then I do not controlwhich of the two alternatives I choose, but (so long as I have reasons and desires for either

choice) I control and am the cause of my action of helping my friend or of working, whicheveroccurs. This second interpretation will be discussed below, but it need not present a threat to the

requirement of a theory of free will that the agent causes his actionsthat is, the agent can stillbe the source of his actions. The first interpretation does, however, conflict with an agentsability to cause or to control his actions, and this is the view suggested by compatibilists who

claim indeterminism is incompatible with free will. However, it is a misleading interpretation of

indeterminism.Philippa Foot (1957) offers an ordinary language rebuttal of the claim that if an event is

undetermined, this suggests it is accidental or random: It is not at all clear that when actions or

choices are called chance or accidental this has anything to do with the absence of causes;

36 Quoted in Foot (1957: 96).

37 Compare Hume: According to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently

liberty [in the libertarian sense], by removing necessity, removes also causes, and is the very same thing withchance (Treatise on Human Nature, 407).

38 Many incompatibilists agree with this claim, such as Richard Taylor (1963: 47). Thus they argue that agent

causation is the only theory that can explain how agents can be undetermined andcontrol their actions (see section 6below).


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rather, she says, accidental actions are unintentional (107). She also argues that an agents

motives need not determine his actions.39

If accidental (or random) events are contrasted withdetermined events, then if determinism is true, there could be no accidents at all, and if

determinism is not true, then any event with a probability less than 1 would be an accident

(regardless of whether it had a .01 or a .99 chance of occurring).40

Elizabeth Anscombe (1971) also offers a rebuttal of the claim that causation requires

determinism. Causation need not be seen as a logical connection (as Hume discovered), and itneed not be seen as a Humean relation ofconstantconjunction either; some causes may be non-

necessitatingthat is, irreducibly statistical or probabilistic: A non-necessitating cause is thenone that can fail of its effect without the intervention of anything to frustrate it (101). Such an

idea is anathema to many philosophers, steeped in the principle of sufficient reason, who want

something (some cause) to make the difference whenever there is a difference (an effect). ButAnscombe argues that the burden of proof is on the philosopher who claims it is a necessary

truth that all causes are deterministic.41

Anscombes view has been supplemented by positive accounts of probabilistic causation.Such accounts suggest that some laws of nature are irreducibly statistical; given a particular

situation (set of causes), there are certain probabilities that one of several effects will follow.

One of the proponents of such accounts, Wesley Salmon, explains that the common response thatsuch probabilities are only epistemological not ontologicalthat hidden variables will explain

away the probabilitiesis a declaration of faith.42

Probabilistic accounts generally define a

cause as some factor that increases the probability that an effect will occur, in contrast, for

instance, to those accounts that define a cause in terms of sufficient conditions (i.e. given thecause, cetibus paribus, the effect necessarily follows). So, on a probabilistic account, a virus is a

cause of a disease if, when a person is infected with the virus, she is more likely to contract the

disease than a non-infected person (even if, on some relevantly similar occasion, a person doesnot contract the disease).

These causal accounts were developed in part to deal with the revolution in 20th

-centuryphysics launched by quantum mechanics. The classical physics of Newton and Galileo inspired

Laplace and later philosophers to embrace determinism and mechanism in conceiving ofcausation.

43The predictions and explanations in quantum mechanics, however, are irreducibly

39 She argues that motives are not causes at allthey are descriptions of actions and hence analytically, notempirically (i.e. causally), related to the actions. In general, I will accept the Davidsonian view (1963) that reasons

are causes (see Epilogue).

40 See Loewer (1996: 100).

41 Hence, the burden of proof is on the philosopher who supports the conclusion that free will necessarily requires

determinism with the premises that (1) free will requires causation (sc. of human actions) and (2) causation

necessarily requires determinism.

42 Salmon (1980). He discusses several probabilistic accounts of causation, including those of Hans Reichenbach,

I.J. Good, and Patrick Suppes.

43 I believe this historical connection between deterministic causation and mechanistic causation has fueled

incompatibilism. It provided (e.g. for philosophers like Descartes) a reason to think that if the mind is part of the

physical universe, it will have to be explained not only in mechanistic terms but also in deterministic terms. So, toavoid the implications of either mechanism or determinism, the other had to be rejected (e.g. with a theory like

substance dualism). See section 5D below.


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indeterministic, at least according to the current orthodox interpretation.44

Hence, given a

certain type of event, such as an electrons being fired at a barrier, there are certain probabilitiesthat the electron will penetrate or be deflected by the barrier. Each outcome is possible given the

same initial conditions, and each outcome is caused by those conditions. So, quantum theory

offers a model for probabilistic causes, undermining the idea that science requires the concept ofdeterminism. As Anscombe rightly points out, It has taken the inventions of indeterministic

physics to shake the rather common dogmatic conviction that determinism is a presupposition, orperhaps a conclusion, of scientific knowledge. Not that the conviction has been very much

shaken even so (103).Some philosophers suggest that, even if quantum events are irreducibly indeterministic,

they cancel out at the macro-level, including the level of causation involved in mental events and

actions. But such a claim also seems to be a declaration of faith. Quantum events mayperhaps through the sensitive dependence on initial conditions suggested by nonlinear

dynamicspercolate up to the macro level (for instance, to neuronal activity). And many

philosophers have offered thought experiments in which an indeterministic event, for instance, aGeiger counter measurement, has large-scale effects, such as the dropping of a nuclear weapon.

45

Some philosophers and scientists also believe that indeterministic causation may occur at the

macro level autonomously (i.e. without being based on quantum effects), for instance, in theprocesses of natural selection.

46Again, it is not known whether probabilistic causation is

required to explain and predict events only at the quantum level or whether such causation may

be required to deal with bigger events as well, including perhaps events in the human brain,

but the possibility should not be dismissed a priori. Probabilistic accounts of causation arecontroversial, but so is every other account of causation. The point is that they provide

arguments against the claim that it is necessary that causation requires determinism and that

indeterminism entails randomness. Hence, they provide reason to dismiss the claims of thosecompatibilists who argue that free will requires determinism, and hence, there must be something

wrong with incompatibilism.In fact, some libertarians have made use of probabilistic accounts of causation in order to

develop a theory of human choice and action that is causal but not deterministic.47

For example,Robert Kanes (1996) impressive libertarian theory of free will suggests that quantumindeterminacy is magnified by nonlinear dynamics (chaos theory) to affect neuronal activity in

the brain:

In effect, conflicts of will . . . stir up chaos in the brain and make the agents thoughtprocesses more sensitive to undetermined influences. . . . The result is that [some choices]

are influenced by, but not determined by, past motives and character. The uncertainty

44 The Copenhagen Interpretation. Other interpretations (Bohms) are deterministic, though the predictions remainfundamentally statistical. See Loewer (1996).

45 Schroedingers cat was perhaps the first such thought experiment.

46 See Brandon and Carson (1996). Most laws in psychology are presented in statistical terms, but no argument is

provided that these laws are actually deterministic and only epistemically probabilistic.

47 For instance, Kane (1996), Ekstrom (2000), Ginet (1990). See section 6 below.


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and inner tension that agents feel at such moments are reflected in the indeterminacy of

their neural processes (130).48

So, for instance, when I feel conflicted in my deliberations about whether to help my friend or go

to the lake, it is because I have good reasons for either choice and these reasons are instantiatedin competing neural networks, sensitive to micro indeterminacies. If the reasons are near

equilibrium, the indeterminacy may affect my choice, making it undetermined. But since I havea reason to help my friend move, then these reasons can be a cause of my action even if my

choice to help him is undetermined (I might choose to go to the lake). So, if I in fact help myfriend, the action is still caused in the appropriate way (e.g. by my desires) to call it an action.

Since I also have a desire to go to the lake, then if I choose to do that, the action is also caused by

my desire, even though the choice is undetermined. My reasons may, in Leibnizs phrase,incline without necessitating my choice.

49Hence, Hobarts argument that undetermined

behaviors cannot be actions is mistaken. Whether to call such actionsfree actions will depend

on conditions otherthan whether my choice is determined or undetermined.I will discuss below whether or not such indeterminism helps secure free will, but it

certainly offers a model for undetermined choices that are nevertheless caused by an agents

mental states (and can thereby satisfy AS conditions). It undermines the arguments of thosecompatibilists who claim that indeterminism entails randomness and thus lack of control by the

agent.Given the arguments of Foot and Anscombe, the positive accounts of probabilistic

causation, current theories in physics and other sciences, and contemporary libertarian accounts

like Kanes, we may conclude that:(1)The causation required for accounts of action and free willfor instance, that ones reasons

cause ones actionsmay be probabilistic (i.e. irreducibly indeterministic).

(2)Since it is not necessary that such causation is deterministic, it is not necessary thatundetermined choices and actions are uncaused and therefore random (as asserted by some

compatibilists).(3)So, it is not necessary that free will is incompatible with indeterminism (at least for the

reasons given by such compatibilists).(4)Hence, it is possible that free will is compatible with indeterminism.

For all we know, the universe may have a degree of metaphysical looseness or

openness without having random causal gaps. Events may be caused without being

deterministically caused (i.e. without there being sufficient prior causes). That this middleground between deterministic causation and randomness has opened up suggests to the

compatriotist that the concepts of causation, determinism, and indeterminism (and the relations

between them) may be elucidated in a way that will make the age-old debate between

compatibilists and libertarians outdated.

48 See also Eccles (1995), Thorp (1980), and Ekstrom (1999) for similar accounts.

49 See also Ginet (1990), chapter 6, for a discussion of anomic reasons explanations in which the very same

antecedent state of the world could afford a reasons explanation for either of two or more different alternative

actions (146).


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5. Misconceptions about Determinism

We have seen that the argument that free will is incompatible with indeterminism isbased on particular views of indeterminism and causation that are implausible and are certainly

not necessary truths. Now I will turn to some of the arguments for the incompatibility ofdeterminism and free will to show that they too are misconceived. Traditionally incompatibilistshave presented determinism as a monolithic threat to free will: if determinism is true, then

agents cannot do other than they do and hence they cannot have free will (since it requires theability to do otherwise). But in fact, determinism is usually presented, implicitly or explicitly, as

a many-headed monster posing a plethora of threats to free will: determinism hardens theuniverse and prunes any possible alternatives for action; it makes our actions the inevitable result

of physical forces beyond our control; it makes us mere outcomes of our genes and upbringing; it

makes our conscious states epiphenomenal, as if we are turning steering wheels towards roadswe have to go down anyway; it makes us part of a predictable machine such that we could be

manipulated by someone who knew our program. Once we separate these images and

arguments, we can see which of them are threats legitimately implied by determinism and whichare not. We can also see if indeterministic theories can help overcome the threats. I will thus

take on the many heads of the monster of determinism one by one and, in most cases, sever

them from determinism. I argue that, in the end, the threat of determinism is much diminishedand what is left of it cannot be defeated by any tenable theory of indeterministic causation.

My divide-and-conquer strategy begins by laying out six different threats that

incompatibilists have suggested determinism poses to free will. These six threats are: (1)

external constraint, (2) scientific determinism, (3) predictability, (4) reductionism andepiphenomenalism, (5) a closed future, and (6) lack of dual control. In this section I will argue

that it is a misconception of determinism to suggest that it implies any of the first four of these

threats to free will. In the next section I will discuss the last two (legitimate) threats ofdeterminism and suggest that, while the fifth (closed future) may be countered by indeterminism,

it is not what we really want out of free will nor what incompatibilist arguments demand. Thesixth threat (to dual control) can only be countered by a theory, agent causation, which is

untenable.Again, the goal of this strategy is not to prove that free will is necessarily compatible

with determinism, but rather to counter many of the arguments that claim determinism is

necessarily incompatible with a legitimate conception of free will (arguments that, I believe,

account for the strong holdstranglehold?that incompatibilist intuitions have on us). I willalso show that coherent libertarian theories do not answer the dilemma posed by incompatibilist

arguments. Along the way, it will also become clear that, because the most significant threats to

our ability to be responsible for our actions are not in fact tied to determinism, we should

develop a conception of free will that answers to these threats, and we should leave behind thecompatibility question.

A. External Control and ConstraintWe legitimately feel that to be free we must be able to act on our desires and choices

without some external force or agent controlling or constraining us. As discussed in section 1,

we want thepowerto act on what we really want. I am not free to help my friend move if thatswhat I want to do but Im locked in my room or paralyzed. I am also not free if someone

hypnotizes me to avoid helping my friend or if an evil neurosurgeon excises any desire I have

to help. In describing the conflict between determinism and free will, some incompatibilists


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depict the past and the laws of nature as if they were analogous to these external constraints.

They personify history and nature to blur the boundary between constraints we all recognize asexculpating and metaphysical limitations on our ability to change the past or the laws of nature.

Richard Taylor, for instance, writes, What am I but a helpless product of nature, destined by her

to do whatever I do and to become whatever I become, and he claims that there is no differencebetween an ingenious physiologist [who] can induce in me any volition he pleases and

perfectly impersonal forces such as deterministic laws (1963: 36). He continues, Whether adesire which causes my body to behave in a certain way is inflicted upon me by another person,

for instance, or derived from hereditary factors, or indeed from anything at all, matters not in theleast (46).

Of course it matters! First of all, there is the ordinary language point that we do

distinguish between control by external agents and other causal histories.50

To suggest that allcauses are coercive undermines our ability to describe only certain causes as coercive. For

instance, contra Taylors assertion, we ascribe responsibility very differently to a person who

chooses to steal because someone threatens him (or even because he is coerced by his poverty)than a person who chooses to steal because he wants more stuff. And we do not blame a person

for having a hereditary disease, but we may blame someone (somewhat) for contracting a disease

he knew he could avoid by refraining from risky behaviors.51 To suggest that determinismentails that all our actions are like coerced actions is to beg the question against compatibilists

since they agree that coercion undermines free will but disagree that the laws of nature are

coercive.

External agents can coerce us in a way that Mother Nature cannot, because agents havedesires of their own, whereas the laws of nature have no goals or purposes. Indeed, the concept

of coercion seems teleological in a way that would preclude its applicability to anything that did

not have goalsthat is, goals it wantedto achieve by coercing someone to do something.52

Furthermore, if we act on other agents desires only because they induce or implant them in us

without our knowledge or assent, then it seems more accurate to say we are acting on theirdesires, not our own. More precisely, if we can trace the development of the desires that move

us to act directly to other agents manipulation (based on their desires), then they should be seenas the source of our actions. To respond that we might have developed the same desires anywayis to suggest that, in analyzing free will, different types of causal processes make no difference

for instance, that learning from your parents about why helping others is a good desire to

cultivate is no different than having a friend (who wants help moving) slip you a drug that willinduce that desire.

50 Ayer (1954) effectively makes this point. Ironically, he does so using ordinary language considerations similar to

those, described above, that Foot uses against Ayer (and others) to show that he mistakenly conflates accidental

with undetermined.

51 To make this point is not to suggest that it is easy to ascribe varying degrees of responsibility in these cases.

Determining which sorts of causal histories mitigate ones freedom and responsibility is the reason for engaging thequestion of free will in the first place. I will return to this problem in Chapter 2. Fischer (1994, chap. 1) argues that

there is no in principle difference between constraint by agents and other external forces, yet his theory of

responsibility is based on distinguishing whether the actual causal sequence leading to action involves coercion.

52 Hence the scare quotes around coerce in the example above: poverty often constrainspeoples choices but we

personify poverty (endowing it with intentionality) if we suggest it coerces people.


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Even most libertarians allow that coercion and compulsion must be marked off from

other types of causation.53

It is a misconception of determinism to suggest that it implies that weare always controlled by external forces, that the past and the laws of nature are just like agents

who manipulate our desires and actions. If determinism threatens our free will, it is not because

it entails that we are always pushed around or forced to do what we do. And when we arepushed around or forced to do what we do, it is not because the universe is governed by

deterministic laws.54

B. Scientific Determinism

Some incompatibilists (and compatibilists too) associate determinism with scientific

practice. They then link threats to free will implied by certain scientific theories to the thesis of

determinism. Laura Ekstrom, for instance, calls the thesis that every event is causallynecessitated by a previous event scientific determinism (2000: 16), suggesting that

determinism is implied by or required for scientific explanations. Other philosophers suggest

that scientific determinism is just a specific formulation of metaphysical determinism: scientificdiscoveries (e.g. about human genetics and neurobiology) simply spell out the deterministic laws

that necessitate our choices and actions. The bony metaphysical thesis of determinism is thus

fleshed out with scientific theories about how agents actions are in fact causally determinedby genes or behavioristic reinforcement or neural activity or economic conditions or Freudian

drives, etc. These threats are more alarming than the metaphysical thesis of determinism since

they are more comprehensible and specific (and they get more media coverage). But they are

also more alarming because they far outstrip the threat to our ability to do otherwise; they posepotential problems for many aspects of our conception of agency, such as our ability to

understand why we do what we do. And often they replace the reasons we offer for our behavior

with causes we dont (consciously) want to move us, such as Oedipal drives to marry ourmothers or genes to choose our mates based on their pheromones.

However, it is a mistake to equate determinism with science, and so, the very termscientific determinism is a misnomer. First of all, scientific practice does not require

deterministic causation. After all, it was quantum theory which first developed a coherent modelof indeterministic causation, though the thesis of determinism is often maintained despite claimsof scientific theories such as quantum mechanics. Furthermore, theories in almost every branch

of science use statistical explanations, and while scientists may view such indeterminacies as

epistemological and pursue explanations to eliminate them, they need not commit themselves tothe metaphysical claim that every effect has a sufficient cause.

55Though perhaps inspired by

Newtonian science, determinism is a metaphysical thesis that arose well before the

Enlightenment with the Atomists and the Stoics. Scientific practice may rely on some

53 See, for instance, Kane (1996: 30) and van Inwagen (1975: 52).

54 Dennett (1984, esp. chapters 1 and 3) elucidates much more fully on the arguments in this section.

55 Some philosophers and some scientists nevertheless believe determinism is a necessary condition for scientific

work (see, for instance, James comment about psychology that for her scientific purposes determinism can be

claimed [cite]). What is necessary, however, is not determinism but some conception of causal connections and

laws. A belief in determinism might, however, serve as a useful motivational tool to keep a scientist looking forunderlying factors when faced with statistical results.


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conception of causation and laws (though philosophers have not agreed on which, if any,

conception), but it is not wedded to deterministic causation and laws.More importantly, the scientific theories that seem to threaten free will (and often

motivate incompatibilist intuitions) need not rely on deterministic causation and, even if they

turn out to be deterministic, thatwould not be why they were threatening. For instance, if thetruth of radical behaviorism threatens free will, it is not because the theory requires deterministic

causationits laws (if it has any) could be irreducibly probabilisticbut rather because itdenies the existence (and/or causal efficacy) of mental states, such as conscious deliberations,

which are required by most theories of free will.56

If the idea of the Freudian unconsciousthreatens free will, it is not because unconscious drives deterministically cause our behavior; it is

because unconscious drives cause our behavior, and because we have no knowledge or control

over our unconscious drives (at least not until, through therapy, we make them conscious).57

Ifthe truth of sociobiology threatens free will, it is not because the theory claims we aredeterministically caused by our genes or evolutionary history to act in certain ways, but rather

because it suggests severe limits to our abilities to overcome our genetic programming forbehaviors such as aggression, altruism, or sexual attraction (again, these programs could

involve probabilistic causation).58

Compatibilists can and do fret about these scientific threats as much as libertarians. Bothfret about such threats because they conflict with our abilities to deliberate rationally and act on

our consciously considered desires, not because they are specific examples of deterministic

causal chains. Libertarians too often present psychological theories as particular examples of

universal causal determinism, but the latter is neither necessary nor sufficient for the former.Conversely, compatibilists sometimes ignore the threats of particular scientific theories of human

nature because they associate them with deterministic causation, which they do not see as a

threat to free will.If particular scientific theories, such as Freudian psychology, evolutionary psychology

(the new name for sociobiology), or reductive neuroscience, threaten free will, it is not becausetheir explanations follow the dictum of determinism that every state is necessary given previous

states and the laws of nature. Their explanations may end up being irreducibly probabilistic. Butsuch indeterminism need not suggest that anything goes. Just because the exact time of decayof a particular atom is indeterministic, this does not entail that the atom is free neverto decay

(much less, to jump to the moon). Similarly, if the relationship between genes and certain

behavior in humans is probabilistic, that does not entail that there is no relationship betweenthem (much less, that a baby with two blue-eyed parents could have brown eyes). In fact,

probabilistic causes can be more limiting than deterministic causes if the alternatives are more

limiting. For instance, a (hypothetical) gene that has a 70% chance of producing early-stage

56 In fact, behavioristic laws, such as schedules of reinforcement, are almost always presented as probabilistic, butthis does not diminish the worry that behaviorism threatens free will.

57 See Hospers (1950) for a discussion of the implications of Freudian psychology for free will, implications that aredistinct from the question of causal determinism, though Hospers conflates them.

58 The term genetic determinism adds to the confusion I am describing. If any of our genes determine (causally

necessitate) any of our behaviorsa highly unlikely claimit is not because the thesis of determinism is true, andthe falsity of the thesis of determinism would not entail that our genes cannot substantially influence many of our

behaviors in a way that conflicts with our conception of free will.


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Alzheimers before the age of fifty and a 30% chance of producing late-stage Alzheimers after

the age of sixty is more limiting (e.g. to our survival) that a gene that has a 100% chance ofproducing late-stage Alzheimers.

59

Scientific theories conflict with free will, to the extent they do, not because of the type of

causal laws they invoke (deterministic or indeterministic) but because of the content of thetheory (i.e. the specific causal stories they suggest). They are threatening to the extent that they

undermine AS conditions. Isiah Berlin writes, If social and psychological determinism wereestablished as an accepted truth, our world would be transformed more radically than was the

teleological world of the classical and middle ages by the triumphs of mechanistic principles orthose of natural selection.

60Again, linking the word determinism to social and psychological

sciences is misleading. But Berlin is absolutely right to suggest that such sciences could

radically transform our notions of choice, of responsibility, of freedom. They would threatensuch notions, for instance, if they eliminated teleological concepts, such as desires and goals,

from human deliberation and action. Berlin concludes, There is, as yet, no need to alarm

ourselves unduly. True, but this is not because the human sciences have turned out to beindeterministic; it is because they are increasingly recognizing the need to explain, not explainaway (or eliminate), the purposeful aspects of our mental life.

In order to combat the specific threats to free will from scientific theories, compatriotistsdo not see indeterminism as the savior. Rather, they focus their arguments on developing

accounts of free will that are consistent with good scientific theories but that offer alternatives to

interpretations of those theories that undermine our freedom. (This will be the approach I take in

Chapter 3 when I defend free will against experimental work in social psychology that suggestswe do not understand the reasons we act the way we do.) Here, I have shown that there is no

reason to link the truth of threatening scientific theories with the truth of determinism. If the

metaphysical thesis of determinism threatens free will, it is not because it is inextricably linkedto scientific theories that threaten our free will. This head can be severed from the monster of

determinism.

C. PredictabilityIncompatibilists often portray determinism as a threat to free will by suggesting that it

entails the predictability of our choices and actions. Laplaces demon personifies the connection

between determinism and prediction: Given for one instant an intelligence which could

comprehend all the forces by which nature is animated and the respective situation of the beingswho compose it . . . nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the past, would be present to

its eyes.61

Such an intelligence (or God or perhaps a supercomputer) could know every total

state of the universe if it knew any total state of the universe along with the laws of nature, as

59 Mele (1995: 188) offers another example: King Georges advisors might be able to steer him in the direction of

a handful of optionsany of which would serve their purposes, and none of which conduces to Georges aimswithout being able to ensure that he selects their most preferred option. This undetermined manipulation is more

constraining on Georges ability to get what he wants than if George were causally determined to choose his

preferred option.

60 Berlin (Four Essays on Liberty, p. 113) quoted in Ayer and OGrady (1992: 60).61 Laplace (1951: 4). Some philosophers (e.g. Karl Popper) define determinism in terms of predictability by science.

I think this is a mistake for several reasons; for instance, quantum mechanics, though indeterministic, offers the bestpredictions for certain phenomena (see also Goldman [1970: 171]).


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long as those laws were deterministic. Given that our choices and actions are events in the

universe, it would be able to predict them as well.62

This idea is troubling not only because it suggests our future actions could be known

before they happened, but also because it threatens our sense of individuality and control. We

want to believe we know ourselves (at least in some ways) better than anyone else could. And asAlasdair MacIntyre writes (in reference mainly to psychology and social sciences), success in

explaining and predicting can never be divorced from success in manipulating and controlling(1957: 241). For instance, the external agents described earlier (such as the evil neurosurgeon)

could control and coerce us much more effectively if they could predict how we will act. Anti-utopian novels likeBrave New World(and Walden Two if you see it as anti-utopian) scare us

because they present the possibility that humans can be controlled in predictable ways. The

contentment of the people in the stories does not outweigh our sense that they lack freedom.63

However, there are several reasons to distinguish determinism from predictability. First

of all, indeterminism does not entail lack of predictability. If the best available theory in a

particular domain invokes probabilistic causation, as in quantum mechanics, it does so becausethe probabilities involved offer the best predictions. Randomness may be appropriately

contrasted with predictability, but as we have seen, indeterminism need not mean randomness. If

the best theories of human behavior turn out to be probabilistic, that might limit the precision ofsome predictions, but it would not mean we were unpredictable. Furthermore, unpredictability

of the sort suggested by randomness seems inimical to free will to the extent it entails that agents

cannot predict or control their own behavior (this is one reason some compatibilists argue

determinism is necessary for free will). As we will see, free will requires that agents can knowhow their motivations are related to their actions, and this requires some degree of self-

prediction. What we really seem to want is that other agentsor even conceivable agents like

Laplaces Demoncannot predict our behavior as well as, or better than, we can ourselves (as Iwill discuss below, we may have what we want, regardless of whether determinism is true).

In any case, determinism may not in fact entail predictability. First of all, determinismcertainly does not entail predictability in practice. Many systems, especially the human brain,

are too complex to predict with complete accuracy given even the most optimistic hopes forfuture science and technology. However, there are also reasons to believe determinism does notentail predictability inprinciple. First, there is the problem that, despite the truth of

determinism, any predictor that is part of the universe it is describing will be unable to predict its

own future behavior perfectly.64

There are also two speculative scientific theories that suggestthat determinism does not entail predictability.

65

62 This view suggests a connection between causal determinism, theological determinism (the threat of Gods

foreknowledge of our actions), and logical determinism (the threat that propositions about our actions must be true

or false timelessly and so the actions they describe cannot be other than they are).

63 It should be noted that, while these novels do illustrate certain threats to our free will, it is not because they

present a universe in which determinism holds (or indeterminism for that matter).64 Perhaps this is irrelevant if we are worried only about others predicting our behavior, but it may be relevant if weare worried that determinism undermines the rationale for deliberation. See Dennett (1984a, chapter 5).

65 Alvin Goldman (1970, chapter 6) also offers some philosophical reasons to carefully distinguish between

determinism and predictability (171). His admonition supports my point, though his arguments are directedspecifically to undermine the claim made by anti-predictionists that human actions are not determined, because if

they were, they would be predictable, and they are not predictable. Most of Goldmans arguments are aimed at


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First, some interpretations of nonlinear dynamics (chaos theory) suggest that certain

systems, though deterministic, may nonetheless be unpredictable in principlei.e. not simplybecause we lack some relevant information. John Dupre writes of such a system: no

measurements to a finite degree of precision of parameters at a time would suffice to predict its

state at a future time. Many physical systems, for example those in meteorology, arehypothesized to obey such functions, and thus to be both deterministic and in principle

unpredictable.66 The basic idea is that unmeasurable differences lead to measurable differences.Of course, even if these interpretations turn out to be unfounded and deterministic but complex

events, such as human actions, are predictable in principle, chaos theory still suggests that theseevents, though deterministic, are not predictable in the way imagined within the Newtonian

mindset of mechanical systems. The more complex the system, the more difficult it is to take

into account all the minute factors that can make significant differences. Given the complexityof our brains alone and their sensitivity to external events, predicting our actions will never be

like predicting eclipses, the motions of the planets, or the arc of a cannonball.67

A second theory that suggests a disconnect between determinism and predictabilityinvolves a particular interpretation of quantum mechanics: Bohms theory. Contrary to the

orthodox (realist) interpretation that suggests subatomic particles really exist in indeterminate

states, Bohms theory suggests that a particle is assigned a probability of having a particularposition, but it actually has a determinate position and that position is deterministically caused by

earlier states. That is, the theory suggests both ontological determinism and unpredictability.

This unpredictability is not due to our epistemological limitations; it is due to the nature of the

phenomena being measured. The theory entails that another system (e.g. a measuring device orhuman observer) cannot access the (determinate) position of the particle; the information is

limited to probabilities so that predictions are imprecise just as they are under the orthodox

interpretation. Barry Loewer suggests that if some of these uncertainties infect an agentsactions [then] even on the deterministic Bohmian theory it would sometimes be impossible to

predict with certainty an agents choices.68

These interpretations of chaos theory and quantum mechanics indicate that it is a

mistake to assume that, in a deterministic universe, even Laplaces demon could predict theevolution of events.

69They equally indicate that the agent himself would be limited in his

ability to predict (some of) his own actions, at least at the level of precision associated with a

Laplacian demon. In fact, however, we dont require that level of precision in predicting our

own behavior. We just want to be able to know how we are likely to act given our beliefs and

refuting the claim that human actions are notor could not bepredictable. I am more concerned with showing

that determinism (not just of human actions) does not entail predictability.

66 Dupre (1993: 175). See also references in Kane (1996: 231, note 5) and Juarrerro (1999).

67 Furthermore, predictions made about increasingly distant times in the future will require increasingly more

information. For instance, a prediction about any event 10 years from now would require the predictor to have

information about the state of a sphere 10 light years in diameter (thanks to David Sanford for this point). Unlessthe predictor could calculate instantaneously (like God perhaps), the information would become irrelevant by the

time any predictions could be made.

68Loewer (1996: 111, note 24); see also p. 99.

69 Dupre (1993: 3).


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desires in a particular situation. And we want our predictions about our own actions to be, in

general, more accurate and extensive than the predictions of others are.There is good reason to believe that this isand will remaintrue, regardless of whether

or not we are deterministic systems. This is because humans are conscious creatures; we directly

experience mental states that (in some cases) are the causes of our actions. And no one else candirectly experience our mental states. As Owen Flanagan puts it: The structure of the nervous

system accounts for the happy fact that we each have our own, and only our own, experiences(1992: 107). Despite the general acceptance that our conscious mental states are directly related

to (e.g. supervene on, are identical to) physical states of our bodies, an observer of those physicalstates is unlikely to be able to make certain predictions about us. An observer of another agents

brain states, for instance, will have to make connections and calculations about those states that

the agent, being directly hooked up to them, can perceive directly and immediately. The agenthas a different type of access to and information about some of his own mental states than can be

obtained with information about the physical states of the agents brain and body.70

If such first-

personal information about conscious states is, in certain cases, crucial for the agent to knowwhat he is likely to do, then he should be able to know what he will do in a way that an observer

cannot.71

The significance of this discrepancy of knowledge between subject and observer wouldbe challenged, however, if our access to our conscious mental states does notoffer reliable

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