challenger disaster: a failure of engineering

8/10/2019 Challenger Disaster: A Failure of Engineering

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The Challenger Disaster

University of Greenwich at Medway | Engineering Management

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TABL E OF CONTENT

Executive Summary.2

A Symbolic Mission.3

What Happened & Why .....4

Technical Problems..... ..5 Administrative Problems .6

Recommendations..8

Conclusion ....9

References .10


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Executive Summary

It was supposed to be a symbolic flight to outer space, but unfortunately it lastfor about 73 seconds and end with a blast and death of 7 brave and good peopleon-board. It was 28 th January 1986, when a history was about to be created inFlorida with a joint venture of National Aeronautic and Space Administration(NASA) and Morton Thiokol. A space shuttle named Challenger wasscheduled to be launched on this day, with is seven crew members includingone school teacher, Christie McAuliffe, but because of because of poorengineering and management practices it turns out to be a disaster.

There are more than just one or two factors that we should inquire if we reallywant to go to root causes and depth of the case The Challenger Space

Shuttle Accident . There is a need of inquiring the technical and managementcauses, more importantly lack of communication between NASA and Thiokol

plus the political pressure that remained invisible at that time. So, we shall lookinto the internal affairs as well as the external pressures like media, congress ormilitary. Along with this inquiry we will try to compare the technology andmanagement of that time and that of modern era.

Later, on technical inquiry by NASA O-rings used to seal the Solid RocketBoosters (SRBs) was identified as the main problem. O -rings are the largerubber loops made up of fluoroelastomer, used to seal two SRB sections. Therewere already concerns regarding disintegration of O-rings at low temperature

but the space program wasnt delayed by the authorities leading to this misshappening.

This paper will discuss the main technical problems and flaws in management practices which were responsible for the Challenger Disaster.

(Ref. 1)


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THE SYMBOLIC MISSION

On 28 th January 1986, the space shuttle Challenger was supposed to make ahistoric and symbolic journey into the outer space. This mission captivated the

mind of many Americans as it was taking an average American with it, a schoolteacher, Christie McAuliffe as one its seven crew member and she was going togive a lesson to the students from the space. Every one including children andadult were excited and fascinated.

This mission was viewed as a pride symbol of safety and a pledge of hope forscience and technology. By letting a regular everyday person to go into thespace NASA wanted to represent the space travel to be safe and secure. Noteven safety it was also a symbol of Americans dream. Mission was going torepresent economic, social, political and scientific success of the America. ThisChallenger mission was going to help Americans feel more comfortable withthe concept of outer space and universe.

That crisp clear Morning was going to be the start of new era of spacetravelWhole world had its eye on that historic moment but as the space shuttlewas launched something went wrong. Due to some technical trouble, Challengerexplodes soon after the few seconds of the launch. And a mission of new

beginning of understanding changed into a historic moment of disaster andgrief. (Ref . 2)

F ig. 1: Cr ew M embers of Chall enger M ission


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WHAT HAPPENED & WHY

On the bright and cold day of 28 th January 1986, everything was seems to begoing smoothly and the space shuttle Challenger was ready for the launch.

There was a huge crowd gathered to witness the historic moment. After fewminor problems like high wind and equipment problems launch was alreadydelayed by 6 times. Finally at 11:38 am shuttle took a successful launch into theair with a stream of joy on each face. But soon after 73 second later all ofsudden everything changed. There was an explosion in the air about 9 milesabove the ground and Challenger was engulfed in flames and a white cloud ofsmoke. It was clear to the NASA that shuttle and mission was in serious trouble.

F ig 2: F li ght of Space Shuttl e Chall enger

Fig. 2 shows the whole event of accident starting from few seconds prior toengine ignition to the last moment when signals with shuttle were lost. Therewere no prior indication or alarm for the crewmates about any kind upcomingtrouble, before the rapid breakdown of the shuttle. First evidence of accidentwas found after 73 second when radar starts tracking multiple objects.

(Ref. 3)


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Technical Problems

The main mechanical faults that led to the disastrous end of shuttle Challengerwas found in right SRB. The Booster was finally constructed at Kennedy Space

Center by assembling all the SRBs together. There were certainly leaks in thefield joint of the SRB section due to due to the continuous leak test under high

pressure and temperature. This led to the leakage of exhaust flame through theSRB field joints which somehow manage to penetrate and ignites the fuel of theexternal tank causing explosion.

This failure of seal system was due to four technical problems, which are:-

1. Blow Holes: These are the tiny holes in the sealing putty used to prevent

O-ring seal from high temperature exhaust gas. These holes were createdin the putty because of high pressurized leak test. The pressure appliedwas too high for the putty and it blew hole through it even before it wasable to seal the openings.

2. O-Rings Erosion: O-Rings are the giant black rubber seal used as theseal in the joint of SRBs. Blow holes in putty led to the breakdown of the

primary O-rings. Initially erosion of the primary O-ring was just 12% buton increased pressure it reaches to 88%, and now not only the primary but

secondary O-rings had stared to erode. Engineers were totally aware ofthe fact that O-rings and the putty were eroding. But managers decidedthis damage was acceptable and continued the leak test on high pressureand temperature.

3. Joint Rotation: When shuttle was ignited the case walls were under lotsof pressure which cause the expansion of the walls. This bilge out causemisalignment of Clevis and Tang resulting joint rotation. As the O-ringswere already damaged due to leak test, it was incapable of sealing the gap

instantly caused by joint rotation. And due to rapidly increasing gaps O-rings were stretched to the limits.

4. Response of O-Rings to the low Temperature: As outside temperaturewas very low that day, O-rings get stiffer preventing it to expand to therequired size quickly. This slowed down the reaction of O-rings to thegaps caused by joint rotation. So, cold weather could have played a majorrole as the cause of accident.

(Ref 4)


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ADMISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

Main problems found are:-

1. Communication Breakdown2. Organisational Pressure3. Flawed Decision making Process

There were lots of technical causes of the disaster but one of the mostsignificant causes that led to the explosion of the shuttle was lack ofcommunication. There was the lack or written and verbal communication plusthe lack of understanding throughout the different levels of whole organisationalstructure responsible for the safe execution of the mission.

Lack of communication in the organisation was basically found betweenengineers and administrators of the project. Engineers had their own technicallanguage which was almost meaningless for the higher managing andadministrating officials. Engineers were aware of the potential disaster and theyhad found problem of erosion of the O-Rings after tests, e ngineers werent fullyconfident about the efficient working of the O- rings. On the other hand it wasnta big trouble for the management. All they were worried about was the delayingof the project and they didnt wanted it to b e delayed, as they were under lots of

political, economic and social or media pressure to launch. So, engineers were busy in making a prefect ship and management had no idea about the workingof the shuttle all they wanted was a quick launch. Thus after analysing all therisk factor s when engineers tried to raise their voices manager didnt realise the importance of the risk factors. This might be because of lack of understandingand communication between technical and management staff.

Not only in NASA organisational structure there was a lack of communication

between companies involved in the project. Engineers of Morton-Thiokol wereinitially aware of the fact that O- ring doesnt work efficiently at lowtemperature, but didnt pass this information to the NASA, not even out ofconcern of seven crew member on- board. They didnt want to accept the fact that they had made a faulty product.


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Even if Thiokol didnt inform engineers of NASA had discovered these risk andtried to inform the management but memorandum just didnt went up the ladderof management staff. And because of this negligence of management staff asymbolic mission turn into a shameful disaster which could have been a successonly if there wasnt this flawed decision making process with propercommunication and understanding between the team members of every level.

(Ref. 2)


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RECOMMENDATIONS

Challenger shouldnt be launched that time. A lot of things could have beendone to prevent this miss-happening. Most importantly NASA needed a better

communication between different levels of employees.

However technical and non-technical departments might have a differentterminology but they could still learn to communicate. This could have beendone by introducing communication training session for both technical and non-technical departments. In both department employees could be trained tounderstand each other more properly. Management employees with no technicalknowledge can learn technical terminology and should work along withtechnical department so that they can get an idea about technical aspect of theshuttle. Then classes for technical department employees should attend thesession related to the responsibilities and pressure of the managementdepartment. Like these days we have course of Engineering Management intechnical degrees to teach them pressure on management department how couldthey both work together efficiently.

During such big project there must be meetings between both departmentsemployees in which they can come out with plans of execution of project and

consider every kind of risk technical or non-technical. With this managementmust improve its decision making process most importantly under pressure.Each and every; major or minor risk must be considered and mission mustntnot be execute until unless both the technical and management department are100% certain about safety.

Then there must be a zero tolerance, strict rule and disciplinary actions for theacts like information hiding or self-decision making as these were the mainreasons behind flawed decisions made by management official. Every important

paper must reach to the top in concerned department.


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REFERNCES

For Matter

Ref. 1 - unknown. (1990). Challenger Diasaster a case study. Available:https://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CDsQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fweb.cecs.pdx.edu%2F~far%2Fme493%2FEthics%2FThe%2520Challenger%2520Disaster.ppt&ei=H7_UUMzMGYK5h. Last accessed 19-dec-1012.

Ref . 2 - Kathy Neuner & Jeremy Rider (unknow). The Challenger Disaster .USA: self published. all pages

Ref. 3 - Presidential Commision on space shuttle challenger accident(1986). Report of Presidential Commision . washington D.C.: Diane PublishingConpany

For Figures

Fig. 1: unknown. (unkonw year). columbia diasaster. Available:http://www.marquette.edu/bizethics/cases%20folder/Challenger.htm. Lastaccessed 19-dec-1012.

Fig. 2: Presidential Commision on space shuttle challenger accident(1986). Report of Presidential Commision . washington D.C.: Diane PublishingCompany.

challenger disaster: a failure of engineering

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