centre for the study of african economies causes and consequences of civil war anke hoeffler centre...

Centre for the Study of African Economies

Causes and Consequences of

Civil War

Anke Hoeffler


Department of Economics, University of Oxford


Conflicts: Global Prevalence


Conflict and War: Global Prevalence


Total Battle Deaths (in Millions)1960-2002


Battle and War Deaths in Selected African Countries

Country Years Total Deaths Battle Deaths Proportion of Total Deaths

Angola 1975-2002 1.5 million 160,500 11%

Mozambique 1967-1992 0.5-1 million 145,400 15-29%

Sudan 1983-2002 2 million 55,000 3%

DRC 1998-2002 2.5 million 145,000 6%


Refugees, IDPs and Others of Concern (in Millions)


Civil WarResearch

Onset Duration Post-War


Collier-Hoeffler Model of Civil War

Aim:

• model and estimate what factors make a country more prone to large scale violent internal conflict

• Theoretical Model

• Empirical Tests

Method:

• Global panel data study (cross-country, 1960-99)

Greed and Grievance in Civil War, OEP, 2004


Explanations of Civil War Onset

• Economics

• Political Science

• Sociology

• History

• Geography


Conclusions

• Little evidence for grievances as a sufficient determinant of conflict

• Economic factors are important (level, growth and structure of income, sources of finance)

• Past conflict makes a country more conflict prone


Duration of War

• Duration is not determined by the same variables as the initiation

• An increase in natural resource prices tends to increase the duration of war


Post-ConflictChallenges

Economic Recovery Risk Reduction


Economic Recovery: Questions raised

1. Is there a peace dividend?

2. Does aid increase growth post-conflict?

3. Does policy improve growth post-conflict?


Empirical Analysis of Post-Conflict Societies

Peace dividend, about 1.1% extra growth

3-7 years during post conflict aid increases growth

Traditionally this is not what donors have done


Risk Reduction

What about Military Expenditure?

• Domestic milex increases the risk post conflict

• UN Peace Keeping?

• Coalitions of the Willing?


Sequence of international post-conflict practice

1. Negotiated settlement2. Light presence of peace keeping troops3. Pump-priming democracy4. Light footprint5. Post-conflict elections6. Withdrawal of international peacekeeping troops


Post-Conflict Risks:Current Policy and Recent Research

Current policy models are practitioner and case study based

Cost of conflict $64bn

Benefit of avoiding conflict for one decade $33bn

British PK in Sierra Leone cost $397m

Conclusion: enormous differences between situations, can we generalise?


Post Conflict Risks

68 post-conflict episodes

46% of cases recurrence of war

40% of cases recurrence within a decade


Statistical Results

• There is no safe period during the decade

• Growth is important, stagnant economies 42% risk,10% income growth 26.9% risk

• Elections shift the risk, lower in election year, higher after, subsequent elections do not have a different effect to first elections


Results continued

• PK force absolute not relative size matters (deterrence)

• Doubling expenditure reduces risk from 40% to 31%


Conclusions on Post-Conflict Risks

• Post-conflict situations are fragile• Emphasis on addressing grievances• Democracy and elections although intrinsically desirable

are not peace enhancing• Robust military and economic assistance required• Exclusively statistical• Application must be guided by appropriate contextual

knowledge


Some References

Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars, Oxford Economic Papers 56:663–595.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler and Dominic Rohner. 2009. Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers 61: 1-27.

Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke and Måns Söderbom. 2004. On the Duration of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research 41(3): 253-273.

Collier, Paul, Hoeffler, Anke and Måns Söderbom. 2008. Post-Conflict Risks. Journal of Peace Research 45(4): 461-478.

Collier, Paul, Lance Elliot, Håvard Hegre, Anke Hoeffler, Marta Reynal-Querol and Nicholas Sambanis. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, World Bank Policy Research Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Fearon, James. 2004. Why do some wars last so much longer than others? Journal of Peace Research 41:275–301.

Fearon, James and David Laitin. 2003. Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, American Political Science Review 97:75–90.

Gates, Scott. 2002. Recruitment and allegiance: The microfoundations of rebellion. Journal of Conflict Resolution 46:111–130.

Hegre, Hårvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 2001. Towards a democratic civil peace? American Political Science Review 95:33–48.

Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2008. Who Fights? The Determinants of Participation in Civil War. American Journal of Political Science 52:436-455.

Miguel, E., S. Satyanath and E. Sergenti (2004), Economic shocks and civil conflict: An instrumental variables approach, Journal of Political Economy 112:725–753.

Regan, Patrick M. 2009. Sixteen Million One: Understanding Civil War. Paradigm Publishers, Boulder CO.

Ross, Michael L. 2004. What Do We Know about Natural Resources and Civil War? Journal of Peace Research 41: 337-56.

Toft, Monica D. 2010.Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlements of Civil Wars. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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