CHANGING IDENTITIES AMONG UZBEK YOUTH: TRANSITION

FROM REGIONAL TO SOCIO-ECONOMIC IDENTITIES

Diora Ziyaeva

PAPER PREPARED FOR NBR CONFERENCE ON “GENERATIONAL CHANGE AND LEADERSHIP

SUCCESSION IN UZBEKISTAN”

THURSDAY, MARCH 2, 2006, WASHINGTON D.C.

Diora Ziyaeva is currently completing her undergraduate degree in international law and political science.

She has augmented her diploma by studying at several institutions, including the European College of

Liberal Arts in Berlin, Westminster International University in Tashkent, and Georgetown University in

Washington, DC. In the past year, Ms. Ziyaeva has held internships with both the American Enterprise

Institute (AEI) and the Eastman Kodak Company. At AEI she worked primarily with foreign defense

policy in Eurasia. In Tashkent, she has collaborated with several international organizations, including

ACTR/ACCELS, IREX, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. For one project

she coordinated a USAID-sponsored program for HIV patients, youth criminals, and orphans in

Uzbekistan. Ms. Ziyaeva also studied in the United States as a high school student through the Future

Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program.

THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH (NBR) Seattle, Washington

June 2006

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This essay examines the political and cultural attitudes of youth in Uzbekistan, and analyzes their

likely impact on the future of Uzbek society.

MAIN ARGUMENT

Five groups in Uzbek society represent the majority of the youth generation: Western-oriented

youth, ambitious students from suburban areas, provincial youth, “gilded youth” connected to the

current regime, and youth in the criminal underworld. In this environment, education is the

primary source of development of new elites that can secure Uzbekistan’s independent

statehood.

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

• Uzbekistan is a truly multilayered society with different youth groups oriented toward

varied cultural and political goals. The most reliable path to further national development

thus lies in providing an education that is available on a national and international level.

• The presence of more educated people with a clear vision of Uzbekistan’s future and the

ability to analyze the country’s political and social situation objectively would contribute

greatly to future democratization. This is especially important to counteract the Uzbek

government policies, which now include closing international organizations that used to

provide opportunities for young people to apply for grants and education abroad. Left

unchecked, such policies will only further the growing apathy among the younger

generations in Uzbekistan.

ORGANIZATION OF THE ESSAY

Four main sections follow the introduction:

Regional Identities ..................................................................................................................... 3

Generations ................................................................................................................................ 5

New Identities ............................................................................................................................ 8

Future Research ......................................................................................................................... 13

Finally, a conclusion (p. 14) summarizes the central points of the study.

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Regional ties among youths in Uzbekistan are increasingly being replaced by socio-economic

affiliations. Regions in Uzbekistan had a powerful influence on previous generations but new

educational opportunities and economic pressures have forced young people in Uzbekistan to

either re-examine those ties or form new ones. This paper will explore the challenges that Uzbek

youths face as they build, or rebuild, their identities.

The first section of the paper explains the regions that exist within Uzbekistan. This section

introduces the meaning of “regional identity” and how this concept has undergone certain

transformations in the past. This is preceded by an exploration of regional identities in

Uzbekistan, how these identities differ from Uzbek national identity, and how regional identities

have changed from one generation to the next. After comparing and contrasting identities across

generations, the paper introduces the new identities that have appeared in independent

Uzbekistan, and summarizes by describing the impact of these identities on future leadership in

Uzbekistan. Finally, the paper concludes with some recommendations for the improvement, and

importance, of further research on the metamorphosis of identities and their impact on the future

of the country.

Regional Identities

Leading scholars of Central Asia emphasize the importance of research on the concept of the

“crisis of identity.” They identify this malady in post-Soviet society through sociological surveys

held throughout Central Asia and most of the CIS countries. This section of the paper will

examine identities within Uzbekistan (the most populated state in Central Asia with

approximately 26 million people) as they pertain to the 16 to 27 year old age demographic,

which constitutes the majority of the population.1

Provinces and regions Looking at the surface, one might assume that Uzbekistan has a single Uzbek identity. However,

closer observation reveals that Uzbekistan is a multiethnic state with distinct identities associated

with different locales, as well as multiple layers of these identities. Different identities are

associated with the twelve provinces (Andijon, Namangan, Ferghana, Marghilon, Bukhara,

Samarkand, Syrdarya, Kashkadarya, Surkhondarya, Navoi, Jizzakh, and Khoresm), with the

capital Tashkent, and with the autonomous republic of Karakalpakistan. These identities can be

grouped into five major regional categories: Ferghana Valley, Khoresmi, Samarkandi, Tashkent,

and Kipchak.

Local identity is instilled in the mahalla, the local community.2 The mahalla is the place where

youths are primarily raised and socialized; it is the network that provides the foundation for

establishing one’s identity and sense of community. It generates a level of trust that is inherent

in, and the basis of, regional cultures and the preservation of traditions. The mahalla also creates

a certain pressure for youths, both in terms of prompting them to identify their values and in

1 Youth under the age of 30 represent 60% of the population of Uzbekistan,

http://freeuzbekistan.com/ru.php/2006/04/12/rokirovki-v-stane-karimova-podgotovka-k-peredache-vlasti.html. 2 A mahalla is like a neighborhood.

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dictating behaviors such as marrying early and securing a good match with a family of a good

name.

Regional identities Regional identity is associated with different cultural particularities practiced in Uzbek regions.

For example, the traditional Uzbek dish osh is made everywhere in the country, but its

preparation varies from region to region. Another example is weddings, which are a part of

Uzbek culture. The bigger the wedding, the better it is, however, wedding styles, again, vary

from one region to another.

The language of instruction in most schools is Uzbek, and at times is Russian. Yet, young people

from Bukhara and Samarqand regions fluently speak a dialect of Tajik, just as their parents and

the generations before them did. This is a part of their identity and is an immediate connection to

other people who come from the same region they do. Another example of a distinctive regional

identity marker can be observed among young people from the Ferghana Valley, where the

tradition is to address everyone, including younger children, with the respectful grammar form–a

contrast from other regions where the formal emphasis is generally not applied to younger

people.

There are indeed many more particularities associated with each region in the country, including

spoken dialects (known as shevalar) of the Uzbek language, national clothes, and styles of the

national Uzbek dance, which differs greatly, for example, in Khorezm and Bukhara. What is

important to accentuate is that regional particularities that a person might identify with have been

passed down for centuries from father to son, from parents to their children. These historic norms

were abused during the Soviet times since the central government tried to break down these

traditions, primarily to target traditions that fostered very close ties to the specific regional

communities that existed before the creation of the Soviet Union. After all, in 1924 the Central

Asian region, also known as Turkestan, was divided into five countries, which still exist.

Thus, when making comparisons across the generations, it is crucial to note that this paper does

not aim specifically to compare the Soviet generation and the post-Soviet one. Rather, the idea is

to demonstrate the transformation of traditions and ties in society, both past and present. For

example, the parents and grandparents of current youths were brought up in a Soviet society that

aimed to loosen ties to regional identity. This slow, yet effective, transformation is evident in the

late Soviet generation, the parents of today’s youth. They are the ones who had increasing

economic and social freedom with regards to marriage choices and the pursuit of education. The

current youth is even more different than the previous generation—they have international

opportunities and better access to information, which allows them to reevaluate the basic set of

values that traditionally is imposed on them by their families and mahallas.

“Uzbek” national identity Uzbek national identity is a comparatively new concept. History shows us that the territory of

present-day Uzbekistan consisted of different kingdoms (khanates)—Kokand, Bukhara, and

Khiva—before being absorbed into the Russian empire and then the Soviet Union. Throughout

the Soviet era, the matter of “national identity” as equated with certain republics within the

Union was not a particularly popular subject, and efforts were made by the Soviet state to create

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particular identity constructs that facilitated easier labeling of peoples. For example, the Soviets

put ethnic identity on passports. This particular tradition remains in independent Uzbekistan.

The term “national identity” gained predominance in the post-independent years (1991 to the

present). Many history books were produced at that time with the specific aim of educating

school students about the richness of Uzbek history and the priorities of post-independence

Uzbekistan. Many of these history textbooks are not very accurate; in fact, some of them

contradict one another. However, they exist and, along with books written by the government

leader, they are used to instill a particular awareness among youth about what Uzbekistan was

and how much better it will become. With the rise of national identity, regional identity has also

re-established itself through discussions about how every region in the country—though united

through one shared history—has its own cultural particularities.

Transformation of identity Many scholars believe that the essence of Uzbek culture, which is found in its regional identities,

is slowly disappearing. Nowadays, this progression is taking place primarily on the surface,

though it has a tendency to go beyond the surface. Although the globalization process and

expanding access to information is developing, the percentage of young people who actually

have access to open information is minimal, especially in the provincial areas. Most young

people still follow tradition: they get married at the age they are supposed to and, regardless of

career objectives, believe that their primary task is to create a family, build a house, raise

children, and care for the elderly. These are not merely words. Uzbek youth consider these

values to be the primary ones that define what is really important in their lives.

Yet, at the same time their actual regional ties gradually vanish if they live in a place outside of

their region for an extended period of time. It is in this new place that they start to feel a sense of

belonging more than they do back home. For example, young people from Bukhara region speak

Tajik with other people from their region and emphasize in conversation that this is the place that

they come from. That is one way that regional networks are being built outside of the actual

region. In order for these networks to grow, common socio-economic interests tend to prevail.

With time, the notion of regional identity transforms—as young people migrate within the

country or internationally, they adjust to the new environment where they live or study fairly

quickly.

Generations

Education is a vehicle of social and economic prosperity. As important as it is to individuals,

access to a high standard of education also impacts society in a given region. With the dawning

of the age of globalization, certain changes started to occur, especially in traditional societies

with transitional economies. Uzbekistan is not an exception to this occurrence.

Soviet generation During the Soviet period, the parents of today’s youth were brought up in an environment that

shaped them according to the so-called “Moral Code of Communism.” The aim of this youth

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ideology was to create a society where the common interest prevailed over individual

preferences.

Although propaganda of Soviet ideology was active everywhere—in primary schools and

universities, on television programs, and in the introductions of most written publications—at

that time more young people were able to receive a better education than youths do now.

Education was connected to the national ideology, but the quality of education was without a

doubt much higher than that of the education which is currently provided to the youth of

Uzbekistan.

Post-Soviet generation The post-Soviet environment has created fewer opportunities. Young Uzbeks certainly enjoy

more freedoms and have more choices available to them, but there is also a common apathy that

has become very visible among those who, for example, receive an education and then have to

face the “real world” and find a job. Pervasive corruption is not very appealing to them. A young

graduate who has, for instance, told his family that he is going to pursue his dreams outside the

community where he was raised, discovers that networks are crucial and that corruption is

inevitable. Living in the capital hypothetically opens youths to many employment opportunities;

however, well-educated young professionals also realize that their dreams cannot be truly

fulfilled without access to importance connections.

Thus, in addition to the legacies of tradition and national values that arose after the collapse of

the Soviet Union, there are also two other legacies that have emerged in post-Soviet Uzbekistan.

These legacies are regionally-based networks and pervasive corruption left over from the Soviet

era. For these reasons young people feel apathetic. They see that no matter how much they study,

these legacies will hold them back. That is why many Uzbeks, even those that have degrees,

choose to go abroad to work not necessarily in pursuit of their career objectives, but simply to

earn enough money to satisfy their basic needs and return with money to help their parents and

maybe start their own businesses.

Changes in the sphere of education With the collapse of the Soviet system, better access to information has increasingly helped

young people realize that there are choices and that individual success often depends on the level

of a person’s education. Education is a primary source of social development in Uzbek society—

particularly for students that are funded to study abroad or receive a grant to study at local higher

education institutions.3 Nowadays, however, Uzbek youths not only worry about receiving a

quality education, which is a matter of great importance and strong concern, they wonder

whether there will be an opportunity to receive any post-secondary education at all.

The results of a survey conducted by the author (see appendix) clearly reveal that generally only

a select group of Uzbek youths have an opportunity to receive an advanced education.

3 It is important to note, however, that starting in 2006 all graduates who have been studying at any higher education

institution on a government grant (budget) have to work for the government or at the very least provide the place of

employment before receiving a B.A. diploma. The President and Ministry of Secondary, Specialized, and Higher

Education made no special decree, but, according to the Law Department of the University of World Economy and

Diplomacy, they plan to issue one in the summer of 2006.

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Approximately 520,000 children complete their secondary education every year. The quality of

education they receive varies by location. Many of the rural areas have poor quality teaching

staff, dilapidated school buildings, and lack textbooks. The city centers of different regions

provide better secondary educations, and secondary schools in Tashkent city are considered the

best in the country.

Out of the 520,000 young people that finish 8 years of secondary education, approximately

300,000 chose to continue studying for three years in lyceums. Of those who enroll in lyceums,

approximately 200,000 spend 10th

and 11th

grades in the school and receive a high school

certificate/diploma. The majority, however, continues to work in the fields with their families or

tries to find employment in the city centers or in the capital. Because competition is so high, it is

very difficult to find employment.4 In regards to the male youth population, it is important to

note that by law they all have to serve one year in the military.

Only 51,000 seats are available in the universities and institutes of Uzbekistan. There are no

private universities in Uzbekistan, and only three branches of International Universities—

Plekhanov Academy (of Moscow, Russia), Westminster International University (of London,

UK), and Moscow State University (of Moscow, Russia).5 This means that only 10 percent of

high school graduates are able to receive a university education. Out of these 51,000 students

only 6,200 people are able to garner a seat to continue their education at the Master’s degree

level. And only 0.32 percent of the original 10 percent of Uzbeks studying at undergraduate

institutions continue their studies at the PhD level and beyond.6 If education is the primary

source of development, then, by default, young people are not provided with enough

opportunities to complete their higher education.

The importance of education also has its practical implications. The labor market is suffering

from a high unemployment rate and for this reason the value of education is known for providing

people with at least a theoretical chance of finding employment upon graduation. For example,

approximately 45 percent of the graduates of the National University of Uzbekistan are

unemployed for more than half a year after graduating.7 Qualified graduates find that there is

inadequate compensation for their skills and unqualified graduates are not competent to take on

many jobs.

A number of reports on Uzbekistan’s development and prospective reforms have emphasized

that progress must be made toward creating favorable conditions for people working in the

sphere of education. For example, an EFA UNESCO report states that: “Salary, living

conditions, access to informational and cultural-recreation services—such is an incomplete list of

issues that are of concern for all the people working in education sphere. These issues are also

4 Uzbekistan has the fastest growing and largest population in Central Asia. The majority of Uzbeks are young

people. 5 The branch of Moscow State University is planned to be opened in fall 2006, with degrees available in Applied

Mathematics and Psychology. 6 The provided information is based on the following source: “Decree of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

on Admission to Higher Education Institutions for 2005-2006 Academic Year.” 7 Unofficial statistics from interviews held with graduates and university professors.

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the reason why many educational workers are leaving education sector and join other economic

sectors. This factor determines the shortage of pedagogical staff in the schools of the Republic.”8

New Identities

This section analyzes the five youth groups that exist in Uzbekistan today and represent the

majority of the young generation. These five groups are: westernized youths, ambitious

provincial youths, traditional youths, gilded youths, and criminal youths. The section discusses

the leadership potential for each group and the values that are being shared among group

members, as well as the potential role each group will play in Uzbekistan’s future.

Western oriented, “advanced” youth This group consists of alumni of international exchange programs or young people that had an

opportunity to study outside of Uzbekistan for a lengthy period of time. Often, depending on

how old they were when they studied abroad, the values of western-oriented youth have

significantly changed after this experience. Often these young people actively practice religion

and are known to be very intelligent in this sense and tolerant toward other cultures. They are

very different from the previous generations in terms of their political, social, economic, and

cultural beliefs.

One example of youths in this group is alumni of the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program,

of which there are 900 in Uzbekistan. At the age of 15 or 16, these students were awarded a full

scholarship by the U.S. Department of State to become U.S. high school students for a year and

live in an American community with a host family.

Most FLEX students come from the provinces and the year abroad significantly changes their

perception of the world. Most of these students experience severe reverse culture shock upon

returning to Uzbekistan because while abroad they become more independent, gain more

initiative, and become more mature and pro-active—they are no longer truly Uzbek by mentality.

This phenomenon occurs because traveling at such a young age allows them to experience a

different area and provides them enough time to adopt certain particularities of the region where

they lived in the United States. However, practice shows that they do not necessarily become

completely different. Most of them adjust back to Uzbek traditions. This is especially true for the

students who return to their home school or continue living with their families.

The majority of these students sooner or later leave Uzbekistan to study at a foreign university.

The ones who remain in Uzbekistan try to look for employment opportunities with organizations

and companies that require fluent knowledge of English. A lot of the alumni have been at the top

of their class and have entered the best universities in Uzbekistan.

Another portion of this group of western-oriented youths are students who have studied for a

year at universities abroad—in the United States, the European Union, or East Asia. Some of

these youths return to Uzbekistan, but many try to stay at the universities where they have spent

8 The EFA 2000 Assessment: Country Reports, URL:

http://www2.unesco.org/wef/countryreports/uzbekistan/rapport_1.html.

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the year. They realize that there are many more opportunities available to them abroad. There are

also students who have been granted full scholarships to study in one of the above-mentioned

countries for the Master’s degree. Upon arrival these graduates try to find employment in the

private sector or join international non-governmental agencies.

Young professional researchers are also sponsored by international education agencies to

participate in internships abroad for a short period of time. This experience also can change their

perception of the current system. They start to analyze the world through the perspective they

gain while studying abroad. Upon their return to Uzbekistan, they try to share their experience

with their peers. This obviously makes the programs more valuable because this way many

people are affected by the internship experience of one person.

Another group of students who have studied abroad did so with a governmental scholarship,

which used to be administered by the UMID (Hope) Foundation. Upon completion of their

studies abroad, these alumni were contractually obligated to work five years for the government.

The main point of the contract was to ensure that graduates returned to Uzbekistan. The contract

was also a way for the government to benefit from these students’ educational and professional

experiences and get a return on the governmental investment. If the young people failed to fulfill

their contract, their families faced possible prosecution or the loss of their homes. However, after

the Foundation stopped its activities, a large number of alumni immediately returned to the

countries where they had studied.

A final portion of this advanced and internationally experienced youth group is comprised of

those youths that lived outside of the country or traveled internationally for conferences,

seminars, and summer university programs.

Assessment of their future

This youth group is united by ideas gathered while studying abroad. They have an ability to

analyze the situation within their country from advanced and more comparative points of view.

They also often seek a way to improve the situation in Uzbekistan; however, many of them do

not find support in their workplace or, if they work for the government, from its officials. They

tend to demonstrate initiative in society, but the initiative is not very welcome. It is no

exaggeration to say that these people are, in a way, untimely for Uzbekistan. However, practice

has showed that their participation in project implementation and in the growth of the private

sector is crucial for movement toward true democratic reforms in Uzbekistan. Many of these

youth now living abroad still want to return to Uzbekistan and work for democratic reform

because their roots are very important to them.

Taking into account current trends of domestic policy development, it is unlikely that one of

these young people would become a future leader of Uzbekistan. It is not because they do not

possess enough skills, experience, and intelligence, but because they are, as many say,

“poisoned” by Western thought. Representatives of this group have the potential to return abroad

and form cohorts of Uzbeks in specific countries.

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Ambitious students from the provinces This is the second largest youth group and represents extremely ambitious young people. Among

them are current students who only by the virtue of their efforts and preparedness are able to

receive a university education in Uzbekistan. Among them can also be found very nationalist

youths. They are not as sophisticated as urban youths and believe the propaganda that

perpetuates the current national ideology. This means that Amir Temur is their great ancestor and

there can be no other view on that because it is what is being told to them in their educational

institutions. They also subscribe to ideas in Karimov’s books, such as “Ideas of National

Independence” and “Harmonically developed generation is the basis for the progress of

Uzbekistan.”

These books aim to reflect and shape everything that could be called Uzbek—the history,

traditions, and essence of society’s values and principals. The books are also filled with very

positive thoughts about Uzbekistan’s future. They tend to try to answer any questions that young

Uzbeks might have and are aimed at these “future leaders,” the ambitious youths that primarily

speak Uzbek and come from a traditional family.

Assessment of their future

It is possible to call these youths the “future leaders” because they form the majority among

existing educated youth in Uzbekistan and most of them believe in the national ideology. For

them, the ideology fosters a sense of belonging, which is very important for young people. This

sense of belonging comes from shared interests, concerns, historical legacies, meaningful

symbols, and cultural understanding. Family, mahalla, ethnicity, language, and religion are all

characteristics through which this group feels connected.

However, it is important to identify another group of young ambitious people coming from the

regions of Uzbekistan. These are not youths that dream of working in the prosecutor’s office or

at one of the governmental ministries after graduating from university. They are more

independent thinkers and only ironically praise the country. They realize the importance of

education and try to get the highest possible results in order to find their place in life. Many of

these young people can be found in the leading universities of the country and they have worked

really hard to get there. They are interested in science, humanities, or medicine, regardless of the

fact that these spheres are underdeveloped. They are more critical of what is written in

Karimov’s books, particularly as it pertains to society’s future. These youth may have a plan

about how to realize this future for their country, but they are rational and understand the

importance of the county’s openness to the world and democratic reforms. Some of them tend to

look to the West and are working hard to study abroad, but also firmly believe in returning to

Uzbekistan.

Among this group one can meet many patriots, as well as many religious people. Youths try not

to speak nowadays about their religious affiliation, but due to the harsh environment of constant

competition and the very cynical surroundings that exist in the cities, people tend to become

more spiritual, finding a lot of answers in religion and faith.9

9 Note, the author differentiates between these terms because in Uzbekistan one may meet young people who have

faith, but do not practice Islam or Christianity, or others who are religious because of family traditions.

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Traditional youth This group represents the majority of the population, for whom family and the mahalla still play

key roles in shaping individual identities. It became clear in the author’s interviews that many of

the representatives of this group view family as their life-blood, something that provides a sense

of being needed. The family gives men faith in life and provides women with a sense of security.

This presupposes, of course, that the family is built on mutual understanding between husband

and wife, children and parents, younger and older generations. In most families in Uzbekistan,

older people, by the law of tradition, live together with their children until the very end of their

lives. This is called respect for older people. Respect is a relative concept and everyone has their

own understanding of it. As a grown-up child, one has an obligation toward his parents for

bringing him up. It is important to note, however, that this is not region-specific. It is of the set of

values shared by young people from traditional families, no matter what locale they are from.

Assessment of their future

This group undergoes a certain transformation based on one’s needs, necessities, and available

resources. Young people see different opportunities because employment varies from region to

region. Many representatives of this youth group tend to migrate to the capital because there are

more labor opportunities there.

Some of these young people are future farmers, the ones who will follow their parents’ example

in the agricultural sector since Uzbekistan is an agricultural country and 70 percent of the

population lives in rural areas. As stated earlier, representatives of this group may not receive a

good education, but they are the majority and their choices are associated with the prosperity of

their families. Thus, a representative from this group is unlikely to be interested in leadership

succession on the national level.

Many young people in this group end up going abroad to work illegally in order to earn enough

money to return to Uzbekistan with capital. South Korea is one of the top destinations for labor

migrants from Uzbekistan. Young people from rural areas find this to be a safe opportunity since

work permits are based on a cooperation agreement between the countries and allow labor

migrants to have legal status while working outside of the country.

Though legal job opportunities exist, youths from many provinces are very vulnerable to human

trafficking. There is a high demand for employment among rural youth who do not have enough

finances to cover their basic needs. For this reason, they look for opportunities to go abroad. The

United States and European Union are the first destination choices, but women, for example,

often end up working in Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, and

Hong Kong as practically slaves or street workers, trapped because their “employers” take their

passports. In a legal sense it is difficult to penalize the people responsible for human trafficking

because these Uzbek women and men often sign contracts stating that they are ready to do

anything for an opportunity to work abroad. This phenomenon primarily takes place in rural

areas where people receive only a little education. Because of their lack of knowledge about

different spheres and their lack of access to information, it is easy to take advantage of these

people.

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Research by the author revealed that young people from Karakalpakistan (in the Northwest part

of Uzbekistan) are being promised well-paid jobs in Kazakhstan. They agree to give up their

passports after being told that the passports will be returned to them once they arrive in

Kazakhstan. In recent years many Uzbek citizens have believed these fake promises; their

families are still trying to find them and take them home to Karakalpakistan. The proportion of

the youth population that is turning to cheap labor and migrating is growing quickly. Non-

governmental organizations that work to combat illegal human trafficking are thus implementing

radio projects to help find Uzbeks who have lost their passports and are obliged to work in the

cotton fields of Kazakhstan, for example.10

It became clear through the author’s research that the balance of males to females in some of the

small rural areas has drastically changed. One can find villages with a mainly female population,

where the women work in the farms or fields and also raise all of the children.

Youth elite groups, the ‘gilded youth’ of Uzbekistan Youths in this group primarily live in different city centers throughout Uzbekistan. They

represent a minority of the population and usually come from rather wealthy and powerful

families. Their parents are either high-ranking government officials or work for large

corporations. Representatives of this group have a modern perspective. For example, many of

these young people are involved in the arts, visual performance productions, media, and theater.

By the time they graduate, some of them may also hold good professional positions at the

governmental level. They travel abroad and many of them have some sort of international

education experience.

This group differs from the advanced, western-oriented youth group because gilded youth have

family networks, which is not necessarily the case for representatives of the western-oriented

group, and a high position in the social hierarchy because of their family status.

Assessment of their future

Taking into account the current situation, gilded youth are the potential successors of their

parents (of those who currently hold ministerial seats or have strong connections in the

government) and might be the future governmental leaders of the country. Among them are

found some who practice religion, often Islam, but also many that do not follow the religious

canons.

Criminal youth This group has been growing relatively quickly in recent decades. The statistics show that the

number of juvenile criminals has increased in the country because of increased drug abuse and

poverty. In many provincial areas the young people who attend lyceums abuse heroin and

marijuana because those substances are easily obtainable.

After interviewing young male inmates in Zangiata prison, it became clear that many of them

hope to remain in juvenile colonies for a long period of time. They know that the stamp in their

passport indicates that they were imprisoned and makes it unlikely that they will find a job—

according to unofficial statistics, over 75 percent of youths who have been imprisoned once

10

The primary radio show these days is called “Ishyu tebya,” “Looking for you.”

13

return to prison for more serious infractions and their future security is highly improbable.

Consequently, many interviewees unquestionably expressed that it is better for them to remain in

the prison, at the very least because their basic needs are taken care of there.

Assessment of their future

There is a serious lack of rehabilitation centers for young people returning home or to the streets

from these prisons. Thus, the quantity of criminals continues to significantly increase. Many of

the inmates interviewed by the author claimed that they find meaning for life by practicing

religion.

Future Research

Implications for the 17 to 30 age cohort: Rising leaders in the Transition Generation

It is important to note once again that Uzbek society has multiple layers of youth groups. It is fair

to say that in many locales one can find several identities and representatives of different social

and cultural groups. Thus, as was mentioned earlier, there is also no single regional identity and

the national identity reflects only a very general picture of society as a whole.

Education is the driving force of economic reforms and stability, and should be key to

infrastructural development in Uzbekistan. Developing more educated people with clear visions

and the ability to think analytically is the first step toward establishing a society capable of

moving toward true democratic discoveries. Establishment of open educational centers that can

offer non-traditional methods of learning in suburban and rural areas would be a small, yet

significant, step forward. Open discussions, seminars, debate programs, roundtable meetings,

student conferences, and information technology access centers are only some examples of the

activities these educational centers could provide. Such centers would broaden youths’

perspectives and allow them to acquire skills other than ones that can be obtained from “street

education.” A significant obstacle to the development of such centers is inadequate financial

compensation for teachers and staff. Without compensation, many people lack the motivation

required to establish such opportunities for youth in Uzbekistan.

In the past couple of years, the government has worked to shut down international organizations

that used to provide opportunities for young people to apply for grants to study abroad.

Organizations such as IREX, which administered most of the U.S. Department of State exchange

programs, the FLEX high school exchange program in the CIS, and Freedom House, which

worked on the youth awareness project, have all been closed down or are in the process of being

expelled from the country. Local NGOs are suffering from the change in the government’s

policy and have been asked to discontinue their activities. For example, research has shown that

out of 44 existing local NGOs in Djizzah Oblast’, 36 had been closed by February 2006. In

Khorezm Oblast’, 109 of 141 organizations were forced to shut their doors.

Implications for the first completely post-Soviet generation: 0-18 demographic cohort who will

experience the social and economic decay

The prognosis for this generation varies from scholar to scholar within Uzbekistan. Some

sociologists remain optimistic about this rising youth. However, others believe that this cohort

14

will become a relatively aggressive group due to the fact that their teenage years will generally

be filled with tension. Youths in this cohort grow up in the current environment which is

characterized by a transitional economy and contemporary social and cultural issues. For

example, they see certain practices, such as corruption, being accepted as common practice.

Many of their parents are frustrated and eventually become apathetic. Regional identities may

continue to vanish as urbanization and massive pop-culture propaganda continue to increase. The

level of education provided in kindergartens is slowly declining and in the long term this will

negatively affect this generation. Thus, it is crucially important to continue examining this group

of growing youths to find ways to improve their upbringing and instill new values that are based

on the values of independence and democracy—where a person, his or her rights, freedoms, and

ideals are the focus of further reforms.

Conclusion

This paper attempts to analyze current youth groups with different regional and social identities

throughout Uzbekistan. Social and political discontent threatens to undermine stability and

provides fertile ground for the recruitment of youth into Islamic radical groups. Promised

reforms have proven illusory and there are signs that the populace is increasingly unwilling to

submit passively to ruinous and exploitative economic policies.11

The combination of state

control over land tenure, domination of cotton sales by state or quasi-state bodies, and low prices

paid to farmers mean most cotton farmers are no better off then they were in Soviet times.

Indeed, without Soviet welfare and with declining government expenditure in rural areas, young

people in the provinces, though they are in the current majority, are mostly much poorer, in

worse health, and have less perspective than their parents. Not surprisingly, young men are

desperate to do almost anything anywhere rather to get out of the cotton fields. Nor is it

surprising that some of these internal migrants end up sitting in darkened rooms studying the

anti-government leaflets of radical Islamic groups.

Author’s note While conducting my research, I could not help thinking about certain questions. Who is going

to be the future leader of Uzbekistan? How are we different from the generation that came before

us? What can we do to improve this difficult situation in our country? Yes, it is true that the

government implements some development programs to foster active youth participation, but

these efforts are minimal and at times artificial. Issues of political culture, regional identity, and

many other socially important factors are being neglected because almost every young person is

worried about where he or she is going to work tomorrow and how he or she will afford to pay

for rent, facilities, food, and family. I received different feedback and answers in all of my

interviews, but one thing that I felt the most and that left me speechless was the complete apathy

among young people of my generation (I am in my early 20s). Youths graduating this year from

the top universities in Uzbekistan do not have any idea how they will build their tomorrow, and

even if they find that they are able to do something, they are confident that it is not worth it. It is

not worth starting a business because laws may change tomorrow (and often do) and you are not

11

Crisis Group Asia Report # 46, Uzbekistan‘s Reform Program: Illusion or Reality?, 18 February 2003, and Crisis

Group Asia Report # 76, The Failure of Reform in Uzbekistan: Ways Forward for the International Community, 11

March 2004.

15

secure if you find a job because you might be fired the next day due to your viewpoints and free

thinking. These youths are starting to believe that there is nothing that can be done to alter the

present order. This substantial discontent stymies both motivation and the formation of creative,

socially active, and rich individuals. I still strongly believe that bright and open-minded people

who acknowledge their regional identity are needed for our country, particularly today.

16

APPENDIX I: APPENDICES TO REPORT BY DIORA ZIYAEVA

Employment by Sector

Agriculture

40%

Industry

13%

Education,

culture, and art,

science

12%

Other services

8%

Others

17%

Construction

6%Transport and

communication

4%

Education, culture, and art,

science

Other services

Others

Construction

Transport and communication

Agriculture

Industry

Uzbek Economic Trends, Third Quarter 2004, NIS/Tacis Services

A. Interviews

I conducted over 70 interviews with young people throughout Uzbekistan in order to get

specific responses from representatives of different age and ethnic groups. I am including

selected transcriptions of my interviews below (Please note that pseudonyms are used for various reasons):

Transcribed Interview I (from A.A., aged 15, in a rural area of Kashkadarya region)

“I am the seventh child in my family. I have five sisters and one brother. My parents, or actually

more my dad, wanted another son so they kept trying. I live in a family where only two people

work officially, in a government work place—my dad and my brother.

We, the women of the family, work in the house. We have a garden and a small farm. We also

work in the village cotton fields as cotton pickers throughout the year, except in winter.

During the cotton season we don’t go to school, only the youngsters go until 12 p.m. They go to

school for half a day because the teachers are busy at school too.

We don’t have gas at home so we usually spend a lot of time cooking. We do laundry and clean.

Since there is not much money in my family we can’t buy books and we also don’t have many

teachers. But my parents, and not only them but many people in the village, in our mahalla, think

17

that education is not very important because men in the village don’t marry educated girls and

because getting an education is too difficult since a girl would have to go to a different town and

live there with relatives.

My brother got an education because he needed to get a job with the government and they

require that you are educated. Girls just get married; my sister got married at 18. She lives with

her in-laws. Her family is happy, my mother taught her well. She is very domestic and knows

how to cook, clean, and work in the fields. My parents were happy when my sister was asked to

marry because they knew the family. The parents arranged the marriage. My sister got married

because parents can’t be wrong and they would never harm their daughter.

We don’t have books because they are expensive. We have TV, but we don’t have electricity in

our village. Only two ‘rich’ people have newspapers.

We know that there are computers in the city but we don’t have any at school. I have never seen

one, but my brother did when he went to school. He needed to go to school because he will

support his family.

When I am 17, I will get married just like many girls in our mahalla. I have to learn more about

the house, then I should be ready.”

Transcribed Interview II: Questions Asked of Several Interviewees12

Q: Do you remember your childhood? What dreams did you have?

Z.I. (26, young person from a village area in Uzbekistan):

There is an attic in our house, where we put food for domestic animals and winter purchases.

There is hay and it’s good to lie in there once in a while. We’ve also had an area where we

gathered the rice (every 4 weeks per year), as coming back from harvest, I would dream of

winter. There was a perestroika, and no one had money. So the gastronoms [grocery stores]

would have a certain ration for everyone. We had to stay in line and wait for this part of food. I

think I was half-hungry and wanted to eat. Because of this uncertainty, parents, family members

were constantly in the argument and I wanted peace between them. Perestroika was difficult.

1989-1991—a period of no money at all. As a child I couldn’t really understand how we would

not have rice at home. But after the perestroika, there was strange for me that food was not there.

Relatives would borrow money from each other, though never give back and it would lead to

conflicts and arguments. But they, themselves, did not have enough to cover the basic

necessities.

G.K. (24, young person from a suburban area in Uzbekistan):

I used to read fairy tales. I loved those times of the day when I could do that. They always had

happy ends. But I didn’t like the fact that in fairy tales poor people were described as happy

people, because in my reality it was the opposite. Once, I think I was 12, my aunt studied in Kiev

at that time. She sent my family presents. And for me there was a shirt with name “perestroyka’.

12

Please note that the text was originally written in English by the interviewees.

18

As I was walking down the street in that shirt, two old men started yelling at me. I came home

crying, but my dad told me that there is nothing to worry about. I could not understand it. I took

it as it is, but now as I think about my childhood, the happy memories come from the Soviet

Union time. My definition of happy is peace in the family as a child, when parents don’t argue. I

felt I was running away as I was reading the fairy tales. The end was always good. But as I was

closing a book, sitting in that attic I could feel the reality again, hitting me with the daily worries

and quarrels in my family.

K.R. (25, young man from a regional city center):

Problems were too real for me to think about anything or dream about my personal life in future.

Q: How would you describe your school years?

L.A., 22: My parents always told me that they will take me to Moscow, because it is the center I

still would like to go there. At school I studied in Russian class. I feel like Russian history is

more part of me than what they teach in Uzbek textbooks. I speak Uzbek fluently; I had to

because I live in mahalla. I am ethnically Jewish, my family does not want to go to Israel, but all

my relatives are there. I want to go to Russia. I think that this is the place we mostly belong.

When we were part of Soviet Union, I felt like I am part of a huge family, but then someone took

that away from me. After collapse, I felt like I was a left out child, Jewish girl in Uzbekistan.

Never before had I sensed the difference between Jewish, Kazakh, Uzbek, Russian, and etc.

Q: What was the most complicated part of living in your hometown? Why did you decide to move

to another town/city?

Z.I. (26, young person from the village area in Uzbekistan):

Higher education was available only in the city. In my family parents gave a chance to try

education. I wanted to become a college student one day, and there are no universities in my

hometown. I also had to work in the bank college as an assistant to earn for living. It was not fair

that my dad only worked. I earned the money since I was 17.

K.R. (25, young man from a regional city center):

My brother and I (probably till 9th

grade) would buy the bubble gums and re-sell it to my

classmates. It was good business. Girls in my class, consisting of 13 people do the same. I

wanted to have my business and there were not enough opportunities in my city, so I moved to

the capital. It is for sure better than a bubble gum business now for me. But sometimes I think

that I might have done a mistake. I left my family. I do send them money. But all these law, these

changes with taxes, it is impossible to have secure capital here.

G.K. (24, young person from a suburban area in Uzbekistan):

I had to go to cotton fields. If you live in Oblast center, you have chance not to go to cotton

harvest. I remember, cotton field – first time in 8th

grade. That was horrible. I was tall and

couldn’t bend, so they took me to chayhona (local canteen) to make hot water. 60kg per day is

the average of what people have to gather (the first harvest). The second harvest is the one that

occurs after the rain.

19

During my college years I continued going to the cotton fields. We slept in the village cinema;

on the stage there are about 30 beds. We stayed there for two and a half months. I remember my

university rector told me once very quietly that there was better in Bislan. There are large

numbers of unemployed people in my country. The question arises, why do they use students?

It’s the way to control I think. Though, there is a budget allocated to cleaning the streets and

towards the works connected with cotton harvest.

Q: What are your professional goals? Where do you see yourself 5 years from now? Do you

picture yourself being successful? What would it take for you to become successful?

S.R., 18: I want to open a farm: If you have 3 cows, you live pretty average, if you have 5, than

you are rich. If you’ve got a car, then you are totally rich.

U.I., 21: I want to work in a law enforcement agency, better a prosecutor’s office, prokuratura.

They always get the money in time and I need to take care of my family.

K.M., 25 (school teacher): I want to move to Kazakhstan.

Q: What are your personal goals? Do you think it is realistic to stay in this country?

R.I. (alumna of FSA FLEX program, active volunteer worker):

I consider myself as a very patriotic person, patriotism for me is not praising your country and

your ancestors, it is identifying the needs and current issues of your community and help them to

solve it. I volunteered a lot in various projects for my community, but at the age of 24 I agreed to

marry a foreigner not because of love only but also because I felt that I was unappreciated and

unwanted in my surroundings. When you work, you seek partners or people who support and

understand you and when instead of becoming partners for common development and good they

see you as a danger then you just have to step out from the field and wait until the “right time.”

Many people observe my behavior as a “betrayer” but for me I am just waiting for the “right

time” and working on myself.

Transcribed Interview III: Questions Asked of Several Interviewees

Q: What is your understanding of leadership? Do you ever want to become a person who is in

the position to choose? Where do you show yourself as a leader?

N.Ch., 21: I do not want to become a leader, it is too dangerous—too much of a responsibility

and something may happen to my family. I don’t want to be a leader; I just want to find a job.

V.Ts., 22: I think leaders in my country are people who are not afraid. Being ethnically Korean, I

do not think I could become a political leader in my country, although I want to. I do not mind

taking responsibility of others on myself, but I want to go abroad because there I will be more or

less in the position to choose.

20

B.D., 27: Being a leader is being the person who others listen to. My family listens to me and I

want to become rich so I will be respected in my mahalla.

R.T., 20: For me a leader is someone who is in control. I hope one day I will become president;

at least right now I do everything to get my education and hopefully will work in the Ministry of

Economics once I graduate.

Q: What is your perception of religion? Would you consider yourself to be a religious person?

Are your values connected to what religion teaches you?

O.B., 22: I think that it is dangerous to talk about religion these days. I consider myself to be a

very religious person. I go to mosque and learn more about Koran. I try not to drink and smoke,

but I do not think that this is important. I do that, but I keep the fast. I want to devote my life to

Islam, I think that this is a responsibility of every Uzbek.

K.U., 23: I do not know if I can call myself religious, I do not keep up with the norms, but I have

faith. This is actually the only thing that keeps me going.

R.I., 20: I am not religious at all. I think in Uzbekistan Islam is more like a pop culture; there are

no proper Muslim people. It is more like religious values are combined with the local culture and

mentality. I come from Surkhandarya, and many people there are religious, but I do not think

they are as religious as the ones in the Fergana Valley. Yet, still, it is an important part of daily

life. Maybe because I lived abroad working for the past three years, I have realized that Islam is

not for me. I have many friends who actually started practicing religion while they were abroad

working with me. I think people try to look religious, however, in reality they do not care.

I.S., 23: Religion is very important to me. I want to study it and continue practicing. My uncle

was put into prison for practicing religion, but I don’t want to talk about it. It was unfair. I think

religion teaches you how to be good, and all the radical things cannot be called my religion, my

Islam.

Q: What do you know about your region? How would you describe youth in your town? Is there

anything special you could say about your town?

D.A., 21: I live in the Oblast center. Many people here are much more open than in Tashkent.

We all share our daily worries and happy moments together in my mahalla. I like it here. Many

tourists come to visit ancient monuments and I think that my town is rich in its culture. Everyone

here speaks Tajik better than Uzbek; I think that makes us different.

Q: How do you think you are different from your grandmother/grandfather? And how do you

picture your grandkids?

B.D., 27: I think I am more independent. I live independently in Tashkent, while my family is

living in the region. I am different in a way that I am not that traditional. At home I speak Uzbek,

here more Russian, which I don’t really speak well. When I go home, I wear different clothes.

My relationship with my parents is different than theirs with my grandparents. For example,

21

when I speak to my father, I do not look down; my eyes are not cast on the floor. I try to speak

with my parents and explain to them my values, sometimes they do not understand me, but they

are my family and they try to adjust. I think I am freer than my parents, but the older I become

the more I see myself as a reflection of my father. I picture my grandkids happier and wealthier

than I am, and I hope I will do something for that.

K.M, 19: I know I am different from my grandparents but I believe in their values. My parents

are the ones closest to me and I follow their advice. I am getting married soon. My mother found

me a wife. I don’t know her, but I am sure that mom wouldn’t suggest to me someone who is not

good. I want to continue the traditions of my family and will do everything for the good name of

my parents.

Please note that more interview transcripts are available upon request.

B. Interview Surveys [To follow-up on the point made in the paper about the role and

importance of elderly people in families in Uzbekistan]:

If we take a look at history, we can see that older people have always fulfilled a major role in the

family: “Normally two or three generations lived in the same home. The family structure was

officially patriarchal, with the senior male member of the household having ultimate authority

over the others. A home…would usually accommodate the father, his wife or wives, married

sons and their families, single sons, unmarried or divorced daughters and a retinue of attendants

and servants.”13

Nowadays the situation has not changed very much, although the increasing role

of women in modern society undermines the patriarchal structure of families. Moreover, the

older generation can no longer adapt to rapidly changing conditions. They feel that the authority

they had in the family is waning with each day. They cannot handle modern technology and

often feel that their grandchildren live in an alien world. The question of grandchildren is of

special importance to the older generation because traditionally grandparents are the ones who

bring up the young people. With the decreasing role that the older generation is playing in

bringing up their grandchildren they feel less needed by their children. I interviewed many

families and gathered the following data.

I surveyed 53 families in Uzbekistan:

o 6 from Urgench (Khorezm Region)

o 8 from Samarkand (Samarkand Region)

o 6 from Karshi (Kashkadarya Region)

o 13 from Tashkent (capital of Uzbekistan)

o 11 from Ferghana (Ferghana Region)

o 9 from Bukhara (Bukhara Region)

The 53 families totaled 307 people. These 307 people can be separated into two generations:

13

Scarce J. (1996). Domestic Culture in the Middle East. An exploration of the household interio,. National

Museums of Scotland, p.75.

22

• First Generation (those over 50 years old)—these people are the target groups of the

proposed university. 189 people were questioned.

• Second Generation (those between 30 and 49 years old)—these people were questioned

in order to evaluate their attitudes toward older life and toward older generations. This

generation was also questioned because I wanted to compare their opinion with the ‘first’

generation. 118 people were questioned.

I would like to note two points. First, each family I interviewed had a different amount of people.

Second, this is not scientific data, but rather my personal student research.

Results of the Questionnaire:

Q: What is the most important thing in your life?

Both generations answered this question, and the results are astonishing. Out of 307 people, 272

said that the most important thing is their family; 16 said that it is their work or financial status,

12 said that it is their social status, and 7 gave different answers.

Q: Do you ever feel neglected and unneeded by your family?

The first generation answered this question. Out of 189 representatives of the first generation,

134 said ‘yes’ and 55 said ‘no’.

Family

Work/

Money

Social Status Other

23

No

29%

Yes

71%

Q: Why do you visit the mahalla centers?

Both generations answered this question. Out of 307 people, 261 said that they do it to have

conversations with their friends, 215 said that they visit the mahalla center to hold holiday

activities, 173 said that they don’t have any other things to do at home and feel bored, and 87

said that they do it to play doira and chess.

050

100150200250300

Co

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Ho

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hess

No

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Nu

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Peo

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Qu

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Q: Do you have experience in solving family conflicts?

This was a “yes/no” question and both generations answered it. Out of 307 people, 191 answered

“yes” and 116 answered “no.”

Yes

No

24

Q: What are the ways you solve family conflicts?

Both generations answered this question and the results came to be that out of 307 people, 154

said that they usually avoid conflicts or do not know how to act in these situations. 127 said that

they just live through conflicts, 17 said that they try to find a compromise, and only 9 answered

that they discuss the conflicts with their family members.

Discuss

it with

Family

3%

Find

Compro

mise

6%

Avoid it

50%Live

Throug

h it

41%

Q: If you could, what would you do to change you lifestyle?

Only representatives of the First Generation answered this question. The 189 people gave a

variety of answers: 116 said that they want to fulfill their dreams (for example, go on a

pilgrimage to Mecca, live to see their children/grandchildren’s weddings, etc.); 123 said that they

would be glad to occupy themselves with something (for example, take care of their

grandchildren, recreate their garden, write a book, etc); 176 said that they would like to have a

new experience (for example, learn to use the computer and internet, visit countries, learn how to

play musical instruments, learn plaster carving, publish poems and stories, etc.); but most of the

representatives of the first generation, 185 of 189, said that they want to feel more useful and to

be able to share their wisdom and lifelong experiences.

116

123

176

185

To Fulfill my Dream

Occupy Myself

New Experience

Feel More Useful

Q: Why don’t you live separately from your parents?

Representatives of the second generation answered this question. Some people gave more than

one answer so the results came to be that 96 said it is because of their traditions, 85 said that their

25

parents are part of their family, 103 said that their parents need their care, and only 67 said that

they need their parents’ moral support.

96 85103

67

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