Challenges in Global Governance:Opportunities for G-x Leadership

March 2010

Alan S. AlexandroffCodirector G-20 Research Group, Munk Centre, University of Toronto and Senior Fellow, Centre for InternationalGovernance Innovation. Editor most recently of Rising States, Rising Institutions (Brookings). Blogs at risingbricsam.com.

“Multilateralism in the 21st century is, like the century itself,likely to be more fluid and, at times, mess[ier] than what we are used to.”1—Richard Haass

The Shape of Global GovernanceAs the first decade of the 21st century drew to a close,a new global governance institution was born. At theconclusion of the G-20 Leaders Summit in Pittsburgh,they declared that this group, and no longer the G-8,was now “the premier forum for our internationaleconomic cooperation.” In cementing the place of yetanother leaders’ summit on the annual calendar, theyonly reinforced the view that global governance is aconfusing jumble of institutions. One of America’sleading foreign policy experts, Richard Haass, head ofthe Council of Foreign Relations, calls this “messymultilateralism.”

The rise of the new institutionalism in global gover-nance, has thus, in no way created a sense of order.More pointedly, global governance has increasinglyspawned institutions that are far more informal andunstaffed than the UN and Bretton Woods institutionsthat preceded them. The rise of the G-x process—theG-5, the G-7/8, and the G-20—is structurally and pro-cedurally in sharp contrast with the earlier treaty-based organizations of the postwar world. Manyofficials and commentators have found it hard toaccept such an institutional transformation with equa-nimity. Critics have attacked the informal structures;argued that the membership, being less than universal,fails any test of representativeness and legitimacy; andquestioned the G-x process, accountability, and abilityto reach the critical decisions that meet the contempo-rary global governance challenges.

Beyond the emergence of these new G-x forums, con-temporary geopolitical realities have expanded thegreat power club quite significantly since the end ofthe Cold War. There is a sense that an enlarged andmore diverse global leadership consists not just of theUnited States and its traditional allies but, as the G-20demonstrates, the new rising states—Brazil, India andespecially China—and then an additional ring of influ-ential middle-income states such as Indonesia, SouthKorea, and Turkey.

Along with the question of new countries assumingmore prominence as international leaders, it remainsunclear what role will be played by the still acknowl-edged hegemonic leader—the United States. Followingthe demise of the Soviet Union, the United Statesemerged as the sole superpower and hegemon. Yet thismoment of unipolar ascendance ultimately devolvedinto a pell-mell series of unilateral actions.2 The Bushadministration expressed a deep-rooted skepticismtoward the multilateral system of which the UnitedStates had historically been the chief architect and pro-ponent. While the Bush administration “reawakened”to the advantages of multilateralism following Iraq,many countries and their publics had already acquireda distaste for American exceptionalism.

After these rifts and suspicion toward American leader-ship, the arrival of the Obama administration, with itsexpressed desire to reengage and commit to multilater-alism, boosted international hopes for cooperation.That hardly settled the matter, though. Secretary ofState Hillary Clinton’s talk of “a multi-partner world”

Policy Analysis Briefs are thought-provoking contributions to the public debate over peace and security issues. The views expressed in this brief arethose of the author and not necessarily those of the Stanley Foundation. The author’s affiliation is listed for identification purposes only.

at its inception in 1975—with the first summit atRambouillet included France, the United States,the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and Italy.By the time of its next meeting in Puerto Rico, aseventh leader was added: the Canadian primeminister.4 Once this grouping, and its pattern ofannual summit meetings, was established, it con-tinued uninterrupted until the 1998 enlargementto the G-8 with the inclusion of Russia.

The emergence of a prominent role for the G-xhas been propelled by broader forces of contem-porary global affairs. As the formal permanentmechanisms of the Bretton Woods and UN insti-tutions have been increasingly deadlocked andunable to marshal collective action on the inter-national agenda at hand, the G-x offered analternative outlet. In its initial agenda in the1970s, the leading industrial powers of the late-20th century actually had the combined econom-ic heft to mount an effective response tochallenges such as:

• The collapse of the fixed exchange rate systemof Bretton Woods.

• The first enlargement of the EuropeanCommunity in 1972 where the UnitedKingdom, Denmark, and Ireland joined theoriginal six.

• The 1973 oil crisis.

• The consequent 1974 economic recession.

Though at the outset the G-7 leaders and theirgovernments regarded these annual gatheringsas temporary and ad hoc, over time the gather-ing took root in the leaders’ annual calendars,a sequence was set for the rotation of its presi-dency, and the forum became a fixture in glob-al governance.

Over time, this summit diplomacy has shown anadaptability that helped it evolve along with theinternational environment and agenda. G-xagendas began with a rather tight focus on polit-ical and economic issues and the relationshipbetween the two. As governments and their lead-ers concluded that market forces and multina-tionals were driving global policy, the agendabroadened to the environment, infectious dis-eases, international crime, Africa, and develop-ment. Nor were international security questions

sounded ad hoc to some ears. And the new presi-dent’s emphasis on America’s multilateral reen-gagement was coupled with a stress on theresponsibilities of others in achieving global gov-ernance. Thus Secretary of State Hillary Clintonsuggested that the United States would work tocreate a collaborative environment where statesare likely to be incentivized to act together:

So these two facts demand a differentglobal architecture, one in which stateshave clear incentives to cooperate andlive up to their responsibilities, as well asstrong disincentives to sit on the sidelinesor sow discord and division. … We’llwork through institutions and reformthem, but we’ll go further. We’ll use ourpower to convene, our ability to connectcountries around the world, and soundforeign policy strategies to create partner-ships aimed at solving problems. … Inshort, we will lead by inducing greatercooperation among a greater number ofactors and reducing competition, tiltingthe balance away from a multi-polarworld and toward a multi-partner world.3

The analysis presented here explores leadership inthe context of contemporary global governance.More particularly, it focuses on the G-x process asa forum for international leadership, especially incomparison and combination with the formalinstitutions of the UN-Bretton Woods system, andoffers a frame to evaluate the effectiveness of theG-x process. To begin with, the scope of the G-xprocess is significantly larger than the annualsummitry that draws the most attention. But theultimate test for any global governance innova-tion is the same: Does it offer the prospect forgreater deliberation and collaboration in theinternational system, particularly in the face of agrowing set of challenges? As the informal G-xprocess incorporates emerging powers and tries tospread leadership beyond the United States as ahegemon, will this help to overcome the obstaclesto collective action? Or, will this enlarged leader-ship club, with all its diversity and its attempt todiminish the hegemonic leadership of the pastdecades, actually pose insurmountable problemsto decision making?

The Emergence of G-x LeadershipThe G-x process traces its history to the early1970s. The creation of the G-7—actually the G-6

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ignored. As early as 1983, the G-7 turned itsattention to missiles in Europe (though inprotest, the French president refused to attend)and as the Cold War came to an end, attentionturned to the question of Central Europe andthen to Russia. Indeed, by the 1998 Birminghamsummit, Russia became a permanent member.Also at this summit, the agenda includedemployment and crime, and it appeared that theG-7/8 seemed to be tackling domestic gover-nance issues. With the global financial crisis, ofcourse the summits returned (the 1995 Halifaxsummit had taken up institutional reform of theInternational Monetary Fund and indeed of theUnited Nations) to the reform of global financialregulatory institutional reform. The range ofissues placed on the agenda has been broadindeed.

Despite becoming a fixture of high-level diplo-macy, there is scant agreement on the purpose orexpectations of outcomes for these summits. Atthe optimistic end of the spectrum, John Kirton,the director of the G-8 Research Group at theUniversity of Toronto, sees these summits as fill-ing “core functions of forging co-operativeagreements, inducing national compliance withthose collective commitments, and responding toregional cries before they endanger systemic sta-bility.”5 A somewhat more modest view suggeststhat the summits serve primarily deliberativefunctions. In this view, the summit performs thecore functions of stability maintenance throughongoing communication, consensus formation,and crisis response. Leaders have the opportuni-ty for frank face-to-face discussions and infor-mation on national policy action. The summitbecomes more an information-sharing venue forleaders, but not much else. While the deliberativefunction may encourage broad direction setting,possibly a convergence of some national policies,and occasional collective agreements, true collec-tive action will be rare.6 Finally, for skeptics, thesummits are really no more than a consultativeforum at which leaders get to know each otherand better understand one another’s domesticpressures. According to this view, the summitcommuniqués are generally aspirational anddeliberately vague to hide differences of view.

The Impact of the G-x ProcessThe specialist discourse on the nature of coopera-tion within the G-x is complemented by anotherdebate over its impact on the global political order.

Some scholars have highlighted the summits’inability to fashion major agreements on economicpolicy or take leadership on a major basket ofissues such as macroeconomics, trade, or energy,leading them to conclude that the summits are, atbest, reactive policy instruments.7 Another critiquequestions the very relevance of the G-x process: thechorus of frustration with the G-7 in the 1990s forits failure to adjust and respond to the host of newpost-Cold War political, security, and economicissues attests to legitimacy questions that long pre-date the recent debate.

And then with the rise of the emerging powers,the G-x has come under sharp attack for the pre-sumptuousness of being a closed circle of tradi-tional powers claiming to deal with the globaleconomy and, increasingly, a wider range ofsecurity, development, and other transnationalissues. The criticism has only been partly stilledby creation of the G-20 Leaders Summit, regard-ed by some as just a larger exclusive club.

In contrast, enthusiasts such as John Kirtonlikened the G-7 to the Concert of Europe and itsdiplomatic success as a framework for a largelypeaceful 19th century.8 Kirton also viewed the G-7as an optimal and influential structure to deal withtoday’s multileveled policy challenges:

Increasingly, the G-7 is coming to resem-ble the inner cabinet of the global polity,compactly including all globally-orientedcountries, embracing the full public poli-cy agenda, and engaging the multilateralinternational bureaucracies, and mostdepartments of national government atthe ministerial and official level. It is thusuniquely tailored to deal with the intensi-fying linkages across the global agendaand between processes at the internation-al and domestic levels.9

Multilateral ImprovisationThe prevailing American view toward multilater-alism is an opportunistic “let a hundred flowersbloom” flexibility, welcoming whatever the G-xprocess and informal institutions have to offer ascomplements to other multilateral instruments. Auseful picture of the recent evolution in thinkingis presented by Richard Haass, formerly a direc-tor of policy planning in the Bush StateDepartment. Shortly after the 9/11 terroristattack, Haass described the Bush administration’s

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institutions, he also stresses the administration’ssensitivity to the rising powers and the efforts toenlarge the global leadership. This prompts aninterest in the potential of the G-x process, partic-ularly a “more legitimate” G-20 leaders summit,as unveiled at the Pittsburgh Summit inSeptember 2009. Concerning the effectiveness ofthese G-x processes, Patrick also notes the dan-gers of overemphasis on informal multilateralism:

Regardless of which format emerges [in theG-x process], the Obama administrationshould be wary of indulging in unrealisticexpectations. It is implausible that anyannual summit can morph into a true deci-sion-making (much less decision-imple-menting) body that could substitute for theauthority, legitimacy or capacity of formalinstitutions like the United Nations, WorldTrade Organization (WTO), InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF), or The WorldBank. Going forward, a priority for theObama administration and its counter-parts abroad will be to design systematicprocedures for linking the initiativeslaunched and commitments made in theseconsultative forums with the ongoingwork streams and reform agendas withinthe world’s formal organizations.12

But is the skepticism and criticism of the G-xprocess institutions warranted? Is it indeed“implausible” that these annual summits can beno more than a consultative forum—generatingmerely aspirational statements and hostingdeliberations, with little or no capacity to engi-neer and implement significant collaborativedecision making?

Underlying Motivation forG-x Process CooperationIf any significant hopes for international leader-ship are to be placed in the G-x process, it isimportant to ask about the factors that mightpush policymakers in that direction. In interna-tional relations it is well accepted that the provi-sion of public goods at the international levelposes great challenges. Overcoming the collectiveaction problem and joining national govern-ments for collective decision making is achievedonly with difficulty.

Nevertheless, advocates for collective decisionmaking point to a number of factors that exert a

foreign policy—particularly its selective aban-donment of a number of international agree-ments and its refusal to sign on to new ones—as“à la carte multilateralism.” In the blossoming ofthat US unilateralist moment, the Bush adminis-tration eschewed those organizations and agree-ments viewed as impediments to their agendaand built transactional coalitions around chal-lenges and specific tasks where it saw need. AsStewart Patrick, now at the Council on ForeignRelations, chronicled the evolution of US post9/11 policy:

Unlike large, formal bodies that con-strained US options, empowered spoil-ers, and forced the United States tostrive for bland consensus, these selec-tive arrangements would be restrictedto capable, like-minded countries, per-mitting decisive action in the service ofUS priorities.10

Recent commentary by Haass captures therecent shift in American foreign policy conven-tional wisdom, with Haass now calling not for“à la carte multilateralism,” but instead a“messy multilateralism” of heterogeneous insti-tutions and arrangements. This new conceptionof American policy no longer focuses on optingin or out of arrangements as the Bush policydid. Nor is it about unilateralism or the cre-ation of ad hoc coalitions of the willing. Rather,global governance, as Haass now sees it, con-sists of a variety of platforms that seek to pro-vide “the collective effort” that not even theUnited States can face alone. Thus we see thatmultilateralism consists of democratic multilat-eralism (universalist institutions, CopenhagenConference, United Nations General Assembly),elite multilateralism (G-7 Leaders Summit andnow G-20), functional multilateralism (coali-tions of the willing and relevant to the specificpolicy subject), informal multilateralism (finan-cial and standard setting reforms), and evenregionalism (bilateral and regional trade andinvestment regimes).

Similarly measured and flexible is the assess-ment presented by Stewart Patrick of theCouncil on Foreign Relations in his own StanleyFoundation policy analysis brief. 11 Whileacknowledging the greater reliance of the nas-cent Obama administration foreign policy strat-egy on multilateralism and international

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gravitational pull toward multilateral coopera-tion. First among these is the framework provid-ed by institutions, or what is often referred to asthe “international regime.” According to thislargely structural view, the continuous organiza-tion of intergovernmental relations and thewidening policy breadth give a context that canengender cooperation. Institutional commitmentwould be encouraged with summit repetition. Inthe case of the G-x, iteration of the summitshighlights matters of commitment and compli-ance as leaders anticipate future interaction andongoing relationships. The associated flow ofinformation and growth in transparency andmutual understanding impose constraints, or atleast costs, for cheating or defection. As commit-ments gain support and adherence over time,social pressure on leaders would increase forthem to undertake further commitments.

A related structural view focusing more on the“small group” character of the G-x process addsfurther dimensions to the analysis. A club orconcert multilateral structure generates collabo-ration through concerted power—a particulardynamic of compliance built on restricted greatpower membership. As with broader regimes,the restricted participation lowers transactioncosts, increases transparency, and reduces thepotential for vetoes—only more so, given theclose quarters of a small group. Finally, concertor club politics emphasizes the importance ofsimilar values and normative orientations.According to this analysis, such congruencemakes it easier to fashion collective policies(though shared values left room for frequentbickering within the G-7/8 over specific policyoptions). The degree to which values and normsare shared becomes highly relevant, of course, aswe examine the G-7/8 enlargement to the G-20.

The focus of the recent global governance dis-course has increasingly turned to the imperativesof cooperation that stem from growing sharedinterests among global leaders. From this per-spective, inclusion in international leadership isas much about obligations and responsibilities asit is about rights. The Managing GlobalInsecurity (MGI) Project has pressed an especiallypointed focus on responsibility. This BrookingsInstitution project was originally led by codirec-tors, Carlos Pascual, now US Ambassador toMexico, Bruce Jones of New York University,and Stephen Stedman of Stanford University. In

their resulting “Plan for Action” they argued thata new era of international cooperation “shouldbe built on the principle of responsible sovereign-ty: the idea that states must take responsibility forthe external effects of their domestic actions—that sovereignty entails obligation and dutiestoward other sovereign states as well as to one’sown citizens.”13

Stewart Patrick has similarly emphasized theconcept of “sovereignty as responsibility” as abasis for shared interests and collaborativebehavior. From this perspective, basic nationalsovereignty itself not only confers rights but alsoimposes obligations upon, among other things,the wider international community. “In otherwords, all countries must follow the rules andshoulder the burdens of providing global collec-tive goods, from controlling the spread ofweapons of mass destruction to stemming theemissions of greenhouse gases, rather than ‘free-riding’ on goods supplied to others.”14

Both of these approaches—building on theAfrican statesman Francis Deng’s 1993 conceptof sovereignty as responsibility—rely on somesort of balancing of national interest with globalresponsibility. Thus, the concept envisages thatthe price of membership among the communityof nations involves a normative public responsi-bility to show leadership. Beyond this conceptionof sovereignty and the international order,though, the need remains to marshal evidenceshowing how such duties are taken up by theindividuals or governing parties who makenational policy decisions.

Ultimately, the most realistic depiction of globalgovernance would be that collective decisions aredriven in part by structure as well as cognitionand behavior—all of which are built on a strongbase of national interest. And in identifying thesedimensions underlying collective action, it isindeed reasonable to suggest that interdepend-ence, especially among the powers, has had astrong impact on global governance. The trans-mission of the recent global financial storm sys-tem outward from the United States through theglobal economic system rendered meaninglessany contention that the rising states were decou-pled from traditional states. Strong interdepend-ence in finance and beyond has both transmittedthe consequences of the crisis and spurred theinternational response. The Great Recession

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ering of the leaders,” as John Kirton has pointedout, “is now supplemented by a year-roundsequence of ad hoc meetings of the leaders andtheir finance and foreign ministers, regularforums collectively embracing a majority of theministries of government, and a subterraneanweb of working groups that even the leaders’personal representatives find it difficult to moni-tor and control.”16 These personal representa-tives—known as sherpas and sous sherpas (twofor each leader)—provide important connectivetissue between the various consultations and thesummit agendas, about which they themselvesmeet several times a year.

Beyond these ministerial networks, regular andad hoc task forces and working groups have alsobecome part of the G-x process. An AfricaForum serves as a major venue for the discussionand monitoring of policies, strategies, and priori-ties to support Africa’s development. The G-8 in2001 at Genoa launched the Global Fund toFight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. ACounter-terrorism Action Group was set up asearly as 2002. In the area of finance, theFinancial Action Task Force (FATF) was createdin 1989 to coordinate efforts to fight drug-relat-ed money laundering. The purpose of the FATFis to develop and promote national and interna-tional policies to combat money laundering andterrorist financing. An expert group on financialcrime was set up by the 1997 Denver Summit.

In response to the threat of nuclear terrorism,the Global Initiative to Counter NuclearTerrorism is another such network. This groupbrings together government experts to fosterbest practices to: safeguard nuclear material,strengthen governmental capacities for detec-tion and disruption of nuclear materials traf-ficking, enhance information sharing and lawenforcement cooperation, establish legal andregulatory frameworks, deny terrorists the safehaven and financial resources they need, andprepare responses to a terrorist attack.

In the financial area, the G-20 finance ministersgroup arguably rivals the summits in policy sig-nificance and has accrued its own supportingstructure. Hard on the heels of the Asian finan-cial crisis, the G-7 created this forum in 1999.17

This highly active network of policymakers, theprecursor to the G-20 Leaders Summit, wasestablished to coordinate national political man-

indeed focused the minds of international leaderson collective action.

Institutional Development DepthWhile critics and skeptics of the G-x process—andof informal institutions more broadly—tend tofocus narrowly on the annual leaders summits, theprocesses and structures are actually much moreextensive. Prior to becoming policy planningdirector in the Obama administration’s StateDepartment, Anne-Marie Slaughter’s scholarshipargued the growing importance of transgovern-mental networks in international relations andglobal governance.15 Contrasted with classic inter-governmental multilateralism—in which high-level personnel of each delegation presents aposition on behalf of its government or nation aswhole—trans-governmental consultations aremore like public administration guilds, based onspecialized expertise and professional standards aswell as ministerial competence. This has certainlybeen prevalent for the G-7 and now for the G-20.

Clearly summit meetings among heads of stateand government are essential to the character ofthe G-x process, from the first summit atRambouillet in 1975 right up to the present.Over the years, though, consultations at otherlevels, and across diverse portfolios, have becomean important part of the process as well. Indeed,it is striking to note the range of consultations,for instance by tracking the history of ministerial-level meetings for different cabinet portfolios:

• Trade—first met in 1978. In 1982 formed thequadrilateral—European Union, United States,Canada, and Japan—that met three to fourtimes a year. Ceased to meet after 1999.

• Foreign affairs—from 1984

• Finance ministers—from 1986

• Environment—from 1992

• Employment—from 1994

• Information—from 1995

• Terrorism—from 1995

In the case of finance, not only do the financeministers meet periodically, but deputy ministersalso meet periodically. “Indeed the annual gath-

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agement of policy as well as collective delibera-tion and direction setting. On domestic politicalmanagement, the G-20 finance group was usedto reassure publics that collective leadership wasresponding decisively to the financial crises ofthe late 1990s. More recently in the GreatRecession, the G-20 finance group has added adistinct track of meetings in support of the newforum/format of the G-20 Leaders Summits. Atthe most recent meetings in November 2009 atSt. Andrews, Scotland, the ministers tackled suchsubjects as unemployment, sustainable growth,development, and poverty reduction.

Though the G-20 was established as a deliberativeand direction-setting network, the global financialcrisis has propelled it—in conjunction with otherG-x forums and the Bretton Woods institutions—to involve itself in the more detailed task of pro-viding policy guidance and/or monitoring policycompliance with the commitments made by G-20leaders. Thus, in the St. Andrews meeting inNovember 2009, the finance ministers issued alengthy communiqué appendix that trackedprogress in the implementation of the leaders’commitments. The finance group also set up anew consultative mechanism for peer assessment.

A prominent new economic and regulatory insti-tution, the Financial Stability Board, (FSB) wasanother significant governance response to theglobal financial recession. The board’s rootsstretch back to the Financial Stability Forum cre-ated by G-7 finance ministers and centralbankers in 1999, which was designed to improvethe function of financial markets and reduce sys-temic risk. The G-20 enlarged it, changed itsname to the Financial Stability Board and gave ita lead role in crafting international regulatoryreform measures. In addition, the FSB tasksextend to the promotion of global financial sta-bility (international supervisory colleges, earlywarning mechanisms, and research). In January2010, the FSB launched a peer review process onthe implementation of the FSB Principles forSound Compensation Practices, ImplementationStandards. The inquiry includes a template fordistribution to national capitals for governmentsto provide input for the thematic review.

The UN-Bretton Woods Systemand the G-x ProcessTo fully grasp the role of the G-x, it is crucial tohave an accurate picture of its relationship to the

UN system and the Bretton Woods institutions.While much is made of the supposedly zero-sumcompetition between formal and informal multi-lateral forums, the relationship between the G-xand the international financial institutionsrefutes that perception. To the contrary, JohnKirton and his colleagues have described thesedifferent types of global governance institutionsas “two great galaxies.”

For Kirton and his colleagues, the central featureof this two-system global governance universe isthat the institution building of the G-x processwas clearly an adjunct to, rather than a replace-ment for, the existing system. As multilateralismadjusted to the demise of the Cold War system in1989, “[t]he institutions and ideals of a new andold order thus had to compete, converge andcooperate with each other as they sought to gov-ern this ever more demanding and globalizingsystem.”18 The Bretton Woods-UN system hadbeen built on a formal “hard law” of heavilyorganized bodies. Over the decades this formalsystem was joined by “softer” organizationswith more limited membership, less bureaucracy,and more flexible organizations. Nor was the G-xthe only manifestation of this heterogeneity,which also included the Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development, theInternational Energy Agency, and the Bank forInternational Settlements.

Again, the recent financial crisis—a crucible forsuch a flurry of multilateral innovation—helpsshow the working connections between theinformal G-x process and the permanent struc-tures of global governance. In the context of thecrisis, and given its consultations at the highestlevels of government, the G-x has indeed been avital source of political will. The recent G-20Leaders Summits, particularly the WashingtonCommuniqué, tasked the IMF with carrying outa number of leaders’ commitments. As describedabove, institutions from the G-x process (G-20finance, Basel Committee, and especially theFSB) have increasingly undertaken complianceand administration of G-20 commitments. Itwould seem that the relationship between formaland informal institutions is one where there is a“pulling together” with “support flowing bothways,” as suggested by Kirton. Internationalorganizations from both systems weave togethertheir combined capacities in expertise, policy-making, and compliance monitoring.

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influential nations give themselves an alternativeto the universalism and the “committee of thewhole” sluggishness evident in many of theBretton Woods-UN institutions.

Equality and InformalityThe informality of the G-x process, and the sum-mits in particular, is often overlooked by experts.But the same cannot be said of participants.Leaders and others emphasize the value of thisdimension and the opportunity of the smallgroup setting to get to know each other person-ally. Over time, leaders become familiar with oneanother personally as well as the respective prob-lems they face back home. The summits alsooffer a chance to speak more directly and forth-rightly than in other diplomatic settings.

The G-x process also has a leveling effect, interms of the relative stature of the leaders. TheG-x process is notably nonhierarchical and builton a basis of equality. The leaders are accordedthe same strength of voice in the discussions.This obviously contrasts with the UnitedNations, where the key forum for internationalpeace and security, the Security Council, is atwo-tiered system of permanent (veto-holding)and rotating members. In the Bretton Woodsinstitutions, differing quota shares also distin-guish the clout of the different member states.Yet even with the collegiality and openness of theG-x, power realities are bound to intrude; intruth the United States and, say, China probablycarry greater voice and influence than others.

EffectivenessThe dimension of effectiveness is the mostimportant in the analysis of global governance,assessing G-x process performance from at leasttwo angles. First there are the commitmentsreadily identified in the communiqués of theleaders and reflecting the agreed intentions andpolicies of those leaders.

But a multilateral body’s effectiveness cannot beevaluated just by the commitments made by itsmembers. Commitments are only consideredeffective if followed through and implemented. Afocus on implementation or compliance, in turn,draws attention toward the political and policyactions taking place principally in national capi-tals. Though there are commitments that can beimplemented at the international level in, say, aninternational organization, most international

Examining the Key Dimensionsof the G-x ProcessWhile experts have offered widely varying viewsof the import and constructiveness of leadershipclub multilateralism, the global governance dis-course has been strikingly consistent when itcomes to choosing criteria to assess the G-x. Afairly common list of factors comes up in special-ist discussions of the G-x:

• legitimacy• informality• effectiveness• equality and• like-mindedness

LegitimacyCritiques of the G-7 and G-8 as a “club of therich”’ appointing themselves as global leadershave been prominent for many years. As early asthe 2003 Evian Summit—and then consistentlyfrom the 2005 Gleneagles Summit onward—theG-8 pulled the G-5 rising powers of Brazil,China, India, South Africa, and Mexico intoconsultation and attendance, but not full mem-bership. Beginning at the 2007 Heiligendammmeeting, the G-8 and the G-5 initiated a so-called “structured dialogue” that worked forcollective policy in selected issue areas. But theHeiligendamm Process was never a negotiatingprocess, nor did the G-8 countries commit toenlarging their group. Though this structureddialogue was extended at the L’Aquila Summitin 2008, fueling expectations of enlargement toa G-13, those expectations were eclipsed by theSeptember 2009 Pittsburgh decision to crystal-lize the G-20 as the principal economic leaderssummit. In the aggregate, the G-20 membernations today account for more than 85 percentof global GDP, 80 percent of international trade,and approximately 66 percent of the planet’spopulation. These dimensions certainly reflect agreater global representation than was true ofthe G-8.

But it is also clear that for many experts andofficials—especially from those officials that rep-resent the so-called “uninvited,” (the “172”)—legitimacy is in the eye of the beholder. Thelegitimacy discussion is largely an unwinnableexercise. For those outside the club an element ofillegitimacy will remain, but the G-x process isconsciously a club structure, through which

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commitments are carried out at the nationallevel. Global governance is not global when itcomes to implementation. It is local.

The diverse methodologies of scholarly analystshave left scant consensus on precisely how tomeasure effectiveness—never mind advice forpolicymakers on how to achieve it. That said,the pioneering research led by Harvard’s RobertPutnam and diplomat Nicholas Bayne (and morerecently just Bayne) emphasizes multilateral chal-lenges familiar to any diplomatic practitioner.19

Their work assessed how political leaders recon-ciled the tensions between their positions (andthe associated domestic pressures), their degreeof commitment to the resulting policy, the effectof that policy on the given problem, and itspalatability to the rest of the world community.

Bayne concluded that for the subject areas hefocused on, the earliest years of the G-7 summitswere quite successful, the summits of the 1990sdeclined in salience and then only late in the firstdecade of the 21st century, and only with theglobal financial crisis, did the summits againachieve some measure of success.

Since the mid-1990s the G-8 Research Grouphas, on an annual basis, evaluated G-8 perform-ance. Kirton has summarized the findings ofthese years of performance and has concludedthat the G-8 has continued to broaden the scopeof the agenda and that G-8 performance has gen-erally risen over the period of the summits. Morepointedly, Kirton identifies that for the criticaldimension of compliance, performance has alsobeen rising for G-8 countries and doing so acrossmost issue areas taken up by the G-8.20

If We Grow, Can We Lead?—TheLooming ChallengesOver many years the G-8 Research Group hasemphasized the critical importance of the shareddemocratic character of the G-7 states. But whilethe initial rationale for integrating Russia withthe G-7 was an effort to ensure Russia’s furtherturn away from authoritarian government, as theyears passed it became increasingly difficult toargue the democratic character of Russia. Oncethe question of enlargement grew prominent, itwas evident that the addition of key rising pow-ers like China would be a further dilution of val-ues-based solidarity.

But with just a measure of scrutiny it becomesapparent that democracies do not necessarilyshare the same norms and values, and it is cer-tainly possible for authoritarian and democraticregimes to share norms and values in realmsother than domestic governance. Thus, bothIndia and Brazil, democracies for sure, disagreewith traditional European states, the UnitedStates, and Canada over the principle of humani-tarian intervention and the “responsibility toprotect.” And in this case, China agrees withboth India and Brazil.

Indeed, analysts reflecting back on the 19th cen-tury concert—including monarchical and moredemocratic regimes, have suggested that what isrequired is “fundamentally compatible views ofwhat constitutes a stable and acceptable interna-tional regime.”21 While in the world of greatpowers and great power rivalry such a minimumcommon denominator might have sufficed, in themore complex contemporary world of globalgovernance it is very likely insufficient in the con-temporary concert setting of today’s G-x process.

Enlargement may well pose serious challenges.The increase to a G-20 brings diversity and raisesthe challenge to collaborative decision making inglobal governance. While it is the case that tradi-tional powers have often disagreed, their disagree-ments have been principally over particular policyalternatives and not fundamental differencesregarding norms and values in the internationalsystem. The “values gulf” today between risingand traditional powers threatens to weaken, per-haps fundamentally, G-x global governance insti-tutions just as it has eroded collaboration in theBretton Woods-UN formal institutions. The mostacute aspects of the values gulf among theenlarged leadership are described below.

National Sovereignty and Noninterferencein the Domestic AffairsIn the enlarged leadership of G-x there arestrong differences over contending concepts andpriorities regarding national sovereignty—alsoknown as noninterference in the domestic affairsof other states. China has long defended (goingback to Bandung in 1955) the most traditionalnotions of national sovereignty. But China is notalone. Both India and Brazil also strongly sup-port noninterference in such contexts asResponsibility to Protect and humanitarian inter-vention. The jealous defense of the state’s prerog-

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governance”—given the undercurrent ofsuspicion that international institutionsare running roughshod over the USConstitution.22

But the US democratic system is hardly the onlydomestic constraint on an influential nation.Chinese leadership, too, is increasingly con-strained. The premium it places on collectivedecision making and domestic political potencyof nationalism severely limits the options ofChinese leaders. And for the Chinese leader-shipm the lack of institutionalized accountabilitymakes its policy prerogatives often quite brittle.23

Chinese public sentiment on issues is hard todefine. Without elections as an arena for policydebate, the leadership is forced to troll throughthe blogs and portals of China’s Internet.

Canadian policy now is constrained by minoritygovernments, ever vigilant to identify an issuethat could bring partisan advantage. FrenchPresident Sarkozy is under sharp criticism for hisapparent aloofness from the public needs andwants. Overall, all governments seem to beinhibited by political sentiments and sensitivitiesthat are at odds with the demands of the interna-tional agenda. Many leaders find it difficult tolead, and the public finds it unsatisfactory toconsent. Domestic governance appears to pose asgreat a burden to effective global governance asever before.

The Paradox of theExistential ChallengesThis analysis has taken us on a bit of a voyageinto the contemporary realm of informal globalgovernance institutions and the ability of this G-xgalaxy of global governance to organize collectivedecisions and meet the challenges facing the glob-al economic and political system. The G-x sys-tem has been both harshly criticized andfrequently dismissed as irrelevant. For propo-nents of traditional multilateralism, these G-xinstitutions could not possibly take the place oftreaty-made and legally binding decisions by for-mal institutions. From a traditionalist perspec-tive, and in the chaotic world of contemporarymultilateralism, the G-x process represents “set-tling” for a lesser form of collective decisions.

I trust, however, that the above analysis has castthe G-x process in a different light. This systemof G-x institutions—though informal—is an

atives has extended to other policy debates aswell; for instance, China’s recent objections tointernational verification of carbon reductions.

DevelopmentalismInternational political appeals to the develop-ment gap and attacks on the unfair advantagesof the wealthy industrialized states are a stapleof the trade and finance debates and of others aswell. The rising states regularly point to the gulfbetween north and the Global South, demandgreater equity and participation for the GlobalSouth, and insist on satisfaction for the interestsof the Global South as the price of agreement.Bringing this north-south divide into the leader-ship club itself only raises the difficulties ofreaching consensus and collective action.

Universalism and HierarchyUniversalism versus hierarchy is a basic questionfor how multilateralism is organized—the sover-eign equality of one-country, one-vote principle(sometimes, even further, arguably requiring con-sensus) as in the WTO, or stratified levels of sta-tus. Hierarchy allocates differences in influencelevels, whether within larger universal settings asthe UN Security Council or in smaller clubs thatgive some states greater sway than others. As hasbeen pointed out above, universalism remains theoperative principle in many organizations and isimportant for many G-172 states as a means ofpreserving influence. While the G-x process hasbeen strongly attacked as being overly exclusive,universalist-style multilateralism has been showntoo often—the Doha Round in the WTO or theCopenhagen Conference on climate change—as arecipe for paralysis.

The Domestic Political ChallengeDomestic politics have become a growing con-straint on leaders. The essential structure of theUS governance system, with its checks and bal-ances, has constrained all US administrations’freedom of action. But the American politicalculture—including an overarching suspicion ofthe international community and tradition of“exceptionalism”—has put an added brake oninternational cooperation. Stewart Patrickdescribes the constraint this way:

And yet it remains political suicide forany US aspirant to elective office to speakof moving “beyond sovereignty”—orindeed to speak the language of “global

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influential world of summits and wider supportstructures that have promoted collective decisionmaking in economics, finance, development,global health (most recently), and potentially cli-mate change. But the possible future scopestretches even beyond these issues to include pol-itics, institutional reform, and security. The G-xprocess should be seen as a significant element ofglobal governance, with a solid record, over thedecades, of forging commitments and followingthrough—though in no way uniformly (but thenthe formal system does not either)—with imple-mentation of collective decisions.

While the analysis paints an optimistic picture ofthe utility of the G-x process, it also identifieschallenges that may slow or even cripple collec-tive decision making. The enlargement from theG-8 to the G-20 and the diverse enlarged leader-ship has a strong “values gulf” that was absentfrom the earlier leaders summits. This values gulfcould pose difficulty in forging collective policiesat the G-20 leadership level. Further, it hasbecome more obvious that domestic politicsinhibits major states—certainly the UnitedStates, with a deep partisan divide that rendersthe legislative process complex and, at times,paralyzing. But China, too, suffers from thestrictures of collective leadership and unpre-dictable politics. Overall the democratic deficitin global governance confronts many leaderswith significant rear guard resistance.

With these various new challenges, does thismean that we have already seen the high watermark on successful G-x collaboration? With thecontinuing dissension among experts over whatexplains successful collective action, we cannotbe sure what the most important factor in collec-tive action is—though it would appear thatstructure, behavior, and contemporary contexttogether provide favorable conditions. To be21st century has brought tight internationalinterdependence with heightened consequencesfor societies from the actions of others. As a par-adox of interdependence, it may be that some ofthe most difficult issues—the existential prob-lems of climate change and nonproliferation—could stir national interests enough to bring anauspicious collective decision-making moment.And once engaged, who knows where globalgovernance may take us?

Endnotes1 Richard Haass, “The Case for Messy Multilateralism,”Financial Times, January 5, 2010.

2 G. John Ikenberry, “America and the Reform of GlobalInstitutions,” Alan S. Alexandroff (ed.), Can the World BeGoverned? Possibilities for Effective Multilateralism(Waterloo, ON: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008),pp. 110-138.

3 Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Council on Foreign RelationsAddress by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton,” July 15, 2009.

4 For a practical summary of these summit initiatives, seePeter Hajnal, “The G7/G8 as an International Institution,”in Peter I. Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution,Role and Documentation, (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007),pp. 1-12. The definitive sources on the G-x process are twomultivolume series from Ashgate entitled “Global Finance”with John Kirton, University of Toronto, Michele Fratianni,Indiana University, and Paolo Savona, LUISS University asthe series editors and “The G8 and Global Governance,”edited by John Kirton.

5 John Kirton, “Explaining G8 Effectiveness,” Michael R.Hodges, John J. Kirton, and Joseph P. Daniels (eds.), “TheG8’s Role in the New Millennium (Aldershot, UK:Ashgate, 1999), p. 53.

6 John Kirton, “Economic Co-operation: Summitry,Institutions, and Structural Change,” paper prepared for aconference on, “Structural Change and Co-Operation inthe Global Economy,” The Center for InternationalBusiness Education and the Center for Global Change andGovernance, Rutgers University, May 19-20, 1997.

7 C. Fred Bergsten and C. Randall Henning, GlobalEconomic Leadership and the Group of Seven (Washington:Institute for International Economics, 1996).

8 John Kirton, “The Diplomacy of Concert: Canada, the G7and the Halifax Summit,” Canadian Foreign Policy, 3:1,pp. 64-65.

9John Kirton, “Explaining G8 Effectiveness,” Michael R.Hodges, John J. Kirton, and Joseph P. Daniels (eds.), TheG8’s Role in the New Millennium (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,1999), p. 47.

10 Stewart Patrick, “Prix Fixe and a la Carte: Avoiding FalseMultilateral Choices,” The Washington Quarterly, 32:4(October, 2009), p. 83.

11 Stewart Patrick, Global Governance Reform: AnAmerican View of US Leadership, Stanley FoundationPolicy Analysis Brief, February 2010.

12 Ibid. page 11.

13 “A Plan for Action: A New Era of International Cooperationfor a ChangedWorld: 2009, 2010, and Beyond,” (Washington:The Brookings Institution, September 2008). See also BruceJones, Carlos Pascual, and Stephen John Stedman, Power &Responsibility: Building International Order in an Era ofTransnational Threats (Washington: The BrookingsInstitution Press, 2009), p. 10.

14 Stewart Patrick, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief.

15 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton,NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

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16 John Kirton, “Explaining G8 Effectiveness,” Michael R.Hodges, John J. Kirton, and Joseph P. Daniels (eds.), TheG8’s Role in the New Millennium (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate,1999), p. 46.

17 John Kirton, “The G-20 Finance Ministers: NetworkGovernance,” Alan S. Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper(eds.), Rising States; Rising Institutions: Challenges for GlobalGovernance (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2010).

18 John Kirton, Marina Larionova, and Paolo Savona,“Introduction, Argument and Conclusions,” John Kirton,Marina Larionova, and Paolo Savona (eds.),MakingGlobal Economic Governance Effective: Hard and SoftLaw Institutions in a Crowded World, (Aldershot, UK:Ashgate, 2010), p. 4.

19 See Peter I. Hajnal, “Evaluating the Summits,” Peter I.Hajnal, The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role andDocumentation (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2007), pp. 95-102.

20 John Kirton, “Assessing G8 and G20 Performance, 1975-2009.” Paper for the International Studies Association atthe panel, “Relevance and Legitimacy of the G8 andG20,” (February, 2010).

21 Charles and Clifford Kupchan, “Concerts, CollectiveSecurity, and the Future of Europe,” InternationalSecurity, 16:1 (Summer, 1991), p 124.

22 Stewart Patrick, Stanley Foundation Policy Analysis Brief.

23 Susan L. Shirk, China Fragile Superpower (New York:Oxford University Press, 2007).

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