cdc dec 2015 - strengthening a culture of laboratory safety
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CDC PUBLIC HEALTH GRAND ROUNDS
December 15, 2015
Strengthening a Culture of Laboratory Safety
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Evolution of Laboratory Safety Standards
Steve Monroe, PhDAssociate Director for Laboratory Science and Safety
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
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Origins of Laboratory Science at CDC
1942 Malaria Control in War Areas 1943 Communicable Disease Center 1970 Center for Disease Control1992 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
Origins of Laboratory Science at CDC
PHIL ID 17644, 13150cdc.gov/about/history/ourstory.htm
Dr. Joseph W. Mountin Class of state laboratory personnel at the Communicable Disease Center
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Current Scope of Laboratory Science at CDC
CDC's laboratory work now includes: Infectious diseases Noninfectious diseases Environmental health Occupational health Laboratory systems (e.g. standards, quality guidelines)
PHIL ID 10727, 14235
Viral Special Pathogens Branch
Tobacco and Volatiles Branch
Infectious Diseases Pathology Branch
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Current Scope of Laboratory Science at CDC
Outbreak investigations Emergency response Population health studies Laboratory quality improvement Advanced Molecular Detection
PHIL ID 19381, 19896
Genetic studies Biomonitoring Vaccine development Pathogen discovery Newborn screening
Poxvirus and Rabies Branch
Newborn Screening and Molecular Biology Branch
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
www.cdc.gov/amdwww.cdc.gov/cdcgrandrounds/archives/2013/december2013.htm
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Present-Day Scope of Laboratory Science at CDC
Over 2,000 laboratory staff Laboratory Staff Biologists Chemists Veterinarians Engineers Medical technologists Biosafety experts Quality managers
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Over 2,000 laboratory staff
Present-Day Scope of Laboratory Science at CDC
Over 150 laboratory groups
Biosafety Level (BSL)BSL-1:
Low potential of disease and risk to environment
BSL-2: Moderate potential of disease
and risk to environment BSL-3:
Serious or potentially lethal disease after inhalation
BSL-4: High risk of disease through
aerosol exposure, causing severe to fatal illness with no vaccine or treatment available
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Present-Day Scope of Laboratory Science at CDC
Over 150 laboratory groups
Over 200 infectious pathogens
Pathogens Viruses Bacteria Parasites Fungi Prions (infectious agents
composed of misfolded protein)
Over 2,000 laboratory staff
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Present-Day Scope of Laboratory Science at CDC
Over 150 laboratory groups
Over 200 infectious pathogensOver 2,000 laboratory staff
Over 5,000 samples processed per day
PHIL ID 10032
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Safety standards change as new information becomes available
Laboratory Safety Standard Evolution
PHIL ID 9770, 12155
A scientist in 1943 works with potentially dangerous chemicals without modern personal protective equipment (PPE)
Two scientists in 1967 using practices no longer considered
appropriate today
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Laboratory Safety Standard Evolution
Evolving Practices
PHIL ID 13342, 8675
A scientist works with infectious influenza virus without modern personal
protective equipment (PPE)
Today, scientists use biological safety cabinets (BSC) and
powered air purifying respirators (PAPR) when working with highly pathogenic avian influenza virus
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2014 Laboratory Safety Incidents
“What we’re seeing is a pattern that we missed, and the pattern is an insufficient culture of safety.”
– Dr. Thomas Frieden, Director, CDC
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2014 Laboratory Safety Incidents
Incident
Problem
Solution
Improper inactivation
Cross-contamination
Sample misidentification
Separation and quality
testing
Color-coded sample
identifier
InfluenzaAnthrax Ebola
Inactivation protocols reviewed
agency-wide
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
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2014 Laboratory Safety Incidents
Incident
Problem
Solution
Improper inactivation
Cross-contamination
Sample misidentification
Separation and quality
testing
Color-coded sample
identifier
InfluenzaAnthrax Ebola
Inactivation protocols reviewed
agency-wide
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
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2014 Laboratory Safety Incidents
Incident
Problem
Solution
Improper inactivation
Cross-contamination
Sample misidentification
Separation and quality
testing
Color-coded sample
identifier
InfluenzaAnthrax Ebola
Inactivation protocols reviewed
agency-wide
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
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2014 Laboratory Safety Incidents
Incident
Problem
Solution
Improper inactivation
Cross-contamination
Sample misidentification
Separation and quality
testing
Color-coded sample
identifier
InfluenzaAnthrax Ebola
Inactivation protocols reviewed
agency-wide
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
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Changes Implemented at CDC in Response to External Review Findings
Established clear laboratory leadership Provide scientific, technical, and managerial guidance to enhance
science, safety and quality Advocate for laboratory science within the agency
Revised laboratory competency training Laboratory Safety Training Board to develop and update courses
to support a standardized, competency based CDC curriculum Creating a “CDC Way” of performing risk assessments Pursuing external accreditation
Identify best practices for broad QMS implementation across CDC Clarified incident notification
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/laboratory-safety-workgroup/workgroup.htmlQMS: Quality Management Systems
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New Laboratory Science and Safety Leadership
Vision Make CDC labs the gold standard
for scientific excellence and safety Goals
Leadership Policy and compliance Communication and collaboration Laboratory improvement Training
ACTTTTCAACTTTTTAATAGATTTTTCGGGCGTGTACTTTTATTTTATTTTCTTTTATTTTATTTTCTTTTAGTTTCTTTTATTTATTTTATTTTATTTTATATTCGATTTTATTTATTATTATTTTTCCGTTTTAGGTGTATAGAGTCGTAAGTACATGTGTTTTTGTTATATTTATAGTTTTGATAAACATTGTCGTATTGAATATATATATATATATATATTTATTTATATAGGTATATATAATATTTTTTTAATATGATAATTCAAATAGATAGAGAAAAATTAGATTTATTTATTTTTCCTTGATTATTTTTATCCATTTATGTTTTCGTATTTAAGTTCATTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTTATTTTATTTTATTTAATTAGAAGAGAATATATTACGAATGAGAATTATATGGAAAAATGAGTTCATTAATAAATTCGCTACTATTTAATGGTTTTATAAAAAAGAAAGAAAATAAAAATGAAGAAAAACAAAATAAAAAAGATATACAAAATAATGAGAGTAATAGTAAATTTGATGAAATAAATATGAACAATCTCTCGAGAAGGGAAAGCAAGGAAAGGATAAACAACAATAATGAGAATAA
OADLSSOffice of the Associate Director for Laboratory Science and Safety
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/index.html
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Laboratory Leadership Service
LLS: Laboratory Leadership Servicecdc.gov/lls/
Mission Develop future public health laboratory leaders who integrate
laboratory safety and quality as a principal standard of practice in every facet of their work
Laboratory Leadership Service Principles Integrate safety and quality
into laboratory science Provide training through service Promote applied public health
laboratory research Produce future public health
laboratory leadersInaugural LLS Fellowship Class of 2015
2020
Risk Assessment Process
Reinforcing the CDC Way of Risk Assessment
Identify hazards
Evaluate risk
Mitigate risk
Conduct procedure
Reassess risk
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Reinforcing the CDC Way of Risk Assessment
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
Identify Hazards
Evaluate Risk
Mitigate Risk
Conduct Procedure
Reassess Risk
Before Ensure research benefits outweigh the risks Explore safer alternatives Use of non-pathogenic strains
Predict potential problems
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Reinforcing the CDC Way of Risk Assessment
Identify Hazards
Evaluate Risk
Mitigate Risk
Conduct Procedure
Reassess Risk
During Have a contingency plan Prompt notification of
incidents and near misses
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
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Reinforcing the CDC Way of Risk Assessment
Identify Hazards
Evaluate Risk
Mitigate Risk
Conduct Procedure
Reassess Risk
After Use lessons learned Reassess the risk
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
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Reinforcing the CDC Way of Risk Assessment
Identify Hazards
Evaluate Risk
Mitigate Risk
Conduct Procedure
Reassess Risk
Before Ensure research benefits outweigh the risks Explore safer alternatives Use of non-pathogenic strains
Predict potential problemsDuring Have a contingency plan Prompt notification of
incidents and near missesAfter Use lessons learned Reassess the risk
cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/reports-updates.html
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Conclusions
Laboratories and lab scientists are essential to all aspects of public health
CDC laboratories have a unique scope of work CDC laboratory science has the opportunity for
improvement in safety and quality of work Risk assessment is critical at the agency, individual
laboratory, and worker level
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Quality, Safety and Public Health Impact of Laboratory Science: A Case Study
Conrad P. Quinn, PhDChief, Meningitis and Vaccine Preventable Diseases Branch
Division of Bacterial DiseasesNational Center for Immunization and Respiratory Diseases
Office of Infectious Diseases
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Designed, managed, analyzed, and reported under CDC sponsored Investigational New Drug application
Why CDC? High public trust No conflict of interest Quality of science
Comprehensive and collaborative Laboratory scientists Clinical practitioners Statisticians Academics Interagency partners
The CDC Anthrax Vaccine Research Program:A Congressional Mandate
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Regulatory compliant Good Clinical Practice
(cGCP) Good Laboratory
Practice (cGLP) Quality assured
laboratory data Data submission to FDA
Manufacturer’s supplemental BLA
Basis for regulatory action
The CDC Anthrax Vaccine Research Program: A First for CDC
FDA: Food and Drug Administration BLA: Biologics License Application
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The Laboratory Component
Microbial Pathogenesis and Immune Response (MPIR) laboratory Established February 2001 Laboratory support to AVRP To build human clinical
trials capability Expertise of Anthrax
disease development Build and apply a customized QMS
CLIA, ISO-9000, 21 CFR Part 58, CDC Quality and safety are integral and inseparable
Regulatory compliant methods validation—ICH QMS controlled and monitored processes and procedures
AVRP: Anthrax Vaccine Research ProgramQMS: Quality Management SystemCLIA: Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments
ISO-9000: International Organization for Standardization-9000CFR: Code of Federal RegulationsICH: International Conference on Harmonization
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Embracing a Culture of Laboratory Quality and Safety from Day 1
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An Effective QMS Encourages Public Trust in CDC Science and Recommendations
Team development was guided by Recognition that high public trust in CDC was an earned privilege Functional structure Specialized staff for specialized activities
Safety and quality management Specimen management Data management Laboratory science
QMS documented evidence Processes and procedures Competent and proficient Primary record data
QMS: Quality Management System
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An Investment of Leadership and Management
Ensure support from management
Create the proper environment
Craft a strategy Lead by example
ISO: International Organization for StandardsVerma U. www.slideshare.net/mtaram/total-quality-management-presentation-949360linkedin.com/pulse/20141106190850-228512303-the-role-of-leadership-in-total-quality-management-tqm
“Perfection is not attainable,but if we chase perfectionwe can catch excellence”
– Vince Lombardi
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What Leaders Must Understand First
What does the project I am leading involve?
What are the benefits from success?
Who benefits from success?
What does my team need to succeed?
Facilities and safety Organization Personnel
Equipment
Purchasing and
inventory
Process control
Information management
Documents and records
Customer service
Assessment Occurrence management
Continuous improvement
The Quality Essentials
Flaherty C. wwwn.cdc.gov/cliac/pdf/Addenda/cliac0208/Addendum%20T.pdf
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What Gets Measured, Gets Done
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Leaders Should Designate ResourcesBased on Initial Assessment
Make investments that are Tangible Sustainable
Develop assets including Personnel
Roles and responsibilities Training Skillsets
Equipment Reagent standards Quality controls Standardized technologies
Data reduction and analysis
Soroka SD, Schiffer JM, Semenova VA, et al. Biologicals: 2010; 38(6): 675-683.
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Resources Must be Valued and Protected
People are our most valuable resource Practice accountability and empowerment Know where you fit Own what you do Establish study-specific role descriptions Maintain training and competency records
Protecting our state of the art facilities and equipment Perform preventative
equipment maintenance Monitor performance Manage facilities and equipment
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Quality Management Systems (QMS):Building on Existing Expertise
Implementation of enterprise level LIMS Specimen and data
management Study data management,
analysis and reporting Specimen and critical
reagent inventory Use existing agency
expertise Specimen barcoding CASPIR inventory Information management Facilities management
LIMS: Laboratory Information Management SystemCASPIR: CDC/ATSDR Specimen Packaging, Inventory and Repository
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Quality and Safety are Integrally Linked
i.ensohaber.com/resimler/galeri/komik_bebekler_7.jpg
Quality managers, safety liaisons, and team members should engage in Developing
risk assessments Managing content Controlling documents Monitoring compliance
Requirements Frequency Competency
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Laboratories Should Train With Intent
A core safety training curriculum is critical Train like you fight,
fight like you train What training do I need?
Know where I fit Set clear expectations
What am I trained to do? Defined curriculum Defined outcomes
How do I know I am trained? Competency based outcome
and proficiency measures
medium.com/homeland-security/train-like-you-fight-and-fight-like-you-train-1787c0b78fde#.mctsiqn31origami.about.com/od/History-Of-Origami/a/Akira-Yoshizawa-Origami-Biography.htm
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Documenting Safety and the Quality of Science
Document control system Laboratory risk
assessments Process linked Biological and chemical hazards Risk mitigation and response
Event and incident reporting Root cause analysis Impact assessment Corrective action Preventative action
CDC MPIR-6001 Laboratory Risk AssessmentCDC MPIR-6005 Chemical Risk AssessmentCDC MPIR-7075 Event Reporting Form
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Validated Science Adds Value and Confidence
Documented validation Defined performance characteristics Established acceptable measures
of confidence and uncertainty Data management
Traceable Transparent Reliable
Secure reporting Evidence-based interpretation
pH1N1 Hemagglutination Inhibition Assay and Statistical Analysis System-generated data report
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Be Flexible
“Effective leadership isputting first things first.Effective management isdiscipline, carrying it out”
– Stephen Covey
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The Plan–Do–Check–Act Cycle
A process for implementing change Plan: Recognize an opportunity and plan a change Do: Test the change – start small Check: Review, analyze, and identify lessons learned Act: Take action based on lessons learned Repeat: Promotes continuous improvement
Set targets – quality indicators Measure progress Adapt to improve
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AVRP Demonstrates that Attention to Quality and Safety Does Not Compromise Productivity
Laboratory tests for diagnosis and patient management
Analysis models for immune correlates of protection
A basis for regulatory action More than 70 laboratory
specific publications More than 10 Patents Nine Shepard Award
nominations
Marano N, Plikaytis BD, Martin SW, et al. JAMA. 2008;300(13):1532-1543.Wright JG, Plikaytis BD, Rose CE, et al. Vaccine. 2014;32(8): 1019-1028. Schiffer JM, Chen L, Dalton S, et al. Vaccine. 2015;33(31): 3709-3716. AVRP: Anthrax Vaccine Research Program
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A Congressional Mandate Fulfilled
A first for the anthrax vaccine Only data-driven changes in AVA use in 38 years
Improved safety profile – 2008 Change to intramuscular injection route Reduction in frequency, severity and duration of
injection site adverse events Simplified regimen – 2012
Reduction in priming series to 3 doses IM Protection in 6 months
Correlates of protection in humans Application of the Animal Rule
sBLA for booster schedule reduction – 2016
AVA: anthrax vaccine adsorbedIM: intramuscularsBLA: Supplemental Biologics License ApplicationWright JG, Quinn CP, Shadomy S, et al. MMWR. 2010:59(6):1–36.
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MPIR Laboratory Contributions to Enhancing Research and Collaboration
Emergency response capacity Anthrax letter attacks of 2001 Pandemic H1N1 response contributions 2009 STRIVE and Phase 1 Ebola vaccine studies Laboratory surge capacity
Expertise PEP anthrax vaccine optimization Pertussis and bacterial meningitis
Technology Methods development and technology transfer Emergency response laboratory capability
Reputation Associated funding Research-base expansion
Agrawal A, Lingappa J, Leppla SH. et al. Nature. 2003;424:329-334. Veguilla V, Hancock K, Schiffer J, et al. Journal of Clinical Microbiology. 2011;49(6):2210-2215.Fay MP, Follmann DA, Lynn F, et al. Science translational medicine. 2012;4(151):151ra126.MPIR: Microbial Pathogenesis and Immune ResponseSTRIVE: Sierra Leone Trial to Introduce a Vaccine against EbolaPEP: post-exposure prophylaxis
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Inspire Your Team
Recognize the value your team contributes to quality, safety, and public health or patient impact
Share the vision you see for what the laboratory team can accomplish, and how it can best achieve its goals
Articulate the importance of attention to safety and quality best practices Catch people being good—recognize exemplary practices and
performers
Continue to improve
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Embracing a Culture of Quality and Safety
“Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other time.”
— Barack Obama
“The illiterate of the 21st century will not bethe person who cannot read. It will be thosewho cannot learn, unlearn and relearn.”
— Alvin Toffler
blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/files/2013/07/obama-best.jpgupload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e1/Alvin_Toffler_02.jpg
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Establishing a Culture of Safety in an Academic Research Institution: Teaching Safety to Scientists
Joseph Kanabrocki, PhD, NRCM(SM)Associate Vice-President of Research Safety
Professor of Microbiology
University of ChicagoChair, External Laboratory Safety Workgroup, CDC
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Building A Culture of Responsible Science
People Provide leadership and support at all levels, especially high levels Develop and track training needs Support development of laboratory professionals
Institutional infrastructure and oversight Use institutional controls to assess and monitor risk Improve biosafety procedures Encourage reporting of incidents
Knowledge, awareness, and communication Engage broader community Increase awareness through multiple media
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Leadership and Governance for Lab Safety at the University of Chicago
University of ChicagoPresident
VP Research
Associate Vice-President of Research Safety,Office of Research Safety established 2014
VP Finance and Administration
AVP Safety and Security
Director, Environmental Health and Safety
Provost
Research Safety Policy Council
AVP: Associate Vice-President
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University of ChicagoOffice of Research Safety
Provost’sResearch
Safety Policy Council
Environmental Health and
Safety
AVP Research
Safety
Office of Research Safety Department Administrator
IT and Training Coordinator
Research Safety Fellow
Biosafety• Biosafety Officer/ARO
(PhD Microbiology) DURC Admin.
• Biosafety Officer/ARO(PhD Microbiology)
• Biosafety Officer(PhD Cell & Molecular Biology, MBA)
• H.T. Ricketts LaboratoryBiosafety Officer/ARO (IH)
Lab Compliance• Director, Regulatory
Compliance for Lab Programs (IBC, IACUC, DURC)
• 3 IBC/IACUCAdministrators
Chemical Safety• 2 Chemical Safety Officers (PhD Chemistry)
Radiation and Laser Safety
• Radiation and LaserSafety Officer
• Administrative Ass’t• 3 Health Physicists• Laser SafetySpecialist
AVP: Associate Vice-President IBC: Institutional Biosafety CommitteeIACUC: Institutional Animal Use and Care CommitteeDURC: Dual Use Research of ConcernARO: Alternate Responsible Official
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Risk Assessments:Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC)
IBC is responsible for all life-sciences research protocols at University of Chicago Review and approval Surveillance
Review the use of biohazardous materials including Recombinant DNA Infectious agents
Humans Animals Plants
Biological toxins
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Laboratory Safety Training
Laboratory safety training designed to meet needs of personnel working on research Training requirements dictated by research description as
detailed in IBC protocol Variety of courses, matched to protocol needs
Bloodborne Pathogens for Research Staff BSL1 and rDNA BSL2 and rDNA Viral Vectors Biological Toxins Human Gene Transfer (in development) Chemical Hygiene
IBC: Institutional Biosafety CommitteeBSL: Biosafety LevelrDNA: recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid
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Cognitive and Practical Biosafety Educationfor the Host-Pathogen Investigator
Intensive 4-day course Basic BSL3 lab safety, PPE, and respiratory protection Decontamination and disinfection History of biodefense programs, biologic toxins,
biosecurity, and dual-use research Emergency response Epidemiology of lab-acquired infections Risk assessment of:
Recombinant DNA and pathogenic microorganisms Laboratory animals and exposure Vivarium and zoonoses
BSL: Biosafety LevelPPE: Personal protective equipment
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Cognitive and Practical Biosafety Education for Host-Pathogen Investigators
Learning How to Prepare to Enter Laboratory Environment
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Cognitive and Practical Biosafety Education for Host-Pathogen Investigators
Learning how to put on personal protective equipment to enter BSL3 laboratory
BSL: Biosafety Level
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Working with First Responders to Improve Understanding Risks in Laboratory Setting
First responders from the Argonne National Labs being shown laboratory work environment
www.anl.gov/
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Responding to Ebola: Training Healthcare Workers How to Don and Doff PPE
Ebola PPE protocol for healthcare workers similar to those used by laboratory workers
Biosafety personnel rapidly developed training for proper use of PPE, clinical procedures, decontamination
PPE: Personal protective equipment PAPR: Powered air purifying respirators
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Shaping the Future: GLRCE Biosafety Research Fellow Program
One fellow per year in-residence program NIH stipend, plus benefits
Fellows support biosafety and IBC activities, with primary focus on laboratory and research safety IBC protocol review and risk assessment Select Agent Program management Laboratory inspections, including external inspections (USDA, CDC, FAA) Training BSL3 facility operations and maintenance Emergency spill response Export controls/DURC program and material transfer agreements
GLRCE: Great Lakes Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases ResearchIBC: Institutional Biosafety CommitteeUSDA: U.S. Department of AgricultureFAA: Federal Aviation AdministrationDURC: Dual-Use Research of Concern
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Additional Experience for GLRCE Biosafety Research Fellows
Fellows are expected to participate in applied biosafety research
Fellows are encouraged to take advantage of resources and projects conducted at the H.T. Ricketts Laboratory (NIAID Regional Biocontainment Laboratory)
Fellows attend and present at national and regional meetings
Fellows prepare and sit for certification exams National Registry of Certified Microbiologists (NRCM) and
Specialist in Microbiology (SM)
GLRCE: Great Lakes Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases ResearchNIAID: National institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases
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Using Applied Biosafety Research to Improve Safety and Facilitate Research
Two previously established University of Chicago autoclave standard operating procedures Non-spore-formers: 40-min cycle at 121oC Spore-formers (B. anthracis): 180-min cycle at 121oC
Study found 40-min cycle safely decontaminates all infectious waste
generated at H.T. Ricketts Laboratory (HTRL) Effective regardless of whether spores are in moist or dry waste Reproducible using several different types of bacteria
New SOP with reduced autoclave times Approved by IBC Increased efficiency and safety of operations
SOP: Standard Operating ProcedureIBC: Institutional Biosafety CommitteeHelm RA. Unpublished data, reviewed by University of Chicago Institutional Biosafety Committee.
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GLRCE Programmatic Legacy and Direct Impact: Biosafety Fellows
Previous fellows now work in key laboratory safety positions with various organizations including Universities
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Northwestern University University of Chicago-Hyde Park University of Cincinnati University of Illinois at Chicago University of Nebraska-Lincoln Washington University in St Louis
Research Institutes Governmental Agencies (DHS)
GLRCE: Great Lakes Regional Center of Excellence for Biodefense and Emerging Infectious Diseases ResearchDHS: Department of Homeland Security
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Incident Reporting Is Encouraged:Multiple Reporting Pathways Established
IBC: Institutional Biosafety Committee
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Code of Conduct Includes Reporting Incidents
Heightens awareness Reinforces importance of safety Employees are required to
sign annually
HTRL: H.T. Ricketts Laboratory
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Services Provided by University of Chicago Office of Research Safety
“How do we get investigators to even know we exist?”
“How do we get investigators to realize we are here to help?”
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Communication and Outreachto Frontline Laboratory Workers
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Clever Posters Designed to Increase Awareness
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… and Reinforce Good Behavior
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How to Strengthen A Culture of Lab Safety
Leadership at high levels UC – Office of Research Safety CDC – Office of the Associate Director for Laboratory Science
and Safety Developing future leaders
UC – GLRCE Biosafety Research Fellows CDC – Laboratory Leadership Service
Review mechanisms for lab safety UC – Institutional Biosafety Committee CDC – Laboratory Safety Review Board
Engaging and proactive communication
UC: University of Chicago
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Questions?
Selected CDC Pathogen and Toxin Discoveries
Lychee Nut Toxin2009 pandemic H1N1 Influenza
Carcinogens in SmokeSARS
Legionella
Bourbon Virus
Akhmeta Virus
PHIL ID 14542, 11215, 15530, 11152, 19479
For more information about CDC Laboratory Safetywww.cdc.gov/about/lab-safety/index.html