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Performance Enhancement & Health 1 (2012) 3– 9

Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect

Performance Enhancement & Health

jo ur nal homepage: www.elsev ier .com/ locate /peh

hallenging human and sporting boundaries: The case of Oscar Pistorius

nne Marcellini a,∗, Sylvain Fereza, Damien Issanchoua, Eric De Léséleuca, Mike McNameeb,∗

Laboratoire “Santé, Education and Situations de Handicap” [Health, Education and Disabling Situations], JE n◦2516, Université Montpellier 1, FranceCollege of Human and Health Sciences, Swansea University, UK

r t i c l e i n f o

eywords:portisabilityuman enhancementechnologyocial categorisation

a b s t r a c t

The controversy surrounding Oscar Pistorius’s disputed eligibility for Olympic participation serves here asa focal point for a number of debates regarding the ethics of human enhancement, conceptions of abilityand disability, and the transformative effects of technology upon the nature of sports competition itself.A world beating Paralympics athlete, Pistorius attempted to gain eligibility to represent South Africa inthe Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. An account is given as to the process of his initial rejection, based upon

nclusion scientific experiments that argued his performance was unacceptably “boosted”, and the subsequentsuccessful appeal that undermined the scientific basis of the judgement while leaving unchallenged thedeeper question of the role that biotechnology might play in transforming athletic performance. Weshow how what began as an eligibility dispute in the sports arena, became a political debate that raisedfundamental questions about how society at large regarding the place for “technological” and “enhanced”humans, and of performers of exceptional ability.

. Introduction: A sports controversy that went beyond theorld of sport

At the beginning of the 21st century a man who would have beenonsidered infirm just 50 years ago, challenged widespread socialorms and sports law in particular, leading to a lengthy question-

ng of sports institutions and their rules. In fact, for several yearsow, Oscar Pistorius, a South African Paralympic athlete, has beenhe subject of a continuing debate. The so called “Pistorius affair”tarted with the Athens Paralympic Games (2004) when this athleteeversed the sports order instituted for the first time by winningaces against the best paralympic athletes in the category “singleibial amputation” (Paralympic category T44), while he was actu-lly a “double tibial amputation” athlete (Paralympic category T43).his fact has been the subject of less discussion, which is an inter-sting point in its own right. Nevertheless, more widely covered by

he sports and general press1 is the issue regarding the legitimacyf his taking part in elite able-bodied sports.

∗ Corresponding authors.E-mail addresses: anne.marcellini@univ-montp1.fr (A. Marcellini),

.j.mcnamee@swansea.ac.uk (M. McNamee).1 According to the Factiva data base, 5909 press articles reporting on Oscar Pisto-

ius were published in various languages from September 2004 to December 2008including 5305 between January 2007 and December 2008). In France, over the twoears 2007 and 2008, 53 articles were devoted to him in five newspapers, out of 294ress articles on the Paralympic Games, in other words 18% of the total (Figaro, Midiibre, Libération, Le Monde, Les Echos).

211-2669/$ – see front matter © 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.oi:10.1016/j.peh.2011.11.002

© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Oscar Pistorius was born in 1986 with a physical anomaly, ormore precisely a malformation of fibulae and feet, which preventedhim from walking. When he was 11 months old the doctors sug-gested to his parents that a double amputation below the kneewould enable him to use prostheses and learn to walk. Equippedwith these artificial legs, he led an unremarkable childhood, went toschool, played various sports, and when a teenager, started playingorganised rugby. His very early experience with motor deficiencyand the use of prosthetic limbs significantly reduced the disabili-ties that might have been the consequence of his deformity. At 17,he took up athletics, and equipped himself for running – like mostother similarly disabled athletes – with “Flexfoot” (more gener-ally referred to as “Cheetahs”) a high technology racing prosthesesincorporating a carbon fibre blade. After training as a high-levelathlete, he soon overturned all sprint records established in theParalympic games, before aspiring to the heights of competinginternationally in elite “able-bodied”2 400 m races and claimingadmission to “ordinary” sports competitions, as a result of his

exceptional ability and dedication.3 Thus it was that a controversybegan about his case which was to expand on a remarkable scale.

2 The term “able-bodied” used here refers to the current terminology used inFrance in particular, by those having motor disabilities, to designate those withoutmotor disabilities.

3 We also note that during the process of this publication, Pistorius was allowedto compete with able bodied athletes at the 2011 world athletics championships inDaegu, South Korea. He successfully qualified through the first qualifying round butcame last in his sem-final. This is clearly a historic achievement.

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was the first Paralympic athlete in a wheelchair to take part in theOlympic Games in Archery. Beyond her Olympic performance (35thplace) it might be said that her greater achievement was in being

A. Marcellini et al. / Performance

e examine here the institutional and symbolic imperatives hisase raises.

What issues are raised by this athlete’s request to take partn “ordinary” sports competitions? What is the peculiarity or sin-ularity of his case compared with other disabled athletes whoxcel? What are the reactions and arguments put forward and theositions taken by various protagonists in the face of this appar-ntly “disturbing” case? What sense can be made of the sportsuthorities’ response to him? What does his case tell us aboutur conception(s) of “human boundaries”? In response to theseuestions we adopt a casuistic approach (Passeron & Revel, 2005),

terating between general norms and the particular case we havehosen to highlight. A casuistic approach rejects the idea of generalorms that can be deductively applied in all cases (Jonsen, 1995).

t pays particular attention to the specific singularities of the sin-ular case at hand, with the aim of exploring particularities of thePistorius case” while moving to and fro between more generalmpacts on disability, the sports spectacle, and the subject of defin-ng “human boundaries” in contemporary society. Through thisase study we intend to bring out the symbolic dimensions of thenstitution, showing how various rationalisations were constructednd disputed to arrive at a decision regarding Oscar Pistorius. Tochieve this, required the bringing together of data from variousnstitutional sources, media reportage, and information publishedn various scientific literatures.

. Methods

The institutional sources were mainly documents producedy the Olympic and Paralympic organisations, as well as workAuberger, 2005; Bailey, 2007) conducted in respect of these sports

ovements (the Olympic Revue, official Olympic and Paralympicites4 and the report by the Court of Arbitration for Sports/Tribunalrbitral du Sport (CAS) in Lausanne, Switzerland. Our analysis willoncentrate on the practices and the discourse relating to “dis-bled” athletes and more specifically on the subject of “disabled”thletes taking part in the Olympic Games and the transformationf its organisational method over time.

The press data examined reportage by the French national dailyress (Le Monde, Le Figaro, Libération) concerning the controversyreated by the Pistorius case, as published from 2004 to 2008.ports-specific press reporting was eschewed since we were seek-ng to understand the tenor of this controversy through nationalress coverage and beyond the specific sports and sports mediaorld. The contents of the press data (30 articles) were analysed in

rder to bring out the arguments used in the daily press to foster thisontroversy and disseminate it outside the sports world. Finally, thecientific literature dealing with the Pistorius case is used to illus-rate how the scientific world became inextricably linked in theebate. This analysis shows how scientific and ideological currentsere marshalled in the controversy.

The analysis situates the “Pistorius case” within the frameworkf relations between disability sport and the Olympic movement,n order to throw light on his particular case. The examination ofhis background shows how Olympic institutions controlled, wellefore the Pistorius case, involvement by athletes with disabilities

n the Olympic Games in an organised and progressive campaign.

e argue that one reason for the very public nature of this debate

s because brought into question the nature and significance ofport and the symbolic representation of the Human Being that

4 The official Internet site of the Olympic movement (French version:ww.olympic.org.fr, English version: olympic.org.uk); and the official Paralympic

ite: www.paralympic.org.

cement & Health 1 (2012) 3– 9

the sporting spectacle, as a theatrical reflection of our society, isstaged.

2.1. Case Background: The history of “disabled” sports categoriesand their mode of participation in Olympic Games5

Understanding the controversy raised by Pistorius’ desire toparticipate in able-bodied sporting competitions requires a priorappreciation of the Paralympic movement and its relations with theOlympic movement. Pistorius is far from being the first athlete witha bodily or sensorial deficiency to take part in the Olympic Games.The purpose of these remarks is to situate eligibility debates of ath-letes with a disability within able-bodied sport. The Pistorius casecannot be seen to have initiated these debates ab initio, although anew dialogue emerges because of his particular attributes and thetechnology he utilises.

Before the Paralympic Games were institutionalised in 1960, it ispossible to identify, from the historical records of the Olympic andParalympic movements, three Olympic athletes who fell into thiscategory (Auberger, 2005; Bailey, 2007). George Eyser is the firstfigure of renown found in the annals of the International OlympicCommittee, a one-legged gymnast who, in the Saint Louis OlympicGames in 1904, won six Olympic medals in gymnastics (parallelbars, horizontal bar, climbing rope, vault and pommel horse, andfull competition of four tests), three of them gold. Next, KarolyTakacs (1910–1976), a Hungarian pistol shooter with his right handamputated, won a gold medal for pistol shooting in the 1948 Lon-don Olympic Games, and then took part in the Helsinki Games in1952. Lastly, the Danish athlete Liz Hartel, paralysed in both legsfrom the after effects of poliomyelitis, took part in the 1952 HelsinkiGames, where she won a silver medal in the individual dressage. Itwas the first time that the Olympic Equestrian events were opento women riders, and Liz Hartel is remarkable therefore; with animpairment of her lower limbs, she was the first women to competein the equitation, and against men. She subsequently participatedin the Melbourne Games in 1956.

The physical anomalies of these athletes were anecdotallyreported at the time though we now know little of the route theyhad to follow to enable them to take part in the Olympic Games.Before the 1960s, the idea of “handicap” was seldom used (as itis today, notably in Scandinavian countries) to indicate the “dis-abled person” describing all those affected by an impairment of anysort.6 For this reason, these athletes were not described as “disabledathletes”, but simply classified by their physical handicap, in otherwords their “impairment”.

In 1960 the first official Paralympic Games were held in Rome,following various Stoke Mandeville Games – the first sports com-petitions reserved for those with motor deficiency were held in1948 at the hospital of the same name (see Jespersen & McNamee,2008). From this time onward, athletes with motor (and later sight)impairment took part in increasing numbers in the ParalympicGames which were to be held every four years.

In 1984, Neroli Fairhall of New Zealand, a paraplegic athlete,

5 For an extended historical discussion see Marcellini, Vidal, Ferez, and de Léséleuc(2010).

6 In France, in 1957 the term “disabled” appeared officially in the designation ofa category of the population, that of “disabled workers”: Law no. 57-1223 of 23November 1957 on the employment classification of disabled workers, defined assuch in article 1:“Are considered as a disabled worker to benefit from the provisionsof this law, is any person whose possibility to acquire, or to retain a job is effec-tively reduced following an insufficiency or a reduction in their physical or mentalabilities.”

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he first athlete to make the transition from the Paralympic (havingreviously competed in the 1972 Heidelberg and 1980 Arnhem Par-lympics) to Olympic participation. She returned to the Paralympicircuit in 1988 (Seoul) and later in Sydney (2000). It is noteworthyowever, that her Olympic/Paralympic participation was not con-urrent: she alternately participated as either an athlete with anmpairment or and able-bodied athlete. At no time did she simul-aneously compete in both events during the same year. It appearshat the question of whether her performance was unjustly assistedas not raised in a formal way. Nevertheless, there is frequentention in the literature of a slightly comic anecdote. When we

sked her if she thought that firing from a sitting position gave hern advantage, Neroli replied: “I don’t know. I have never fired anrrow other than when seated”.7 Her achievement of 35th place isot inconsequential in the context of an official lacuna or silenceegarding the ethical aspects of the later debate. In 1982 her poten-ial advantage went largely without question while Pistorius’s caseecame headline news around the world.

The principal of employing an exclusive category was to beonfirmed a few years later by the case of Marla Runyan, aight impaired U.S. sprinter who won four gold medals (100 m,00 m, 400 m and high jump at the Barcelona Paralympic Games

n 1992) and a gold in the heptathlon at the Atlanta Paralympicames (1996). Having met the qualifying times required for theydney Olympic Games in 2000, she was the first Paralympic sight-mpaired athlete to run in the Olympics and achieved eighth placen the women’s 1500 m final. She subsequently participated in the004 Athens Olympic Games, running in the 5000 m. What is inter-sting is that her transition to elite able-bodied sport, like Neroliairhall, occurred at the time her performances were registered inhe same zone as Olympic competitors.

From these two cases, we can see the transition from one cat-gory to the other – but not belonging to both at the same time

leaves intact the hierarchical organisation of the classification.hus when a Paralympic athlete becomes an Olympic athlete theyannot at one and the same time be considered both, according to

principal of taxonomical exclusivity. De Pauw (1997) interpretedhis phenomenon as an “obliteration” of the disability in the sensehat the “transition” led to a sort of invisibility of the disability,nly to be evoked subsequently as an anecdotic, a peripheral aside.t should be noted here that the Olympic institution extricated itselfrom employing a strictly medical definition of “disability” (an ath-ete with impairment is a “disabled athlete” or more commonlyhese days we refer to “athletes with a disability”) to adopt a rel-tive definition of disability if, and only if, their performance wasnferior to those of athletes without impairment; otherwise ath-etes are considered under the description “able-bodied athlete”).uch an approach effectively ignores the disability while preser-ing the hierarchical organisation of designated categories in whichthletes are either labelled “disabled” (athletes with a disability) orable-bodied”.

The end of this binary sporting logic disappeared in the 2008ames in Beijing, when two athletes competed concurrently in thearalympic and Olympic Games. Nathalie Du Toit, a South Africanmputee swimmer, won five gold medals and a silver at the Athensaralympic Games in 2004. In 2008, in Beijing, she was classed 16th

n the 10 km freestyle swimming in the Athens Olympic Gamesnd carried off five gold medals at the Paralympic Games. Simi-arly, Natalia Partyka, a Polish table-tennis player, whose forearm

7 This anecdote relates to her first victory in a valid international competition in982, the 12th Commonwealth Games in which she carried off the gold, see therticle: The 12th Commonwealth Games (1982, no. 182). Olympic Revue, p. 763.he story is retold in various summary presentations of the athlete, in institutionalocuments.

cement & Health 1 (2012) 3– 9 5

had been amputated, having won a gold at the Athens ParalympicGames, was selected for the Beijing Olympics in the team event,and then competed in the Paralympic Games, winning a goldmedal. It is interesting in both cases, relatively unheralded by theworld’s sports media, the participation of these two athletes in theOlympics did not require any environmental or regulatory alter-ations, or the use of a technological body-device.

This cursory historical analysis shows that the Olympic authori-ties have coped with the issue of dual eligibility first by developingand then gradually amending, the definition of the “disabled ath-lete” category in relation with that of “able-bodied athlete”. In thisway they ensured that a coherent classification organised witha sports rationale provided a hierarchy between both categories.This hierarchy has been established and maintained in a way thathas avoided drawing attention to the problematic assumptionsregarding the privileging of abled over disabled categories. Thereare neither details about the double participation, nor any formalcomment at all from either Olympic or Paralympic organisationsabout the athletes who participate in Beijing session at both events.Rather, there is an institutional silence.

Given the amount of ink spilt on the Pistorius case one couldbe forgiven for thinking that the particularities of the case werewithout precedent, but this would represent historical ignorance aswe have noted above. Nevertheless, Pistorius’ successive exploitsafter the Paralympic Games of 2004 merit sustained scrutiny inorder to draw out some fundamental views of the nature of sportsand sports performance held by powerful sports institutions in thedebate concerning “human boundaries”.

2.2. From competitive equality to “technological dependence”?

In order to provide for a satisfactory discussion of the(re)presentation of human boundaries within sport it is necessaryto give a fairly detailed chronology of the course of events.

2.2.1. The first controversy at the Athens Paralympic Games(2004)

Oscar Pistorius first took part in the Athens Paralympic Games(2004). Aged just 17, he won the 200 m gold medal and the 100 mbronze against more experienced opponents with a single tibialamputation (Paralympic category T43), despite the fact that he hada double (trans)tibial amputation (Paralympic category T44). Thissudden incursion, associated with an unprecedented performancefor a double tibial amputee, brought Pistorius to the attention of thewhole world of Paralympic sport. Interestingly it was an Americanathlete, Marlon Shirley, who started the controversial ball rolling.Having been dethroned as the Paralympic T43 champion Shirleyremarked in the journal “Liberation” that “The size of his prosthe-ses increases the length of his stride. This effect was already knownin the (then called) “handisport” world as early as 2004. While thedevices of his “single amputee” adversaries could not exceed thelength of their own leg, Pistorius is accused of having taken advan-tage of his double amputation to artificially increase his height.”(Hirsch & Mathiot, 2007). Shirley became an outspoken detractor:“Pistorius wants to run in 20 seconds? We’re going to see a guy 2 mtall run [200 m] in 20 seconds. That’s cool, but it’s not sport, it’s anexhibition. I’m not convinced he’ll help handisport” he remarked.

Thus Pistorius, who would be understood under “the” med-ical model as having greater impairment than athletes (single

amputees) with lesser disabilities, challenges assumptions aboutthe wisdom of sports ability hierarchies derived from medical(functional) models. But the tensions within Paralympics sportbecame evident too, though not at an official level (i.e. by the IPC).

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One interesting turn in the controversy arose within the contextof scholarly debate regarding how issues to do with exclusion (orpotential discrimination) might reflect on the role of technology to

A. Marcellini et al. / Performance

.2.2. From hesitation to exclusionIn 2004, Pistorius made known his intention to take part in

able-bodied” athletic events. He began by competing with theble-bodied in his own country, and in 2007 he finished secondn the national 400 m athletics championship in South Africa. He

as spoken of in the French press as a young man who did notee himself as disabled, since the significance of “incapacity” anddisadvantage” associated with these terms was foreign to him. Hehen made a formal request to enter international athletics com-etitions. His request was at first accepted by the Internationalssociation of Athletics Federations (IAAF). The press reported theiresponse thus: “Through the good offices of Elio Locatelli, formerrainer, doctor of physiology and development director at the IAAF,he international authority that provisionally confirmed the rightf Pistorius to compete with the able-bodied, is carrying out testsn the athlete and his prostheses.” The public relations director ofhe IAAF was reported in the press as attempting to take the heatut of the controversy, basing his approach on empathy, closenessnd cooperation with the athlete, as well as having recourse to sci-nce, and expects that objective findings will result: “This is not aattle. Oscar’s dream of taking part in the Olympic Games is under-tandable, but in the absence of precedent, we are examining theacts to be sure that his prostheses do not give him an advantage,nd he is contributing to this.” (Cédric, 2007).

One unforeseen event, which would go on to complicate mat-ers, was his rapid performance improvements: Pistorius finishedecond in the 400 m Athletics Golden Gala in Rome on 13th July007, beating a group of elite professional able bodied athletes. Theanagement of the IAAF sought to understand and explain this

natural-hierarchical’ reversal using their own reference system:ositive science, measurement, sports law and ethics. Pistorius’sace in Rome was filmed by a team from the Sports Sciences Insti-ute of the Italian Olympic Committee, the work being overseen byocatelli (IAAF).

Yet the tone of empathy dissipated and on 15th July 2007 theress published a sharp reaction by Oscar Pistorius and his trainer.ick Davies, spokesperson for the IAAF, explained in Le Monde that

he research was conducted jointly with the athlete. The Southfrican team denied this: “They are doing their research by them-elves and we have no idea of the basis they are using,” saidistorius. “The position they’ve taken is offensive and discrimina-ory” (Jolly, 2007).

In this hostile environment, the IAAF invited an independent sci-ntific institution with the task of analysing this hitherto unknownerformance, thereby reaffirming that the debate was actuallybout the scientific validation of sporting fairness or unfairness.hus Peter Bruggeman, Professor at the Institute of Biomechan-cs at Cologne University was engaged to lead a team to carry outxperiments to in/validate any potential performance advantageor Oscar Pistorius (typically referred to as “boosting”) resultingrom the use of the “Cheetahs”. He concluded that there was amechanical advantage” of more than 30% for an athlete using theserostheses over athletes without prostheses. The investigation also

ndicated that Pistorius could further improve his performance, ase was already running at the same speed as his competitors with

25% lower energy output (IAAF, 2008). From the point of view ofiomechanical and physiological assessments it seemed the issueas scientifically settled.

The IAAF, cited rule 144.2, ratified in March 2007, prohibitinghe use of any technical device that incorporates springs, wheelsr any other element that provides the user with an advantagever another athlete not using such a device. Based on Bruggeman’s

tudy IAAF held that the Cheetah’s gave an advantage to him andhat he would no longer be authorised to take part in competitionsun under IAAF rules (IAAF, 2008). This decision was announced on4th January 2008.

cement & Health 1 (2012) 3– 9

On 15th January 2008, the press headlined the news of the“prohibition”: “Oscar Pistorius prohibited from the Olympics”(Libération), “The ‘legless sprinter’ prohibited from the Olympics”(Le Figaro). Le Monde only mentioned the issue in its on-lineedition8: “The amputated athlete, Oscar Pistorius cannot take partin the Beijing Olympics with the able-bodied.” The press underlinedthe scientific nature of the data on which the decision was basedand focused on the reception of this information by the athlete.The latter who “dreamt of taking part in the Olympics”, the IAAFthat “refused the young man the opportunity to run” and Pisto-rius expressed his intention to contest the decision by all possiblemeans; “[He] is contesting the decision and will appeal.” “[He] isvery disappointed by the decision.”

The racing prostheses used by Pistorius were thus seen in anew light by the press: carbon “blades”, “carbon-fibre swords”,“technical aids”, the “Cheetah”. The evidence that a prosthesis isby definition a technical aid only exists in the world of personswith disabilities and in motor rehabilitation. In the world of sport, a“technical aid” is now defined more precisely as “a technical devicewhich gives the athlete an advantage by comparison with one whodoes not use such a device”, and it was therefore prohibitable forthis reason.

In this way, after the IAAF’s decision in January 2008, thecontroversy took a new turn. Pistorius, now excluded from the“able-bodied” sports circuit, began to mount a legal defence. At thesame time, the debate in the French press extricated itself from itsprevious approach of awaiting the IAAF decision, to take up a betterargued, more radical position and members of the research com-munity took part in the debate (biomechanic specialists and sportsdoctors, disability studies and bioethics, philosophy and sociologyin particular) (see Burkett, Potthast, & McNamee, 2011; Edwards,2008; Jones & Wilson, 2009; Van Hilvoorde & Landeweerd, 2008).

2.2.3. From exclusion to appeal at the Court of Arbitration forSport

Since 1984, the CAS in Lausanne is the place where internationalsports disputes typically are resolved. They received Pistorius’ offi-cial petition on 20th February 2008. They summarised in four pointsthe issues on which the athlete sought an opinion (CAS, 2008): “Didthe IAAF council exceed its rights by taking the decision to excludeMr Pistorius? Was the process that led to the IAAF decision weak ordefective from the point of view of the procedure followed? Is theIAAF decision discriminatory and thus illegal? Is the IAAF decisionincorrect when it considered that the use of the Cheetah Flexfootby Mr. Pistorius is contrary to rule 144.2?”

Perhaps unsurprisingly the CAS refuted the accusation of dis-crimination by the IAAF. This might have been foreseen in themanner in which its ruminations had been circumscribed. It arguedthat the Convention for the Rights of the Disabled implies enablingathletes with disabilities to take part on an equal basis in sportsactivities and that this is precisely the reply the CAS must give: Yesor no – does Mr. Pistorius compete on an equal basis with athleteswho are not using the Cheetah Flex-Foot? Given the physiologicaland biomechanical boosting evidence the answer had to be “yes”.But the lawfulness of the exclusion is one thing, the ethical andpolitical dimensions another.

2.2.4. Is sports exclusion discriminatory towards athletes withdisabilities?

8 Newspaper Le Monde.fr, January 14, 2009, available on the World Wide Web:http://www.lemonde.fr/.

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hallenge the concept of humanness or human integrity where per-ons with disabilities utilised significant and complex technologyonjoined with their bodies. Swartz and Watermeyer (2008), and

olbring (2008) each challenged the idea of human essentialismn their own ways. It was, more strongly suggested, that personssing such technology might in some way be being denied theirumanity as a result of technophobic stigmatism. One element ofhilosophical and bioethical debate that was discussed linked these of technology to fairly radical movements such as “posthu-anism” or “transhumanism”,9 which promote new possibilities

or technological transformation of the human body (McNamee,007). In more than one place, the use of technology was consid-red as a new and potentially worrying case of Prometheanism. Theontext for discussion surrounding Oscar’s eligibility thus becameven more complex.

It could be argued that Oscar Pistorius himself contributed,nowingly or otherwise, to this problematic. He appeared in a Nikedvert, staged against a black backdrop, supported by his two rac-ng prostheses, in a futuristic one piece body-hugging suit with arst person by-line in which he defines himself as a “thing”: “I wasorn without bones below the knee. I only stand 5 ft 2. But this ishe body I have been given. This is my weapon. How I conquer, how

wage my war. This is how I have broken the world record 49 times . . How I become the fastest thing on no legs. This is my weapon;his is how I fight.” Quite who the opponent was for such a fightas not clear: other athletes, paralympic athletes, or the IAAF.

.2.5. Sports exclusion for reasons of “technological doping”The original sporting exclusion of Pistorius was according to

he Court of Arbitration of Sport justified in virtue of the usef prohibited “technical aid”. While the IAAF remained cautious,nly speaking of “the advantage provided by prosthetic limbs” andeferring to rule 144.2, the press rapidly made the link betweentechnical aid” and “doping”, reporting such terms as “cyber doped”Hirsch & Mathiot, 2007), arising from interviews with athletes, andcientific articles using the term “technodoping”.

In the article “Oscar Pistorius veut défier, avec ses prothèses thethlètes valides” [Oscar Pistorius wants to challenge able-bodiedthletes with his protheses], 30 June 2007 in Le Monde, a Para-ympic athlete is quoted: “He [Pistorius] has gone from a little over9 seconds to 46 seconds 56 in less than three years. If an able bod-

ed [athlete] achieved such a performance, it would be said thate was doped.” To what extent is this just conceptual confusion,

ournalistic sloppiness, or the casuistic manipulation of doping defi-itions? The French sports code’s definition of doping runs: “Doping

s considered as the use of substances or procedures of a nature tortificially change the abilities of an athlete or to mask the use ofubstances or procedures having such a property.” Using this def-nition, a technical aid is by its nature a procedure that artificiallyhanges the abilities of the impaired athlete using such a device andight reasonably be considered as “doping”. In this situation, Pis-

orius, now classified as a “technologically doped” athlete, sought second scientific opinion to be presented before the CAS, withhe primary purpose of trying to reopen the issue of “advantage”rovided by his prosthetic limbs.

The association with the issue of doping is particularly note-orthy since it is charged with heavy moral overtones. Among the

acophony are distinct discourses: the discourse on equitable sport,n health, and on “purity”. Disentangling the scientific, ideological,

conomic and political discourse is one of the major character-stics in the analyses of the sports doping phenomenon. From aociological perspective the debates Oscar’s eligibility raised must

9 A movement which now, perhaps more softly, refers to itself as H+. See on theorld Wide Web: http://humanityplus.org/ accessed 28.23.11.

cement & Health 1 (2012) 3– 9 7

be understood contextually. The initial judgement against Oscarmust be seen alongside the prohibition of doping products or pro-cesses in competitive sports even though in broader society thereis much greater use and acceptance of enhancement techniques.How we are to understand the tension between broad social accep-tance and their rejection in sports is a moot point (Laure, 2009;Louveau, Augustini, Duret, Irlinger, & Marcellini, 1995). It may eas-ily be seen as a defence mechanism against the anxiety causedby the exaggeration of the principle of human performance, ofthe transformative potential of biotechnology, or of excessive indi-vidualism (see Erhenberg, 2000; Habermas, 1973; Taguieff, 2001).In adopting, declaring or concealing these postures within sportspolicy or law, sports may oddly proclaim a certain self-conceivedpurity where the use of certain ergogenic practices are prohibited.It might be suggested that the motivation for this is a misplacedUtopianism that attempts to preserve an idealised vision of thesocial sphere marked by the harmonious cohabitation of perfor-mance values, technology, and progress, with the values of health,naturalness, fairness, solidarity, fraternity, ethics and humanity.

The case of Pistorius also impacts on a particular dimension inthe definition of doping that is not officially explicit, but is oftenput forward by the athletes themselves: that of identity. In fact, anexamination of the representations and definitions of “real dop-ing” among high-level athletes has shown that for them there isa fundamental distinction between doping procedures perceivedas questioning the biological identity of the athlete (this is “realdoping”) and that which does not affect it (Marcellini, de Léséleuc,Ferez, Le-Germain, & Garcia, 2005). Analysing these ethical posi-tions of athletes shows how the definition of “real doping”, whichis condemned from their point of view, is closely tied to the actualdefinition of a champion, which is firstly “he who has the qualities”,“he who has a gift”, “he who is predisposed”. Thus, the champion isin essence, a “gifted being”, in other words someone who has apti-tudes that are above average: the gift is the natural, the biological,the hereditary, the genetic. But it is also, in this representative sys-tem, the “natural” environment of life that gives “natural qualities”to the individual, just as living at high altitude and running daily areassociated with the “natural” qualities of Ethiopian middle distancerunners (de Léséleuc & Marcellini, 2005).

“Real doping”, from this time on, is that which falsifies humanbeing, their primary identity, that which modifies the “natural”biology of the human, and for this reason that ruins the systemwhich places the “natural” values of human beings in a hierarchy(see Culbertson, 2007). It is precisely this “technological hybridity”concerning Pistorius that is under the spotlight here; it appears tochallenge the sporting rationale of a comparative and hierarchicalorganisation of the diversity of natural human abilities.

Leaving behind the potential classification of “doped athlete”and entering that of “champion” meant that Pistorius has had tonavigate his way through an administrative procedure to provideproof that his sports performance was meritocratic and not techni-cally boosted. He declared: “This type of prostheses has been usedfor fourteen years by other athletes who have never achieved myperformance. This is proof that I owe my results to my talent andmy work.” (Hirsch & Mathiot, 2007).

To defend his position, Oscar Pistorius commissioned other U.S.researchers to present a balanced analysis brought out the dis-advantages linked to the use of racing “blades” such as a slowstart, slowness during the first phase of the race and the difficultyof mastering trajectory, particularly on bends (see also Edwards,2008). This second-assessment, the so-called Houston Report, con-cluded in favour of Pistorius and was presented to the CAS. Amidst

protestations that, somehow, Pistorius had bought a new scientificopinion favourable to his case (Tucker & Dugas, 2008) with the aidof the Icelandic prosthetic company Össur, whose marketing sloganis “Life without limitations”.

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Notwithstanding these allegations, the CAS report held that thessue raised many problems and irregularities in the IAAF’s man-gement of the early scientific assessment and in the disseminationf Basing its ruling on the Houston report, on 16th May 2008, theourt of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) held that Pistorius was eligi-le to compete with the able-bodied and thus to take part in thelympic selection procedure for the Beijing Olympic Games. In bas-

ng its judgement on the flawed IAAF procedures and incompletecience, the arbitrators could not be viewed as setting a precedentn jurisprudential terms. As it turned out, Pistorius – though eligi-le to compete for Olympic participation for his native South Africa,ailed in his bid to achieve the compulsory qualifying time eitheror the individual event or the relay team. Notwithstanding this, heent on to win three gold medals (100 m, 200 m, 400 m) in the Bei-

ing Paralympic Games and is currently in training for the London012 Olympic Games.

. Conclusions

.1. Sport, technology, humanness

In the analysis of the Oscar Pistorius situation developed here,istorius’ case caused a major problem for the sports by conjoin-ng two previously unknown factors: first, by raising the spectref potentially superior performance compared by an athlete withisabilities over able-bodied athletes at the absolute level of sport-

ng excellence; and, secondly, that this performance was producedsing a technological device that replaced a human body part. Ino doing the Pistorius case broke new ground: he was, in effect, acompound” athlete: he is both human and machine. His athlete’sody, unlike that of other “Paralympians” become “Olympian”,ppears to be a hybrid of humanness and high technology, and its in this context that the issue of his “status” subsequently arose.s a technological hybrid, his participation in the sports circuit forthletes with disabilities went unquestioned. In this social arenaringing together athletes with widely different impairments, the

egitimacy of the repair or of the best possible technological com-ensation for the impairment would be difficult conceptually toistinguish and therefore legitimately to challenge.

It is perhaps not surprising then that the sports world, guarantorf a theoretical equality of opportunity in competitions, hesitated toecognise his legitimacy in the field. The technological and humancompound” that he is as an athlete, challenged instituted sportsategories: categories by age, sex, and weight have already beenrovided for – but how should Pistorius be categorised?

The extended hesitancy of different sports authorities involvedn his request, as discussed above, show that Pistorius is seen as anunclassifiable” case for sports law, which enables human bound-ries to be situated in the institutional sports imagination. Thethlete with impairment, running “bare-bodied” is however, as weave shown, considered by the sports authority as legitimate. It

s obvious that these athletes suffer an “anomaly” or a deficiencyn their biological bodies but they can be considered biologicallypeaking as “pure”, natural. That the “anomaly” is also a differ-nce in the biological body and noted as a deficiency in relationo a theoretical organic integrity, or that this difference is consid-red an advantageous biological “singularity” in respect of the normlike the difference in height of Usain Bolt’s calceneum, thought in

art to explain his exceptional performance10), in both cases, theivergence in the biological realities of the human body and the dif-erence in performance that this leads to makes sense in the sports

10 We are indebted to M. Pierre Legreneur, researcher in biomechanics with theRIS team in Lyon, for having brought to our attention the scientific debate by sportiomechanics regarding Usain Bolt, at the CRIS seminar of 8 January 2009.

cement & Health 1 (2012) 3– 9

rationale. Yet, a technical aid, perceived as an artificial transforma-tion of the athlete’s biological identity, is associated with dopingand rejected as a transgression of the ideal of fair competition, of“biological purity” or “nature” that reigns in the sports competition.

The sports spectacle is discredited by the ricochet from any sortof doping, since it is tainted by deception, falsehood, or impurityand is no longer a measure of human endeavour in a biologi-cal order. Yet, from the view point of the spectacle, doping israther more of an issue since it is directly visible and thereforenot debateable. Doping by means of pharmacology, blood manip-ulation, genetics or surgery (e.g. the replacement of tendons orligaments by synthetic material, artery enlargement, etc.) is moreor less discernable, always the subject of discussion but invisibleto the spectator. In this sense, it can be the subject of games ofstrategy, as it guarantees an increase in the level of performancewhile being able to pass as “natural”. This is why the athlete witha device can be considered a significant personification of the lossof meaning in the sports spectacle.

3.2. Pushing the limits of human nature (but only in traditionalways)

In summary, the theatrical metaphor used by Bromberger(2004), and the analysis of the symbolic dimensions of the specta-cle conducted by Sperber (1974, 1975) may be suggestive. Similarly,to the idea of sport as a morality tale about the limits of humanityand the nature of goodness or purity (McNamee, 2008), it revealsthe function that sports have as public ceremonies. It seems that thesports spectacle is a cultural institution by means of which Humansare invited to think symbolically of, and to display or perform, therelationship between different categories of Humans and Humanrelationship with their own biological limits.11 Thus sports institu-tions today, by initially refusing Pistorius on the grounds of being“technologically doped” and by persisting in its battle against dop-ing in general, appears as an institution that pushes extraordinaryhumans to the limits of their biology. Paradoxically, it seems to sayto athletes, coaches, sports physicians and scientists, “challenge thelimits of humanness but do so in an exclusive, traditional, humanway”.

Nevertheless, now that it has accepted Pistorius’s performanceswithin the boundaries of its spectacle, its purpose appears funda-mentally to have changed. From a spectacle inviting thought onthe symbolic confrontation between the Human and their biologi-cal limits, we may be passing to a new stage in which the Humansurpassing biological boundaries by unchecked transformation, tothe spectacle of the “enhanced human”. This change in the sportsspectacle desired by posthumanist currents supports the thesis ofthe ineluctability of human enhancement by new technologies. Itis precisely this change in the nature of the sports spectacle that isfeared by many and that is expressed in the discourse on contra-vening the “purity of sport”.

The “purity of sport” is personified by the biological “purity”or “naturalness” of those taking part in a sports performance. Andthis “purity” has nothing to do with biological “normality”. What-ever way we characterise elite athletes, they are outliers in thespecies range. In this sense they too are far from “normal”. Nev-ertheless, neither anomaly nor organic impairment changes thesymbolic dimension of sport. Quite the contrary, it enriches it by

exhibiting the immense diversity of “natural” humanity in its unex-pected ability to optimise its aptitude, up to the point of showingits limits.

11 This is to say nothing of constructed events such as the South African rugbyplayer, Bryan Habana, who raced a cheetah recently to raise awareness of campaignsto preserve endangered species.

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Technoscientific modification and the technological additions tohe body however, muddy the impact of the sport spectacle, erasinghe limits that it would demonstrate and signify. One of the prag-

atic proposal to the fear of “muddying”, as suggested by Lippind Mattiuzzi (2008), as well as Wolbring (2008) (for a considerediscussion of Transhumanist fare, see Bostrom & Sandberg, 2009)ould be to set up an “open” sports category where the question

f “naturalness” of the athletes is no longer an issue. But this “cate-ory innovation” has not yet been envisaged by sports institutions.hether it will be in the near future is a moot point. Perhaps it iserely an analogue of the proposals to have games where doped

nd no-doped athletes competed alongside each other, which haseen mooted since the early days of anabolic steroid driven perfor-ances (King, 2011) but that only taken root in some powerlifting

ports (Todd, 2009). Certainly, some Western academics seem toe increasingly vocal about the emergence of this new category ofybrid humans whether through art, entertainment, or the sport-

ng display of biotechnological innovations. The aim of this paperas been to show how the Pistorius debate is not simply a matter ofetermining the boundaries of meritocratically conceived athleticxcellence but rather a pressing ethical and social debate turn-ng on the question of the distinguishing between repairing and/ornhancing the human in the pursuit of (sporting) excellence.

onflicts of Interest

The authors declare that there have no conflicts of interest withegard to this essay.

cknowledgment

Mike McNamee gratefully acknowledges the award of an EU FP7rant 266660 Epoch* (Ethics in public policy making: the case ofuman enhancement), which supported his work on this essay.

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