central african republic policy report 2015 final

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC

POLICY REPORT 2015 “The Forgotten Crisis”

Abstract: To what extent has the religious cleavage shaped

the ongoing Seleka – Anti-Balaka conflict in the Central

African Republic?

Rachel Freeborn and Joshua Dolman

Central African Republic Policy Report 2015

“The Forgotten Crisis” 1

Contents

i. Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 3

ii. Introduction: The Forgotten Crisis ................................................................................................. 6

1.0 The Formation of the Seleka: Extractive by Design ....................................................................... 10

2.0. The Anti-Balaka Formation: Nearly “never again” ...................................................................... 14

3.0. The contemporary analysis: Institutions, Institutions, Institutions Error! Bookmark not defined.

4.0 Summary and Conclusion – A state building roadmap is urgently needed ........................................ 24

5.0 Policy Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 26

5.1 Electoral Reform .......................................................................................................................... 26

5.2 Security ........................................................................................................................................ 27

5.3 Judiciary ....................................................................................................................................... 28

5.4 Constitutional ............................................................................................................................... 29

Reference List ....................................................................................................................................... 31



Acronyms

_____________________________________________________________

AFISM-CAR International Support Mission in the Central African

Republic

ANE National Election Authority

CAR Central African Republic

DDR Disarmament, Demobilisation, Reintegration

FACA Central African Armed Forces

FIDH The International Federation for Human Rights

HRW Human Rights Watch

ICG International Crisis Group

ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross

LRA Ugandan Lord’s Resistance Army

MICOPAX Mission of the Economic Community of Central African

States for the Consolidation of Peace in the Central African

Republic

MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization

Mission in the Central African Republic

MPI Migration Policy Institute

MSF Medecins Sans Frontieres

UN United Nations



i. Executive Summary

On a general level, the authors argue that popular analysis of the ‘Muslim Seleka’ and

‘Christian Anti-Balaka’ conflict in the Central African Republic (CAR) as sectarian is

oversimplified. Not only do many of the country’s population not share this view but it only

portrays a ‘media ready’ narrative of the crisis.

More specifically, the authors claim that the religious dimension has served as a key

mobilisation tool for the current conflict but, to re-iterate, the conflict is not intrinsically

systemic to religion (Kane 2014). Having established a basis for this argument, the real

questions answered in this report are therefore: Why religion? And. What have people who

share in religious identities been mobilising against and for?

It is argued that inequality along ethno-religious lines (horizontal inequalities) has been

exacerbated due to a multiplex of factors, most pertinently the political divide of the Muslim

north and Christian South (Gatestone Institute 2014; Kane 2014), an abundance of and

dependency on natural resources (Lindner 2014), and the Christian/Southerner dominance

over national government since colonial independence (Arieff 2014). But there is a clear

commonality in these issues; they all pivot around decisions made at an institutional level

(figure 1). A politics of extraction, exclusionary behaviour and marginalisation over a range of

public policies from the Bozize government created conditions for the motivation to take up

arms. In other words, institutional conditions have caused horizontal inequalities (Stewart

2012) between the country’s two main religions, leading to the formation of the Muslim

dominated Seleka rebels, who overthrew the Christian dominated Bozize government in the

Coup d’état of 2013.

Additionally, the authors find that lack of state strength transformed the conflict once it had

reached the height of violence in the capital. From August 2013, violence continued despite

the Seleka successfully overthrowing the Bozize administration and having been officially



disbanded by former leader Michel Djotodia. Specifically, through qualitative analysis and

humanitarian reports the authors find that due to the escalation of violence, pre-existing

fragile institutions collapsed altogether (figure 1): reports confirm that violence was not so

much driven by a religious or political standpoint but by chaos. Therefore, on a fundamental

level, weak institutions additionally served to create the conditions for the transformation of

the crisis in CAR from an ideologically driven cleavage to diffuse, vigilante-style violence.

Particularly in the capital, this has given rise to unorganised violence that capitalised on the

breakdown of public services. Although there has been de-escalation of the violence at

present (April 2015), this contemporary analysis remains the most significant challenge.

In depth analysis of these issues are complex; therefore a range of techniques have been

deployed (figure 2). The report has been sectioned in a linear structure and the authors have

attempted to mitigate for artificial partitioning. Section 1.0 maps the Seleka’s formation, their

ideology and trajectory towards Bangui. It focuses on how institutional conditions have

negatively impacted on the northern region where the Seleka were formed and discusses

how these have led to inequality between CAR’s Muslim-north and Christian-south. To

illustrate this point a range of policy decisions are discussed, consolidated with the

theoretical literature on horizontal inequalities, the grievances mechanism and institutional

approaches to conflict. Section 2.0 considers the formation of the Christian Anti-Balaka group

and assesses the crisis at the height of violence through qualitative data. It argues that in

addition state breakdown, the escalation of violence can be based on the perception of

national identity change and that retaliatory violence can in part be attributed to Wood’s

(2008) theory of social navigation and Tilly’s analysis of the ‘repertoires of violence’ (2003).

Section 3.0 looks at the contemporary situation and challenges the capital faces. It focuses on

how a set of weak institutions created the conditions for the continuation of violence and the

breakdown of law and order.

Consistently, this report finds that institutional conditions have been the overriding factor in

the cause and continuation of the conflict, not sectarian hatred. Where anti-religious

sentiment has existed, it is only indicative of the weak underlying institutional structures and



not a characterization of the violence overall. To this extent, policy recommendations focus

on providing a road map to political and institutional reform.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Weak institutions

Horizontal inequalities

Conflict



ii. Introduction: The Forgotten Crisis

CAR is a country is crisis, locked in a bloody civil war caused by a coup d’état that took place

26 months ago (figure 3). According to the MSF, in August 2014 there were almost 400,000

internally displaced people and over 50% of the population were in need of humanitarian

assistance (ICG 2013). In the capital Bangui (figure 4), in May 2014 there were reported to be

nearly 130,000 IDPs located at 43 sites in the city (MPI 2014).

The seeds for the country’s ongoing Civil War were sown in the “largely neglected” (Lombard

2013) and resource rich north of the country in 2011 with the formation of the ‘Seleka’

coalition. They were an alliance of three rebel groups united against the perceived

marginalisation of the north, as a result of increasingly ethnically bias and ‘extractive’

decisions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) from the Bozize government. After undergoing a

journey of recruitment en route to the capital and seizing power from the government once

there, a massacre ensued between the Seleka and the recently established Christian/Animist

force ‘Anti-Balaka’. Over 1000 people died in the first three weeks of 2014 (Covington 2015;

Boas 2014).

As a country that has suffered from a lack of state strength and regular domestic fighting for

decades (Conciliation Resources 2013), CAR is no stranger to fragility. After independence

from France in 1960, the country continued to be run by a series of autocratic regimes until

1993, when elections were held and Ange-Felix Patasse became president. Patasse was

overthrown in 2003 by rebel leader General François Bozize, supported by neighbouring

country Chad. Throughout Bozize’s rule, a number of institutional decisions served to isolate

the northern population, increasing Christian dominance within national government and

exacerbating inequality between the Muslim north and Christian south. This resulted in

numerous ‘bush wars’ between 2004 and 2007.



At present, CAR has installed a transitional government, with Catherine Samba-Panza as the

interim president. Violence has de-escalated, but CAR still remains extremely volatile, with

kidnappings and killings on a regular basis (Reuters 2015; Oberti 2013).

Much is currently being written of the current conflict in CAR; much of which oversimplifies

its narrative. More so than any other aspect, the conflict is portrayed as sectarian. Yet CAR

does not have a history of religious or ethnic conflict (Kane 2014). People of different faiths

have long lived in the same communities together and inter-religious marriage is common

(Oberti 2013). Instead, it seems that religion was a mobilising factor for the onset of violence

due to horizontal equalities, which formed between the Muslim-north and the Christian-

South. To a significant degree, these inequalities do not pivot around ethno-religious tensions

but political representation and national identity issues. Moreover, once violence had been

established in the capital, a pre-existing and now incredibly fragile state perpetuated societal

conditions for the continuation of violence, turning what was initially an armed struggle

motivated by grievances into a disparate set of atrocities (Guichaoua 2010).

This brief presents an in-depth and accurate report of the causes and events of the conflict in

CAR, from 2011 – April 2015. Given the pinnacle of violence occurred in the capital, much of

the contemporary analysis of the conflict will be specific to Bangui, as will policy

recommendations. Most importantly, given the country’s upcoming elections in July/August,

mass displacement, and that we find the existence of underlying institutional failures on a

fundamental level, we believe it is essential to ascertain what institutional conditions are

likely to repair the damage so that it’s possible to plot a realistic time frame on when and

how these can be achieved. The time is now to build institutional reform.

Figure 3



Figure 4



1.0 The Formation of the Seleka: Extractive by Design

Circa 2011 – January 2013

If policy can hope to further the de-escalation of violence in CAR, analysts must assess what

caused its escalation in the first place. To this effect the preconditions of the north-eastern

region, where the ‘Seleka’ were formed, are vitally important in understanding what

motivated this demographic to take up arms.

The north east of CAR had gained somewhat of a reputation under Bozize’s rule for being

"remote, neglected, and largely Muslim", as stated by Lombard, 2013. Other researchers

confirm that the region is lawless and without the provision of basic public services and

infrastructure (MSF 2014b; ICG 2013). This is no coincidence. Although the north of the

country has long been under-developed compared to the south, since Bozize’s inauguration it

has suffered from an increasing set of ‘extractive institutions’. A term borrowed from

Acemoglu and Robinson (2012), extractive institutions are ruled by a narrow elite, who adopt

policies with short-term considerations and/or for their own gains. It is a theory which says

that poor countries are not poor because of their geographies or cultures. Instead, prosperity

is determined by the incentives created by institutions. Extractive institutions generate

deterioration in almost every society in the western Common Era, however, in our case we

shall let the unfolding events in this section speak as case in point.

The decision was made by Bozize to maintain a small army, ironically, given his paranoia that

he risked being overthrown by military forces (ICG 2013). As a result, the concentration of

the country’s military power was based some 200 miles down south. Strategically, this left

the northern region open to the foreign looting of natural resources and general instability,

such as the LRA looting raid in 2008. This was also evident in the longstanding intrusion of

Sudanese poachers, armed Chadian groups and militants escaping from Darfur (ICG 2013;



Covington 2015). With no military protection these events practically necessitated the

creation of armed groups.

Perhaps the most single illustrative issue of how extractive institutional conditions

mechanised inequality between the Muslim north and Christian south are decisions

pertaining to natural resource extraction. The north – or the ‘grey zone’ - is rich in timber,

diamonds, and oil. However, its inhabitants receive little benefit from the presence of the

extraction industry. In Birao (figure 3), Bozize’s administration permitted the exploitation of

petroleum resources without including or informing the local stakeholders (Bollen 2013). The

rebel groups hoped to gain control of some of these natural resources. At the height of

violence in 2013, the Ministry of Forestry launched a bidding process for five forest

concessions covering an area of over a million hectares. The action raises concerns over

whether the outbreak of war was providing welcomed cover for some to gain further control

over natural resources (EU Forest Watch 2014).

As the ICG summarises at this point, “[Over] ten years, the [CAR] government did not

promote development” (ICG 2013 p.2) and instead took extractive decisions which

marginalised and isolated the north from the rest of the country, not to mention exposed a

significant number of the Muslim minority to a severe lack of national security.

Indeed, although the Seleka’s trajectory to the capital and their formal ideology is ill-

understood (due to a severe lack of empirical evidence), their political aspirations are broadly

reflective of these Muslim-north and Christian-south inequalities. Their demands of the

Bozize government are reactive to the extractive institutions of the Bozize government, such

as calling for greater state investment and representation for the northeast (ICG 2013).



Interestingly, some testimonies further support the existence of horizontal inequalities

between the north and south. Whilst many testimonies state that CAR is not a country with

entrenched religious division, on deeper investigation some testimonies do exist accepting

historic tension between Muslims and Christians. However, the testimonies below which

accept religious division are from Muslim citizens of the north and the testimonies that deny

are from Muslims and Christians in or near the capital:

Inequality from institutional failings further served to benefit the Seleka when mobilising

recruits along religious lines. To this effect, perhaps it is unsurprising that the group’s

ideology is so imprecise given their alliance was so notably diverse. Policies of neglect and a

tolerance for porous borders facilitated the amalgamation of foreign militants and guerilla

groups in the region and the Seleka. A notable amount of Seleka members were not CAR

citizens, but Sudanese and Chadian nationals (ICG 2013). Many joined in the hope of

benefitting from the financial gains of the rebellion (ICG 2013). ‘Foreign blood’ within the

Seleka was to later have great importance in the coming challenges and perceived threats to

national identity once in the capital. Additionally, the Bozize government’s unwillingness to

maintain a strong army impacted upon the security forces that Bozize did employ. The

military suffered long-standing mismanagement, most prominently lack of pay (ICG 2013).

Once again, poor policy-making set to further diversify the Seleka, leading ex-members of the

presidential guard and military to join with rebels in the north and eventually, the Seleka (ICG

2013).

“Muslims and Christians have lived in harmony in this country for generations,”

Public Official; UN Africa (2014).

“We grew up together, people have intermarried. Here, you can find a child with a Muslim

name in a Christian home because the father is Muslim.”

‘Bash’, Muslim resident of Bangui, aged 28; France 24 (2013)

“How many Christian holidays are national holidays in this country? Many. How many

Muslims holidays have the same status? None.”

CAR Civil Servant; UN Africa (2014).



Another example of religion as a mobilising factor is the recruitment of the Fulani ethnic

group of pastoralists. Before the CAR crisis began, pastoralism had been a source of violence

in rural areas between pastoralist and farming communities. The Fulani pastoralists were

Muslim, and had suffered hardship and conflict for decades (ICG 2014b). Loss of livestock and

the resulting impoverishment had led some pastoralists to turn to banditry in order to survive

(ICG 2014b). Young Fulani, often impoverished and alienated from traditional structures were

sympathetic towards the Seleka’s political struggle. Religion was again the quality to unite

this demographic with the Seleka.

With ex-members of the military, former critics, opportunistic foreigners, and of course

Muslim northerners, the Seleka was a diverse alliance from the get go. As the ICG (2013: 23)

aptly summarises: “the Seleka is a heterogeneous coalition of Central African and foreign

combatants who have nothing in common except being Muslims”.

A politics of extraction, exclusionary decision making and actions which served to increasingly

marginalised the north are articulated through a range of institutional and public policies

above. But to a significant degree, the inequality created from these institutional conditions

did not pivot intrinsically around ethno-religious tensions. Rather, grievances stemmed from

political representation and national identity issues. To this end, whilst religion was a

mobilising factor for the subsequent violence in the capital, it is too broad a conclusion to

surmise that the violence is therefore motivated by religious hatred.



2.0. The Anti-Balaka Formation: Nearly “never again”

March 2013 – January 2014

Some short while after the month of March 2013 the International Community narrowly

missed repeating the words “never again”, as violence erupted into genocidal proportions

reminiscent of Rwanda, in Bangui. Having quickly overthrown president Bozize on March 24th

(due to poor military defence), Seleka leader Michel Djotodia installed himself as president

and became the country’s first ever Muslim leader. This was not to mark the end of the

group’s grievance reprisals and the Seleka continued to loot, rape and kill; targeting mainly

Christian civilians.

Through qualitative analysis of testimonies, it’s apparent that the rate in which institutional

structures collapsed created a void within the conflict which could be filled by other activists,

rebels, vigilantes, anybody, in addition to the main parties of the political cleavage. With a

virtually non-existent military and the pre-emptive withdrawal of international troops after

an earlier botched peace agreement between the Seleka and the Bozize government, the

state’s collapse created conditions in which it was extremely difficult for Djotodia to control

the group and they quickly became radicalised, opportunist, and diffuse.

HRW (2013) have reported that more than 1000 houses were burnt by Seleka forces during

this period (figure 5, figure 6) and FIDH (2014) gathered testimonies for specific instances of

crimes. A source from FIDH recorded 82 cases of rape in the first month following the arrival

of the Seleka in the capital; a number which is likely to have grown considerably. Cases of

kidnappings, extortion and the forced recruitment have also been reported.



The country’s public and private assets were systematically looted in the weeks following the

coup for rogue rebels’ and war lords’ gain and the FACA and Bangui gendarmes were able to

offer no protection to the civilian population. One specific example was on 20th August 2013

when many Seleka combatants ignored direct orders from Djotodia and MICOPAX and

launched a punitive raid under the cover of a disarmament operation on Boy Rabe, an

allegedly pro-Bozizé residential district in Bangui. Many people were killed and homes looted

(ICG 2013). In the capital’s provinces where the Seleka held absolute power, humanitarian

assistance and law and order were entirely absent. FIDH (2014) reported that In Bangui, at

the time of their fact-finding mission (April 2013), only sixteen detention warrants had been

confirmed by the state prosecutor. Seleka elements actually arrested were for the most part

confined to centres for disciplinary training but escaped all forms of judicial process. In such

circumstances, the MICOPAX forces and mandate were manifestly inadequate to ensure the

population’s protection.

In this respect, the failed state did not only contribute to societal disparity but internal

splintering within the Seleka. Indeed, as some more conservative Seleka leaders have

admitted, they had been unable to ensure security and order (ICG 2013). These additional

rationales due to the state’s collapse transformed the crisis in the capital from predominantly

“They would arrive in a village and publicly kill all the men, targeting the Christians in

particular”

Journalist, Radio Centrafique; UN Africa (2014)

“They are slaughtering us like chickens”.

Appolinaire Donoboy, Christian; Telegraph (2013)

"What we see here reminds us of what we experienced in Rwanda in 1994, and we are

absolutely determined not to let 1994 happen again."

A commander of Rwandan troops representing the AU; Independent (2014)



an ideologically driven civil war into to diffuse, non-formal violence, as can be heard in

various testimonies:

As a direct response the overwhelming majority of the population had grown hateful and

fearful (ICG 2013). With the absence of state protection the Christian and Animist Bangui

citizens formed the Anti-Balaka (“invincible”) and quickly launched what were initially

‘defence’ missions, but what were swiftly understood as retribution. Only several months

after the coup, the Seleka were pushed out of the capital by the Anti-Balaka. The Anti-Balaka

continued to launch an all-out assault on the Muslim population of Bangui: from 5th

December 2013 – 26th over 1000 Muslims civilians were killed (FIDH 2014) and by the end of

mid-January the number of IDPs and refugees reportedly peaked at 958,000 (MPI 2014):

"Some military and political leaders have promoted the view that the conflict is linked to

religious differences because it furthers their aims, whether by forcing the partitioning of

the country or by helping them gain influence."

Omar Ahmed, Field Coordinator for MSF; MSF (2014a)

"Widespread poverty, inequality, exclusion and a weak State in a country with high

economic potential: these are the ingredients of the crisis in the Central African Republic,"

Abdoulaye Mar Dieye, Head of the Africa bureau at UNDP; UNDP (2015)

“The government has an obligation to control the rebels who brought it to power…without

security, the government will not be able to govern effectively or protect civilians.”

Daniel Bekele, Africa director for HRW; HRW (2014)

“They are our brothers. We are together against the Seleka.”

FACA soldiers in Bangui; IRIN (2014)

“Whether the anti-balaka (…) are pursuing a deliberate policy of ethnic cleansing or

exacting abusive collective punishment against the Muslim population [in response to the

Seleka’s atrocities], the end result is clear: the disappearance of longstanding Muslim

communities.” Peter Bouckaert: IRIN (2014)



This ‘Christian’ response to ‘Muslim violence’ and the quickness in which the conflict became

so violent have understandably been glossed as markedly ‘religious’. Instead, it seems that on

a fundamental, empirical level, the formation of the Anti-Balaka was, predominantly due to

the absence of a military or police force for protection:

The binary partitioning of the Seleka as Muslim and the Anti-Balaka as Christian is only half

the narrative, as in addition to the state’s collapse creating mass insecurity, it also created

the sustained conditions for more opportunistic members to commit violent acts such as

looting, rioting, kidnapping, and capitalising on the breakdown of vital public services. This

will be discussed further in the next section.

Figure 5

“No one helped us when the Seleka came to power. If someone comes and puts a boot on

your head and knife to your neck, what do you do? You defend yourself.”

Dieudonné, one of the founders of the Anti-Balaka; The New Yorker (2014)

“They killed our people and left our parents to be eaten by dogs. We balanced things out”

Anon, Anti-Balaka; The New Yorker (2014)

“There is no State. The national army has melted away…it’s anarchy.”

Prime Minister, Nicolas Tiangaye; FIDH (2013)



Figure 6



3.0. The contemporary analysis: Institutions, Institutions, Institutions

January 2014 – February 2015

Following the Anti-Balaka’s violent retribution in Bangui throughout December 2013,

Djotodia resigned and went into exile. By the end of January 2014, Catherine Samba-Panza

became the interim president for the new transitional government.

Over the last sixteen months, violence has deescalated in the capital. There are signs that

Bangui is on the road to recovery: inter-faith forums have been held by religious leaders and

peace agreements have been made in Brazzaville and in Nairobi. However, although the

violence has deescalated, the situation remains extremely fragile, with ongoing violence and

a lack of state control. Some Muslims are slowly returning to their homes in Bangui (Yahoo

2015), but the situation is fraught with tension. In January 2015, 15 people (including a

government minister and a UN employee) were kidnapped (IRIN 2015a). In February 2015,

elections were postponed until later this year due to the instability of the country.

The nature of the violence and the continuation of the violence can in part be attributed to

Wood’s (2008) theory of social navigation and Tilly’s analysis of ‘repertoires of violence’

(2008). Wood asserts that irregular war leads to reshaped social networks. According to

Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), irregular wars are those in which non-state combatants mingle

with civilians and rarely mass in significant numbers.

This has certainly been the case in Bangui, where violence has become diffuse and non-

formal, and it difficult to determine who is a combatant and who is a civilian. In the endless

tit-for-tat, perpetrators become victims and vice versa.

Wood (2008) states that irregular war “relies on the ongoing support of civilians...the

frequent contact with civilians implies that everyday social processes may be reshaped by

conflict (p543)”.

These social processes and networks have been dramatically altered: in a country with little

history of religious conflict, to suddenly a perceived sectarian war, the very fabric of

communities has been altered. Although the conflict has deescalated, the changed social

identities cause the violence to continue. As Wood states; “the polarisation of political



identities that frequently occurs during civil war breaks apart prewar networks, as former

neighbours are shunned and coloyalists favoured” (p549).

These changes to social networks have subsequently led to a shift in national identity. The

country risks being divided along religious lines. For CAR to move forward, Christians and

Muslims must be united once more and characterize themselves as citizens of CAR, rather

than by their religion.

As has been found throughout our analysis, the transformation of social networks and

identities has been enabled by the weak institutions of Bangui. The Bangui gendarmes are

drastically underfunded and understaffed. With the little government funds pillaged, Samba-

Panza’s transitional government has very little autonomy beyond her international support

(ICC p6). Yet this international backing has not been supportive enough. Only 67 percent of

the funding requirements for 2015 have been met. The UN agency says it will require at least

$300 million to cater to the violence (Chinafrica, 2015).

The perceived sectarian nature of the conflict by Anti-Balaka and by civilians led to

retribution against all Muslims. However, testimonies show that attacks actually tend to be

motivated by greed, not religion. In Bangui, many Muslims were previously traders and shop

owners, controlling much of the CAR's financial system (TBFF 2015). The ongoing extortion

and looting committed by the Anti-Balaka supports Hoeffler and Collier’s (2007: 589) theory

that economic variables are linked to the viability of rebellion. As they state, “opportunity as

an explanation of conflict risk is consistent with the economic interpretation of rebellion as

"[Of the Bangui gendarmes] they don't have any weapons. With what should they then

defend themselves - or the citizens of Bangui?"

‘Chris’, former resident of Bangui, displaced person in Ghana; Deutsche Welle (2015)

“French Sangaris troops often seem reluctant to intervene and told me they cannot take

sides”.

Peter Bouckaert, Emergencies Director at Human Rights Watch; HRW (2014)

“International engagement to help CAR does not go far enough”.

French political scientist Roland Marchal; Deutsche Welle (2015)



greed-motivated”. In Bangui, with almost non-existent institutions and long-standing poverty,

some Anti-Balaka use religion and retribution as an opportunity for financial gain.

“Many unemployed youths participated in the looting in the wake of the Seleka but then

joined the Anti-Balaka”. Report from ICG; (2014a)

"The ultimate cause of our instability is not religious but political, because whoever comes to

power makes his entourage commit abuses to stay in power”.

Pastor Koudougeret, a Baptist priest in the capital; HRW (2014)

This rebel-greed mechanism of course links back to weak institutions. The unemployed

youths who participated where failed by a “failed state”.

The breakdown of social networks and identities have shaped the diffuse nature of the

contemporary conflict in CAR, yet its continuation and ‘tit-for-tat’ nature can also be

attributed to Tilly’s ‘repertoires of violence’(2008). CAR, with its second transitional

government in two years, and history of despotic leaders, is caught in a cycle of violence. As

Hoover (2007, cited in Wood 2008: 547) states, the widening of repertoires of violence over

the course of conflict likely reflects “the ongoing effects of underlying mechanisms;

dehumanisation, diffusion of responsibility, habituation, and deindividuation, all of which are

likely to undermine constraints on violence”. Violence has become normalised in an

environment when civilians cannot rely on state judiciary or security forces.

To summarise, we have illustrated that micro foundational factors have shaped the nature of

the ongoing conflict in Bangui. Changes to social networks and identities have broken down

community bonds and caught civilians and combatants alike in brutal repertoires of violence,

where communities are pitted against one another. The ineffective transitional government,

and the largely neutral and delayed international support has not been conducive to

rebuilding the core institutions of the country. This has enabled the conflict to continue.

Without established gendarmes, FACA, the breakdown of society and lack of infrastructure

and state governance, the conflict is fragmented and localised, centred around social identity

change and on a broader level, national identity change. This has torn the fabric of society,



but steps are being made to mend it. It is imperative that these steps focus on strengthening

institutions.



4.0 Summary and Conclusion – A state building roadmap is urgently

needed

Overall, it has been found that the popular depiction of the crisis in CAR as sectarian is

oversimplified. Whilst it is true that violence has existed along religious lines during key

moments of the conflict, the authors have found on an empirical level, that this is indicative

of the fact that religion has been used as a mobilisation tool and not indicative of violence

motivated by religious hatred.

Specifically, religion was used successfully as a recruitment strategy by both the Seleka and

the Anti-Balaka rebel groups due to systemic institutional failures: Weak institutions created

inequality on a range of issues, most pertinently regional inequality and a lack of (human)

security. Because of this, the authors conclude that weak institutional conditions and the

subsequent collapse of the state have been the presiding factors over this ‘religious

narrative’.

To summarise:

- Religion was a mobilising factor for the onset of violence in the north of CAR due to

horizontal equalities, which formed between the Muslim-north and the Christian-South. To a

significant degree, these inequalities do not pivot around ethno-religious tensions but

political representation and national identity issues.

- Religion continued to be mobilising factor for the escalation of violence in the capital,

Bangui. To a significant degree, the diffusion of ideology within the Seleka and the formation

of the Anti-Balaka is due to the implosion of the state and its institutional structures.

- The collapse of the state has created the conditions for sustained violence, with some

still using religious tensions to mobilise, but others capitalising on the breakdown of law and

order in other ways.



Given the authors’ analysis, major institutional reform should be the goal in CAR. And how to

get there should be the priority. To repeat, having found the degree to which institutional

failings have permeated the conflict, it is imperative to re-build the state with the authors’

findings in mind. This focus need not, and should not, undermine the immediate

peacebuilding processes that are needed - such as humanitarian assistance, agricultural

infrastructure, community reconciliation programme, to name but a few - but compliment

them. That is to say, in pursuing the achievement of negative peace in CAR, particular

attention should be given to what is likely to create conditions for long-term, meaningful

institutional and political reform, as well as what will enable the democratic process of

elections in the shortest possible time.

The following recommendations are specific guidelines for how to achieve this.



5.0 Policy Recommendations

A long-standing set of weak institutions have consistently been identified as a structural

causal mechanism for the conflict in CAR. Given the upcoming elections, mass displacement

of the population, and a lack of accountable justice, the time to address these issues is now.

Building the capacities of institutions at a time when violence is still high may seem self-

serving given our analysis, but there is a real necessity in addressing the above issues

immediately, alongside addressing the negative peace.

5.1 Electoral Reform

1. Postpone elections. Many international bodies are calling for the country’s parliamentary

and presidential elections to go ahead as scheduled for this July and August (The Guardian

2015). We see this as unrealistic (owing to a tendency for the international community to

place more faith in the electoral process as a marker of stability than is always the reality)

(Deutsche Welle 2015). In addition to reform in the remits of the judiciary, security, and

constitutionality outlined below, we recommend the following be ensured prior to voting:

2. A credible peace accord needs to be signed between the Seleka and Anti-Balaka, and it is

essential that the transitional government are involved in the negotiations. In recent peace

negotiations in Nairobi, the transitional government were excluded (one government

minister termed the Nairobi accord a 'non-event' (Bloomberg 2015). For any peace

agreement to have legitimacy in CAR, all three actors must be involved and have

international backing

3. As soon as possible, and with support of the international community, implement the

measures required to establish the required documents for a pluralist, free, transparent

election process, in particular recreating civil registry records and reliable electoral lists (IRIN

2015c).

4. Ensure participation of refugees and displaced persons in the elections.

5. Propose to the political parties a charter on principles and responsible conduct for the

elections (FIDH 2013).



6. Channel a greater proportion of overseas aid to support the electoral process. The National

Election Authority (ANE) had a 20 billion CFA deficit as of February 2015. Urge the European

Union to fulfil their pledge of 20 million euros in January 2015 as soon as possible.

5.2 Security Reform

1. National security must be prioritised over the current short-termism electoral process. The

collapse of the state and security (real and perceived) created the conditions for sustained

violence and will continue to do so if unresolved, undermining the democratic process of

voting and increasing the likelihood of the re-escalation of violence. In particular, we

recommend the following actions:

2. Urgently bolster the number of peacekeeping troops by implementing the African Union

Peace and Security Council’s July 19, 2013, decision to protect civilians, restore security and

public order, and create the necessary security conditions for the provision of humanitarian

assistance and electoral process (IRIN 2015c).

3. Deploy the additional 1030 MINUSCA soldiers and police, as outlined in a letter from the UN

Secretary General, as soon as possible (VOA 2015).

4. Ensure that the African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic

(AFISM-CAR) has the logistical and financial support to fulfil a mandate for achieving the pre-

conditions for the country’s electoral process outline above.

5. Continue to re-claim areas controlled by Seleka strongholds; especially in the east and the

north of the country. Seleka troops have prevented the National Election Authority (ANE)

from setting up offices in those areas (and in one case even briefly abducted officials who

were trying to raise public awareness of the election process.) In all, the ANE has opened 83

of a planned 141 offices across the country. Creating conditions to allow for the opening of

the additional 58 ANE offices should be a priority of peacekeeping forces in these areas (IRIN

2015c).

6. Work alongside the judicial process to continue a thorough vetting process of the national

military and police forces, excluding individuals who have committed human rights abuses.



7. Put in place measures to prevent harassment or intimidation by Seleka and Anti-Balaka

members of any potential witnesses in future investigations at the ‘hybrid’ court, outlined

below.

8. Ensure all police and soldiers are receiving a regular and adequate salary, and enforce a zero

tolerance policy on looting (HRW 2013).

9. With logistical and financial backing from the International Community, increase the

number of police personnel being trained - particularly on the basic rules of international

humanitarian law - from 300 - 600; currently being facilitated by the ICRC (2014).

5.3 Judiciary Reform

1. Justice and Accountability should be prioritised in tandem with the above security proposals

in order to ensure credibility of any future administrations and restore community relations.

In particular, we recommend the following actions:

2. Establish the creation of a ‘hybrid’ tribunal as soon as possible, compromising of both CAR

citizens and international partners, as recommended by Amnesty International and backed by

the UN. This court would not prevent cases being prosecuted by the International Criminal

Court (ICC), which has already conducted a preliminary examination of the situation on the

ground. AU and ICC do not hold the strongest relationship, though there appears to be a

great deal of promise in establishing such a tailored, country-specific response to mass

violence in CAR, combining the strengths of the ad hoc tribunals with the benefits of local

prosecutions. Without the ICC’s direct involvement, financial assistance would be required.

3. Channel a greater proportion of overseas aid to support judicial reformation and processes,

in particular the aforementioned hybrid court.

4. The hybrid court and the ICC should work with peacekeeping forces to ensure that Seleka

and Anti-Balaka fighters found responsible for serious human rights abuses are not

reintegrated into (or allowed to join) the national army and are not given other official

positions within the government.



5. The hybrid court and the ICC should assist MINUSCA in implementing and coordinating the

proposed community based DDR programme.

6. Channel a greater proportion of overseas aid to support the IOM’s cash-for-work

programme in Bangui and encourage cross-communication between the IOM’s programme

team and the UNDP’s work based project team. According to Colonel Kalle Seppala of the EU

force, the former has helped reduce violence in the capital (IRIN 2015b).

7. Issue a public broadcast via radio that the government will not tolerate attacks on civilians

and will hold accountable anyone found responsible for murder, rape, pillage, and other

serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law.

9. The government of Chad should investigate and publish findings into allegations of Chadian

involvement with and/or support to the Seleka. If evidence of Chadian involvement is

discovered, ensure this activity ceases immediately (HRW 2013).

5.4 Constitutional Reform

1. Long-term vision when achieving negative peace should also focus on major constitutional

reform, as well as electoral. In working towards this, the following are recommended in

particular:

2. Examine the responsibilities of the former Bozize government and the ex-Seleka political and

military leaders with regard to their alleged responsibility for war crimes committed, starting

with ex-president Michel Djotodia and François Bozizé.

3. The transitional government and international agencies should work with the International

Organization for Migration to conduct a nationwide IDP return intention survey, especially in

the northern regions. Whilst 60% of IDPs in the capital indicated their intention to return to

their place of origin, the number and intention of IDP’s outside of the capital remains largely

unknown (FIDH 2014).



4. Humanitarian assistance should be provided to enable IDPs in CAR to return to their

communities, once the above security conditions have been achieved. This could include

guarded convoys and safe routes for the IDPs to return.

3. Regional and ethnic representation should be ensured at the legislative and national level:

Following an initial peace agreement, a road-map to political reform should be drafted by the

transitional government, key political figures and overseen by the UN. Inter-faith dialogue in

relation to political transformation should form a key composition of these discussions.

4. Constitutional amendments made by Bozize in 2003 should, where necessary, be re-

considered during the above political discussions.

5. Peacekeepers and international bodies must continue to limit themselves to law and order

operations, encouraging political dialogue and reconciliation where it is considered objective to

do so.

6. Undertaking an electoral process should remain the priority over long-term constitutional

reform, however a cross-party consensus should be reached considering a referendum on

whether to become a semi-federal state by the next parliamentary and presidential elections.



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