Notes

Chapter 1

1. This is the case, for example, in the United States, where in many states some of the judges and the district attorneys (public prosecutors) are elected.

2. For definition and discussion of the agency problem, see, for example, Eisen-hardt (1989) and Stiglitz (1987).

3. World Banks website on Worldwide Governance Indicators defines governance as follows: Governance consists of the traditions and institutions by which author-ity in a country is exercised. This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them (see http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home). This definition does include many pertinent elements. However, it does not provide a sharp under-standing of the structure of governance and the essence of the governance problem.

4. See, for example, Sen (1985, 1999, 2005); Nussbaum (2003); Alkire (2005); Anand, Hunter, and Smith (2005).

5. See, for example, Putnam (2000); Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000); Knack and Keefer (1997); Dasgupta (2008); Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000).

6. For discussion of the role of social capability in economic growth, see Koo and Perkins (1995) and Temple and Johnson (1998).

7. Hayek (1944/1994 and 1988) was averse to the term society, though for differ-ent reasons.

8. See later for more on the Old Institutional School of economics. 9. See later for more on the New Institutional School of economics.10. See Coplin and OLeary (1994) for details.11. There may, however, be dispute regarding which assassination to be considered

as political and which not. Thus individual views can vary with regard to what otherwise seems objective measures of governance.

12. See World Bank (2014) at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index .aspx#home for this data set and related information. See also Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzi (2010) for documentation regarding this data set.

212 Notes

13. See World Development Indicators Online (http://data.worldbank.org/data -catalog/world-development-indicators). The exact numbers vary depending on the source and type of data used. Introduction of the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) measures of GDP has led to considerable upward revision of the income figures. Also, PPP data themselves have undergone several revisions, so that results differ depending on which revision is used. However, the growth rate figures do not change much depending on which set of figures are used. In the comparison presented in Table 1.2, GDP data using 2005 constant US dollar is used, because they go further into the past, while the GDP data using 2011 constant PPP$ starts only from 1990.

14. Take off is an expression that Rostow (1985) used in his book, Stages of Eco-nomic Growth, basically to refer to the process of industrialization characterized by high investment and savings rates.

15. Over the long run, Bangladeshs GDP grew at an annual growth rate of 4.5 per-cent between 1972 and 2013. See World Development Indicators Online (http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators).

16. For Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) data, see http://bbs.gov.bd/WebTest Application/userfiles/Image/GDP/GDP_2013-14.pdf.

17. See Sobhan (1999) for related discussion.18. Political neutrality of the civil bureaucracy of the British and Pakistan period

can be spoken of only in a relative sense. Members of the bureaucracy always gravitated toward the interests of ruling parties, for obvious reasons. However, there is no doubt that politicization of the bureaucracy in current Bangladesh is of a far greater degree than observed previously. Also, the issue here is of taking sides with regard to parties representing the ruling class and not with regard to parties representing different socio-economic classes.

19. This does not mean that there are no individual members of the civil bureaucracy who are of high quality, honest, effective, nonpolitical, and who perform their duties with sincerity and devotion. However, they are generally thought to be few in number.

20. See, for example, Veblen (1898, 1899, 1904, 1909, and 1919), Commons (1924, 1934), Myrdal (1944, 1957, and 1968), Galbraith (1952, 1958, 1967, 1973, 1979, 1983, and 1993), Chang (1994, 2002, 2003, 2008, and 2010), and Hodg-son (1988, 1991, 1999, 2004, 2006, and 2015).

21. In fact, many think that the ideas of the old institutional economics can be derived to a large extent from Marxs analysis of capitalism.

22. See, for example, Coase (1937, 1960, 1991, 1998), North (1990, 1995), Wil-liamson (1975, 2000), and Ostrom (2005). See Furubotn and Richter (2005), Rutherford (2001), and Warren (1987/2008) for general discussions of institu-tional economics and the contribution of the New Institutional Economics.

23. See, for example, Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001); Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, 2012, 2015); Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2015); Acemo-glu, Gallego, and Robinson (2014); Acemoglu, Garcia-Jimeno, and Robinson (2015); Knack and Keefer (1995, 1997); Keefer and Knack (1997); Rodrik,

Notes 213

Subramanian, and Trebbi (2004); Sachs (2003); McArthur and Sachs (2001); Sachs and Warner (1997).

24. See, for example, Sen (1985, 1999, 2005, and 2006).25. See ().26. See, for example, Talukder (1975, 1980, 1988, 1995, and 2001).27. See Karim (2009).28. See Nurul Islam (2003).29. See Muhith (1999).30. See M. Ahmed (1983, 1995, 2012, and 2015).31. See, for example, Riaz (1994, 2004, 2008a, 2008b, 2012) and Riaz and Fair

(2011).32. See , (, ).33. See Lifschultz and Bird (1979).34. See Mascarenhas (1986).35. See, for example, Ali (2002, 2004), G. Ahmed (1986, 1990), M. Khan (1998),

Zafarullah and Khan (2005), Jreisat (2002).36. See, for example, Haque and Ahmed (1992), Mirza (n.d.), Siddiquee (2003),

Sikder (2006), Karim (2007).37. See, for example, Asian Development Bank (2007), United Nations Develop-

ment Programme (1993, 2007), World Bank (1996, 2002). For general dis-cussion of governance focusing on the administrative side, see United Nations (2001, 2005) and World Bank (1991, 1992, 1994).

38. See, for example, Muhith and Muhith (1981), Muhith (2001), Sobhan (1997, 1998). See also Barenstein (1994), Frischtak (1994), S. Haque (1997), Haque and Ahmed (1992). For a comparative perspective, see Dia (1993) and Human Development Centre (1999).

39. See Solow (1956) for original formulation of the neoclassical growth model. For discussion of subsequent developments of the model, see Solow (1970, 1994); Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004); Mankiw (1995); Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992); and Islam (2004b).

40. See Islam (2003) for a review of the convergence hypothesis and the empirical tests of this hypothesis. See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004).

41. See Romer (1987).42. See Romer (1986, 1990, 1994), Rebelo (1991), Lucas (1988), Aghion and How-

itt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1991) for various variants of new growth theory and Bardhan (1995), Temple (1999), Darlauf and Quah (1999) for review of new growth theories. See Islam (2004) for a review of implications of new growth theories for developing countries.

43. In the economics jargon, the short- and medium-term growth rate is referred to as the transitional growth rate, as different from the steady state growth rate, which refers to the long-term growth rate.

44. See Islam (2003) for discussion.45. The work by Chenery, Robinson, and Sirquin (1985) can be viewed in this light.46. Barro (1991) initiated this line of analysis and continued in Barro (1997).

214 Notes

47. See, for example, Alesina et al. (2003); Benhabib and Rustichini (1996); Easterly and Levine (1997, 2001); La Porta, Shleifer, and Vishny (1999); Landes (1998); Mauro (1995); Treisman (2000). In particular, see Acemoglu and Robinson (2005, 2012). See Islam (2008) for discussion of many of the determinants of growth that appeared in the literature.

48. See, for example, Sachs (2003); Gallup, Mellinger, and Sachs (1999); Gylfason (2001); and McArthur and Sachs (2001).

Chapter 2

1. See Faaland and Parkinson (1976). See N. Islam (1984) (Bangla) for a discussion of the views of Faaland and Parkinson and several other scholars, expressed dur-ing the 1970s, on the prospects of Bangladesh.

2. See Financial Express, Saturday, May 11, 2013. 3. Computed on the basis of data presented in Khan (1972, Table 2.1, p. 12). 4. Computed on the basis of data presented in Khan (1972, Table 3.1, p. 17). 5. See Malthus (1798). 6. For earlier discussion of this gap, see (, , ). See also Rahman

(1993). 7. As for the rest, Bangabandhu thanked but asked them to Go Back to Respective

Stations! 8. For more on this point, see () and A. Rahman (2007, 2011). See also

The Daily Star, May 6, 2012, for the disappointment that Lt. Col. Quazi Nuruz-zaman, the valinat Sector Commander during the Liberation War, felt at this decision by Bangabandhu. See the reminiscences of Lt. Col. Quazi Nuruzzaman. Recently, Prof. Sirajul Islam Chowdhury noted that role of Freedom Fighters in independent Bangladesh was one of the points of differences between Bang-abandhu and Tajuddin Ahmed, the leader of Bangladesh Liberation War. See S. Chowdhury (2014).

9. This issue was one of the main driving forces behind opposition to Bangabandhu by Col. Taher, Maor Ziauddin, and others who wanted a peoples military devoid of class division (i.e., difference between officers and soldiers). Doing away with this division was one of the main demands of Biplobi Sainik Sangstha that Col. Taher and his followers organized in the military and that spearheaded the mutiny of November 7, 1975, as we shall see later.

10. Bangabandhu rejected that proposal possibly and in part due to his adherence to the parliamentary system, under which government is formed by the party that enjoys the majority in the parliament. Accordingly, he went for an exclusively Awami League government, ignoring the significance and spirit of the all-party Consultative Committee that was formed during the Liberation War in order to provide a role in the national leadership to nonAwami League but pro-Libera-tion parties.

11. In 1970, elections were held for both the (all Pakistan) National Assembly and the Provincial Assembly (of East Pakistan). Thus 150 members of the National

Notes 215

Assembly (called MNA) and 300 members of the Provincial Assembly (called MPA) were elected. During the Liberation War, all the MNAs and MPAs elected from Bangladesh (East Pakistan) were combined to form one body, which was recognized, following independence, as the Constituent Assembly responsible for drafting and adopting the Constitution of Bangladesh.

12. See, in particular, Md. Anisur Rahmans article in Robinson and Griffin (1974). Also, as is now clear from the collapse of socialism in the former USSR and the East European countries and transition of China and Vietnam to market economies and large role of private enterprise, the project of socialism based on sweeping nationalization had inherent problems, so that Bangabandhu eventually would have faced problems even if Awami League was a party of socialism.

13. The Left Challenge included both those who were sincere (though misguided) regarding their Left convictions and those who were pseudo Left. The latter com-prised people who masqueraded as Left, because it was convenient to do so in order to oppose Bangabandhu. In many observers view, this was true for some in Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (JSD) (see Chowdhury, 2014). In fact, it is alleged that many communal forces also rallied behind apparently Left parties, because their own parties were banned, and politics based on religion was banned and did not have public support.

14. Sometimes, JSD leaders added Mao Zedong and some other international Com-munist leaders to this list.

15. The Left challenge also included pro-Peking parties who had either opposed the Liberation War and sided with the Pakistan army or fought against both the Pakistan army and the Bangladesh Liberation Forces, under the slogan that Ban-gladesh Liberation War was mere a fight between two dogs. These parties were generally engaged in armed struggle in various pockets of rural Bangladesh and directed their armed operations against the rural rich and the law enforcement agencies stationed in the localities. Note that armed struggle was also an overt form of operation.

16. As noted already, it is alleged that many of these forces therefore rallied behind JSD, Moulana Bhashani, and other pro-Peking parties who could launch an open anti-Mujib movement.

17. This fact is often missed because these parties did not receive, due to the majority system of election, any seat, thus creating the impression that all (100 percent) of Bangladesh population were for the six-point charter and independence.

18. In addition, Mushtaque was unhappy with his removal from the ministry of for-eign affairs to the relatively less-important ministry of water resources. Also, it is said that Bangabandhu warned Mushtaque that he was aware of the latters con-spiratorial activities and would take action against him when the time was ripe. See Nurul Islam (2003) and () for some evidence.

19. Bangabandhu apparently tried to pacify some of these forces by joining the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) conference held in Lahore, Pakistan, in 1974 and inviting to visit Bangladesh Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan Peoples Party, who was instrumental to Yahya regimes decision not to accept the

216 Notes

verdict of 1970 election, a decision that led to the March 25 crackdown, trig-gering Bangladeshs Liberation War. Many found Mujibs visit to Pakistan and reconciliation with Bhutto to be too soon to be acceptable. Ironically, it seems that Mujibs overtures did not prove enough.

20. In this effort, the Awami League Right headed by Mushtaque was apparently joined by young Turks such as Sheikh Fazlul Haque Moni, Bangabandhus nephew and an ex-leader of Chatra League (the student wing of Awami League).

While Mushtaques opposition to Tajuddin was prompted by or was aligned with the position of the United States, it was not necessarily always the case with Sheikh Moni, who appeared to be driven more by partisan and personal consider-ations. During the Liberation War, Shiekh Moni apparently claimed that he had the mantle of leadership in absence of Bangabandhu and on that basis challenged Tajuddin as the leader. He was also one of those who took the initiative to form Mujib Bahini, an armed force comprising only bona fide members of Awami League and its mass organizations. Mujib Bahini was separate from the regular Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force) and was outside the command and control of the Bangladesh government in exile, headed by Tajuddin as the Prime Minister. Apparently, Sheikh Moni and his associates took this initiative to ensure that the leadership of the Liberation War and, in particular, of post-independence Ban-gladesh remained in the hands of die-hard Awami Leaguers. They were apparently apprehensive that non Awami Leaguers could become preponderant in Mukti Bahini, and not sure that Tajuddin would like to or be able to prevent such an outcome. The initiative to form All-Party Consultative Committee, including representatives of Left parties, might have fueled their apprehensions. Thus, while Tajuddin was trying to unite the nation for the success of the Liberation War, Sheikh Moni and his associates appeared to be more focused on preserving their control on the Liberation War and did not mind aggravating partisan and sectar-ian tendencies in order to achieve their goal.

Thus both the Mushtaque clique and the Sheikh Moni group had grudges against Tajuddin, though not for exactly the same reasons. Sheikh Monis opposi-tion to Tajuddin might not have been as ideologically driven as that of Mush-taque. The arguments they made to Bangabandhu against Tajuddin might overlap in some respects and differ in others. However, the combined effect on Bang-abandhu must have been the creation of a distance from Tajuddin. It is another irony of Bangladesh history that when the Mushtaque clique ultimately hit Bang-abandhu on August 15, 1975, it also killed Sheikh Moni and most of his family members.

21. See, for example, Chowdhury (2014).22. For more on Tajuddins economic views and his differences in this regard with

Bangabandhu, see Nurul Islam (2003).23. It is intriguing how much the removal of Tajuddin from the cabinet was due to

personal rift and how much due to policy difference. If policy differences (e.g., with regard to the US aid) were important, one wonders whether it would not have been sufficient to move Tajuddin to another ministry rather than removing

Notes 217

him from the cabinet altogether. On the other hand, if personal issues had the decisive role, one wonders how Bangabandhu could fail to see the unquestioned personal loyalty of Tajuddin toward him and be misled by others.

There is ample evidence that Tajuddin was never guided by personal ambition. He was as determined to bring Bangabandhu back alive as any other leader of Awami League. Also, it was not the decision of Tajuddin alone to reject Mush-taques confederation proposal. Instead, it was the collective decision of the Ban-gladesh government in exile.

Tajuddin led the entire Liberation War in the name of Bangabandhu. In fact, Tajuddin was so self-effacing as a leader as to once urge all to work in such a manner that future generations would not even know the names of who did the work! Upon victory, Tajuddin gave all credit of the success of the Liberation War to Bangabandhu. He characterized it to be the happiest day of his life when on January 12, 1972, he stepped aside to let Bangabandhu be the Prime Minister and form his government. To attribute personal ambition to such a leader is simply absurd.

Tajuddins loyalty to Bangabandhu and his lack of personal ambition were proved again when, upon removal from the cabinet, he withdrew himself from politics completely and did not engage in any form of opposition to or criticism of either the government or Bangabandhu. His loyalty to Bangabandhu was dem-onstrated further when, upon the August 15 coup, he rejected any offer to join the Mushtaque government and ultimately gave his life on November 3, 1975, when Mushtaques henchmen entered the jail and killed him along with the other national leaders.

It is perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of Bangladesh history that Bang-abandhu apparently couldnt appreciate fully Tajuddins decisive role in organiza-tion of the Liberation War and Tajuddins unflinching loyalty toward him. It is said that Tajuddin lamented that Bangabandhu never made time to learn from him the details of the Liberation War. It is also the case that Bangabandhu never visited Mujibnagar, the historic place named after him, where the provisional government of independent Bangladesh was sworn in on April 17, 1971.

These are some of the ironies of Bangladeshs political history and they need fuller investigation. For some discussion that has already taken place of Tajuddins role during the Liberation War and Mujib-Tajuddin relationship, see (), (), (), (), Nurul Islam (2003), (), and Matin (2013).

24. It is not clear who advised Bangabandhu to launch the Second Revolution and to design it the way he did. One-party rule, taking over the press, compulsory vil-lage cooperatives, and so forth had the resemblance of the systems that prevailed in the socialist countries. This would suggest that socialists, either outside or inside Awami League, might have an important role. However, Tajuddin, a more socialist-minded leader of Awami League than others, was by that time no lon-ger in the government. According to various sources, Tajuddin was vehemently against BAKSAL. The outside Left parties, which were allies of Bangabandhu

218 Notes

regime, such as the Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) and NAP (Muzaf-far), were also apparently not consulted regarding the BAKSAL initiative. Many suggest that Bangabandhus nephew, Sheikh Moni, had an important role in the BAKSAL initiative. If true, this would support the previous observation that, in contrast to that of Mushtaques, the opposition of Shiekh Moni to Tajuddin was not primarily because the latter was allegedly a Leftist.

25. Clearly, Bangabandhu hoped that BAKSAL would unite all nationalist and pro-gressive forces and help him overcome the dissension and discord that were tear-ing the nation apart. Also, it should be noted that he introduced the one-party BAKSAL rule following the rules of parliamentary democracy, and the 1973 Par-liament continued to function. However, his distracters would term the Fourth Amendment as strangling of democracy and a self-serving attempt to preserve his power by resisting the forces that were trying to unseat him.

26. The government-in-exile that Tajuddin Ahmed and his associates formed during the Liberation War was of the presidential form, designating Bangabandhu as the president (in absentia). That is how it remained until Bangabandhu returned on January 10, 1972. He had the option of keeping that system, letting Tajuddin Ahmed function as the Prime Minister. However, Bangabandhu did not accept the idea, changed the form of the government from the presidential to the par-liamentary almost immediately, and assumed the office of the Prime Minister. According to knowledgeable sources, one of the first things that Bangabandhu said to Tajuddin was, Tajuddin, I will be the Prime Minister! Tajuddin was obviously more than willing to oblige. Bangabandhus decision to switch from the presidential system to the parliamentary system (under a Provisional Constitu-tion that was announced in January 1972) and assume the post of prime minister can be attributed to his life long struggle for parliamentary democracy. See () for an evaluation of Bangabandhus role during the post-independence period.

27. Bangabandhus brother-in-law, Abdur Rab Serniabat, and his nephew, Sheikh Fazlul Hoque Moni, were also killed, along with many members of their families.

28. Some of these officers, such as Maj. Shariful Haque (Dalim), were discharged recently from the army on disciplinary grounds. Maj. Rashid, one of the two leaders of the coup, was a nephew of Mushtaque, and Maj. Faruque, the other leader of the coup, was Rashids brother-in-law.

29. Many suspect Zia of having prior knowledge of the August 15 coup. In their tele-vision interview conducted by Anthony Mascarenhas, the two main military lead-ers of the coup, Maj. Faruque and Maj. Rashid, themselves provided the ground for this suspicion. (See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBpkJFtETQ0 for this interview.) According to this interview and accounts provided by Lifschultz and Bird (1979) and Mascarenhas (1986) and other researchers, Maj. Faruque met Zia on March 20, 1975, and informed him about their plan of a coup. Zia allegedly took him to the lawn outside his office and told him that while junior officers like Faruque could go ahead with such a plan, as a senior officer he could not take part in it. Many cite anecdotal evidence regarding how Zia reacted after

Notes 219

first being informed of the coup and his behavior in those early hours to suggest that he had already mentally processed the steps that would have to be taken fol-lowing the coup.

According to some sources, Zia was unhappy that the government super-seded him and appointed Shafiullah, who was junior to him, as the Chief of Staff of the army. Retired Air Vice Marshal, A. K. Khandaker (2014), the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of Bangladesh Liberation Force, notes in his recent mem-oirs that such a supersession was unwarranted. Why the government decided to supersede Zia is not fully known. According to some accounts, Zia was perceived by many in the Awami League leadership as ambitious. In particular, Col. M. A. G. Osmani, the Supreme Commander of Bangladesh Liberation Forces, was reportedly unhappy with Zia due to incidents that occurred during the Liberation War. If this were true, it would be another irony of Bangladesh political history that, following the August 15, 1975, coup, both Osmani and Zia turned out to be on the same side as allies of Mushtaque.

To pacify Zia, the government created the post of Deputy Chief of Staff and appointed Zia to that position. However, apparently Zia was not happy with this accommodation. According to press reports, Col. (retired) Oli Ahad, who was close to Zia in many ways, often expresses the view that there would have been no August 15 coup had Zia been appointed the Chief of Staff. Also, according to press reports, Nurul Islam, then State Minister of Defense (a portfolio that Bangabandhu kept in his own hands), lamented that he had inadvertently let Zia know that Shafiullah had received an extension of his appointment, implying that Zia had no hope left to be the Chief of Staff, because he would reach retirement age by the time Shafiullahs extension would expire.

Whether or not the above claims and accounts are true, it is difficult to dis-pute the following facts. First, as already noted, soon after the coup, Zia was made the Chief of Staff of the army, replacing Shafiullah. Second, Zia did not take any step to rein in the army officers (majors and captains) who carried out the coup and continued to violate the army chain of command by staying in Bangabhaban and issuing commands from there. Third, after assuming power, he appointed many of these officers as ambassadors and to other posts in Bangladesh embassies in various Middle Eastern and African countries.

30. Khaled Mosharraf was appointed Chief of General Staff in 1973, following his promotion to the rank of a Brigadier.

31. For Khaled Mosharraf s role in Bangladesh Liberation War, see ().32. For discussion of the role of Shafayat Jamil in the Liberation War and the fateful

events of 1975, see ().33. The Twelve-point-demand charter that was given to Zia on November 7 by Bip-

lobi Sainik Sangsthya (BSS) is as follows:

1. Our revolution is for the poor of the society. Our revolution is not for just change of leaders. For long we have served in the armed forces to protect the interests of the rich. General Zia has to declare clearly that he will

220 Notes

change the present structure of the armed forces and will provide leader-ship to the poor. The rich have used us in their interests. The events of August 15 are its best proof. Our current revolution is not for protection of the interests of the rich. We have allied with the people in revolting. From now on the armed forces will build themselves for the protection of the interests of the people at large. From now on Bangladesh army will be a peoples army protecting the interests of the poor.

2. All political leaders, including Jalil and Rab, have to be released. 3. No decisions will be taken without discussion with the political leaders. 4. Distinction between officers and jawaans (soldiers) has to be ended.

Instead of appointing officers separately, ranks have to be determined on the basis of military education and qualifications from within the forces.

5. The same rationing system has to be introduced for officers and the sol-diers. Salary of the soldiers has to be fixed at the 7th grade and deduction from salary for housing has to stop.

6. The batman system under which soldiers are used as private servants of officers has to be abolished.

7. Colonial norms and practices, i.e., rules and regulations from the British period, have to be ended.

8. Proper care has to be taken of the families of all our patriotic brothers who died during the Liberation War, Mass Uprising, and the current revolution.

9. Property of all the corrupt persons has to be confiscated. The money that many have sent out abroad will have to be brought back.

10. Those officers and soldiers who have been sent abroad will have to be brought back home.

11. The repatriated members of the armed forces have to be given salaries for 18 months.

12. Biplobi Sainik Sangstha (Revolutionary Soldiers Organization) will serve as the central policy organ of the military. General Zia will take all decision regarding the military in consultation with this Organization.

Source: Taher website: http://www.col-taher.org/en/. Translation is done by the author.

34. The rescue was led by Captain Haider, one of the August 15 coup participants.35. See () for his account of the August 15 coup and the events of Novem-

ber 1975.36. See ! () for information on Col. K. N. Huda and his role during the Libera-

tion War.37. According to some accounts (see for example https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Khaled_Mosharraf ), Capt. Asad and Capt. Jalil of 10th East Bengal Regiment shot and killed Maj. Gen. Khaled Mosharraf, Col. Huda, and Col. A. T. M. Haider, under order of an officer from 2nd Field Regiment Artillery (rumored to be Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed, executed on January 28, 2010, for killing Sheikh Mujibur Rahman). If true, it would be an irony because both Capt. Asad and

Notes 221

Capt. Jalil fought in K-force under Khaled Mosharraf during Bangladesh Libera-tion War. It is also said that Khaled Mosharraf had once saved Capt. Asads life while risking his own life. Who in turn ordered Lt. Col. Mohiuddin Ahmed to kill Khaled Mosharraf and his associates, is not clear. See () for information on Col. A. T. M. Haider and his role in Bangladesh Liberation War.

38. Actually, in his speech recorded at 2nd Field Artillery Regiment, to be broadcast via radio, Zia on November 7 declared himself as the CMLA. This was later changed, because Justice Sayem, as the President (following Mushtaques resig-nation), was already the CMLA. Hence Zia, M. A. Khan, and A. G. Mahmud became the three DCMLAs. For details, see Taher website: http://www.col-taher .org/en/.

39. It is alleged that Zia approved execution of several thousand officers and soldiers.40. Voters were asked, Do you have confidence in President Major General Ziaur

Rahman BU and the policies and programs adopted by him? The results appar-ently showed 98.9 percent yes vote, with a turnout of 88.1 percent. See Nohlen et al. (2001).

41. According to some sources, Zia contacted Zohra Tajuddin, wife of Tajuddin Ahmed, and the then main leader of Awami League, about possible support for his power. This was similar to the strategy of the Pakistani military ruler Ayub Khan, who managed to split the Muslim League, the dominating political party of the time, and get support of one of its parts, named Muslim League (Conven-tion). The other part, named Muslim League (Council), remained opposed to military rule of Ayub Khan. Apparently, Zohra Tajuddin made it clear that, in view of Zias alleged involvement in the August 15 coup, there was no way for him to get Awami League support.

42. Golam Azam, the head of the Jamaat-e-Islamii party, escaped from Bangladesh to Pakistan following the victory of the Liberation War. He was stripped of Bangla-desh citizenship by the Bangabandhu government. Zia allowed him to return, and he eventually gained Bangladeshi citizenship in 1994 through a Supreme Court order (more on this later).

43. This included Jamaat-e-Islami, the most important and virulent supporter of the occupation Pakistan force during the Liberation War. Other religious par-ties include Muslim League, Nejame Islam, Islamic Democratic League, and so forth.

44. The following presents Zias 19-point program:

1. Protect the countrys independence, integrity, and sovereignty. 2. Reflect in national life the four constitutional principles, namely belief and

confidence in the All-might Allah, Democracy, Nationalism, and Social-ism as social and economic justice.

3. Build a self-reliant nation. 4. Ensure peoples participation in administration at all levels, in develop-

ment activities, and in maintenance of law and order. 5. Strengthen the rural economy by giving top priority to agricultural

development.

222 Notes

6. Make the country self-sufficient in food and ensure that nobody remains hungry.

7. Increase cloth production in the country to ensure basic clothing for all. 8. Ensure that nobody remains homeless. 9. Free the country from the curse of illiteracy.10. Ensure basic healthcare for all.11. Establish proper respect for the women in the society and organize and

mobilize the youth for nation building.12. Encourage the private sector for the development of the economy.13. Improve the condition of the workers and build healthy worker-owner

relationship with the aim of increasing the production.14. Encourage among government employees the public service and nation

building spirit and improve their economic condition.15. Curb population growth.16. Build friendly relationship with all foreign countries on the basis of equal-

ity and strengthen the relationship with the Muslim nations.17. Decentralize administration and development effort and strengthen the

local government.18. Build a corruption free and fair and just society.19. Protect to the full extent the rights of all citizens irrespective of religion,

ethnicity, and race, and strengthen national unity and solidarity.

Source: www.bnpbangladesh.com/en/index.php/b-n-p/19-points-program.

In a sense, Zia had some of the historys wind in his sail. Bangabandhu wanted to follow a socialistic path to development. However, as noted above, sweeping nationalization-based economic program would have been difficult to make suc-cessful, even if Awami League or BAKSAL were genuinely committed to social-ism, which they were not. In addition, the program of compulsory production cooperatives in the villages, announced by Bangabandhu in March 1975, would also face serious difficulties, as the subsequent experience of the socialist coun-tries, including China and Vietnam, showed.

Zia, on the other hand, appeared not to have any such ideological bag-gage. Contrary to Col. Tahers expectations, he was not to be the front man of a socialistic government. Instead, he was happy to align himself with the rightist ideology of the Mushtaque clique, unhinge Bangladesh from all its socialistic moorings, and let it sail in the direction in which the wind blew at that time: toward capitalism. Similarly, he apparently did not have much qualms to ally himself with political forces that were opposed to the liberation of Bangladesh.

45. Loans from BSB and BSRS as well as from the nationalized commercial banks provided the initial capital for many of the current capitalists of Bangladesh. In many cases, they just defaulted on the loans and never paid them back. See () for a discussion of the rise of the capitalist class in Bangladesh and the role of loan default in this process. See also Hoque (2004).

46. Bangabandhus two daughters, Sheikh Hasina and Sheikh Rehana, escaped the killing on August 15, 1975, because they were away to Germany, where Sheikh

Notes 223

Hasinas husband, Dr. Wazed, a nuclear scientist, was on a fellowship. Later they moved to and stayed in New Delhi, India, until Zia allowed Sheikh Hasina to return to Bangladesh on May 18, 1981.

47. See, for example, http://bdnews24.com/politics/2014/05/04/khaleda-accuses -ershad-of-killing-zia-manzur. See also The Daily Star, May 10, 2014. Col. Oli Ahmed, a close associate of Gen. Zia, has also accused Ershad of killing Zia and then hanging the FF officers (Dhaka Tribune, May 20, 2014). See http://www.dhaka tribune.com/politics/2014/may/20/now-oli-accuses-ershad-killing-zia-manzoor.

48. Lifschultz (2014) suggests that there might have been a plot inside the plot of the Chittagong revolt. According to his interpretation, Ershad tried and suc-ceeded in killing two birds (Gen. Zia and Gen. Manzuur) at one stroke. There was widespread resentment among FF officers against Zias patronization of repatri-ated officers and in particular his decision to appoint Ershad as Deputy Chief of Staff in 1975 and as then Chief of Staff in 1978. Gen. Manzur, the famed sector commander of the Liberation War, was an outspoken critique of Ershad. Manzur was therefore posted to distant Chittagong, where the army was engaged in a dirty war against the tribal insurgents (Shanti Bahini). Many other FF officers were also posted in Chittagong, apparently to instigate a revolt. There is also the allegation of double-crossing that bungled the operation, which was allegedly not intended to kill Zia but to abduct him to the cantonment and force him to remove Ershad from the Chief of Staff (of the Army) position and change the policy of favoring repatriated officers over FFs. Lifschultz describes how, once the revolt occurred, Ershad made sure that Manzur was not given any chance to explain and defend himself. Instead Manzur was taken from police custody to the Chittagong cantonment and killed.

49. Earlier, February 10, 2014, was declared as the date for announcement of the verdict of the case. However, the presiding judge has been changed again, and the case has been slated for more hearings.

50. The most prominent among them is Barrister Moudud Ahmed, who was a min-ister in Zia regime, but became a Vice President in the Ershad regime.

51. See Nohlen et al. (2001, p. 536) for detailed reported results of this election.52. See Sobrab Hasans article in Prothom Alo of October 8, 2012.53. The misuse of power in Magura by-election was so flagrant that the Chief Elec-

tion Commissioner had to flee the scene in order to save face. See, for example, Caretaker Chronicle, by Julfikar Ali Manik, The Daily Star, July 1, 2011.

54. See Caretaker Chronicle, by Julfikar Ali Manik, The Daily Star, July 1, 2011.55. Whether Awami League had the will to do so is a separate question.56. See Banglanews24, October 22, 2013, at http://www.banglanews24.com/full

news/bn/232808.html.57. It is suggested that a UN threat to stop recruiting peacekeeping forces from

Bangladesh prompted the military to intervene, instead of siding with BNP and engaging in a confrontation with the Opposition.

58. This regime is also often called the Three Uddin regime, because the three important figuresnamely, Moen Uddin, Iazuddin, and Fakruddinall had uddin as part of their names.

224 Notes

59. For discussion on the experience and lessons of the 1/11 regime, see Islam (2007) and Sobhan (2007a, 2007b).

60. See New York Times, January 13, 2007.61. Zia appointed several top collaborators to high positions in the government. For

example, in March, 1979 he appointed as Prime Minister Shah Azizur Rahman, a well-known collaborator, who went, at the behest of the Pakistan government, to the United Nations General Assembly session in September 1971 to argue against Bangladeshs independence. Similarly, he appointed Mashiur Rahman (Jadu Miah), another well-known collaborator, as the Chief Minister in June 1978.

62. See "#$.63. See , %& () for an assessment of Tareque Masuds films, in particular of

Muktir Gaan.64. On January 22, 2006, Sheikh Hasina signed a controversial agreement with

Khelafat Majlish, a group of religious parties, to form a political alliance for the then-scheduled 2006 general election, apparently with the aim of getting more support of the religious-minded voters. According to press reports, the agreement included such provisions as declaring the Ahmadiyya community as non-Muslim, passing a blasphemy law (outlawing expressions of criticism of Islam) and making fatwas (decrees issued by Muslim clerics) legally binding. The pact was criticized not only by outside secular and democratic forces but also by many within Awami League, who resented the fact that it was signed with-out discussion with and consent of other party leaders. Sheikh Hasina scrapped the agreement following her return to Bangladesh from the exile imposed by the interim government (20062008). Defending her actions, Sheikh Hasina reportedly said that the pact was signed for a certain period to resist the com-munal-fundamentalist forces led by the Jamaat-e-Islami. She apparently also claimed that she was authorized by party leaders to make any decisions to ensure election victory for the Awami League. She is also reported to have claimed that the Khelafat had approached her about forming an alliance and had promised to support a secular policy. (See New Age Bangladesh, June 24, 2007.)

65. While from the sensibility of developed countries, many of which have abolished death penalty, life imprisonment may appear to be a harsh enough sentence, from the Bangladeshi perspective it amounted to setting the guilty free. This is because (1) the death penalty in Bangladesh is the standard punishment for murder; (2) Quader Molla was found guilty not only of one murder, but of mass murder, in addition to rape, arson, and other crimes; and (3) more importantly, life sen-tence meant that Quader Molla could eventually go free, because there was the possibility that whenever BNP would come to power, it would go soft and find a way to let the convicted Jamaat leaders go free. That this suspicion was not without basis found reflection in the fact that BNP leaders often complained that the War Criminals Trial process was flawed, and that it would redo the trial once it ascended to power. (See http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2014/04/27/former-pakistan-colonel-attacks-war-crimes-trials.)

Notes 225

66. See, for example, Sen (2006).67. For discussion of changes of the land tenure system in Bengal during the British

rule, see, for example, S. Islam (1979, 1985). See N. Islam (2011) (Bangla) for a discussion of the socioeconomic history of Bangladesh.

68. For more on Pakistan movement, see, for example, Umar (1993), Azad (1978), and S. Islam (1997). See also Singh (2009).

69. For more on the role of Bengal Muslims in Pakistan movement, see, for example, Harun-or-Rashid (1987), Kabir (1943), S. Sen (1976), (), and S. Islam (1997). For discussion of the Muslim identity among the Bangalee population of East Bengal, see A. A. Khan (1996) and B. Sen (2000).

70. Tajuddin Ahmeds diary on August 14, 1947, provides authentic description of the sentiment among Bangladeshi Muslims during those days. See '()* (). See also K. Ahmad (1967).

71. For more on the language movement, see ( (, ), Umar (2000, 2004), (), Muhith (2008). For discussion of the decline of the Muslim League, see Kamal (2009).

72. For more on Bangladesh movement, see, for example, M. Ahmed (1979), Nuru-lIslam (2003), S. Islam (1997), R. Jahan (1994), S. Karim (2009), Muhith (1978), Sobhan (2015). For an invaluable account by Bangabandhu himself, see %+% (),.

73. For detailed discussion of rise of political Islam and its impact on governance in Bangladesh, see Riaz (2004, 2008a, 2008b) and Riaz and Fair (2011).

74. See, for example, Gramsci (1971).75. For more on the financial strength of the Wahabi forces in Bangladesh, see Barkat

(2013).76. Source: Testimony of Samina Ahmed to US Senate Foreign Relations Commit-

tee, available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/speeches/2005/testimony-of-samina-ahmed-to-us-senate-foreign-relations-committee.aspx. See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Befaqul_Madarisil_Arabia_Bangladesh.

77. For more on growth of Madrasahs and their impact, see Riaz (2008a) and Barkat et al. (2011).

78. See Prothom Alo, October 29, 2013.79. On the March 9, Hefazat-e-Islam leader Shaykh-ul-Islam Allama Shah Ahmad

Shafi put forward the following 13-point demand at the Olama-Mashayekh (Islamic Scholars) Convention organized at Darul Uloom Hathazari Madrassah Convention Hall:

1. Reinstatement of Absolute trust and faith in Allah in the constitution of Bangladesh and abolishment of all laws which are in conflict with the values of the Quran and Sunnah.

2. Enactment of (anti-defamation) law at the parliament keeping death pen-alty as the highest form of punishment to prevent defamation of Allah, Muhammad (S. A. W.) and Islam, and prevent spreading hate against Muslims (highest penalty prevalent for defamation is 10 years).

226 Notes

3. Immediate end to the negative propaganda by all atheist bloggers in a leading role in the so called Shahbag movement who have defamed Allah, Mohammad (S. A. W.), and Islam and their exemplary punishment.

4. End to all alien cultural practices like immodesty, lewdness, misconduct, culture of free mixing of the sexes, candle lighting in the name of personal freedom and free speech.

5. Abolishment of the anti-Islamic inheritance law and the ungodly educa-tion policy. Making Islamic education compulsory at all levels from pri-mary to higher secondary.

6. Declaration of Ahmadias as non-Muslims by the government and put a stop to their negative and conspiratorial activities.

7. Stop installing more statues in the name of sculpture at road intersec-tions and educational institutions to save Dhaka the city of mosques, from becoming the city of statues.

8. Remove all the hassles and obstructions at Baitul Mokarram and all mosques in Bangladesh which prevent Musallis from offering prayer. Also stop creating obstruction for people to attend religious sermons and other religious gatherings.

9. Stop the spread of Islamophobia among the youth through depiction of negative characters on TV, plays, and movies in religious attire and paint-ing negative stereotypes of the beard, cap and Islamic practices on various media.

10. Stop anti-Islamic activities at Chittagong propagated by several NGOs and Christian missionaries under guise of religious conversion.

11. End to the massacre, indiscriminate firing and attacks on the prophet lov-ing Muslim scholars, madrasah students, and the general public.

12. End to all threats against Islamic scholars, madrasah students, and Imams and Muslim clerics of mosques throughout the country.

13. Immediate and unconditional release of all detained Islamic scholars, madrassah students, and members of the general public and with-drawal of all false cases filed against them. Compensation to families of all injured and deceased and exemplary punishment to all those responsible.

Source: http://www.kaagoj.com/details?id=139, accessed on July 10, 2014.

80. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yd8vpB3wVpg.81. The resulting conflict between the secular and Islamic fundamentalist forces now

observed in Bangladesh is similar to what can be seen in many other Muslim dominated countries, including Turkey, Tunisia, Iran, and Egypt.

82. The tenure of the Ninth Parliament was to expire on January 25, 2014. According to the Constitution, election of the Tenth Parliament was supposed to be held within 90 days before that date.

83. Reflecting on a similar issue, Marx noted in his Preface to Capital Vol. I, The English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income (Marx 1977).

Notes 227

84. In another verdict, the High Court found registration of Jamaat-e-Islami as a political party to be illegal. It is now in the stage of appeal. See the appendix to this chapter for the details of the constitutional amendments.

85. Nevertheless, the Fifteenth Amendment was a huge step forward in restoring the integrity of the Constitution. It also strengthened democracy in Bangladesh by making assumption of power though coups and other unconstitutional means not only illegal under all circumstances but also punishable as treason.

86. The crucial role in this regard belonged to Justice A. B. M. Khairul Haque, who first as Judge of the High Court and then as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, guided the cases toward constitutional issues and arrived at the bold verdicts repealing both Fifth and Seventh Amendments. The people of Bangladesh need to be grateful for the outstanding service that Justice Haque has rendered to the nation. The credit also goes to other High Court and Supreme Court Justices who cooperated with Justice Haque in this noble endeavor.

87. Not all in BNP, however, seemed to be enthusiastic about relying so much on Jamaat for capturing power. However, Khaleda Zia and her son Tareque Zia appeared to have preferred this route, and the rest of the party had to comply.

Khaleda Zias strategy of depending on Jamaat and Hefazat to capture power also became clear when she lent BNPs all-out support for Hefazats Dhaka rally on May 5, 2013. She called upon all citizens of Dhaka to come out in support of the Hefazat rally and seemed intent on using it to precipitate the governments downfall. In the end, however, things did not go the way that Jamaat, Hefazat, and BNP leaders had apparently thought or planned to go. The mayhem that Jamaat and Hefazat activists created in and around Motijheel and Baitul Mokar-ram Masjid area, including burning of a huge number of shops that sold Holy Quran and other Islamic literature and articles, uprooting of trees and lampposts, and so on, created a horror, and the public rather felt relieved when finally the law enforcement agencies applied force to flush out the rally participants from Dhaka city.

88. For example, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina offered to form an all-party gov-ernment to conduct the polls, as an alternative to the CTG. On October 18, she offered the Opposition to send names of its MPs who could be included in such an all-party government that would oversee the election. However, the Opposition rejected the offer and called for 60-hour hartal, stretching over three consecutive days. On October 26, Sheikh Hasina called Begum Khaleda Zia on the phone, requesting that she call off the hartal and inviting her to a dinner and discussion at Gonobhaban (residence of the PM). Khaleda Zia turned down that request too.

89. With respect to the economy, for example, the BNP-led government during 20012006 failed to expand the countrys electricity generation capacity. The law-and-order situation also underwent deterioration during this period. Its record with regard to abuse of power and corruption was also no better. By letting Hawah Bhaban to be an alternative center of power, occupied by Tareque Zia and his friends, BNP allowed a dual power situation to develop, creating lawlessness in the administration. Moreover, during the five years (2009-2014) of the Awami

228 Notes

League government, BNP did not really engage itself with peoples issues and build movement around those issues.

90. In addition, the agitation spearheaded mostly by Jamaat took the form of uproot-ing trees on a massive scale to create barricades on highways; removing fishplates to derail trains and setting them on fire; cutting deep trenches on roads and highways to make them impassable; burning houses of judges and prosecutors taking part in the trial; killing those who provided evidence against its leaders at the war criminal trial; killing and maiming leaders of the civilian movement demanding the WCT, and so on. Overall, Jamaat created a warlike situation, and in the districts where it had stronger hold, it created a situation of terror.

91. A large number of schools, which were to serve as polling stations, were burned the night before election day.

92. See Prathom Alo, January 7, 2014. There are claims that the turnout was much lower, around 22 percent (see New York Times, January 6, 2014).

93. See Parliament of Bangladesh: http://www.parliament.gov.bd/index.php/en/mps/members-of-parliament/current-mp-s/list-of-10th-parliament-members-english and IFES Election Guide: http://www.electionguide.org/elections/id/2436/.

94. In these elections, BNP and Jamaat-backed candidates did pretty well, vindicat-ing again the considerable electoral support for them. Though the opposition parties and some of the Western governments continue to talk about holding another election soon, with participation of all parties, Awami League and its allies in the government are brushing aside these suggestions and are maintaining that both the Tenth Parliament and the government it formed will serve the full five-year term.

95. For example, both Khaleda Zia and Tareque Zia face the trial of the corruption cases involving Zia Charitable Trust and Zia Orphanage. In addition, Tareque Zia faces the more important trial of the Ten-truck arms hauling case (more on this in Chapter 3).

96. For example, many were not happy with the governments earlier decisions bar-ring BNP to hold rallies in Gazipur and Dhaka city, locking up BNPs head office, and virtually confining Khaleda Zia to her office. However, the government sug-gested that BNP was intent on launching a violent movement, no matter what, and the steps that it took prior to January 5, 2015, were only of precautionary nature.

97. Apart from large-scale arrests, there were also many so-called gun fights with police in which arrested alleged perpetrators of violence, many of whom belonged to Jamaat and BNP, were killed. There were protests, particularly from BNP and its sympathizers, who termed these gun fights as mere extrajudicial killings. The government ignored these complaints. However, it did not take any extreme step, such as declaring emergency or calling up the army.

98. According to critics, the vulnerability of Jamaat with regard to the WCT gives the government certain leverage, which it may try to use to its advantage.

99. There is the allegation that the government gave a large tract of land belonging to the railway department to the Hathazari Madrasah of Allama Shafi.

Notes 229

100. A third group is said to be led by Bappaditya Basu, the leader Chhatra Moitri, a Left-leaning student organization. For reports on Gonojagoron Moncho split, see http://english.thereport24.com/article/13628/index.html.

101. Gonojagoron Moncho can be a great topic for political and sociological studies.

Chapter 3

1. For analyses of military rule in Bangladesh, see Riaz (1994). 2. As noted earlier, Bangabandhu wanted and pursued a constitutional rule, even

though the early years of independent Bangladesh were not that peaceful. The country had just emerged from an armed struggle, and many political groups continued to possess arms. JSD built up a powerful challenge against the regime. There were many covert operations and conspiracies.

3. To be accurate, there have been some changes in the political set up during 19721975 period too. For example, the provisional government that was formed on April 10, 1971, was based on the presidential system. Bangabandhu was declared (in absentia) the President, and Syed Nazrul Islam as the Vice President. Tajuddin Ahmed was the Prime Minister. At that time, there was no constitution yet. Upon his return on January 10, 1972, Bangabandhu announced a provisional constitution and changed the government into the usual parliamentary form, with the Prime Minister as the Chief Executive, with himself assuming that office. He appointed Justice Abu Sayed Chowd-hury as the President. The 1972 Constitution formalized the parliamentary system, and Bangabandhu continued to be the Prime Minister, with Awami League leader Mahmudullah as the new President. Following introduction of BAKSAL (Fourth Amendment), the country reverted back to the Presidential system, with Bangabandhu now being the President and Captain Mansur Ali as the Prime Minister. However, these governmental changes did not amount to regime changes, because in all cases, Bangabandhu remained the center of power. However, these changes also reflected some underlying tensions and contradictions, as we will see later.

4. With Bangabandhu killed, Bangladesh in a sense became an orphan, because he was regarded as the Father of the Nation. International experience shows that those nations did better in nation building which could preserve the conti-nuity of leadership between their pre- and post-independence phases. This con-tinuity of leadership conduces to political stability and helps the countries move ahead toward the goals they set for themselves when they were fighting for inde-pendence. For example, in neighboring India, the pre-independence leadership remained almost intact (except Mahatma Gandhi, who was assassinated), and continued to provide leadership during its post-independence phase. India thus had an uninterrupted history of parliamentary democracy since independence in 1947. Furthermore, for the first almost three decades, the Indian National Congress alone was in power. In Japan, following the Second World War, Lib-eral Democratic Party (LDP) alone continued to be in power for about four

230 Notes

decades, even though elections were held on a regular basis. In Singapore too, the National Party had an uninterrupted rule for a long time since indepen-dence. There are, however, counterexamples too.

5. It is likely that this idea of ending the lineage came from Mushtaque, who was particularly conscious about lineage. It is well-known that Mushtaque thought himself to have a better family lineage than Bangabandhu, and this became a sore point for him when Bangabandhu soared as a leader overshadowing him, even though they both held the same position (of Joint Secretary) when Awami Muslim League was founded in 1948.

6. See, for example, Barkat (2013). Most of the funding of these organizations is thought to come from the Middle Eastern countries and Pakistan. The fund-ing takes the form of both contribution of individuals and finance through organizations. Among the foreign and international NGOs alleged to provide funding to radical Islamist organizations are the Kuwait-based Society of the Revival of Islamic Heritage (RIHS) and Doulatul Kuwait; Saudi Arabiabased Al Haramaine Islamic Institute and Rabita Al Alam Al Islami; Qatar Charitable Society; and UAE-based Al Fuzaira and Khairul Ansar Al Khairia. Foreign intelligence services are also thought to be involved in funding jihadist groups in Bangladesh.

7. Among such ministers are Aminul Haq, Fazlur Rahman Patal, and Ruhul Kud-dus Dulu. See http://bangladeshwatchdog.blogspot.com/2007/06/bangla-bhai -story-trading-in-death.html. Bangla Bhai Story: Trading in Death Under Shadow of Authority, by Julfikar Ali Manik (Friday, June 22, 2007).

8. See Bangladesh: State of Denial, The Economist, June 16, 2005. 9. The following is a list compiled by Reuters on the series of terrorist attacks car-

ried out by Jihadist forces in Bangladesh during 20042005:

January 15, 2004: A reporter for a Bengali-language newspaper is killed in a bomb attack in the southwestern town of Khulna.

May 21: British High Commissioner Anwar Choudhury is wounded by a bomb while praying at a shrine in the northeastern Sylhet town but his body-guard and two others are killed.

August 21: Twenty-three people are killed in a bomb attack on an opposi-tion rally in the capital Dhaka. Former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed escapes with minor injuries.

September 5: Two people are killed in a bomb blast outside a cinema in the northeastern city of Sylhet.

January 27, 2005: A bomb blast kills four people, including former Finance Minister Shah Abu Mohammad Shamsul Kibria, at an opposition rally in the northeastern town of Laskarpur.

February 5: A bomb explodes in the parking lot of the press club in the southwestern city of Khulna, killing a journalist.

August 17: Some 500 small bombs, many of them targeting government build-ings, go off across Bangladesh, killing two people.

Notes 231

October 3: Two people are killed when five bombs explode in three court build-ings outside the capital Dhaka.

November 14: Two judges are killed when suspected Islamic militants throw a bomb at their car in Jhalakathi, 250 km (155 miles) south of Dhaka.

Novmber 29: Eleven people are killed by suspected suicide bombers in the port city of Chittagong and in Gazipur, 30 km (20 miles) north of Dhaka.

December 1: A suspected suicide bomber kills two people near a court build-ing in Gazipur.

December 8: At least eight people are killed in a suicide bomb attack in Netro-kona town, 360 km (220 miles) north of Dhaka.

10. For details regarding Kibria assassination, see http://www.kibria.org/.11. For details on Ahsanullah Master assassination, see http://mygoldenbengal

.wordpress.com/2012/11/30/ahsanullah-master-a-very-respectable-awami-league -leader-assassinated/.

12. For details on Kotalipara incident, see The Independent (Bangladesh), August 1, 2000.13. According to press reports on testimony of Mufti Abdul Hannan, who had a lead-

ing role in the operation and is now in custody, Maulana Tajuddin, a jihadist leader and the brother of BNP minister, Abdus Salam Pintu, supplied the gre-nades, and the perpetrators met and held discussions with Lutfuzzman Babar, the Home Minister, and Tareque Zia, son of Khaleda Zia and the senior vice president of BNP. The way police behaved immediately after the attack and the way the Jote government subsequently dealt with the investigation and prosecution of the case, also provide support to the allegation of involvement of government officials in the August 21 grenade attack.

14. They seized ten truckloads of material: a total of 4,930 different types of sophis-ticated firearms; 27,020 grenades; 840 rocket launchers; 300 rockets; 2,000 grenade-launching tubes; 6,392 magazines; and 11,40,520 bullets; which were being loaded on ten trucks from two-engine boats at the jetty of CUFL at Chit-tagong harbor. For details, see the Full Text of the verdict on the Chittagong Ten-Truck Arms Haul Case released on February 4, 2014. Ten persons received death penalty including the thenState Minister for Home, Lutfuzzaman Babar, and the Industries Minister and Jamaat leader, Matiur Rahman Nizami.

15. For details regarding alleged ISI involvement in CHT, see http://www.niticentral .com/2014/01/30/isi-linked-to-2004-bangladesh-arms-smuggling-case-report -184949.html.

16. See D. Choudhury (2013) for discussion on culture of boycotting the parliament.17. This is a point that the Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina made recently.18. See The Daily Star, January 26, 2014. See also UNDP (2005).19. Sheikh Mujib was appointed as the minister of industries, commerce, labour,

anticorruption and village aid in the cabinet of Ataur Rahman Khan (19561958). However, he resigned in 1957 to work full time for the party organization. During the time of Ayub Khan, Mujib took the courageous decision to revive Awami League, going against his political mentor, H. S. Suhrawardy, who was in

232 Notes

favor of working only under the National Democratic Front for the restoration of constitutional rule in Pakistan. See () for information about Bang-abandhu and his familys enormous sacrifice made for the Bangladesh movement. See Bangabandhus own account in (),

20. See Sohrab Hasan (2012).21. See, for example, Massive Nepotism in Rajuks Plot Allotment, The Daily Star,

July 14, 1999.22. For more details regarding Suranjit Sen scandal, see, for example, The Daily Star

(Bangladesh), October 6, 2012, and Weekly Blitz, April 13, 2012.23. The criminalization is not limited to the sphere of electoral politics. Instead, it

has spread to other spheres and rungs. As noted above, many operatives of major political parties and their affiliates are busy everywhere in extortion, misappro-priation, expropriation, forceful capture of tenders, contracts, and work permits, and outright loot. These operations often require resorting to criminal methods. Thus murders resulting from conflicts regarding award of tenders and contracts are a frequent occurrence in current Bangladesh.

24. According to recent confession of the Finance Minister, Mr. AMA Muhith, the student leaders of Murari Chand (MC) College of Sylhet did not deposit to the college account Tk 70 lakh collected as admission fees and instead just pocketed it for themselves. Apparently, leaders of the student organizations belonging to both the ruling and opposition political parties colluded in this loot. This example shows the extent of lawlessness and criminalization that has taken hold of Bangla-desh student politics. See The Daily Star, October 26, 2013.

25. For reports on violence in the recent Upazilla election, see, for example, Dhaka Tribune, March 24, 2014.

26. Some argue that extrajudicial killing by law enforcement agencies started dur-ing the Bangabandhu period when Rakkhi Bahini was formed. It is alleged that Rakkhi Bahini killed many Left activists without any trial.

27. See http://bdnews24.com/bangladesh/2012/07/29/operation-clean-heart-indem nity-questioned for a report on the High Court motion that human rights activists submitted against the Operation Clean Heart indemnity.

28. See Habib (2015) at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2593650 for a discussion of extra-judicial killing in Bangladesh and the opposition by human rights organizations to such killings.

29. See http://newsnextbd.com/tag/narayanganj-7-murder/. Criminalization of Ban-gladesh politics reflects the general weakness of the Bangladesh state, exemplified by weak enforcement of laws. This weakness makes it easy to use muscle power and criminal means to achieve political goals, which then translate into financial gains.

30. Hopefully, the primitive capitalist accumulation phase will eventually end, and Bangladesh will enter a more mature phase of capitalism. This transition is likely to have some positive effects on politics too. However, hoping that politics will eventually take care of itself may not be a good strategy. This is more so because, unless politics is fixed, there is the danger that Bangladesh may not reach that mature phase for a long time to come! Hence, it is necessary to be pro-active and take conscious steps to improve Bangladesh politics.

Notes 233

Chapter 4

1. For discussion of Colonial Capitalism, see, for example, Alavi (1975, 1980a, 1980b, 1981, 1982a, 1982b), N. Islam (1984) and (

, ).

2. For discussion of the economic impact of the British rule on the Indian economy, see Dutt (1902, 1904).

3. See Dutt (1902, 1904). 4. For more discussions of the impact of colonial rule Bangladesh, see (). 5. For discussions on the rise of bourgeois democracy, see, for example, Therborn

(1977), Huber and Stephens (1999). 6. The Peoples Charter called for six basic reforms to make the political system more

democratic:

1. Every man over 21 who is not a criminal or insane should be allowed to vote. 2. Voting should be done in secret. 3. Candidates should not need to be rich or own property to become a Mem-

ber of Parliament. 4. All Members of Parliament should be paid for doing their job. 5. All electoral areas should represent the same number of people. 6. Elections should be held annually.

Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chartist_movement.

7. For discussion on womens franchise, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Womens_suffrage, and the references therein.

8. Formally voting rights of the black population in the United States were con-firmed in 1870 (through the Fifteenth Amendment to the US Constitution). See May (2013) for a discussion of the struggle that was needed to establish in reality the voting right of the black population in the United States.

9. During the Pakistan period, the dictator Ayub Khan introduced the so-called Basic Democracy (BD), under which people were supposed to elect local BD members, who would then elect the president and national parliament (Sobhan 1968). This system was widely perceived as an attempt to deprive the people their basic right to franchise, and it became one of the reasons the Ayub govern-ment was overthrown through the 1968-69 mass uprising, in which the people of Bangladesh played the most active role. This shows why any restriction on adult franchise is now inconceivable in Bangladesh and for that matter in most countries of the world, irrespective of income levels.

10. For discussion of the East Asian success, see, for example, Wade (1990) and World Bank (1993).

11. For discussion on transition to democracy by East Asian countries, see, for exam-ple, Huntington (1991), Wakabayashi (1997), and Wong (2006).

12. For discussion about transition to democracy by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Thailand, see Rolfe (2004), Leigh and Lip (2004), Bhakti (2004), LoGerfo and King (1996), and Neher (1996). See also Scott Marciels testimony about difficulties faced by Thailand democracy (see http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2014/06/228368.htm).

234 Notes

13. For more on Latin American independence wars, see, for example, Chasteen (2008), Harvey (2000), Humphreys and Lynch (1965). See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Latin_American_wars_of_independence.

14. For discussion of economic and political transition and the Soviet Union and East European countries, see, for example, N. Islam (2011) and the references therein.

15. In more prosaic terms, when the people are well fed and well read, it is difficult to preside over their lives in undemocratic fashion.

16. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hindu_rate_of_growth.17. India has recently sent a spacecraft to the planet Mars.18. For a discussion on why Indian democracy succeeded, see Kohli (2001). That the

British legacy was not enough can be seen from the fact that Pakistan, which inher-ited the same legacy, failed to practice democracy, and soon went under military rule. Part of the reason for this fate is that Mohammad Ali Jinnah died soon after founding of Pakistan, and the second most important leader, Liaquat Ali Khan, was assassinated soon after. The class composition of the Muslim League in West Pakistan, which dominated Pakistan, was different from that of Indian National Congress, which took the helm in India. The former was much more feudal than the latter. For a discussion of why democracy failed in Pakistan while it succeeded in India, see Chawala (2010).

19. For discussion of democracy in South Africa and Costa Rica, see Booysen (2013) and Booth (1987), respectively.

20. See N. Islam (2001a, 2008) for a discussion of the different approaches to politi-cal stability in Bangladesh. See also (

).

21. See N. Islam (1998, 1999).22. The Commonwealth comprises countries that were once colonies of the United

Kingdom.23. In a recent interview, Rehman Sobhan admitted that the influence of the domestic

civil society on Bangladesh politics had decreased over time. See The Daily Star, April 22, 2014.

24. The August 21, 2005, attack on the Awami League rally, intended clearly to kill Sheikh Hasina, has caused so much of bad blood between Awami League and BNP that the former is now totally averse to any dialogue with the latter. In such a situation, appeals and exhortations can hardly work.

25. See N. Islam (1998, 1999).26. See Abdul Mannan Bhuyian v. State 60 DLR (AD) 49. See, for discussion, http://

archive.thedailystar.net/law/2010/05/05/judgement.htm.27. Barrister Md. Shawkat Ali Khan and Barrister Md. Jamiruddin Sircar were requested

to brief the Court as amicus curie. The Secretary General of BNP appearing before the Court submitted that hartal was a historically recognized democratic right of the people to express their disapproval of governmental activities (Para 6).

28. It also found a procedural flaw (lack of jurisdiction) in the High Court Divisions suo moto action because it did not have a related issue pending before it.

29. See UNDP (2005) and The Daily Star, December 17, 2006.

Notes 235

30. Efforts to improve politics through enactment of laws passed by the parliament, however, come close to the institutional approach that we discuss later.

31. As noted in Chapter 2, the possible politicization of the judiciary impact of CTG came to the fore when in 2006 BNP government raised the retirement age limit for Supreme Court judges in order to make Justice K. M. Hasan, its favorite, the Chief of the next CTG. In fact, it is this unintended consequence, together with the experience of the CTG government under Justice Latifur Rahman and the 1/11 government, that ultimately led to the repeal of the CTG system.

32. The popular expression that a nation gets the leaders it deserves, is a partial though distorted expression of this reality.

33. It is widely held that the current authority and image that the Indian EC enjoys is to a great extent the result of the exceptional role that its former chief, retired justice T. N. Session, played in upholding the integrity of the commission. However, it is also a reflection of the greater integrity of the Indian civil service as a whole.

34. It is generally thought that the Indian civil service has relatively more integrity, so that it can often withstand some of the weaknesses of the political side. For more on this, see Chapter 7.

Chapter 5

1. For earlier discussion by the author on proportional election, see Islam (2001a, 2008) and (

).

2. For general discussions on the MS and PE systems, see Amy (2000, 2002), Barber (2000), Colomer (2003, 2004), Cox (1997), Hill (2003), Linton and Southcott (1998), and Loenen (1997).

3. It may be noted that the United States itself was, in a sense, a British colony. 4. Nepals new constitution allows for a second chamber, the National Assembly,

comprising 45 members: five from each province (elected by Provincial Assembly members and heads of local bodies) and the rest nominated by the president.

5. The primaries of the US Democratic Party use the proportional system, and that was one reason why the Democratic Party primaries of 2008 proved to be more interesting than primaries of the Republican Party, which still uses the MS system.

6. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fair_Vote_Canada. 7. See references in endnote 2 for discussions of variations of PE. 8. Of course, rounding is an issue, and there are many methods of rounding and

allocation from which to choose. 9. Of the 500 members of the lower house (House of Representatives), 300 are

elected through MS and the rest 200 through PE. Of the 242 members of the upper house (House of Councillors), only half (121) are elected at a time. Of them 73 are elected through MS and the other 48 through PE.

10. Interested readers can see the references cited in endnote 2 for further informa-tion about these systems.

11. The progressive National Awami Party (NAP) received 1.8 percent and Indepen-dents received 3.4 percent. The rest went to various religious and rightist parties.

236 Notes

This shows that, even at the height of Bengali nationalism, there was about 20 percent of voters who did not vote for Awami League.

12. See Choudhury (2006a, 2006b) for more discussion of Bangladeshs recent vote arithmetic.

13. The PE system may therefore generate a process something similar to that of party primaries in the United States. However, unlike the United States, where primaries are held to choose only the party candidate for presidency, in Bangladesh the party primaries will have to focus on the entire list of candidates for the parliament.

14. There is a saying that people vote for banana tree (kola gach), meaning that what matters is the party and not the individual candidate, who can be even a very expendable tree, such as the banana plant.

15. In the United States, an ex-colony of Great Britain, there was in fact a tendency to do everything in the opposite way to that in Britain, including on which side of the road to drive and in which direction to move the switch to turn on the light!

Chapter 6

1. See Islam (1998, 1999). See Islam (2001a) and (

) for earlier discussion by the author of the proposal to shorten government term in Bangladesh.

2. This type of government is therefore sometimes called the semipresidential system. 3. The awareness-raising value of this disclosure was revealed particularly during

election to the Tenth Parliament in 2014. The declared wealth of many can-didates seeking reelection was more than hundred times the wealth they had declared when they ran for election to the Ninth Parliament. The revelation was so shocking that the government allegedly tried to discontinue the process of making public the wealth statements that candidates submitted to the Election Commission. Many such candidates indeed failed to get reelected, and the politi-cal lives of some of them effectively ended with this election.

4. Many observers view corruption of the political system as one of the most perni-cious effects of the rising economic inequality. See Stiglitz (2013).

5. America Goes to the Polls: Voter Participation Gaps in the 2012 Presidential Election, http://www.nonprofitvote.org/documents/2013/09/america-goes-to-the-polls -2012-voter-participation-gaps-in-the-2012-presidential-election.pdf (accessed June 8, 2014).

6. See Stiglitz (2013). 7. Reflecting the raw character of Bangladesh democracy, candidates in Bangladesh

elections often engage in many other practices that are at least not moral if not outright illegal. For example, they often offer people various material induce-ments, including cash, to vote for them. As the election approaches, candidates usually set up tea stalls to treat voters to tea and snacks! Legal or illegal, moral or immoral, all these represent efforts by politicians to show that they value the poor and the downtrodden, at least as voters, if not for anything else. By allowing these episodes of empowerment of the poor happen more frequently, a shortened government term may help improve Bangladeshs politics.

Notes 237

8. It should be noted that the security, regulatory, redistributive, and development functions of a government are interrelated, and there is significant overlap among them. However, the conceptual distinction among them is useful to understand and discuss the governments role.

Chapter 7

1. For more detailed discussion of many of the issues raised in this chapter, see A. A. Khan (2015).

2. For details on how a feudal society was organized, see, for example, Bloch (1961) and Zeitlin (1960).

3. For discussion of civil service in early capitalism, see Bekke and van der Meer (2000), Beloff (1962), Butler (1993), and Zmohra (2001).

4. For discussion of the Chinese imperial bureaucracy, see Ali (2004), Ebrey (2010), Elman (2002), Fairbank (1992), Ichisada (1976), Karim (2007), Paludan (1998), Wang (2013), Wolfgang (1968). See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial_ examination.

5. It is an intriguing question why China was able to develop such a system during feudal times, when other feudal countries did not. One reason may be the influence of Confucian thinking that put emphasis on learning. Another might have been the far-flung nature of the Chinese empire, which was difficult to manage unless there was some rule-based behavior of the representatives of the imperial power, namely its civil officials, who were responsible for revenue collection and administration of justice. However, India was also far flung and yet did not develop a similar system. A third reason may be the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of the population, which distinguished it from, for example, India. However, such a system did not develop in Japan, whose population is even more homogeneous than of China. A convinc-ing answer to the question, beyond appeals to path-dependence and uniqueness of a country, is yet to emerge.

Meanwhile, an interesting issue concerning the Chinese imperial bureaucracy is the following. While the merit-based Chinese imperial bureaucracy played a useful function for China during the feudal times, according to Lin (2011) it also became a drag on Chinas subsequent development. The reason was that the recruitment exam of the imperial bureaucracy mainly tested for the knowledge of the Chinese classics. According to Lin, the emphasis on classics discouraged the study of science and technology among the youth. As a result, China lagged behind the Western nations and could not be the first in developing capitalism and instead became the victim of aggression and semicolonial rule by the European capitalist nations.

6. For details regarding the influence of Chinas imperial civil service on the evolution of the civil service of capitalism, see, for example, Ali (2004), Bodde (1948), Brook (1999), and Hu (1997). See also Fairbank and Goldman (2006).

Chinas imperial service had a direct influence on the formation of the British civil service. Britains consul in Guangzhou, China, Thomas Taylor Meadows, noted that the long duration of the Chinese empire is solely and altogether owing to the good

238 Notes

government which consists in the advancement of men of talent and merit only (Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China, 1847).

In 1853, Chancellor of the Exchequer, William Gladstone, commissioned Sir Stafford Northcote and Charles Trevelyan to examine and report on the opera-tion and organization of the Civil Service. The Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1854 made four main recommendations: (1) merit-based recruitment through competi-tive examination, (2) ensuring solid general education of the candidates to enable interdepartmental transfers, (3) grading of recruits into a hierarchy, and (4) promo-tion based on achievement, rather than preferment, patronage or purchase. It also recommended a clear division between staff responsible for routine (mechanical) work and those engaged in policy formulation and implementation in an admin-istrative class.

Coming in the midst of bureaucratic chaos during the Crimean War, when there was a strong demand for the change, the reports conclusions were immedi-ately implemented, and a permanent, unified, and politically neutral civil service was introduced as Her Majestys Civil Service. A Civil Service Commission was also set up in 1855 to oversee open recruitment and end patronage. Most of the other Northcote-Trevelyan recommendations were implemented in subsequent years.

The civil service model introduced by Northcote-Trevelyan proved successful in removing corruption, delivering public services (even during the two world wars), and responding effectively to political change. It remained unchanged for more than a hundred years. The model was also copied in most of the countries of the British Commonwealth. The model was followed by almost all Western countries, including the United States, through the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act. See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Civil_service for details.

Following the transfer of colonial Indias administration from the British East India Company to the Crown after the First Indian War of Independence, the Chinese Imperial Civil Service model was implemented in British India from 1858.

7. Of course, there would be change of kings and emperors, because of death, usurpa-tion, conquest, and so on, and the new king or emperor could appoint new people to run the administration. In this sense, civil service under feudalism, at least its upper echelons, could be thought to have been completely political. However, it still remains the fact that change of government under feudalism was arbitrary (did not have any regular periodicity) and that there were generally no set rules about what the impact of the change of government (ruler) will be on the administra-tion service. Also under feudalism civil service used to be closely intertwined with military service.

8. See Finer (1961), Heady (1966). See also http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/civil_service.aspx.

9. For details regarding introduction of civil service in India by the British, see, for example, Ali (2004), Blunt (1937), Ewing (1982), Sharma (2001), and Thakur (1969).

Notes 239

10. The first PSC was established in British India at the central level on October 1, 1926, and at the provincial level in Bengal on April 1, 1937, under the Govern-ment of India Acts of 1919 and 1935, respectively. See Ahmed (1990, p. 28).

11. For details regarding civil service evolution during the Pakistan period, see, among other, Ali (2004), Chaudry (2011), and Jilanee (2011).

12. See Ali (2004, p. 1).13. As noted in Chapter 2, these developments with regard to the civil service were

another reflection of the gap between Bangabandhu and the advanced par-ticipants of the Liberation War with regard to the vision about post-Liberation Bangladesh.

14. The Bangladesh PSC (BPSC) was established on May 9, 1972, under the Presi-dents Order No. 34, by merging the entire setup of East Pakistan PSC and the Regional Office of Central PSC (BPSC Annual Report, 2005, p. 1). Like its prede-cessors in British India (i.e., Federal Public Service Commission) and United Pak-istan (i.e., Central Public Service Commission and East Pakistan Public Service Commission), BPSC is a constitutional body, governed by the Articles 137141 of Bangladesh Constitution. See G. Ahmed (1986, 1990) and Ali (2004) for details.

15. Ali (2004, p. 94).16. One issue that Ali (2004) emphasizes is that civil servants enjoy much less job

security and protection now than they enjoyed during either the British or the Pakistan period. In his view, during the British, there was a basic protection given to public services. It consisted in the fact that the terms and conditions of the services could not be varied to the disadvantage of the various services. This protection was there in the Government of India Act, 1919 and later in 1935, which provided the basic framework of the governments in both India and Pakistan in 1947 (p. 95). By contrast, in his view, the Bangladesh constitution, adopted in 1972, accorded, under article 136, the right to the state, to enact law for reorganization of the services of the Republic by the creation, amalgamation, or unification of the services, and the State was also empowered to vary or revoke any condition of the service of a person employed in the service of the republic. The provision of the article 136 led the government to promulgate an Ordinance to reorganize the services. This was replaced by an Act in 1975, called Act XXXII of 1975. The law specifically empowered the government to vary or revoke condi-tions of service even to the disadvantage of the public servants employed by it (p. 95). Ali (2004, pp. 98100) elaborates further on this issue.

17. See Ali (2004, p. 103).18. The emphasis was therefore on representation of different cadres in the higher

levels of service, rather than on identification of the most qualified officers, irre-spective of the cadre to which they belonged. See Ali (2004, p. 108) for further details.

19. See Ali (2004, p. 108) for more on this issue.20. See Ali (2004) for more details.21. See Ali (2004, p. 18).

240 Notes

22. As mentioned earlier, BPSC, a quasi-judicial body, works under the provisions of the Article 137141 of the Bangladesh Constitution and certain other rules and regulations made by the government from time to time. Bangladeshi Nation-als are recruited by PSC under Articles 133136 and Article 29. Initially, two separate commissionsthe Public Service Commission (First), and the Public Service Commission (Second)were established in May 1972 following Presi-dents Order No. 34 of 1972. However, following the adoption of the Constitu-tion in November 1972, a fresh Presidential Order (Presidents Order No. 25 of 1973) was promulgated in March 1973 in order to regularize the establishment of the two commissions formed in May 1972. However, in November 1977 the government promulgated another ordinance to establish a single commission, the Bangladesh